ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF BUDDHISM

VOLUME IV

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Volume IV

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PREFACE

The compilation of the Encyclopaedia of Buddhism was inaugurated by the Government of Sri Lanka in 1955, under the editorship of Dr. G. P. Malalasekera, in connection with the celebration of the Buddha Jayanti, the 2500th Anniversary of the Buddhist Era. Initially, the vision of the work, as indicated in the preface to the first volume of the Encyclopaedia, was to 'include information on the doctrines of Buddhism and their growth, the story of their spread and expansion, accounts of the numerous Buddhist schools and sects and of their origins and subsequent ramifications, descriptions of Buddhist rites and ceremonies as found in many countries, the history of the fine arts—painting and sculpture, music, dance and drama—under the influence of Buddhism in various countries, details of Buddhist shrines and places of pilgrimage and of the vast literatures connected with Buddhism which developed in many languages, both ancient and modern, in original works as well as in translations, and biographies of persons, who in the course of Buddhist history, played important roles in their own countries and made contributions to the development of Buddhist culture'.

As a result of an overall survey of the work on the Encyclopaedia, attempted and accomplished so far, and in consequence of the recognition of the interest shown in the field of Buddhism by students hailing from diverse disciplines like psychology, sociology and philosophy, the conviction has been gained that inspite of the vastness of the scope of the project, this pioneer work must be completed within a reasonable length of time.

With this end in view, the Editorial Board has reorganised the work on the Encyclopaedia. The primary need today is a basic encyclopaedia, introducing Buddhism as a World Religion in its historical perspective. It is important to know, first and foremost, the original teachings of Gotama, the Buddha, and what they meant to the world then and their relevance today, despite the changing moods and structure of society. Therefore, it is proposed to begin where possible, with the words of the Buddha, before highlighting the variations to the theme introduced by the subsequent Masters of the Buddhist schools. Pursuing the course of Buddhism through the ages, history and civilization and development of thought are presented in due order.

In this process of being selective in order to get our emphasis right, it has also become necessary to leave out of this Encyclopaedia names of places and persons which are less historical and more legendary. It would be futile, for instance, to reproduce herein the entire gamut of Brahmadattas or Visakhas, adequately treated in a work like the *Dictionary of Pali Proper Names*. For many such references in Buddhist Sanskrit literature the reader could conveniently be referred to the *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary*. Names of Buddhist texts in Chinese, Tibetan etc. which are only known through entries in lexicons are also left out for the same reason. It is intended that the Encyclopaedia of Buddhism would thereby be saved from being an encyclopaedia of proper names, of persons and places, and would serve instead the required purpose of being an encyclopaedia of concepts of Buddhist doctrine, philosophy and civilization.

Ministry of Cultural Affairs,
212, Bauddhaloka Mawatha,
Colombo 7.

JOTIYA DHIRASEKERS
Editor-in-Chief

ABBREVIATIONS

A.	..	Aṅguttara Nikāya, I–VI, ed. R. Morris, E. Hardy, C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *PTS.* 1885–1910
AA.	..	Aṅguttaranikāya Aṭṭhakathā, (Manorathapūraṇī), I–V, ed. M. Walleser, H. Kopp, *PTS.* 1924–56
AAWG.	..	Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen
Abhd.	..	Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti, ed. P. S. Jaini, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. IV, Patna, 1959
AbhK.	..	Abidharmakośa (Nāgari characters), ed. R. Sankrityayana, Banaras, 1930
AbhKbh.	..	Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, ed. Th. Stcherbatsky, *BB.* XX, 1930
AbhKk.	..	Abhidharmakośakārikā, ed. L. de la Vallee Poussin, Paris, 1931
AbhKvy.	..	Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, ed. U. Wogihara, Tokyo, 1932–36
Abhs.	..	Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids, *JPTS.* 1884, pp. 1–48
AbhsS.	..	Abhidharmārthasaṃgrahasanna - ya, ed. T. Paññamoli Tissa. Peliyagoda (Ceylon), 1897
Abhsv.	..	Abhidhammattha-saṃgaha-vibhāvinī-ṭīkā
Abhsy.	..	Abhidharmasamuccaya, ed. P. Pradhan, *VBS.* 12, 1950
Abhv.	..	Abhidhammatthavikāsinī, ed. A. P. Buddhadatta, Maradana (Ceylon), 1961
Abhvt.	..	Abhidhammāvatāra, ed. A. P. Buddhadatta, *BM.* 1, 1915
ABIA.	..	Annual Bibliography of Indian Archæology, Kern Institute
ABORI.	..	Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (Poona)
AbsPuś.	..	Abhisamayālaṃkāraprajñāpāramitā-upadeśaśāstra (Sanskrit text and Tibetan translation), ed. Th. Stcherbatsky and E. Obermiller, *BB.* XXIII, 1929
AbsPvy.	..	Abhisamayālaṃkārâlokaprajñāpāramitāvyākhyā, ed. U. Wogihara, Tokyo, 1932–35
AdhP.	..	Adhyardhaśatikāprajñāpāramitā, ed. H. Loumann, Strassburg, 1912
Akanuma 1	..	Akanuma, C.: Indo-Bukkyō, Koyūmeishi-Jiten (Dictionary of Buddhist Indian Proper Names), Nagoya, 1931
Akanuma 2	..	Akanuma, C. : Kam-pa Shibu Agon Goshōroku (The Comparative Catalogue of Chinese Āgamas and Pali Nikāyas), Nagoya, 1929
AKM.		Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, herausg. von der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft
Alamp.	..	Ālambanaparīkṣā, *WZKM.* Vol. XXXIX, pp. 247–85
AM.	..	Asia Minor
AMG.	..	Annales du Musée Guimet
Anāgv.	..	Anāgatavaṃsa, ed. J. Minayeff, *JPTS.* 1886, p. 33 ff.
Anesaki.	..	Anesaki, M. : The Four Buddhist Āgamas in Chinese, 1908
AO.	..	Archiv Orientální : Journal of the Czechoslovak Oriental Institute
Ap.	..	Apadāna. I–II, ed. M. E. Lilley, *PTS.* 1925–27
ApA.	..	Apadāna Aṭṭhakathā (Visuddhajanavilāsinī), C. E. Godakumbura, *PTS.* 1954
ArtA.	..	Artibus Asiae (Ascona, Switzerland)
Arvś.	..	Arthaviniścaya, ed. A. Ferrari, Rome, 1944
AS.	..	Aluvihāra Series (Colombo)
ASCAR.	..	Archæological Survey of Ceylon Annual Report
ASCI.	..	Archæological Survey of Ceylon Inscription
ASCMem.	..	Archæological Survey of Ceylon Memoir
ASIAR.	..	Archæological Survey of India Annual Report
ASIMem.	..	Archæological Survey of India Memoir
AsP.	..	Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā, ed. R. Mitra, Calcutta, 1888
ASWI.	..	Report of the Archæological Survey of Western India
Aṭā.	..	Āṭānāṭikasūtra, ed. H. Hoffmann (Bruchstücke des Āṭānāṭikasūtra), *KlTurf.* V, 1939
Avk.	..	Avadānakalpalatā, ed. S. C. Das, *BI.* 1888–96
Avś.	..	Avadānaśataka, ed. P. L. Vaidya, *BST.* 19, 1958
BASR.	..	Bulletin de L' Académie des Sciences de Russie
BB.	..	Bibliotheca Buddhica (Leningrad)
Bbh.	..	Bodhisattvabhūmi, ed. U. Wogihara, Tokyo, 1930–36
Bc.	..	Bodhicaryāvatāra, ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin, Calcutta, 1901–14
Bcp.	..	Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā, ed L. de la Vallée Poussin, 1902

BD. .. Buddhist Dictionary by Nyānatiloka (revised edition), .. Colombo, 1956

Beal. .. Beal, S. : The Buddhist Tripiṭaka, 1876

BEFEO. .. Bulletin de L'École Française d'Extreme Orient (Hanoi)

Bendall .. Bendall, C. : Catalogue of Buddhist Sanskrit Manuscripts, Cambridge, 1883

Bhkāv. .. Bhadrakalpāvadāna, ed. S. F. Oldenburg, 1894

BHS. .. Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary, ed. F. Edgerton, Yale, 1953

Bhsk. .. Bhavasaṃkrāntisūtra (and commentary, reconstructed in Sanskrit from Tibetan translation), ed. N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Adyar, 1938

BI. .. Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta)

BiblB. .. Bibliographie Bouddhique (Paris)

BIIMEO. .. Bolletino dell' Instituto Indiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente (Rome)

BM. .. Buddhadatta's Manuals, I–II, ed. A. P. Buddhadatta, *PTS.* 1915, 1927

BMFJ. .. Bulletin de la Maison Franco-Japonaise (Tokyo)

BruPrāt. .. Bhikṣuṇīprātimokṣa, ed. E. Waldschmidt (Bruchstücke des Bhikṣuṇīprātimokṣa), *KlTurf.* III, 1926

BOH. .. Bibliotheca Orientalis Hungarica (Budapest)

BPrāt. .. Bodhisattvaprātimokṣasūtra, ed. N. Dutt, *IHQ.* 7, 1931, p.259 ff.

BS. .. Buddhistic Studies, ed. B. C. Law, Calcutta, 1931

BSOAS. .. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London Institution

BSS. .. Bombay Sanskrit Series

BST. .. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts (Darbhanga)

Buc. .. Buddhacarita, ed. E.H. Johnston, Calcutta, 1935

Bup. .. Buddhaghosuppatti (with translation), ed. J. Gray, London, 1892

Buv. .. Buddhavaṃsa, ed. R. Morris, *PTS.* 1882

BuvA. .. Buddhavaṃsa Aṭṭhakathā (Madhuratthavilāsinī), ed. I. B. Horner, *PTS.* 1946

Cabaton. .. Cabaton, A. : Catalogue Sommaire des Manuscrits Sanskrits et Pāli, Paris, 1907

Catuś. .. Catuḥśataka (Sanskrit and Tibetan texts reconstructed), ed. V. Bhattacharyya, Calcutta, 1931

CHJ. .. The Ceylon Historical Journal

CII. .. Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum

CJHSS. .. The Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies

CJSc. .. Ceylon Journal of Science—Section G

Ckv. .. Chakesadhātuvaṃsa, ed. J. Minayeff, *JPTS.* 1885, 5–16

Cordier .. Cordier, P. : Catalogue du Fonds Tibétain, II–III, 1909–15

Cp. .. Cariyāpiṭaka, ed. B. C. Law, *PTS.* Lahore, 1924

CpA. .. Cariyāpiṭaka Aṭṭhakathā (Paramatthadīpanī), ed. D. L. Barua, *PTS.* 1939

CPD. .. A Critical Pāli Dictionary, Copenhagen, 1925–65

Cviśp. .. Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa, ed. P. B. Patel. *VBS.* 8. 1949

D. .. Dīgha Nikāya, I–III, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter, *PTS.* 1890–1911

DA. .. Dīghanikāya Aṭṭhakathā (Sumaṅgalavilāsinī), I–III, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids, J. E. Carpenter, W. Stede, *PTS.* 1886–1932

Dāṭhv. .. Dāṭhāvaṃsa. ed. B. C. Law, *PSS.* 7, 1925

Dthg. .. Daśabhūmika sūtra (Gāthā portion) ed. J. Rahder and S. Susa, Extract from the Eastern Buddhist, Vol. V, No. 4, 1931

Dbhs. .. Daśabhūmika-sūtra, ed. J. Rahder, Louvain, 1926

DCBT. .. Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms, ed. W. E. Soothill and L. Hodous, London, 1937

DeS. .. de Silva, W. A. : Catalogue of Palm-leaf Manuscripts, I, *MCM.* series A, No. 4, 1938

DeZ. .. de Zoysa, Louis : A Catalogue of Pali, Sinhalese and Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Temple Libraries of Ceylon, Colombo, 1885

Dhk. .. Dhātukathā (with commentary), ed. E. R. Gooneratne, *PTS.* 1892

Dhmpr. .. Dharmottarapradīpa, ed. D. Malvania, Patna, 1955

Dhp. .. Dhammapada, ed. S. Sumangala, *PTS.* 1914

DhpA. ..Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā, I–V, ed. H. Smith, H. C. Norman, L. S. Tailang, *PTS.* 1906–15

Dhs.	..	Dhammasaṅgaṇī, ed. E. Müller, *PTS.* 1885
DhsA.	..	Dhammasaṅganī Aṭṭhakathā (Atthasālinī), ed. E. Müller, *PTS.* 1897.
Dhscy.	..	Dharmasamuccaya, ed. Lin Li-Kouang (first part of Sanskrit text with Tibetan and Chinese versions), Paris, 1946
Dhsmg.	..	Dharmasaṃgraha, ed. F. Max Müller and H. Wenzel, Oxford, 1885
Divy.	..	Divyāvadāna, ed. E. B. Cowell and R. A. Neil, Cambridge, 1886
DPPN.	..	Dictionary of Pali Proper Names, I–II, by G. P. Malalasekera, London, 1960
Dpv.	..	Dīpavaṃsa, ed. H. Oldenberg, London, 1879
Dukap.	..	Dukapaṭṭhāna, ed. Mrs. Rhys Davids, *PTS.* 1909
EI.	..	Epigraphia Indica (Calcutta, Government Press)
EB.	..	Encyclopaedia of Buddhism
ERE.	..	Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, I–XIII, ed. J. Hastings, Edinburg, 1908–26
EW.	..	East and West (Rome)
EWA.	..	Encyclopaedia of World Art, I–VIII, McGraw-Hill
EZ.	..	Epigraphia Zeylanica (Ceylon Government Press)
Gg.	..	Gaṇḍīstotragāthā (reconstructed in Sanskrit from the Chinese Kien-ch'ui-fan-tsan) ed. Staël-Holstein, *BB.* XV, 1913
GM.	..	Gilgit Manuscripts, I–III, ed. N. Dutt, Srinagar and Calcutta, 1939–50
GOS.	..	Gaekwad's Oriental Series (Baroda)
Gst.	..	Guhyasamājatantra, ed. B. Bhattacharyya, Baroda, 1931
Gv.	..	Gandhavaṃsa, ed. J. Minayeff, *JPTS.* 1886, pp. 54–80
Gvyū.	..	Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra, I–IV, ed. D. T. Suzuki and H. Idzumi (second edition), Kyoto, 1949
Hatthv.	..	Hatthavanagallavihāravaṃsa, ed C. E. Godakumbura, *PTS.* 1957
Hbg.	..	Hôbôgirin, Dictionnaire Encyclopédique du Bouddhisme, ed. P Demiéville, Tokyo, 1929–37
Hetub.	..	Hetubinduṭīkā (with sub-commentary), ed. S. Sanghavi and M.S. Jinavijayaji, *GOS.* 113, 1949
HJAS.	..	Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies
HOS.	..	Harvard Oriental Series
Hvp.	..	Hastavālaprakaraṇa (reconstructed in Sanskrit from Chinese and Tibetan translations) ed. F. W.Thomas, *JRAS.*1918,p.267ff.
IA.	..	Indian Antiquary (Bombay)
IAL.	..	Indian Art and Letters (London)
IBK.	..	Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū (University of Tokyo, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies)
IC.	..	Indian Culture (Calcutta)
IHQ.	..	The Indian Historical Quarterly
It.	..	Itivuttaka, ed. E. Windisch. *PTS.* 1889
ItA.	..	Itivuttaka Aṭṭhakathā (Paramatthadīpanī, I–II, ed. M. M. Bose, *PTS.* 1934–36
J.	..	Jātaka (with commentary), I–VI, ed. V. Fausböll, *PTS.* 1962
JAOS.	..	Journal of the American Oriental Society
JAs.	..	Journal Asiatique
JASB.	..	Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal
JBHU.	..	Journal of the Benares Hindu University
JBORS.	..	Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society
JBRAS.	..	Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
JBRS.	..	Journal of the Burma Research Society
JBTS.	..	Journal of the Buddhist Text Society
JCBRAS.	..	Journal of the Ceylon Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
JDLC.	..	Journal of the Department of Letters, University of Calcutta

JGIS. .. Journal of the Greater India Society

JIH. .. Journal of Indian History

Jinac. .. Jinacarita, ed. W. H. D. Rouse *JPTS.* 1904–5, pp. 1–165

Jinak. .. Jinakālamālī, ed. A. P. Buddhadatta, *PTS.* 1962

Jināl .. Jinālaṃkāra (with translation) ed. J. Gray, London, 1894

Jm. .. Jātakamālā, ed. H. Kern, *HOS.* 1, Boston, 1891

JOR. .. Journal of Oriental Research

JPTS. .. Journal of the Pali Text Society

JRAS. .. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britian and Ireland

JSS. .. Journal of the Siam Society

Keith .. Keith, A. B. : Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, 1905

Khp. .. Khuddakapāṭha, ed. H. Smith, *PTS.* 1915

KhpA. .. Khuddakapāṭha Aṭṭhakathā (Paramatthajotikā I), ed. H. Smith, *PTS.* 1915

Khs. .. Khuddasikkhā, ed. E. Müller, *JPTS.* 1833, pp. 88–121

KhT. .. Khotanese Texts, I–II, ed.H.W. Bailey, Cambridge, 1946–54

Klpm. .. Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā, ed. H. Lüders (Bruchstücke der Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā), *KlTurf.* II, 1926

KlTurf. .. Kleinere Sanskrit-Texte (Königliche Preussische Turfan-Expeditionen)

Kp. .. Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka, ed S. C. Das and S. C. Sastri, Calcutta, 1898

Kśyp. .. Kāśyapaparivarta, ed. H. Staël-Holstein, 1926

Ktr. .. Karatalaratna (reconstructed in Sanskrit from the Chinese translation) ed. N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Adyar, 1938

Kvbh. .. (Karmavibhaṅga) : Mahākarmavibhaṅga (La grande Classification des Actes) et Karmavibhaṅgopadeśa (Discussion sur le Mahākarmavibhaṅga) ed. S. Lévi, Paris, 1932

Kvit. .. Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī, ed. Dorothy Maskell, *PTS.* 1956

Kvu. .. Kathāvatthu, I–II, ed. A. C. Taylor, *PTS.* 1894–95

KvuA. .. Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa Aṭṭhakathā, ed. J. Minayeff, *JPTS.* 1889, pp. 1–222

Kvyū. .. (Avalokiteśvaraguṇa) Kāraṇḍavyūha, ed. S. Samasrami, Calcutta, 1873

Lal. .. Lalitavistara, ed. P. L. Vaidya, *BST.* I, 1958

Lank. .. Laṅkāvatārasūtra, ed. B. Nanjio, Kyoto, 1923

Ligeti .. Ligeti, Louis : Catalogue du Kanjur Mongol, I. *BOH.* III 1942–44

Lś. .. Lokeśvaraśataka, ed. Suzanne-Karpelès, *JAs.* 1919, 5. 11, XIV, pp. 357–465

M. .. Majjhima Nikāya, I–IV, ed. V. Trenckner, R. Chalmers, Mrs. Rhys Davids, *PTS.* 1888–1925

MA. .. Majjhimanikāya Aṭṭhakathā (Papañcasūdanī), I–V, ed. J. H. Woods, D. Kosambi, I. B. Horner, *PTS.* 1922–38

MBT. .. Minor Buddhist Texts, ed. G. Tucci, *SOR.* IX, Part I, 1956

MCB. .. Mélanges Chinois et Buddhiques

MCM. .. Memoir of the Colombo Museum

Mdhvr. .. Madhyamakavṛtti, ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin, *BB.* IV, 1902–13

Mdhvt. .. Madhyamakāvatāra, ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin, *BB.* IX

Mgh. .. Meghasūtra, ed. C. Bendall, *JRAS.* 1880, p. 288 ff.

Mhbv. .. Mahābodhivaṃsa, ed. S. A. Strong, *PTS.* 1891

Mhm. .. Mahāmāyūrī, ed. Oldenburg in Zapiski Vostochnago Otdelenija Imp. Russk. Archeol. Obschestva, XI, 1899

Mhps. .. Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, ed. E. Waldschmidt, Abhandlungen der Deutschen Akademie, Berlin, 1950–51

Mhs. .. Mahāsamājasūtra, ed. E. Waldschmidt (Bruchstücke Buddhistischer Sūtras, I) *KlTurf.* IV, 1932

Mhsmg. .. Mahāyānasaṃgraha, I–II, ed. E. Lamotte (La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asaṅga), Louvain, 1938

Mhv. .. Mahāvaṃsa, ed. W. Geiger (chapters i–xxxvii), *PTS.* 1908 : Cūlavaṃsa, ed. W. Geiger, I–II, (chapters xxxviii–lxxii and lxxiii–ci), *PTS.* 1925–27

MhvA. .. Mahāvaṃsaṭīkā (Vaṃsatthappakāsinī—Mahāvaṃsa Aṭṭhakathā), I–II, ed. G. P. Malalasekera, *PTS.* 1935

MhvE. .. Extended Mahāvaṃsa, ed. G. P. Malalasekera, *AS.* III, 1937

Mhvu. .. Mahāvastu, I-III, ed. E. Senart, Paris, 1882–97

Mhvyut. .. Mahāvyutpatti, ed. R. Sakaki, Kyoto, 1916

Miln. .. Milindapañha, ed. V. Trenckner, *PTS.* 1962

Mmk. .. (Ārya) Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa, ed. T. G. Sastri, *TSS.* 1920–25

Moc. .. Mochizuki, S : Bukkyo-dai-jiten, 1–8, Tokyo, 1933–57

Mohv. .. Mohavicchedanī, ed. A. P. Buddhadatta and A. K. Warder, *PTS.* 1961.

Mūls. .. Mūlasikkhā, ed E. Müller, *JPTS.* 1883, pp. 122–32

Mvibh .. Madhyāntavibhāga, ed. S. Yamaguchi, Nagoya, 1934

Mvyk. .. Maitreyavyākaraṇa, ed. S. Lévi, Mélanges Linossier, Paris, 1933, pp. 381–90

Nanjio .. Nanjio, B. : Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka, Oxford, 1883

Nd. I .. Mahāniddesa, I–II, ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin and E. J. Thomas, *PTS.* 1916–17

Nd. II .. Cullaniddesa, I–III, ed W. Stede, *PTS.* 1918

NdA. I .. Niddesavaṇṇanā (Saddhammapajjotikā = Mahāniddesa Aṭṭhakathā), I–III, ed. A.P. Buddhadatta, *PTS.* 1931–41

NdA. II .. Niddesavaṇṇanā (Saddhammapajjotikā = Cullaniddesa Aṭṭhakathā), ed. Boruggamuwe Siri Revata, *SHB.* XIV, 1923

Nett. .. Nettippakaraṇa, ed. E. Hardy, *PTS.* 1902

NettA. .. Nettippakaraṇa Aṭṭhakathā, ed. Widurupola Piyatissa, *SHB.* IX, 1921

NIA. .. New Indian Antiquary

NR. .. Nagoya Daigaku Bungaku-bu Kenkyū Ronshū (Bulletin of the Faculty of Letters, Nagoya University)

Nrp. .. Nāmarūpapariccheda, ed. A. P. Buddhadatta, *JPTS.* 1913–14

Nrs. .. Nāmarūpasamāsa, ed. P. Dhammārāma, *JPTS.* 1915–16

Nyāb. .. Nyāyabindu, ed. Th. Stcherbatsky (Nyāyabindu, Nyāyabinduṭīkā), I–II, *BB.* VIII, 1904 ; III, 1929

Nyām. .. Nyāyamukha, ed. G. Tucci, Heidelberg, 1930

Nyāp. .. Nyāyapraveśa (with commentary), ed. A. B. Dhruva, *GOS.* 38, 1930

ŌM. .. Ōtani Daigaku Toshokan-zō Tibet Daizōkyō Kanjur Kandō Mokuroku, Kyoto, 1930–32

Pañcag. .. Pañcagatidīpanī, ed. L. Feer, *JPTS.* 1884, pp. 152–61

PB. .. Prabuddha Bhārata

PBO. .. Polski Biuletyn Orientalistyczny (The Polish Bulletin of Oriental Studies, Varsovie)

PED. .. Pali-English Dictionary, ed. T.W. Rhys Davids and W. Stede. *PTS.*

Pet. .. Peṭakopadesa, ed. A. Barua, *PTS.* 1949

Phrd. .. Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayasūtra, ed. F. Max Müller, Oxford, 1884

Pjm. .. Pajjamadhu, ed. E. R. Gooneratne, *JPTS.* 1887, pp. 1–16

PMG. .. Publications du Musée Guimet

PpA. .. Pañcappakaraṇa Aṭṭhakathā (Paramatthadīpanī), Part I, ed. Rerukāne Ariyañāṇa, *SHB.* XXXVIII, 1936 : Part II, ed. Rerukāne Candavimala, *SHB.* XL, 1938

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Prgag. .. Prajñāpāramitāratnaguṇasañcayagāthā, ed. E. Obermiller, Moscow, 1937

Prsy. .. Pramāṇasamuccaya, (translated and annotated) Masaaki Hattori, *HOS.* Vol. 47, 1968

Prvār. .. Pramāṇavārttikam (with commentary and sub-commentary), ed. R. Sankrityayana, Allahabad, 1949

Ps. .. Paṭisambhidāmagga, I–II, ed. A. C. Taylor, *PTS.* 1905–07

PsA. .. Paṭisambhidāmagga Aṭṭhakathā (Saddhammappakāsinī), I–III, ed. C. V. Joshi, *PTS.* 1933–47

PSS. .. Panjab Sanskrit Series (Lahore

PTC. .. Pāli Tipiṭakam Concordance *PTS.*

PTS.	..	Pali Text Society (edition)
Pug.	..	Puggalapaññatti, ed. R. Morris, *PTS.* 1883
Pug.A.	..	Puggalapaññatti Aṭṭhakathā, ed. G. Landsberg and Mrs. Rhys Davids, *JPTS.* 1913–14, pp. 170–254
PvsP.	..	Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā, ed. N. Dutt, London, 1934
Pvu.	..	Petavatthu, with commentary : Petavatthu Aṭṭhakathā (Paramatthadīpanī), ed. E. Hardy, *PTS.* 1894
Ratnagot.	..	Ratnagotravibhāgamahāyānottaratantraśāstra, ed. E. H. Johnston, Patna, 1950
Rkāv.	..	Roruka Avadāna (I : Tibetischer Text und Dt. Übersetzung ; II : Wörterbuch), ed. J. Nobel, 1954
Rpp.	..	Rāṣṭrapālaparipṛcchā, ed. L. Finot, St. Petersburg, 1901
Rsv.	..	Rasavāhinī, ed. Ñāṇavimala Mahāthera, Colombo, 1961
Rvibh.	..	Rūpārūpavibhāga, ed. A. P. Buddhadatta, *BM.* I, 1915
S.	..	Saṃyutta Nikāya, I–VI, ed. L. Féer and Mrs. Rhys Davids, *PTS.* 1884–1904
SA.	..	Saṃyuttanikāya Aṭṭhakathā (Sāratthappakāsinī), I–III, ed. F. L. Woodward, *PTS.* 1929–37
Sādh.	..	Sādhanamālā, ed. B. Bhattacharyya, Baroda, 1925–28
Sāg.	..	Saṃyuktāgama (fragments from Stein manuscripts), ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin, *JRAS.* 1913, p. 569 ff.
Śāl.	..	Śālistambasūtra (reconstructed), ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin, (Bouddhisme, Études et Matériaux, Théorie des douze causes), Gand, 1913, pp. 19–90
Sāsv.	..	Sāsanavaṃsa, ed. M. Bode, *PTS.* 1897
Saund.	..	Saundarananda, ed. E. H. Johnston, Oxford, 1928
SaundK.	..	Saundaranandakāvya, ed. Haraprasad Sastri, Calcutta, 1910
SBB.	..	Sacred Books of the Buddhists
SBE.	..	Sacred Books of the East
SBNT.	..	Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal, *BI.* Calcutta, 1910
Sdarś.	..	Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, ed. E. B. Cowell, 1878
Sdmp.	..	Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra, ed. U. Wogihara and K. Tsuchida, Tokyo, 1934–35
Sdmpy.	..	Saddhammopāyana, ed. R. Morris, *JPTS.* 1887, pp. 35–98
Sdms.	..	Saddhammasaṅgaha, ed. Nedimale Saddhānanda, *JPTS.* 1890, pp. 21–90
Sdurg.	..	Sarvadurgatipariśodhanauṣṇīṣavijayadhāraṇī, ed. F. Max Müller, 1884
SED.	..	Sanskrit-English Dictionary, ed. Monier-Williams, Oxford, 1899
Ṣgh.	..	Ṣaḍgatikārikā, ed. P. Mus : La Lumière sur les Six Voies, Paris, 1939
Shastri	..	Shastri, Hara Prasad : A Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Government collection, under the care of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1917
SHB.	..	Simon Hewavitarane Bequest (Colombo)
SII.	..	South Indian Inscriptions (Madras)
Śikṣ.	..	Śikṣāsamuccaya, ed. C. Bendall, St. Petersburg, 1897–1902
Sīmā.	..	Sīmāvivādavinicchayakathā, ed. J. Minayeff, *JPTS.* 1887. pp. 17–34
SIS.	..	Sino-Indian Studies (Santiniketan)
Sn.	..	Suttanipāta, ed. D. Andersen and H. Smith, *PTS.* 1913
SnA.	..	Suttanipāta Aṭṭhakathā (Paramatthajotikā II), ed. H. Smith, *PTS.* 1916–18
Snir.	..	Sandhinirmocanasūtra, ed. E. Lamotte (Sandhinirmocanasūtra, L'explication des Mysterès), Paris, 1935
SOR.	..	Serie Orientale Roma
Srs.	..	Samādhirājasūtra (chapters 8, 19, 22), ed. C. Règamey, Warsaw, 1938
Sśkp	..	Saptaśatikāprajñāpāramitā, ed. J. Masuda, Tokyo, 1930
Ssmg.	..	Suttasaṃgaha, ed. R. Chaudhuri and D. Guha, *BI.* 1957
Ssmk.	..	Saccasaṃkhepa, ed. P. Dhammārāma, *JPTS.* 1917–19, pp. 1–25
Śsp.	..	Śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā, ed. P. Ghosa, *BI.* 1910
Ssvu.	..	Sahassavatthuppakaraṇaṃ (in Sinhalese characters), ed. A. P. Buddhadatta, Maradana, 1956

Sumag. .. Sumagadhāvadāna, ed. G. Tokiwai, 1897

Sūtrāl. .. (Mahāyāna) Sūtrālaṃkāra, ed. (and translated in French), S. Lévi, Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études, 159, 190, Paris, 1907, 1911

Suvṛ. .. Suvarṇaprabhāsottamasūtra, ed. J. Nobel (Das Goldglanz Sūtra), Leipzig, 1937

Svu. .. Sīhalavatthuppakaraṇa (in Sinhalese characters), ed. A. P. Buddhadaṭṭa, Colombo, 1959

Svyū. .. Sukhāvatīvyūha, ed. F. Max Muller, Oxford, 1883

Taishō .. Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō, ed. J. Takakusu, I–CII, 1924–32

Tant. .. Tantrākhyāna, ed. C. Bendall, *JRAS.* 1888

Thag. .. Theragāthā, ed. H. Oldenberg, *PTS.* 1883

ThagA. .. Theragāthā Aṭṭhakathā (Paramatthadīpanī), I–III, ed. F. L. Woodward, *PTS.* 1940–59

Thig. .. Therīgāthā, ed. R. Pischel, *PTS.* 1883

ThigA. .. Therīgāthā Aṭṭhakathā (Paramatthadīpanī), ed. E. Müller, *PTS.* 1893

Thūpv. .. Thūpavaṃsa, ed. B. C. Law, *PTS.* 1935

Tikap. .. Tikapaṭṭhāna, I–III (with commentary), ed. Mrs. Rhys Davids, *PTS.* 1921–23

Tkg. .. Telakaṭāhagāthā, ed. E.R. Gooneratne, *JPTS.* 1884, pp. 49–68

TM. .. Tōhoku-Teikoku-Daigaku Hōbun-gakubu Tibet-Daizōkyō-So-Mokuroku, I–II, Sendai, 1932

Triṃś. .. Triṃśikāvijñapti, ed. H. Jacobi (Triṃśikāvijñapti mit Bhāṣya des Ācarya Sthiramati), 1932

Ts. .. Tattvasaṃgraha with Pañjikā, ed. E. Krishnamacharya, 2 Vols. *GOS.* 1925

TSS. .. Trivandrum Sanskrit Series

TT. .. Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Peking Edition, edited by D. T. Suzuki, Vol. 1–165

TurkRem. .. Manuscript Remains of Buddhist Literature found in Eastern Turkestan, ed. (in conjunction with other scholars) A. F. Rudolf Hoernle, I, Oxford, 1916

UCR. .. University of Ceylon Review

Ud. .. Udāna, ed. P. Steinthal, *PTS.* 1885

UdA. .. Udāna Aṭṭhakathā (Paramatthadīpanī), ed. F. L. Woodward, *PTS.* 1926

Udvg. .. Udānavarga, ed. N. P. Chakravarti, Paris, 1930

Uvch. .. Uttaraviniechaya, ed. A. P. Buddhadatta, *BM.* II, pp 231–304

VajP. .. Vajracchedikāprajñāpāramitā, ed. (and translated) E. Conzé *SOR.* XIII, Rome, 1957

Vajsū. .. Vajrasūcī, ed. (and translated), S. K. Mukhopadhyaya, Santiniketan, 1950

Vbh. .. Vibhaṅga, ed. Mrs. Rhys Davids, *PTS.* 1904

VbhA. .. Vibhaṅga Aṭṭhakathā (Sammohavinodanī), ed. A. P. Buddhadatta, *PTS.* 1923

VBS. .. Visva-Bharati Studies

Vickāv. .. Vicitrakarṇikāvadāna, ed. (and translated) H. Jörgensen, London, 1931

Viṃś. .. (Viṃśatikā) Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, ed. S. Lévi, 1925–26

Vin. .. Vinayapiṭaka, I–V, ed. H. Oldenberg, London, 1879–83

VinA. .. Vinaya Aṭṭhakathā (Samantapāsādikā), I–VII, ed. J. Takakusu, M. Nagai, *PTS.* 1924–47

VinMS. .. Mūla Sarvāstivāda Vinaya : Gilgit Manuscripts, Vol. III, ed. N. Dutt, 1939–50

VinS. .. Vinaya des Sarvāstivādin, ed. (and translated in French) J. Filliozat and H. Kuno, *JAs.* 1938, 21–64

Vinvch. .. Vinayavinicchaya, ed. A. P. Buddhadatta, *BM.* II, pp. 1–230

Vism. .. Visuddhimagga, ed. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *PTS.* 1975

Vvu. .. Vimānavatthu (with commentary), ed. E. Hardy, *PTS.* 1901

WZKM. .. Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes

Yam. .. Yamaka, I–II, ed. Caroline Rhys Davids, *PTS.* 1911–13

YamA. .. Yamakappakaraṇa Aṭṭhakathā, ed. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *JPTS.* 1910–12, pp. 51–107

ZDMG. .. Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft

Special Titles of Pali Aṭṭhakathās and their Abbreviations

Atthasālinī ..	..	Dhammasaṅgaṇī Aṭṭhakathā ..	.. (*DhsA.*)
Madhuratthavilāsinī	..	Buddhavaṃsa Aṭṭhakathā ..	.. (*BuvA.*)
Manorathapūraṇī ..	..	Aṅguttara Nikāya Aṭṭhakathā ..	.. (*AA*).
Niddesa-vaṇṇanā ..	..	Mahā-(Culla-)niddesa Aṭṭhakathā	.. (*NdA.I,II*)
Papañcasūdanī ..	..	Majjhima Nikāya Aṭṭhakathā ..	.. (*MA.*)
Paramatthadīpanī ..	..	Cariyāpiṭaka Aṭṭhakathā ..	.. (*CpA.*)
Paramatthadīpanī ..	..	Itivuttaka Aṭṭhakathā ..	.. (*ItA.*)
Paramatthadīpanī ..	..	Pañcappakaraṇa Aṭṭhakathā ..	.. (*PpA.*)
Paramatthadīpanī ..	..	Petavatthu Aṭṭhakathā ..	.. (*PvuA.*)
Paramatthadīpanī ..	..	Theragāthā Aṭṭhakathā ..	.. (*ThagA.*)
Paramatthadīpanī ..	..	Therīgāthā Aṭṭhakathā ..	.. (*ThīgA.*)
Paramatthajotikā I	..	Khuddakapāṭha Aṭṭhakathā ..	.. (*KhpA.*)
Paramatthajotikā II	..	Suttanipāta Aṭṭhakathā ..	.. (*SnA.*)
Paramatthamañjūsā	..	Visuddhimagga Aṭṭhakathā ..	.. (*VismA.*)
Saddhammapajjotikā I, II	..	Mahā-(Culla-) niddesa Aṭṭhakathā	.. (*NdA,I,II*)
Saddhammappakāsinī	..	Paṭisambhidāmagga Aṭṭhakathā	.. (*PsA.*)
Samantapāsādikā ..	..	Vinaya Aṭṭhakathā ..	.. (*VinA.*)
Sammohavinodanī ..	..	Vibhaṅga Aṭṭhakathā ..	.. (*VbhA.*)
Sāratthappakāsinī ..	..	Saṃyutta Nikāya Aṭṭhakathā ..	.. (*SA.*)
Sumaṅgalavilāsinī ..	..	Dīgha Nikāya Aṭṭhakathā ..	.. (*DA.*)
Visuddhajanavilāsinī	..	Apadāna Aṭṭhakathā ..	.. (*ApA.*)

ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF BUDDHISM

VOLUME IV

CAUSALITY. Buddhist literature reveals a great deal of interest in the subject of causation as is borne out by the large number of synonyms for the word 'cause' found in the Buddhist texts. Some of these words, such as *samudaya*, *hetu*, *nidāna*, *kāraṇa*, have each acquired a specific nuance of meaning, conveying some subtle distinction in the concept as is required to discuss the subject in differing contexts, while others, such as *paṭicca-samuppāda*, *idappaccayata* and *paccaya* have evolved almost into a technical terminology necessary for the explanation of the very unique position taken by Buddhism regarding the problem of causation.

But the main interest of the Buddhists in causation seems to be reflected in a causal law formulated in connection with the phenomenon of human suffering. From this law may be extracted the Buddhists' general notion of causality, of what causation really implies to the Buddhists.

This causal law is usually discussed under the term *paṭicca-samuppāda*, a concept, or rather, a complex of concepts occurring and recurring with persistent frequency in Buddhist discussions on many and different problems, philosophical, ethical, logical and epistemological. Both the general notion of causality elicited from the causal law of *paṭicca-samuppāda*, and this causal law itself, are claimed by the Buddhists of all schools to be distinctive and unique, and their discovery and enunciation attributed to the founder himself. This view of causation is described by the texts as 'a doctrine which had never been heard before' (*pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu: S.* II, p. 10) and as different from all other views proposed by any preceding or contemporaneous theory of causation.

The causal law of *paṭicca-samuppāda* is also described as Buddhism's cardinal doctrine whose understanding is indispensable to the understanding of its total philosophy and ethic, both of which pivot, as will be seen later, on the view of causation implied by this causal law. In fact, it may be legitimately said that the practice of the Buddhist ethic and the concept of the Buddhist *summum bonum*, are without a rationale, when isolated from this theory of causation

The essence of the causal view thus emphasized is expressed in a recurrent statement attributed to the Buddha which may be translated from the Pali as follows:

> *When this is present, that*[1] *is present*
> *From the arising of this, that arises.*
> *When this is absent, that is absent*
> *On the cessation of this, that ceases*[2]

Occurring almost always in the introductory lines to an exposition of the process by which suffering arises in the human individual (s.v. PAṬICCA-SAMUPPĀDA), it functions as a statement of the law of which this process is an instance. A study of the instance makes it clear that the formula is an abstraction derived from an introspective observation of that process. It is therefore understood in the Buddhist tradition as meaning that occurrences are interdependent, that they are dependently related in a regular manner so as to warrant a generalization sufficient for the prediction and anticipation of events and, therefore, for the planning and conduct of human behaviour and ethics. Thus, the first and third lines of the formula are reducible to the abstract formula: *Whenever A is present, then B is present. And B is not present unless A is present.*

The second and the fourth lines may be seen as the concrete version of the same formula as applicable in the world of change.

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1 Literally, *this*.
2 *Imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti*
Imassuppādā idaṃ uppajjati
Imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti
Imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati (*S.*II, pp.28,70; cf. *M.* I, p. 262 f., III, p. 63; *Ud.* p. 1 f.).

The acceptance of this principle is not merely implicit in the Buddhist argument, but is explicitly stated throughout the development of its vast and variegated literature, at first, in simple form as the very word of the Buddha, but later amplified and elaborated upon in the interpretations of the various schools and commentarial traditions.

The claim that this principle was discovered and formulated by the Buddha himself seems to be attested when the literary evidences are viewed in their contexts. The early Pāli literature (e.g., *Vin.* I, p 1 f ; *S.* II, p 10; *Ud.* p.1) states quite clearly that the principle manifested itself to the Buddha while he was meditating under the Bodhi-tree on the occasion of his attainment of Buddhahood. The *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (*S.* II, p. 10) is even more specific in its statement and reports the Buddha himself declaring that the truth of this causal principle dawned on his mind in the process of reaching Enlightenment, but while yet a Bodhisatta. The process itself, by which the causal view evolves in his mind, is traced. The ring of authenticity in the description of the process of evolution of the idea is convincing. The acceptance of the principle thus seems to be of the highest antiquity in the history of Buddhism.

The claim for originality of the discovery made in the last quoted context seems to be supported by external historical evidence. The description of the discovery as a disclosure of 'doctrines not heard before'(*pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu*)may be clearly understood as a reference to the historical position the doctrine takes in relation to pre-Buddhistic and contemporaneous philosophy in India. A comparative study of the preceding and contemporaneous Indian philosophical and religious literatures would reveal quite clearly that the Buddha's was the first clear-cut theory of natural causation which appeared on the Indian philosophical scene.

Fumblings towards naturalistic causal interpretations of phenomena seem to have begun in the time of the *Ṛgveda* when it superceded the current animistic views by its conception of *ṛta*, which meant 'the course of things'. This conception of 'a course of things' implied the admission of a natural physical order. However, it did not imply the admission of a causal order, for divine beings were suggested as the custodians of this physical order. The Ṛgvedic view remained, in fact, an Activity-view or Agency-view, not far removed from the earlier animistic interpretations.

Evolving through a cosmogonic phase, the idea of causation seems to have groped closer to a naturalistic approach in the Ājīvaka attempts to solve the problems of time and change, and in their application of the principles of causal determination,[3] to their arguments on the problems of ethics (see further NIYATIVĀDA). The closest approach, however, to a naturalistic causal view seems to have been that of the Materialists, who, protesting against a theory of non-causation, advocated that inherent properties of things (*svabhāva*) determined the occurrence of all phenomena.

The canonical records, as well as the most unchallengeable of the biographical details contained therein, reveal that the Buddha, in his quest for truth, was disillusioned with all these prevalent theories. The Buddha, on several occasions, as will be shown below, gives a classification of the prevalent theories and declares that his own theory does not correspond to any one of these classes. The texts insist that the causal principle was discovered after a rejection of these traditional views of cause It is declared as being discovered in a direct confrontation with experience (see *S.* II, p. 5).

It appears that it is this direct confrontation with experience which makes the Buddha's approach empirical and gives his whole teaching its strongly empirical flavour, an empiricism, however, redefined to include extra-sensory perception as a source or means of knowledge, verifiable by Man (see further EMPIRICISM).

The experience that is his main concern seems to be the experience of suffering. It is, in fact, undeniable that the driving motive behind his quest for truth was a profound existential interest in suffering (*dukkha*). It is also equally undeniable that the Buddha arrived at the principle of causation in his search for a solution to the problem of suffering rather than through an epistemological interest in a ground for logical inference. The already cited *Saṃyutta Nikāya* reminiscence of the process by which the Buddha arrived at the principle of causation unmistakably demonstrates that causation was discovered by him as a result of a decided interest and conscious involvement with human suffering. The text under reference reports the Buddha speaking autobiographically, as reflecting thus on the eve of his Enlightenment: "Alas! this world has fallen upon trouble. There is getting born and growing old, and dying and falling and being reborn.

3 A similarity between these principles and those of Mill has been seen by K. N. Jayatilleke (*Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1963, p. 146 f.).

And yet from this suffering an escape is not known, even from decay and death. O when shall escape from this suffering, even from decay and death, be revealed ?" (tr. Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Book of Kindred Sayings*, II, *PTS*. London, 1952, p. 6). The Buddha then goes on to relate the genesis in his own mind of the idea of causation to which his reflection led him, thus : "Then to me, brethren, came the thought 'What now being present, does decay and death come to be ? What conditions decay and death ? Then to me, thinking according to law came to pass comprehension of insight, let there be birth, then there is decay and death. Decay and death is conditioned by birth...." (loc. cit.).

The passage, continuing, goes on to state the conditioned nature of all suffering, enumerating step by step the various stages of the mainly psychological process involved in the evolution of suffering. The *Vinaya* (loc. cit.) and the *Udāna* (loc. cit.), referring to the Buddha's recapitulation of the same event, begin with the statement of the abstract formula and ends with the exposition of the conditioned genesis which concludes with the clinching phrase, "this is the cause of the arising of this whole mass of suffering" (*evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti*).

This existential concern with suffering seems to determine the character and position the Buddhist principle of causation takes in relation to the rest of the doctrine. It explains, at the same time, why a special application of this general principle is so frequently made and so often emphasized. The approach from the point of view of suffering also explains the emphasis laid throughout, on the operation of causality on sentient existence rather than on the physical order. It accounts, again, for the largely introspective method adopted and advocated. Thus, apart from the historical fact that the causal principle was discovered by the Buddha in relation to the main problem of his quest—the problem of suffering, we find that the Buddha's discussion of the principle occurs in the suttas most frequently in association with that problem, and this, most usually, in an analysis of the process by which the state of suffering arises in the individual.

Thus it is that we discover the suttas concentrating on what is generally called by European Indologists the theory of 'Dependent Origination' (see further DEPENDENT ORIGINATION), sometimes called 'the Chain of Causation', the *paṭicca-samuppāda* of the Pali. This theory of 'Dependent Origination' is not only frequent in its occurrence with the Four Noble Truths but sometimes identified with them, the abstract causal formula underlying or being presupposed in the total argument of the Four Noble Truths, as illustrated, for instance, in the passage (*S*. II, p. 43) "Now inasmuch, brethren, as the Ariyan disciple knows the causal relation thus, knows the uprising of the causal relation thus, knows the cessation of the causal relation thus, knows the way going to the cessation of the causal relation thus, he is what we called the Ariyan disciple who has won the view, who has won vision .... etc." (tr. Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Book of Kindred Sayings*, II, p. 33). The abstract causal formula, in fact, seems to be directly applied in the Four Noble Truths, which treat of what is present (*samudaya*) when suffering (*dukkha*) is present, and argues that when the *samudaya* is absent, the effect, *dukkha*, is absent, which absence, is equated to *nirodha*, the cessation of suffering, i.e., the absence of the effect. In this sense, the practice of the Noble Eightfold Path (*ariya aṭṭhaṅgika maggа*) may be understood as causing the removal of the *samudaya*, leading to the effect, *nirodha*. In other words, it reasons that, since *dukkha* is present only when *taṇhā* is present, then the elimination of *taṇhā*, which is the purpose of the *maggа*, will be succeeded by the absence of *dukkha*. This is probably why the causal relation is associated in the above passage, as well as elsewhere, with the Four Noble Truths and occurs sometimes together with the exposition of the latter.

Characteristics

In this investigation of causality, the Buddha notes four distinct characteristics of a causal relation, namely, objectivity (*tathatā*), necessity (*avitathatā*), invariability (*anaññathatā*) and conditionality (*idappaccayatā*). In the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (*S*. II, p. 26), the Buddha defines causality thus :

"Thus, brethren, that which here is such wise, (objectivity) not otherwise (necessity), not otherwise (invariability), the relatedness of this to that (conditionality) : this, brethren, is called causal happening " (tr. Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Book of Kindred Sayings*, II, p. 22).[4] The commentator explains the above terms thus : "As those conditions alone neither more nor less, bring about this or that event, there is said to be objectivity; since there is no failure even for a moment to produce the events which arise when the conditions come together, there is said to be necessity ; since no event different arises with other events or conditions, there is

4 The terms within brackets are inserted by the author and are not found in the translation.

said to be invariability ; since one or a group of conditions give rise to such states as decay and death, there is said to be conditionality" (*SA*. II, p. 41).

The objectivity spoken of is further elaborated and it seems clear that the Buddha conceived of the principle of causality operating independent of the discovery of it, as it had done before and will do long after the Buddha's discovery of it. The *Paccaya Sutta* (S. II, p 25) which, inspite of its brevity, gives all the essential features of the Buddha's causal view in a nutshell, reports that the Buddha, having discussed the causal theory in relation to the conditioned origin of suffering, declares thus : "Whether, brethren, there be an arising of Tathāgatas, or whether there be no such arising, in each this nature of things just stands, this causal status, this causal orderliness, the relatedness of this to that. Concerning that the Tathāgata is fully enlightened, that he fully understands. Fully enlightened, fully understanding, he declares it, teaches it, reveals it, sets it forth, manifests, explains, makes it plain, saying : 'Behold! conditioned by this, that comes to be' (tr. Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Book of Kindred Sayings*, II, p 21)

Thus, it is evident that the Buddha admitted of an objective Universe in which a principle of causality was operative, on the basis of which uniformities were recognizable and inference was possible as to the past and the future, as well as to the present. This is probably why the Buddha identifies the principle of causality with the *dhamma*, the law pertaining to the nature of things, when he says, "whoever sees conditioned genesis, sees *dhamma*, whoever sees *dhamma*, sees conditioned genesis" (*M*. I, p. 191). Speaking to Susima, the paribbājaka, the Buddha says (*S*. II, p. 124 f.) that the knowledge of the law of causality essentially precedes the knowledge of Nibbāna. Here the word, *dhamma thitiñāṇa* is used to describe the concept 'knowledge of the law of causality' implying by it a sense of the fixedness of the laws of nature. Numerous psychological processes which necessarily arise from causes even where effort is not exercised are discussed in the suttas (e.g., *M*. I, p. 324; *A*. V, pp 23, 312). They are described as behaving merely in accordance with nature (*dhammatā*), thus identifying the nature of things with the principle of causation. This principle of causation is understood as operating on all species of beings, men, gods, demons and sub-human spirits, and in all three spheres, *kāma*, *rūpa* and *arūpa*.

The notion of necessity seems to be inextricably interwoven with the Buddhist concept of causation, as is seen from the examples cited above, of the psychological processes which arise whenever the cause is present. Necessity is already implicit in the abstract causal formula itself and is borne out in the illustration of the abstract formula through the *paṭicca-samuppāda*, where each of the factors are shown as necessarily arising from another. For instance, the emotional state of suffering (*dukkhā*) arises only in the presence of life (which is equivalent with birth, i.e., the arising or emergence of sentient existence, the awakening of sentience signified by the word '*jāti*') and not unless life is present. The emotional state of attachment (*upādāna*) arises only in the presence of craving (*taṇhā*) and not unless craving is present. Craving arises only in the presence of feeling (*vedanā*) and not unless feeling is present, and so forth. The *paṭicca-samuppāda*, in fact, works out all the main conditions which are independently necessary for the presence of the 'mass of ill' described in its concluding phrase : decay-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair (*jarā-maraṇa*, *soka*, *parideva*, *dukkha*, *domanassa*, *upāyāsa*).

Invariability, as will be seen from the above examples themselves, is inextricably bound up with this concept of necessity in causation, but the notion that an effect and a cause are invariably connected is most explicitly brought out in the Buddha's statement in the *Assutavā Sutta* (*S*. II, p. 96 f.) where he emphasizes : "Because of a contact which makes for pleasant feeling, brethren, pleasant feeling arises. From the ceasing of that contact which makes for pleasant feeling, the pleasant feeling, — which had arisen *because of the contact for an appropriate experience*, that ceases, that is quenched. Because of a contact which makes for painful feeling, brethren, painful feeling arises. From the ceasing of that contact which makes for painful feeling, the painful feeling,—which had arisen *because of the contact making for an appropriate experience*,—that ceases, that is quenched"[5] (tr. Mrs Rhys Davids, *Book of Kindred Sayings*, II, p. 67 : italicized for emphasis by the author).

The last mentioned of the four characteristics, too, is inseparably bound up with the other three, but may be considered as dominating them all in the Buddhist causal theory, so much so that it would be erroneous to speak of causation in the Buddhist sense without emphasizing conditiona-

5 *Sukhavedaniyaṃ bhikkhave phassaṃ paṭicca-uppajjati sukhā vedanā taṃyeva sukhavedaniyassa phassassa nirodhā yaṃ ajjhattaṃ sukhaṃ vedayitaṃ sukhavedaniyaṃ phassaṃ paṭicca uppannā sukhā vedanā sā nirujjhati sā vūpasammati...* The same is repeated with the necessary adjustments, for neutral feeling in the succeeding passages.

lity. For the Buddhist, it is virtually identifiable with the former. In most instances where the Buddha is found speaking of causation, he is seen to be referring to the conditioned arising and cessation of things. The doctrine of conditionality is pointed out as distinguishing the Buddhist view from all other prevalent views. No single factor is mentioned as cause but numerous conditions are shown as operating together to bring a out any particular effect. This is made particularly manifest in the *paṭicca-samuppāda*.

Conditionality is emphasized throughout the suttas and this emphasis does not seem to be incidental but deliberate. The Buddha seems to have been fully aware of the need, importance and implication of laying that emphasis. In the *Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya Sutta* (*M*. I, p. 258 f.), the Buddha tells Sāti who has misconceived the concept of causation, that he (the Buddha) has already spoken of conditioned genesis in many a figure (*anekapariyāyena*) and that it is indeed foolish of Sāti to have misunderstood it. This is true. Various are the ways in which the Buddha discourses on this subject in the suttas and a whole samyutta is devoted to its discussion in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (II, pp. 1–131), so that it seems curious how Keith (*Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon*, Oxford, 1923, p. 96) could have concluded that only "meagre and inadequate examination" is "accorded to causation in the Canon".

The Buddha's notion of conditionality, however, is most precisely stated in the discussion of the psychology of sense-cognition. Here the Buddha explains sense-cognition as arising and having its origin through the mediation of the senses. In the instance of each of these senses, three conditions are given as independently necessary and together sufficient to produce the particular kind of sense-cognition which is associated with a particular sense-organ. In visual-cognition, for example :

(1) an unimpaired sense organ of sight, the eye,
(2) external visible forms coming into the range of vision,
(3) an appropriate act of attention,

are given as conditions, each independently necessary and all together sufficient for the production of the appropriate effect (*M*. I, p. 190).

This view is also manifest in the *paṭicca-samuppāda*, where the 'whole mass of suffering' is conceived as arising from a number of conditions, all of them not necessarily arising in sequential order but concurrently present at the arising of suffering.

But, as must be evident from the above paragraph, the Buddha appears to have utilised the causal principle in the explanation of psychological processes other than those mentioned in the *paṭicca-samuppāda* diagnosis of suffering. Thus, we see that he discusses causality in relation to remorse, joy, rapture, calm, happiness, concentration, knowledge, revulsion etc; Mrs. Rhys Davids (*Kindred Sayings*, II, viii) has pointed out a very interesting and significant sutta which seems to have hitherto escaped the attention it deserves from scholars, namely, the *Upaniva Sutta* (*S*. II, p. 29 f.) in which the Buddha traces, in the same manner as he traces the conditioned arising of suffering, the conditioned arising of happiness. Both processes, in fact, seem to be in one stream. The downward path from suffering is traced to *avijj* in terms of the familiar twelvefold scheme of the *paṭicca-samuppāda*. The upward path from suffering is traced to its climax, happiness.

The acceptance of the objectivity of the causal principle, its identification with the nature of things and the consequent realisation of its universality, must necessarily have led to the above mentioned position, i.e., of applying the causal principle to other psychological processes pertinent, though not necessarily connected, to the *paṭicca-samuppāda*. It is natural that it was applied also to several other fields of knowledge, whenever necessary. Thus, as we have already noted, it was applied in the field of epistemology, especially where it is concerned with the problems of perception. A conscious application of the principle is also seen in the field of ethics where conditions giving rise to moral impurity are discussed (*S*. II, p. 69 f.). The Noble Eightfold Path, the fundamental base of Buddhist ethics, is quite obviously founded on the admission of the causal principle and aims at the removal of conditions giving rise to the undesired effect. The principle of causality seems to have been thoroughly integrated with the rest of Buddhist thought and is found applied in the treatment of its main tenets—the *tilakkhaṇa*. We have already seen this to be so in the case of one of them, namely, *dukkha* which we have seen was the original inspiration for the discovery of the principle, as it is the point of departure from which all other causal connections of the *paṭicca-samuppāda* are traced. The philosophical problems of change and substance are integrated with the Buddhist causal view in similar manner. Change (*anicca*) is inalienable from the Buddhist conception of causality and the latter is almost derived from the contemplation of change. The uniquely Buddhist doctrine of

Anatta is virtually a conclusion from the argument of conditionality of all component things, the inevitable corollary of conceiving phenomena as conditioned events.

The application of the causal principle to the physical world seems to have been no dominating interest of the Buddhists, for the reason given above, but the principle seems to have pervaded many areas of Buddhist thinking, so that it is no surprise to find it manifested and assumed in matters pertaining to the physical world Jayatilleke (*Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, p. 446 f.) has pointed out an interesting instance of the application of the causal principle, in the essentially Buddhist sense, to the physical world. Here (*S.* III, p 54) three conditions are described as independently necessary and together sufficient for the growth and maturing of a plant-seed. Causalistic thinking on naturalistic lines seems to have invaded Buddhist discussions on the evolution of life on earth in the *Aggañña Sutta* (q.v.) and of kingship in the *Cakkavatti Sīhanāda Sutta* (*D.* III, p 58 ff.). It is striking that in one instance (*S.* IV, p 230), the Buddha tells a questioner, Sīvaka, that some sufferings are caused by physical conditions, viz. phlegm, wind, bile, the union of odily humours, the change of the seasons, untoward happenings, sudden attacks from without.

Relationship with Anicca

As mentioned above, the Buddha recognizes the inalienable connection between the philosophical problems of causation, and of change. It is in the perpetual changing of phenomena from one state to another that causality is observed, and this change is seen as a continuous reaction of conditions, one with another. With its man-centred interest, Buddhism occupies itself with change in the psychological sphere and the sentient individual is seen more or less as an immanent system become transuent,[6] through its sensitivity to the system outside itself. With the outside, it is in contact through what are termed 'the sense-doors' (*saḷāyatana*). Composed as it is of physical and psychological elements, this sentient individual is seen as a metabolic process perpetually in reaction with its environment which is also physical and psychological. All of these are in a state of incessant change. Just as in the physical sphere the organic individual is constantly transforming itself into its environment and transforming the environment into itself by such processes as breathing, consumption and excretion of food, it is, in the psychological sphere, being transformed by and transforming the environment through contact (*phassa*). Just as in the physical sphere the transformations are dependent on the properties of the conditions with which it is in a relation of action and reaction, so, in the psychological sphere, the qualities of the psychological individual, which are the cumulative products of its saṃsāric history, are in constant reaction with the properties of the environmental conditions. The character of the resultant psychological state is dependent on the characteristics of the two interacting elements. It is, in fact, a one-one relationship, invariable and regular. It is on the basis of this regularity, as a matter of fact, that the Buddhist causal view is built. Changes follow regular patterns and the form and character of these patterns, or uniformities as we may call them, are regulated by the character of the conditions. The abstraction of all such uniformities, or the grand uniformity, is the Law of Causal Change, i.e., change as always dependent on causes.

From this thesis, Buddhism develops the view that these processes are observable in oneself, that, in fact, they must be fully and objectively so observed if the Buddhist is to prevent change from causing unsatisfactory emotional states. Change and causation are both empirical generalizations based on observable and verifiable facts. They are inferred from experiences of our own lives and must be recognised, if fruitful results are to be obtained in life.

Relationship with Anatta

Interwoven with these two salient concepts of change and causation is also the other equally important tenet that was understood by the early Buddhists as following from the very theory of the twelvefold Conditioned Genesis of the individual. This, the doctrine of Substancelessness (*anattatā*) consists of a total denial of a continuant, unchanging entity or substance persisting behind the properties of phenomena, which are themselves known to be in a state of continuous change. The Buddhists maintained that conditionality eliminated the necessity to assume 'a doer' (*kattā*), that there was no active agent but only a series of reactions to conditions. Mental phenomena, like physical ones, changed with changing conditions and the psycho-physical individual was, therefore, a mere process. The denial of a 'doer' thus precluded within Buddhist thought any possibility of the emergence of an Agency view of causation.

This denial of agency, however, did not imply for the Buddhist the absence of freedom in action and of individual effort. The effort of the individual (*attakāra*) was seen as an empirically observable

6 See Stebbing, *A Modern Introduction to Logic*, London, 933, p. 272.

fact. The individual was seen as free to take initiative and such initiative was causally efficacious, in the same manner as a man moving his body. In other words, the faculty of choice between alternatives is a property of sentient existence observable in everyday experience. It is a property or quality which can enter into efficacious interaction with its environment. Thoroughgoing in its empiricism, Buddhism did not hold that the admission of freedom of choice was inconsistent with its doctrine of conditionality. (See further FREE-WILL)

Examination of other Causal Views

It is entrenched in this position that the Buddha and the early Buddhists meet their critics and answer their opposing contemporaneous philosophies, a process through which the Buddhists shed a great deal of light on the meaning and import of their own theory, both by enabling us to place it in the context of its contemporaneous philosophical background, as well as by making explicit their stand on controversial and finer points.

A significant encounter with criticism of this kind is the one met with in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (*S.* II, p. 18 f.) where the Buddha is seen answering an unbelieving interlocutor, Acela Kassapa, who classifies the pronouncements made by his contemporaries with regard to the causes of suffering into four broad positions or categories. These four positions are that suffering is caused by :

(1) oneself (*sayaṃ kataṃ*)

(2) by another, or The Other (*paraṃ kataṃ*)

(3) Both by oneself or another, or The Other (*sayaṃ katañca paraṃ katañca*)

(4) Neither by oneself nor another, or The Other (*asayaṃkāraṃ aparaṃkāraṃ*)

which is equated to Non-causation (*adhicca-samuppanna*), i.e., in fact, suffering is not an effect.

The other logically possible or conceivable position which Kassapa seems to assume in this discourse is that which denies that suffering exists at all (*natthi dukkhanti*). *Dukkha* is in fact non-existent.

The Buddha is seen here as emphatically denying that his position is any one of the above. In the very next sutta of the same saṃyutta (*S.* II, p. 22 f.), the identical answer is given to Timbaruka whose question differs in that it refers to both happiness and suffering instead of suffering alone. Timbaruka categorizes the prevalent or possible viewpoints into the identical five groups, the only variation being the substitution of happiness and suffering (*sukha-dukkha*) as the subject at issue. The Buddha's alternative to all these five positions (which may be taken as one when alternated with the Buddha's) is given as the theory of Conditioned Genesis, the *paṭicca-samuppāda*, which he here describes as a teaching of the Truth in the middle (*majjhena*) not approaching either extreme (*ubho ante anupagamma*) the conclusion that may be drawn being that it is the middle way.

The first four positions are also mentioned by the Buddha himself without the intervention of an interlocutor, in a dialogue with Cunda which is reported in the *Pāsādika Sutta* (*D.* III, p. 137 f.) where, according to the Buddha, contemporaneous speculation is described as being concerned to explain in terms of self-causation, external causation, joint-causation and non-causation not only the psychological problems of the cause of suffering or happiness but also the ontological problem of the cause of the self (*atta*) and the world (*loka*). The holders of each of these four positions are presented here as uncompromisingly asserting theirs alone to be identical with the truth and all others as being false (*idam eva saccam mogham aññanti*). The Buddha states, in summing up, that he does not agree with any one of these positions for the reason that there can be holders of yet other views (*aññathā saññino*), implying perhaps that his view is one of these other possible views. This same classification concerning the self and the world is repeated again in the *Udāna* (p.69) in a different context where the disputatious confusion among the proponents of these four views is emphasised as resulting from their ignorance and blindness to the truth (*dhamma*).

However, in contrast to the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* passages, in neither of these two contexts is the theory of Conditioned Genesis given as the alternative, but in both it is made patently clear that the Buddha's position falls into none of these four categories while in the *Dīgha Nikāya* instance, the Buddha, adding that people have yet other views, affirms that his view is by no means on an equal level but is in fact on a higher plane.[7]

It is obvious that the fourfold classification given in all the four contexts cited above is based on the application of the formula of the four positions logically possible whenever the existence of any particular state is accepted as the effect (i.e., whenever the fifth position is denied). This formula, which the Buddha is in the habit of using frequently

7 *Imāya pi kho ahaṃ, Cunda paññattiyā vā'ttho ettāvatā samasamaṃ samanupassāmi kuto bhiyyo* . . . (*D.* III, p. 138).

in his analytical presentations of many problems pertaining to contemporaneously current views and which later Buddhist writers called the *catuṣkoṭi* (see further LOGIC), may in this instance be loosely presented in symbolic form as follows :—

Either (1) A is the cause, i.e., Self (*sayaṃ*) is the Cause,

Or (2) B is the cause, i.e., The Other (*paraṃ*) is the Cause,

Or (3) Both (A and B) is the cause — i.e., Self and The Other (together) is the Cause,

Or (4) Neither A nor B is the cause — i.e., Neither Self nor The Other is the Cause

—*if* the state C (e.g., Suffering) is admitted as true and this state C is admitted as an effect.

The *Dīgha Nikāya* assertion that the holders of each of these positions insisted on the truth of their position *alone*, implies that each assertion was held as excluding all the other three positions. This would mean that if A is the Cause, Not-A is not the cause, understanding B to be equivalent to Not-A. Then the assertion (1) 'A is the cause' would imply that the assertions:—

(2) Not-A is the cause
(3) (A + Not-A) is the cause
(4) (Neither A nor Not-A) is the cause
} are false

Similarly the assertion of the propositions (2) or (3) or (4) substituting Not-A for B would imply the denial of the remaining propositions as being true.

Thus it appears that the Buddha's contemporaries referred to here held that there were only four positions logically possible, of which only one could be true. Both Kassapa and Timbaruka, basing themselves on this 'logic', assume that there are only these four positions possible, presuming C to be admitted, and are so surprised when the Buddha denies that his position falls into any one of these categories that they ask him whether it is that he denies the existence of the state in question (i.e., 'the effect', suffering in one instance and pleasure-and-pain in the other), which is the only other logical position they can conceive of. Their consternation and puzzlement increase when he not only admits unconditionally but asserts[8] in no uncertain terms the existence of the 'effect' so much so that they are desperately driven to ask him, "What then, indeed, Sir, is your position?" The Buddha's answer is: Conditioned Genesis. This, he says, is the alternative, i.e., that causation is conditioned, that the arising and decline of things is dependent on conditions. It is evident, therefore, that the Buddhist theory, Conditioned Genesis, was conceived to be different from any one of the above positions and to have os apod and eschewed the *catuṣkoṭi* logic of the contemporaneous theorists. We have already noted that the Buddha specifically states that his view was not on an equal level with the four views, 'not to speak of these views being higher' This statement in the *Dīgha Nikāya* (loc. cit.) discussion on causation, we may legitimately consider as relevantly applicable in the present context too. It is important, therefore, to discover in what respects the Buddha's theory differed from those of these speculators. If the Buddha, accepting the existence of any state as an effect (i.e., as caused) denied that it was self-caused or caused by some other factor external to self, or caused by both or caused by neither of the first two agents, then it is clear that he must have considered all the content of the terms in the four propositions as faulty or meaningless and that his interpretation of the term 'cause' must be different in content.

Thus it becomes useful to understand the meaning and content attached to the three key terms in this context, namely, *sayaṃ*, *paraṃ*, and *kataṃ*, not only in their literary connotation but also as to how they stood in relation to each other in terms of the *catuṣko'i* logic and in the light of the Buddhist point of view.

Before proceeding to examine these terms in relation to the more complex ontological problem presented in the *Dīgha Nikāya* (*D.* III, p. 137 f.), it would be useful to investigate their use in the analysis of the psychological ones raised by Kassapa and Timbaruka, as the former seems to shed light on the latter and thus facilitates a solution.

In the case of Kassapa's problem, we have noticed already that the term *sayaṃ kataṃ* excludes the term *paraṃ kataṃ* (i.e., B=Not-A and A excludes Not-A). Then if A is taken to be the individual contemplating himself as the subject or the 'experiencer', whatever is not this individual is equivalent to *paraṃ* (Not-A). *Paraṃ* is then co-extensive with the universe of individuals, understood in a logical sense. This could be taken to mean that the proponents of the *sayaṃ kataṃ* theory held that the individual created his own suffering and that no-one else was the cause, that no external factor was responsible for the individual's suffering, that suffering as subjectively caused. Their view, in other words, was a kind of epistemological subjectivism with regard to its object, suffering. It

8 "Nay, Kassapa, suffering is not non-existent; suffering is. I am not one who knows not suffering nor sees it. I am one that knows suffering, Kassapa, I am one that sees suffering" (tr. Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Book of Kindred Sayings*, II, London, 1952, p. 15).

could be taken as also implying a kind of ethical subjectivism where the individual alone was responsible for creating his suffering, nothing external being the cause of it. This view could be followed by its cognate or corollary implication, dangerous from the Buddhist point of view, that suffering could be removed by merely taking thought, by mere act of resolution.

If the term *paraṃ* was to be interpreted as above (i e., Not–A), then to assert that suffering was *paraṃ kataṃ* (externally caused) would be a total denial that suffering was caused by oneself and that one had any hand or power in the matter. It would amount to an assertion that the universe excluding oneself was the cause of an individual's suffering, here the word universe si nifying not only the perceived and inferred world but also such conceived entities as God or Gods, Devil or Demons, Fate or Destiny. That the term *paraṃ* as cause excluded the individual as oneself and was not inclusive of the latter is obvious in that this position (of including both) is given as the third alternative position (proposition 3), viz. 'Both *sayaṃ* and *paraṃ* is the cause', i.e., the proposition A and Not-A is the cause. The third and the ourth propositions, in fact, illuminate further the circumference of the two terms used in the first two propositions, just as much as the first two illuminate the limits of the latter two. A+Not-A taken as a totality, a sing.e entity would imply self-causation, causation by itself, i e., the own intrinsic nature of (A+Not-A) would cause an effect on itself. The individual and the universe taken together as an entity would be the cause of suffering. The need, then, for the third proposition would not exist since this assertion is given in the first proposition itself, if *sayaṃ* is understood as an entity causing its own effects. The separate mention of the third proposition may be taken as indicating that *sayaṃ* is not to be understood in this aforesaid sense but only as meaning the individual as subject, as oneself. It may mean that the joint terms are to be taken as partial participation or interaction of the two factors, *sayaṃ* and *paraṃ*

The fourth proposition may be interpreted as implying Non-Causation, although the word *adhicca-samuppanna* which is usually appended to the formulas, has sometimes been translated as 'Chance-Causation'. Chance-Causation would imply a denial of the regularity observed in events, a denial that the character of one event was related to the character of an antecedent one whose non-occurrence would result in the non-occurrence of the later event. It would mean that the nature of any event, or at least of certain events, was unpredictable on the basis of an earlier event, although, in fact, an earlier event may have given rise to the later one. Events, then, would be fortuitous in origin, mere accidents. They occur at random, like the winning of a sweep-ticket or the turn up of trumps in a card-g me. It may be said that the purchase of the sweep-ticket led to the winning but it is not considered the cause of the winning and in fact the winning is not predicta le y the purchase. Historically, it appears that the idea of chan e-events has more often than not led to views of fate or providence and would rightly fall into the category of External Causation in the above classification.

Non-Causation, on the other hand, would imply that nothing is an effect, that ph nomena arise without cause, that an event had no antecedent event which was related to it and on whose occurrence the event under consideration depended for its occurrence or depended on its existence. It is probably this latter position that Kassapa and Timbaruka had in mind when they referred to the thinkers who maintained that neither Self nor the Other was the cause, for 'Chance-Causation' is not total denial of a cause but only a denial of *laws* of causation which imply regularity of behaviour. (See further DETERMINISM AND INDETREMINISM).

The term '*kataṃ*' stands for 'done', 'worked' or 'made' (*PED.* sub voce *kata*) and therefore. to be understood as implying agency, volitional action.

Buddha's criticism, then, of the four positions may be interpreted as being on two grounds, firstly, that the Self and the World are, in these arguments, separated as two distinct entities, when, in fact, they are part and parcel of a total flux , a vortex of perpetual interchange and exchange. Secondly, the propositions assume the existence of an active agent, a volitional force, a 'doer', which assumption the Buddha's doctrine of *anatta* rejects as totally unfounded. Both the first and the second assumptions are, thus, in the Buddha's view, propositions for which there exists no ground. It may be noted that the Buddha, having agreed to be questioned by Kassapa, does not answer him either in the affirmative or the negative,[9] but only says "not so" (*māh' evaṃ*) meaning 'ask not so', which implies most probably, that the question is not worded correctly, assuming, as it does, two groundless propositions.

9 The negative which he usually uses is *no h'etaṃ* (e.g., *D.* I, p. 3).

Thus it is that, in the Kassapa episode, the Buddha points out that the Self-Causation (*sayaṃ kataṃ*) theory, by identifying 'he who acts' with 'he who experiences' (*so karoti so paṭisaṃvediyati*) leads to the Eternalist theory (*sassatavāda*) (*S.* II, p 20). The Eternalists were apparently led to error, according to the Buddhists, by failing to take into account the change and the assumption of an arbitrary time-interval involved between the action and the experience (of the result), wherefore the idea of a self which acted, as persisting to receive the resultant experience, so that the effect is seen to be received by the same entity which caused it.

The same error, seen in the reversed form, seems to be at the root of the view of External Causation (*paraṃ kataṃ*) where it was maintained that 'one acts, another experiences' (*aññe karoti, aññe paṭisaṃvediyati*). This, the Buddha tells Kassapa (*S.* II, p 20), leads to the Annihilationist view (*ucchedavāda*). Here again the change and the assumption of an arbitrary time-interval has misled these theorists to take the 'experiencer' as an entirely separate entity from the one who acts, assuming that the one who acts has ceased to be and the recipient is entirely another (*aññe*). The one who acts, then, is equivalent to any external agency.

In both these positions, the Buddha detects the presence of the Substantialist and Agency views of Causation and it is obviously these assumptions which the Buddha rejects, in the light of his doctrines of *anicca* and *anatta*.

The implication of this rejection is obvious as regards the problem of suffering or of happiness and suffering. That an individual's suffering or happiness is caused by oneself is faulty because it is based on the assumption of an immutable self or of an agency. That it is caused by others or by external factors would be equally fallacious, being based on the same false assumption of abiding entities or of an agency. The Buddha, in placing the *paticca-samuppāda* as the alternative to all these four propositions is obviously making it clear that his theory is distinctly free from these two assumptions of Substance and Agency. The arising of suffering, as well as its opposite, happiness, must, according to him, be explained as phenomena within a flux of change, interchange and exchange. A true perspective of that problem must be obtained free from notions of substance and agents.

This rejection has also implications for the ontological problem referred to in the *Digha Nikāya* (see above). The Ṛgvedic animism and the subsequent anthropomorphism, as well as the Upaniṣadic theory of *ātman* stand eliminated as self-causationist theories, for here too are the unwarranted assumptions of an eternal self or substance and an agency.

From the ontological point of view, several other theories would also stand rejected as basing themselves on External Causation. One of these is the *Issaranimmānavāda* which posits the creation by a deity. In fact, the Buddhists seem to take into account two possible deductions, when the argument of creation by a deity is taken to its logical conclusion. One would amount to the admission of a First Cause, and the other, of a Final Cause, in the Aristotelian or even in the Liebnizian sense. The Buddhists detect that the theory of First Cause might as well lead to an admission of Non-Causation. An uncaused Cause might as well be a negation of causation since here the law of causation is suspended at an arbitrary point. The point is only being pushed back in time. The *Dīgha Nikāya* (*D.* I, p. 28), in fact, speaks of a class of thinkers in its time, who by an error of retrocognition claimed: "I did not exist before, but now, not having existed before, have come into being." They thereby came to the conclusion that, as first beings, they were uncaused. The Buddhists classified them, not as First-Causationists but as Non-Causationists (*adhicca-samuppannika*).

On the other hand, the Buddhists were not slow to see that the *Issaranimmānavāda* would argue towards a teleological interpretation of the Universe, basing itself on the notion of a Final Cause. The Buddhist criticism of the teleological view, apart from that it assumes an Agency view of causation, was that it has two untenable presuppositions, that the Creator-Deity was a benign being or that evil did not exist in the world. The Buddhists argued that either the Deity was an evil overlord (*pāpaka issara*) or that the theory did not explain the problem of evil in the world (*M.* II, p. 222).

A teleological view, which may have been either theistic or mechanical, was also expressed by Makkhali Gosāla and the theory of deterministic causation implied in his theory of salvation through transmigration (*saṃsārasuddhi*) was detected as such by the Buddhists. If Gosāla's theory was not theistic, the doctrine of predetermination or destiny (*niyati*) which he preached would still stand rejected by the Buddhists on the ground that it assumed thereby an Agency, *niyati* having been conceived as a hypostatized entity.

Thus, the Buddhists note in any external-agency view the admission of the presence, at one and the same time, both Determinism and Indeterminism, the cause being considered a free agent while the caused is a determined or conditioned subject of the causal agent.

When the Buddha speaks to Kassapa and Timbaruka of his own theory of Causation as taking the middle way and presents the *paṭicca-samuppāda* as the alternative to both, it is obvious that he is indicating that it is distinctly separate from either Rigid Determinism or Indeterminism as it is from Eternalism and Annihilationism. A close study of the *paṭicca-samuppāda* would reveal that its interpretation of causation as a confluence of conditions is to be apprehended, surmounting the logic of the four propositions. Thus it is that one of the epithets which the Buddha uses to describe it to Ānanda is that it is 'beyond the sphere of mere logic'.

See further: CONDITIONALITY, DETERMINISM AND INDETERMINISM, HETU, PACCAYA, PAṬICCA-SAMUPPĀDA.

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CAVES. It has been generally accepted by archaeologists and anthropologists that some of the earliest of the human species selected caves as their natural and safest refuge for shelter, in preference to the arboreal habitat of their pre-human remote ancestors. (This is, of course, subject to the proviso that the physical character of the region occupied by a particular group of men permitted them to do it.) Caves, thus, have a continuous history of occupation by mankind throughout the Pleistocene Age and particularly in the Middle and Late Palaeolithic cultural phases. Men have taken advantage of this kind of free shelter even up to the present day. Although caves have a remote antiquity attached to them and are generally associated with pre-historic times, cave-dwelling does not necessarily imply a primitive culture. They have played a significant role in the civilizations attached to the world's greatest religions and the pre-eminent position which they hold in connection with the history of Buddhism is described by David MacRitchie in his article on Caves (*ERE.*) as follows:

> "But, on the other hand, it is a remarkable fact that cave life, in its crudest form, without any environment to suggest civilization even of a primitive kind, has been voluntarily adopted

by many members of highly developed races. In these instances the impelling power has been religious, and its origin is oriental. At the present day the practice is pre-eminently associated with Buddhism, of which religion it has been a feature for untold centuries" (*id.* III, p. 267).

Buddhist caves comprehend not merely natural caverns and grottoes but also man-made recesses hewn from rock, cliff and boulder. Caves have been utilised by the Buddhists, at various times and climes, for a wide variety of purposes, as individual dwelling units and dormitories for corporate living, as shrines and temples for the performance of worship and ritual, as centres of meditation and retreat, as halls for congregational assembly, as venues for convention of councils, as recesses for housing libraries, as stores for victuals and valuables and even as hide-outs and refuges during periods of invasion, civil war, intolerance and terror. Caves are prominently associated with the history of the rise of Buddhist schools and of the development of the multifarious aspects of Buddhist culture and civilization. The history of Buddhist caves is a monumental record of the significant achievements of the Buddhists in the realms of architecture, sculpture, painting, religion, ritual and other forms of religious symbolism. Since Buddhist caves represent in concrete form the prevalent religious and philosophical idealism of different Buddhist communities of monks and nuns, the caves used by them throw considerable light on the background to developments in Buddhist thought and practice. In many of the lands where the Buddhist communities grew up, they were the first, within historical times, to make systematic and extensive use of caves for a multitude of religious purposes. Buddhist caves are found throughout all traditional Buddhist lands situated in the mainland of Asia and the adjacent islands in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. These monuments, which bear silent testimony to the gigantic achievements of the spiritual culture of the Buddhists, and which form a partial record of the glorious heights to which humanity ascended in times gone by, have lain in ruins for many centuries due to ravages of time and circumstance and the most important of them were re-discovered only in modern times consequent to scientific expeditions and archaeological research. Among the Buddhist caves the world over, those in India such as Ajanta and Ellora and in Central Asia such as Tun Huang and Mai-chi-shan have been able to achieve greater world renown on account of their magnitude and magnificence.

Early Buddhism

The use of caves in India primarily for purposes of dwelling is decidedly pre-Buddhistic. The custom goes back to Vedic and even pre-historic times. The primitive aboriginal tribes of India settled not only along banks of rivers but also, wherever available, in natural caverns where they sought shelter from the elements as well as from wild beasts. Natural caverns were utilised in Vedic times as the abodes of hermits and as sojourns of mendicants and wanderers. The earliest historical use of caves for purposes of assembly may be credited to the ancient Indian community of Ājīvakas who like the Buddhists professed corporate ideals. Among these pre-Buddhistic caves reference may be made to the Gopika, Vahiyaka and Vedathika caves in the area around ancient Rājagṛha.

The Buddhist association with caves goes right back to the time of the Buddha himself. During his long public career as the Enlightened one as well as during the years of his wandering as an ascetic in search of truth and peace, the Buddha is recorded to have lived in a variety of dwellings which included caves and mountain retreats. Caves lent themselves ideally to a life of continence and celibacy and aloofness and solitude. Located in jungles and mountain fastnesses, and therefore removed from populous centres of lay life in town and hamlet, caves conduced to the culture of the ascetic life. Life in the caves was not always and altogether congenial and salubrious but it allowed men of detachment and of a contemplative disposition to return to the simple life of nature away from the ensnaring accoutrements of civilization. The *Thera-* and *Therī-gāthā*, which form part of Sutta Piṭaka of the Pali Canon, depict to us in idyllic terms the life of freedom and joy led by monks and nuns in caves and other lonely retreats commanding scenes of natural beauty and grandeur.

The Gijjhakūṭa which the Buddhist tradition identifies as a favourite place of sojourn by the Buddha, itself appears to be a cave resort. There is evidence to indicate that the custom of living in caves was fairly prevalent though not extensive in the Janapadas covered by the Buddha's itineraries. Some of his immediate disciples who betook themselves to a life in the caves undoubtedly did so following a prevalent custom and the fact that the Buddha sanctioned the custom is confirmed in the Vinaya texts.

According to the Vinaya Piṭaka, the Buddha has prescribed four *nissayas* (resources or requisites) for a monk on food, clothing, shelter and medicine. In

the case of shelter he says " The religious life has dwelling at the foot of a tree for its resource. Thus you must endeavour to live all your life. *Vihāras, aḍḍhayogas*, storied dwellings, attics, caves (*guhā*) are extra allowances." (Rhys Davids and Oldenberg, *Vinaya Texts*, Oxford, 1881, Part I, p. 173; see also n. 1 which says : These are the five kinds of dwellings (*pañca lenāni*) which are declared to be allowable, (*Vin.* II, p. 146). The single expressions are explained by Buddhaghosa in his note on *Cullavagga* 1.1. as follows : '*aḍḍhayogo ' ti suvaṇṇavaṅgageham, pāsādo'ti dīghapāsādo, hammiyan ti upariākāsatale patiṭṭhita-kūṭāgāro pāsādo yeva, guhāti iṭṭhakaguhā silāguhā dāruguhā paṃsuguhā*, i.e., '*Aḍḍhayoga* is a gold coloured Bengal house. *Pāsāda* is a long storied mansion (or, the whole of an upper storey). Hammiya is a *Pāsāda*, which has an upper chamber placed on the topmost storey. *Guhā* is a hut made of bricks, or in a rock, or of wood . . .').

It is evident from the above that caves were used as dwelling places from the earliest days of Buddhist monasticism. Though a cave is classified under 'extra allowances', the Vinaya Piṭaka reflects the actual conditions of the Buddha's day. The Buddha himself is said to have used a cave as his abode. The famous cave called Sattapaṇṇiguhā in Rājagaha or Rajgir was one such instance (see *DPPN*. Vol. II, p. 1009). Sattapaṇṇiguhā was, "a cave in Rājagaha, on the slope of Mount Vebhāra. Once when the Buddha was staying there, he gave to Ānanda the opportunity of asking him to live for an aeon, but Ānanda because of his unmindfulness failed to take it (*D*. II, p.116). The cave was sometimes used as a residence for monks coming from afar (e.g., *Vin*. II, p. 76 ; III p. 159). According to the Commentaries and the Chronicles (*DA*. I, p. 9; *VinA* I, p. 10; *Mhv*. Ch. iii, *v*. 19 ; *Dpv*. Ch. iv, *v*. 5 ; *ThagA*. I, p. 351 ; the cave is not mentioned in the Vinaya account of the Council, in the eleventh chapter of the *Cullavagga*) the First Council was held in a hall erected by Ajātasattu outside the Sattapaṇṇiguhā."

Asoka and the Caves in North India

During the two centuries following the *Parinirvāṇa* of the Buddha, Buddhist monastic establishments witnessed a slow and steady growth. Asoka the Buddhist Emperor is credited with having been responsible for the erection of many stūpas and monasteries. His inscriptions do not mention any dedication of caves to the Buddhist Saṅgha, but in the thirteenth year of his reign, he donated two caves in the Barabar Hills to the Ājīvakas (Romila Thapar, *Asoka and the Decline of the Mauryas*, Oxford University Press, 1961. p. 154). There are, in fact, three cave inscriptions on Barabar Hill ascribed to Asoka. The word *Kubha* is used here to signify a cave. Two have been donated after Asoka had been anointed twelve years and the third when he had been anointed nineteen years (*Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum*, ed. E. Hultzsch, Clarendon University Press, 1925, pp. 181-2). Barabar Hills are situated 15 miles to the North of Gaya in Bihar. There are altogether seven caves in these hills, four of which belong to the Barabar group and three to the Nagarjuni group. Each of the three Nagarjuna caves contains an inscription of Dasaratha, grandson of Emperor Asoka (ibid Introduction p. xxviii).

South India

"The earliest inscriptions in the Tamil country are found engraved in the natural caves and caverns in the generally inaccessible heights and slopes of some of the hills in the districts of Tirunelveli, Madurai, Ramanathapuram, Tiruchirappalli and Coimbatore and a few in the North Arcot and Chingleput districts in the Madras State. One is found in the Nellore district of the Andhra Pradesh. With some dressing the caves were made fairly fit for human habitation. Not very far from the bustle and noise of the inhabited areas, and yet solemn and quiet, these places were obviously resorted to by religious people who wanted seclusion and calmness for leading a life of contemplation and religious exercise. Some of the caves are found to exist amidst picturesque surroundings and provided with stone beds carved out of rock and water convenience ; all of them appear as ideal resorts for the serious and religious minded few devoted to a life of seclusion, high thinking and simple living. The period that may be assigned to the lithic records found in these natural caverns and caves is the second century B.C. to the first century A.C."

"The caves and the caverns in the Tamil country are associated with the Jains, Buddhists and the Ājīvikas, whose arrival and spread formed one of the important aspects of the religious history of South India during the pre-Christian era. These religions appear to have reached the Tamil country in the third and second centuries B.C. when the Mauryan Empire was at the height of its power and influence under its rulers " (T.V. Mahalingam, *Early South Indian Palaeography*, University of Madras, 1967, p.161.)

Sri Lanka

The idea of caves or rock abodes for monks was introduced to Sri Lanka from Mauryan India. Rock caves meant as abodes for anchorites are the only monuments dating from the earliest period of Buddhism now available almost intact. These caves are not chambers excavated into rocks but natural rock caverns made fit for human habitation by cutting a drip ledge to prevent rain-water inside. The Rājagirilena (Pl. I) at Mihintale off the ancient capital city of Anuradhapura is representative of these caves (S. Paranavitana, *History of Ceylon*, Vol. I, Pt. I, Ceylon University Press, Colombo, 1959, pp. 256–57).

Sri Lanka is fortunate in possessing over 1200 cave inscriptions which belong to the period between the third century B.C. and the first century A.C. A complete account of these caves in Sri Lanka is included in Volume 1 of the '*Inscriptions of Ceylon*' published by the Archaeological Survey of Ceylon (1970). There, S. Paranavitana gives a graphic account of these caves:

"Our inscriptions are indited in nearly 1200 caves in various parts of the Island. These caves had been prepared with considerable labour and granted to the Buddhist Saṅgha by devotees from all walks of life, from royalty down to artisans like potters and smiths. These caves, and the inscriptions indited in them, prove that there were numerous members of the Saṅgha who were so earnest about their spiritual culture as to take up their abodes in caves in secluded spots, and spend their time in meditation and that there was a lay following of these monks large enough to prepare for them the necessary abodes, and provide them with their requisites. In the period of about three centuries following the advent of Saint Mahinda, to which these records can be assigned, there were thus in Ceylon congregations of monks and of nuns (bhikkhus and bhikkhuṇīs) as well as of *upāsakas* and *upāsikās* (male and female lay devotees)" (p. cii).

The caves in Sri Lanka are situated mostly in the eastern, central, north-central and north-western parts of the island. "All but 42 inscriptions in this collection have been incised in caves which are mostly natural rock shelters, but slightly enlarged and improved by human effort. The most important artificial feature about these caves is the drip-line cut on the brow to prevent rain-water flowing into the cave. The inscriptions, as a rule, are incised above this drip-line. They are therefore protected from the action of water. The engraving of the letters has been done to a considerable depth, a quarter of an inch on the average .. Normally, these cave inscriptions are beyond the reach of a person standing on the ground. These circumstances have contributed to their excellent state of preservation, excepting where the rock has cracked or peeled away due to natural causes. In a few instances, the boulder containing the cave has collapsed, damaging the inscription."

"The distribution of these inscriptions gives an indication of the early settlements of the Sinhalese, but the absence of Brahmi inscriptions in a particular area does not necessarily mean that the area in question was not occupied by the Sinhalese in the early period. The absence of Brahmi inscriptions in the Kalutara, Galle and Matara districts may be explained as due to the reason that these wet and thickly forested regions were not favoured for settlements by the early Aryan-speaking immigrants to Ceylon. But their absence in the Mannar and Jaffna districts is not due to the reason that these areas were not occupied by them. We know that Nāgadīpa (Jaffna Peninsula) and the vicinity of Mahātittha (near Mannar) were among the areas in which the early Sinhalese first arrived. Due to the reason that the early inscriptions are in caves, they are only found in those areas where outcrops of gneiss formation afford rock shelters among the numerous boulders. There are no caves, and no inscriptions in areas where such rock formations do not exist. Between Riṭigala and Polonnaruwa also, there is a considerable stretch of territory in which rock caves containing inscriptions have not been discovered" (ibid. p. xvi).

In addition to the overwhelming inscriptional evidence, there is literary evidence too to support the occupation of caves by Buddhist monks in ancient times. The *Visuddhimagga* (*Vism.* I, p. 38) gives such an instance where the Thera Cittagutta lived in a cave called Karandaka for over sixty years, but he was said to have been so restrained in the use of his five senses that during the whole of that time he did not look at the beautiful paintings on the walls of the cave (E. W. Adikaram, *Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon*, Ceylon, 1946, p. 126). The *Mahāvaṃsa* states that in the reign of Duṭṭhagāmaṇī (2nd century B.C.), silver appeared in the Ambaṭṭhakola cave which was at a distance of eight yojanas south of Anuradhapura (*Mhv.* Ch. xxviii, *v.* 20). Later, one of his successors Āmaṇḍagāmaṇī Abhaya (1st century A.C.) built the Rajatalena-vihāra at the same place (See Geiger, *Mhv.* tr 1950. p. 246). This monastery known as Ridī-vihāra near Kurunegala is still a living place

of worship. The cave temple known as Ālokavihāra is traditionally believed to be the place where the Tripiṭaka was committed to writing in the reign of Vaṭṭagāmaṇī Abhaya (Vaḷagambā) in the 1st century B.C.

Architecturally speaking, the cave-temples in Sri Lanka contain only improvements and embellishments within the natural caves themselves, in contrast to the artificially excavated rock-cut architecture of India. Many cave-temples seem to have had paintings on their walls, which have now perished both due to natural causes and acts of vandalism. Examples of mediaeval and 'Kan' yan' (18th c. A.C.) paintings are found mainly in the central regions of Sri Lanka. Dambulla and Degaldoruva are two of the most well known of these cave temples. Dambulla (Pl.II), in the Matale District, is the largest of the living cave shrines in Sri Lanka and dates from the pre-Christian era. The most striking painting here is on the ceiling—that of the Buddha calling the Earth to witness (*bhūmisparśa mudrā*). Degaldoruva is a much smaller cave temple, near Kandy, the ancient hill capital, but here too the 'Kandyan' period paintings are exquisite.

Caves are still used by the Buddhists (both the laity and the Saṅgha) for meditation and quiet retreat.

India (Period after Asoka)

With the development and spread of Buddhism after Asoka, not only natural rock-shelters but also artificially excavated caves were used for monastic purposes. On the subject of 'rock architecture', it is worthwhile to note the following words of Percy Brown which are relevant to the cave-temples of India.

"The fashioning of architectural forms out of the living rock, or rock-architecture, occupies a very prominent place in the development of creative art in India. Yet in spite of the admittedly high aesthetic character of these productions they have never been allowed that position in the field of art to which they are fully entitled. Ever since these examples of rock architecture became a subject of study, it has been the custom to refer to them as 'caves', implying that they were natural grottoes on the mountain side, the haunt of wild people, and still wilder animals. No word would be more misleading to designate these wonderful records of man's handwork, as many of them are large and well planned temples skillfully wrought and chiselled out of the solid cliff and to define which the term rock architecture is the only one which can adequately describe their workmanship. If, however, the usually accepted definition of architecture as 'good construction truthfully expressed' is applied, then on account of their technique alone they cannot be classed as architecture in the strict sense of the word. These rock-hewn forms are expert achievements but they involved no constructional principles, nor do they display any functional properties, their columns signify no adjustment of support to load, the arches carry no weight, nor do they counteract any thrust, in the whole operation no structural intelligibility is required, as no problems of this nature arise. In a word rock architecture to all intents and purposes is not architecture, it is sculpture, but sculpture on a grand and magnificent scale." (*Indian Architecture* 'Buddhist and Hindu Periods', by Percy Brown, Bombay, 1965, p. 19).

Late Buddhism

Buddhist Caves in Western India

The Buddhist Caves in Western India are greater in both splendour and extent compared to those in Northern and Eastern India. These Western caves constitute a living commentary on the rise and spread as well as the development and decline of Buddhism in India. There are over fifty groups of caves in Western India mostly within the state of Maharastra and largely belonging to the Buddhists. Out of a total of about 900 caves over 700 belong to the Buddhists.

Buddhist cave temples belong to two great classes, the pre-Christian Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna caves dating from around 100 A.C. The earlier caves consisted of one or more cells with stone beds with a verandah (*padaśālā*). To these were later added square halls for the use of the monastic assembly. Sculpture in these earlier caves consisted of a symbol of the Buddha such as a *dāgāba*. But with the development of the Buddha cult these symbols failed to satisfy the worshippers. The Buddha statue seated on a throne gradually replaced the earlier symbols. Statue making itself was later extended until the caves became transformed into complicated shrines. Various types of beings who in the earlier era were attendants of the Buddha were now exalted into separate objects of worship. In the developed Mahāyāna times later on, the great odhisattvas began to dominate the sculpture and painting in these Buddhist caves. The Western Indian caves of the Buddhists extend through a period from 300 B.C. to 750 A.C.

Among the Western caves the earliest are at Junagadh. Others are in the Konkan and Deccan as well as Kondane, Bhaja, Bedsa and Karle. Early groups of caves are also found in Nasik and at Ajanta as well as at Marol and Kanheri. The more recent groups of caves belong to the Mahāyāna and these are found at Ajanta, Ellora, Bagh, Kanheri, Dhank and Dhamnar (See J. Fergusson, *Illustrations of the Rock-cut Temples of India*, London, 1845 ; See also James Fergusson and James Burgess, *The Cave Temples of India*, London, 1880).

These Buddhist caves in Western India appear to have been adopted by the monks first as monasteries along trade routes.* The hard and soft stone in the Western ghats lent itself excellently to excavation of caves. They afforded protection from the summer heat and the rains of the monsoon, within the caves the monks were exposed to the cool winds and the beauty of the surrounding scenery. These caves were excavated by driving rows of vertical holes into the bottom of parallel tunnels, inserting wooden bolts and soaking in water and detaching huge stone blocks. The sculptures were executed next with the aid of the chisel.

There is evidence to suggest that the design of caves imitated brick and timber structures of the time . The cells inhabited by the monks were cut out beneath overhanging rocks or along cliff ledges, accessible by ladders, bridges and tunnels. The earlier Buddhist caves in this region consisted of pillared halls with stone benches for beds, and underground cisterns were dug by the side of the entrances. The cisterns themselves were fed by a catchment and aqueduct system. Later caves show greater sophistication and magnitude and they consist of pillared halls with dozens of cells and porches. The refectories carved out of the rock consisted of vast halls with low stone tables. Still later caitya-halls were added together with a stūpa. Some of the caves were even provided with rock-cut cemeteries.

There were dozens of such cave settlements in Western India where the number of individual caves ran to hundreds.

The biggest group of caves is at Junnar on the Deccan plateau consisting of 150 caves, the second biggest at Krishnagiri with 87 caves followed by those at Ajanta and Ellora with 27 and 33 caves.

The earliest cave settlement in Western India is that of Bhaja dating from the first centuary B.C. to first century A.C. This settlement consists of two stories of monks' cells with caitya-halls, towers and balconies. The caves at Kanheri and Karle (1st century – 2nd century A.C.) reveal a later stage in cave construction. Vertical pillars rise from pot bases and end in round capitals. Balconies let in floods of light. The doors consist of three arches each and between these are hewn life-size groups of donors. Later on huge Buddha statues are added. The outer courts are fenced off by balustrades in stone columns.

The last stage in cave construction is represented by Pandulena caves off Nasik (2nd cent. A C.) These caves have caitya-halls, windows, entrances with several stūpas and arches and colonnades. Other groups of caves consist of those further south in Maharastra including the world-renowned Ajanta caves noted for their frescoes and sculptures.

At Ajanta we have the most perfect and complete series of Buddhist caves in India. Of the caves at Ajanta, six belong to the Hīnayāna and as many as twenty three to the Mahāyāna. Changes in form of worship and ritual and dogma mark the essential differences between the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna caves. The Ajanta caves are grand and sophisticated structures incorporating all the latest developments in architecture, sculpture and painting. Cave No. XVII is noteworthy for many fine paintings including the animated scence of the landing of Vijaya in Sri Lanka and his coronation (See J. Fergusson and James Burgess, op. cit for detailed information).

During the later Mahāyāna and Tantric stages of Indian Buddhism, the older cave temples such as Bhaja, Kanheri, Junnar and Nasik were re-decorated consistent with the needs of the new religion. There now appeared ornate reliefs of the Buddha preaching, surrounded by hosts of bodhisattvas. New shrines devoted to the cults of Avalokiteśvara and Tārā were carved out of the living rock. The new balustrades depict not only the Buddha but erotic couples (*mithuna*). The walls and ceilings were painted not only with Jātaka scenes but also with dancers, musicians and couples in dalliance. The new caves at Ajanta belonging to the period 5th cent. A.C. to 8th cent. A.C. reflect this change.

Buddhist Caves in N.W. India and Afghanistan

From Western India the tradition of Buddhist caves spread northwards and across the Kabul valley to Afghanistan and beyond to Central Asia. The period of the Kushana emperors witnessed extensive

* What follows is based on the account given by H. Goetz, *India — Five Thousand Years of Indian Art*, London, 1959, p. 55 ff.

cave construction which was made possible by royal protection and the financial support of wealthy merchants who embraced Buddhism. The caves of the Buddhists dotted the hill sides of Peshawar, Surat, the Kabul valley, Baluchistan, Bactria and Bukhora. The Bamian valley, in particular, developed rapidly in the matter of the construction of roligious foundations. Rocky cliffs with their high vertical surfaces were transformed into thousands of caves forming sanctuaries adorned with statues and sumptuous paintings. The cave monasteries at Bamiyan had numerous colls, domed shrines and assembly halls interconnected with tunnels.

The influence of Western elements in Buddhist art is reflected clearly at Bamiyan. Just as the statue of the deified Roman Emperor may have influenced the anthropomorphic representation of the Buddha, so the classical cult of the colossal that began to manifest itself in the giant effigies of Nero and Constantine has reflected its influence on the giant images at Bamiyan. These two colossal statues, respectively 120 and 175 feet high, were carved out of the sandstone cliff and covered with a heavy layer of mud and plaster originally painted and gilded. The 120 foot colossus is an enlargement of a typical Gandhara Buddha of the second century A. C. The larger 175 foot statue, with its drapery arranged in string-like folds corresponds to the late phase of Gandhara sculpture. One of the chapels behind the 175 foot Buddha has a coffered dome that might have been inspired by the vaults of the Temple of Bacchus at Baalbek In a number of assembly halls there is an imitation of the familiar squinch of Sassanian domical architecture.

The famous examples of the wall-paintings at Bamiyan belong to a relatively later period and a provincial variants of Indian and Sassanian styles (*Gandhara Sculpture from Pakistan Museums* by Benjamin Rowland, Jr., The Asia Society Inc., New York City, 1960).

Tibet

David MacRitchie gives a further account in the article quoted earlier (*ERE*. Vol. III, p. 267) of the life of Buddhist anchorites in caves in Tibet :

"From the graphic pen of Sven Hedin, whose knowledge of the inner life of Tibet is unsurpassed by that of any European, one gains a clear idea of the anchorite life as it is practised by Buddhist hermits. On one occasion, Sven Hedin visited a cave, situated near the monastery of Linga, whose occupant was a lama who had lived there for three years, in complete darkness, and in isolation from his follow-men. His food was brought to him daily, being pushed into his cave through a narrow tunnel. His predecessor had spent twelve years in this way, in absolute silence. And he in turn had succeeded a lama who, entering the cave at the age of twenty, lived there in the same manner to the day of his death, after forty years of seclusion. Another cave, on a mountain side, was inhabited by a hermit said to be a hundred years old. At the hermitage of Lung-ganden-gompa, a lama had lived for sixty nine years, having been brought out only to die."

"These details are noteworthy, because they picture the appearance of the anchorites of the present and of the past, and are probably applicable to mediaeval Europe as well as to the East. For the Buddhist ideal of a supposed sanctity obtained in this way actuated thousands of anchorites in Egypt and Syria, and thence passed westward into Europe, during the early centuries of the Chirstian era. It is to be observed that caves thus occupied would yield no traces of civilization to the modern investigator, who might consequently make the erroneous deduction that only the lowest savages had ever made such places their abode" (*ERE*. Vol. III, p. 267).

Central Asia and China

The oasis towns of Central Asia, lying on the trade and pilgrim routes between India and China, Kashgar, Khotan, Kucha, Turfan and Tun-huang are specially important for the history of Buddhist Art. The most important caves are those of Ming Oi (Thousand Cells) in Kuch, those at Bezeklik and Khocho in Turfan and those at Kumtura. The caves here consist of cells, hermitages and chapels hewn out of rock on the faces of cliffs. They were embellished with works of sculpture and painting. They also frequently contained a stūpa. The idea of these rock sanctuaries came from India and were transmitted into this area through Bamiyan.

The iconography illustrated the life of the Buddha and the Jātaka tales. The westernmost caves in Central Asia, being earlier to those in the east, reflect more the symbolism of Hīnayāna Buddhism. Thus, caves in Kucha are typical of Hīnayāna art whereas those at Turfan are typical of Mahāyāna art. The caves in Kumtura, Khocho and Bezeklik reflect the influence of Chinese art of the Mahāyāna tradit on. The caves in Tun-huang (Pl. VII) reflect Chinese art. Tun-huang was a vital military, political and commercial centre on the Chinese border. The caves at Tun-huang are in several stories. one above the other and were at one time connected by wooden

porches, galleries and flights of steps. At the end of the 8th century more than a thousand caves are said to have existed. This exaggerated number might have been inspired by the concept of the thousand Buddhas which was responsible for naming the spot as Chien-fo Tung (Caves of the thousand Buddhas). Tradition traces the excavation of these caves to a vision which the monk Lo Tsun had in 366 A.C. of a Thousand Buddhas in a cloud of glory on the three peaks, across the valley from the cliff escarpment off Tun-huang city in the far west of Kansu. The actual number of caves yielded by the latest surveys is however 486. Architecturally the caves at Tun-huang are much less complex than others in Central Asia. Most of them are simple cubic-shaped chambers of moderate or small size. The largest chapels consist of a vestibule and the shrine proper. Less frequently the caves have stūpa pillars with an ambulatory around them. The embellishments consist largely of paintings on the walls depicting Buddha realms, Jātakas etc. The art is wholly Mahāyānist. The cave sanctuaries of Central Asia have both an artistic as well as a cultural value (Dietrich Seckel, *The Art of Buddhism*, London, 1964, p. 65 f.).

The idea of excavating monasteries and shrines from the living rock travelled with Buddhism, as already referred to, from India to Central Asia and beyond. As a matter of fact the routes along which Buddhism spread to China and the Far East can be traced by following the line of cave temples and the dates ascribed to them. From Tun-huang (360-1300 A.C.) Buddhism spread to the North East China(Yunkang, 460-540 A.C.; I-hsien, 490-530 A.C.), then to the centre around Loyang(Lungmen, 495-750 A.C. ; Kung-hsien, 505-40 A.C.) ; later some way to the north (Hsian-tang-shan, 550-90 A.C., Tien-lung-shan, 540-620 A.C.) and to the east (To-shan and Yun-men-shan, 580-620 A.C.) and finally reached the south-west (Kung-yuan, 72 -895 A.C. ; Tung-chiang, 740-880 A.C.). At an early stage however one line branched off to the south (Mai-chi-shan, 480-620 A.C., Tien-ti shan, 500-35 A.C. and Ping-ling-ssu, 500-35 A.C.). Many more cave temples are found along the Hwang Ho in North East and Central China. The interiors of these caves are covered with groups of figures, reliefs and ornaments carved out of the living rock. In caves like those at Yung- Kang (Pl.V) and Lung-men (Pl.VI) there are colossal Buddha figures representative of the concept of the all-embracing Buddha(Seckel, op.cit. p.141 f.).

The discovery of the Buddhist cave shrines of Mai-chi-shan (Pl.III) is among the most spectacular in recent years. These caves are situated in south China and date from the period 5th cent. A.C. to the Ming period, that is, 10th cent. A.C. To the south west of Lan-chow and to the north west of Mai-chi-shan are the shrine caves of Ping-ling-ssu. Other Chinese cave temples are at Hwang-ling, Cheng-tu, Kuang-han, Ye-nan, Wang-chia-man, Hsi-peng, Tien-ti-shan, Ma-ti-ssu, Wen-shu-shan, Chan-ma, Lung-men and Wan-fo-hsia. At Mai-chi-shan there are seven types of caves : (1) chambers opening into the cliff face, (2) caves with inverted V shaped ceiling, (3) square caves, (4) caves with bow-shaped ceiling and caitya-hall, (5) caves with square lintel and flat ceiling, (6) caves with flat top ceiling with sloping sides and (7) open niches in the cliff face. Altogether there are at Mai-chi-shan 187 chambers hollowed out of the cliff, plastered, painted and adorned with clay sculpture. The caves display a wide variety of artistic influences. These caves contain magnificent stone sculptures and stelae of the 6th cent. A.C. brought to the mountain cliff from some distance and hauled up the cliff face by methods hitherto undiscovered. They are accessible only by wooden galleries cantilevered out from the cliff face. (Pl. IV)

Whereas the Tun-huang caves reflect Hellenic and Iranian influences, Mai-chi-shan caves reflect Iranian and S. E. Asian influences. Mai-chi-shan marks the full realisation of the Chinese aesthetic (Michael Sullivan, *Cave Temples of Mai-chi-shan*, London, 1969).

Korea and Japan

It was in the fourth century A.C. according to Korean traditions, that Buddhism was first introduced into the land. In A.C. 369 a priest named Sundo is said to have come to the northern kingdom of Kokuryo from a small Chinese kingdom on the upper border of Korea bringing Buddhist idols and sacred texts. In A.C. 384 when the people of Pekche learned of the new faith which was being practised in Kokuryo they asked the Emperor of China to send them a famous priest named Marananda, and he and other priests who soon followed from China spread the faith in the south western kingdom. Finally around A.C. 424 a priest from Pyongyang named Makocha came to Silla and preached Buddhism to the south eastern kingdom (ibid. p. 311).

"The story is that Makocha first hired out as a 'plowman' to a farmer who concealed him in a cave. Later in Kyongju the priest was able to accomplish the cure of the illness of the king's daughter by burning incense and offering prayer before a Buddhist image. Soon after that the king acceded to a request from Makocha to

bring artists from China to carve figures in the rock walls of his cave in order to make it into a chapel. In these labours the artists are said to have spent forty years."

"For a single impressive monument of Buddhism in Korea we may speak of the Sokkulam or Temple of the Rock cave not far southeast of Kyongju. Some would identify this cave with that of Mukocha, but in certain ancient chronicles there is mention of the building of the Sokpulsa or Temple of the Rock Buddha near Kyongju in the tenth year of King Kyongtokwang and if this is to be identified with the Sokkulam it would date this work in 752 A.C." (Jack Finegan, *The Archaeology of World Religions*, New Jersey, 1952, p. 311 f.).

The Sokkulam cave temple has a huge statue of Sakyamuni Buddha which forms the centre of a circular chapel, together with an ambulatory for the faithful to walk around. The reliefs on the walls depict arhats and odhisattvas.

The cave sanctuaries of Japan are relatively unimportant such as those at Usuki on the island of Kyushu and they consist of flat niches in the rocks containing groups of figures (Seckel, op. cit. p. 141 f.).

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SADDHAMANGALA KARUNARATNA
W. S. KARUNARATNA

CELESTIAL or heavenly as a possible plane of existence, distinct and different from terrestrial or earthly, is conceded or even reckoned with in Buddhism. The words *divya* (Pali *dibba*) and *deva*, used in general to denote the celestial, stand in marked contrast to *mānusa* or human. According to Buddhism, however, human life is neither created by a supreme divine being (*issara*) nor is it an earthly reflection of or a scattering from a primary divine source. On the other hand, in the Buddhist analysis of life, the human is taken as the unit of reckoning and life in the celestial plane, i.e., in the deva worlds, is given as the result of purposeful direction of human life in a particular way. These celestial planes of existence are also governed by the law of impermanence and change or *anicca* which is the dominant characteristic of human life caught up in the cycle of existence or saṃsāra. Even of the highest of the beings of these celestial realms, of the Great Brahmā himself who presides over a thousand-world-systems (*sahassalokadhātu*), it is said that he is subject to the law of change and evolution (*Mahābrahmunopi kho bhikkhave atth'eva aññathattam atthi vipariṇāmo: A*.V,p. 60). Hence eternity is ruled out of the Buddhist concept of celestial. However, at the level of popular religion, celestial life seems to serve the eschatalogical interests which are peripheral to the primary Nibbānic orientation of Buddhism. Virtuous and meritorious activity through thought, word and deed is described as being rewarded with birth in these regions, where an illusory escape from the ills of the world like birth, disease and death appears to be implied. For, in these realms, new arrivals make their appearance in full stature and maturity and tend to show no difference at the time they disappear even after a humanly incalculable long sojourn there. In a way, it is also an unrewarding plane of existence for one continues to reap the harvest of the good deeds done while being in the human world but rarely sow any new seed. While this implies a moral and spiritual stagnation, it is also no secret that the atmosphere in at least some of the celestial planes, according to Buddhism, can lead to positive spiritual degradation.

This is particularly true of the *Kāmāvacara* deva-worlds or the celestial planes of sensual pleasure. Some of the 'higher grade' Brahma-worlds which still come under the category of celestial, however, provide a richer religious atmosphere, for the residents there are said to ascend higher and higher (*uparūpari nibbattitvā*) without returning to the human plane and reach their final liberation in their upward trend (*opapātiko hoti tattha parinibbāyī anāvattidhammo tasmā lokā: M*. II,p. 146; III, p. 80).

The pleasures and comforts of these heavenly abodes are looked upon as being ensnaring in themselves. We hear of devas who perish on account of their excessive indulgence in pleasure (*khiḍḍā padosikā devā: D*. I, p. 20). There are yet other devas who suffer the same fate on account of vexation and intolerance of the fortunes of their comrades (*manopadosikā* : loc. cit.). This is apparently why we hear of the snares that bind one to the endless chain of existence as being both celestial and terrestrial. The Buddha assures his first sixty disciples who had attained arhanthood that both

he and they are free from all snares, both celestial and terrestrial (*muttā'ham sabbapāsehi ye dibbā ye ca mānusā : Vin.* I, p. 20 f.). What is apparently meant by *dibbapāsa* here are the *uddhambhāgiya-saṃyojana* or fetters of the higher realms like the desire to be born in the World of Form or the World of Formlessness both of which are celestial, viz. *rūparāga* and *arūparāga*. It is undoubtedly in pursuance of this same line of argument that the Buddha pointed out to his disciples that expectation of birth in the heavenly worlds as a reward for the practice of the higher life under the Buddhist discipline (i.e., *brahmacariya*) would be a matter of shame (*A.* I, p. 115). Finally, the Buddha's relative estimation of birth in these celestial realms is seen in the *Dhānañjāni Sutta* (*M.* II, p. 196) where even what is conceded to be the highest of these, i.e., the *Brahma-loka* or the world of Brahmas (note the use of the plural in *brahmānam sahavyatāya*) is referred to as being low and inferior (*hīna*), relative to the highest attainment in Nirvāṇa (*sati uttariṃ karaṇīye* : loc. cit.).

J.D.

CELIBACY, the state of being single or unmarried, motivated through the need to eschew totally the gratification of sex desires. In this sense it approximates to the practice of the Buddhist virtue of *brahmacariya* (q.v.). In the context of Buddhist religious life it is conceded that even laymen living the household life (*gihī odātavasanā* : literally meaning 'white-clad laymen' in contrast to the monks who have renounced household life ; *M.* I, p. 491) are capable of practising this virtue of continence (*brahmacārino*).

Already in pre-Buddhist India, i.e., in the 6th century B.C., a life of total dedication to religion and celibacy appear to have gone hand in hand. Buddhist texts themselves record instances of the bodhisatta, in his search for true happiness (*santi-varapadam pariyesamāno*) going to numerous teachers who apparently had large organizations of celibate pupils. Āḷāra Kālāma, Uddaka Rāmaputta and even Sañjaya under whom Sāriputta was a pupil before coming over to the Buddha, appear to belong to this category. Such studentship, even of pre-Buddhist institutions, is referred to in Pali texts as *brahmacariya* (*Icchām'aham āvuso Kālāma imasmiṃ dhammavinaye brahmacariyam caritunti : M.* I, p. 163). There is reason to believe that this *brahmacariya* consisted essentially of the life of celibacy which formed a part of the contemporary *śramaṇa* tradition.

Brahmanic religious tradition, too, strikes an equally dominant note on the virtue of celibacy as a part of their religious discipline. In the doctrine of 'the four stages of life' or *catur āśramadharma* of the Brahmins, *brahmacarya* was the first stage during which the study of the *Vedas*, generally three, was undertaken which in turn paved the way to religious initiation or *upanayana*. Commenting on the references to *brahmacarya* in the Upaniṣadic texts, Śaṅkara emphasises the fact that the practice of celibacy and renunciation of all desire for women constitute the hall-mark of *brahmacarya* (*strīviṣayatṛṣṇātyāga* at *Chānd.* 8.4.3 and *maithuna asamācāra* at *Mund.* 3.1.5). Rāmānuja is even more emphatic in recognising this aspect of *brahmacarya*, namely, celibacy, as the pre-requisite of studentship in the Brahmanic religious tradition.

This celibacy of the Brahmins which is restricted to the period of studentship is believed to be capable of extending from nine to thirty-six years, giving three to twelve years for each of the three *Vedas*, excluding the *Atharvaveda*. The observance of the vow of celibacy by the Brahmins, initially, for limited periods of time, is perhaps what the Buddhists refer to as the *komārabrahmacariya* of the Brahmins (*Sn. v.* 289). They also speak of the pre-Buddhist practice of celibacy as being restricted to fixed periods of time, of ten, twenty, thirty or forty years (*eke samaṇabrāhmaṇe pariyantakataṃ brahmacariyaṃ caranti.... : M.* II, p. 120).

In Buddhism, life-long celibacy is a requirement of monastic life. Generally speaking, the term *brahmacārī* is used to refer to the monk who renounces the life in the household, and celibacy is consequently a requirement under the spirit of the Dhamma. That such a person who has accepted the higher course of religious training should totally reject all sexual indulgence is provided for by item no. 3 of *sīla : abrahmacariyam pahāya brahmacārī hoti ārācārī virato methunā gāmadhammā* (*D.* I, p. 63).

Buddhist considerations of restraint in relation to sexual indulgence, celibacy or chastity (q.v.) spring solely from the Buddhist attitude to *kāma* or the pleasures of the senses. *Kāma* are described in Buddhism as leading to grief and turbulence. The increase of the thirst (*tṛṣṇā*) to gratify sense desires (*kāma*) reinforces the desire for existence (*bhava*). Those, on one hand, as *rāga*, *lobha* or *abhijjhā*, form one basis of evil thought and action (*akusala mūla*) while *dosa* or *vyāpāda*, (hatred or hostility) which may be pointed out as coming in the wake of the former forms the other. *Dosa*, *vyāpāda* or *paṭigha* may rightly be assumed to be generated in the face of opposition to the fulfilment or gratification of sense desires.

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According to the *Tissametteyya Sutta* of the *Suttanipāta* (*v.* 814 f.) a Buddhist disciple has to eschew sex life as negating the fulfilment of his avowed mission (*mussatevā'pi sāsanam* : ibid. *v.* 815) which, according to the Commentary (*Mahāniddesa* I, p. 143), is gaining mastery of the Buddha's teaching (*pariyattisāsana*) and attainment of higher states of spiritual progress (*patipattisāsana*). In brief, the pursuit of the pleasures of sex by a disciple who has voluntarily renounced the life in the household is said to be contrary to his spirit of renunciation.

Non-attachment to pleasures of the senses (*virāga*) is a preliminary requirement of higher religious training. Thus involvement (*saṃyoga*) leading to dissipation is avoided, and the ideal of *visaṃyoga* (non-involvement) is achieved. Grabbing and grasping (*upādāna*) which result from the desire to gratify sense-pleasures is to be rejected with equal discretion. Sex pleasures would rank uppermost among them as being most alluring and distracting. These were the arguments that were placed before Sudinna who found himself guilty of breaking the vow of celibacy at a time when a rule of law had not been instituted against such a breach (see *Vin.* III, p. 19).

As for legal provision for safeguarding this monastic virtue, we find both *Pātimokkhas*, *Bhikkhu-p°* and *Bhikkhuṇī-p°*, including this rule of celibacy under the *Pārājikas* and thereby making it inviolable. In fact, it heads the list of rules in this group. Its breach results in a total breakdown of the monastic life. Thus celibacy is a pre-requisite, a means to the attainment of the goal of religious life in Buddhism. And this undoubtedly was facilitated by a life of renunciation lived in the monastery but neither of these was an end in itself.

On the otherhand, we also find, as already indicated, the virtue of celibacy looked upon as being within the reach of laymen living in the household. In the *Mahāvacchagotta Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* they are referred to as 'white-clad laymen who are brahmacārins' who are contrasted with the laymen who gratify their sense desires (*kāmabhogino : M.* I, p. 492). Periodic observance of this vow of celibacy by laymen and laywomen is also countenanced in Buddhist texts. This is made possible under the observance of the eight moral precepts or *aṭṭhaṅga uposatha* which is undertaken on days of the full-moon and the new-moon as well as of the quarter-moon. On these days, the layman's regular vow of chastity, i.e., the item of *sīla* relating to propriety in sexual behaviour under *pañca sīla* (q.v.) is replaced by the vow of celibacy which is an item of higher monastic discipline.

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CENTRAL ASIA.* Abu'l-Rayḥan Muḥammad al-Bīrūni was the first to trace the history of Buddhism in Central Asia and the Near East. Approximately a thousand years ago, he said :"In former times Khorāsān, Persia, Iraq, Mosul, the country up to the frontier of Syria, was Buddhistic, but then Zarathustra went forth from Ādharbāyjān and preached Magism in Balkh (Baktra). His doctrine came into favour with King Gushtasp, and his son Isfendiyād spread the new faith both in East and West, both by force and by treaties. He founded fire temples throughout his whole empire. The succeeding Kings made their religion (i.e., Zoroastrianism) the obligatory state religion of Persia and Iraq. In consequence, the Buddhists were banished from those countries, and had to emigrate to the countries east of Balkh."[1] "They worshipped idols, their remnants may now be

*In addition to the general abbreviations listed in the Encyclopaedia, the following are also used in the foot-notes of this article :

BSOS. Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, London Institution.
CAJ. Central Asiatic Journal, Wiesbaden.
KAEE. Khorezmskoy arkheologo — etnograficheskoy ekspeditsii (Khorezm Archaeological and Ethnographical Expedition).
MDAFA. Mémoires de la Délégation Archéologique Francaise en Afghanistan.
MIA. Materialy i issledovaniya po arkheolgii SSSR (Material and Investigations on the Archaeology on the Soviet Union).
SA. Sovetskaya arkheologiya (Soviet Archaeology).
SE. Sovetskaya etnografiya (Soviet Ethnography).
SPAW. Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
VDI. Vestnik drevney istorii (Journal of Ancient History).
YuTAKE. Yuzhno – Turkmenskaya arkheologicheskaya kompleksnaya ekspeditsiya (Southern Turkmenian Complex Archaeological Expedition).

1 "Alberuni's India," tr. E. C. Sachau, Vol. I, London, 1888, p. 21 Abureikhan Biruni, India, 'Izbrannye proisvedeniya", Vol. II, Tashkent, 1963, pp. 66–67.

found in India, China and among the Toghuzghuz; the inhabitants of Khorāsān call them 'shamanan', or in the singular 'shaman' (from the Sanskrit śramaṇa). Their shrines are the 'vihāras' of their idols and the 'fārkharas' can (still) be seen in the border district of Khorāsān adjoining India."[2]

So wrote this learned Khoresmian, who was really not too conversant with the factual history of Buddhism.[3] But the true history of the spread of Buddhism in Central Asia has not been fully recapitulated even to this day, as A. M. Belenitsky has justly pointed out.[4]

In the present outline, the author, whose field is the study of Buddhist monuments in Western Turkistan, has attempted to summarize the new archaeological material against the background of available data concerning the spread of Buddhism in this part of Asia.

The history of Buddhism in Central Asia is usually dated from the time of the Graeco-Bactrian state, although knowledge of the teachings of the Buddha, and perhaps some Buddhist adepts, may have found their way here much earlier, in the Achaemenian era.[5] There are frequent references in the literature to the representation of a stūpa on Agathocles coins, to the probable Buddhist origin of one of the legends on the coins of Menander, and to the fact that the wheel on his coins is a Buddhist symbol. We also have the Buddhist tradition of King Menander's conversion to Buddhism as related in the famous *Milinda-pañha* ("Milinda's Questions"), Milinda being the Indian name of Menander. This source has come down to us in the Pali text and Chinese translation, and though it was composed at a later date (after Menander's death) we cannot discount what it tells us as to Milinda's (Menander's) having been a Buddhist.[6] W. W. Tarn is inclined to put an entirely different interpretation on the date of the Graeco-Bactrian coins, denying that they bear reflections of Buddhism.[7] But his arguments are not altogether convincing.[8] (See INDO-GREEKS.)

At the very latest, Buddhism must have found a wide following in the Qandahār area of what is now southern Afghanistan by the middle of the 3rd century B. C.[9] The Qandahār bilingual edict of Aśoka is rightly spoken of as an eloquent testimonial to the extension of Buddhism in the direction of Central Asia.[10] The further progress of Buddhism to the north is borne out by a Kharoṣṭhī inscription on a clay object extracted from the Begram I layer (3rd-2nd centuries B.C.). J. Harmatta reads a Buddhist name in it.[11]

In southern Bactria a tradition of great antiquity which persisted among local Buddhists up to the early Middle Ages averred that two of their countrymen had received enlightenment from the Buddha himself (s.v. BALKH), and had then disseminated his teachings.[12] Fantastic as it may seem, this story of Hsüan Tsang's must be taken into consideration.

Certainly in the latter part or well towards the end of the century the spread of Buddhism must have been promoted by uniting in one state the north Indian regions, the territory of Afghanistan and several of the Western Turkistan lands. Buddhist missionaries and local adepts of the Buddhist faith made their appearance in northern Afghanistan and then in the south of Western Turkistan.[13]

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2 Abureikhan Biruni, Pamyatniki minuvshikh pokoleniy, "Isbranniye proisvedeniya", Vol. I, Tashkent, 1957, p. 204.

3 In the opinion of E. S. Sachau, al-Bīrūnī knew very little about the history of Buddhism; see "Alberuni's India", Vol. II, London, 1888, p. 237, note 40.

4 A. M. Belenitsky, Is istorii kulturnykh svyasei Srednei Azii i Indii v rannem srednevekovye, *KSIA.*, fasc. 93, Moscow, 1964, p. 33.

5 A similar view was expressed earlier with respect to Iran; see E. Herzfeld, *Zoroaster and His World*, Vol. II, Princeton, 1947, p. 629.

6 For a detailed account, see S. Lévi, Le bouddhisme et les grecs, "Revue de l'histoire des religions", Vol. XXIII Paris, 1891, No. 1, pp 40-45; also K. V. Trever, "Pamyatniki greko-baktriyskogo iskusstva" Moscow-Leningrad, 1940, p. 24 V. A. Smith, *The Early History of India*, 1957, p. 239.

7 W. W. Tarn, *The Greeks in Bactria and India*, Cambridge, 1951, pp. 160-161, 262-265.

8 For more on this, see F. Altheim, *Weltgeschichte Asiens im griechischen Zeitalter*, Vol. I, Halle (Saale), 1947, pp. 335-337.

9 G.Tucci, U.Scerrato, G. Pugliese Carratelli, G. Levidella Vida, *Un editto bilingue greco-aramaico di Asoka*, Roma. 1958; D. Schlumberger, L. Robert, A. Dupont-Sommer, E. Benveniste, *Une bilingue gréco- araméenne d' Asoka*, *JAs.*, Vol. 246, 1958, pp. 1-48; also later publications. Also see D. Schlumberger, *Une nouvelle inscription grecque d' Asoka*, Paris, 1964.

10 J. Harmatta, *Sino-Indica*, *A.A.* Vol. XII, No. 1-2, Budapest, 1964, p. 4.

11 Ibid. pp. 4-5.

12 "The Life of Hsüan-Tsang compiled by Monk Hui-li" Peking, 1955, p. 51.

13 As to this, the view of P. C. Bagchi (*India and Central Asia*, Calcutta, 1955, p. 32) that Buddhism had penetrated into Bactria by the time of Asoka, seems to us to be more probable than that of A. Foucher, who held that Buddhism did not appear in Bactria until the end of the 1st or the 2nd century A. C. (see A. Foucher, *La vieille route de l' Inde de Bactres a Taxila*, Vol. II, Paris, 1947, pp. 280-281). The latter view seems mistaken.

It is very tempting to seek the evidence of the *Avesta* in tracing the ancient pathways of Buddhism in Western Turkistan. The word 'Būiti' ('Būti') figures three times in the 'Vīdevdāt'. H. W. Bailey sees the possibility of this being a loan-word, borrowed from the Indian 'Buddha', and explains the terminal 'i' as the result of East Iranian adaptation of the word.[14] This view rests upon the dating of the 'Vīdevdāt' in the 2nd century B.C., as suggested by E. Herzfeld. The latter is inclined to read Buddhist content in the epithet given in Balkh in the 'Vīdevdāt' : *rdwa drafša* — 'with lofted banners'. He arrives at this by analogy with the account of the Buddhist monastery of Navbahār in Balkh, which is described by Arab authors as flying vast numbers of huge banners.[15]

In the opinion of a number of scholars, Alexander Polyhistor's statement that the word Σαρμανοι derived from the Sanskrit 'śramaṇa' suggests that Buddhism was widely practised in Bactria as early as the 1st century B.C.[16] To be sure, it is not clear from the text whether the reference is to Bactria proper or to the whole of the Graeco-Bactrian state.

Only recently G. A. Koshelenko pointed out, and with full justice, that like Bactria, Margiana was also a centre of early Western Turkistan Buddhism.[17] He is of the opinion that the Parthians made the acquaintance of Buddhism no later than the turn of our era, and refers the appearance of Buddhism in Margiana to the 1st century A.C.[18] It may be, however, that these dates or at least the first of them should be moved back a little in time.[19]

In this connection we would like to draw the reader's attention to a fact which has apparently escaped the notice of students of the history of Buddhism in Western Turkistan.

According to the *Mahāvaṃsa*, historical chronicle of Sri Lanka, the Lankian king Duṭṭhagāmaṇī, whose regnal years most scholars give as 161–77 B.C.,[20] marked the laying of the 'Great Stūpa' by a huge celebration which was attended by great numbers of bhikṣus from many foreign lands (*Mhv.* xxix, *v* 29). So there came to Sri Lanka the wise Mahādeva from Pallavabhogga with 460,000 bhikṣus; and from Alasaṅda, the city of the Yonas, came Yonamahādhammarakkhita with 30,000 bhikṣus (*Mhv.* xxix, *vv.* 38, 39). What matters for us is the degree of authenticity that can be attached to this account of the arrival in Sri Lanka of representatives of a Buddhist Saṅgha from Pallavabhogga and Alasaṅda.

Varying evaluations of the authenticity of the chronicle can be found in the literature. W. Geiger, its latest and most authoritative investigator, believes that although it was composed around the beginning of the 6th century A.C., the *Mahāvaṃsa* was based upon much older material, primarily upon local chronicles which are no longer extant. Significantly, whenever it has been possible to verify the information in the *Mahāvaṃsa*, that information, as Geiger notes, has proved correct.[21]

Analysing the excerpt quoted above, S. Lévi associates 'Pallavas' with Pahlavas, i.e., the Parthians, while Alasaṅda in his reading is Alexandria — 'either Alexandria in the Caucasus,' or 'Alexandria in Egypt',[22] In his notes on the translation of the text, Geiger says that Palava is a Persian name (the Sanskrit 'Pallava' or 'Pahlava'). 'Bhoggam' may mean feudal domain or landed estate. He adds that Alexandria in the land of the Greeks was probably the city the Macedonian king founded in the Parapamisade near Kabul.

Where had 'the wise Mahādeva' come from? The historical situation leaves little room for doubt on that score. It is most unlikely that he and his companions came from the inland possessions of the Parthians. What is more probable is that they set out from the south-eastern dominions of

14 H. W. Bailey, The Word 'bnt' in Iranian, *BSOS*. 1931, Vol. VI, Pt. 2, pp. 282–283. Compare with E. Herzfeld *Zoroaster and His World*, Vol. II, Princeton, 1947, pp. 755–756.

15 E. Herzfeld, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 754–755.

16 See S. Lévi, *Le bouddhisme et les grecs*, pp. 36–40 (the comparison of the *Sarmanes* of Megasthenes with the Sanskrit *śramaṇa*; the Boutta of Clement of Alexandria with Buddha, etc); J. P. Asmussen, Xuāstvanift, Studies in Manichaeism, "Acta Theologia Danica", Vol. VII, Copenhagen, pp. 135, 157; J. Marquart, *Erānšahr nach der Geographie der Ps. Moses Xorenac'i*, Berlin, 1901, p. 90; A. Foucher *L'art greco-bouddhique du Gandhara*, Vol. II, Paris, 1918, p. 639.

17 G. A. Koshelenko, Review on 'Kara-tepe-buddiysky monastry v Stanom Termeze' (by T. Y. Grek, Y. G. Pchelina, B. Y. Stavisky, published in Moscow in 1964). *VDI*. 1966, No. 2, pp. 192–193.

18 G. Koshelenko 'The Beginning of Buddhism in Margiana', *AA*. XIV, fasc. 1–2, Budapest, 1966, p. 180.

19 B. A. Litvinsky, 'Mahādeva & Duṭṭhagāmaṇī' (O nachale buddizma v Parfii), *VDI*. 1967, No. 3, pp. 88–91.

20 "The Mahāvaṃsa or the Great Chronicle of Ceylon" (translated by W. Geiger), Colombo, 1950, p. xxxvii. This date is also accepted by W. Rāhula (*History of Buddhism in Ceylon*, Colombo, 1957, p. 80). Compare with "History of Ceylon", Vol. I, Pt. I, Colombo, 1959, p. 255 (for the date 161–136 B.C.).

21 "The Mahāvaṃsa", pp. ix–xx. The same view of the Sri Lanka chronicle is shared by its Soviet investigator, K. S. Semeka, from whom we received valuable consultation on this question.

22 S. Lévi, Le buddhisme et les grecs, op.cit. p. 45; J. P. Asmussen, "Xuāstvanift....," pp. 135–136.

the Parthian state.[23] These dominions, particularly Sakastane, were semi-independent lands. The term 'Pallavabhogga', whose meaning was explained in the preceding paragraph, is a most appropriate designation for such a domain. In addition, we might recall that the Parthians obviously engaged in trade with the countries along the Indian Ocean and so had access to Sri Lanka.[24]

The second of the above-mentioned representations must indeed have been from Alexandria in the Caucasus, in other words — from the vicinity of present-day Kabul.[25] This fully accords, for one, with the other evidences we have of the early spread of Buddhism there, and, in addition, with the fact that a small Graeco-Bactrian state[26] continued to exist there.

The above 'Sri Lanka episode' of Parthian Buddhism may be taken as proof, accordingly, that Buddhism had gained a wide footing in the south-eastern territories of the Parthian state by the 1st century B.C. at the latest. Soon after that, it may also have reached Margiana. There are thus grounds for assuming that by the 2nd century A.C., or the time of An Shih-kao, there was already a long tradition of Buddhism in Parthia.

With respect to the further destinies of Buddhism in eastern Parthia, note should be made of the fact that the role of the Kushan Empire in the spread of Buddhism was not the same in Parthia as in Central Asia.[27] Only in Central Asia can the political aims of the Kushan state be said to have played a vital role in the broad stream of Buddhist propaganda; in Parthia, which did not belong to the Kushan Empire, the fate of Buddhism was different.

The oldest relic found in Tajikistan which is possibly related to Buddhism is the inscription which the 1956 expedition led by A. N. Bernashtam brought to light at Darshai, a site in the West Pamirs. J. Harmatta, in publishing the inscription, called it 'the oldest Kharosti inscription in Inner Asia' and has suggested that it be read as 'Nārāya-ṇa, be victorious!' By the method of Paleographic analysis he has dated the inscription in the end of the 2nd or beginning of the 1st century B.C., and has discounted the paleographic data that might support a later date (the Kushan period). But there is nothing final about the dating of this written testimony to the appearance of the Nārāyaṇa cult in Western Turkistan ('Nārāyaṇa, the Buddha' is encountered in the Khotanese-Saka documents from Eastern Turkistan, and 'Nārāyaṇa, the deva' occurs in the Buddhist Sogdian documents).[28]

The spread of Buddhism in Western Turkistan was doubtlessly stimulated by the formation of the Kushan Empire, whose borders at its zenith stretched far wider than those of the Graeco-Bactrian kingdom. Not only were the rulers of the Kushan Empire well disposed towards Buddhism but some of them,[29] as the great Kaniṣka, were evidently adherents of Buddhism.

The written sources attest to the important role natives of Ṭukhāristān played in the elaboration and dissemination of the Buddhist doctrine in Kushan times. The famous Buddhist theologian Ghoṣaka was born in Ṭukhāristān. He was one of the leading figures at the Buddhist Council in Purushapura and author of the commentary composed there on the *Abhidharmavibhāṣā*. Ghoṣaka returned to Ṭukhāristān after the Council. This theologian was accordingly a disciple of the Vaibhāṣika school, later divided into branch schools, one of which, called the western Vaibhāṣika school, was connected with 'the country of Balkhika' or Balkh. The traditions of this school may even be traceable to Ghoṣaka. The importance of this school in Ṭurkhāristān is reflected in the fact that the first translator of its treatises into the Tokharian language was the Ṭukhārian monk Dharmamitra of Tarmita or Termez,[30] about whom we have various direct evidences. This justifies us in concluding that the Vaibhāṣika school, a branch of the Sarvāstivāda school, was widespread in Western Turkistan or at least in its southern part. Generally, Sarvāstivāda was related to the Hinayāna

23 B. A. Litvinsky, *Cultural History of Buddhism in Central Asia*, Dushanbe, 1968, p. 78, n. 27.

24 Ibid. p. 78-9, n. 28.

25 W. Tarn, *The Greeks in Bactria and India*, Cambridge, 1951, p. 421, note 4, pp. 460-462 (excursus, 'Alexandria of the Caucasus and Kapisa').

26 This view was stated earlier by P. Gardner ("The Coins..." p. xl).

27 A different point of view was recently presented by J. Brough (comments on 'Third-Centruy Shan-Shan and the History of Buddhism', *BSOAS*. Vol. XXVIII, Pt. 3, 1965, p. 586).

28 Nārāyaṇa is, as you know, connected with the cult of the sun (see S. K. De, Bhāgavatism and Sun-Worship. *BSOS*. 1931. Vol. VI. Pt. 3).

29 The opinion is encountered in the literature that representations of the Buddha are found on Kujula Kadphises coins. This view was advanced by V. Smith and supported by R. Whitehead ("Catalogue of Coins...", pp. 181-182, Pl. XVII,129). The seated figure on the averse does in a way reflect the early iconography of the Buddha image, but certain details make us doubt the correctness of identifying it as the Buddha.

30 H. W. Bailey, Indo-Iranica (III, 5), Tarmita, *BSOAS*. 1950, Vol. XIII, Pt. 2, pp. 400-403; P. C. Bagchi, *India and Central Asia*, Calcutta, 1955, pp. 32-33.

but a number of important elements in the Vaibhāṣika doctrine brought it close to the Mahāyāna sphere. Some scholars believe that Vaibhāṣika "even seems in certain ways to have paved the way for Mahāyāna" in Khotan.[31]

The spread of other schools in Western Turkistan is also postulated. From his study of the writing on the potsherds at Kara-Tepe, J. Harmatta has found that the Kharoṣṭhi inscriptions there reflect the teachings of the Mahāsaṅghika school and suggested that this was the school that pioneered the spread of Buddhism in Western Turkistan. Anotner group of Kara-Tepe inscriptions in Brāhmī is regarded by Harmatta as proof of the spread of the doctrine of the Sarvāstivāda school of Buddhism in Western Turkistan at a later date, under Kaniṣka.[32]

According to I-Tsing, the Sarvāstivāda school predominated in northern India in the 7th century, still encountered there sometimes.[33] How matters stood in Western Turkistan in this respect is not known.

We also have information on the spread of Buddhism in other regions of Western Turkistan. The *Sūtrālaṅkāra* tells us that a native of Puṣkaravatī journeyed (evidently in the Kushan period) to the site of what later became Tashkent in order to decorate a vihāra or Buddhist monastery.[34]

Buddhism also consolidated its positions in Margiana in the first centuries A.C.[35] Via Western Turkistan, too, it reached Eastern Turkistan and then China. A plausible hypothesis, in our opinion, is that of E. Zürcher to the effect that the gradual infiltration of Buddhism into China took place primarily from the direction of Western Turkistan, following the usual routes from the west. This process was enacted between the middle of the 1st century B.C. and middle of the 1st century A.C.[36]

Western Turkistan theologians and missionaries played an important role in the spread of Buddhism in Eastern Turkistan and China. Truth and legend are fantastically interwoven in the stories about the initial phase of the spread of Buddhism in those countries.[37] In the "Wei Lio," a third century source, there is a piece[38] variously interpreted by Sinologists to mean that : 1) a mission from the Great Yüeh-chih arrived in China in the year 2 B.C. and the Yüeh-chih crown prince acquainted the visitors with Buddhism. Some scholars today believe that the lines in question are not worth any consideration at all.[39] Although their historical authenticity is disputable[40] they do however tell us of the part men from the land of the Yüeh-chih were credited by Chinese Buddhist tradition with having played in popularising Buddhism in China. From them we may infer (and that is the most important thing for us) that the land of Yüeh-chih was regarded as one of the main centres of Buddhism in the 3rd century A.C., when the "Wei-Lio" was composed or again in the early 5th century, when the commentaries on it appeared.[41] Of course, the 'land of the Yüeh-chih' or Kushan Empire at the time of its maximum expansion embraced not only a large part of Western Turkistan, but also Afghanistan and northern India. At the same time it must be granted that the compilers of the Chinese historical chronicles were perfectly aware that Western Turkistan specifically was the nucleus of the Yüeh-chih dominions at the threshold of our era. It may be safely assumed that the Chinese sources were speaking of Western Turkistan or men who originally came from there.[42] R. N. Frye has even suggested that the Buddhist writings were first translated into Sogdian from the 'Kushan' (i.e., Bactrian) language, but his arguments do not seem very strong.[43]

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31 J. P. Asmussen, "Xuāstvānift ...", p. 144.
32 J. Harmatta, K. interpretatsii nadpisey iz Kara-Tepe, In : "Kara-Tepe", II (currently at press).
33 B.A. Litvinsky, op. cit. p. 80 n. 40.
34 Ibid. p. 80 n. 41.
35 Ibid. p. 80 n. 42.
36 E. Zürcher, *The Buddhist Conquest of China*, The Spread and Adaptation of Buddhism in Early Medieval China, Vol. I, (text), "Sinica Leidensia", Vol.XI, Leiden, 1956, pp. 22–33.
37 H. Glasenapp, *Der Buddhismus in indian und im Fernen Osten*, Berlin-Zürich, 1936, pp. 197–198.
38 E. Chavannes, *Les pays d' occident après de Weli Lio*, T'oung Pao, sér. II, Vol. VI, Leide, 1905, pp. 540–550.
39 For more on the initial period of the spread of Buddhism in China see P. C. Bagchi, *India and Central Asia*, Calcutta, 1955, pp. 33–34, 37–40; P. C. Bagchi, Expansion of Buddhism. Central Asia and China in : "2500 Years of Buddhism", Delhi, 1956, pp.66–68 ; Chao Pu-chu, *Buddhism in China*, Peking, pp. 66–68 ; V. N. Shtein, Ekonomicheskiye i kulturniye svyazi mezhdu ki-taem i Indiei v drevnosti (do III v.n.e.), Moscow, 1960, pp. 154–157. For a more detailed account of same see E, Zürcher, *The Buddhist Conquest of China* ...,(re this mission : pp. 24–25).
40 Chavannes " Les pays d' occident ...",) and Franke ("Die Ausbreitung des Buddhismus ...",p. 209) are certain that the mission took place.
41 A. von Gabain accepts without reservation the historicity of the mission in the year 2 B.C., but points out that it was unsuccessful (Der Buddhismus in Zentralasien, "Handbuch der Orientalistik", I, VIII, 2, Leiden-Köln, 1961, p. 493).
42 For other proofs of this premise see J. Brough, "Comments ... ", p. 586.
43 R. N. Frye, "Bukhara. The Medieval Achievement", University of Oklahoma Press, 1965, p. 7.

What prompted the flow of Western Turkistan missionaries to the east — to the oases of Eastern Turkistan ? Why did the fervent propagation of Buddhism there take place in the 2nd and 3rd centuries ? It appears that behind their religious zeal lay quite secular motives, inspired by the political aims the Kushan state had set itself with respect to Eastern Turkistan."

Among the earliest Buddhist missionaries in China (Loyang) it seems that there was quite a large group from Western Turkistan. Two were Parthians (An Shih-kao and An Hsüan) ; three were Yüeh-chih (Chih Lou-chia-ch'ien:Lokakṣema ? Chih Yao and Chih Liang) ; two were Sogdians (K'ang Mêng-hsiang and K'ang Chu, the last named coming from the K'ang-chu (in the Russian literature, they are called 'Kangyu'). [45]

The most famous of these was the Parthian An Shih-kao. According to the very early tradition, he was a Parthian crown prince who abdicated in favour of his uncle and dedicated himself to a religious life."[46] It is quite possible that he came from Margiana.[47] All we know about him is that he undertook a journey to the East and in 148 settled in Loyang where he occupied himself with translations up to 170. He translated the Hīnayāna writings.[48] The Parthian An Shih-kao who went to Eastern Turkistan to preach Buddhism was not only a religious figure ; he was also a great scholar and astronomer. According to the Chinese tradition his birth place was Parthia. [49] It follows then that the spread of Buddhism from Western Turkistan to China was from the first accompanied by a process of transmission of the cultural and scientific treasures developed by the Western Turkistan peoples.

The second Parthian missionary, An Hsüan, arrived in Loyang in 181 and became a translator there. He collaborated with An Shih-kao in the translation of one of the Mahāyāna texts Also known for his translations was the Yüeh-chih Lokakṣema, a representative of the following generation and adherent of the Mahāyāna doctrine. He arrived in Loyang twenty years after An Shih-kao The belief is that the Mahāyāna was introduced into China or at least consolidated its position there in his time.

At the beginning of the 3rd century we again find Sogdians among the translators.[50]

Throughout the 3rd century the spread of Buddhism continued, thanks largely to the efforts of many men whose ancestors had migrated from Western Turkistan to neighbouring lands. One was Chih Ch'ien, also known as Chih Yüeh, grandson of a native of the land of the Yüeh-chih who had settled in Loyang. Another was the Sogdian K'ang Seng-hui, whose ancestors had migrated to India and whose merchant father had taken up residence in Loyang.[51] It was to this type of translator, born and bred outside his own country, that the famous Yüeh-chih Dharmarakṣa (who worked between A.C. 266 and 309) belonged. His birthplace was Tun-huang, where his ancestors had settled several generations earlier. Among his disciples he counted a Yüeh-chih, evidently a Sogdian.

The Parthian An Fa-ch'in engaged in translations from A.C. 281 to 306.[52] The famous fourth-century translator K'ang Seng-yüan was a Sogdian born in a foreign land and out of touch with the country of his fathers.[53] At the end of the 4th century there came to China from Ṭukhāristān (Tu-ho-lo) one by the name of Dharmanandin. He arrived in China in 384 and stayed there till 391, translating five works in the interim. Then he went back West. He is remembered as the translator of very important parts of the Hīnayāna scriptures.[54]

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44 See J. Brough, "Comments ...", pp. 586–590, 596–599.

45 B. A. Litvinsky, 'Dzhunskv mogilnik i nekotoriye aspekty kanguyiskoi problemy', *SA*. 1967, No. 2, pp. 29–37.

46 Attempts to identify him with some member of the Parthian ruling house (as the son of Mithradates IV or of Pakores (I), see A. Waley, *An Introduction to the Study of Chinese Painting*, New York, 1958, p. 33) have failed. It has been logically suggested by scholars that he might have been a member of the ruling family of one of the smaller dominations (H. Maspero, Essay sur le Taoisme, in : "Mélanges posthumes", Vol. II, Paris, 1950, p. 189 ; E. Zürcher, *The Buddhist Conquest of China* , pp. 32–33 ; N. G. Debevoise, *A Political History of Parthia*, Chicago, 1938, p. 245).

47 H Maspero, "Essay sur le Taoisme", p.189 (actually he is speaking of the district of Parthia bordering on Afghanistan); M. E. Masson, Iz rabot Yuzhno-Turkmenistanskoi arkheologicheskoi kompleksnoi ekspeditsii Akademii nauk Turkmenskoi SSR. 1962 godu, in: "Izvestiya AN Turkmenskoi SSR" (social sciences series), 1963, No. 3, p. 57.

48 A great many translations of Buddhist texts into the Chinese language (from three dozen to 176) have been ascribed to him. But, in a catalogue drawn up at the end of the 4th century, he is mentioned as the author of 34 translations, 19 of which are preserved, and only 4 of these can be considered as having been unquestionably authored by him (Bunyiu Nanjio. *A Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of The Buddhist Tripitaka*, Oxford, 1883, cols. 381–383, No. 4 ; E. Zürcher, *The Buddhist Conquest of China* , pp. 32–34).

49 A. Waley, 'Notes on Chinese Alchemy', *BSOS*, Vol,VI. Pt. I, London, 1930, p. 23.

50 B. Nanjio, op. cit. cols. 388–389, No. 18 ; E, Zürcher, op cit. pp. 34–36.

51 B. Nanjio, op. cit. cols. 388–389, No. 18, col. 390, No. 21 ; E Zürcher, op. cit. pp. 46–54.

52 B.Nanjio, op. cit. cols. 391–393, Nos. 23, 25 ; E. Zürcher, op. cit. pp. 65–70.

53 E. Zürcher, op. cit. pp. 102–103.

54 B. Nanjio, op. cit. cols. 404–405, No. 57 (also col. 397, No. 35) ; E. Zürcher, op. cit. pp. 202–204, 246.

According to one calculation, among the translators engaged in rendering the Buddhist writings into Chinese, sometime before the end of the dynasty of the Western Chin, there were six or seven of Chinese and six of Indian origin as well as sixteen belonging to various Central Asian nationalities: six Yüeh-chih, four Parthians, three Sogdians, two Kucheans and one Khotanese. Naturally, these are only proximate figures, but they may be taken as an indication of the general trend[54] — the important role played by Central Asian Buddhists.

The large number of translators of the Buddhist writings who came from various parts of Central Asia[55] obviously attests to the spread of Buddhism in the translator's land of origin — Central Asia.

In this connection the following fact is not without interest for us. Excavations at Taxila in 1914 brought to light a silver vessel containing a small golden casket in which there were fragments of bones and a silver scroll bearing a Kharoṣṭhī inscription. The building in which the find was made may have been erected in the middle of the 1st to middle of the 2nd century A.C.[57] The inscription is dated in the year 136 of the unknown era, and it bears wishes "for the bestowal of health on the great King, the King of Kings, the Son of the Heavens, the Kuṣāṇa". It touches on the disposition of Buddhist reliquary in the bodhisattva 'chapel' at Taxila owned by a certain Bactrian (Bāhlīkena), resident in the town of Noacha or Noachaa, which cannot be exactly localised (somewhere in the area of Taxila or Bactira).[58]

The contents of the inscription show that Bactrians were not only representatives of the Kushan administration, but also acted as zealots of the Buddhist religion, even in India.

Linguistic analysis of the Manichaean Parthian, Manichaean Sogdian and also Turkic Buddhist texts has produced highly interesting results.

The main language of the 'sacred scripture' of the eastern Manichaean church was Middle Persian, but there were also Manichaean Parthian texts. The Sogdians copied these, accompanying them with a Sogdian version. Most of the Manichaean texts in the Central Asian languages found in Eastern Turkistan were copies made by members of the Manichaean Sogdian communities; this applies no less to the Manichaean Parthian texts. The Parthian language had been ousted quite early (evidently it ceased to be a spoken language by the 5th century A.C.) and only persisted as a dead language in the eastern Manichaean church. That explains why the great majority of the Manichaean Parthian texts that have come down to us are characterised by the poverty of their vocabulary and monotony of their syntactical constructions and stylistic resources. But there is one Manichaean Parthian magical text from Eastern Turkistan which is an exception in that respect. In the opinion of W. B. Henning, the publisher and interpreter of the text, it was written at a time and place when and where Parthian was the living language of the Manichaean communities — that is, either in Parthian proper or in some one of the regions immediately bordering on it, where the influence of the Parthian language was very strong and Manichaeism was disseminated by Parthian preachers. In this connection, Henning goes into the question of the spread of Manichaeism in Central Asia.

Mār Ammō, the founder of Central Asian Manichaeism, had made Parthian the official language of eastern Manichaeism. It is known that he preached successfully in Nishapur and Merv and then journeyed beyond Merv into the domains of the Kushans. He reached a region near Balkh and perhaps even Balkh itself. Later, with the spread of Manichaeism in the Central Asian interfluvial area, the Parthian language was replaced in the Manichaean church by the Sogdian language. W. B. Henning thinks this may have occurred in the second half of the 6th century A. C. But he notes that in Parthia itself, as in Merv and Balkh, the Parthian language continued to be used (as stated earlier) only as the language of the Manichaean church. Little is known, says Henning, about this history of the Manichaean church in Merv and Balkh, but the fact that strong Manichaean communities existed there for several centuries is beyond question.

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55 J. Brough, "Comments ..." p. 587. This scholar points out that certain Yüeh-chih translators may have come not from the land of the 'Great Yüeh-chih', but from the milieu of the East Turkistan 'Little Yüeh-chih' (ibid. pp. 606–607).

56 We have not met with any evidences of the emigrants from Ferghana of whom A. von Gabain speaks (Buddhistische Türkenmission, in: "Asiatica", Festschrift Fr. Weller, Leipzig, 1954, p. 166). Nor are there any in the Nanjio's catalogue to which she refers.

57 S. Konow, "Kharoshṭhī inscriptions with the Exception of Those of Aśoka", (Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum II, I), Calcutta, 1929, pp. 70–71.

58 Ibid. pp. 74–75, 77.

This information about Manichaeism is highly important for an understanding of the situation in which the spread of Buddhism took place in Western Turkistan. The problem interests us, moreover, from still another aspect. While the above magical text (published by W. B. Henning) is in itself Manichaean, it reveals the strong influence of the literature of northern Buddhism.

Henning has established that even the oldest Manichaean Parthian poetical texts which may be ascribed to Mār Ammō himself, contain certain Indian Buddhist terms. In the Parthian texts written in the 4th century the number of such terms gradually increases. The magical text analysed by Henning reflects very close contacts between the Manichaeans and Buddhists in the frontier area between Iran and India. The text was most likely composed in the 6th century in Balkh or close by.[59] It is known that the Manichaean Parthian texts are sprinkled with such purely Buddhist terms as *š'qmn bwt* (Buddha Śākyamuni), *smn* (śramaṇa), *nybr'n* (Nirvāṇa), *bγxš* (bhikṣu), *mytrg* (Maitreya), etc.

Similarly the Manichaean Sogdian texts contain borrowed Buddhist terms and concepts associated with the Buddhist tradition.[60] That the Sogdians played an important role in preaching the Buddhist doctrine in both Western and Eastern Turkistan is indicated by the fact that the word 'bodhisattva' (Sogdian *pwtyst*) came into Middle Persian, Uighur and Chinese from the Sogdian language and that it was by way of the Middle Persian (*bwt'sp*) that the Arabic Būdāsaf and Jousaph appeared in the western variant of the legend of Barlaam and Josaphat.[61] The role of the Sogdian is also corraborated by analysis of the Turkic Buddhist texts discovered in Eastern Turkistan. A. von Gabain, who made a study of the texts, noted that "many of the basic terms in the Buddhism of the Turkic people are of Zoroastrian origin and they must have been borrowed from the west (i.e., Western Turkistan) through the medium of the Sogdians." Gabain rules out the possibility of this process having taken place in the east and believes that it was the result of contacts between the western Turkic peoples and the Sogdians in Western Turkistan,[62] although of course the role of the Sogdian diaspora cannot be excluded.

Facts have already been adduced to show the strong effect the Western Turkistan Buddhist substratum had on eastern Manichaeism. Additional proof of the spread of Buddhism in Western Turkistan is afforded by the fact that western Manichaeism also evinced definite, though rudimentary, reflections of the conceptions of Buddhism and the Buddha;[63] these may have been due, at least in part, to the mediation of the Parthian.[64]

The linguistic data thus confirms the existence of a deep-rooted Buddhist religious tradition, an ancient 'Buddhist background', so to say, among such Western Turkistan peoples as the Sogdians and the Parthians. Linguists likewise consider it indisputable that the facts show a relation with the territory as well as the ethnic communities of Western Turkistan, even though the texts analysed were found in Eastern Turkistan. It all fits together quite well, for, as J. P. Asmussen has noted, it corresponds to the historical facts and is certainly logical. And so we may say that the path of Manichaeism into Eastern Turkistan lay through Western Turkistan.[65] Later, too, Central Asia continued to be a stronghold of Manichaeism.[66] The information gleaned from the written sources and linguistic analysis has been confirmed by the study of the archaeological monuments, especially those from right-bank Bactria. Such monuments are particularly abundant in the vicinity of Termez, or, more broadly, of the Surkhan Darya valley.

Let us consider some of the more important monuments.

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59 W. B. Henning, Two Manichaean Magical Texts, *BSOAS*. Vol. XII, 1947, No. I, pp. 48–50: W. B. Henning Waručān-Šāh, "The Journal of the Greater India Society", Calcutta, 1944, Vol. XI, No. 2, pp. 87–90.

60 J. P. Asmussen, "Xuāstvānift...", pp. 136–137. In this connection W. B. Henning wrote that it should be remembered that the Sogdians (or at least a large proportion of them) were Buddhists before the arrival of the Manichaean preachers in their midst (W. B. Henning, Neue Materiallen zur Geschichte des Manichäismus, *ZDMG*. Bd. 90, Leipzig, 1936, No. I, p. 5.

61 H. W. Bailey, The Word 'but' in Iranian, *BSOS*. 1931, Vol. VI, pt. 2, pp. 281–282. Compare with W. B. Henning, Sogdian Tales, *BSOAS*. 1945, Vol. XI, Pt. 3, p. 487. For a detailed study of this subject in the east and the west, see D. M. Lang, "The Wisdom of Balahvar", A Christian Legend of the Buddha, London - New York, 1957, pp. 11–64.

62 A. von Gabain, Buddhistische Türkenmission, op. cit. pp. 167–168. Also, A. von Gabain, Der Buddhismus in Zentralasien, op. cit. p. 501.

63 J. P. Asmussen, "Xuāstvānift...", p. 136.

64 It is generally believed that the ideas of Buddhism to some extent influenced the philosophers known as Gnostics and were even accepted by them and through them by Mani himself. See D. M. Land, *The Wisdom of Balahvar*, p. 24.

65 J. P. Asmussen, "Xuāstvānift...", p. 136.

66 A. Adam, Manichäismus, in: "Handbuch der Orientalistik", I, VIII, 2, Leiden-Köln, 1961, p. 118.

In 1932 frontier guards came upon stone high-reliefs lying in the water near the bank of the Amu Darya, 17 km. above Termez, at a place called Airtam. One of the reliefs was shipped to Tashkent.[67] In 1933 M. E. Masson and in 1937 M. I. Vyaznitina conducted excavations at Airtam. This work led to the discovery of part of a building consisting of many chambers of a cult and auxiliary nature. The shrine consisted of two parts : a sort of ante-chamber and, beyond that, a square cell. In the centre of the cell was a rectangular podestal made of unbaked bricks stuccoed with white plaster. One corner was occupied by a three-quarter stone base ; in the other lay a stone reliquary that had fallen off its pedestal. There were also several fragments of alabaster statues lying about — folds of a garment, an ear with elongated lobe, pieces of a coiffure with the hair painted black, and so on. The antechamber included a pylon whose nucleus of clay blocks was faced with stone slabs.

Many questions came up in connection with these finds, among them that of the purpose of the antechamber, which was not altogether clarified. The stone reliefs mentioned earlier belonged to this antechamber, and it was here too that the other high reliefs were found — but more of that below.

Adjoining the temple were the living quarters and subsidiary premises, including a kitchen and storeroom. Evidently this was a Kushan period *saṅghārāma*. A 'nameless king' coin was discovered in the sanctuary. That does not definitely date the complex, but it may be taken as an indication that it functioned in early Kushan times.[68]

G. A. Pugachenkova's recent excavations at Airtam (1964—1965) have not only established the stratigraphy of the buildings that antedated the Buddhist complex and clarified various details of its history ; they have also filled in the picture of the Buddhist stūpa at Airtam. This had a roughly rectangular stylobate, 9 meters broad and 1 metre high ; the sides were oriented on the cardinal points. The stūpa was made of square unbaked bricks. Upon the stylobate rested a cylindrical part of clay blocks preserved to a height of 2 metres, topped by more brickwork in what must have been a semi-spherical arrangement. The presence of bits of marl limestone all around suggests the possibility of stone revetting. It may well be that the stūpa and shrine were synchronous.[69]

The publication of the high reliefs which have come to be known as the 'Airtam frieze' was accomplished by K. V. Trever. There are eight slabs (36–38 cm. and one about 50 cm. high, and 78–100 cm. long) covered with wonderful bust images of people surrounded by large acanthus leaves. The first of the slabs discovered has proved to be the most striking of the lot : it depicts three persons holding musical instruments. The corner figure of the harpist intently fingering her string is particularly effective. S. F. Oldenburg has suggested that the musicians of the Airtam frieze represent the *pañcamahāśabda* or Five Great Sounds of Indian mythology. G. A. Pugachenkova has submitted a different interpretation of the figures on the Airtam frieze, which she has explained as a reflection of the *Parinirvāṇa Jātaka*. K. V. Trever has called attention on its resemblance to the work of the Gandhara school and at the same time to some of the features that distinguish it from that school ; she is of the opinion that the Airtam frieze should be regarded as a specimen of the output of the local Bactrian school.[70] M. I. Vyazmitina reached almost the same conclusion several years later ; she has pointed up a number of parallels with the Mathurā school and called the Airtam frieze "an example of one of the local schools of Kushan art which imbibed elements of Hellenistic and Indian art, but subjected these to distinctive treatment."[71]

Now, with the appearance of new publications on Gandharan art,[72] the discovery of numerous Gandharan art monuments on the territory of Afghanistan, including Bactria and last but not least the establishment of the existence of a Bactrian art school, all the above conclusions require careful verification.

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67 M. E. Masson, "Nakhodka fragmenta skulpturnogo karniza pervykh vekov n.e.", Tashkent, 1933, pp. 11–16, figs. 1–4

68 M. E. Masson, Skulptura Airtama, "Iskusstvo", 1935, No. 2 ; M. I. Vyazmitina, Raskopki na gorodishche Airtam, in : "I Termezskaya arkheologicheskaya ekspeditsia", Vol. II, Tashkent, 1945. During the latest excavations at Airtam in 1963–1964, a Kanishka coin was found, according to G. A. Pugachenkova, in the brickwork of the walls of the Buddhist complex which she dates on the basis of that coin (G. A. Pugachenkova, Dve stupy na yuge Uzbekistana, *SA*. 1967, No. 3, p. 262). In the list of coins from Airtam published by the same researcher all five Kanishka coins found there are designated, however as surface finds (G. A. Pugachenkova, K. stratigrafii novykh monetnykh nakhodok iz Severnoi Baktrii, *VDI*. 1967, No. 3, p. 75, Nos. 10–14). What is more in dating the complex Pugachenkova ignores the discovery of 'nameless king' coins at the same site, yet the 'nameless king', in the view she upholds was none other than Kadphises I.

69 G. A. Pugachenkova, "Dve stupy...", p. 262.

70 K.V.Trever,"Pamyatniki Greko-baktriyskogo iskusstva", Moscow–Leningrad, 1940, pp. 149–153; G.A. Pugachenkova, L. I Rempel, "Istoriya iskusstv Uzbekistana s drevneishikh vremyon do serediny devyatnadtsatogo veka", Moscow, 1965, pp. 76–77.

71 M. I. Vyazmitina. 'Raskopki na gorodishche Airtam', op. cit. pp. 30–31.

72 In particular see H. Ingholt, *Gandhāran Art in Pakistan*, New York, 1957 ; J. Marshall, *The Buddhist Art of Gandhara*, Cambridge, 1960 ; also the numerous works of B. Rowland ; corresponding sections in ; J. M. Rosenfield, *The Dynastic Arts of the Kushans*.

The spread of Buddhism and proliferation of Indian, especially Buddhist, art in Bactria were interconnected but by no means parallel or identical processes. The existence in Bactria of a great and highly viable school of local Bactrian art, brilliantly exemplified at Khalchayan, must have acted as a kind of barrier in the beginning. Along with the spread of Buddhist art, this local Bactrian school continued to thrive. D. Schlumberger notes, for example, that the sculptures at Surkh Kotal are linked with the monuments of Gandhara and Mathura by Greek or Iranian rather than Indian ties. "This monument," he said, "was as yet untouched by the Buddhist-inspired Indian influence which was later to make such phenomenal headway in Central Asia and the Far East."[73] And yet, no more than two kilometres from the Surkh Kotal acropolis and probably synchronous with it, there stood a Buddhist monument which had obviously once contained Buddhist images; its architectural decor, capitals and bases were, identically the same as the above acropolis.[74]

This territorial proximity is symbolical, for it was on Bactrian soil that Gandharan and the later Indo-Buddhist and local Bactrian schools of art all merged. The process was a highly complicated, contradictory and many-sided one. All we can say is that Gandharan art itself, as D. Schlumberger has brilliantly demonstrated, would have been impossible without the Graeco-Bactrian, or more broadly, the Graeco-Iranian contribution.[75] Schlumberger notes in this connection that the Buddhist art of Kushan times in Gandhara and non-Buddhist art of the same period in Bactria were twin brothers.[76] More recent discoveries have reconfirmed the significance of the Bactrian and Graeco-Bactrian element in Gandharan art. The discoveries of the French archaeological expedition at Al-Khanum have told us still more about the extent of the influence Hellenistic culture exerted in Bactria.[77] Khalchayan[78] has revealed to us the features of Bactrian art at the beginning of the Christian era (in the opinion of G. A. Pugachenkova, the second or third quarter of the 1st century B. C.[79] but we think the 1st or 2nd centuries A.C. a much more likely date).[80]

How did the art of Bactria or specifically Ṭukhāristān develop after Surkh Kotal? We can only guess at the complexity of the processes of interaction between Bactrian art and the schools associated with Buddhism as well as the art of the nomad peoples whose domains in the 4th to 6th centuries took in Ṭukhāristān. The wide diffusion of Buddhist doctrine in early medieval Ṭukhāristān must have encouraged an even deeper acceptance of Buddhist art than before. At the same time it is pobable that the non-Buddhist trend presisted even though its sphere of application may have grown smaller. Balalyk-Tepe unfolds to our gaze a vivid picture[81] of the zenith of secular non-Buddhist art rooted in the local Bactrian art tradition.

In Termez proper, systematic work has been in progress for some time at Kara-Tepe, the Buddhist cave monastery of the 1st to 3rd centuries A.C. This is the only cave complex of a plainly Buddhist nature in Western Turkistan.[82] The excavation of the site was launched in 1937 by Y. G. Pchelina, and B. Y. Stavisky has been conducting systematic diggings there ever since 1961.[83]

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73 D. Schlumberger, Descendants non-méditerranéens de l'art grec, in: "Syria", Vol. XXXVII, 1960, pp. 146–147, 159–160.

74 D. Schlumberger, "Descendants non-méditerranéens...", pp. 148–149; D. Schlumberger, The Excavations at Surkh Kotal and the Problem of Hellenism in Bactria and India reprinted from "Proceedings of the British Academy", Vol. XLVII, 1964, pp. 90–91.

75 D. Schlumberger, "Descendants non-méditerranéens...", pp. 160–164.

76 D. Schlumberger, "The Excavations at Surkh Kotal...", p. 91.

77 D. Schlumberger, Al Khanoum, une ville hellénistique en Afghanistan, in: "Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres. Comptes Rendus", 1965, Janvier-Juin, Paris, 1966, pp. 36–46; P. Bernard, Premiere campagne de fouilles d' Al Khanoum, in: "Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, Comptes Rendus", 1966, Janvier-Mars, Paris, 1966, pp. 127–133; P. Bernard, Deuxième campagne de fouilles d' Al Khanoum en Bactriane, in: "Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, Comptes Rendus", 1967, Avril-Juin, Paris, 1967, pp. 306–327; G. A. Koshelenko, R. N. Munchaev, Arkhelogicheskaya ekspeditsiya v. Afganistane, "Vestnik AN SSSR", 1966, No. 6, pp. 64–68.

78 G. A. Pugachenkova, Skulptura Khalchayan, "Iskusstvo", 1964, No. 6; G. A. Pugachenkova, Khalchayan, K. probleme khudoznestvennoi kultury Severnoi Baktrii, Tashkent, 1966.

79 G. A. Pugachenkova, "Khalchayan...", p. 190.

80 This date, in our opinion, corresponds more closely to the character of all the material unearthed here.

81 L. I. Albaum, *Balalyk-tepe*. Tashkent, 1960.

82 See T. V. Grek, P. G. Pchelina, B. Y. Stavisky, Kara-Tepe-buddiysky peshcherny monastyr v Starom Termere. Osnovniye itogi rabot 1937, 1961-1962 godov i indiyskiye nadpisi na Keramike, Moscow, 1964 (includes references to previous publications). Later reports: B. Y. Stavisky, Noviye dannіye o Kara-Tepe, in: "Tezisy dokladov nauchnoi sessii posvyash-chonnoi itogam raboty Gosudarstvennogo Ermitzha za 1965 god," Moscow-Leningrad, 1966, pp. 23–24. For information on the numerous Buddhist cave complexes in Afghanistan and northern India, see "Haibak and Kashmir-Smast, Buddhist Cave-Temples in Afganistan and Pakistan Surveyed in 1960", ed. S. Mizuno, Kyoto, 1962, pp. 85–103.

83 For data on the finds see the text by B. Y. Stavisky quoted below and also his paper in the volume "Kara-Tepe".

Zurmala, as this monument is called, was identified as a Buddhist stūpa (and correctly so, it appears) by A. S. Strelkov as early as 1927. Originally the stūpa was faced, for stone fragments and the rubble of baked bricks were found lying nearby, as was the stone bas relief with a representation of a bodhisattva.[84]

Other stone sculptures of the Buddhist sphere have also been found at Termez. A. S. Strelkov published a large fragment (29 cm. in height) of a small statue of the seated Buddha and part of the figurine of a bodhisatttva holding a lotus flower in his flexed right hand. As he wrote at the time, the statue of the Buddha may be considered to show the influence of Gandharan art.[85]

The photographs of the finds support Strelkov's appraisal. The Buddha, seated in *padmāsana* on a smooth low pedestal edged along the top by several grooves, is in *abhaya mudrā* (reassurance). The pose, the position of the hands, the kind of pedestal, and above all the draping of the garment covering his feet all have perfect parallels in Gandharan sculpture.[86] We might add that a similar image of the Buddha is encountered as the central unit of large sculptural (or high relief) compositions.

B. Y. Stavisky[87] and G. A. Pugachenkova[88] have published a wonderful stone high relief with a two-tier composition of Buddhist content — large Buddha figures on pedestals, in the *padmāsana* attitude, the hands in *dhyāna mudrā* (gesture of meditation); the kneeling or standing figures stationed beside or behind the Buddha figures are executed on a smaller scale. Stavisky has called this monument 'a relief of scenes from the life of the Buddha'. Pugachenkova has seen fit to identify the large figures as bodhisattvas and interpret the whole scene as a reproduction of the conversion of the ascetics in the Benares forest, but this interpretation seems untenable to us for a number of reasons. What is more likely is that the relief illustrates a subject popular in Gandharan sculpture, namely, the visit of the deities to the Buddha after his Enlightenment. On his left is a kneeling Indra, on his right Brahmā, and then come the deities of lesser rank. The scene is repeated with slight alterations. But we do not rule out another hypothesis — namely, that the upper tier portrays the visit of Indra and his harpist to the Buddha in Indrasāla cave.[89]

Another Buddhist monument referable to the Kushan period was found in 1967 near Dalverzin-Tepe in the course of the economic development work in the north-eastern part of Surkhan Darya Region. It has been dated, according to the published material, by the coins of Kadphises I and II unearthed there. It has also yielded a large number of sculptures, some of which are clearly representations of Buddhist mythological characters while others are secular in content. Of the latter G. A. Pugachenkova has said that "while they are portraits, and individualised ones at that, the facial features are treated in such a conventional manner as to conceal character and inner make-up. This is the beginning of the idealisation of the characters, despite the unquestionable individuality of the faces as such."[90]

The spread of Buddhism in Sogd is reflected in such landmarks as the cult structure in the Sanazar Valley which is said to have housed large bronze statues of the Buddha surrounded by bronze figures of seated lions. The sole remaining figure of a lion and the Chinese mirror with an inner circle from arcs ('ch'ing pai' or 'ming kuang' type mirrors) found there justify us in considering the 1st and 2nd centuries A.C. (as suggested by L. I. Albaum) to be the probable date of this monument.[91]

The archaeological monuments show the spread of Buddhism to Khoresm. In the first centuries A.C., according to S. P. Tolstov, "the Indo-Buddhist

84 A. Strelkov, Zurmala na Katta-Tyupe okolo Termeza, in: "Kultura Vostoka, I", Moscow, 1927, pp. 27–30; G. A. Pugachenkova, "Dve stupy...", pp. 257–261.

85 A. Strelkov, Doislamskiye pamyatniki Drevnego Termeza, in: "Kultura Vostoka, Sbornik Muzeya vostochnykh kultur II", Moscow, 1928, pp. 41–44 figs. 22–23.

86 H. Ingholt, *Gandharan Art in Pakistan*, New York, 1957, Pl. XI/3, 4; XII/3, 4 et seq.

87 B. Y. Stavisky, "Kara-Tepe", pp. 60–61, 1964, fig. 28.

88 G. A. Pugachenkova, L. I. Rempel, "Istoriya iskusstv Uzbekistana...", pp. 74–76.

89 H. Ingholt, op. cit. pp. 68, 87–91 (with further bibliographical lists and figs. 70–73, 129–136). The treatment Indra in fig. 134 and the kneeling figure on the left of the Termez relief is practically identical.

90 G. A. Pugachenkova, K. probleme kushanskogo, iskusstva, in: "Problemy arkheologii Srednei Azii. Tezisy dokla-dov i soobshcheny k soveshchaniyu no arkheologii Srednei Azii" (1–7 April, 1968), Leningrad, 1968, pp. 43–44.

91 L. I. Albaum, Buddiysky khram v doline Sanazara, DAN UzSSR, 1955, No. 8, pp. 57–60, fi.s. 1–3. On the date of these mirrors see, for example, A. Bulling, *The Decoration of Mirrors of the Han Period*. A Chronology, Ascona, 1955) pp. 26–32. We consider Stavisky's doubts re this data (see B. Y. Stavisky, Srednaya Aziya, Indiya, Rim, pp. 175–176e unfounded, and find it quite impossible to accept the alternative he suggests – 7th–8th centuries (B. Y. Stavisky, Nekotoriy voprosy istorii buddizma v Sredney Azii. Is itogov raskopok Kara–Tepe, buddiyskogo peshchernogo monastyrya v Starom Termeze, in: "Dokiady po etnografii", fasc. I (4), Leningrad, 1965, p. 28).

influence (in Khoresm) resulted in the appearance of miniature reproductions of Indian sanctuaries or 'stūpas' and in the portrayal of monkeys, a practice foreign to Khoresmian tradition;" statuettes of seated male nudes "also take us into the realm of Buddhist imagery."[92]

Yet it is far from established that the above are indisputably Buddhist monuments.[93] Extensive and thorough as the excavations conducted in Khoresm have been, they have not produced any other evidences to date. We may therefore conclude that the influence of Buddhism on Khoresmian culture was on the whole insignificant as far as we can now see.

How is this wide dispersion of Buddhism in Western Turkistan during the first centuries A.C. to be explained ? This is a very difficult question and we do not have sufficient information at our disposal yet to answer it. We have already had occasion to note that the southern regions of Western Turkistan and North India entered into one and the same state formations from the Achaemenian era onwards, and often for considerable stretches of time ; close economic, cultural and religious contacts naturally resulted between these regions.[94] This is the context in which the spread of Buddhism must be considered, and not as an isolated phenomenon. At the same time Buddhism could only have spread in Western Turkistan under the condition that it corresponded in character to the distinct requirements of Western Turkistan society.

Of course, many other factors may have contributed to the spread of Buddhism in Western Turkistan. Buddhism's remarkable adaptability to local conditions was of signal importance, no doubt. It incorporated several Western Turkistan cults. In this respect, its only rival in Western Turkistan was Manichaeism.[95]

What was the position of Buddhism in Western Turkistan in the 3rd and 4th centuries A.C. ? An-Nadim tells us in "Fihrist" that "the first person, aside from the Samanians, i.e., Buddhists to settle in Mā-warā' al-Nahr was a Manichaean."[96] As we know, the "Fihrist" as composed in 987–988, and although its author drew on the Arabian sources for his history of Manichaeism, he utilised the old Manichaean compositions,[97] and hence the great authenticity of An-Nadim's reports. From the above source it follows that at the very time that Manichaeism appeared in Western Turkistan, that is, in the second half of the 3rd century, Buddhism was already widespread there. This is confirmed by other sources.

Proceeding from the inscriptions of a Zoroastrian character at Kara-Tepo, J. Harmatta has advanced the hypothesis that after the Sassanian conquest and during the religious repressions under Varahran II (about A.C. 275), the Buddhist monastery at Kara-Tepe was devastated and then converted into a Zoroastrian shrine.[98] It must be said, however, that his hypothesis is in need of further substantiation.

Buddhism was also widespread in other eastern regions, among them Merv, situated much nearer to the centres of the Sassanian state.[99]

For a somewhat later period (the 4th century A.C.) we have the evidence of a Chinese religious (Buddhist) text dated 383 which states that the Buddha knew the language of Tukhāristān better than its native inhabitants.[100]

Buddhism made great headway in Margiana in the 3rd and 4th centuries A.C., as the Buddhist shrine discovered in Ancient Merv at the site of Gyaur-Kala witnesses.

Various opinions have been broached in the literature on the position of Buddhism in Western Turkistan after the Kushan era. A. M. Bolonitsky says, for instance : "The position of an official religion Buddhism occupied in the Kushan state must have led to at least its external transformation. But the same circumstance was probably also the reason why, when state support was withdrawn due

92 S. P. Tolstov, Po sledam drevne-khorezmiyskoi tsivilizatsii, Moscow-Leningrad, 1948, p. 160; B. Y. Stavisky Srednaya Aziya, Indiya, Rim, p. 176, fig. 24.

93 V. M. Masson, Khoresm i kushany, *EV*. XVII, Moscow-Leningrad, 1966, p. 83.

94 B. A. Litvinsky, Tadzhikistan i Indiya (primery drevnikh svyazei i kontaktov), in : "Indiya v drevnosti", Moscow, 1963, p .158; B. A. Litvinsky, Srednеaziatskiye narody i rasprostraneniye buddhizma, in : "Istoriya, arkheologiya i entografiya Srednei Azii", Moscow, 1968, pp. 128–135.

95. J. P. Asmussen, "Xuāstvanift...", p. 11; W. B. Henning, *The Murder of the Magi*, pp. 136–137; W. B. Henning, Two Manichaean Magical Texts, *BSOAS*. 1947, Vol. XII, No. 1, p. 39.

96 ,G. Flügel, Mani, seine Lehre and seine Schriften, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Manichaismus, Leipzig, 1862, pp. 76 105; A. M. Belenitsky, Voprosy ideologii i kultov Sogda po materialam pendzhikentskikh khramov, in : "Zhivopis drevnego Pendzhikenta", Moscow, 1954, p. 38.

97 K. Kessler, Mani, Forschungen über die manichäische, Religion, Bd. I, Berlin, 1889, pp. 331–338.

98 J. Harmatta, K. interpretatsii nadpisei iz Kara-Tepe, in : "Kara-Tepe, II"

99 These events, by the way, are not taken into account by M. E. Masson in his deliberations on the history of Buddhism in Margiana.

100 F. W. K. Müller, Töxri ünd Küšän (Küšän), *SPAW*. Philosophisch-historische Klasse, XXVII, Berlin, 1918, p. 575.

to the changing political situation in western Turkistan attendant on the rise of first the Ephthalite and then the Turkic states, Buddhism rapidly declined."[101] Here the decline of Buddhism is tied up with the rise of the Ephthalites and Turks to power. A. von Gabain, on the other hand, thinks this applies only to Sogd where, in her words, "not until the beginning of the 7th century was Buddhism definitely superseded by Manichaeism and a reinvigorated fire cult."[102] Finally, we have M. E. Masson's attempt to tie up the position Buddhism reached in Samarkand with the intensification "by the end of the 5th century of the activities of the Persian and Sogdian merchants of Zoroastrian faith, whose commercial rivalry with the Indian merchants trading with China led to the gradual but by no means peaceful expulsion of Buddhism from certain parts of Sogd and the adjacent countries." Masson also suggests that a similar situation developed in Merv and that the Mervians staged the "despoilage of the local stūpa." Masson sees the proof of this hypothesis in the fact that a much mutilated head that had been broken off a marble statue of the Buddha was found "in an ancient badrab" (cesspool) into which it had been thrown, in the Tailyak village near Samarkand.[103] The date of the badrab is not given, nor is any information offered as to the age of the marble statue, thus invalidating the whole argument. The vulnerable thing about this conception is also its central postulate : in the 5th to 7th centuries the Western Turkistan Buddhists were for the most part not emigrants from India at all ; they were local people.[104] What is more, it is quite wrong to equate the religious and political situation in Merv and in Samarkand.

What factual material have we to go on in passing judgments on this question ?

From the middle of the 5th century to the 60's of the 6th century, a large part of Western Turkistan was incorporated in the Ephthalite state, which embraced a number of neighbouring countries. Sung Yun (519 A.C.) had this to say about the Ephthalites of Badakhshan : "The majority of them do not believe in the Buddha". Of the Ephthalites of Gandhara he said that they did not believe in the Buddha at all. Comparing what Sung Yun and other sources have to tell us about the religious affiliations of Central Asia, the Japanese scholar K. Enoki concludes that the Ephthalites themselves were not adherents of the Buddhist faith. As for the reports in Sui-shu and Pei-shih on the abundance of Buddhist monasteries and stūpas in the Ephthalite capital, he explains these as a reflection of the religious affiliations of a specific section of the local population.[105] A more complicated theory on the relation of the Ephthalite to Buddhism has been advanced by A. Herrmann ; he has ventured the opinion that the Ephthalites were not Buddhists to begin with, but tolerated the preaching of that religion, and then later, after the defeat of the Ephthalite state by the Turks, a small Ephthalite dominion arose with its centre at Himotala whose rulers adopted Buddhism in order to strengthen their position in the fight against the Turks. Much the same view is taken by A. von Gabain.[106]

It is hardly proper to ignore the reports on the religious policy of the Ephthalites who subdued part of northern India. Sung Yun tells us that two generations before his time, Gandhara had been overrun by the Ephthalites.[107] Accordingly, that must have happened somewhere in the second half of the 5th century.[108] J. Marshall feels that it can be dated even more closely, around A.C. 460. That is evidently when the monasteries in the vicinity of Taxila were put to flame although their ruins continued to stand for another 150 years.[109] At the same time, some of the inscriptions on Ephthalite coins, in the opinion of V.A. Livshitz, are connected with Buddhism.[110]

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101 A. M. Belenitsky, "Voprosy ideologii...", p. 38.

102 A. von Gabain, Der Buddhismus in Zentralasien, op. cit. p. 501.

103 M. E. Masson, "Iz rabot...", p. 56.

104 It follows from the above accounts that the Buddhist religion had adepts in Western Turkistan certainly no later than the Kushan period. The same is borne out by the written records from Kara-Tepe; see B. Y. Stavisky, "Nekotoriye voprosy istorii buddizma...", p. 38.

105 "The Mission of Sung Yun and Hwei Sang to obtain Buddhist Books in the West (518 A.D.)", in : S. Beal, *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, Vol. I, London, 1906, p.xcii ; K. Enoki, On the Nationality of the Ephthalites, in : "Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko", (The Oriental Library), No. 18, Tokyo, 1959, pp. 45–48. On the reports of Sung-Yun and information of the Pei Shih based on them, see E. Chavannes, Documents sur les Tou-kiu (turcs) occidentaux, in: "Trudy Orkhonskoi ekspeditsii", VI, St. Petersburg, 1903, p. 225, note 3 ; compare with R. Ghirshman, Les Chionites-Hephtalites, *MDAFA*. Vol. XIII, Le Caire. 1948, p. 120.

106 A. von Gabain, Der Buddhismus in Zentralasien, op. cit. pp. 500–501. Compare with J. Marquart, "Ērānšahr...", p. 240.

107 "The Mission of Sung Yun...", p. xcix–c.

108 E. Chavannes, "Documents...", p. 226.

109 J. Marshall, *Taxila*, Vol. I, Cambridge, 1951, p. 77. Also see U. N. Ghoshal, *Ancient Indian Culture in Afganistan*, Calcutta. 1928, pp. 25–26.

110 V. A. Livshitz, Kotkrytiyu baktriyskikh nadpisei na Kara-Tepe, in : "Kara-Tepe II".

It would therefore appear that the Ephthalite rulers of different regions pursued different policies towards Buddhism at different times. During periods of military operations, Buddhist religious institutions were destroyed and plundered. But by and large, Buddhism was not persecuted in Central Asia under the Ephthalites and some Ephthalite rulers even gave it their support.

What stand did the Turks who came in the wake of the Ephthalites take towards Buddhism? In Western Turkistan at least they did not discriminate against that religion. From the middle of the 6th century on, the Eastern Turks were strongly influenced by Buddhist propaganda.[111] Its influence was also felt among the Western Turks. We do know, of course, that the Turkic tribes which settled around Issyk-Kul continued to worship fire and spirits.[112] Yet the khāqān of the Western Turks, Tun-Shehu, when in this region, gave Hsüan Tsang a warm reception some time around A.C. 630 and lent his preaching a friendly ear.[113] It would be risky to assume that it was this famous traveller who sowed the seeds of Buddhism in Semirechye, for there must have been Buddhist preachers there before as well as after him and they no doubt were able to convert a section of the population of Semirechye to Buddhism. We must not rule out the possibility that Buddhist missionaries came to Semirechye and Ferghana from the central and southern parts of Central Asia together with the successive waves of the Sogdian colonising effort. This hypothesis fits in nicely with the architectural style of the Buddhist temples of Semirechye, which belong to one of the surface variants of planning used at Kara-Tepe and Haḍḍa, in the temples of Pjanjikent, and then further east in Central Asia. It likewise accords with the sculptural objects and so on. B. Y. Stavisky on the contrary has come to the conclusion that the Buddhist monuments in Semirechye and Forghana are the result of the activity of East-Turkistan and Chinese missionaries.[114] This view cannot be substantiated, however, by the facts thus far at our disposal.

Ou-k'ong, a Chinese traveller of a much later period than Hsüan Tsang, who visited Kashmir and Gandhara between 759 and 764, saw among the local Buddhist sanctuaries a number of temples that had been erected by Turkic rulers or members of their families; these monuments had already been in existence for a century. In Kashmir he saw the Khātūn's temple, established under the Turks, and the temple of Ve-li-t'e-le or Ve-li-togin, son of the Turkic king. E. Chavannes offers the opinion that this may be the person who figures as Vel-tekin in Dinavari and as Barmuda (Parmuda) in other sources — the prince of Bukhara region who is mentioned in the historical sources with reference to the events of the end of the 6th century. In Gandhara, according to Ou-k'ong, there was a temple of Tegin-cha (or T'e-k'in-li) whose foundation was attributed to the son of the Turkic king and another that was allegedly established by the Khātūn, 'the wife of the king of the Turks'. E. Chavannes also suggests that this Tegin-cha may be the same as the Ousan tegin-cha who ruled in Kapisa in 739.[115]

There is no reason to doubt the validity of this local tradition, which links the foundation of the above Buddhist shrines with the Turks. But the identification suggested by various scholars and the chronological determinations which follow from these can hardly be taken for granted. At the same time it is quite clear that sometime at the end of the 6th century or not later than the first half of the 7th century, certain rulers of the Western Turks either became Buddhists or extended that religion their patronage.[116] In the early 8th century the Western Turkic rulers and aristocracy are portrayed in the reports of Huei-Ch'ao as devout Buddhists who founded monasteries and showered them with gifts. Of a certain north-western region of India we read, "although the

111. A. Levi, E. Chavannes, L'itenéraire d'Ou-K'ong, *JAs. N.S.*, 1895, Vol. VI, pp. 354–355, note 2; A. von Gabain, Buddhistische Turkenmission, op. cit. pp. 162–164; A. von Gabain, Der Buddhismus in Zentralasien, op. cit. p. 500. According to one student of the history of the ancient Turks, "it must be that at least the Turkic ruling element must have been familiar at an early date with Buddhism": early in the 6th century Buddhist preachers were known to have visited the precursors of the Turks, the Chuan-Chuan (Liu Mau-tsai, Kulturelle Beziehungen zwischen den Ost-Türken (–T'u–küe) und China, *CAJ*. Vol. III, No. 3, Wiesbaden, 1958, pp. 194–195). But according to Huei-Ch'ao, even at the beginning of the 8th century the majority of the Turks "did not know the law of Buddha and had neither monasteries nor monks" (W. Fuchs, Huei-Ch'ao's Pilgerreise durch Nordwest-Indien und Zentral Asien um 726, *SPAW*. Berlin, 1938, p. 453).

112 A. von Gabain, Der Buddhismus in Zentralasien, op. cit. p. 506.

113 "The Life of Hsuan Tsang...", pp. 43–45.

114 B. Y. Stavisky, Nekotorye voprosy istorii buddizma Srednei Azii (Iz itogov raskopok Kara-Tepe–Buddiyskogo peshchernogo monastyrya v Starom Termeze), in: "Doklady po etnographii", Geographical Society of the USSR, Section of Ethnography, fasc. I (4), Leningrad, 1965, p. 29.

115 S. Levi, E. Chavannes, L'itenéraire d'Ou-Kong, pp. 354–355; E. Chavannes, "Documents...", pp. 198, 242–245. Compare with A. von Gabain, Buddhistische Turkenmission, op. cit. p. 166.

116 Also see B. Y. Stavisky, O mezhdunarodnykh svyazyakh Srednei Azii v seredine VIII v. (v svete dannykh sovetskoi arkheologii), *PV*. 1960, No. 5, p. 115.

king here is a T'u-kueh (Turk) he adheres to the *triratna* (or The Three Treasures, as the Buddhists call their religion). The king, his wives, the princes and nobles all build monasteries and made Buddhist offerings."[117] This traveller has left us very useful accounts of the Turkic rulers who gave their support to Buddhism.[118] Evidently A. von Gabain was right when she pointed out the connection between the spread of Buddhism among the Western Turks and their translation to a settled and especially an urban way of life under the impact of the local Buddhist population.[119] We would add that political considerations must have played a very big part in this, support for Buddhism being necessary to their successful rule over a population that numbered many Buddhists.

However that may be, Hsüan Tsang's reports paint the following picture of Ṭukhāristān in the first half of the 7th century. The governor was the eldest son of the khāqān. Buddhism prospered throughout the land. When the governor died and the son of his chief wife succeeded him, he invited Hsüan Tsang to Balkh to inspect his Buddhist sanctuaries there.[120] Hsüan Tsang also tells the story of an attempt by one of the Turkic rulers (evidently, the khāqān's eldest son) to seize the wealth housed in the main Balkh monastery, of the punishment meted out to him, and of his belated penitence.[121]

I-Tsing left us a bit of information which is very important for our reconstruction of the history of Buddhism in Ṭukhāristān, although it has never been cited in this connection. In one of his compositions I-Tsing, who lived in India from 671 to 695, says of a certain Buddhist monk that the latter had 'recently' stopped at a monastery originally built by the inhabitants of Tu-ho-lo (Ṭukhāristān) for practising 'the religion of their land'. This monastery was very rich in possessions and land and very ornately decorated. Its furnishings and the donations upon which it existed exceeded anything the other monasteries had. The name of the monastery was 'Kien-t'ouo-louo-chan-tch'a'. This name includes the word 'Gandhara,' making the interpretation of this difficult text all the harder. It is not impossible that the Buddhist temple in question was built in Gandhara by settlers from Ṭukhāristān. Without discounting this possibility, E. Chavannes, suggests another explanation, namely, that it was built in Ṭukhāristān at the time when Ṭukhāristān and Gandhara both belonged to the same empire, that is, in the 5th century, under the Kidarites or Little Kushana.[122] We are inclined to believe with him that the reference is to a monastery in Ṭukhāristān (Balkh Navbahār ?). The report of the great wealth this monastery commanded is highly significant. It is the only report of the kind we have had about a monument connected with Western Turkistan.

That Buddhism made great headway in Ṭukhāristān in the second half of the 7th and beginning of the 8th century is borne out by the remark of Huoi-Ch'ao that in Ṭukhāristān "the king, nobles and people are very devoted to the *triratna* ; there are many monasteries and monks ; they follow the Hinayana doctrine."[123]

The proliferation of Buddhist sanctuaries and wide diffusion of Buddhism in Ṭukhāristān made such a great impression on Huei-Ch'ao that he declared "there are no heretical (from a Buddhist standpoint) teachings here."[124] This Buddhist traveller was guilty of wishful thinking, however. Buddhism was not the sole religion of northern Ṭukhāristān or other parts of Western Turkistan, as we have noted before. Ever since the second half of the 3rd century, the role of Manichaeism there had been growing.[125] By the beginning of the 7th century, according to Hsüan Tsang, Manichaeism in its eastern variant was very strong in the regions of Persia bordering on Ṭukhāristān.[126]

117 W. Fuchs, "Huei-Ch'ao's Pilgerreise...", p. 445.

118 Ibid. pp. 440–449.

119 A. von Gabain, Buddhistische Turkenmission, op.cit. p. 166 ; A. von Gabain, Der Buddhismus in Zentralasien, op.cit. p. 506.

120 "The Life of Hsüan-Tsang...", pp. 48–49.

121 S. Beal, "Buddhist Records...", I, p. 45.

122 I-Tsing, Mémoire composé a l'époque de la grande dynastie T'ang sur les religieux éminents qui allèrent chercher la loi dans les pais d' Occident. Traduit en Francais par E. Chavannes, Paris, 1894, p. 80. Cf. I-Tsing, Account of Fifty-One Monks, in : S. Dutt, *Buddhist Monks and Monasteries of India, Their History and Their contribution to Indian Culture*, London, 1962, p. 312, (the reference to this latest edition was kindly supplied by B. Y. Stavisky).

123 W. Fuchs, "Huei-Ch'ao's Pilgerreise...", p. 449. The predominance of the Hinayāna in Western Turkistan during the early Middle Ages is confirmed by other sources as well. For instance, a man from Western Turkistan (who was in fact of Ṭukhāristān origin) by the name of Buddhadharma is reported to have studied the doctrine of 'the Little Wheel' in Nālandā during the latter half of the 7th century (see I-Tsing, Mémoire..., pp. 37–38).

124 W. Fuchs, "Huei-Ch'ao's Pilgerreise...", p. 449.

125 For more on this subject, and also on the important role played by the Central Asian Manichaean communities, as compared with the Iranian, see W. B. Henning, "Neue Materialien...", pp. 10–11.

126 E. Chavannes, P. Pelliot, Traité Manichéen retrouvé en Chine, II, *J.As.* ser. XI, 1913, Vol. I, p. 150. A. M. Belenitsky refers this report to Western Turkistan (Voprosy ideologii..., p. 44).

In general, Buddhism and Manichaeism existed side by side in Western and Eastern Turkistan for a long time, and, as we have said before, Buddhism exerted a great influence on the pantheon, terminology and even the concepts of Eastern Manichaeism (and, to a lesser degree, of Nestorianism). It also influenced the religious practices of Manichaeism. For example, one of the central ideas of Eastern Manichaeism, the concept of the confession of sin, was borrowed from Buddhism (where this concept was developed and strengthened in the Hīnayāna and particularly in the Mahāyāna and here also applied to the laity). Under the influence of the Buddhist monasteries, Manichaean monasteries appeared in the east and began to spread to the west as well. The Manichaean scriptures are imitations of the Buddhist sūtras. Mānī is endowed with the title of 'Bodhisattva' in the Middle-Persian texts. The death of Mānī is spoken of as Nirvāṇa. More than that, there is a Manichaean Buddhist text in which, speaking of the arrival of Mānī in Turan (the territory of present-day Baluchistan), he is addressed in these words: "You are the Buddha and we are sinful human beings." A Manichaean hymn in the Turkic language is addressed to "my father, Mani-Buddha."

There are no attempts to polemise with Buddhism in Manichaean literature. As J. P. Asmussen has aptly noted, the Manichaeans' sole method of warring with Buddhism was by borrowing its theses and incorporating them in their own doctrine. Such was the case at least on the ideological, or rather the theological plane. In real life, however, one religion was always at war with the other. Enlisting converts among the ruling element and members of the upper class generally was a customary tactic of this struggle.

The question of the interrelation of Buddhism and Zoroastrianism is also very complicated. From the iconographical standpoint it is safe to say that there are mutual influences, resulting in such syncretised works as the frescoes of Bāmiyān and Dukhtar Nōshirvān; the figure of Rustam coincided in many ways with that of a Bodhisattva, and so on. But the question of Buddhism's influence on Zoroastrianism from the theological standpoint has not been adequately investigated. Still, the following points may be noted. R. C. Zaehner is of the opinion that Zoroastrianism certainly felt the impact of Indian religious-philosophical thought in the Sassanian period.[127] The wily demon Āz of the Pahlavi Zoroastrian books is reminiscent of the Buddhist *avidyā* (ignorance) and its manifestation *tṛṣṇā* (persistent desire), associated with the wish to continue one's existence. Actually, Āz is an example of the transfer of the above Buddhist concepts into Zoroastrianism in its later stage, although these concepts underwent considerable modification in Zoroastrianism. As Zaehner says, "if the idea is originally Buddhistic, the working out of it is throughly Zoroastrian."[128]

In addition to the three religions (Buddhism, Manichaeism and Christianity), Ṭukhāristān also must have had a local religion that was popular with the masses of townsfolk and especially among the rural population. Our knowledge of this religion is utterly inadequate as yet, but so much is clear — in many respects it had points of contact and parallels with the indigenous religion of the Sogdians.[129]

And so we find a true conglomeration of religions in Ṭukhāristān in the 6th and up to the beginning of the 8th century, and also in varying degree in the other regions of Western Turkistan; these religions competed for the minds and souls of the people, influenced one another and often interlaced. Against this background, the relative place of Buddhism was very great, as the written sources and archaeological data cited below can tell us. For convenience sake we are presenting this material geographically, for specific regions of Western Turkistan.

The *Sogd* Chinese dynastic chronicles tell us that the inhabitants of Kang (Samarkand Sogd) "worship the Buddha".[130] The Buddhist pilgrim by the name of Saṅghavarma who gained renown at the end of the 7th century was a native of Kang.[131] T'ang-shu says that the inhabitants of Kang followed the Buddhist religion and made sacrifices to the sky (seen by E. Chavannes as evidence of

127 R. C. Zaehner, *The Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism*, New York, 1961, pp. 195–198.

128 Ibid. pp. 229–230. Also R. C. Zaehner, *Zurvan: A Zoroastrian Dilemma*, Oxford, 1955, pp. 166–188.

129 See W. B. Henning, 'A Sogdian God' *BSOAS*. 1965, Vol. XXVIII, pt. 2, pp. 252–253. About the local religion of Bactria-Ṭukhāristān, see also H. Humbach, *Kušān und Hephthaliten*, München, 1961, pp. 18–25; G. Widengren, *Die Religionen Irans*, Stuttgart, 1965, pp. 333–343 (on the religion of the Sogdians, see pp. 320–332).

130 N.Y. Bichurin(Iakinf), "Sobraniye svedeniy o narodakh obitavshikh v Srednei Azii v drevniye vremena", II, Moscow-Leningrad, 1950, pp. 272–281.

131 I-Tsing, "Mémoire...", pp. 73–7 .

the religion of the worshippers of Mazdah).[131] These reports do not coincide with what Hsüan Tsang tells us ; in his biography we read that in 'the country' of Kang-Samarkand, the king and the people do not believe in Buddhism, but worship fire. There are two monastery buildings but no monks. If wandering monks tried to stop over in them, the local inhabitants would drive them out with burning sticks. That is exactly what happened to the two monks who accompanied Hsüan Tsang. At the same time we learn that after Hsüan Tsang talked to them, the king and the people came to believe in Buddhism, and a large meeting was held to ordain a certain number of converts who then went to live in the monasteries.'[132] But there is nothing about Buddhism in Samarkand in Hsüan Tsang's accounts of his travels.[134]

It is all too possible that the success of the pious deeds of the Buddhist monk was exaggerated in this biographical apologia. It is likewise plausible that the 'infidelity' of the inhabitants of Kang was overemphasised for the same reason. However that may be, it hardly seems advisable to take these words of Hsüan Tsang without a grain of salt, especially since they are utterly contradicted by the information in the Chinese chronicles. In the opinion of A. von Gabain, when Hsüan Tsang arrived in cities with mixed population, he sought out and interested himself primarily in the Chinese and Indian Buddhists.[135] Samarkand and Ṭukhāristān must have presented highly contrasting pictures in that respect. It is perhaps along this line that one must seek an explanation for the marked disparity between the reports of the chronicles and Hsüan Tsang. Nevertheless, it is clear that Buddhism held a much less important place in Sogd during the first half of the 7th century than in Ṭukhāristān, and that subsequently its role diminished still more. By the end of the first quarter of the 8th century, there was one solitary Buddhist monastery attended by one monk in all of Samarkand.[136] A Mug document mentions *sr'mn* (Buddhist monk) and also *krph* (in the opinion of V. A. Livshitz, the Sanskrit *kalpa* – decree, command), a term found in the Buddhist monuments. According to this investigator, "from the Mug documents it would appear that by the beginning of the 8th century Buddhism no longer played a noticeable role on the territory of Samarkand Sogd." Livshitz suggests that the above document was addressed "to some person outside of Samarkand Sogd, possibly living in one of the Sogdian villages of Semirechye."[137] This last is still in need of confirmation, but neither can it be entirely discounted.

We might also note that the Indian word 'Buddha' came into the Tajik language through the Sogdian *bwty, pwtty*[138] with the meaning of 'idol'[139] and sometimes just 'the Buddha'.[140] The word 'ahaman' or 'idol worshipper' came into the Tajik and a number of other languages from the Sogdian *smn* or 'monk' (the Prākrit form of the Sanskrit *śramaṇa*).[141]

The most logical assumption is that the incorporation of these and similar Sogdian words into the Tajik occurred in places where the areas of these languages impinged on each other, that is, in Western Turkistan, or specifically, Sogd or its environs.[142] Livshitz takes care to remind us, at the same time, that the possibility of books

132 E. Chavannes, "Documents...", p. 136. In the opinion of some scholars, the Chinese term 'Hsien' applied by the Chinese to designate the religion of the people of the West, meant Zoroastrianism in the Tang period, but may have designated the Buddhist deities at an earlier time ; see A. E. Dien, A Note on HSIEN, "Zoroastrianism", "Orient", Vol. X, No. 2, Leiden, 1957, pp. 284–288 ; H. W. Bailey has suggested, on the other hand that the Chinese HSIEN may be a derivation from the Iranian (a) Orya–a term related to the fire of the deity of the Zoroastrian sphere. See H. W. Bailey, *Indo-Scythian Studies*, Vol. IV, Cambridge, 1961, p. 11.

133 "The Life of Hsüan Tsang...", p. 46–47.

134 S. Beal, "Buddhist Records...", I, pp. 32–33.

135 A. von Gabain, Buddhistische Türkenmission, op. cit. p. 167.

136 W. Fuchs, "Huei-Ch'ao's Pilgerreise ..", p. 452.

137 "Yuridicheskiye dokumenty i pisma. Chteniye, perevod i kommentarii V. A. Livshitza", ("Sogdiiskiye dokumenty s gory Mug", fasc. II), Moscow, 1962, pp. 165–166.

138 J. Gershevitch, *A Grammar of Manichaean Sogdian*, Oxford, 1954, pp. 4, 5, 179.

139 W. E. Henning, Sogdian Loan-Words in New Persian, *BSOS* Vol. X Pt. I, 1939, p. 94. Compare with E. Herzfeld, *Zoroaster and His World*, II, p. 756 ; V. A. Livshitz, Sogdiyskiye slova v Tadzhikskom yazyke, I, "Izvestiya otdeleniya obshches-tvennykh nauk AN Tadzhikskoi SSR" No. 19 1957 – 84

140 H. W. Bailey, The Word 'but' in Iranian, *BSOS*, 1931, Vol. VI, Pt. 2, pp. 279–280. For the designation of the Buddha in different Central Asian Languages, see also H. W. Bailey, Madu, A Contribution to the History of Wine, Reprinted from "Silver Jubilee Volume of the Zinbun-Kagaki Kenkyusyo", Kyoto University, 1954, pp. 7–9.

141 V.A. Livshitz, "Sogdiyskiye slova...", p. 35; Aburelhan Biruni, Izbranniye proizvedeniya, Vol. II, pp. 544–545. About the term *śramaṇa* in the Arabic-Persian sources, see G. Flügel, *Mani*, pp. 385–386 ; "Alberuni's India", Vol. II, p. 261. In the Indian literature, see N. A. Sastri, 'Śrāmaṇa or Non-brahmanical Sects,' in : "The Cultural Heritage of India" Vol. I. Calcutta, 1958, p. 389.

142 It is less probable that this happened outside Western Turkistan, in Eastern Turkistan, where the Sogdian-Buddhist tradition was very strong. At the same time, A. Stein has found at Khotan in Dadak-Uilik the fragmented letter of a Jewish merchant which is one of the earliest examples of a written record in the Tajik-Persian ; it has been dated in the 8th century. See V. Minorsky, Some Early Documents in Parsian (I), *JRAS*. October, 1942, p. 183 ; W. B. Henning The Inscriptions of Tang-i Azao, *BSOAS*. 1957, Vol. XX, p. 338.

being the source of loan words must not be excluded either : such words could have made their way into Tajik-Persian literature from the Sogdian written sources (not necessarily those of Western Turkistan provenance).

The existence of Buddhist religious edifices in Sogd is borne out by the ancient toponymics.

W. Barthold saw a relation (and not without justification) between the name of the village and rural district of Sandjarfaghan (later Zenjirbāgh), situated to the south-east of Samarkand, and the word for a Buddhist monastery 'saṅghārāma'. He also maintained that the Navbahār gates in Samarkand and Bukhara were originally connected with a vihāra.[143] Linguists agree that the Sanskrit *vihāra* may have been transposed into the later *bihar*.[144] But the association of the name of Bukhara itself with the word 'vihāra which is frequently encountered in the literature[145] cannot be considered tenable from a linguistic standpoint.[146]

Taking all the above into consideration, we cannot agree with the view often expressed in the literature that Buddhism was completely obliterated in Sogd by the time of the Arab conquest. The true situation has been more aptly described by A. M. Belenitsky, one of the foremost authorities on Sogdian ideology : "By the time of the existence of the Pjanjikent temples of the 7th century, Buddhism had been substantially superseded by other faiths."[147] It is hard to see why Buddhism should have failed to withstand the 'competition' of other religions in Sogd and survived it in many other parts of Western Turkistan. Other factors must have come into play ; we can only guess what they were. Perhaps one was the following.

Nobody knows what the relations of the Buddhist community or Saṅgha were with the state, or what legal status it enjoyed in Western Turkistan. It is not unlikely that these relations may have taken different forms at different periods. The history of the Chinese Buddhist church shows that when it was strongest, the Saṅgha tried to secure its autonomy from the power of the state (340–403) :[148] the Tibetan church, on the other hand, merged with the state.[149] It is perfectly possible that the same tendencies manifested themselves in Western Turkistan, culminating in conflicts with the rulers and the subsequent weakening of Buddhist influence in the central part of Western Turkistan in the 6th to 8th centuries.

Extensive archaeological excavations have been conducted for many years now on the territory of Sogd. So far they have not led to the discovery of any 6th to 8th century monuments relating to Buddhism. The monumental art works discovered in Pjanjikent and Varakhsha, in the opinion of A. M. Belenitsky, "do not point to any direct relation between those monuments and Buddhism as a religious system. And yet we cannot understand those monuments or analyse their sources without drawing upon the artistic heritage of India, above all the Buddhistic Indian heritage."[150] This conclusion is endorsed by V. A. Shishkin, another eminent student of Central Asian art. "Neither in Varakhsha nor in Pjanjikent nor in Balalyk-Tepe is there any hint of the well-known Buddhist iconography", he writes. "These paintings also differ from the synchronous Indian paintings in style."[151] But Belenitsky and Shishkin both follow much the same line of argument in explaining the indisputable resemblance between the art of Pjanjikent and Varakhsha, on the one hand, and the Buddhist art of India, on the other (the number of such points of resemblance at Pjanjikent has steadily increased, by the way, as the diggings have continued). They locate the intermediate chronological and territorial links in the south of Western Turkistan, in Bactria – Ṭukhāristān. Basically we agree with their conclusion, although we would point up the direct contacts that also existed between Sogd and India.[152]

143 W. Barthold, Istoriya kulturnoi zhizni Turkestana, "Sochineniya", Vol. II (I), Moscow, 1963, pp. 215–216.
144 V. A. Livshitz, K. V. Kaufman, I. M. Diakonoff, O drevnei Sogdiyskoi pismennosti Bukhary, *VDI*. 1954, No. 1,pp. 155.
145 R. N. Frye, "Bukhara...", pp. 8–9 ; V. A. Nikonov, Kratky toponimicheskiy slovar, Moscow, 1696, p. 70.
146 V. A. Livshitz, K. V. Kaufman, I. M. Diakonoff, O drevnei Sogdiyskoi pismennosti Bukhary , op. cit. p. 155.
147 A. M. Belenitsky, "Voprosy ideologii...", p. 39.
148 E. Zürcher, "The Buddhist Conquest of China...", pp. 106–107, 231 et seq., 255 et seq.
149 B. Y. Vladimirtsov, "Buddizm v Tibete i Mongolii", Petrograd, 1919.
150 A. M. Belenitsky, K. istorii kulturnykh svyazev Srednei Azii i Indii v rannee srednevekovye, In: "Indiya v drevnosti", p. 189. Compare with the attempt by K. Jettmar to consider the scene of 'The Mourning of Siyavush' as a portrayal of the cremation of the dead Buddha (K. Jettmar, Zur 'Bewcinung szene' aus Pendzikent, *CAJ*. Vol. VI, No. 4, 1961, pp. 262–267). Also see M. Bussagli, *Painting of Central Asia*, Geneva, 1963, pp. 47–48.
151 V. A. Shishkin, *Varakhsha*, Moscow, 1963, pp. 205–208.
152 These had a definite impact on painting, examples of which have recently been found at Afrasiab (V. A. Shishkin, "Afrasiab–sokrovishchnitsa drevnei kultury", Tashkent, 1966 pp. 12–22). The contacts of Sogd with India were very intensive. According to a contemporary Indian scholar the Sogdians immersed themselves deeply in Indian history and culture. The diffusion of the Sogdians in northern and perhaps even central India is clearly reflected in the Indian linguistic material (Buddha Prakash, Thākura, "Central Asiatic Journal", Vol. 4 III, No. 3, Wiesbaden, 1958, p. 23). Naturally, this could not but stimulate the spread of Buddhism in Sogd, along with the development of all kinds of economic and cultural ties.

But neither can we overlook the unquestionable parallelism that comes to light when we examine the Manichaean and Buddhist texts from Eastern Turkistan, on the one hand, and the art of Pjanjikent and Varakhsha, on the other. Behind the one and the other there hovers a Central Asian Buddhist background. It is hard to dismiss the thought that the latter was exclusively Tukhāristānian. What is most likely is the existence of a Sogdian substratum too.

During the second half of the 6th century A.C., the development of Chinese art was greatly influenced by the school of Ts'ao Chung-ta, the foremost Buddhist artist of his time. From his name he is judged to have been a native of the Western Turkistan province of Tsao. It is not clear whether this is the Eastern Tsao (Ustrūshana) or Western (in Samarkand Sogd).[153] Other data of the same nature can be found in the written sources. Even more convincing is the rich store of early medieval Western Turkistan painting. When this is compared with Eastern Turkistan art we see that a substantial contribution the painting of Western Turkistan made to the development of painting in Central Asia.[154] Since the Soviet discoveries at Adzhine – Tepa, the same can be said for sculpture. The time is past when Central Asian art was considered a derivative of Iranian art. And yet to this day, even in the major works of certain authoritative Western scholars, the role of Sasanian art in the formation of the art of Eastern Turkistan is exaggerated, while the Western Turkistan contribution is relegated to a secondary place.[155] Truly scientific analysis of the total Western Turkistan material now at hand, and comparison of the latter with that from Eastern Turkistan will enable us to replace the subjective chronological determinations of the Eastern Turkistan frescoes by scientific ones and reconsider our ideas on the origins and development of Eastern Turkistan painting generally. [156]

But to get back to Western Turkistan — in the early Middle Ages Buddhism was also widespread in Semirechye and Ferghana, judging by the archaeological material.

Semirechye

L. R. Kyzlasov has completed the excavation of a Buddhist temple at the site of Ak-Beshim, 8 kilometres to the south-west of the town of Tokmak. L. P. Zyablin has excavated a second temple.[157]

On the western side of the hall, flanking the entrance to the shrine, stood two narrow stepped pedestals. Near one of these, on lotus-shaped elevations, rested the feet and legs (up to the knees) of a large statue of the Buddha. The length of the foot was 0.8 metres. Near the other pedestal lay the fragments of another large sculpture. In the opinion of L. R. Kyzlasov, the first pedestal must have supported a large statue of the Buddha seated with his legs resting on the floor, and the other pedestal a seated Buddha. There were two more pedestals of the suffa type here. Inside the shrine (40 square metres in area), Kyzlasov concludes from the small fragments littering the floor, there must have been a bronze statue of the Buddha. Other finds were gilded bronze plates with depictions of Buddhist subjects. There was a square depression in the centre of the shrine.

The second temple[158] was in the form of a closed square 38 metres on each side. Its main entrance was flanked by pylons on the north and branched into two narrow passageways on the sides. The central passage led into a square yard two of whose sides were lined with additional walls, from which one may logically assume, (contrary to L. P. Zyablin) that it was originally an Iwân construction. This yard could also be reached by passages from the central shrine and two passages from the inner circumambulatory corridor which encircled the shrine on three sides. The outer corridor ran around the sides of the suggested Iwān and ended at the front wall.

The numerous sculptures, in the opinion of L. P. Zyablin, were of standing figures. Of those partially extant, we might mention the head of a odhisattva with an elaborate headdress, and fragments of other heads : that of a Buddha (?), a dokait (?), of the coiffure of a very large central figure of the Buddha, and pieces of sculptural ornamentation.

153 A. Waley, *An Introduction to the Study of Chinese Painting*, New York, 1958, pp. 86–87 ; M. Bussagli, *Painting of Central Asia*, Geneva 1963 p. 53. This also applies to the Buddhist monk from Tsao who was likewise a famous musician Tsao-Polomen (5th–6th centuries).

154 M. M. Diakonov, Rospisi Pendzhikenta i zhivopis Srednei Azii, in : "Zhhivopis drevnego Pendzhikenta", Moscow 1954, pp. 147–154.

155 R. Ghirshman, Iran, Parthians and Sassanians, London, 1962, pp. 317–324.

156 See F. H. Andrews, *Wall Paintings from Ancient Shrines in Central Asia Recovered by Sir Aurel Stein*, London, 1948, p. xvi.

157 L. R. Kyzlasov, Arkheologicheskiye issledovaniya na gorodishche AK-Beshim v 1953-1954 gg., in : "Trudy *KAEE*." II, Moscow, 1959, pp. 155–227 : S. G. Khmelnitsky, Opyt rekonstruktsii buddiyskogo khrama gorodishcha AK–Beshim, op cit. pp. 243–265.

158 L. P. Zyablin, Vtoroi buddiysky khram Ak-Beshimskogo gorodishcha, Frunze, 1961.

Another large Buddhist structure has been excavated by P. N. Kozhemyako in the Chū Valley, near the village of Krasnorechensky. We have only some very terse newspaper reports on the results of these excavations, which included the find of part of a huge statue of the Buddha "lying along the whole length of the western corridor on its plastered pedestal, evidently once ornamented".[158]

Artistically the most important find was that of a head of the bodhisattva,[161] in a fine state of preservation. It was topped by an intricate coiffure and crown, with a twisted puff of hair on the forehead. The hair was dyed blue; the broad, blunt face retained no traces of paint; the ear lobes were elongated. L. P. Zyablin has compared this sculpture with one of the heads at Haḍḍa.[161] We might add that there are some resemblances with other Haḍḍa heads as well.[162] But these are all very remote analogies, for the proportions and treatments of the faces are very different at Haḍḍa. Much closer ties can be established with Eastern Turkistan. This applies to the kind of headdress[163] and, more important still, to the proportions and treatment of the face and its individual features. The Ak-Beshim head is particularly close to one of the heads at Tumchuq,[164] and also the sculptures at Duldur-Aqur,[165] with which the resemblance is particularly striking. Similarities with the art of Eastern Turkistan are apparent in the other statues, especially of a demoniacal nature.

Ferghana

V. A. Bultova-Levina has discovered a Buddhist temple at Quvā,[166] but no full description of the temple or the material there has been published as yet. Lying on the floor was part of a very large Buddha figure, including the head, shoulders and upper part of the right arm. Many other clay heads and sculptural as well as micro-architectural (terracotta) details littered the interior. Outside, near one of the pylons at the entrance, were two sculptures—of a horse and of a warrior equerry.[167]

Of course, it is very tempting to conclude that what we have here at Quvā is the portrayal of an episode in the Buddha's life which is so often repeated with variations in Buddhist art — his departure from the palace. In that case the horse is his beloved Kanthaka, and the equerry is Chandaka. But this interpretation of the scene can only be accepted after the whole cycle of Quvā sculpture has been published.

We must look more closely, however, into the sculptured heads wearing crowns of skulls. One of the finds allow of the reconstruction of "the black head of a goddess with her thin gilded eyebrows angrily knitted and a crown of skulls on her high coiffure." V. A. Bulatova-Levina believes this to be a representation of the female deity Śrīdevī.[168] Remains of the sculpture of her mule, specifically the leg and hoof, are preserved. Other finds include many large and small clay skulls and other sculptural details belonging in all likelihood to the companions of the deity. Another sculptured head found in the same temple also seems to have been adorned originally with a crown of skulls. In the opinion of the investigator of the temple, this is the head of Mañjuśrī, God of Enlightenment and simultaneously Champion of Faith. Fragments of reliefs in the shape of lion (or tiger) skins, which may have served as the skirt of these deities, were also found.[169]

The skull (one tiny sculptured skull was found, by the way, at Adzhina-Tepa, the early medieval Buddhist monument in southern Tajikistan) was an element of the headdress of many of the demons of the Buddhist pantheon: the guardian deity

159 Y. Golovanov, Chuysky koloss, "Komsomolskaya Pravda", July 7, 1962.

160 L. P. Zyablin, "Vtoroi buddiysky khram...", pp. 43–44, fig. 3.

161 J. Barthoux, Les fouilles de Haḍḍa, III, Figures et figurines, Paris, 1930, Pl. 67/c.

162 J Barthoux, "Les fouilles de Haḍḍa..." Pl. 70/a.

163 M. Paul-David, M. Hallade, L. Hambis, Toumchouq, "Mission Paul Pelliot. Documents archéologiques, II" Paris, 1964, p. 177. Pl. D/68, 69, 71 and especially H/11; "Toumchouq. Planches", Paris, 1961, Pl. LXXXIX/225.

164 "Toumchouq. Planches", op. cit. Pl. XXIV/44–78.

165 "Douldour-Aqour et Soubachi. Planches", Paris, 1967. Pl. V.

166 V. A. Bulatova-Levina, Buddiysky khram v Kuve, *SA*, 1961, No. 3, pp. 241–250.

167 For more about the Kuva sculptures, see G. A. Pugachenkova, L.I. Rempel, "Istoriya iskusstv Uzbekistana...", 1965, p. 134. There were evidently other Buddhist edifices beside the Quvā temple in Ferghana – see N. G. Gorbunova, Raskopki poseleny v zone zatopleniya Kerkidonskogo vodokhranilishcha (Ferghana) v 1964–1965 godakh, in: "Sektsiya arkheologii Srednei Azii (Tezisy dokladov)", Moscow, 1966, p. 17.

168 V. A. Bulatova-Levina, "Buddiysky khram v Kuve", op. cit. pp. 246–247, fig. 5, including a reference to A. K. Gordon, *Tibetan Religious Art*, New York, 1952.

169 V. A. Bulatova-Levina, "Buddiysky khram v Kuve" op. cit pp. 247–249, fig. 6. In this connection we might mention that the head of the "Mañjuśrī" is surprisingly like the head in the statuette which A. Grünwedel has defined as that of a ḍākinī: see A. Grünwedel, "Obzor sobraniya predmetov lamaiskogo kulta", Pt. I, St. Petersburg, 1905 (*Bibliotheca Buddhica*, VI), p. 76 · Pt. II, St. Petersburg, 1905, table 9/194

Saṃvara and his female counterpart Śakti, the guardian of the law Acala and the female deities Vajravarāhī, Śrīdevī and the ḍākinī. The crowns these deities wear consist of from five to seven skulls.[170] But the skull was not the exclusive attribute of these ominous guardians of the faith, for two of the sculptured figures at Haḍda have a skull in their hands.[171]

Bulatova-Levina's identification of the head as that of Śrīdevī or Śrīmatidevī is correct, in our view. Śrīdevī was an ardent champion of the Buddhist doctrine, and was therefore the recipient of many of the attributes of the other deities, including Nanda, the snake. She and her companions fly over the bloody lake containing the blood of the murdered demons.[172]

This would allow us to define the other head not as that of Mañjuśrī, but as that of the ḍākinī Siṃhavaktrā, the constant companion or Śrīdevī, especially since she also wore a crown of skulls.[173] The lion (or tiger ?) face would similarly have a bearing on this scene, for the related Vyāghravaktrā also wore a tiger's head.[174] In venturing this hypothesis we do not deny the possibility that the second head may be of Mañjuśrī.[175]

Perhaps this temple contained a representation of the five Dharmapālas — Tib. C'os-skyoṅ or 'Guardians of the Faith' (or 'the Doctrine'), which also go by many other hypostases and names. One of the five is the leader. According to legend, he transported himself in a miraculous manner from Ujjain to one of the monasteries near Lhasa.

Usually they are all depicted together. The leader has three heads and six arms, is seated on a lion, wears a skirt made of tiger skin. He is the three-eyed deity. The four accompanying deities have one head and two arms each, and are mounted respectively on white elephant, lion, mule and horse. The one on the horse wears a garment of tiger's skin.[176] It is not precluded that the third head which was defined as that of Māra may be the head of one of the Dharmapālas.

Among the paintings at Balavaste there is a portrait of a four-armed and three-headed Buddhist deity of the tantric type, with a large skull (exactly as the one from Adzhina-Tepa) set in the crown. The skull is depicted in the centre of the upper part of the crown. Bussagli refers this painting to the 7th–8th centuries A.C.[177]

Demoniacal characters are often encountered in the paintings at Kizyl, the sculptures at Tumchuq, etc. Take the sculptural figures at Tumchuq, with their prominent eyes, elongated ears, fangs protruding from the corners of their mouths (some of them almost identical with the Quvā sculptures). It has been correctly noted that they are not necessarily members of Māra's host which attacked the Buddha; they may in fact belong to the Buddha's entourage and represent guardians of Good and Order, expressing "the militant essence of the power of good".[178]

In the foregoing we mentioned some additional Tibetan material (part of it contributed by V. A. Bulatova-Levina) which may further our understanding of some Quvā sculptures. At the same time we would like to point out that many of the characters received their ultimate formation on Tibetan soil, imbibing Tibetan features, and that this took place at a later date than the creation of the Quvā sculptures. Therefore we should regard the demons of Ferghana as a link and a manifestation of the process of the transfer of the prototypes from India and Afghanistan to Eastern Turkistan and Tibet via Western Turkistan. From this vantage, particular interest attaches to the yakṣīs from Haḍda[179] and the portraits of the demons at Adzhina-Tepa and Quvā.[180]

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170 S. F. Oldenburg, "Materialy no buddiyskoy ikonografii Khara-khoto," pp. 49–53, 58–59.

171 J. Barthoux, "Les fouilles de Haḍda" p. 39.

172 For more details about her cult and attributes see A. Grünwedel, *Mythologie des Buddhismus in Tibet und der Mongolei*, Leipzig, 1900, pp. 175–176, Abb. 52, 133, 148. For more about the role of the human skull in the Lamaistic ritual, see Golsan Gamboyev, Obyasneniye semipalatinskikh drevnostei, "Izvestiya Arkheologicheskogo obshchestva", Vol. II, Moscow, 1861, pp. 208–209.

173 A Grünwedel, "Mythologie...", p. 177, Abb. 148–149.

174 Ibid. p. 177.

175 On the iconography of that personality, see ibid. p. 136; also B. A. Kuftin. "Kratky obzor panteona severnogo buddizma i shamanizma v svyazi s istoriey ucheniya", Moscow, 1927, pp. 43–45; J. Hackin, Guide-Catalogue du Musee Guimet Les collections bouddhiques, Paris-Bruxelles, 1923, Pl. XVI.

176 A Grünwedel, "Mythologie...", pp. 182–184, Abb. 151.

177 M. Bussagli, *Painting of Central Asia*, pp. 60, 63–64.

178 "Toumchouq", I, 1961, Pl. LVII, LXXIX-LXXX, XCIII; "Toumchouq", II, 1964, pp. 263, 265. Also interesting in this connection are the heads of demons from Idi-kutshari (Eastern Turkistan); see A. Grünwedel, Bericht über archäologische Arbeiten in Idikutschari und Umgebung im Winter 1902-1903, München, 1905 (Abhandlungen d. Baerischen Akademie d. Wissenschaften, I. Klasse. XXIV, I. Abteilung), pp. 72-73, Taf. XIII.

179 J. Barthoux, "Les fouilles de Haḍda..." II, Pl. 99-102.

180 A certain Khotanese-Saka text speaks of the yakṣi as a hungry monster, most horrific (H.W. Bailey, Iranica et vedica, "Indo-Iranian Journal", Vol. II, 1958, No. 2, pp. 152- 156). It is perfectly possible that in Western Turkistan the demons and monsters of Buddhist mythology underwent changes in the popular imagination, merging with the local conceptions of such beings.

The discovery of the Buddhist temple at Quvā refutes the report of Huei Ch'ao that "the Buddhist doctrine is unknown in Ferghana and there are no monasteries, no monks or nuns";[181] it turns out now that all these things were to be found in Ferghana! At the same time Huei Ch'ao may not have been as unreliable as at first sight appears. Quvā and its temple were situated in southern Ferghana, which at the time of his pilgrimage had already been conquered by the Arabs, and it is they in all probability who destroyed the Quvā temple.

Ustrūshana

The question of the religious affinities of the population of early medieval Ustrūshana is still not fully answered. Of course, it seems promising to try to use the material of the trial of Ḥaydar, the Ustrūshanian afshīn who was accused in 841–842, among other things, of secretly practising the religion of his ancestors and giving the inhabitants of Sogd permission to continue in the worship of their own religion. There are detailed descriptions of the course and materials of the trial in various works,[182] and therefore we shall dwell only on those points which have some bearing on our subject.

The medieval sources state that the afshīn had punished two Muslims who had staged an attack on a temple housing idols worshipped by the inhabitants of Ustrūshana. In quoting this part of the story, Herzfeld adds that it was a Buddhist temple.[183] When the afshīn's courtyard in Samarra was searched, an idol was seen there — a wooden figure of a man, wearing among his various rich ornaments a pair of golden earrings set with precious stones. Other 'indecent' images and idols were also found there. All these idols and images were later set on fire.

In translating and commenting on this excerpt, Herzfeld recalls that the idols sent from Kabul to Samarra in 250/864–865 must all have been Buddhist statues.[184] This hypothesis would seem to find support in the following circumstance known to us from Ṭabarī. A certain Khuttal ruler fled from the Arabs, first to Ferghana and from there to Ustrūshana, and we are told that he brought with him "great numbers of images" and set them up in Ustrūshana. "His flight to Ustrūshana and the fact that he chose it to set up his idols were hardly fortuitous", comments A. M. Belenitsky.[185] To this we might add that the Khuttal rulers (we have the direct evidence of the sources for saying so–see below) were known to be Buddhist adepts. And still all this is not enough to warrant the claim, as Herzfeld would have it that the afshīn was incriminated precisely for practising the Buddhist faith. Against that we have the following counter-evidence. The main statue evidently wore golden earrings, and consequently could not be a figure of the Buddha. It could only have been a bodhisattva. But it is hardly likely, considering the Hīnayāna character of Western Turkistan Buddhism, that a bodhisattva would be the centre of worship.

The answer to the question of the relative place of Buddhism in Ustrūshana, where it must have played some role just as it did in Sogd, depends upon the further accumulation of archaeological material. So far it has not given us the answer.

In Ustrūshana, and in Sogd too, local religions played the dominant role; his subjects called afshīn Ḥaydar 'the god of gods' This was their form of address, Ḥaydar said in his own exoneration, according to the custom of their forbears. At the trial this was the unjust charge levelled against Ḥaydar. If one is to judge by the documents from Mug Mountain, the expression, as V. A. Livshitz has demonstrated, was not more than a polite form of address and had nothing to do with the concept of a supernatural deity.[186] Although the Muslims knew this they nevertheless regarded the idiomatic Sogdian expression with disapproval. Therefore they saw fit to accuse Ḥaydar of trying to deify himself.[187]

But it is also true that members of the ruling family of Ustrūshana were known by the names of Dīvdād and Dīvdast, whose composition includes the word *dīv* (dew), applied here in the opinion of Henning in its original meaning of

181 W. Fuchs, "Huei-Ch'ao's Pilgerreise . . . ", p. 452.

182 E. Herzfeld, "Geschichte der Stadt Samarra", Hamburg, 1948; N. "Negmatov, Ustrushana v drevnosti i rannem srednevekovye", Stalinabad, 1957.

183 E. Herzfeld, "Geschichte . . . ", p. 148.

184 Ibid. p. 152.

185 A. M. Belenitsky, "Voprosy ideologii . . . ", p. 50.

186 V. A. Livshitz, "Yuridicheskiye dokumenty i pisma", pp. 41, 92-93.

187 W. B. Henning, *A Sogdian God*, p. 249 (here, too, on the semantic order of the development of the meaning of these terms).

god'.[188] Paraphrasing Henning,[189] we might say that the religion of Zoroaster had some influence on the ancient paganism of the Ustrūshanians (which must have been very similar to that of the Sogdians). That ancient religious doctrine enjoyed the support of the rulers of Ustrūshana, which was one of the crimes of which afshīn Ḥaydar was accused. It is characteristic that the use of ossuaries was part of the burial cult of the Ustrūshanians, as we know from recent archaeological finds. It is also reasonable to assume that other religions had a following in Ustrūshana by the time of the Arab conquest.

Ṭukhāristān

From the reports of Buddhist pilgrims it appears that there were many (a hundred) functioning monasteries in Balkh, the capital of Tukhāristān, during the 7th and early part of the 8th century, that some 3000 monks resided in them, and that they housed all kinds of Buddhist cult objects; a large section of the population followed the Hīnayāna school.

Hsüan Tsang recalled that in his day Ta-mi (Termez) had about ten monasteries inhabited by about 1000 monks, and containing stūpas and images of the Buddha. In Chaghā-niyān, for instance, there were five monasteries and a definite number of monks, in Akhārūn — two monasteries and about a hundred monks, in Shūmān — two monasteries and a small number of monks, in Quwādhiyān — three monasteries and about one hundred monks.[190]

The Chinese sources have it that at the beginning of the 8th century, in the year 719, a ruler of Kumēdh, one by the name of No-lo-yen, sent a mission to China. E. Chavannes has recognised in this name the Chinese version of the Indian form of Nārāyaṇa or some local variant of the word. J. Harmatta sees this as indisputable evidence that the deity Nārāyaṇa was popular in this part of the world by the beginning of the 8th century.[192]

Hsüan Tsang listed and briefly characterised the regions of Ṭukhāristān, among them Hu-sha (Vakhsh) and Kho-to-lo (Khuttal) but there is nothing about the spread of Buddhism there in his extremely laconical remarks about these regions.[193] Huei Ch'ao, on the other hand, told us that in Khuttal "the king, the aristocracy and the people believe in the *triratna*, there are monasteries and monks, and the Hīnayāna doctrine is followed". He had the same to say about Vakhān but not Shughnān, where, in the words of Huei Ch'ao, the Buddhist religion was not popular.[194]

The reports of Hsüan Tsang and Huei Ch'ao on the spread of Buddhism in the northern part of Ṭukhāristān have been brilliantly confirmed by L. I. Albaum's discovery, during the diggings at Zang-Tepe (30 km. from Termez) of fragments of birch-bark manuscripts, which came from the 7th and 8th century layers at the site. The page that is in the best state of preservation is written in Central Asian Brāhmī letters in the hybrid Buddhist Sanskrit tongue.[195] According to M.I. Vorobyova-Desyatovskaya, one of those who deciphered the documents in question, "in content the text is related to that part of the Buddhist canon which is known as the *Vinayapiṭaka* or simply *Vinaya*. It consists of rules of conduct for monks, nuns and the Buddhist laity, regulates all sides of life, and sets down the rules for the monasteries".[196]

The other documents from Zang-Tepe (altogether there were 12 fragments, counting the one mentioned above, that could be read, as well as hosts of tiny pieces) are also written in variants of Brāhmī and are Buddhist in nature. Evidently, there was a collection of Buddhist texts deposited at Zang-Tepe.[197]

During the second half of the 7th and first half of the 8th century, there must have been various situations when the monks, fearing persecution

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188 Ibid. pp. 253-254. I. M. Oranskiy maintains that in these names, the word *dēv* is connected with those of its meanings in modern Tajik and Persian which relate it to the conception "of everything that is supernatural, extraordinary in might, strength, size, skill, artistry, etc." I. M. Oranskiy, Etimologicheskiye zametki, "Izvestiya otdeleniya obshchestvennykh nauk AN Tadzhikskoi SSR", No. 12, 1957, pp. 79-82.

189 W. B. Henning, *A Sogdian God* p. 250.

190 S. Beal, "Buddhist Records ...", I, pp. 44-46; "The Life of Hsüan-Tsang", pp. 49-52; W. Fuchs, "Huei-Ch'ao's Pilgerreise ...", p. 449. Also A. Foucher, La vieille route de Inde de Bactres à Taxila, *MDAFA*. Vol. I, Paris, 1942 p. 84.

191 S. Beal, "Buddhist Records ...", I. pp. 39-40.

192 E. Chavannes, "Documents ...", pp. 164, 304; J. Harmatta, "The Oldest Kharoṣṭhī Inscription ...", p. 6.

193 S. Beal, "Buddhist Records ...", I, p. 41.

194 W. Fuchs, "Huei-Ch'ao's Pilgerreise...", pp. 452-453.

195 A. I. Albaum, Pismennost iz zamka Zang-tepe, in: "Obshchestvennyye nauki v Uzbekistane" 1963, No. 2; A. I Albaum, Raskopki Zang-tepe, in: "Istoriya materialnoi kultury Uzbekistana", IV. Tashkent, 1963.

196 M. I. Vorobyova-Desyatovskaya, Nakhodka sanskritskikh rukopisei v Srednei Azii, "Narody Azii i Afriki", 1965 No. 3, p. 94; M. I. Vorobyova-Desyatovskaya, Pamyatniki indiyskoi pismennosti iz Srednei Azii, in: "Indiya v drevnosti"

197 G. M. Bongard-Levin, M. I. Vorobyova-Desyatovskaya, E. P. Tyomkin, Fragmenty sanskritskikh rukopisei iz Zang-tep (Preliminary account), *VDI*, 1965, No. 1.

by the Arabs, hid their Buddhist manuscripts in the palatial residence of the local ruler or dihqkān who was either an adept of their religion or regarded it with sympathy.

We might note in passing that the translation activities of the natives of Ṭukhāristān continued during this whole period. In 705, for instance, a Buddhist monk from Ṭukhāristān by the name of Mi-tho-shan (Mithrosanta ?) translated a certain Buddhist composition into the Chinese language.[198]

Adzhina - Tepa

This in the Vakhsh Valley. 12 kilometres off the town of Kurgan-Tübe, is the most important Buddhist monument in North Ṭukhāristān studied so far. Excavations of the monastery have been carried on by the present writer (together with T. I. Zeymal) since 1960.[199] The monastery was rather small (perimetre, 100X50 metres.) It consisted of two adjoining parts, two square courtyards, bounded by structures.

The signal feature of Adzhina-Tepa is the abundance of sculptures and paintings unearthed there. There were also seated and standing figures on the pedestals of the cella in the bicameral set of the northern side. In the middle of two tiny cellae on this side stood miniature stūpas with very intricate profiles ; the other shrines also contained statuary. The corridors round the great stūpa in the northern part of the monastery had vaulted niches holding pedestals The pedestals supported large Buddha figures (one and a half times life-size). Some of the figures (in *dharmacakramudrā* and *dhyānamudrā*) have been preserved.

All the sculptures and reliefs were made of clay and then painted. They suffered great damage at the time of the monastery's destruction. Comparatively a few whole sculptures have been unearthed so far, but the number of sculptured heads and fragments of statues and reliefs is about 500. This is the largest collection of relics of Buddhist art from the territory of Western Turkistan. Characters of the Buddhist pantheon (Buddhas, bodhisattvas, devatās), heads of monks and ascetics were the sculptors' main subjects. The rooms and corridors were decorated with reliefs depicting human heads and processions of birds and animals, as well as geometrical and herbaceous designs. The statues were mostly made by pressing and finished subsequently.

Along with the idealised figures executed in keeping with the religious canons, Buddhist sculpture from Western Turkistan includes a large group of figures treated quite realistically. This is a general characteristic of Buddhist art. The idealised, canonical types of the Buddha and bodhisattva images (though they show marked evolution in time and have strong, sometimes striking, local distinctions in different countries and areas)[200] were combined with other realistically treated personages, which only had certain traditional attributes. Sculptures from Hadda (Afghanistan)[201] afford a graphic example.

The walls of many rooms and corridors were covered with paintings applied on the plaster layer. On the southern side, the pedestals were painted, too. The corridors round the great stūpa had painted plafonds.

Buddha images dominate the paintings. Thus, all the plafonds show row upon row of small seated Buddha figures in *padmāsana* (with legs drawn under). But sometimes there are other personages and scenes. Of great interest is the surviving fragment of a scene showing Buddhist devotees bearing gifts. There are two male figures (height, 45 cm.) in white garments, sitting with their legs drawn under them. In their outstretched hands they hold gifts : vessels with flowers (judging by the colour, one vessel was gold, the other silver) The gift-bearers' flowing garments fully cover their bodies. The waists are belted, with a sword and a dagger attached to the belt.

The fragment of a scene showing devotees bringing offerings clearly reproduced the Buddhist *praṇidhā* ceremony (bringing offerings to a shrine)[202] Similar scenes have been registered in many areas of Buddhist art, including the brilliant frescoes of Sigiriya (Sri Lanka)[203] and the wall paintings of

198 B. Nanjio, " A Catalogue . . . ", col. 440, No. 147.

199 See T.I. Zeymal, Arkheologicheskiye raboty v Vakhshskoi doline v 1960 g., in : "Arkheologicheskiye raboty v Tadzhikistane, VIII, 1960 god", Dushanbe, 1962, pp. 45-47 ; B.A. Litvinsky, T. I. Zeymal, Raskopki i razvedki v Yuzhnom Tadzhikistane v 1961 g., in : "Arkheologicheskiye raboty v Tadzhikistane IX 1961 god" Dushanbe, 1964 ; B.A. Litvinsky, Tadzhikistan i India (primery drevnikh svyazei i kontaktov, in: "Indiya v drevnosti",p. 159 ; B.A. Litvinsky, " Recent Archaeological Discoveries in South Tajikistan and Problems of Cultural Contacts between the Peoples of Central Asia and Hindustan in Antiquity", Moscow, 1967, pp. 4-8.

200 For details, see B. Rowland, *The Art and Architecture of India, Buddhist Hindu Jain*, London, 1959.

201 See J. Barthoux, " Les Fouilles de Hadda . . . ", III.

202 See A. Grünwedel, " Kratkiye zametki o Buddiyskom iskusstve v Turfane", St. Petersburg, 1908 ; B. A. Litvinsky T. I. Zeymal, Buddiysky syuzhet v srednеaziatskoi, zhivopisi, *SE*. 1968, No. 3.

203 See V. A. Smith, *A History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon*, 3rd ed., Bombay, (s. a.), pp. 99-100, Pl. 90-91 ; A Coomaraswamy, *History of Indian and Indonesian Art*, London - Leipzig - New York, 1927, Pl. LI.

Eastern Turkistan.[204] The characters depicted at Adzhina-Tepa are most probably local noblemen bringing gifts to the monastery. In appearance they are much like the figures in the paintings from Balalyk-Tepe, a site situated relatively near, in southern Uzbekistan. The likeness is probably due to the fact that in both cases the painters were portraying members of the local nobility; and employing rather similar artistic manners.

Adzhina-Tepa gives us an idea of the Buddhist art of Ṭukhāristān, what is more, a comprehensive idea of it, since the site has both paintings and sculptures.

The opinion voiced in the literature (as by L. I. Rempel) that in the 7th century "the artist's creativity in religious (Buddhist) art was fading out"[206] is totally negated by the material from Adzhina-Tepa, for it was precisely in the 7th and early 8th centuries that Buddhist artistic creativity reached its peak in Ṭukhāristān and all of Western Turkistan; the sculptures from Adzhina-Tepa have taken an honoured place in the gallery of masterpieces of Buddhist art.

We are beginning to see now that Adzhina-Tepa art draws certain and quite important features from Gandharan art. Its ties with the late-Gandharan sculptures from Haḍḍa are traceable. There are definite evidences of the Gupta tradition, and, undoubtedly, parallels with Eastern Turkistan sculpture. At the same time, affinities with Fondukistan (circa 7th century A.C.) are particularly strong.

The sculptures of Adzhina-Tepa have quite a few points of similarity with those of Fondukistan.[207] The overall resemblance is very marked, despite certain distinctions.

B. Rowland has pointed to a highly pronounced Indian strain in the art of Fondukistan, traceable not to Gupta, but to much earlier creations. Some of the Fondukistan images, in his opinion, are the sculptural replicas of the 'Indian style' sculptures of Bāmiyān.[208]

M. Bussagli has stressed the strong influence exercised by Western Turkistan art on the art of Fondukistan, notably by the paintings and sculptures of Pjanjikent and the paintings of Balalyk-Tepe. At the same time, like Rowland, he points to the obvious Indian character of some of the Fondukistan works, even though these came under a Western Turkistan influence. In the opinion of Bussagli, Indian and Western Turkistan elements 'complete the fusion' in Fondukistan.[209]

The 'Indian' strain is not so pronounced in the sculptures of Adzhina-Tepa. This may be due to the strong influence of the local, Bactrian-Ṭukhāristān traditions mentioned above.

These traditions of local secular art not only had an impact on, and repercussions in, the Buddhist art of Adzhina-Tepa: in some instances they ceased to be the undercurrent and formed the mainstream, e.g., in the gift-bearers' scene (painting) and the heads of a 'Brahman' and a monk (sculpture). That it is the portraits of the monk and the 'Brahman' that stand out from the mass of sculptures is not fortuitous (see the material from Eastern Turkistan).[210]

The two above-mentioned sculptured heads of elderly men from Adzhina-Tepa, though they differ from one another and evidently represent different ethnic types, clearly portray dwellers of Ṭukhāristān. In spite of a certain measure of Indo-Buddhist traditionalism, the artistic impression conveyed by the two sculptures certainly relates them in essence more to the Bactrian school of realistic sculpture.

Thus, even the fraction of painted and sculptured decorations unearthed at Adzhina-Tepa tells of a vital school of Ṭukhāristān-Buddhist art. This school sprang up and drew sustenance from both Indian and Bactrian roots: a synthesis of the artistic achievements of both countries accounts for the originality of Ṭukhāristān Buddhist art.

In its turn, it exerted a telling influence on the art of other parts of Western Turkistan and the contiguous lands. M. Bussagli has called attention to the impact which the art centres of Western Turkistan (not Iran?) had on the early medieval

204 See A. Grünwedel, Berichte über archäeologische Arbeiten in Idikutschari und Umgebung in Winter 1902–1903, München, 1905, Abb. 144, Taf. II/I, XVII; A. Grünwedel, *Altbuddhistische Kultstätten in Chinesisch Turkistan*, Berlin, 1912, pp. 43, 184 et seq., figs. 256–266, 544–567 et seq.

205 See L. I. Albaum, *Balalyk-tepe*, Tashkent, 1960, figs. 107, 109.

206 G. A. Pugachenkova, L. I. Rempel, "Istoriya iskusstv Uzbekistana...," p. 161.

207 See J. Hackin, Le monastère bouddhique de Foundoukistan, *MDAFA*, Vol. VIII, Paris, 1959, pp. 49–59; B. Rowland, "The Art and Architecture of India...", p. 103, Ph. Stern, Avant-propos, *MDAFA*, Vol. VIII, Paris, 1959, p. X; B. Rowland, *Ancient Art from Afghanistan. Treasures of the Kabul Museum*, The Asian Publishing House, 1966, pp. 116–118

208 B. Rowland, "The Art and Architecture of India..." p. 103.

209 M. Bussagli, *Painting of Central Asia*, Geneva, 1963, pp. 40, 48; On the "Gandhāra tradition" in the sculpture of Foundukistan, see H. G. Franz, *Buddhistische Kunst Indiens*, Leipzig, 1965, pp. 110–111.

210 See A. Grünwedel, "Kratkiye zametki...", p. 4.

art of Afghanistan and Eastern Turkistan ; in his opinion, it was precisely the art of Western Turkistan that possessed "styles and trends.... either unknown to Sassanian art or as yet undocumented". Bussagli noted further : "We may therefore assume that certain trends which developed in the Serindian centres were in reality echoes of the East Iranian (Western Turkistan) creations."[211]

With the excavations of Adzhina-Tepa we have gained a comprehensive idea of Western Turkistan Buddhist art, as exemplified by its Ṭukhāristān school. The master-pieces of Adzhina-Tepa give us a deeper and broader insight into the evolution of art both in Western Turkistan and all of Central Asia, as well as the contribution made by the peoples of the former to the development of Oriental culture.

The above suggests our considering two problems : 1) the extent of the spread of Buddhism in Ṭukhāristān, and 2) the nature of Buddhism in Western Turkistan.

Was Huei Ch'ao exaggerating when he stated that in Ṭukhāristān, and specifically in Khuttal, not only the king and the nobles but also the people adhered to Buddhism ? We think he was a little guilty of exaggeration. Suppose we reformulate the question : was Buddhism part and parcel of the life of Ṭukhāristān's people, or was it mainly the religion of the urban dwellers (as assumed, for example, by A. von Gabain).[212] In Eastern Turkistan and China the spread of Buddhism was indeed confined to the urban milieu[213] and this may initially have been the case in Western Turkistan too. But in the 7th and early 8th centuries there were not merely some urban nests of Buddhism in Western Turkistan : the rural population, too, embraced Buddhism to a certain extent. Aside from Huei Ch'ao, this is definitely corroborated by the archaeological relics, primarily Adzhina-Tepa and Zang-Tepe, both monuments of "non-urban" Buddhism.

Students of early Chinese Buddhism have found the 'co-existence' of the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna to be its characteristic feature. We might note that no traces of the Mahāyāna can be found in the translations of An Shih-kao and his closest associates. This veteran translator himself founded a Hīnayāna school. It is true that Mahāyānist works appeared as early as the 2nd century A.C. But even in the 4th century A.C. preachers coming to China from Ṭukhāristān were authorities on the components of the Hīnayāna[214] the prevailing trend in Western Turkistan Buddhism to the very end. Judging by the catalogues of translated works[215], not only were many of the Buddhist scholars from Western Turkistan familiar with the works reflecting the Mahāyāna doctrine, but engaged in their translation. This might indicate some developments totally unknown to us and connected with possible attempts at spreading the Mahāyāna doctrine in Western Turkistan – perhaps even a struggle between the zealots of the Small and the Great Vehicles, as was the case for example, in Khotan in the second half of the 3rd century A.C.[216]

According to I-Tsing (7th century), "those who worship the Bodhisattvas and read the Mahayana Sūtras are called the Mahayanists (the Great), while those who do not perform these are called the Hinayanists (the Small)". But I-Tsing, too, recognised the difficulty of classifying certain schools as Hīnayānist or Mahāyānist.[217] Finds of written records tell us that monks from the monasteries in the south of Western Turkistan studied works of the Hīnayāna doctrine ; outside Western Turkistan, they preached the Hīnayāna and translated its basic works ; passing Buddhist pilgrims called them Hīnayānists. This does not imply however, that the bodhisattvas were not honoured in the monasteries of Western Turkistan. The iconography of Adzhina-Tepa statuary shows that bodhisattva images were fashioned and kept in the monasteries along with those of the Buddha and the characters associated with his life. But the bodhisattvas had not yet come to the fore there, and their cult was not independent.

Last but not least, Western Turkistan Buddhism seems to have had its specifics both as regards its creed and rituals. This is borne out by the direct evidence of I-Tsing to the effect that the *upavasatha* ceremony, as it was performed in such lands as Tukhara (Ṭukhāristān) and Su-li (Sogd), differed from its counterpart in other countries.[218]

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211 M. Bussagli, *Painting of Central Asia*, Geneva, 1963, p. 36.
212 See A. von Gabain, "Buddhistische Türkmenmission...", p. 166
213 See E.Zürcher. "The Buddhist Conquest of China...," p. 59.
214 See E. Zürcher, "The Buddhist Conquest of China...", pp. 33–34, 54, 72, 202–204.
215 See B. Nanjio, "A Catalogue, . " cols. 381 et seq.
216 See E.Zürcher, "The Buddhist Conquest of China...," pp.62–63.
217 I-Tsing, "A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practised in India and the Malay Archipelago (A. D. 671-695)," Oxford, 1896, pp. 14–15; see also O. Franke, "Die Ausbreitung des Buddhismus...", p. 216. According to I-Tsing, in northern India and the South Sea Islands, the people mostly adhered to the Hīnayāna, while in China they adhered to the Mahāyāna (A Record..., p. 14). On the location and correlation of the number of monasteries and the size of the adherents of the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna (on the basis of the data of Fa Hsien, Hsüan Tsang and Huei Ch'ao), see E. Lamotte, Sur la formation du Mahāyāna, in : "Asiatica", Leipzig, 1954, pp. 392–396.
218 See I-Tsing, "A Record of the Buddhist Religion...", p. 49.

Merv

The history of Buddhism in Merv in the early Middle Ages is likewise illustrated by very interesting archaeological material. A vessel containing Sassanian coins of the 5th century A.C. was found in ancient Merv, east of Gyaur-kala, in a Buddhist shrine[219] beyond the town wall. The vessel also contained stone statuettes of the Buddha executed in the Gandharan tradition, and birch-bark manuscripts.[220] M. Vorobyova-Desyatovskaya and E. Tyomkin were able to identify these as *Vinaya* manuscripts in the Brāhmī writing.[221]

The finds at Merv and all that is known on the spread of Buddhism, Christianity and Manichaeism there, knock the ground from under the artificial conception of E. Herzfeld, who opposed Merv as a centre and bastion of Zoroastrianism to Balkh as a centre of Buddhism.[222] What is more the discovery of the *Vinaya* manuscripts enables us to elaborate the problem discussed above. As M. Vorobyova-Desyatovskaya has informed us, the Vinaya contains a direct indication that this is the Sarvāstivādin version. Ṭukhāristān's Buddhists, too, apparently belonged to the Sarvāstivādin school. In any case, the colophon of the Turkic version of *Maitreyamiti* names as its compiler Āryacandra Bodhisattva, a Vaibhāṣika adherent and a native of Nagardeshi (probably Jalālābād on the Kabul River). Thus a native of southern Ṭukhāristān belonged to the Vaibhāṣika school,[223] the school that prevailed the Ṭukhāristān in the Kushan period. The Vaibhāṣika is known to have been a component of the Sarvāstivādin doctrine.

Thus, on the eve of the Arab conquest, Buddhism was still firmly entrenched in many parts of Western Turkistan. Arab writers who studied the history of religion were well aware of this. An-Nadīm said: "The majority of people in Māwarā 'an-nahr adhered to this creed (the Buddhist) before Islam and in ancient times."[224]

Although E. Herzfeld's assertion that the entire eastern part of Iran was converted to Buddhism[225] is a slight over-statement, on the whole it is undoubtedly true. The sources describing the Arab conquest repeatedly speak of the destruction or capture of idols or 'houses of idols'.[226] The question of which religion one or another idol represented cannot be settled with certainty, but some of them may have been Buddhist idols.

The end of Buddhism in Western Turkistan is usually connected with the Arab conquest. This assumption is not fully correct. Below are cited data for the Bāmiyān valley. Let us not forget that even in the north of Western Turkistan in Semirechye which lay beyond the solid nucleus of Arab-conquered-lands Buddhist cult structures continued to exist and new ones were built. These were discovered and investigated by A. B. Bernshtam, who dated them in the 9th–12th centuries.[227] A characteristic feature is the persistence of tradition: Buddhist cult structures continued to exist in the 9th–10th centuries,[228] as at the site of Ak-Beshim, whose temples have been discussed in detail above.

There is much that is obscure in the history of Buddhism in Semirechye. We know that in 762–845 Manichaeism became the Uigurs' official religion and that the Buddha images worshipped before were burned. In Semirechye itself Manichaeism was also spreading; in the 8th century, the khāqān of the Western Turks was regarded as the great protector of all Manichaeans of the East, up to China.[229] The desolation into which the first and second Ak-Beshim temples fell may be associated with that particular period.

The sources indicate, however, that gradually the importance of Buddhism was again enhanced. By the 10th century it had won many supporters among the Turks, Sogdians, Sakas, Tokharians and Chinese in Eastern Turkistan. One may

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219 This is a different shrine, not the one mentioned earlier.

220 See M. Vorobyova-Desyatovskaya, E. Tyomkin, Indiyskiye rukopisi v Turkmenii, "Nauka i zhizn", 1966, No. 1, p. 26; V.I. Sarianidi, Z. I. Usmanova, Yuzhno-Turkestanskoi arkheologicheskoi kompleksnoi ekspeditsii dvadtsat let, *SA*. 1967, No. 1, p. 316.

221 In the light of new discoveries it seems likely that the well-known Murghab caves do have a direct bearing on Buddhism — in spite of the repeatedly expressed opinion to the contrary.

222 See E. Herzfeld, Kushano-Sassanian Coins, *ASI Mem.* No. 38, Calcutta, 1930, pp. 13–14. (A long stage, from the Arsacid period to the end of the Sassanian period, is meant here.)

223 See H.W. Bailey, Ttaugara, *BSOS*. 1937, Vol. VIII, Pt. 4, pp. 894–895.

224 W. Barthold, O khristianstve v Turkestane v domongolsky period, "Sochineniya", Vol. II, 2, Moscow, 1964, p. 269. Also see G. Flügel, *Mani*, p. 386; S. Navdi, The Origin of the Barmakids, "Islamic Culture. The Hyderabad Quarterly", Vol. VI, No. 1, 1932, p. 6.

225 E. Herzfeld, *Zoroaster and His World*, Princeton 1947, Vol. II, p. 755.

226 Detailed information on the question is given in the works of W. Barthold and A. M. Belenitsky.

227 See A. M. Bernshtam, Trudy Semirechenskoi arkheologicheskoi ekspeditsii "Chuiskaya dolina", *MIA*. No. 41, Moscow–Leningrad, 1950, pp. 48–55, 131–133, 139–140; A. N. Bernshtam, V gorakh i dolinakh Pamira i Tyan-Shany. in: "Po sledam drevnikh kultur. Ot Volgi do Tikhogo okeana", Moscow, 1954, pp. 295, 302.

228 On the date of these structures, see L. R. Kyzlasov, "Issledovaniya...", p. 236 (Note 100).

229 See A. von Gabain, Der Buddhismus in Zentralasien, op. cit. pp. 506–507.

speak not only of the revival but even of the flourishing of Buddhism at that time.[230] Similar processes were apparently taking place in Semirechye, where the survival of Buddhism was facilitated by the decline of the Samanid state by the middle of the 10th century.

The short-lived revival of Buddhism in Western Turkistan is associated with the Mongol conquest. The Buddhist shrine at Merv, dated in the second half of the 13th century, commemorates that process. Judging by the remains of its decor, it was fitted out in keeping with Far Eastern traditions; its architecture was on the whole eclectic.[231]

The last wave of Buddhism, vested already in the Lamaistic form, was connected with the Kalmuks' arrival in the northern part of Western Turkistan. Documentary evidence, among others, the famous "*om maṇi padme hūm*" formula, occurs in many places in the north of Western Turkistan.

Of particular importance for research is the problem of the role of Buddhism and the associated elements of secular culture and art in the further development of Western Turkistan culture after the Arab conquest and the introduction of Islam. Actually, this is a component of the more general problem of the pre-Muslim cultural heritage of the peoples of Western Turkistan. Hardly any research has been done from this particular angle, and many things are still obscure. We cannot deal with all the aspects of this interesting problem in the present article, but we shall discuss a few points.

Above, we have endeavoured to show that Islam in Western Turkistan fell on far from 'virginal' (irreligious) soil. Therefore, in considering the further evolution of Islam one should not underestimate the pre-Muslim background, including the Buddhist. This is all the more important because some of the pre-Muslim priests attained to high prominence in the Caliphate. Suffice it to mention Yaḥyā ibn Khālid, whose ancestor was a high-ranking priest in the Buddhist monastery at Balkh, a Barmak (according to E. Sachau, the word 'Barmak' came from 'paramaka', meaning abbot of the vihāra, superior).[232] Yaḥyā ibn Khālid became Hārūn al-Rashīd's all-powerful wazīr. At the same time, it was this very man (as An-Nadīm specially pointed out)[233] who sponsored the systematic translation of Indian writings into Arabic. V. Minorsky has established that Yaḥyā ibn Khālid sent an envoy to India, who was to bring back medicinal herbs and collect information on Indian religions. The efforts of this envoy were an important source of knowledge of India for the Caliphate scholars.[234]

Not all Buddhist institutions were destroyed or stopped functioning immediately after the Arab conquest.[235] A case in point is Bāmiyān, where Buddhism flourished at the time of Hsüan Tsang. J. Marquart and W. Barthold cite the following with regard to Bāmiyān: though the ruler of Bāmiyān embraced Islam under Caliph Mansūr (754–775), a Buddhist monastery existed in Bāmiyān for another 100 years, up to the time when the area was seized by Ya'qūb ibn-Laith (the monastery was raided in 870 A.C.).[236] The history of afshīn Ḥaydar indicates that there could be similar cases in Western Turkistan at least till the 830's.

All this must have been felt at the time when the Samanid state realised the need for setting up special theological schools. Thus arose the madrasahs, and at first they had their 'birthmarks'—the result of their genetic ties with the Buddhist monasteries.

The madrasahs of Western Turkistan (and many beyond its confines) had inner courts laid out in the four-īwān composition. Tracing the origin of

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230 See Ibid. p. 507. Written records from Tibet, speaking of the spread of Buddhism in the 10th century, mention a river which is sometimes linked with Yaxartes-Syr Darya (see S. Ch. Das, On the Kāla Cakra System of Buddhism which Originated in Orissa, "Journal and Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1907", Calcutta, 1908, Vol. III, pp. 225–227). Such localisation, however, rests, as pointed out by M. I. Vorobyova-Desyatovskaya, on a very shaky foundation, a mythical, not a real river is obviously meant in the text.

231 A. G. Pugachenkova, Puti razvitiya arkhitektury Yuzhnogo Turkmenistana pory rabovladeniya i feodalizma, in: "Trudy *YuTAKE*", Vol. VI, Moscow, 1058, pp. 351–357.

232 See I. Y. Krachkovsky, Fragment indiyskoi retoriki v arabskoi peredache, "Izbranniye sochineniya", Vol. II, Moscow-Leningrad, 1056, p. 315; A. B. Khalidov, V. G. Erman, Vvedeniye, in: Abureikhan Biruni, "Izbranniye proizvedeniya", II, Tashkent, 1963, pp. 10–11; E. C. Sachau, Preface, in: "Alberuni's India", I, pp. xxxi-xxxii; S. Nadvi, The Origin of the Barmakids, "Islamic Culture", Vol. 6, 1932, pp. 19–28; S. Nadvi, Literary Relations between Arabia and India, "Islamic Culture", Vol. 6, 1932, pp. 624–641, Vol. 7, 1933 pp. 83–94.

233 See S. Navdi, The Origin of the Barmakids, op. cit. p. 26. Also see E. C. Sachau, Preface in: "Alberuni's India", p. xxxi.

234 See A. B. Khalidov, V. G. Erman, "Vvedeniye...," p. 12

235 See W. Barthold, Der Iranische Buddhismus und sein Verhältnis zum Islam, in: "Oriental Studies in Honour of C. F. Pavry", London, 1933, pp. 30–31.

236 J. Marquart, Ērānšahr nach der Geographie des Ps. Moses Xorenac, I, p. 92; W. Barthold's review of *MDAFA*. Vol. II, in: "Iran", fasc. III, Leningrad, 1929, pp. 244–245.

this composition is regarded by students of the history of architecture as the key to establishing the genesis of the architectural type of the madrasah.[237]

After the excavation of Adzhina-Tepa, the conjectures as to the date of the rise of the four-īwān composition had to be revised. In its fully developed form, this composition existed in the south of Western Turkistan at least in the 7th century, moreover, in a Buddhist cult structure.

Later, in the Middle Ages, the four-īwān composition occurred in Northern Khorāsān (10th–12th centuries), and it continued to develop and spread in the following centuries. The Kyrk-Kyz of Termez, dated in the 9th century, is the earliest case of the employment of this composition in the medieval architecture of Māwarā' an-nahr. Other early examples of the use of the four-īwān composition in Māwarā' an-nahr include the 10th century building (mosque) of the Varakhsha citadel[238] and the 11th century architectural complex in the village of Sayat (Shaartuz District, southern Tajikistan), which S. A. Khmelnitsky believes to be a madrasah. The Nizāmiye Madrasah in Khardjird (late 11th century) is one of the oldest specimens extant of the embodiment of the four-īwān composition in the Middle Ages. Could it be fortuitous that there were madrasahs among the first Muslim cult buildings with the four-īwān composition? The answer is obviously no. W. Barthold in his time suggested the possibility of links between the Buddhist monastery and the Muslim madrasah when he wrote: "The Muslim higher theological schools, madrasahs, appeared on the eastern outskirts of the Caliphate earlier than in its central and western regions; it is highly probable that in this respect Islam was influenced by Buddhism, and the madrasah first appeared on both banks of the Amu Darya, on territories adjoining Balkh, where Buddhism predominated up to the Muslim conquest."[239]

In spite of the direct evidence of Narshakhī (under the year 937) about the existence of madrasahs in Bukhara, R. N. Frye believes that 10th-century Bukhara had no madrasahs, the information of the source being an anachronism.[240] In his opinion, if madrasahs did appear at the very end of the Samanid dynasty, they were an innovation.[241] At the same time, Frye thinks that Bukhara had very old — perhaps the oldest — higher theological schools, that Bukhara rather than Balkh was the birthplace of the madrasah. According to Frye, Nizām al-Mulk merely copied the Bukhara models when establishing the famous Nizamiye at Baghdad.[242] Not all of this scholar's hypotheses seem convincing but they certainly merit attention. We believe that a collation of Narshakhī's data with the data of authors who wrote at the close of the 10th and the beginning of the 11th centuries clearly reveals that there may have been madrasahs in Bukhara in the period indicated by Narshakhī. But the hypothesis about Bukhara being the birthplace of the madrasah is not fully grounded. The archaeological material accumulated so far, historico-architectural arguments and, finally, the evidence of Huei Ch'ao which has recently become known, all bear out W. Barthold's conclusion that Ṭukhāristān, the Ṭukhāristān domains of the Samanids, were the home of the madrasah.

Barthold has pointed out that the term madrasah does not occur in the records before the 10th century: "Moreover, at that time the term was evidently used only in the eastern areas and it was not before the second half of the 11th century that it was transferred to the West." Barthold stressed that the first mention of the madrasah

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237 See K. A. Creswell, The Origin of the Cruciform Plan of Cairene Madrasas, "Bulletin de l'Institut Francais d 'archéolog' orientale", Vol. XXI, Le Caire, 1923; E. Herzfeld, Damascus: Studies in Architecture, II, "Ars Islamica" Ann Arbor, 1943, Vol. X, pp. 13–30; A. Godard L'origine de la madrasa, de la mosquée et du caravanséraii à quartre iwans, "Art Islamica", 1951, Vol. XV–XVI; A. Godard, *L'art de l'Iran*, Paris, 1962, pp. 345–346; G. A. Pugachenkova, "Puti razvtiya arkhitektury Yuzhnogo Tadzhikistana...," pp. 340–341; S. G. Khmelnitsky, Architekturny kmopleks Khodzha Mashad v selenii Sayet, in: "Voprosy arkhitektury i gradostroitelstva", (Papers for the 22nd scientific conference), Leningrad, 1965, p. 38.

238 See A. M. Pribytkova, Zdaniye Kyrk-Kyz kak obrazets stroitelnoi tekhniki IX v., "Arkhitekturnoye nasledstvo" fasc. 13, Moscow, 1961; V. A. Nilsen, Varakhshskaya taitadel, in: "Trudy Instituta istorii i arkheologii AN UzSSR", fasc. VII, Tashkent, 1956, pp. 66, fig. 18.

239 W. Barthold, Ulugbek i yego vremya, "Sochineniya" Vol. II, Moscow, 1964, p. 30. At present, the Oriental origin of the madrasah is generally recognised. See R. N. Frye, *The History of Bukhara*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1954, p. 120. On the early history of the madrasah, see J. Pedersen, Some Aspects of the History of the Madrasa, "Islamic Culture. The Hyderabad Quarterly Review", Vol. III, No. 4, 1929, pp. 525–537; A. S. Tritton, *Meteriais on Muslim Education in the Middle Ages*, London, 1957, pp. 102, et aq.; G. Makdisi, Muslim Institutions of Learning in Eleventh-Centruy Baghdad, *BSOAS*. Vol. XXIV, Pt. 1, 1961, pp. 1–56; A. L. Tibawi, Origin and Character of al-Madrasah, *BSOAS*. Vol. XXV, Pt. 2, 1962, pp. 229–238.

240 See R. N. Frye, *The History of Bukhara*, op. cit. p. 131.

241 See ibid. p. 132.

242 See ibid. p. 189.

is connected with Bukhara (937 A.C) ; later, in the second half of the 10th century, mention was made of the 'fine madrasahs' of Nishapur, the madrasahs of Merv, etc. Speaking of the events of 1026, Bayhakī says that the Khuttal area had over 20 madrasahs. Barthold specially stressed this statement, regarding it as a proof of the possible links between the Buddhist monastery and the madrasah, since the Khuttal area gravitated to Balkh with its Buddhist monasteries.[243] The text of Huei Ch'ao, published after Barthold's death, is direct evidence of the fact that even in the 8th century (726 A.C.) there were many Buddhist monasteries on the territory of Khuttal proper ; this is also borne out by some toponymic data (see above).

Adzhina-Tepa with its four-Iwān composition can be regarded not only as the starting-point of this architectural layout which was of such great importance in the following 1000-odd years but, still more significantly, as a convincing argument in favour of genetic ties between the Muslim madrasah and the Buddhist monastery, and of the origin of the madrasah in the territory of Ṭukhāristān.[244] It goes without saying that ties with India and Afghanistan and the influence of Buddhist architecture are also traceable in other types of Western Turkistan structures.[245]

Let us go back, however, to the relationship between the madrasah and the saṅghārāma and examine another aspect of this question. Monasteries were centres of Buddhist education, both theological and secular. The period of instruction was very long, up to ten years.[246] By the early medieval period, the Buddhist monasteries' function of educating laymen had become more pronounced. The 'syllabus' included both Buddhist theology and various secular subjects. There were two categories of pupils — *māṇava* and *brahmacārin*. According to I-Tsing,[247] the *māṇava* studied chiefly Buddhist works, in preparation for retiring from the world and becoming Buddhist monks, while the *brahmacārin* ('students') took up only secular subjects and had no intention of changing their way of life ; the latter category of pupils was quite numerous. The Saṅgha, I-Tsing continues, was not obliged to maintain the 'students', with the exception of cases when they performed

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243 W. Barthold, Istoriya kulturnoi, zhizni Turkestana, "Sochineniya", Vol. II, Moscow, 1963, p. 227. On the Khuttal madrassahs, see Abu'l' Faḍl Bayhakī, "Istoriya Masuda 1030 – 1041", Tashkent, 1962, p. 207.

244 Architecturally the madrasah was not a mere combination of "an Indo-Buddhist monastry, on the one hand, and the Khorāsān Iwān, on the other" (E. Diez, Masjid, *EL.* III, 1936, p. 431). In reality, the genesis of this type of architectural structure was far more complex.

245 Of particular interest is the genesis of shrines with circumambulatory corridors, which attracted the attention of A. M. Belenitsky, V. L. Voronina, L. P. Zyablin and B. Stavisky, each of whom contributed valuable ideas. Our conception with regard to the genesis of this form boils down to the following. The custom of ritual processions was widespread among different Indo-European and non-Indo-European peoples. The custom of making a ritual procession round the stūpa (*pradakṣiṇā*) became prominent in the Buddhist ceremonial at a very early time. Initially, the procession circled a capital structure—e.g., the stūpa of Sāñci. However, when the idea of placing miniature stūpas within the buildings came into effect, the ceremony began to be performed round these stūpas.

The Buddhists regarded the *pradakṣiṇā* ceremony as a ritual act of no less importance than offerings of flowers, lamps and incense-burners. In some cases, the space round the stūpa was too narrow for *pradakṣiṇā*, but it was always reserved as a token of observing this ritual custom (see S. Dutt, "Buddhist Monks and Monasteries...", p. 13 et seq.) We believe that the necessity of observing *pradakṣiṇā* in a small cella accounted for the building of a special circumambulatory corridor round the cella.

The fully established layout of the Iranian (and Western Turkistan) fire temple may have been used for that purpose As early as Achaemenian times, we have the fire temple at Susa with a circumambulatory corridor. Parthian fire temples, specifically those in Seleucia on the Tigris, in Hatra and Kūhi-Khwādja, also developed this layout (see C. Hopkins, The Parthian Temple, "Berytus", VII, I, 1942, pp. 1–17 ; G. Widengren, Die Religionen Iran, in : "Die Religionen der Menschheit", Vol. 14, Stuttgart, 1965, pp. 188–190). They are likewise represented in Sassanian architecture – e.g., the Bishapur temple dated in the second half of the 3rd century (see R. Chrishman, *Iran, Parthians and Sassanian*, London, 1962, pp. 149–150 fig. 191). It is extremely important, on the one hand, that there were temples with circumambulatory corridors also in the Gandharan area, e.g., the temple at Jaṇḍiāl, dated by J. Marshall in the 2nd or 1st centuries B.C. (J. Marshall, *Taxila*, I, pp. 225, 229) ; R. A. Jairazboy, when mentioning this in his book (*Foreign Influence in Ancient India*, Bombay, 1963, p. 154) does not make any conclusions as to the further evolution of this layout in Indian architecture. On the other hand, this layout occurs in the shrine of the Surkh Kotal temple in Bactria (see works by D. Schlumberger, in particular his latest article – Le Temple de Surkh Kotal en Bactriane (VI), *JAs.* Paris, 1964, pp. 303–333, fig. 1). On the links between the layout of the Surkh Kotal shrine and that of the Susa fire temple, see D. Schlumberger. "Descendents non méditerranéens...", p. 145. As to Bactria, we have a far earlier specimen. Sakkanohur, the palace – and temple complex of the 3rd–2nd centuries B.C. (Pārkhar District, South, Tajikistan), of whose excavations I am in charge, has an identical circumambulatory corridor. On the strength of the existence of this layout at Kara-Tepe alone, B. Y. Stavisky believes that this layout (in Buddhist structures) in all probability originated in Bactria (Ṭukhāristān) in the Kushan period (see B. Y. Stavisky, Nekotoriye voprosy istorii buddizma v Srednei Azii, in : Doklady po ethnografii, fasc. I (4), Leningrad, 1965, p. 39). We would rather look for the emergence of this layout in a wider region, including, along with the above-mentioned, also Gandhara: the layout was likely to have been assimilated by Buddhist architecture (and not arisen in it) in such an extensive region, against the background of interaction of Indo-Buddhist and Zoroastrian architectural ideas. At Hadda (Bagh Gai complex) we already find a circumambulatory corridor running round a square cella with a stūpa (B. 51), as well as a bicameral (B. 56) cella of the Iwān type (see J. Barthoux, Les fouilles de Hadda. I, pp. 159–167). The same composition occurs in certain Buddhist structures in India proper, for example at Saheth (Daya Ram Sahni, Saheth, *ASIAR.* Calcutta, 1911, pp. 119–121, Pl. XXXIV, XXVI). For parallels in Eastern Turkistan, see L. P. Zyablin, "Vtoroi buddiyaky khram...", pp. 17–18. In Western Turkistan, this composition spread widely, becoming much more complicated in the process.

246 See R. K. Mookerji, *Ancient Indian Education* (Brahmanical and Buddhist), London, 1951, p. 402.

247 See I-Tsing,"A Record of the Buddhist Religion...", pp. 105-106.

some work necessary for the monastery. However, donations made for the express purpose of maintaining the 'students' could be used to this end.[248]

In the opinion of a number of scholars, these 'educational seminaries' under certain monasteries became 'universities' of a kind, with a very long term of instruction. The Nālandā (q.v.) monastery stood out in this respect.[249] The aspirants had to take entrance examinations. 'Students' received instruction in groups, each comprising several dozen people. Instruction was mostly oral, with the contents of the texts assimilated by heart; reading was an auxiliary process. Debates were a feature of studies. Great merit was attached to citing texts by heart, expounding and interpreting them, and also to skilful debating.[250] The Nālandā monastery had a great many manuscripts, which were systematically copied.[251]

Even this cursory description shows that the Buddhist vihāra-saṅghārāma and the Muslim madrasah had many common features in regard to their status, functions, the organisation and nature of instruction. Their relationship was much closer and more specific than W. Barthold could surmise in his day.[252] It is indicative that medieval authors were fully aware of this functional affinity. Thus, in 1243 Jūzjānī took down the evidence of an eyewitness and participant in the events, who narrated that Ikhtiyār ad-Din Muḥammad Khallaj had seized a fortress and settlement in Northern India and killed its people; many books were found there, and then it transpired that the fortress and town constituted a madrasah: in the language of the Hindus, the word *bihār* (i.e., vihāra) meant 'madrasah'.[253] Recounting this incident, Hāfiz-i Abrū notes that several Hindus were summoned and when they had looked at the books they said that the books called the fortress and town a madrasah, or, more exactly, Buddhist monastery. In Raverty's opinion, this information can be traced to Jūzjānī's text.

We are far from equating the Buddhist monastery and the Muslim madrasah. Still, historico-architectural analysis, comparison of the educational functions of these institutions and the evidence of the sources (concerning both the time and places of the appearance of the first madrasahs, and the fact that the Muslims themselves regarded the Buddhist monasteries as madrasahs) lead us to conclude that the Buddhist monastery played a prominent part in the origin of the Muslim madrasah.

According to E. C. Sachau, the influence of Indian science and literature reached Baghdad in two ways: some works were translated directly from Sanskrit, while others came by way of Iran and were initially translated from Sanskrit into Persian, and then from Persian into Arabic.[254] The latest discoveries and investigations stress the special place held by Western Turkistan (and Khorāsān) in the process of cultural relations with India.

Two streams of Indian culture closely intertwined in the Caliphate, one coming by way of Western Turkistan and Khorāsān, where traditions of contacts with Indian culture and Buddhism persisted (a stream assimilated and transformed in the melting pot of local civilisation), and another stream coming directly from India.

Here is a pertinent statement by I. Y. Krachkovsky: "The end of the 8th century may be regarded as the period when the influence of India was felt in different spheres of Arab culture. It is still difficult to discern such instances in the history of Islam's theological movements, particularly in Sufism, and the chronological boundaries may fluctuate considerably; but this period undoubtedly marked the appearance of quite a number of literary works, such as 'The Book of Kalila and Dimna' and 'Barlaam and Josaphat'. Reflecting the light of India, these works were destined to become the pride of Arabic letters as well. We tread on still firmer ground when establishing this influence in the exact sciences..."[255] In the words of Barthold, "neither the Sassanian state nor its official religion, Zoroastrianism, ever comprised the entire Iranian world. In the later-period cultural life of the Iranian world,

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248 See R. K. Mookerji, "Ancient Indian Education..." pp. 541–547; S. Dutt, "Buddhist Monks and Monasteries...", pp. 326–332.

249 This is discussed at great length by R. K. Mookerji in his work. Also see S. Dutt, "Buddhist Monks and Monasteries ...", p. 327.

250 See I-Tsing, "A Record of the Buddhist Religion...", pp. 177–178; R. K. Mookerji, "Ancient Indian Education...", pp. 450–451, 497–499, 530–531; S. Dutt, "Buddhist Monks and Monasteries...", pp. 332–336.

251 See S. Dutt, "Buddhist Monks and Monasteries...", pp. 342–343.

252 W. Barthold, "Istoriya kulturnoi zhizni Turkestana", op. cit. p. 227.

253 The Persian text is quoted from: "The Tabaqāt-i Nasiri", Calcutta, 1864; also see H. M. Elliot, *History of India As told by Its Own Historians*, Vol. II, London, 1869, p. 306; "Tabakāt-i-Nāsiri", Vol. I, London, 1881, p. 552, and notes.

254 See E. C. Sachau, "Preface...", pp. xxx-xxxi.

255 I. Y. Krachkovsky, "Fragment indiyskoi retoriki ...", p. 309. See I. Y. Krachkovsky, Kalila i Dimna, Vvedeniye, "Izbranniye sochineniya", Vol. II, Moscow-Leningrad, 1956, pp. 435–438.

Buddhist Iran played a part of no less importance than Zoroastrian Iran." [256] Recent archaeological discoveries in Western Turkistan lend a truly prophetic ring to these words.

Keeping to the subject of the present essay, we have traced one direction of contacts between Western Turkistan and India — those along Buddhist lines, and have considered certain aspects of the interrelation of Indo-Buddhist and Western Turkistan cultures. We have deliberately omitted the question of the influence exerted by Western Turkistan culture on Indian culture. If Buddhism is to be likened to a bridge between the two cultures, traffic along it was by no means one way. But, of course, the influence exerted by Western Turkistan on India as regards science, material culture, art, ethnic history, the art of warfare, etc., is a vast independent problem which is currently being tackled by Soviet researchers.[257]

The above gives us grounds for radically reviewing the concept of the role played by Buddhism in the history of Western Turkistan civilization. In the course of more than 500 years, from the 1st—2nd to the 7th—8th centuries A.C., Buddhism and the associated elements of secular culture were an important component in the life of Western, Turkistan society. Its impact did not come to an end with the Arab conquest and the spread of Islam. Buddhism offers a clue to the origin and essence of many phenomena of medieval ('Muslim') spiritual and material culture. The problem of Western Turkistan Buddhism is actually part of the broader problem of the 'pre-Muslim' cultural heritage of the peoples inhabiting Western Turkistan today.

Diverse elements of Indian science, literature and art reached Western Turkistan along with Buddhist religious ideas. Reinterpreted and modified, they became a component part of the culture of Western Turkistan which, in its turn, shared quite a few of its finest achievements with India. From Western Turkistan, that giant transmitter of Buddhism, the Buddha's teachings and with it the ideas and works of Indian and Western Turkistan scholars, artists and craftsmen penetrated further east, enriching the material and spiritual cul ure of the peoples of Central Asia, China, Korea and Japan.

Today it is not yet possible to reveal all the stages and aspects of the history of Buddhism in Western Turkistan. But the knowledge so far accumulated is the result of painstaking, systematic studies by Soviet researchers over the past forty years. Countless archaeological expeditions have lifted the edge of the curtain covering the highly developed ancient culture of the peoples of Western Turkistan. Researches by historians, archaeologists and linguists have made it possible to produce synthesising works. Credit for discovering and studying the remarkable monuments of Western Turkistan Buddhism goes to Soviet researchers. Their work is an important contribution to the study of history and culture.

B. A. LITVINSKY

BUDDHIST LITERATURE IN CENTRAL ASIA

There is little detailed knowledge about a country which was for a long time a melting pot of different ethnic, and cultural groups mainly united by the link of Buddhist creed. Most of the information about Buddhism in Eastern Turkistan we get from Chinese sources. The famous Chinese travellers Fa-hsien (5th c. A.C.) and Hsüan-tsang (7th c.A.C.) gave a detailed description about the religious life in the wide scattered oasis towns which they visited on their way to India. Two routes join these oasis towns : one in the northern region at the foot of Tien-shan touching from the west to the east Kaśgar, Maralbaśi, Aqsu, Kučā, Qaraśāhr, Turfan, Hami, and Ansi, where it meets with the Southern Route which leads through the oases of Yarkand, Qarghaliq, Chotan, Niya, Charkhliq, Miran, Tun-huang near Shačou up to Ansi following the Kun-lun mountains. Between the beginning of the Christian era, or somewhat earlier, and the 15th century A.C. these oasis towns possessed a flourishing, predominantly Buddhist culture which was destroyed by the Arabian invasion that overran Kaśgar as early as the 8th century A.C. and had perhaps already annihilated some of the oasis towns on the western side.

1. Expeditions

It was not before the end of the 19th century that scholars came to know about old manuscripts found in sand-covered ruins and monasteries in the

256 W. Barthold, "Der Iranische Buddhismus...", p. 29.

257 See, among other works, articles by A. M. Belenitsky, V. M. Mason, B. Y. Stavisky and the present author in the volume "Indiya v drevnosti", Moscow, 1963. Also see the present author's paper for the 25th International Congress of Orientalists (Moscow, 1967).

mountains round the Taklamakan desert. Expeditions to Eastern Turkistan were undertaken from England, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, Sweden and Finland from 1[illegible] 1929. Each expedition found or bought more or less fragmentary manuscripts in different languages and scripts and these were brought by the members to their homelands. Among these manuscripts were quite a number of forgeries manufactured by a Muslim. Already in 1901 Sir Aurel Stein had exposed all details about them. Nevertheless, some of them were still being edited in earlier publications, so that E. Waldschmidt (*Chinesische Archaologische Forschungen in Sinkiang*) had again to draw attention to this fact. Most of the original manuscripts and blockprints were fragments already mutilated in older times, or by treasure seekers who damaged the books by selling single folios to members of the different expeditions. Therefore, folios of one and the same book are often found in different collections.

2. The Collections and Work on the Manuscripts

As many nations took part in the run for Central Asian manuscripts, we have today several collections. To mention the most important: The British Collection of Sir Aurel Stein was divided: Chinese, Sogdian, Uigur, Mongolian and Prākrit manuscripts and prints were handed to the British Museum, whereas the Khotanese (Sakian), Kuchean (Tokharian), Tibetan, and Sanskrit manuscripts in Brāhmī script were given to the India Office Library, now Commonwealth Relations Office, where the Hoernle collection was already deposited. The finds of the Prussian expeditions were transferred from 'Museum fur Volkerkunde' to the 'Orientalische Kommission' in the 'Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften' in Berlin, now der DDR 'Akademie der Wissenschaften Zentral Institut fur Alte Geschichte und Archaologie. Bereich Alter Orient' situated in the eastern part of the divided city. Some leaves remained in the 'Museum fur Volkerkunde' for exhibition. They belong now to the 'Indische Museum' (Stiftung Preussischer Kultur esitz) in the western part of Berlin. After the second world war a small portion of Sanskrit manuscripts came to the 'Seminar fur Indologie und Buddhismuskunde' in Gottingen, and another part of the collection, mostly Uigur manuscripts to the 'Staatsbibliothek der Stiftung Preussischer Kulturbesitz' in West Berlin. The French collection of P. Pelliot was deposited in the 'Bibliotheque Nationale' and in the 'Musée Guimet' in Paris. The Russian manuscripts were gathered in the collections Potrovskij and Beresovskij in the 'Academy of the UdSSR' in Leningrad. Finally should be mentioned the Ōtani collection of the Ryūkoku University in Kyōto and the National Library in Peking. A good example about how many Central Asian manuscripts are spread over the world has been given by Sargent in his recension of Giles descriptive catalogue of the Chinese manuscripts from Tun-huang (*Journal of Oriental Studies*, p. 205 note 4), where he also has published a list of the private collections of Tun-huang manuscripts.

2a *Tokharian (Kuchean)*

After A.F. Rudolf Hoernle's decipherment of the different specimens of the Central Asian Brāhmī script, the way was paved for reading the texts in other languages than Sanskrit. With the help of Buddhist texts in Sanskrit, Chinese, and Tibetan language and in comparison with those of the more or less differing Theravāda literature written in Pali, it was possible to decipher manuscripts in two Indo-European languages unknown in those days, the Tokharian (Kuchean) and the Khotanese (Sakian). Pioneers for the research work on the Tokharian language — a centum language of the West-Indo-European branch — were, besides S. Lévi, two German scholars, E.Sieg and W.Siegling. They published the first edition of Tokharian manuscripts in a dialect called A by them which was spread in the oases of Qarašāhr and Turfan, while the second dialect B was mainly spoken in the oasis of Kučā. It also spread to the east, where it existed side by side with the dialect A. Many questions regarding the Tokharian language, dialects, culture and even the name of the language are still under discussion. For the more recent research work names such as W. Couvreur, who edited texts from the collection Pelliot, and W. Thomas, a pupil of W. Krause, for the German collection have to be mentioned.

2b. *Khotanese (Sakian)*

The same holds good with the Khotanese language which was first made known by Hoernle. Manuscripts in this East-Iranian language were especially found in Chotan. Some rare manuscripts and documents from Tumšuq and Murtuq (Turfan oasis) show a much differing dialect which H.W. Bailey (*Languages of the Saka. Handbuch der Orientalistik*) calls a second Saka language. He also distinguishes two dialects among the Khotanese manuscripts, an older and a later type. Whereas the language of the manuscripts found on the Northern Silk Route is influenced by Buddhist Sanskrit terms, that of the manuscripts found in Chotan shows traces of a West-Indian Prākrit, the same dialect in which the famous Dutruil de Rhins

Kharoṣṭhī manuscript of the *Dhammapada* is written. The Norwegian scholar St. Konow and the German E. Leumann are pioneers in this field. The first edition (1916) of a Khotanese text was done by Konow who published a manuscript of the *Vajracchedikā* and an *Aparimitāyuḥ Sūtra* in Hoernle's "Manuscript Remains." Later on, it is largely owing to H. W. Bailey and, in the more recent days, to his pupil R. E. Emmerick that Khotanese texts have been edited.

2c. *Sogdian*

The other Iranian language in which Buddhist manuscripts were found is that of the Sogdians, whose native place was situated near Samarkand. Most of the Buddhist manuscripts in Sogdian language were found in the Grotto of Thousand Buddhas near Tun-huang, but some were also discovered on the Northern Route. In the beginning, French and Russian scholars were particularly interested in this field. The first edition of the *Vessantara Jātaka* by R. Gauthiot appeared in 1912 (*Une version sogdienne du Vessantara-Jātaka*). His work was continued by E. Benveniste. The Russian research was signalized by F. Rosenberg with articles in the "Izvêstija Rossijskoj Akademii Nauk" in 1918 and 1920. Later on, also German scholars as F. W. K. Müller, W. B. Henning, H. Reichelt, F. Weller, and O. Hansen wrote important articles.

2d. *Uigur (Old Turkish)*

Closely connected with the Sogdian culture was that of the Uigur kingdom of the Turfān oasis. From the Sogdians the Uigurs received the Manichaean religion and the script. Therefore, in the beginning the research was concentrated on the Manichaean manuscripts, a literature up to then only known from Christian sources. But the Buddhist field of research was not neglected. As early as in 1910 W. Radloff published the "Ṭïšastvustik" (Sanskrit: *diśaṃ sauvastikam* = blessing of the [four] directions) and one year later the "Kuanši-im Pusar" including an Uigur version of the 25th chapter of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*. From the Russian side the work was afterwards continued by S. E. Malov. In 1914 P. Pelliot wrote an article on the novel of the two princes Kalyāṇaṃkara and Pāpaṃkara. Later on, the greatest effort in publishing Uigur texts came from the German side. After A. von le Coq and F.W.K. Müller had started editing mainly Manichaean texts, W. Bang and mainly his pupil Mrs. A. von Gabain and Arat G. R. Rahmeti turned to the Buddhist texts and published quite a number of them. Nowadays, this effort is continued by scholars as G. Hazai and P. Zieme.

2e. *Sanskrit*

Besides these newly dicovered texts in unknown languages, the eiditing of Sanskrit texts took the foremost place. Members of the 'Orientalische Kommission', founded in 1912, wielded the pen in this field. It was the school of H. Lüders and his pupil E. Waldschmidt which brought out many publications of Sanskrit texts found in Eastern Turkistan. The editorial work began (after some pioneer attempts had been made by R. Pischel, H. Stönner, and E. Sieg) with the publication of Aśvaghoṣa's dramas (*Bruchstücke Buddhistischer Dramen*) by H. Lüders. But also Russian scholars, particularly S. von Oldenburg, edited some important Sanskrit texts from the collection of Petrovski, such as the *Pañcarakṣā*, the five protections to which belong the *Mahāsahasrapramardinī* and the *Mahāmāyūrī* (*Otryvki Kašgarskich*). For all this research work R. Hoernle paved the way with his excellent edition of the "Bower-Manuscript" a medical treatise — and some fundamental articles published in the "Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal". Besides Hoernle, L. de la Vallée Poussin wrote some important articles on fragments of the British collection which were published in the "Journal Asiatique" in the years 1911 and 1913. From the French collection of P. Pelliot, S. Lévi and L. Finot contributed quite a number of articles. For the more recent times J. Filliozat and B. Pauly should be mentioned. B. Pauly began to prepare a catalogue of Sanskrit manuscripts of the collection, and identified many of the fragments found at Duldur Aqur (Kučā oasis) which he published under the title "Fragments Sanskrits de Haute Asie (Mission Pelliot)" in the "Journal Asiatique" between 1957 and 1965.

2f. *Chinese and Tibetan Buddhist Publications*

Little has been published from the enormous Chinese and Tibetan Buddhist material mainly found in Tun-huang, but also in the other places around the Tarim-Basin. For the British collection exists now a brilliant catalogue of most of the manuscripts and blockprints found or bought in Tun-huang. It was prepared by L. Giles (*Descriptive Catalogue of the Chinese Manuscripts from Tun-huang*). Helpful is also the more recent publication of A. Fujieda "The Tun-huang manuscripts, a general description". As Japanese scholars have a special interest in this field it is to be expected that sooner or later, we may have a general survey also of other collections, although there is little chance that they will contain Buddhist texts, not published in the Taishō edition of the Chinese Tripiṭaka. Perhaps for a similar reason the

Tibetan finds — most of them come also from the libraries of Tun-huang — have suffered from lack of interest. In the different editions and manuscripts of the *Tanjur* and *Kanjur* most of the material is available. Up to now, only a catalogue of the collection Pelliot was begun by M. Lalou (*Inventaire des manuscripts tibetains de Touen-houeng*) who also edited some of the texts. A. H. Franke contributed some articles about manuscripts of the German collection.

2g. *Catalogues*

Besides the two catalogues mentioned above, a list of the Uigur manuscripts in the Ryūkoku Library written in Japanese language is of interest (A. Haneda, N. Yamada, *A list of the Manuscript Remains*). But generally speaking, there is a considerable want of catalogues for Central Asian manuscripts. This deficiency is due to the fact that most of the manuscripts are fragmentary. Thus, colophons are missing and the content is not always clear at the first sight. The fragments have to be identified by comparison with other Buddhist texts, and that is in a broader sense editorial work. This sort of catalogue was started for the German Buddhist Sanskrit manuscripts of the Turfan collection by E. Waldschmidt and two of his pupils. Three volumes have been published under the title "Sanskrithandschriften aus den Turfanfunden". B. Pauly announced a similar edition of Sanskrit manuscripts of the French collection which was already mentioned above. The introduction to this catalogue is published in the " Journal Asiatique " 1965.

This sketch makes it clear that an article about the Buddhist literature of Central Asia has to be a torso, because the material available is not only widely spread in different collections and published mostly scattered in smaller articles, but also because only a small portion of the vast material is published so far. Or speaking with B. Pauly: "cinquante ans de travail n'ont pu suffire pour exploiter le fruit des trois ou quatre années qu'a duré sa campagne; ily faudra bien un autre demisiècle."

3. Description of the Manuscripts and Block-prints

Buddhist literature was written in Sanskrit, Chinese, Tokharian, Uigur, Sogdian, Khotanese (Sakian), Tibetan and Mongolian languages and even a few block prints are found in Hsi-Hsia, the language of the Tanguts. Also the scripts used differ quite a lot. Sanskrit, Tokharian, Tibetan and Sakian manuscripts or prints are written in different types of the Brāhmī script developed from the Indian Kuṣāṇa Brāhmī or in Kharoṣṭhī, another Indian alphabet which did not exist much longer than up to the 7th century A.C. But there are also Brāhmī manuscripts in Uigur and even in Chinese language. The second branch is the Iranian script which was spread by traders from Sogdiana (Western Turkistan) and transmitted together with the Manichaean and Nestorian creed to the Uigurs of the Turfan oasis. Of Chinese origin is the Hsi-Hsia script. The books found in Eastern Turkistan are multiform. One finds the Indian 'poṭhi' resembling the oblong shaped palm leaf. It was used for most of the manuscripts written in Brāhmī. Besides Chinese scrolls, there are folded manuscripts, blockprints, stitched books, and booklets of European form. The material on which the manuscripts are written varies too. Besides several kinds of paper which point towards a local production, there are manuscripts on palm leaf, birch-bark, leather and wood.

4. Buddhist Mission and Early Buddhist Literature

Chinese and Tibetan sources tell in somewhat differing legends that Chotan was a Buddhist centre already before the Christian era, founded, as in one version, by citizens from Taxila who had been banished by the great Indian king Asoka for blinding his son Kuṇāla. But we do not depend only on these more or less unprovable stories. As the late F. Bernhard (*Gāndhārī and the Buddhist Mission in Central Asia*) has demonstrated, literary sources make it much probable that the school of the Dharmaguptakas started a mission before the great movement of the Sarvāstivādins began which predominated on the Southern Route. The manuscripts and documents found in the realm of the ancient kingdom of Kroraina are mostly written in Kharoṣṭhī script and in a North western Prākrit called Gāndhārī. The famous *Gāndhārī Dhammapada*, the Niya and Endere documents, among which is one that contains final verses of the *Prātimokṣa* in the Dharmaguptaka version, and other sporadic finds, mainly of Vinaya texts, even at places on the Northern Route show that there must have been a Dharmaguptaka movement which spread to China and handed its Vinaya to the Chinese. It should not be passed over in silence that this opinion on the early Buddhist mission stands against the view put forward by H. W. Bailey (*Khotanese Texts*, Vol. IV, p. 15) who claims, based on a Tibetan tradition, that the school of the Mahāsaṅghikas had been the holder of Prākrit tradition in Chotan. However it may have been, there can be no doubt that the Khotanese language was more influenced by an Indian Prākrit dialect than by Buddhist Sanskrit.

But more effective for the literary development in the oasis of the Tarim Basin was the Sarvāstivāda movement during the reign of the great Indian king Kaniṣka. As the legend has it, a council was held in Gandhara or Kashmir during the reign of Kaniṣka, the main topics of which were the philosophical treatises of the Sarvāstivāda school. From these regions a missionary movement started which was perhaps mainly based on the Indian oral tradition,but which had nevertheless left literary traces in the cave monasteries of the Kučā oasis and Qaraśāhr. Sporadic fragments were also found on the Southern Route at Koyumal and Niya in the Lobnor district. The most famous among these early palm leaf manuscripts is that which contains three dramas of Aśvaghoṣa published by H. Lüders already in 1911 (*Bruchstucke buddhistischer Dramen*). If one checks the contents of all the Kuṣāṇa manuscripts of the collection in the 'Berliner Akademie der Wisseesnschaften' which are already published in the catalogues " Sanskrithandschriften aus den Turfanfunden," it is obvious that Abhidharma manuscripts predominate. Out of eight manuscripts there are five dealing with Abhidharma (Kat. Nr. 15, 649 , 809, 810, 920) or philosophical topics. One text contains the already mentioned dramas of Aśvaghoṣa (Kat. Nr. 16), another fragment deals with lyrics (Kat. Nr. 921) and the last one a medical treatise (Kat. Nr. 17) is also published by Lüders. The predominance of Abhidharma may be accidental, but some more support can be given to the fact if one also takes into consideration the later imported palm leaf manuscripts. Among the Gupta manuscripts (3rd-4th c. A.C.) are five Abhidharma manuscripts (Kat. Nr. 18, 19, 20 , 811, 925), and five other manuscripts which belong to philosophical or commentary literature in a broader sense (Kat. Nr. 24, 27, 922, 923, 924). Compared with the total number of 28 manuscripts this seems to be quite a high percentage. Besides early Abhidharma and similar exegetic works which are difficult to identify, because sometimes there seems to exist no parallel versions in Chinese translations, one finds mainly pieces of poetical literature. Except one single fragment of the *Prātimokṣa Sūtra* (Kat. Nr. 650) and two unidentified sūtra texts (Kat. Nr. 24, 816), there is a complete want of canonical texts. Most famous among these palm leaf manuscripts of the Gupta time is the manuscript of the *Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā* composed by Kumāralāta, a contemporary of Aśvaghoṣa (H. Lüders, *Bruchstücke der Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā*). The Chinese version, which is ascribed to Aśvaghoṣa, was translated into French by E. Huber (*Aśvaghoṣa, Sūtrālaṅkāra*) under the title *Sūtrālaṅkāra*. It is a compilation of eighty stories and ten parables in mixed prose and verse.

Another, but a non-Buddhist work, is the *Chandoviciti* (D. Schlingloff, *Chandoviciti*), a manual of metrics composed in a most elaborate style. It was perhaps used by monks and poets as a model for their devotional poetical works. Devotional texts and moral lyrics are often to be found among the early manuscripts. Some of them are of literary value, as e.g. a collection of verses published by E. Waldschmidt in the catalogue " Sanskrithandschriften aus den Turfanfunden" (Vol. 3, Kat. Nr. 813).

> "prakāra - - .t.— — bravīti yo
> naca svayaṃ teṣu guṇeṣu vartate/
> sa kevalaṃ vyañjanamātraniścitair
> naṭais=samatvaṃ samupaiti bāliśaḥ//"
>
> " A childish person, who (simply) talks about . . . and who himself does not behave following these virtues, he may be compared with actors, who are simply determined by the degree of illusion."

Besides these manuscripts of Buddhist lyrics, there are also fragments of popular poetical works as Mātṛceṭa's *Prasādaprutibhodbhava* (= *Śatapañcāśatka* , § 7), some magical texts, fragments of the famous grammar *Kātantra* (H. Lüders, *Kātantra und Kaumāralāta*, § 196) and *Udānavarga* (§ 8a) of which the oldest manuscript is written in Kuṣāṇa Brāhmī on poplar wood. It belongs to the French collection. By these examples the prevalence of non-dogmatic literature among the early manuscripts is amply illustrated.

B. Pauly mentions in his article (*JAs.* 1965) eleven other palm leaf manuscripts in Kuṣāṇa and Gupta script found near Kučā, but they seem to have been not yet identified. The same holds good with the few palm leaf manuscripts found in the realm of the ancient kingdom Kroraina at Niya and Koyumal by Sir Aurel Stein (*Innermost Asia*, Vol III. PI CXXI, Sig. Koy. 1, 09 and Koy 1, 015 ; *Serindia*, Vol. IV, PI. CXLIII, Sig. MII, 0011).

5. The Age of Central Asian Manuscripts, their Translators, Writers and Copyists

A good deal of the manuscripts were written in the country itself. That is indicated by the use of paper which was most probably unknown to the Indians before the 10th century A. C. The earliest paper manuscripts written in the Gupta type of Northern Turkistan (L. Sander, *Paläographisches*) may be dated into the fourth or fifth century

A. C. They are without exception written in Sanskrit, but one may raise the question whether they were written by Indians as the early palm leaf manuscripts had been. Most of them are found in the oasis of Kuča or at Šorčuq near Qarašāhr, that means in the western and the middle region of the Northern Silk Route. These oases were chiefly occupied by the Tokharians. Therefore, there is some probability that these manuscripts were copied from Indian originals or from Indian copies by Tokharian monks or copyists. The contents of these early paper manuscripts, although they are not frequent in number, is less limited than that of the early palm leaf manuscripts. We find fragments of Sūtra and Vinaya texts as well as Abhidharma and poetical literature.

As it has been pointed out by Sander (*Paläographisches*, p. 47, note 201), the earliest manuscripts in Tokharian language have been found in the oasis of Kučā (e.g., E. Sieg/W. Siegling, *Toch. Sprachreste*, *B*, Nr. 514). These manuscripts may belong to the fifth or sixth century A. C. They are written in the 'Early type of Turkistan Brāhmī' and are rare in comparison with the total number of Sanskrit and Tokharian manuscripts written in types of a later phase of the development of the script, i. e., 'the types a and b of the Brāhmī of Northern Turkistan' (in Hoernle's terminology 'Slanting Gupta'). The research work of S. Lévi and H. Lüders made it possible to fix a terminus ad quem for the 'Type a' dating King Suvarṇapuṣpa of Kučā in the seventh century A. C. But nothing more is fixed up to now. Thus, we get a span of time for a flourishing Buddhist culture in the western oasis of Kučā and perhaps also for Qarašāhr dating from the seventh to the tenth century A. C., when at least the culture of Kučā was ruined by the Muslim invasion.

The development of the oasis of Turfan is closely connected with the Uigur kingdom of Xočo which had been founded cir. 850 A. C. Before the foundation of the kingdom, Sogdians, Tokharians, Chinese, Tibetans and others may have formed the stratum of the population in the Turfan oasis. Also other Turkish clans as the Kök-turcs may have had influence which, however, is not traceable before the sixth century A. C. No doubt, the influence of Chinese culture was more intensive here than in the western oases. This can not only be observed in the domain of fine arts, but it is also indicated by Chinese manuscripts found here more often, e. g., in the famous library at Toyoq discovered by the second German expedition. Besides these main streams of influence, Tokharian, Sogdian, Mongolian and Tibetan literary products have been found here, but except in the Chinese manuscripts, which have not yet been catalogued, we seldom find dates. On the strength of palaeographical evidence one may say that the Brāhmī Manuscripts of Turfan are late compared with those of the western oases. Nearly all of them are written in the 'Type b of the Brāhmī of Northern Turkistan' (L. Sandor, *Paläographisches*, p. 46). Also the Uigur literature, mostly translated from Chinese or Tokharian sources and not from the Sanskrit, is of late origin in comparison with the Sanskrit and Tokharian literature. But the Buddhist culture flourished longer here than in Kučā or Qarašāhr. It was not before the year 1469 that the ruler of Xočo became a sultan and, consequently the culture ultimately turned towards Islam.

The development on the Southern Route was, as shown in § 4, determined by the kingdom of Kroraina, the culture of which was already shaped by Indian Buddhism. This heritage was taken over by the Sakas who were the rulers of Chotan. After Chotan had been conquered by the Tibetans in the 8th centruy A.C., the kingdom of the Sakas was officially established in 936 A.C. by the acknowledgement of the Chinese Sung dynasty. It means that the Khotanese culture flourished comparatively late. For this reason the Khotanese and Sanskrit manuscripts written in the 'Calligraphic Brāhmī of the Southern Route' (Hoernle: 'Upright Gupta") have to be ascribed to a relatively late period. Besides the bulk of literature found near Chotan and Tun-huang, there are some rare documents found at Tumšuq and Kučā on the Northern Silk Route which show another Saka dialect than the Khotanese one (§ 2). They may be somewhat older. The kingdom of Chotan seems to have existed approximately up to the same time as that of Xočo, that means up to the 15th century A.C.

Because the manuscripts are in most of the cases fragmentary, they rarely include colophons. Due to this fact it is difficult, especially regarding the manuscripts written in Sanskrit, to know the nationality of the writer. A large number of bilingual texts in Tokharian-Sanskrit and Uigur-Sanskrit show that Sanskrit was used as a lingua sacra. Besides the Chinese language, it was perhaps the connecting link for the monks of so many different nations within the realm. It is seldom that a writer or copyist emerges from obscurity. The custom of writing manuscripts for one's own merit (*puṇya*), or to dedicate a manuscript to somebody seems to have been popular among the Turcs. In earlier Sanskrit texts the writer is anonymous. Waldschmidt (*Bruchstucke Buddhistischer Sūtras*, p 3 f., note 1) mentions a Sanskrit manuscript

found at Xočo which was most probably written by a Turc. Such clear colophons as in the famous Uigur version of the *Maitreyasamiti* (A.von Ga ain, *Maitrisimiti*) only seldom appear. Here it is clearly told that the work was translated by Prajñārakṣita from a Toxri version. The Tokharian version of the same text was also found among manuscripts from Šorčuq (Qarašähr). It was written by the Vaibhāṣika Āryacandra from Agnideśa (= Qarašahr). This colophon makes it clear that the cultural exchange between the Buddhist centres was intensive and that not only Sanskrit and Chinese were known by educated monks, but that at least some of them were also able to translate from other languages in more or less free interpretations. A yet unploughed field is the comparison of mistakes in the manuscripts. From it one may get a clue to the nationality of the writers. The Tokharian writers, for example, mix up letters like *ta* and *da*, *pa* and *ba*, because voiced consonants do not appear in their mother tongue.

Writing on Central Asian Buddhist literature, one has to be aware of the fact that texts have not only been translated in the same shape as they were transmitted through the ages by more or less exact oral or literal tradition, but that many translators, particularly the Chinese, handled the material quite freely. Many translations are not based on Sanskrit originals but on translations into other languages, mostly Chinese, Tibetan, or Tokharian, so that, in the course of time, different versions arose of texts treating one and the same subject. Last but not least, it should be taken into consideration that the fragmentary literature found in the oases gives only a very vague idea about the immense production within a time of nearly 1400 years.

6. The Vinaya Piṭaka

The differences between the Vinaya texts codified by the Buddhist schools are comparatively great. There are even basic differences between the great Hīnayāna schools in Central Asia, the Sarvāstivādins and the Mūlasarvāstivādins.

In accordance with E. Lamotte (*Histoire*, pp. 181—197), the Vinaya of the Sarvāstivādins, as given in the translation of Kumārajīva and some of his collaborators in the Chinese Tripiṭaka, is divided into :

I. *Bhikṣuvibhaṅga : adhyāya* 1—3,
II. *Skandhaka : adhyāya* 4—6,
III. *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga : adhyāya* 7,
IV. Appendices —
   (a) *Ekottaradharma : adhyāya* 8,
   (b) *Upāliparipṛcchā : adhyāya* 9,
   (c) *Bhikṣu adhyāya : Ubhayato vinaya* and *Saṃyukta ; Pārājikadharma ; Saṅghāvaśeṣa : adhyāya* 10.

According to the ten *adhyāyas* the Vinaya is called the *Daśādhyāya Vinaya*, 'the Vinaya of the ten recitations'. This Vinaya was later on enriched by Vimalākṣa. His postscript consists of four sections, two of them dealing with the legends of the first two councils at Rājagṛha and Vaiśālī, the third one containing various texts (*saṃyukta*), and the fourth one the *Nidāna*. For the Pali see *Cullavagga* XI and XII. The most voluminous Vinaya is that of the Mūlasarvāstivāda school which is handed down completely in the Tibetan *Kanjur* (Dulva section) and in Sanskrit manuscripts found at Gilgit (Kashmir). The latter are partly published by N. Dutt (*GM*. Facsimile Edition ; Raghu Vira/Lokesh Chandra, *Gilgit Buddhist Manuscripts*), and for the *Prātimokṣa* by A.C. Banerjee (*Prātimokṣa Sūtram*). This Vinaya is divided into :

I. *Vinayavastu* (=*Skandhaka*),
II. *Prātimokṣa Sūtra* and *Vinayavibhaṅga* of the Bhikṣu,
III. *Prātimokṣa Sūtra* and *Vinayavibhaṅga* of the Bhikṣuṇī,
IV. *Vinayakṣudrakavastu*,
V. *Vinayottaragrantha* including the *Upāliparipṛcchā*.

In spite of the fact that the Vinayas are difficult to compare in detail, there is a common base, so that one may say that the *Bhikṣu-* and *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* corresponds with the Pali *Suttavibhaṅga*, both containing monastic laws, so to say a bill of law (*prātimokṣa*) for monks and nuns and a commentry to it. The so called *Skandhaka* (cf. the Pali *Khandhaka*),in Mūlasarvāstivāda terms *Vinayavastu*, contains prescriptions including *karmavācanās* regulating the every day monastic life apart from the rules of the *Prātimokṣa*. Parallels to the appendices are partly found in the *Cullavagga* — the second part of the *Khandhaka* and the *Parivāra*.

Parts of the biography of the Buddha are included in some of the Vinayas and also traces of ecclesiastical history, as in the accounts about the councils of Rājagṛha, Vaiśālī, and Pāṭaliputra.

We shall not enter here into the frequently discussed problem as to how the Vinaya developed into such different versions which has been adequ-

ately handled by scholars like E. Frauwallner (*The Earliest Vinaya*) and E. Lamotte (*Histoire*). Instead, we merely want to show how much of the Vinaya, whether of the Sarvāstivāda or Mūlasarvāstivāda school, has been preserved in manuscripts found in Central Asia.

Although no *Prātimokṣa* text, separate from the *Vibhaṅga* (its commentary), is to be found in the Chinese translation of the Vinaya of the Sarvāstivādins, many fragments containing simply the rules were preserved in manuscripts found all over the Northern Route (*Sanskrithandschriften* 1). The monastic rules are divided according to the degree of gravity of the offence into *Pārājika*, *Saṃghāvaśeṣa*, *Aniyata*, *Naiḥsargika-Pātayantika*, *Pātayantika*, *Śaikṣa*, and *Adhikaraṇasamatha*. Up to now only an older and incomplete edition of the *Prātimokṣa* rules of the Sarvāstivāda school from manuscripts found at Duldur Aqur (Kučā oasis) has been published by L. Finot (*Prāt.*). Some *Śaikṣa* rules were discovered by J. Filliozat and Hōryū Kuno (*VinS.*). A complete edition of the text mainly based on the numerous finds of the German expeditions is under preparation. When this edition is available, the differences of the *Prātimokṣa* of the Sarvāstivāda and the Mūlasarvāstivāda schools may be more precisely determined.

A synopsis in the book of V. Rosen (*Der Vinaya-vibhaṅga zum Bhikṣuprātimokṣa der Sarvāstivādins*, pp. 42–49) and a comparison of the edition of Finot with that of Banerjee show that the main differences do not appear in the rules themselves — excluding the *Śaikṣa* rules — but in the more or less freely composed introductions (*nidānoddeśa*), and the concluding portions of the *Prātimokṣa*.

The same holds good with the *Vinayavibhaṅga* which was edited by V. Rosen (op.cit.). The differences between the version of the Sarvāstivādins and Mūlasarvāstivādins can be well demonstrated by a single fragment containing rules about the *Pārājika* offence number three which comments on *vadhah*, 'killing by request' (V. Rosen, *Der Vinaya-vibhaṅga*, pp.230–234). The Mūlasarvāstivāda version describes the mental condition of a monk who may be persuaded to commit suicide: firstly, a monk who does not follow the rules, secondly, one who follows the rules, and thirdly, one who is ill. The Sarvāstivāda version extends the rule to all sorts of people and gives a list of bad people like butchers, thieves, etc., and of good people like monks, nuns and laymen. Besides the rules concerning monks, there are also a number of fragments in Sanskrit containing the *Bhikṣuṇī prātimokṣa* which was the basis of an edition of E. Waldschmidt (*Bhī Prāt.*), where as in the other editions, the Chinese and Pali parallels are included.

As the *Prātimokṣa* rules are closely related to the monastic life and are recited every two weeks on the occasion of 'confessing sins' (*poṣatha*), it is not surprising that *Prātimokṣa* rules are not so often translated into foreign languages. Except the Chinese translation, one finds only manuscripts with *Prātimokṣa* rules translated into Tokharian A and B found in the oasis of Kučā and Qarašähr (R. Hoernle, *Manuscript Remains*, p. 357; E. Steg/W. Siegling, *Toch. Sprachreste*, Nr 353–54; E. Steg/W. Siegling, *Toch. Sprachreste B*, Nr. 314–337).

An interesting manuscript of the Chinese Dharmaguptaka version was published by Chung Se Kimm (*Ein Chinesisches Fragment des Prātimokṣa aus Turfan*). It is the only book in poṭhī form among the Chinese manuscripts of the German collection. Smaller fragments of the Dharmaguptaka version written in Sanskrit have been published by E. Waldschmidt (*Sanskrithandschriften* 1, Kat. Nr. 656).

Less has been edited from the so called *Skandhaka* texts, named *Vastu* in the Mūlasarvāstivāda terminology. While the *Prātimokṣa* is the code of law for the Buddhist monks and nuns, the *karmavācanās* are, roughly speaking, regulations relating to the entrance into the Saṅgha (*pravrajyā*) and the ordination (*upasaṃpadā*). The *Skandhaka* portion of the Vinaya also includes rules concerning everyday life as e.g. the use of leather (*carmavastu*). As an appendix or addition they also include rules for the laymen who have taken rufuge in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha. *Karmavācanā* are the *Prātimokṣa* rules, accompanied by stories exemplifying the rules. The edition of the rules, as far as they are handed down in Sanskrit manuscripts found in Central Asia, in comparison with Tibetan and Chinese sources, was done by H. Hartel (*Karmavācanā*) who also used the *Karmavācanā* published from the collection of Pelliot by L. Finot (*Fragments du Vinaya Sanskrit*) and by J. Filliozat and Hōryū Kuno (*VinS.*). As for the *Prātimokṣa* rules, there is also a close affinity of the *Karmavācanā* of the Sarvāstivāda and the Mūlasarvāstivāda schools. Therefore, it was possible to correct some portions of the edition of Hartel after more Gilgit manuscripts had become accesible (O. von Hinüber, *Eine Karmavācanā-Sammlung aus Gilgit*). One Sanskrit-Tokharian bilingual manuscript with a Tokharian commentary, probably found at Kučā, is prepared

for publication by K. T. Schmidt. This text was already mentioned by D. Schlingloff (*Die Birkenrindenhandschriften der Berliner Turfansammlung*, p. 127).

Except these texts, only smaller fragments have been published from the Vinaya of the Sarvāstivāda and the Mūlasarvāstivāda schools. One smaller Sanskrit text from the *Saṅghabhedavastu* of the Sarvāstivāda school contains episodes of Devadatta, the step brother of Buddha Śākyamuni, who tried to kill the Buddha and to split the Order (E. Waldschmidt, *Reste von Devadatta Episoden*). Its parallel version in Pali is found in the *Cullavagga*, chapter vii. The episodes tell how several monks try to protect the Buddha against the murderous attack of Devadatta. The Buddha comforts the monks by telling them that it is impossible to kill him. Ānanda, happy about this fact, is sent to Rājagṛha to announce that Devadatta should no longer be regarded as a member of the Order.

Two other interesting Sanskrit fragments deal with the Council of Rājagṛha (E. Waldschmidt, *Zum ersten buddhistischen Konzil in Rājagṛha*). The Pali version is found in the *Cullavagga* chapters xi and xii. Upāli, who is known for his brilliant knowledge of the *Prātimokṣa*, is questioned by Mahākāśyapa about it. The second fragment deals with the motion of Ānanda to repeal the less important rules. From the Hīnayāna *Upālipariprcchā* only rare fragments are published by V. Rosen (op. cit pp. 234–237).

6a. *Mahāyānistic Works connected with Monastic Rules*

According to N. Dutt (*Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 290 ff.), there are several Mahāyāna sūtras that serve the purpose of non-codified Vinaya of the Mahāyānists. From the list of such works published in Dutt's book only a few fragments have been identified among the Central Asian manuscripts. One fragment of the *Ratnarāśi Sūtra*, which deals with the eight hindrances (*āvaraṇa*) of a śramaṇa, is edited by R. Hoernle (*Manuscript Remains*, p. 116 ff.). Fragments of the Mahāyāna *Brahmajāla Sūtra* had been translated into Sogdian language, most likely from a Chinese source. Fragments of the *Bodhisattvaśikṣāpada*, not yet edited, are mentioned by O. Hansen (*Die buddhistische Literatur der Sogdier. Handbuch der Orientalistik*).

According to A. von Gabain (*Vorislamische altturkische Literatur. Handbuch der Orientalistik*, p. 221), there are no translations of Vinaya literature into the Uigur language. Not only the reasons proposed by A. von Gabain, that the Uigurs may have used a Vinaya in a foreign language like Sanskrit, Tokharian or — less likely — Sakian may be responsible for it, but also the fact that the majority of the Buddhists among the Uigurs seem to have been Mahāyānists, judging from the Buddhist literature found in their language. But one cannot exclude the possibility that parts of the Vinaya are hidden in fragments which are put into other literary groups, especially among the Avadāna texts. Due to the fragmentary character of the manuscripts it is difficult to identify them and often nearly impossible to put the texts into the right order within the Buddhist canon.

7. Hīnayāna Sūtras

The word of the Buddha in the Hīnayāna Buddhist Sanskrit literature is collected in four Āgamas: the *Dīrghāgama*, *Madhyamāgama*, *Saṃyukt'āgama*, and *Ekottarāgama*. These four collections, only partly translated into Chinese, correspond with the Pali *Dīgha-*, *Majjhima-*, *Saṃyutta-*, and *Aṅguttara-Nikāyas*, but the sūtras collected in them differ not only in number, as E. Lamotte (*Histoire*, p. 167 ff.) has shown, but there are also other differences as the sequence of sūtras within a collection, different versions of the sūtras, and different localities in the Pali or Sanskrit version of one and the same sūtra. Moreover the number of pericopes differs as can be easily seen in the synoptic editions published by E. Waldschmidt and his pupils. Roughly speaking, the Sanskrit versions have more interpolations than are found in the Pali tradition.

Because the Buddhist literature found in Eastern Turkistan is fragmentary we depend on the Chinese sources, and therefore, we have no knowledge as to how the Sanskrit canon of the Sarvāstivādins was originally composed. Only two sequences, one of some sūtras belonging to the *Dīrghāgama*, and another, less convincing, of the *Madhyamāgama*, throw some light on a problem that cannot be definitely solved. The following sequence of sūtras of the *Dīrghāgama* is found in quite a number of Sanskrit manuscripts from the Northern Silk Route: *Daśottara-*, *Saṅgīti-*, *Catuṣpariṣat-*, *Mahāvadāna*, *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* (including the *Mahāsudarśana Sūtra*). All these sūtras have been edited by E. Waldschmidt and some of his pupils. The first two deal with philosophical terms as do the Pali parallels *Saṅgīti Suttanta* and *Dasottara Suttanta*. They are classified into special groups, a method that also can be observed in most of the suttas of the Pali *Aṅguttara Nikāya*. The last three sūtras narrate the life of the Buddha,

commencing from the time of the Buddha Vipaśyin. The *Catuṣpariṣat Sūtra* reports on the events in the life of Buddha Śākyamuni starting from his Enlightenment up to the conversion of his two main pupils Upatiṣya (=Śāriputra) and Kolita (=Mahāmaudgalyāyana). In the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* the last days of his life are narrated beginning with the visit of Varṣakāra, the minister of the king Ajātaśatru, upto the distribution of the relics. The *Mahāvadāna Sūtra* deals with the story of the life of the Buddha Vipaśyin, one of the predecessors of the Buddha Śākyamuni, up to the preaching of the *Prātimokṣa* to his followers.

This sequence of sūtras is not found in the *Dīgha Nikāya*; the *Catuṣpariṣat Sūtra* does not even appear in the Sutta Piṭaka. The Theravāda version of it forms part of the introduction to the *Mahāvagga* and, therefore, belongs to the Vinaya Piṭaka.

These larger sūtras are interwoven with smaller sūtras as the *Bimbiṣāra Sūtra* within the *Catuṣpariṣat Sūtra*. It contains the story of the conversion of King Bimbisāra, who is impressed by the subjugation of the famous Brahmin ascetic Uruvilvā Kāśyapa by the Buddha and the sermon by the latter on the *pratītyasamutpāda* and the non-existence of the Ego. The text is word for word the same in the *Catuṣpariṣat Sūtra* (pp. 333-371) and in a manuscript containing a collection of *Madhyamāgama Sūtras* (E. Waldschmidt, *Bruchstücke buddhistischer Sūtras*, pp. 114–148).

Another episode in the *Catuṣpariṣat Sūtra* is the story of the two merchants Trapuṣa and Bhallika. Herein the story is quite simple. The two merchants are told by a god that Śākyamuni has reached Enlightenment and that they may gain happiness (*artha, hita, sukha*), if they pay reverence to him and offer him something to eat and drink. They present him mixed beverage and honey, and to partake the meal in a proper way a bowl is given to the Enlightened One by the four Kings of Heaven. After he had accepted the alms, the Buddha praises and blesses the merchants.

Baron A. von Staël-Holstein (*Bemerkungen zu den Brāhmīglossen des Ṭikastvustik-Manuscripts*, pp. 79–122) has shown that this story is wide-spread within Buddhist literature. He gives examples as to what extent the originally simple story was enlarged in different versions. One of these considerably altered versions we find in the Uigur text of the *Ṭikastvustik* (Sanskrit : *dikṣaṃ sauvastikaṃ*) which was edited and translated by W. Radloff. In this Sūtra text the story of the two merchants is only the frame for a dhāraṇī and a *sauvastika* which show similarities with the *Ātānāṭika Sūtra* and is meant for the protection of travelling merchants. One finds also local interpolations in the *Ṭikastvustik* as the sentence (p. 38) : " Turcs, you who are powerful by treasures, property, and wealth, you may prosper. " The story ends with a farewell for the two merchants as in the *Catuṣpariṣat Sūtra*. A similar version is also found among the Sanskrit manuscripts of the German collection. Schlingloff has identified Kat. Nr. 660 in his recension of the catalogue " Sanskrithandschriften 1 " (*ZDMG*. 1967, p. 423) as one version on which the Uigur text may have been based. A similar fragment is found in the collection Pelliot and was published by B. Pauly (*Fragments Sanskrits de Haute Asie*, 1959, p. 219 f.).

A Tokharian version of any one of the *Dīrghāgama* sūtras mentioned above is not known up to now. But Waldschmidt (*Zu einigen Bilinguen aus den Turfan-Funden*) has pointed out that certain bilingual Sanskrit-Tokharian texts contain stock-phrases which are taken from popular sūtras like *Mahāparinirvāṇa* or the *Catuṣpariṣat Sūtra*. Only these stock-phrases are translated into the foreign language, so that one may suggest that the contents of such sūtras had been so well known that this collection of phrases stands for the whole text. Waldschmidt also notices a connection between the *Uddānas* (memorial verses at the end of the works containing words which summarize the contents), and these stock-phrases. Additional contributions are published by W. Couvreur (*Sanskrit Koetjische trefwoorden listen ; Zu einigen Sanskrit-Kutschischen Listen von Stichwörtern aus dem Catuṣpariṣat-, Daśottara-sūtra, Nidānasaṃyukta*). These lists of stock-phrases for designating popular sūtras are not limited to Sanskrit-Tokharian texts, they are also found in bilingual Sanskrit-Uigur texts as Waldschmidt has shown in the article just mentioned.

Another, but less popular sequence of sūtras from the *Madhyamāgama* appears in some Sanskrit manuscripts of the Turfan collection published in " Sanskrithandschriften 1 ", Kat. Nr. 32, 33,165. Schlingloff (*Zum Mahāgovindasūtra*) has tried for the first time to give a list of the sūtras included, which can be partly enlarged by a second list.

1. A parallel version of the *Pañcattaya Sutta*, another sūtra not yet identified *Pāṭimātr-* (= Pali *Pāṭika Suttanta*), *Sunakṣatra-*, *Bhayabhairava-*, *Mahāsiṃhanāda-*, *Janavasabha-*, *Mahāgovinda Sūtra*.

2. The second sequence cannot be defined so clearly because only parts of it are included in Kat. Nr. 33 and 165. To this collection of sūtras belong :

Bodhirājakumāra-, *Śaṅkaraka-*, *Āṭānāṭika-*, *Mahāsamāja Sūtra*, and parallel texts to the Pali *Caṅkī-* and *Kandaraka Suttas*.

Whereas the sequence of the *Dīrghāgama* sūtras mentioned above is most probably canonical, there arise doubts regarding the *Madhyamāgama* sūtras. Only with much caution one may see in these *Madhyamāgama* manuscripts traces of the original Buddhist Sanskrit canon of the Sarvāstivāda school. Some groups of sūtras as the *Āṭānāṭika-* (H. Hoffmann, *Bruchstücke des Āṭānāṭikasūtra*) and the *Mahāsamāja Sūtras* (E. Waldschmidt, *Bruchstücke buddhistischer Sūtras*) seem to have been more popular than others. In the Theravāda tradition they belong to the *Dīgha Nikāya* (*Āṭānāṭiya Suttanta* and *Mahāsamaya Suttanta*). Their contents stand in close connection with the *Mahāmāyūrī* (15), wherein also lists of gods, yakṣas, nāgas, etc. are given. The popularity of these sūtras may be based on their protectional functions and the mantra like invocational effect.

Different versions of the topic 'retribution of acts', as it is discussed in the *Cūlakammavibhaṅga* (*MA.* 135) of the Theravāda tradition, are found in fragments of sūtras discovered everywhere in the Tarim Basin. Some fragments of a Sanskrit version were published by R. Hoernle (*Manuscript Remains*, p. 46 ff.) under the title *Śuka Sūtra*, because the sermon is held by the Buddha before the son of Taudeya, named Śuka. Parts of the introduction of the same text in a Sogdian version have been published by F. Rosenberg (*Fragment d'un sūtra*). A Tokharian recension has been first edited by S. Lévi under the title "D'un poème en Koutchéen sur la rétribution des actes (*Karmavibhaṅga*)" (*Fragments de Textes Koutchéens*). It is a poetical version on the same topic which is put into the frame of the Buddha's sermon to Śuka Mānavaka. Additional and critical remarks on the edition of Lévi were published by E. Sieg (*Die Kutschischen Karmavibhaṅga-Texte der Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris*). His critique is based on two German edited fragmentary manuscripts of the same text, one of them a bilingual text Sanskrit-Tokharian (E.Sieg/ W. Siegling, *Toch. Sprachreste B*, Nr. 521-526), a version which differs much from the fragments published by Lévi. A more recent discussion on the same topic is contributed by W. Couvreur (*De Tochaarse Karmavibhaṅga*).

The retribution of acts was most probably a popular subject in Central Asian Buddhism. The "*Sūtra du religieux Ongles-Longs*" (E. Benveniste, *Textes Sogdiens*, Nr. 5) in Sogdian language deals with the same question. Although the title points to the *Dīghanakha Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya*, the contents of the sūtra differs from it completely. The Pali version is a discourse to the wanderer Dīghanakha on the conflict caused by different views and the trouble created by feelings of different kinds. Only in the introduction to the sūtra are there any similarities and the locality is the same.

Another Sogdian text named "*Dīrghanakha Sūtra*" (E. Benveniste, op. cit., Nr. 17) is a hymn of praise for the Order, the three *ratnas*, and the *śikṣāpada*, a pure Mahāyānistic work which has nothing to do with the *Dīghanakha Sutta*.

A comparatively well preserved Sanskrit manuscript of the *Nidānasaṃyukta* has been published by Ch. Tripāṭhī (*Fünfundzwanzing Sūtras*) from the *Saṃyuktāgama* manuscripts of the German collection which had been identified before by E. Waldschmidt (*Identifizierung einer Handschrift des Nidānasaṃyukta*). On page 375 (Note 1, 2) Waldschmidt has noted that there are striking differences between the Sanskrit text and the version handed down in the *Tsa-a-han-ching* which cannot be interpreted owing to free translation. It may be that the Sanskrit manuscript belongs to another tradition than the version on which the Chinese translation is based. This touches another problem of Central Asian Buddhist literature which has already been mentioned in connection with the early Abhidharma texts found in Eastern Turkistan (§ 4). Although one or the other of the Chinese versions agrees to some extent with the text of the Sanskrit fragments, there are differences which may be explained either chronologically, i.e., the manuscripts found are older than the versions used for the Chinese translations, or by tradition itself, i.e., the version may belong to a more or less differing branch of the widely spread Sarvāstivāda school or even to another school popular in Central Asia.

The main subject of the *Nidānasaṃyukta* is the discussion of the *pratītyasamutpāda*, 'the origination by dependence'. It is one of the main philosophical topics of the Hīnayāna Buddhism, and the interpretation of it is still under discussion. The list, consisting of twelve members (*avidyā*, *saṃskāra*, *vijñāna*, *nāma-rūpa*, *āyatana*, *sparśa*, *vedanā tṛṣṇā*, *upādāna*, *bhava*, *jāti jarāvyādhimaraṇa*) is also the subject of quite a number of Tokharian manuscripts (E. Sieg/W. Siegling, *Toch. Sprachreste B*, Nr. 148–149). This list can be found even in Uigur manuscripts. F. W. K. Müller (Uigurica II) has published fragments of two different texts in

which the *pratītyasamutpāda* is discussed. One belongs to a text dealing with the life of the Buddha, similar to that of the *Lalitavistara*, and the other one is a part of the *Maitrisimit* (§ 13).

Among the *Saṃyuktāgama* sūtras found in the *Nidānasaṃyukta* the so-called *Nagara Sūtra* seems to have been more popular than others (cf. *S.* II, p 105 f. for identical sūtra). Quite a number of single fragments in Sanskrit is found besides the com ete manuscript published by Tripāṭhī. As Tripāṭhī mentions in his introduction, it had been translated into Chinese several times, and it is often cited in other connections within the Buddhist literature. It contains the metaphor of an old town which is rebuilt by a king and thereby filled with new life, in the same way as the old eightfold path is revived by the Buddha Śākyamuni.

Of quite a different character is another sūtra which has the title *Nagaropamavyākaraṇa* (*Sanskrithandschriften* 2 and 3). It is a rakṣā, a charm for protection against Māra, the evil one, and has some similarities with the *Āṭānāṭika Sūtra*. Waldschmidt (*Sanskrithandschriften* 2, p. 23) has shown that the Pali *Nagarūpama Sutta* of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*A.* IV, p. 106 f.) has little to do with the Sanskrit work of the same title.

This review about the Hīnayāna sūtras can only be a sketch, because the material is vast. Although the published fragments and works do not give a complete survey, one may dare to emphasize the striking fact that Hīnayāna sūtras have been rarely translated into foreign languages, except into Chinese and Tibetan. The lists of stock-phrases in bilingual manuscripts lead to the presumption that popular sūtras were known by heart and therefore, were not translated.

8. Kṣudrāgama Texts and their Commentaries

According to Lamotte (*Histoire*, p. 174 ff.) the *Kṣudrāgama*, though mentioned in many sources under this name, may be regarded more as a fourth Piṭaka besides the Tripiṭaka than a fifth book of the Sūtra Piṭaka. It is not clearly determined which of the texts have become canonized by the Sarvāstivāda school. The sources differ on this point. According to Lamotte the following four groups are mentioned in nearly all the lists : The *Dharmapada* (= *Udānavarga*), the *Arthavarga*, the *Pārāyaṇa* (the last two belong to the *Suttanipāta* in the Pali canon), and the *Sthaviragāthā*. Besides them, the jātakas and avadānas were much favoured by the Central Asian Buddhists, and if not canonized, they were, nevertheless, regarded as highly sacred. Stories from these collections were translated into nearly all languages spoken in the Tarim Basin, often much altered in style and also contents. These books belonging to the devotional literature — prose enriched with moral verses, or as in the *Udānavarga* and the *Anavataptagāthā* only consisting of verses — probably appealed much to the mind of less educated monks and laymen.

8a. *Udānavarga and its Commentaries, and Pārāyaṇa*

The comparably largest number of Sanskrit manuscripts in all the collections contain fragments of the *Udānavarga*, a book of moral verses corresponding to the *Dhammapada* in the Prakrit-Pali tradition. An excellent edition of the *vulgata* text of the Sarvāstivāda recension was published by F. Bernhard (*Udānavarga*). While mainly drawing on the manuscripts of the German collection, Bernhard has also used all other materials available including bilingual texts in Sanskrit-Tokharian A and B, and Sanskrit-Turkish. Additional remarks to Bernhard's edition have been published by L. Schmithausen (*Zu den Rezensionen des Udanavarga*). Besides these sources, there are also translations into Chinese, Tibetan, and Mongol language. Among the vast material, there is Turkish or Tokharian translation of the text ; only fragments of bilingual texts are preserved in the collections. This supports the suggestion already made in connection with the Hīnayāna sūtras, where bilingual stock-phrases take the place of proper translations, that popular texts were known by heart. The *Udānavarga* was most probably considered as the word of the Buddha himself and for that reason recited in its original language.

A smaller fragment of the German collection has been identified as a commentary to the *Udānavarga* (*Sanskrithandschriften* 3, Kat. Nr. 922). It comments on two verses of the Kāmavarga : "desire (*kāma*) is not based on the objects of the sense (*viṣaya*), but on the wish to use them."

Another well known commentary of the *Udānavarga* is the *Udānālaṅkāra* handed down in manuscripts written in the two Tokharian dialects A and B (E. Sieg/W. Siegling, *Die Udānālaṅkāra-Fragmente*). The editors write in their introduction that the manuscripts were most probably translated by an Indian monk, named Dharmasoma, for his pupils. It is a poetic commentary in kāvya-style. Selected verses in the same sequence as in the *Udānavarga* are connected with certain events taken from Buddhist legends. This commentary does not agree with a Tibetan one which has the same title. Up to now little has been found of the

Pārāyaṇa which corresponds with the fourth book of the Pali *Suttanipāta*. Among the Sanskrit manuscripts only one could be identified (*Sanskrithandschriften* 1, Kat. Nr. 50) which includes, besides words of the *Pārāyaṇa Sūtra*, parts of the *Anavataptagāthā*-(§ 8).

8b. *Gāthā, Apadāna, and Jātaka Literature*

The same subjects as in the Pali tradition, where the *Thera-* and *Theri-gāthās*, apadānas and jātakas have become canonized, are found in the Sanskrit semi-canonized literature. How much Gāthā and Apadāna literature are entangled with each other is analyzed by H. Bechert in the introduction to his edition of the *Anavataptagāthā* from Sanskrit manuscripts of the German Turfan collection (*Bruchstücke buddhistischer Versammlungen*). The manuscripts used are of comparatively early date (Early Brāhmī of Northern Turkistan ; § 5). The Sanskrit version of the *Anavataptagāthā* agrees closely with a portion of the text of the *Bhaiṣajyavastu* of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya handed down in the *Kanjur* and in manuscripts found at Gilgit (Kashmir). There are other not so close relations with texts like the *Avadānaśataka* which had been translated into Chinese already in the third century A. C. That applies also to the Pali literature. Bechert takes the view that four of the stories have a common source. They are interrelated in such a way that three of the stories of the *Anavataptagāthā* in the Mūlasarvāstivāda tradition entered the *Therāpadāna* and one, *vice versa*. The *Anavataptagāthā* contains 36 legends of elders (*sthaviras*) in which they tell their *karmaploti*, the string of their life in the past up to the present in poetic form.

The collection of the *Sthaviragāthā* is composed to a certain extent like the Pali collection of the *Theragāthā*. The collections have similar introductory verses and are arranged in the same way. But there are still more differences than similarities, so that the separation of the two verisons must have taken place quite early. It is remarkable that the *Sthaviragāthā* have not been translated into other languages, all the more, because other collections in poetic style as the *Udānavarga* remained so popular, especially in the Sanskrit tradition. In later times the *Sthaviragāthā* were completely forgotten. They still belong to a time, when the oral tradition was perhaps more valued than the written text.

The same holds good with the other larger *Pretāvadāna* and the *Vimānāvadāna*. A fragment of the *Vimānāvadāna* will be published by H. Bechert (*On a Fragment of the Vimānāvadāna*). It belongs to one of the manuscripts used for his publication of the *Anavataptagāthā*. It may be that a canonical order is preserved in the sequence of the texts collected in this manuscript : 1. *Udānavarga*, 2. *Anavataptagāthā*, 3. *Sthaviragāthā*, 4. *Vimānāvadāna*, and 5. *Pretāvadāna*.

From the Uigur manuscripts of the German Turfan collection the "Avadāna des Damons Āḷavaka" was published by A. von Gabain and T. Kowalski (*Türkische Turfantexte X*). Following the contents given by A. von Gabain the story seems to differ much from the version known from Pali sources, the *Āḷavaka Sutta* in the *Suttanipāta* and Buddhaghosa's commentaries. The yakṣa Āḷavaka is a danger for sick people, especially for pregnant women. Therefore, Jīvaka, the doctor, is sent to the Buddha for help. A. von Gabain also mentions that the door keeper Gadrabha of the Pali version is in the Turkish text the brother of Āḷavaka. The Uigur fragment only contains the story preceeding the conversion of the yakṣa. In the Pali version the Buddha sees with his eye of compassion that the King Āḷavaka is going to sacrifice his own son to the man-eating yakkha, and the Buddha converts the yakkha to Buddhism. Since a Chinese source for the Uigurian version is not given, one cannot say how the Turkish version could have developed. The *Āḷavakāvadāna* shows clearly how much the versions may differ, and that it may only sometimes be possible to draw a line of the development of a story, but often enough the connecting links are missing. Also the large collections of the Sanskrit Avadāna literature as the *Avadānaśataka* and the *Divyāvadāna* do not contain all the stories. Being concerned with Central Asian manuscripts means to deal with fragments in the literal sense of the word, and in a broader sense that one can only get a very limited idea about the Buddhist literature used in Central Asia. But this much one may say, except the *Udānavarga* and the *Buddhastotras* of Mātṛceṭa, no literary class was more popular than avadāna stories and jātakas. That is reflected by more or less complete collections preserved in nearly all languages of Central Asia.

According to the three catalogues of Sanskrit manuscripts of the German collection (*Sanskrithandschriften* 1—3) manuscripts of avadānas and jātakas are comparatively rare. There is one old manuscript (ca. 3rd c. A. C., Kat. Nr. 26, *Sanskrithandschriften* 1) which contains a collection of jātakas in a free poetical recension.

Two fragments of a Sanskrit manuscript of the *Śroṇakoṭikarṇāvadāna* have been identified (*Sanskrithandschriften* 1, Kat. Nr. 591, 598) in

which is told the well-known story of the merchant Śroṇakoṭikarṇa who sees on his journey, among other supernatural things, a man who enjoys the days, but who during the night has to suffer for his sins committed in a former life. He comes to the abode of the *pretas* who suffer from hunger because of their bad deeds during their lives. This story has a parallel version in the *Carmavastu* of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya and in the *Divyāvadāna* (E. Waldschmidt, *Zur Sroṇakoṭikarṇa-Legende*). Fragments of a poetical version of the same story are preserved in Tokharian dialect A (E. Sieg/W Siegling, *Toch. Sprachreste*, Nr. 340-341).

Many manuscripts containing avadānas and jātakas, often combined in collective manuscripts, are preserved in Tokharian A. Most of the manuscripts had been found at Šorčuq (Qaraśähr). E. Sieg and W. Siegling transcribed most of them in "Tocharische Sprachreste". How difficult it is to identify them is best demonstrated by the words of the editors which shall be given here in a brief summary (op. cit. p. 1): From the original work, containing surely more than one hundred folios, only 54 are preserved. The title of the work is not known. The remnants point to a classification as avadāna which resembles in its construction the *Mahāvastu*. From the stories collected the editors could only identify the *Puṇyavanta Jātaka* which differs in detail much from that of the literary sources cited. The well known story runs briefly as follows: the five princes Rūpavān, Vīryavān, Śilpavān, Prajñāvān, and Puṇyavān praise their own virtues by telling stories, which are intended to prove that the special virtue signified by each name is the best. At the end Puṇyavān who is nobody else than the Buddha himself gains victory over the others.

Two other prominent fragmentary texts are preserved from the so called *Araṇemi Jātaka* in the Tokharian dialects A and B. Both the manuscripts have been found by the German expeditions at Šorčuq (Qaraśähr). The text starts with a *buddhastotra* and continues with the *Araṇemi Jātaka* which is a variant of the famous *Viśvantara Jātaka* (Pali *Vessantara J°*). The King Araṇemi offers all his property, even his children and his wife, and at last himself, to gain Buddhahood. The *Viśvantara Jātaka* seems to have been very popular in Central Asia. A Sogdian version was edited by E. Benveniste (*Textes sogdiens*, Nr. 1).

A brilliant edition of a poetical text called *Jātakastava* or 'the praise of Buddha's former births' was prepared by M. J. Dresden from a Khotanese manuscript from Tun-huang. This *Jātakstava* is quite different from the Sanskrit *Jātakastava* of Jñānayaśas; (D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *The Jātakastava of Jñānayaśas*). The text is marked as a translation, but the editor was not able to find out from which text and which language it was translated. In the edition of Dresden one finds a helpful synopsis of the jātakas contained in the work, and their parallel versions. From there it is evident that, besides the above mentioned jātakas, the *Sudāna J°* (the jātaka of the six-tusked elephant), the *Sutasoma J°* (the Jātaka of the man-eating Kalmāśapāda released by the pious King Sutasoma) the story of the two hostile princes Pāpaṃkara and Kalyāṇaṃkara, and some others were translated into nearly all languages spoken in the Tarim Basin

9. Abhidharma Literature and its Commentaries

The most important works of the Abhidharma literature were composed in the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda schools. The Sarvāstivādins have canonized an Abhidharma of seven books, but it is called by them *ṣaṭpādābhidharma*, because six of the works were regarded as *pādas* (feet) of the main work of the school, the *Jñānaprasthāna* of Kātyāyanīputra (J. Takakusu, *On the Abhidharma Literature*). The Abhidharma is, except this work, not an independent philosophical literature, but is Dharma, the word of the Buddha, only written in a more scholastic prose than the Sūtras as already M. Winternitz (*Geschichte der indischen Literatur*, p. 134) had described it. In the school of the Sarvāstivādins it was valued as the correct and literal interpretation of the Buddha's word by his pupils.

Little has been identified from the original Abhidharma texts preserved in Central Asian manuscripts. As already mentioned in § 4, early palm leaf Sanskrit manuscripts dominate among the fragments containing Abhidharma. Because most of them were written before the great activity of translating Buddhist texts into Chinese began, the problems connected with their identification are still more complex than with other texts.

Fragments of two manuscripts of the *Saṅgītiparyāya* written in Sanskrit have been published by V. Stache-Rosen (*Das Saṅgītisūtra und sein Kommentar Saṅgītiparyāya*). As indicated in the title of the book the *Saṅgītiparyāya* represents more a commentary upon the *Saṅgīti Sūtra* of the *Dīrghāgama* than an original philosophical work.

Two other fragmentary leaves of Sanskrit manuscripts have been identified by J. Imanishi (*Das Pañcavastuka und die Pañcavastukavibhāṣā*) as belonging to the *Pañcavastuka*, the first chapter of

the *Prakaraṇapāda* ascribed to Vasumitra. Two other fragmentary manuscripts (*Sanskrithandschriften aus den Turfanfunden* 1, *Kat.* Nr. 19, 20) contain a commentary on the chapters *jñāna*, *saptavastuka* and *anuśaya* of the same work. They were prepared for publication by J. Imanishi under the title "Fragmente des Prakaraṇabhāṣyam."

From the most famous, and in philosophical sense most elaborated Abhidharma work, the *Jñānaprasthāna*, one fragment from Duldur Aqur (Kučā oasis) had been identified by P. Demieville (*Un fragment Sanskrit de l' Abhidharma des Sarvāstivādin*). According to the tradition the *Jñānaprasthāna* was composed by Kātyāyanīputra, a monk from Kashmir, three-hundred years after the Parinirvāṇa of the Buddha. This work was regarded as a mile-stone for the development of the Vaibhāṣikas, the most important branch of the Sarvāstivāda school.

10. Other Philosophical Works

The famous scholars Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga, who were themselves indebted to the teaching of the Vaibhāṣikas, are regarded to be the founders of the two main philosophical schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra schools.

From the few books ascribed to Nāgārjuna with some probability only one Sanskrit manuscript had been identified by H. Stānner (*Zentralasiatische Sanskrittexte in Brāhmīschrift aus Idikutšahri*). It is a complete scroll which contains, as given in the colophon, the *Dharmaśarīra*, an extract of the *Dharmasaṃgraha*.

From the main philosophical treatise of Asaṅga, the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, there seem to exist fragments in Uigur language (A. von Gabain, *Vorislamische alttürkische Literatur*, *Handbuch der Orientalistik*, p. 222).

As far as one may judge from the few Abhidharma-sūtras identified, it is Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* that was most popular in Central Asia. Vasubhandhu, brother of Asaṅga, was one of the leading lights of the Hīnayāna Vaibhāṣika school. We have not only fragments of his main work in Sanskrit (*Sanskrithandschriften* 1, Kat. Nr. 624) but, as far as they can be regarded as identified, also a number of Tokharien manuscripts which are closely related to the *Abhidharmakośa* (E. Sieg/ W. Sielging, *Toch. Sprachreste B*, Nr. 170–202). Most of these manuscripts are written in dialect B and are found in the Turfan oasis, sometimes annotated or corrected by Uigur writers. As A. von Gabain has written in the article "Vorislamische alttürkische Literatur" (op. cit.), there is also an Uigur manuscript of the *Abhidharmakośaśāstra* in the Swedish collection. With Vasubandhu, Asaṅga, and Nāgārjuna the philosophical step towards the new conception of *śūnyatā*, emptiness, had been taken which replaced the *pratītyasamutpāda*, the doctrine of the Dependent Origination and the *āryāṣṭaṅgamārga*, the Eightfold Way leading out of saṃsāra.

11. Commentaries

Little has been published from the commentary literature on Sūtra texts. The commentaries on the *Udānavarga* and the *Pañcavastuka* have already been mentioned (§§ 8a, 9). A fragment which comments on the noble truth of suffering (*duḥkha āryasatya*) has been published in "*Sanskrithandschriften*" (3, Kat. Nr. 802). Most of the commentaries on sūtras have not yet been identified. They are often found combined in one manuscript with Sūtra texts, stotras, formulas of donation, and even medical texts, as it may be demonstrated by two manuscripts published in "*Sanskrithandschriften*, part 1" (Kat. Nr. 24,34). These manuals containing texts of quite different contents are found particularly among Sanskrit and Tokharian manuscripts.

12. Yoga and Practice of Meditation

In the early Hīnayāna Buddhism traces of Yoga practice are found in Sūtra texts of which the *Smṛtyupasthāna Sūtra* (Pali *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*) is the most famous. One Sanskrit manuscript written on birch-bark is based on the *Smṛtyupasthāna*. It describes mystical visions as a result of Yoga practice. The practice itself can only be inferred from the visionary pictures described in the text, whose contents have been excellently characterized by Schlingloff's introduction to his eidition (*Ein buddhistisches Yogalehrbuch*). Different from the *Smṛthyupasthāna Sūtra* is the practice of meditation based on compassion (*karuṇāprayoga*) which is also included in this work. The yogin gets his consecration as a bodhisattva during the meditation, and compassion is the main motive for his actions.

In this attitude of the meditator we already find the base for Mahāyāna texts like the *Buddhadhyānasamādhisāgara Sūtra*, also called Dhyāna Text, of which parts have been eidited by H. Reichelt (*Die soghdischen Handschriftenreste* I). The final identification of the text was prepared by F. Weller (*Bemerkungen zum soghdischen Dhyāna-Texte*) and completed by S. Matsumani (O. Hansen,

Die buddhistische Literatur der Sogdier. Handbuch der Orientalistik). The text describes a meditation based on the visions of Buddhas and bodhisattvas.

Another fragmentary Yoga text preceded the "Yogalehrbuch" in the same manual, but little of it has been preserved. From colophons the title *Yogavidhi* can be gathered. This work seems to have been of quite a different character than the "Yogalehrbuch". D. Schlingloff (*Yogavidhi*) has described the contents as consisting of sūtras like the *Yogasūtras* of Patañjali and a commentary on them.

Mahāyāna sūtras often include texts for the practice of meditation, as the *Sūraṅgamasamādhi Sūtra*. They will be mentioned in the next section.

13. Mahāyāna Sūtras

The literary products discussed in the last five sections have already shown a trend towards Mahāyānism, and some of the works mentioned had to be grouped into the category of Mahāyāna literature. The Buddha in his many-fold previous existences was able to release people from their sins heaped up by their bad deeds in previous births as the king Sutasoma in the above mentioned jātaka (§ 8). Or people can be released by *bhakti*, devotion, which is best symbolized by the *Viśvantara Jātaka*. The aim of a monk is no longer Nirvāṇa, but to become a bodhisattva. He renounces Nirvāṇa and is reborn with the aim to help people by the accumulation of his own good deeds. On the basis of the non-existence of an individual (*pudgala*), the Mahāyānists developed their system of *śūnyatā*(emptiness), especially in the Prajñāpāramitā literature. The real world does not exist, it is imagination (*māyā*). Such changes regarding the lore were systematically developed in the works ascribed to the two great Mahāyāna teachers, Nāgārjuna for the Mādhyamikas and Asaṅga for the Yogācārins (§10). But they surely arose in the monastic order, where the Hīnayānist and the Mahāyānist monks seem to have lived peacefully together bound by the monastic rules (Vinaya) of their *nikāya*. The *nikāya* is defined by H. Bechert (*Notes on the Formation of Buddhist Sects*) as "groups of monks that mutually acknowledged validity of their upasampadā or higher ordination, and made use of particular recensions of the sacred texts", particularly *Karmavācanā* and *Prātimokṣa*. On this basis it is not surprising that Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna literature have been found together in many monasteries of Central Asia, especially in Qarašāhr. Although there had been a mingling, one cannot deny the fact that Mahāyāna Buddhism seems to have been predominant in the monasteries of the Southern Route, whereas in the northern parts, particularly in Kučā, the Hīnayāna was favoured. That is already told by Fa-hsien who passed the famous towns on the Southern Route on his way to India, and was confirmed by Hsüan-tsang who has mentioned Khotan as a centre of Mahāyānism. Besides typical Mahāyāna sūtras which may be regarded as collections of texts comparable with the Āgamas, there are some sūtras representing a more or less intermediate state of development between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. The most popular sūtra of this group is the *Maitreyasamiti* which had been translated into various Central Asian languages. Already Winternitz (*Geschichte der indischen Literatur*, II, p. 372) informs the reader in a note about the edition of E. Leumann under the title "Maitreya-samiti, das Zu-kunftsideal der Buddhisten; die nordarische (that means Khotanese) Schilderung in Text und Ubersetzung; mit Begrün-dung der indogermanischen Metrik". A more detailed comparison of all the versions published can be found in the introduction of the facsimile edition of the Uigur text by A. von Gabain (*Maitrisimit* I and II). The frame for all the versions is similar. The Buddha Śākyamuni preaches to his pupils Śāriputra and Ānanda about the life of the future Buddha Maitreya. From this popular work exist translations in the already mentioned Uigur, Khotanese, and Tokharian versions. Also among the Sogdian manuscripts of the German collection there seems to be a Maitreya text which is not published up to now. According to A.von Gabain, the Khotanese version is the least influenced of all by Mahāyānistic ideas. Only the ideal of *bhakti* can be observed, especially in a scene where Maitreya sends a beam of light into the hells to bring release to the people there. The Tokharian version of which four manuscripts exist shows an interesting variation of the epical form. It is called, in the colophons, a *mahānāṭaka*, which means a great drama. Actually it is a mixture of drama and epic. In this version we find more Mahāyānistic trends. Different from the Khotanese version where Maitreya, in the translation of Leumann, is called a priest, he is named a bodhisattva in the Tokharian one. By the colophons, it is settled that the work was translated from an unnamed text by Āryachandra of Agnideśa (Qarašāhr) who was a Vaibhāṣika, a member of the most prominent philosophical branch of the Sarvāstivāda school. The Uigur version was translated from the Tokharian text which is attested by the famous colophon indicating that Prajñārakṣita had translated the

text from the "Toxri tili," into the Uigur language (§ 5). Also quite a number of other works belong to the Maitreya literature, particularly dhāraṇīs (§ 15). From these only one shall be mentioned here, the *Maitreyāvadānavyākaraṇa* which is well preserved in two Tokharian manuscripts written in dialect A, and found at Šorčuq (F. Sieg/W.Siegling, *Toch. Sprachreste*, Nr. 219–238, 239–242). It seems to have been a moral treatise which was dedicated to Maitreya. The Prajñāpāramitās, sūtras of the perfection of knowledge, belong to the oldest Mahāyāna sūtras. A. Bareau (*Der indische Buddhismus*, p. 129) writes that they are closely related to the Hīnayāna sūtras than others, among other reasons, by their mainly didactical character. From the sūtras belonging to the Prajñāpāramitā literature only some Sanskrit fragments, and larger portions of the *Vajracchedikā* in Sanskrit and Khotanese language have been identified and published. All the Mahāyānistic Sanskrit fragments are found in the oases of Qarašāhr or Turfan. Fragments of one older manuscript — cir sixth century A.C. — of the *Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* are published by E. Waldschmidt (*Sanskrithandschriften* 3, Kat. Nr. 933–34), and two additional manuscripts have been catalogued under the numbers Kat. Nr. 951 and 956. The fragments of the older manuscript are dealing with the transcendental knowledge that every thing is comparable to what is created by illusion (*mahānirmitasadṛśa*), and the advantages one may get by studying the transcendental knowledge in the right way. A detailed analysis of the parallel versions and the contents is given in this publication. The additional manuscript Kat. Nr. 951 contains parts of the chapters on the sense of moral training (*śikṣā*) of the comprehensive knowledge (*sarvākārajñatā*). One of the small fragments Kat. Nr. 956 contains parts of the chapters 66–68 of the Sanskrit text edited by E. Conze (*Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*). The most voluminous of the Prajñāpāramitās is the *Śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā* of which fragments of two different Sanskrit manuscripts are published in "Sanskrithandschriften" (1, Kat. Nr. 645; 2, Kat. Nr. 1012). Both these manuscripts are late compared with those of the *Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā*. Kat. Nr. 645 is a block print (cir. 14th century A. C.), as they are often found in Tibet. It contains parts of enumerations of Buddhist terms such as deep (*gambhīra*) resulting in the sentence that the Dharma is deep. The text of the second manuscript (Kat. Nr. 1012) written in the developed form of the calligraphic Brāhmī of Southern Turkistan (Hoernle "Upright Gupta") agrees closely with that of the edition in the Bibliotheca Indica (P. Ghosa, *Śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*). It contains the end of the fourth and the beginning of the fifth *parivāra* (chapter) in which Śāradvatīputra (= Śāriputra) asks Subhūti, whether *rūpa*, *vedanā*, etc. are of existence *per se*(*svabhāva*). Manuscripts of the *Vajracchedikā* (see also § 14 Jingangjing), the smallest compendium within the Prajñāpāramitā literature, seem to have been popular in the area of Sakian influence. This work is one of the most favoured Prajñāpāramitā works in the Far East. In R. Hoernle's "Manuscript Remains" (pp. 176-195) F.E. Pargiter has published a nearly complete Sanskrit manuscript discovered by A. Stein in Dadān Uiliq. Only five leaves of this manuscript are missing. In the following pages of the same book St. Konow has edited a complete manuscript of the Khotanese version which was brought from the 'Halls of the Thousand Buddhas' at Tun-huang. This translation does not correspond always with the Sanskrit text in the edition of M. Müller (*Vajracchedikā*). One fragment of a Sogdian version was published by H. Reichelt (*Die Soghdischen Handschriftenreste* II, pp. 71-75) and by F. W. K. Müller/W. Lentz (*Soghdische Texte* II, pp. 544-548). This fragment was translated from the Chinese text of Kumārajīva (F. Weller, *Bemerkungen zur soghdischen Vajracchedikā*)' a part of which is handed down in a folio which is a curiosity among all the manuscripts found in Eastern Turkistan. It is a transcription of the Chinese Text into the very kind of cursive Brāhmī normally used for Khotanese documents (F. W. Thomas, *A Buddhist Chinese Text in Brāhmī-script*). Two leaves of a Tibetan manuscript found at Ili-Köl (Turfan oasis) are published by A. H. Francke (*Weitere tibetische Handschriftenfunde*).

One of the most voluminous sūtras within the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* — the garland of Buddhas — is the *Gaṇḍavyūha*. One folio of a Sanskrit passage has been identified by E. Waldschmidt (*Sanskrit-handschriften* 1, Kat. Nr. 531). It agrees with a part of chapter 39 of the edition of P. L. Vaidya (*Gaṇḍavyūha Sūtra*, pp. 240-242) and contains an instruction and a praise in verses spoken by a goddess of the night for the son of a merchant, named Sudhana, who had just reached odhisattvahood. Parts of the Khotanese version of the *Bhadracaryādeśanā* in the chapter *Samantabhadracaryāpraṇidhāna* of the *Gaṇḍavyūha* have been published in transliteration by H. W. Bailey (*Khotanese Texts* I, pp. 222-230). The text consists of fifteen folios with gāthās of the Bodhisattva Samantabhadra.

Another smaller sūtra within the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* is the *Daśabhūmika* which deals with the ten stages of a odhisattva. Only three folios of it have been identified by Mrs. E. Lüders (*Sanskrithandschriften* 1, Kat. Nr. 414). The text contains the prose part referring to the first stage. From the Mahāyānistic *Mahāparinirvīṇa Sūtra*, of which one folio of a Sanskrit text was edited by F. W. Thomas (R. Hoernle, *Manuscript Remains*, pp. 93-97) has also now come out. It contains a dialogue between the Buddha and Kāśyapa about the pervasion of the world by the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* and other Mahāyāna sūtras. Another dialogue about the four kinds of actions is handed down in a Sogdian translation of the text (F.W. K. Müller/W. Lentz, *Soghdische Texte* II, pp. 550-555). Two leaves in Tibetan language have been published by A. H. Francke (*Weitere tibetische Handschriftenfunde*).

From the 'great collection', the *Mahāsaṃnipāta*, some Sanskrit fragments have been published by F. W. Thomas (R. Hoernle, *Manuscript Remains*, pp. 100–108). They belong to the second chapter 'Pūrva' of the *Ratnadhvaja*, dealing with the Candragarbha. In the folio containing the chapter 'Pūrva' the beginning is given of a sermon delivered by the Tathāgata Jyotisūryagandhāvabhāśrī to King Utpalavaktra, in which the three vehicles and the law are explained. The folio containing the Candragarbha is a part of a sermon describing how the rain of Māra, evil one, is falling down on the settlements of the Asuras.

To the most famous sūtras of Mahāyāna Buddhism belongs the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, the Lotus of the Good Law. H Bechert has recently published an article on a Sanskrit manuscript, single folios of which were bought in Central Asia by members of the expeditions from five different nations (*Über die "Marburger" Fragmente des Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*). The whole manuscript originally belonged to one finding place on the Southern Route which could not be indicated. The larger part of this calligraphic Central Asian *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* manuscript is in the collection in the USSR which has not yet been made accessible. Its facsimile edition will be published by Lokesh Chandra in the Śatapiṭaka Series. Other fragments of Central Asian texts of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* have been edited in Japan. The fragments analysed and edited by H. Bechert contain the *Devadattaparivarta*, in the Nepalese-Kashmir recension of a part of the *Stūpasaṃdarśanaparivarta*. In an elaborate introduction Bechert discusses the different versions from the historical point of view. Another Sanskrit folio of the same text was published by E. Waldschmidt (*Sanskrithandschriften* I, Kat Nr. 622). It contains a small part of the sixth chapter, the prophecy of Subhūti's Buddhahood. Apart from these Sanskrit manuscripts, fragments in Uigur language were edited by F. W. K. Müller (*Uigurica* II) from the 24th chapter containing the thirty three appearances of the Avalokiteśvara. A transcription and translation of the same chapter was published from folios of the collection Petrovskij by Radloff (*Kuan-ši-im Pusar*). The manuscript only consists of the *Avalokiteśvara Sūtra* and does not belong to a complete *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* manuscript. As Radloff has noted, it agrees with the 25th chapter of a Chinese version and was not translated from a Sanskrit source. Last, but not least, one has to mention a Tibetan manuscript of the Swedish collection found near Chotan which contains one third of the whole *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* (N. Simonsson, *Indo-Tibetische Studien* I).

Still more popular than the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, which is considered by Winternitz (*Geschichte der indischen Literatur*, II, p. 230) as the most important Mahāyāna sūtra measured by its literary value, was the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa* or *Suvarṇabhāsottama Sūtra* which has been translated into not less than seven languages: Tibetan, Chinese, Khotanese, Uigur, Sogdian, Mongolian, and Hsi-hsia. How these translations are interconnected, i.e., who translated from whom, is discussed by R. E. Emmerick in the introduction to the translation of the Khotanese version (*The Sūtra of the Golden Light*). One Tibetan, the Sogdian, the Uigur, and the Hsi-hsia texts are based on the version of I-tsing who had translated the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa* into Chinese in 635–713. The Mongolian version depends on the Uigur one, of which F. W. K. Müller (*Uigurica* I) had given a first account. Two other Tibetan versions are based on Sanskrit sources. Also the Khotanese version tends more towards the Sanskrit, but there are variations which may be explained by the free adaptions of the texts, usual among the Khotanese translators. The Khotanese text was published by H. W. Bailey (*Khotanese Texts* I). From the Sanskrit manuscripts found in Turkistan only little has been preserved which was published by F. W. Thomas (R. Hoernle, *Manuscript Remains*, pp. 108–116). A Sogdian fragment was edited by F. W. K. Müller and W. Lentz (*Soghdische Texte* II, pp. 539–544).

All the Mahāyāna sūtras are to a certain degree compilations of various texts. Although the main subject of the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa* is the doctrine of

emptiness (*śūnyatā*), it includes, besides miraculous stories about bodhisattvas and goddesses, quite a number of dhāraṇīs and mantras which show a tendency towards Tantrism. Also *deśanās*, confessions of sins, are involved in the text. Two of them are published: A Sanskrit text and Uigur text, both written on folded booklets which had been found by the German expeditions in the oasis of Turfan. It seems reasonable to draw the conclusion that both the texts had been written by Turcs. The texts were published in "Sanskrithandschriften 1" (Kat. Nr. 575) and by F. W. K. Müller (*Uigurische Studien*). Two smaller Tibetan fragments may belong to the same variety (A. H. Francke, *Weitere tibetische Handschriftenfunde*).

There is a long quotation from the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* (II, 599-913) within an unidentified text in Sogdian language (E. Benveniste, *Textes Sogdiens*, pp. 4-58), which deals with the prohibition of consuming wine and other alcohol. Other fragments from this larger Mahāyāna sūtra have not yet been identified.

Fragments from the *Bhadrakalpika Sūtra* have been preserved in lists of the *Thousand names of the Buddha*. Sanskrit fragments of this list from the *Bhadrakalpika* are published in "Sanskrithandschriften 3" (Kat. Nr. 840, 840 a). E Waldschmidt gives there a general review about parallel versions, among them the Khotanese lists published by H. W. Bailey (*Khotanese Buddhist Texts*). He also mentions a polyglot in five languages (Sanskrit, Chinese, Tibetan, Mongolian, and Mandshurian) edited by F. Weller (*Tausend Buddhanamen*). The two fragmentary Sanskrit manuscripts have been found in Kučā, where Mahāyāna literature is rather rare, so that one may suggest that such enumerations were used for the cult, and that they were by this function not so much regarded as parts of a sūtra.

Another famous sūtra within the *Bhadrakalpika* is the *Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka*, the Lotus of Compassion. One fragment of it found at Šorčuq is published in "Sanskrithandschriften 3" (Kat. Nr. 976). It contains a small part of the fourth chapter, the *Bodhisattvavyākaraṇa*. Another part of this sūtra, which has not yet been edited, seems to be preserved among the Sogdian manuscripts of Berlin (O. Hansen, *Die Buddhistische Literatur der Sogdier*, *Handbuch der Orientalistik*).

The *Śūraṅgamasamādhi Sūtra*, the sūtra about the concentration on the path of a hero, was highly esteemed by the Sakians. One smaller Sanskrit fragment was published in the "Manuscript Remains" (pp. 125-131) by F. W. Thomas. It contains the final part of the sūtra followed by a dhāraṇī. The fragment was found in Chotan and is written in the calligraphic type of Brāhmī used on the Southern Route. A complete Khotanese version of the sūtra was published and translated by R. E. Emmerick (*The Khotanese Śūraṅgamasamādhisūtra*). The editor has written in his introduction that the work is not a word for word translation from the Chinese but a free version, as are most of the Khotanese texts. It includes parts of a commentary and is shortened or extended according to the taste of the translator. Emmerick dates the text nearly into the seventh century A.C. Fragments and almost complete manuscripts of other important Mahāyāna sūtras, as the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra* — the sūtra of the instruction of Vimala — and the "*Sūtra of Causes and Effects of Actions*" are not preserved in Sanskrit. They are published from Sogdian manuscripts which had been translated from Chinese sources (H. Reichelt, *Die soghdischen Handschriftenreste* I; D. R. Mackenzie, *The "Sūtra of Causes and Effects of Actions" in Sodian*). The same holds good with the *Säkiz yükmäk*, a Mahāyāna sūtra published by W. Bang and A. von Gabain (*Türkische Turfantexte* VI) from a large scroll in the British collection. This sūtra had been translated into Chinese, Tibetan and Mongolian languages, besides the Uigur version. The editors of the Uigur text mention that the Tibetan version does not agree with the others. The title of the sūtra may be translated from the Mongolian colophon as 'Noble sūtra of the eightfold splendour of the heaven', while the meaning of the Uigur title is not clear

Most of the Mahāyāna manuscripts published so far have been found at places of the Southern Route. On the Northern Silk Route only the easternmost places seem to have been touched by Mahāyāna Buddhism.

14. Apocryphal Sūtras or Compilations

Buddhist texts are in most cases compilations grown by oral tradition and written down at a later date. Apart from the more or less canonized compilations, there exist other works which were compiled comparatively late, and which did not enter the canon. If one has to deal with fragments, it is often difficult to decide to which compilation the fragment originally belonged. Only in some cases a large portion of the text has been preserved and colophons give the title. One of these compilations is the "*Book of Zambasta*", recently edited by R. E. Emmerick. The largest part of this voluminous manuscript — most of the folios belonging

to the collection Petrovskij in Leningrad — had been published first by E. Leumann in 1933-36 (*Das nordarische (sakische) Lehrgedicht*). The text contains besides many legends the discussion of the main terms of Mahāyāna Buddhism, as *avidyā*, *dharmakāya*, *śraddhā*, *śūnyatā* etc. But also other works are incorporated, as the chapter twenty-three of one *Mahāparinirvāṇa Śāstra* and a version of the *Maitreyasamiti* (§ 13).

Another late compilation (cir. 9-10 century A.C.) is the *Jin'gangjing* of which an Uigur version was recently published (G. Hazai P. Zieme, *Fragmente der uigurischen Version des "Jin'gangjing"*). According to the introduction of the editors and the comment of Inokuchi, the text agrees with the Chinese version published in the volume 85 of the Taishō Tripiṭaka. The *Chin-kang-pan-jo-po-lo-mi-ching* in the translation of Kumārajīva is a widely spread Chinese text of Mahāyāna Buddhism. It consists of thirty two chapters of the *Vajracchedikā Sūtra* (§ 13) to which are added forty-nine gāthās of the master Fu of the Liang dynasty, who is said to be nobody other than the bodhisattva Maitreya. Five other gāthās are ascribed to an unknown saint. The gāthās are typically Mahāyānist, most of them are dhāraṇīs, nāmāvalīs etc.

The two works included in this paragraph belong to the later Mahāyāna literature, and especially the *Jin'gangjing* shows aspects, particularly in its dhāraṇīs, which were fully developed in Tentrism.

15. Dhāraṇīs and other Magical Texts

This type of literature is closely related to the popular cult and was therefore highly stimulated by Mahāyānism and especially developed in Tantrism. Nevertheless, we have also quite a number of Hīnayānistic dhāraṇīs, rakṣās (magic for protection), mantras, etc. They are often enclosed in sūtras, and it seems that sūtras with magical character have enjoyed much popularity also in the Hīnayāna schools of Central Asia (§ 7). The best examples are the early *Āṭānāṭika Sūtra* and the *Mahāsamāja Sūtra* which consist to a high degree of charms, invocations, and mantras. Manuscripts containing dhāraṇīs, etc. are, in contrast to compilations, like Mahāyāna sūtras (§ 13), equally spread all over the finding places of the Tarim Basin, some of them already in quite early times. Because of the fragmentary character of the manuscripts, it is often not possible to decide whether a dhāraṇī etc. had originally belonged to a sūtra text or if it was used separately, perhaps as an amulet or for similar protective functions. One of the widest spread dhāraṇīs is the *Mahāmāyūrīvidyā-rājinī* which belongs to the *Pañcarakṣā Sūtra*, the fivefold protection. With the help of the edition of the text by S. von Oldenburg (§ 2e), three fragmentary manuscripts of the German collection preserved in fragments from Kučā and Šorčuq could be identified (*Sanskrithandschriften* 1, Kat. Nr. 63, 375, 524). Another part of the same text is the *Mahāsahasra-pramardinī*, of which two later fragmentary Sanskrit manuscripts have been found at Šorčuq (*Sanskrit-handschriften* 3, Kat. Nr. 983, 1011). The text is meant for protection of foetuses and children. From the more prominent dhāraṇīs the *Aparimitāyuḥ Sūtra* in a Khotanese version published by St. Konow (R. Hoernle, *Manuscript Remains*, pp. 289-329) should be mentioned. It is summing up of merits of which the writing down of the immeasurable *Aparimitāyuḥ Sūtra* is the supreme. As M. Walleser (*Aparimitāyur-jñāna-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtram*) has made plausible, the so called sūtra is a dhāraṇī. Most of these invocations and protections consist of 108 syllables corresponding with the pearls of the Buddhist rosary. Of similar character is the *Bhaiṣajyaguru-vaiḍūryaprabhā-tathāgata Sūtra* of which exists a Sogdian text. Other magical literature is preserved in Sogdian, Uigur, and Khotanese translations : the *Nīlakaṇṭha*-, the *Padmacintāmaṇi*-, the *Sumukha*-, *Anantamukha*-, and the *Jñānolkā-dhāraṇī*. But there are also other magical texts of a different character, e.g., a dhāraṇī in which supernatural qualities of stones are invoked, which are to be used for the building of a magical house (O. Hansen, *Die buddhistischer Literatur der Sogdier. Handbuch der Orientalistik*).

16. Buddhastotras

Hymns of praise for the Buddha are less closely connected with early Buddhism than with a later period in which the worship of the Buddha, as a supernatural being had come to be fully developed. They are often composed or recited for the sake of increasing one's own merit. *Buddhastotras* are rare in the Pali literature, but in Sanskrit Buddhism they were highly esteemed. The simplest form of a *Buddhastotra* is the enumeration of names of the Buddha, similar to the *nāmāvalī* in the *Bhadrakalpika Sūtra* (§ 13). But the more elaborate stotras deal with topics as such connected with jātaka stories. The Khotanese *Jātakastava*, edited by M. J. Dresden (§ 8) is a good example for this category. A Sanskrit work of the same title composed by Jñānayaśas is not identical with it, although both texts deal with the same subjects. The edition of the last mentioned text was done by D.R. Shackleton Bailey from a Sanskrit text with a Tibetan

interlinear version in the *Derge Tanjur* (*The Jātakastava of Jñānayaśas*). The difference in style between the two works may be demonstrated by the translations of the jātaka of the elephant Six-tusk. The Sanskrit version translated by Bailey runs as follows : "Because when you were the elephant with the six tusks, splendid as a white, tall, massive cloude-pile, you gratified your enemy of the far drawn bow with your tusks, red with the many drops of blood outpoured as they were wrenched from their sockets..." The Khotanese version runs over four verses, from which only two, the first and the last one, shall be sufficient for our purpose. "Six tusks, white like conch shells, or milk, or a string of pearls, or snow, surpassing the splendour of the autumnal moon, you who, as the lord of elephants, had a beautiful appearance ... At all the times you shall be my best teacher, you shall be my refuge, you shall be my salvation. " etc. From this comparison it appears clearly that the praise of the Buddha is, in both examples, the aim of the authors, and the jātaka is simply the vehicle.

This is also the tenor of the *Buddhastotras* published by D. Schlingloff from Sanskrit manuscripts found by the German expeditions in Turkistan (*Buddhistische Stotras*). The manuscripts contain as many of the Central Asian Sanskrit manuscripts, collections of different poetical texts of which the *Buddhastotras* are only one part. The *Munayastava*, the praise of the Munis, the *Rāhulastava*, the praise of Rāhula, the *Saṅghastotrastava*, the praise of the praisworthy congregation, and the *Udgatāstotra*, a praise in the metre Udgatā are, from the literary point of view, the most valuable among them. Compared with the mass of manuscripts of the very popular hymns of Mātṛceṭa (§17), these *stotras* are poorly represented. Some verses of the *Saṅghastotrastava* in the edition of Schlingloff could only be completed by E. Pauly (*JAs.* 1957, p. 297 ff.) with the help of Sanskrit manuscripts of the French collection. As Schlingloff has remarked, the manuscripts of the *Munayastava* are found at Qizil (Kučā) and Šorčuq (Qarašähr), while the Mahāyānic *Rāhulastava* has only been found in manuscripts of Šorčuq. That agrees with the observations made so far concerning the relation between finding places and literature. It was the oasis of Kučā in which the present Hīnayāna tradition has been preserved *Buddhastotras* belong to one of the most favoured literary forms of the Tokharian tongue. A bilingual fragment of the *Munayastava* (Tokharian-Sanskrit) has already been used by Schlingloff for his edition (op. cit. p. 79). The bulk of Tokharian manuscripts have been written in dialect B (*Toch. Sprachreste* B. Nr. 203-251). For the *stotra* Nr. 241 the authors Sieg and Siegling note that it was meant for purification from the sins of the tongue, but on the whole little has been identified or commented on. Also among the group epigrammatic poetry ("*Spruch-poesie*") there may be one or the other fragment of *stotras* as the identified bilingual fragment (Nr. 311) of the *Munayastava* shows. *Stotras* are not only preserved in dialect B but also in A (E. Sieg/ W Siegling, *Toch. Sprach-reste*). Under the headline 'Invocations and Praises of the Buddha' transcriptions of such texts are given in Nr. 243-250.

17. Mātṛceṭa's Hymns

The most famous among the *Buddhastotras* are those of Mātṛceṭa, of whom it is told that he belonged to the literary school of Aśvaghoṣa, and that he perhaps lived during the reign of Kaniṣka II (2nd century A.C.). The two main works ascribed to him are the *Śatapañcāśataka*, the hymns of one hundred and fifty verses, also known under the title *Prasāda-pratibhodbhava*, and the *Catuḥśataka* (= *Varṇārhavarṇa-stotra*), the hymn of four hundred verses. Many manuscripts of these hymns have been identified among the Sanskrit manuscripts of the German collection (*Sanskrithandschriften* 1). They appear nearly as frequently as the *Udānavarga* manuscripts, and they are mainly represented among the manuscripts found in Kučā and Qarašähr. This distribution agrees completely with that of the *Udānavarga* manuscripts and because of the relative high number of manuscripts preserved of these two great poetical collections, one may say that these two works were most popular with the inhabitants of the north-western oases. This is also supported by the manuscripts published by R. Hoernle (*Manuscript Remains*, pp. 58-84) which have been found at Chora, near Qarašähr, and by another one published by S. Lévi (*Textes Sanscrits de Touen-Houang*) which, although found at Tunhuang, is written in one of the two types of the 'Brāhmī of Northern Turkistan'. Apart from Tibetan and Chinese translations of parts of the work of Mātṛceṭa, one fragment of bilingual Sanskrit-Tokharian B text has been identified (E Sieg/W. Siegling, *Toch. Sprachreste* B. Nr. 251). The fragment was found at Šorčuq and contains verses 82-91 of Mātṛceṭa's *Adhyardhaśatataka*. It is likely that there are still more fragments of Mātṛceṭa hymns among the Tokharian fragments published under the titles "Buddhastotras" and "Spruchpoesie". On the contrary, Uigur, Sogdian, or Khotanese texts of Mātṛceṭa hymns have not yet been identified. It may be due to the special difficulties which arise for a translator, who wants to

translate verses into another language, that so few of the hymns have been translated. Thus, the Sanskrit material is our main source. Although an edition of the German Sanskrit manuscripts was planned quite early, as already mentioned by M. Winternitz (*Geschichte der indischen Literatur* II, p. 212), it was not completed due to the two world wars. After the second war, the editions of D. R. Shackleton Bailey (*The Śatapañcaśataka* and *The Varṇārhavarṇa Stotra*) made a separate publication superfluous. A facsimile edition of D. Schlingloff (*Die Buddhastotras des Mātṛceṭa*) offers the opportunity to compare the variations between the editions and the readings of the manuscripts found in Central Asia by the German expeditions.

18. Dramas, Epics, Narrative Literature and Poems

In addition to the hymns of Mātṛceṭa also other works on Buddhist topics composed in a poetical style have been handed down in the literature of Central Asia.

Among the Sanskrit manuscripts there are fragments of works of Aśvaghoṣa, the famous poet of the Sarvāstivāda school, which have been already partly mentioned in § 4. Besides the dramas, one of which was identified by Lüders as the *Śāriputraprakaraṇa* (*Sanskrithandschriften* 1, Kat. Nr. 57), there are fragments of the *Buddhacarita* and the *Saundarananda kāvya*, both of them published by F. Weller (*Zwei zentralasiatische Fragmente des Buddhacarita*; *Ein zentralasiatisches Fragment des Saundarananda kāvya*).

A Tokharian version of the story of *Nanda and Sundarī* in a mixed prose and verse style was published by E. Sieg and W. Siegling (*Toch. Sprachreste* Nr. 89-143). Some remarks about this typical Tokharian style of semi-dramatic works characterized by the insertion of long epical passages have already been made in § 13. Although different from the Sanskrit original of Aśvaghoṣa, the fragments show a close relation to the chapters five (*bhāryāvilāpa*) and six (*nandavilāpa*) of the Sanskrit version (E. H. Johnston, *The Saundarananda of Aśvaghoṣa*).

Besides these works, the *Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā*, already mentioned in § 4, is of great importance. Closely connected with this collection of Buddhist stories in style and in the way of handling the legends is the *Jātakamālā* of Āryasūra (F. Weller, *Fragmente der Jātakamālā*). Fragments of two Sanskrit manuscripts have been found at Toyoq and Murtuq (Turfan oasis) by the German expeditions. It is perhaps not accidental that the fragmentary manuscript found at Toyoq contains parts of the *Varṇārhavarṇa* of Mātṛceṭa (§ 17), of the *Jātakamālā*, and of the *Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā* (*Sanskrithandschriften*, 1, Kat. Nr. 638). All these works are ascribed to poets belonging to the school of Aśvaghoṣa and may have been comprised through this link in one manual. The Central Asian fragments of the *Jātakamālā* show many variant readings compared with the Sanskrit text edited by H Kern (*The Jātakamālā*).

Apart from these works of more or less well known authors, there are quite a number of Sanskrit moral poems which differ much in quality. One example has already been given in § 4. Another one may be of some interest (*Sanskrithandschriften* 3, Kat. Nr. 837) because of its contents and the way how it was composed by the unknown author. Different topics of Buddhism are offered as a program with the word '*vakṣyāmi*' (I shall speak about ....). E. Waldschmidt has pointed to an interesting polemic against other philosophical views (a, *vv.* 10 and 11) in connection with the exemplification of deeds and their results:

n = āyam = Īśvarasaṃbhūto
vipāko n — āpy = ahetukaḥ
na ca prakṛtisaṃbhūto
na kālapariṇāmitaḥ 10
ahetur = Īśvaraś = c = aiva
kālaś = ca prakṛtis — tathā
hīnamaddhyaviśiṣṭānām =
pha — — — ◡ — ◡ — 11

Translations of poetical works into languages other than the Tokharian one are rare. The poetry of the Uigurs seems to have been more influenced by works of Manichaean creed than by those of the Buddhists (A. von Ga ain, *Zentralasiatische turkische Literaturen. Handbuch der Orientalistik*, pp. 211-213). From the Chinese point of view the *Biography of Hsüan-tsang* is written in a prose which is in conformity with the rules of art, therefore, one may include this work in this category.

Some leaves of the fifth chapter of it were published from an Uigur translation by A. von Gabain (*Die uigurische Übersetzung der Biographie des Hüen-tsangs*). The editor characterizes the text as a precise but not word for word translation.

19. Scientific Literature

Not directly belonging to the Buddhist literature, but closely connected with the daily life in the monasteries and also outside of them, is the scientific literature often imported from India.

19a. *Medical Texts*

Medical treatises, which are handed down in all languages spoken in the Tarim Basin, are frequent among the Central Asian manuscripts. These treatises are not medical books in the modern sense of the word ; but magic and medicine were closely related in ancient times. It cannot be doubted that medical texts were brought very early to Turkistan. There are two leaves of a Kuṣāna manuscript (*Sanskrit-handschriften* 1, Kat. Nr. 16), and some more manuscripts of a somewhat later date in the German collection of Sanskrit manuscripts. The most famous medical text found in Central Asia is a birch-bark manuscript collected by lieutenant Bower, which was edited and translated by R. Hoernle in 1893 (*The Bower Manuscript*). The contents of the three medical texts comprising this manual deal with the origin and use of garlic, and prescriptions for different diseases. The largest of the texts has the title "Nāvanītaka "(The Cream), an extract from different famous medical treatises, among them the *Bheḍasaṃhitā*. Fragments of the compilation of Bheḍa were identified and published by H. Lüders (*Medizinische Sanskrittexte aus Turkestan*). One folio of them contains the end of the chapter about epilepsy.

More or less fragmentary manuscripts of medical books have not only been preserved in Sanskrit, but also in Tokharian, Sogdian, Uigur and Khotanese language. It is due to the work of J. Filliozat that most of the Tokharian medical texts of the French and the British collections are published (*Fragments des Textes Kouchéens de Médicine et de Magie*). Among these texts is a bilingual Sanskrit-Tokharian fragment of the *Yogaśataka* ascribed to Nāgārjuna or Vararuci. Two folios of an Uigur text, transcribed and translated by G. R. Rahmeti (*Zur Heilkunde der Uiguren* II, Nr. 2), seem to be related to this work. Also another one of the Uigur fragments published by Rahmeti had been identified by H. W. Bailey. It agrees with an appendix to a Sanskrit version of the *Siddhasāra* of Ravigupta. Parts of the Sanskrit version are also published in Bailey's edition of the Khotanese text (*Khotanese Texts* I, pp. 2–134). Whereas the Uigur text seems to have been translated from the Sanskrit version, the Khotanese was rendered from a Tibetan text which appears clearly from the synoptical edition of Bailey.

The so called *Jīvakapustaka*, a collection of medical prescriptions in a Sanskrit-Khotanese bilingual text, is also published by H. W. Bailey in his above mentioned work. Most of the medical texts are not yet identified. Two medical treatises are mentioned by O. Hansen in "Die buddhistische Literatur der Sogdier" (*Handbuch der Orientalistick*). Many of them contain prescriptions for all sorts of things, as e.g. a well preserved Sanskrit poem (*Sanskrithandschriften* 3, Kat. Nr. 828) in which the power of a special drink is described.

19b. *Grammar*

Apart from syllabaric exercises in different languages, some fragments of important works on Sanskrit grammar have been found in Central Asia. The grammar *Kātantra* was spread all over the northern parts of the Tarim Basin. Fragments of it have been published by E. Sieg and H. Lüders (E. Sieg, *Bruchstücke einer Sanskrit-Grammatik aus Sängim Agiz, Chinesisch-Turkistan* ; H. Lüders, *Kātantra und Kaumāralāta*). The recension of the manuscripts found in Turkistan differs not only in many details from the text of Durgasiṃha (*The Kātantra with the commentary of Durgasiṃha*, by J. Eggeling), but also in regard to larger portions. Therein is found, e.g., special sūtras for the rules about *bhagos* and *aghos* which are missing in Durgasiṃha's recension.

Pieces of a grammar called in the colophons *Kaumāralāta* are preserved among the early Sanskrit manuscripts. Lüders presumes in his article (op.cit.) that the *Kaumāralāta* was composed by the same author who had written the *Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā* (§ 4), and that it was written with the purpose of enhancing the value of Buddhist Sanskrit. The script of the palm leaf manuscripts, in which the main texts of the *Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā* and that of the *Kaumāralāta* are written, is nearly the same and belongs to the fourth century A. C. (L. Tander, *Palāographisches*, pp. 105 f., 131–136). Lüders says about the relation between the *Kātantra* and the *Kaumāralāta* (op.cit. p. 533) : "It is possible that the author of *Kaumāralāta* enlarged a primary book, like the *Kātantra*, to a complete Buddhist grammar and by the way created a new terminology following the model of Pāṇini. But it may also be that the *Kātantra* is an extract of the *Kaumāralāta* omitting the too much specialized rules, particularly those which refer to the language of the Buddhist canon, and by simplifying the technical language."

A piece of Pāṇini's grammar could also be identified among the Sanskrit manuscripts of the German collection, but it is not yet published.

All these examples show that Sanskrit grammar was much valued by the inhabitants of the monasteries on the Northern Silk Route, and also that the Brahmanical culture influenced Buddhism

in Central Asia. This influence is not only indicated by medical and grammar texts but also by texts on metrics, as the *Chandoviciti* (§ 4), and astrological works, some of which have been published from the Uigur language by G. R. Rahmeti (*Türkische Turfantexte* VII).

20. Conclusion

The historical aspect of the development of Buddhist literature is only scarcely reflected by the literature itself. Nevertheless, the manuscripts published enable us to draw some general lines from the beginnings of Central Asian Buddhist literature upto the end of it. Only scarce remains of Dharmaguptaka manuscripts have been published (§ 4) from Central Asian finds. More important was the Sarvāstivāda-Mūlasarvāstivāda movement which started about the first to the second century A. C. from places in Afghanistan and Kashmir. This missionary movement was directed to the oasis of Kučā and Qarašāhr, that means to the northwestern part of Central Asia, which was inhabited by the so-called Tokharians. Most of the imported early palm leaf manuscripts contain either poems or philosophical literature in a broader sense (§§ 4, -12), but not Vinaya or Hīnayāna sūtra texts The attempt to explain this remarkable fact will remain highly hypothetical. Perhaps the missionaries, while knowing the Sūtra and Vinaya texts by heart, carried only manuscripts with them that contained more complicated works, as Abhidharma, or less well-known ones, as devotional lyrics. The Tokharians adapted the Buddhist culture and with it the Indian Brāhmī script which they altered according to the necessities of their own langauge. They translated Buddhist texts, but also applied themselves to Sanskrit tradition by copying many of the Buddhist Sanskrit works, a fact that can be recognized by the use of the same Brāhmī script for both, Sanskrit and Tokharian manuscripts. W. Couvreur had already shown in his article on Tokharian literature (*Tochaars overzicht*) that the literature preserved in the two Tokharian dialects A and B differs much. More texts related to the monastic life, as *Prātimokṣa* and *Karmavīcanā*, have been translated into the dialect B while Avadāna and Jātaka texts prevail in A.

On the other hand, the Uigurs, who founded their kingdom at about 850 A. C., had been influenced by the Tokharian Buddhist culture which is again best demonstrated by the Brāhmī script surely adapted from the Tokharians. It seems to be probable that the cultural influence of Qarašāhr on the Buddhists among the Uigurs was more intensive than that of Kučā. Many Turkish Buddhist manuscripts contain Avadānas, and the famous *Maitrisimit* was translated from a Tokharian version, written in Agnideśa (Qarašāhr), whereas Vinaya texts, often found in Kučā, have not yet been identified among the Turkish manuscripts. The absence of Vinaya texts in Uigur translations may also have other reasons (§ 5a), one of which may be the prevalence of Mahāyāna. Nearly all the Turkish Sūtra texts belong to the Mahāyāna and they are often translated from Chinese sources. That indicates another important stream of influence on the Buddhist literature of Central Asia, the Chinese one. From circa the sixth century onwards the inter-relation between the different nations of the Buddhist faith within the Tarim Basin and with China seems to have become intensive. In many of the colophons preserved in Uigur, Sogdian and Sakian manuscripts, it is mentioned that the text had been translated from a Chinese source, and if it is not directly mentioned, it could often be proved by scholars that Chinese versions had been the base of the translations. Side by side with the activity of translating texts into the different languages the Sanskrit tradition was highly esteemed. Buddhist Sanskrit texts have been copied by Tokharians, Turcs, and Sakians as recognizable from the different types of Brāhmī script used by them. With the help of the Sanskrit manuscripts one can see that Mahāyānism prevailed on the Southern Route. It perhaps spread from there to the north-eastern region of the Tarim Basin. The Tibetan influence seems to have been of late origin, and inspite of their several invasions which even came upon Kučā, their influence on the Buddhist literature in Central Asia was of little importance. It seems to have been limited to the Khotanese and Turfan region.

LORE SANDER

BUDDHIST ART OF CENTRAL ASIA

Central Asia is a vast area comprising cultural and ethnic units of diverse nature, but superficially linked by a geographical set up that provided a bridge for the free passage of cultural activities among each other of these ethnic groups and also with the world outside. It was *terra-incognito* until the explorers from the West (Europe), mostly archaeologists, brought to light a chain of sites buried in the desert sand, that once flourished in the kingdoms and principalities that had espoused the cause of Buddhist cultural activities.

In the ancient world the entire region was an active stage for the passage of East-West trade through the great land mass, hence it comprised

the major part of the so-called great Northern Highway of ancient Indian literary works, the eponymous ' Uttarāpatha '.

Research scholars who first discovered vast tracts of sand-buried cultural centres in the region to the east beyond Kabul (in Afghanistan) believed that the Central Asian cultural field was the extension of the Gandhara Kingdom towards the Sinkiang or Chinese Turkistan, north of the Tibetan plateau. With this belief the pioneers in the field of art and archaeological research in Central Asia fixed their own boundaries in delimiting the Central Asian theatre for the specific purpose of studying its cultural history.

According to the early delimitations the region was within the confines of the Tien-Shan mountain range in the west and the western fringe of the Gobi and the Chinese Empire in the east. Most of the earlier scholars, for example, Sir Aurel Stein, Albert von Le Coq, Albert Grünwedel Paul Pelliot, Ernst Waldsch midt, all framed the results of their cultural researches within this geographical ensemble.

Benjamin Rowland writing as late as 1955 seems to be still following the same geographical limit when, he declares —" By Central Asia we mean the territory extending to the north and east of the Hindu Kush and Pamir mountain ranges eastward to the Gobi Desert " (*The Art and Architecture of India*, Pelican History of Art, 1956, p. 104). Thus, it could be seen that only this particular region received attention as Central Asia by both the scholar and the research student, until fresh ground was opened by the Russian archaeologists a few decades ago whose researches have opened wide vistas for the study of Buddhist art in Central Asia.

For the student of Buddhist art the finds of the Russian archaeologists are of immense value. The Russian explorations have *en passant* extended the western limit of the Central Asian field of Buddhist art further towards the Caspian Sea.

Thus the newest analysis would give the boundaries of Central Asian field of Buddhist art as follows: In the west the Caspian littoral, in the east the Gobi and the western boundary of the Chinese main-land, and the mountainous borders of the Tibetan plateau in the south and the southern limits of the Siberian Taiga in the north. A major part of this vast terrain is covered with semi-desertic steppe lands today, but scientists believe that there was a time in the historic period when these regions experienced a milder climate and the land turned out to be more fertile (*EWA*. Vol. I, p. 185).

It is believed that the earliest references to the cultural achievements of this part of the world are found in Chinese records and notices of some west Asiatic travellers quoted by Ptolemy and others. But the reference to *Uttarāpatha* in Buddhist literature and its environs, substantiated with documentary evidence from Buddhist art proves that the region was known to the Buddhist scholars too from the earliest times. Although no serious attempt has been made by any scholar to define and investigate the exact location of the *Uttarāpatha* it could be found in the references that follow in this article, that precise definition could be made of the location of *Uttarāpatha* the great northern highway that linked with the Silk Route from China.

It was along the arteries of this great trade route (*Uttarāpatha*) that several Buddhist kingdoms sprang up at the isolated oases and river basins of the desertic land mass that separated and at the same time linked the Indian and Mongoloid cultures of the ancient orient, and spanned the trade and cultural communication between the east European countries and the Far-East.

It was this great inland trade route that paved the way for the missionary activities of the itinerant Buddhist monks from China, Central Asia and South Asia and also helped in communicating Buddhist culture throughout this vast region. Thus, it could be found that this particular region experienced a two-way traffic of Buddhist cultural activities between the Chinese Empire in the east and the oriental kingdoms in India and South Asia. Hence it also served as a filtering zone for cultural endeavours.

In the historical period when the northern nomadic tribes found for themselves a more settled home in the fertile oases of the Central Asian basin, the Gandhara Empire under the Kushanas had extended its sway towards this region and its culture infiltrated to those pockets of settled life in Central Asia.

The earliest finds in this region do not reflect Persian, Babylonian or Assyrian influences, which were the once powerful and predominant nations in the western frontier of Central Asia. Hence it could be safely surmised that a developed culture that possesses artistic merit could be traced to the period of the introduction of Buddhist civilization from the Gandhara empire. While Gandhara art traditions had the most predominant influence, it is also true that Central Asian art gained inspiration from the West-Asiatic, the Indian and the Chinese cultures. The art of Central Asia breathed with full vigour for several centuries, up to about the 8th century A. C., when the iconoclast Muslim hordes

struck terror to almost all the cultural centres in Central Asia. However, bright sparks were not entirely absent in between, when the Mongols and their descendants, the Turks (the Turuksa kings in Indian literature), had temporary control over these regions up to about the 12th century A.C. The Uighur empire that sprang up at Khocho (in the Turfan oasis) too provided a temporary patronage for Buddhist art when the Muslim hordes were despoiling other Central Asian sites.

In the present study of Buddhist art of this vast cultural complex it is proposed to give a bi-partite treatment for the sake of convenience of the reader. The first part would be the Soviet Central Asia starting from the Margiana country (present Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) and continuing eastwards through northern Afghanistan up to Fergana (in the west of the Tien-shan range). The second part would be roughly the Chinese Turkistan or Sinkiang region which covers mostly the northern and southern part of the Tarim basin.

This bi-partite division of the Central Asian theatre could be called, roughly, the centres around the basin of the two rivers Oxus (Amu-darya) and Jaxartes (Syr-darya) and that of the river Tarim, respectively.

Most valuable historical data for the study of Buddhist art in Central Asia are available in the records kept by the Chinese itinerant monks who traversed these regions from the early centuries of the present era up to the Muslim conquests. Cultural activities sponsored by the Sino-Indian and Central Asian monks virtually came to an end with the abandonment of the old Silk Route since the Muslim conquests. Of all these traveller-monks it was Hsüan-tsang (q.v.) who preserved for posterity a most valuable record of the Buddhist sites of importance in Central Asia The itinerary of Hsüan-tsang indicates that he has covered the entire Central Asian region from South Russia to Tun-huang, which also approximates to the land mass taken for the present survey of Buddhist art in Central Asia.

The earlier traveller-monk Fa-hsien (q.v.) in the fifth century A. C. too has kept an equally important record of the Buddhist vihāras and monastic establishments of Central Asia. His description of a Buddhist temple in Khotan is an index to the great artistic achievements the Khotanese Buddhists had reached during the fifth century A. C. Fa-hsien says, inter-alia, " It is perhaps twenty *chang* (290 feet approximately) in height. It is adorned with carving and inlaid work, and covered with gold and silver. Above the roof all kinds of jewels combine to perfect it. Behind the tower there is a hall of Buddha, magnificent and very beautiful. The beams, pillars, doors, and window-frames are all gold-plated. Moreover, there are priests' apartments, also very splendid, and elegantly adorned beyond power of description." (S. Beal, *Chinese Accounts of India, Si-yu-ki*, Indian edition, Calcutta, 1957, Vol. I, p. 14). Fa-hsien, who began his journey through Central Asia from Tun-huang had taken the sea-route on his return journey.

In 518 A.C. Sung-Yun, another Chinese traveller monk, had begun his journey to India through Central Asia and kept an equally important record through which we could glean further information about the art traditions of these sand-buried kingdoms (S. Beal, op. cit. pp. 55-73 ff.).

Hsüan-tsang (A.C. 629-645) traversed the northern caravan route of the Tarim Basin on the outward journey via Karashor, Kucha, Kizil, Aksu and he had found almost all the sites east of the Tien-shan still flourishing with Buddhist culture whereas those lands west of the lake Issyk-kul up to Fergana-Takshent were desolate and inhabited only by a few nomadic tribes probably the aftermath of Muslim conquests of these regions (S. Beal, op. cit.pp. 87-97) It is noteworthy that Hsüan-tsang had not found any Buddhist site worthy of note in this particular track west of Tien-shan. The available data too are scanty in reference to Buddhist art of this particular area. But the dull picture depicted by Hsüan-tsang on Buddhist remains in the Oxus basin does not tally with the innumerable Buddhist edifices that have recently been unearthed there. This indicates that the devastations wrought in by the Arab invaders had already taken its toll in these regions north of Oxus (Amu-darya), when Hsüan-tsang arrived there in the 7th century A.C.

It is only the southern track beyond Balkh in Bactria that provides evidence for the existence of Buddhist art in the time of Hsüan-tsang.

The evidence revealed by the excavations carried out by the Russian archaeological missions, at the early Buddhist monastic sites in these south Russian steppe lands, prove too well that Buddhism had penetrated very close to the Capsian littoral, before its westward expansion was checked by the Arab armies operating from the Bagdad Caliphate. The Arabs gradually unleashed their inconoclastic devastative activities over the rich cultural fields of the Buddhists in the Oxus delta.

The narrative of Buddhist art traditions, in the 7th century during Hsüan-tsang's time, begins again through the south-ward track that starts from Bactria which was still under the Turkik monarchs. These sites of northern Afghanistan

on the south-western fringe of Central Asia had been fortunate enough to last for some more centuries to come, until the Muslim hordes from the Gazni Sultanate in and after the 12th century wrought in their final destruction.

The Buddhist sites in the Sinkiang (Chinese Turkistan) too had revived under the Uigur and Mongol empires, but since the 13th century the Muslim attacks had reached this part of Central Asia too and the edifices, spoilt and pillaged, were left to be buried in the desert sand until the nineteenth century explorers re-discovered them.

It has been mentioned above that the study of Buddhist art in Central Asia would be treated in a bi-partite division. The first part or the Western Sector is dealt with under the following headings: (1) Kara Tepe, (2) Merv, (3) Ayrtam, (4) Adzhina-Tepe (5) Kuva, (6) Ak-Beshim, (7) Krasnaya-Rechka in the Soviet Central Asia.

The Western Sector: Soviet Central Asia

Kara-Tepe

This is a site in the ancient Margiana not very far from the present town of Aksabad, in Turkmenistan. The Soviet archæologists have discovered here a Buddhist cave site, the ruins of which bear evidence of a monastic establishment. The finds at this remote centre, which could be justly called the furthermost point so far brought to light, where Buddhism had penetrated through the great northern trade route in the past, have stimulated the scholar and the research student. Earlier it was thought that Balkh (q.v.) was the western most point of the then known world where Buddhist culture had reached during the historic times. But the discovery of a ruined Buddhist monastic site here throws new light on the cultural expansion of Buddhism through which it could e seen how Buddhist culture has reached up to the very door of the Caspian littoral. Until further excavation and new research could prove the possibility of extending the western boundary of the expansion of Buddhism one could take Kara-Tepe in the Soviet Central Asia as the westernmost fringe of the Buddhist Central Asia (B.A. Litvinsky and T.I. Zeymal, *Adzhina Tepe*, Architecture, Painting and Sculpture, Moscow, 1971, p. 117).

A terracotta votive tablet discovered at this site represents the Buddha in Dhyāni-mudrā inside an arched niche (ibid. Pl. 83).

Merv

On the southern route towards the once famous kingdom of Bactria lies Merv, another Buddhist site in the Soviet territory of Central Asia. Some of the terracotta sculptures discovered here show clear evidence of Hellenistic styles derived from the Bactrian region (ibid. Pl. 74).

Ayrtam

Further down on the great trade route lies Ayrtam on the right bank of the Amu-Darya river, about eight miles above the Greek city Termex. The Russian archæologists have discovered here a Buddhist shrine of the Kushana period. A relief carving on a slab of marl limestone of a group of musicians, addorsed to a foliage of acanthus pattern reveals a very close affinity to Gandhara frieze discovered at such sites like Takti-Bahi, Jamālgarhi, and Taxila (Alexander Belonitsky, *Central Asia*, translated from the Russian by James Hogarth, London, 1969, p. 99, Pl. 49; see also Litvinsky and Zeymal, op.cit. Plates 75, 76), where carvings of human and animal figures were interspersed in between acanthus foliage and floral scrolls.

A very interesting clay sculptured plaque was discovered at a close by site in Termex depicting the great miracle at Śrāvasti. (Litvinsky and Zeymal, op. cit. Pl. 81). This is a popular theme of Buddhist sculptors in India and show definite proof of direct import of art themes from the southern track of the great trade route.

Adzhina-Tepe

The most remarkable discovery of Buddhist art remains in the Western part of Central Asia was made at Adzhina-Tepe. Adzhina-Tepe lies in the Vakhsh valley, on the road from Dushnabe to Khorog and is presently in the Tadzhik Republic of the U.S.S.R. Excavations of sand-buried remains here were begun in the year 1960. Initial excavations have brought to light an enormous Buddhist temple complex which includes cells for the monks, a large hall or auditorium with an area of over 1,000 square feet, and various other apartments that would have probably served as parochial offices. The different compartments of this enormous architectural structure are linked by corridors running round the inside of the perimeter.

The centre of the north-western part is occupied by a terraced stūpa with a ramp leading up to the plinth. The stūpa is surrounded by an outer-structure consisting of long corridors, almost 50 ft., running into one another at an angle, small shrines, and a number of small chapels, each with an *iwân* opening towards the stūpa (A. Belenitsky, op. cit. p. 140).

The entire structure at Adzhina-Tepe is brick built with vaulted roofs covering the long buildings and corridors while the square buildings (the cells and small shrines) had domed roofs. A noteworthy factor at this Buddhist edifice is that no traces of deliberate destruction have been found there. Hence it could be presumed that the monastery was abandoned before any invasion took place and eft to be buried by sand dunes (cf. Rawak).

The most noteworthy finds at Adzhina-Tepe were the remains of painting and stucco sculpture. Originally there seems to have been paintings on the walls and ceilings of the buildings round the stūpa and many of the buildings in the monastery complex. It is very unfortunate to note that today what is left is only a very few fragments and what is found in sites on the walls are negligible. Most of the fragments of painted stucco work were found in the piles of rubble on the floors of the various buildings. A fragment of a ceiling painting illustrating a group of Buddha figures in various mudrās (B. Litvinsky and T.I. Zeymal, op. cit. Pl. 11 and 12) depicts the stylised Buddha figure with the cranial protuberance and the two shoulders covered. The influence of Indo-Hellenistic art tradition is quite explicit in the designing of these Buddha figures. Another mural painting shows a group of devotees carrying baskets of flowers on their way to worship the Buddha (B. Litvinsky and T.I. Zeymal, op cit. Pl.4). The representation of the human figure here shows a peculiar ethnic type and mode of dress. A careful study of the ethnic types in these painted figures would help to glean more facts about the founders of the Adzhina-Tepe shrine and other Buddhist edifices in the area. The Scythian tunic is clearly seen in the painted figures. The clay sculpture at Adzhina-Tepe was better preserved than the paintings (A. Belenitsky, op. cit. Pls. 96, 97, 98 and p. 141). The half closed yogic eyes, the snail-shell pattern coiffure and the aquiline nasal line of these stucco heads of the Buddha, all go to prove that the Adzhina-Tepe artists have lavishly borrowed from the Gandhara school of Buddhist art. If not of the Buddha, these stucco heads could probably be of bodhisattva figures.

The colossus of a recumbent Buddha image (40 ft.) found at Adzhina-Tepe (B. A. Litvinsky and T.I. Zeymal, op. cit. Pl. 3 — showing conservation work being executed on the great reclining Buddha image at Adzhina-Tepe) speaks of an artistic bias for colossi in image carving, and a possible borrowing from the closeby Gandhara site of Bāmiyān in the Ka ul Valley. Here the Buddha is shown wearing randals.

Many more clay sculptures were discovered in the monastery temple and the small shrines round the corridors. It is noteworthy that the portrayal of the Buddha and the bodhisattva figure in stucco (and decorating the outer walls and niches of the stūpa with these stucco figurines) is a direct derivation from such Gandhara centres like Takti-Bahi, Jamālgarhi, Begram, Jelālābād, Haḍḍa and Taxilā.

The torso of a bodhisattva figure from Adzhina-Tepe (ibid. Pl. 40) strikes a very close resemblance with the Avalokiteśvara figures from Ajaṇṭā, Buddhagayā and at later Pāla centres in India. The *Praxitelean déhanchement* if not the 'Tribhaṅga' pose common to bodhisattva figures of India and Sri Lanka is not difficult to be traced in this fragmentary torso.

Another stucco head (i id.Pl. 46) identified as that of a bodhisattva, from Adzhina Tepe reveals more Chinese or Mongolian characteristics than Indo-Hellenistic, and thus is a good index to the cosmopolitan nature of the art of most of these Central Asian sites which stood on the trunk of east-west cultural exchange.

The head of a smiling deity (B. A. Litvinsky and T. I. Zeymal, op. cit. Pl. 49) and a figurine of playful eros (or a deity: i id. Pl. 54) prove further the penetration of the Hellenistic or Indo-Greek styles into this cosmopolitan theatre of Buddhist art.

All the sculptures and paintings at Adzhina-Tepe were based on Buddhist religious themes with the Buddha image at the apex, and bodhisattvas, bhikkhus, demons, devatās (demi-gods), and lay devotees, completing the narrative intended by the artist. There are figures of varying sizes. The Buddha figure is quite often shown surrounded by a nimbus (see AURA).

The sculptures here were mostly moulded from clay without any reinforcement. In the polychromed figures, remains of the original colouring are still visible. The Adzhina-Tepe artist has given vent to local and traditional factors while combining the techniques and styles borrowed from the adjoining great centres of Buddhist art within and beyond Bactria.

Kuva

Another site of Buddhist art remains is Kuva (var. Quva) in eastern Ferghana, where a Buddhist temple lying outside the walls of the ancient town was excavated in 1957–58. This site was subject

to plunder and pillage in the past and was in a poor state of preservation. The available data prove that the edifice was set on fire by an invader but this burning had also been a blessing in disguise, because it had helped to preserve for posterity easily perishable clay products which include valuable sculpture, by converting them into hardened terra-cotta.

Amongst the debris at Kuva were numerous fragments of clay sculpture which include part of a large figure of the Buddha (or a bodhisattva) (ibid. Pl. 82), and a large number of heads and fragments of torsos of gods and goddesses, demons (ibid. Pl. 78) and other figures typical of Mahāyāna Buddhist art. Some of the figures still retain traces of original paint. The few fragments that have survived indicate that the temple at Kuva (Quva) had its walls decorated with murals illustrating the Buddha legend and the jātakas. Unfortunately, no final account of this important Buddhist monument at Kuva has so far been published (A. Belenitsky, op. cit Pl 139).

Ak-Beshin

To the north of Kuva near Frunze (about 11 miles west of Frunze), the capital of the Kirghiz republic, another important site of Buddhist art was discovered. This was Ak-Beshin where during 1953–54, excavations have yielded remains of two Buddhist temples. The Buddhist shrines at Ak-Beshin were decorated with paintings and richly adorned with statues of the Buddha and bodhisattvas. Most of these statues had pedestals. The walls too were decorated with stucco reliefs. Statues of gilt bronze were among the important finds here (A. Belenitsky, op. cit. p. 137 ff.). Although preserved in fragmentary form there is enough left to show that the statuary at Ak-Beshin represents various figures from the Buddhist pantheon, including the Buddha.

A head of a stucco bodhisattva figure discovered here is stylistically close to Gandhara art (Litvinsky and Zeymal, op. cit. Pl. 77) than a similar stucco head discovered at Adzhina-Tepe (ibid. Pl. 46 — referred to above) which is more akin to the Chinese types as found in such places like Tun-huang. The head gear of this figure is noteworthy as it proves, on comparative analysis, that most of the bodhisattva figures in this part of the then Buddhist world had been designed according to a common canon that had indicated the particular characteristics of the individual deities in the Buddhist pantheon.

Another important find at Ak-Beshin was a whole series of openwork plaques of gilded bronze, representing some Buddhist figures in luxuriant patterns of vegetable ornament (Pl. XIV; A. Belenitsky, op. cit. Pls. 66 and 67, p. 138 f.).

The bronze plaque depicting a couple (*mithuna*) could possibly be taken to represent a Central Asian version of the 'Pāñcika-Hārītī' couple of Gandhara-fame (ibid. Pl. 66). The other plaque (ibid. Pl. 67) depicts a stunted figure of a cross-legged male in a yogic-pose. The lotus like seat, the uṣṇīṣa (cranial protuberance), the cross-legged pose, the elongated ear-lobes, the semi-closed eyes, all would prove that this figure represents the Buddha. Stucco figures of the Buddha in similar stunted manner are not uncommon in the Gandhara region and it is very likely that the extension of Kushana authority over these desert tracts in Central Asia had also carried artistic peculiarities of their origin as referred to above.

A second Buddhist temple, smaller in size and square in plan, (125 ft. by 125. ft) too was excavated at Ak-Beshin. A curious feature of the architectural plan is its cruciform shape with two *pradakṣiṇāpathas* (circumambulatories) running round it. A very large stucco head of the Buddha and fragments of clay sculpture were found in this shrine. On the walls are still to be found traces of painting (A. Belenitsky, op.cit. p. 138).

Krasnaya-Rechka

Close to Frunze another Buddhist site that had yielded remains of Buddhist art was discovered. This is Krasnaya-Rechka. Here, too, another large image of the Buddha in the reclining pose was discovered. The core of the image is built out of brick and completed with stucco and lime plaster. The common occurrence of this particular pose of the Buddha image in Central Asian Buddhist shrines, show that there was a flair for the portrayal of the Buddha in Parinirvāna among the Buddhist sculptors and artists of these regions. It is also noteworthy that this type of Buddha image was popular in Sri Lanka

In our discussion on the art products of the above sites we have emphasised the influence of the Indo–Hellenistic school of Buddhist art on them. The *Sūtrālaṃkāra* reference to a bhikṣu from Puṣkaravatī (s.v. CHARSADDA), who had journeyed to a site which later came to be known as Tashkent, in order to decorate a Buddhist monastery there, is an index to the influence of Gandhara art on these Central Asian sites (see the section on CENTRAL ASIA written by B. A. Litvinov).

Apart from the sites discussed a ove it is very likely that there lie innumerable ancient sites, so far undiscovered in the Soviet section of Central Asia. It is hoped that the efforts of the Russian archaeological missions would bring to light more ruined sites of ancient Buddhist vihāras before long.

Thus, taken as a whole, the western sector of the Central Asian theatre shows that Buddhist art traditions had prevailed at different sites within this part from the earliest times, probably from the early centuries of the Christian era, and had continued for several centuries until most of these centres were pillaged, destroyed and set on fire by the Muslim invaders or totally neglected after the patrons of these sites abandoned them. What was left were saved by the desert sand covering the edifices totally from sight.

In the other section of Central Asia (i.e., the Eastern Sector) too, it was more or less the same phenomenon that stood in preserving the centres of Buddhist cultural value for posterity.

The Eastern Sector: Chinese Turkistan or Sinkiang

The history of the Eastern Sector of Central Asia which is commonly referred to as Chinese Turkistan or Sinkiang, reveals that it had been subject to various vicissitudes of political change, which determined to a great extent the nature of its cultural development too. The innumerable Buddhist sites that have been discovered in this section help to throw more light on the chequered history of Sinkiang.

It was the ancient Kingdom of Khotan (or Ho-tien of the Chinese writers) that had dominated the art centres in Sinkiang where the powerful Kushana monarchy had extended its authority over this tract of Central Asia, north of the Tibetan plateau. Noteworthy centres of Buddhist art in the Khotanese territory are: Rawak, Dandan-Uiliq, Niya, Endere and Miran. All these sites are on the southern track of the Silk Route from Tun-huang. On the Northern Track of the Silk Route lie some more centres of early Buddhist culture, of which the north-western region covers the following sites: Kashgar, Tumshuk, Kucha, Kizil (var. Qyzyl), Kumtura, Duldur-akhur, Subashi, Hisar, Tajzik-Karaul Qaraśâhr (var. Karashahr) and Shorchuk. Towards further north-east in the Turfan oasis are some more important sites of which the following could e listed for the present study: Turfan, Khocho (var. Kara-Khojo), Idikut shahri, Murtuk, Bezeklik, Songhim-aghiz, Toyuk and Tun-huang.

Southern Track of Sinkiang

Miran

Miran dates from the 3rd or the 4th century A.C. on the analysis of a graffiti discovered there, written in Kharoṣṭhi script. The walls of the chamber that housed a stūpa, probably a cetiya-ghara (stūpa-ghara), have yielded paintings depicting Buddhist jātaka stories of which those of the *Viśvantara Jātaka* stand unique. The impress of the Indo-Greek style is clearly seen in these paintings. It is interesting to note that one inscription here mentions a painter by the name of Tita, a word which western writers took to be a local version for Roman Titus. But it could possibly stand for Tisa, a name common among the Buddhists in India and Sri Lanka (D. Seckel, *The Art of Buddhism*, Methuen, London, 1964, p. 66; B. Rowland, *The Art and Architecture of India*, Published by Penguin Books, 1956, p.105; see also JUNNAR).

The Miran paintings consisted of a frieze of jātaka scenes and a dado painted with busts of winged divinities and erotes supporting a garland. Benjamin Rowland, referring to these paintings, states that they are a translation into pictorial terms of the same subjects treated in Gandhara relief sculpture. The decoration of the dado with the winged busts and planetary divinities, framed in the swags of a garland (B. Rowland, op.cit. Pl.60 B), has its equivalent in Gandhara sculpture, most notably on the famous reliquary of Kaniṣka. Benjamin Rowland further points out analogical forms from the Roman west, in comparing the paintings of Miran with other schools of art. One is reminded in this context of the early occurrence of the theme of garland bearing erotes in the southern field of Buddhist art in Amarāvatī and Sri Lanka (see B. Rowland, op.cit. Pl.70,; D. T. Devendra, *Classical Sinhalese Sculpture*, London, 1958, Pl.63; S. Paranavitana, *Art of the Ancient Sinhalese*, Colombo, 1971, Pls. 2, 6). However, one need not doubt about the mixture of Western classical and Indian styles together with Mongoloid northern elements in the art of these centres including Miran.

Rawak

To the north-east of the ancient Khotan city, on the other side of the Yurung Kash river, lie the ruins of the Rawak-vihāra. It is believed that this vihāra is the most important architectural complex in the Khotan valley. On numismatic evidence the Rawak site goes as far back as the Han imperial period (25–200 A.C.: *EWA*. Vol. I, p. 829). This dating is confirmed on the stylistic

analysis of the sculptured stucco panels which show affinity to Gandhara models. The stūpa at Rawak is surrounded by a rectangular wall decorated both inside and outside with rows of stucco statues. This rectangular structure corresponds to the courts surrounded by chapels in many Gandhara vihāra sites. (s.v. JELĀLĀBĀD, HAḌḌA, JAMALGIRI, CHARSADDA) As no signs of intended destruction is seen in the remains of Rawak, it was presumed that this ancient Buddhist site found buried deep in sand was abandoned many years before the arrival of an invading army either of the northern nomads or of the Muslims.

The figure of the Buddha depicted in colossal statuary and the array of divinities, bodhisattvas and other figures once shining with paint and polychrome, patches of which are still visible, would have definitely given an impression of a magnificent panorama at these shrines of Rawak (D. Seckel, op.cit. p. 66, Appx. Pl. 5).

Dandan-Uiliq

Several sanctuaries were discovered at Dandan-Uiliq with vihāra edifices having elaborate stucco carvings and mouldings depitcting the Buddha and other figures of the Buddhist pantheon. The walls are also covered with frescoes of arahants and bodhisattvas set against a background of different colours which do not however portray the high standard of Gandhara art.

Although scholars have dated some of these paintings and stucco panels in or around the 10th century A. C., the influences of Bactro-Greek and Indian trends and types are apparent in the Dandan-Uiliq art. This may probably help to shift the date of this site several centuries back (*EWA*. Vol. I, p. 828).

Niya

At Niya were discovered ruins of an ancient Buddhist monastery with a stūpa. The remains resemble those at Dandan-Uiliq. A marked Hellenistic influence at this site is visible through the seals bearing figurines of Heracles, Pallas, Eros, with legends written in the Kharoṣṭhi script (*EWA*. Vol. I, p. 829). The paleographic evidence shows that the site dates as far back as the first few centuries of the Christian era. A decisive proof of the cosmopolitan nature of the Niya culture is made available by the discovery of Chinese documents written on wooden tablets.

Endere

Inside a fortress that had seemingly protected the monastic establishment at Endere, recalling certain Tibetan type monasteries with militia, was discovered a stūpa. Although badly in ruins when discovered, there are signs yet to believe that the temple complex at Endere rested on a triple base and was covered with stucco.

The temple placed in the centre of an enclosure appears to be of the same type as that of Dandan-Uiliq. Stucco carvings are found covering the side walls. At the base of the structure fragmentary remains of frescoes were found at the time of the discovery. The base seems to have held life size statues of the Buddha and Buddhist divinities. The site is dated in the 7th, 8th centuries on the grounds of a fragmentary manuscript, written in Sanskrit of the Gupta period, discovered at the site.

Northern Track of Sinkiang

Kashgar

Kashgar seems to be one of the most unfortunate sites as the remains of Buddhist edifices in this part of the Northern Track reveal nothing of their original shape due to the ruthless devastation wrought upon them by the Muslims. Several stūpa remains, e.g., Maurī-tim and Topa-tim have been unearthed but they do not seem to show anything other than piles of brick masonry.

Tumshuk

The pioneers in Central Asian archaeology, Pelliot and Von Le Coq, have discovered at Tumshuk ruins of an important Buddhist monastic complex. The Buddhist monastery here too was destroyed by fire. The stucco figures of bodhisattvas and Buddhist divinities resemble very much the Haḍḍa masterpieces. It has been thought by some scholars that Tumshuk marks the last centre north of the Tarim basin where the influence of Buddhist art of the Hellenistic type had prevailed (*EWA*. Vol. I, Pl. 472).

Kucha

Kucha provides interesting data for the study of Buddhist monastic architecture in the oases of Central Asia. Like the Western Indian rock-cut

sanctuaries, Kucha provides a range of monastic establishments made by caves cut into the living rock. It is possible that this architectural type was borrowed by Central Asia not from Western India, but from the Kabul valley where the most remarkable achievement in Buddhist architecture has been made by cutting cells out of a live-rock at Bāmiyān, for both living apartments as well as for the enshrinement of the cult image of the Buddha. The caves of the Thousand Buddhas found in more than one site in China may be an extension of this same architectural type from the Bāmiyān region, via Central Asia.

Kizil (Var. *Qyzyl*, also called *Ming Oi*)

A few miles north of Kucha are the two sites Kizil and Kumtura, both revealing a monastic complex typical of the Kucha sanctuary architecture. From Kizil come some of the best representations of Buddhist paintings expressing various moods and emotions and illustrating tales from the Theravāda jātakas and Mahāyāna avadānas. Most interesting is a painting (*EWA*. Vol. I, p. 831, Pl. 471 ; B. Rowland, op. cit. Pl. 66 A) depicting a divine pair, probably a bodhisattva and his śakti, both standing. (Pl. XV, Fig. I)

The cave of the pretas (departed souls) at Kizil, cut out of a living rock, gives a typical example of the Gandhara type cave sanctuaries with the so-called lantern-roof. (Pl. IX)

Most of the entire outer surface of the Kizil caves is covered with mural paintings depicting various stories from Buddhist texts (*EWA*. Pl. 474 ; B. Rowland, op. cit. Pl. 65, A & B, Pl. 63 C). The ceilings of these caves too had once been elegantly covered with various motifs and floral patterns that show a regional bias, when compared with floral motifs from regions towards Gandhara in the west and China towards the east. The anatomical treatment of the figural drawings with supple and sinous limbs show a tendency towards borrowing from such Indian centres like Ajaṇṭā and Amarāvatī (B. Rowland, op. cit. Pl. 63, C.). The Buddha's funeral pyre is depicted in the cave of Māyā (Pl. XVI). A medallion symmetrically divided into panels depicting richly decorated figures of Buddhas flanked by bodhisattvas, diminutive suppliants at the feet of each primary figure, is a devise common to artists of all Buddhist lands.

The wall painting depicting Vessantara offering his two children to the beggar Jūjaka is done in realistic manner. (Pl. XIII)

A scene from a mural fragment depicting 'Rūpavatī Avadāna' (Pl. XIX) shows the heights achieved y the Kizil artist in delineation of figural proportions. Most of the plaster of the Kizil frescoes is now peeled off, but the available remains show that the painters' art here had reached a high standard, rivalling even the best centres like Ajaṇṭā, etc. Another valuable piece of painting from a 7th century Kizil Buddhist vihāra, depicts a person holding a painted scroll in which is painted the life of the Buddha (D. Seckel, op. cit. p. 263, Fig. 64 ; *The Way of the Buddha*, Government of India Publication, 1950, p 114, Pl. 73). This recalls the tradition of sending painted scrolls by Buddhist rulers of India to neighbouring kingdoms as related in the *Rudrāyanāvadāna* of the *Divyāvadāna*.

Interesting also is the painting of an arahant (a bhikkhu), an emaciated figure of an eremite wearing a robe resembling a Greek toga not common to the Buddhist clergy, but may be a Central Asian adaptation of the *cīvara* (robe), carrying a walking stick, a satchel and other unidentifiable objects (Pl. XI, Fig. 2). The peculiar lines marked all over the bare part of his body may be an artist's expression of emaciation through '*tapas*' common to religious men (or yogi). The frescoes from Kizil stand unique in expressing the highly sophisticated art of painting achieved by the Serendian artist from a period as far back as the early centuries of the Christian era. The knowledge of the effect of light and colour achieved by the Kizil artists had probably been a result of a continuous tradition that had spread from the Gandhara region and had its full flowering in the remarkable murals of the Tun-huang sanctuary on the eastern fringe of Central Asia.

As at many other Buddhist centres in Central Asia, the Kizil paintings served the dual purpose of being both decorative and didactic. The decorative purpose is emphatic in the skilful artistic expression both in the anatomical proportions and the selection of colours with which these paintings were executed. The didactic purpose is achieved by the innumerable episodes taken from the Buddha story that have been used to illustrate the paintings (Pls. X ; XI, Fig. I ; XV, Fig. 2).

Kumtura

Not far from Kizil, on the Muzart river stands another early Buddhist cave site known as Kumtura. The style and technique adopted by the Kumtura artist are same as that of the Kizil artist. All the temples, excepting a single example, are rock-cut. The structural edifice has yielded a lower portion of

the statue of the Buddha clad in stylized drapery similar to models from the Gupta period (*EWA*. Vol I, p. 832 f.).

Dietrich Seckel remarks — "For it was here, and especially at Khocho, the Uigur capital, and in nearby Bezeklik that traditional Mahāyāna themes were strongly influenced by the style of eastern Asia– or to : e more precise, that of the mature T'ang art, 7th and 8th centuries" (D. Seckel, op. cit. p.68). Although the Kumtura and the neighbouring Buddhist sites enjoyed independent patronage of the newly established Uigur empire, it was still the Gandhara formulae that prevailed in art with an autochthonous idiom and a vocabulary derived from China forming the dialect of the artist.

At Kumtura there are only a few figures in a composition ; there is contrast between space and mass, each figure retaining its full expressive value.

Duldur–akhur

A site not far from Kumtura. It is a site of a complex of monastic structures systematically arranged around a central court in which there are several separate stūpas. In the ruins at Duldur–akhur, destroyed by fire, were found fragments of wooden sculpture as well as stucco statues moulded with a mixture of straw or tow. A wood–carving of the Buddha Dīpaṅkara (Pl. XII, Fig. 1) and a musician carved in wood (Pl. XII, Fig. 2) show the special traits in rendering the human figure by the artist of Duldur-akhur. Even in its dilapidated form the shrines at Duldur-akhur recalls the architectural planning of Gandhara monsteries. Fragments of painting show both local and Chinese styles at a confluence.

Subashi

Comprising a triangle between Kucha and Kumtura is Su ashi, another early Buddhist monastic site. Here, there are many structures including several large stūpas of various types ! ut in most cases resembling the bell-shaped Tibetan type (Pl. VIII). Stucco reliefs that had once decorated the vihāras and stūpa niches and fresco paintings from Su ashi are of importance to the study of Buddhist art in the Tarim Basin. The stucco sculptures show remote signs of Hellenistic influences, obviously transmitted through such Gandhara centres like Haḍḍa.

Hisar

The Kucha group includes the ruins of Hisar where once stood a Buddhist temple which had succumbed to the ruthless burning by an invader. The Hisar temple also yields some fragments of frescoes.

Tajzik Karaul

An ancient temple site at Tajzik-Karaul yielded early Buddhist paintings. The paintings display characters in rhythmic and sinuous poses striking a close affinity to the style of the paintings at Kumtura and related sites.

Karashahr (var. Qarašāhr) and *Shorchuk*

A pioneer in Central Asian archaeology, S. Oldenburg had named this site Shikshim and later German archaeologists have called it Shorchuk. It offers a complex of many early Buddhist temples and rock-cut monastic establishments. One of the earliest discoveries at this site (by Oldenburg) was a statue of the Buddha in the recumbent pose (attainment of Parinirvāna). As had been mentioned above the flair for this particular type of the Buddha statue had been maintained by the Central Asian artist even at this furthest site (cf. Adzhina-Tepe, Krasnaya-Rechka). The fresco paintings discovered at this site show slight variations from the styles as found in the Uigur sites. A fine specimen of a clay sculpture depicts the Buddha seated on a stylised *padmāsana* which is square in plan but the lotus petels are painted on the rounded base. The podium of the *padmāsana* is painted with the medallion in which are winged gazelles recalling the pair of deer in the pedestal of many Indian Buddha images in the *dharmacakra-mudrā* (Pl. XVIII, Fig. 1). This highly stylised Buddha figure shows in many respects borrowings from the Gandhara school of Buddhist art, e.g., the treatment of the hair, the drapery. The thin lips. the round face and the aquiline nose all show the stamp of the Hellenist school of Indian art but for the thin elongated Mongoloid eyes (D. Seckel, op. cit. Pl. 21, p. 189).

Another clay sculpture from Shorchuk could be easily compared with the above Buddha image in regard to style and technique and the facial expressions (D. Seckel, op. cit. Pl. 47, p. 247). This bust of a worshipping deity probably represents a bodhisattva.

The temple walls had been decorated with stucco and terra-cotta figures, illustrating episodes from the Buddha legend. In most instances the clay figures seem to have been affixed to the walls of the temple structure after they had been burnt and chiselled out and then polychromed. The close resemblance to Haḍḍa statuary recalls an extension of the Gandhara technique in stucco art at this Central Asian centre (*EWA*. Vol. I, p. 833). In the case of small statuary, the stamp of the Indo–Greek Buddhist art is more apparent.

Turfan

Although the Turfan region is more famous as the site of the Uigur empire which flourished since the 9th. century A. C., yet there is evidence to prove that Buddhism had penetrated to this northernmost centre about the 4th and the 5th centuries A.C. The Uigur domination in the late mediaeval periods of the Turfan oasis prevented the total destruction of the Buddhist monuments of this part of Central Asia when the Muslim hordes swept away most of the Buddhist cultural centres in the Tarim Basin.

The inhabitants of the place were predominantly Buddhists, at least if we are to give credence to the documents of the Ming period, which state that at Khocho (var : Kara-Khojo) several Buddhist temples existed and the embassy from Shan-koh, in the year 1420 A. C. mentions the presence of many Buddhists in Turfan, who had magnificent edifices for their idols (*EWA*. Vol. I, p. 834).

Turfan oasis consists of a complex ensemble of religious and civil monuments around which sprang up the principal centres of the Uigurs, e.g., Kara Khojo, Idikut-shahri, Murtuk, Bezeklik, Sanghim-aghiz, Toyuk, Hassa-Shahri, and Bulayik. Both brick a rock-cut monastic establishments of the Buddhists have been discovered at these sites. These sanctuaries have yielded numerous objects of artistic merit. A very important discovery at the site Bulayik, apart from finds of art, historical and archaeological value, is a priceless collection of Buddhist manuscripts (*EWA*. XIV, p. 348 f.).

Murtuk

This is near Bezeklik and obviously belongs to the same epoch. The Buddhist art at Murtuk, despite its close proximity to the Chinese mainland, does not show much traits of Chinese influence. Indian influence becomes more evident in the depiction of the Buddha seated in the European style (*pralambapāda* like in many Ajaṇṭā and Western Indian caves, and also at Candi Mendut in Java) flanked by a bodhisattva of purely Indian type holding a vase.

A noteworthy factor is that the legends from jātakas have been replaced by avadāna tales from the Mahāyāna Buddhist texts in illustrating the Buddha story in art. In the flames surrounding the Buddha figure and the coiffure of one of the donors, the influence of the art of Kizil and the Bactrian field (see above Adzhina-Tepe) is evident.

Toyuk

Before reaching Tun-huang the great rock-cut sanctuary of Buddhist art in Central Asia, Toyuk offers a good example of a successful achievement in the experiment of rock-cut sanctuaries. Toyuk forms yet another link of this chain of rock-cut treasure-houses of Buddhist art that sprang from Western India and spread through Bāmiyān towards the Central Asian theatre to China, Korea and even Japan.

It holds imposing ruins of early Buddhist temples hollowed out of the rock in the walls of a gorge. (*EWA*. Vol. I, p. 836). Most of the paintings that have survived at Toyuk, depicting Buddhist divinities resemble very much the work of the painters' art in other centres in the Turfan oasis.

Tun-huang

Tun-huang is architecturally a cave site, with grottoes cut into the great mass of rock, honeycombed into various chambers and compartments, the type which had its early beginnings at Bāmiyān. These innumerable caves have preserved an enormous bulk of Buddhist artistic and cultural remains. One would verily say that it was at Tun-huang, that Buddhist art of Central Asia had reached its peak of perfection. Tun-huang could be rightly called a store-house of Buddhist art.

A D.T E.P.

CEREMONIES. See RITES AND CEREMONIES.

CESSATION. The concept of cessation or *nirodha* in Buddhist religious thought envisages the irksome continuance of the life process through ceaseless births and deaths (i.e., *saṃsāra* or *bhava*), as well as the concomitant painful situations which are characteristic of life (i.e., *dukkha*). Thus, *nirodha* implies at one and the same time both *bhavanirodha* and *dukkhanirodha* (*S*. II, pp. 7, 9). As has been repeatedly pointed out by the Buddha himself, the burden of his teaching has been the cessation of *dukkha* (*Pubbe cāham bhikkhave etarahi ca dukkhañceva paññāpemi dukkhassa ca nirodham: M*. I, p. 140. Also *S*. III, p. 119).

Underlying this idea is the recurring refrain of the Buddhist texts that whatever is of the nature of origination is also of the nature of cessation (*yam kiñci samudayadhammam sabbam tam nirodhadhammam: D*. II, p. 288; *M*. I, p. 380; *Vin*. I, p. 11). This intelligent attitude to life in saṃsāra which is the result of conditions generated by man himself

and to the possibility of release therefrom in Nibbāna forms the core of Buddhist wisdom and is described as the insight into the truth or *dhammacakkhu* (loc. cit.).

Starting the analysis of the life process of saṃsāra which is the matrix of *dukkha* at a convenient point, attention is focussed on the fact that the momentum for the accelaration of this process is the lack of knowedge (*avijjā*) with regard to the real nature of life itself. Thus, we find the *paṭiccasamuppāda* analysis commencing with *avijjā* and leading on to the life generating and sustaining factors such as *saṅkhāra* etc. Therefore, in terms of this analysis, a true cessation of this process is to be conceived as commencing with a total cessation of this ignorance (*avijjāyatveva asesavirāganirodhā*...) and the consequent dawning of insight or *vijjā*.

Rejecting both the idea of an agent (*sayaṃkataṃ* and *paraṃkataṃ* : *S*. II, p. 19 f.), including a Creator God(*issara-nimmāna*), as the cause for the presence of happiness and unhappiness in human life (*sukhadukkham*: loc. cit.) as well as the explanation that it is due to chance happening without cause (*adhicca-samuppanna* : loc. cit.), the Buddha adopted a different method of analysis of the problem of *dukkha*, leading to the idea of its conditioned origination (*idappaccayatā paṭiccasamuppādo*: *M*. 1, p 167. See also *S*. II, p. 10 ff.). The result of this was the emergence, polarised as it were to the idea of conditioned genesis of *dukkha*, of the idea of conditioned cessation, or more meaningfully stated, the cessation that is brought about through deconditioning, i.e., through the total elimination of all conditions that finally lead, in the fact of birth, to the production of *dukkha*. Thus, these two, the knowledge with regard to the arising of *dukkha*, i.e., *samudaya*, and the knowledge with regard to the cessation of *dukkha*, i.e., *nirodha* are highlighted in the *Buddha-vagga* of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* as the great achievements of Mahā Sākyamuni Gotama, i.e., the Buddha as a historical character (*Samudayo samudayo ti kho me bhikkhave pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu cakkhum udapādi ñāṇam udapādi vijjā udapādi āloko udapādi* : *S*. II, p. 10 ; *Nirodho nirodhoti... āloko udapādi* : ibid. p. 11).

This cessation of *dukkha* in Nibbāna (*dukkhanirodha*) also implies the cessation of all conditions that contribute to its presence, owing to continuance of life, directly or indirectly. In the real and total cessation of *dukkha*, all the eleven items of the *paṭiccasamuppāda* from *avijjā* (lack of true knowledge) to *jāti* (birth as a saṃsāric manifestation) have necessarily to cease. Saṃsāric failings like greed, hatred and delusion (*rāga*, *dosa*, *moha*) also completely cease to be in Nibbāna. What is most significant of all in Nibbāna is that *viññāṇa* which is the main stay of saṃsāric existence ceases to be, thus bringing about a cessation of everything else associated with life in saṃsāra as is evident in the most clinching statement the Buddha makes in the *Kevaṭṭha Sutta* (*D*. 1, p. 223) that in the cessation of *viññāṇa* everything else here ceases to be (*viññāṇassa nirodhena ettha etam uparujjhati*).

J.D

CETANĀ. Generic term in Buddhist ethics epistemology and psychology denoting, in its widest sense, the dominant conative function in mentation. The different aspects of meaning embodied in the term have been rendered variously as will, volition, intention, motivation, conation, drive, stimulus, disposition, determination, effort, choice, resolve, arrangement, organisation, aspiration, purposive intellection, mental construction and formative tendency. In its more specific technical signification, however, *cetanā*, unless otherwise qualified, refers only to the self-centred, goal-directed and result-oriented volitional disposition which impels the worldly individual (*puthujjana*). This *cetanā* is altogether absent in the liberated individual (*ariya*) who is free from the obsessions 'this is mine' (*etam mama*), 'this am I', (*eso 'ham asmi*) and 'this is my self' (*eso me attā*), who has no self-advancing goal to aspire to and who has no result to crave after. As for the disciple of the Buddha who is set on the path leading to total liberation, the later exegetical works describe his *cetanā* as one that conduces only to the elimination of rebirth and the cessation of all self-centred action (*vivaṭṭagāminī maggacetanā... kammakkhayāya saṃvattati* : *Manorathapūraṇī*: III, p. 213).

The teaching on *cetanā* appears in its simplest form in the suttas of the Pali nikāyas. In the course of the gradual development of Buddhist thought the later commentators have made significant contributions to the formulation and elaboration of a Buddhist doctrine of the *will* yielding valuable insight into the ethical, psychological and epistemological aspects of the creative activity of the human mind. The major schools of Buddhist philosophy have shown remarkable unity and consistency in the elucidation of the basic and essential meaning of the Buddha's teaching on *cetanā*. The teaching on *cetanā* is vital to the understanding of the Buddha's teachings on knowledge and action, life and the life beyond, and bondage and freedom.

Brief notice may be made of the pre-Buddhistic background to the Buddhist teaching on *cetanā*. The *Vedas* appear to show an incipient awareness of the function of the *will* in the creative evolution of the mind. A more developed consciousness in this regard is reflected in the *Upaniṣads* although the pronouncements on the role of the *will* are given as corollaries to the central belief in the doctrine of the *Ātman*. The early Vedic texts use a number of words in different contexts to convey the idea of the *will* such as *kāma*, *kratu*, *vaśi*, *vāra*, *cetanā* and *saṅkalpa*. All these appear to have a volitional implication. Among these, *saṅkalpa* appears to have been used as the regular term for the *will* in the *Upaniṣads*. These texts recognise that the *will* is greater than the mind and that the reflective function of the mind follows upon the conative (*Saṁkalpo vā va manaso bhūyān, yadā vai saṃkalpayate atha manasyati.... : Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, ch. vii. 4. 1). The *Upaniṣads* also record the views of the Sāṅkhya teachers that human bondage consists in the being obsessed by the self-centred *will* and that human freedom consists in liberating the mind from self-love and self-determination.[1] These illuminating insights were, however, firmly grounded in metaphysics and it was left to the Buddha to propound, for the first time in Indian philosophy, his own teaching on the *will* on the lasting foundations of the truths of universal relativity and non-substantiality.

Cetanā in the Pali Nikāyas

The Buddha's teaching on the *will* in the Pali nikāyas centres chiefly around the term *cetanā*. *Cetanā* is the verbal noun of *ceteti* and it literally means thinking in relation to action. The volitional implication which the word carries is further developed in the suttas where it sometimes occurs together with other appositional and synonymous terms (*yā ca patthanā yo ca paṇidhi ye ca saṅkhārā : A.* V, pp. 212-3 ; see also *A.* I, p. 224 ; *S.* III, p. 99). The verb *ceteti* is also similarly paraphrased with other verbs whose meanings serve to reinforce the volitional import expressed by *cetanā* (*Yañ ca ceteti yañ ca pakappeti yañ ca anuseti : S.* II, p. 65 ; *Maraṇaṃ . . . ākaṅkhati cetayati : S.* I, p. 121).

The teaching on *cetanā* porvades all other teachings of the Buddha. It is found embodied in the earliest and most authenticated formulations and classifications of the Buddhist doctrine such as Personality (*nāma-rūpa*), the Five Aggregates of Grasping (*pañcupādānakkhandha*), the Four Nutriments (*cattāro āhārā*), Causality (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) and the theory of Action (*kamma*).

i. Human personality is considered as a psycho-physical complex governed by the principles of impermanence, disharmony, non-substantiality and causality. Viewed as an incessant process it is characterised by inter-action, inter-connection and inter-dependence of material and immaterial factors operating together in one integrated causal nexus. These two conceptually distinguished factors, or rather groups of factors, namely, the immaterial and the material (*nāma-rūpa*) are inseparably connected and arise together (*aññamaññupanissitā ete dhammā, ekato' va uppajjanti : Milindapañha*, p. 49). Here *nāma* is defined as collocation of five causal factors of which *cetanā* is one. (*Vedanā saññā cetanā phasso manasikāro idaṃ vuccati nāmaṃ : S.* II, p. 3). This definition shows that the volitional function plays a formative role in determining the psychic life of the individual.

ii. The *Khandha* doctrine which represents a more detailed and comprehensive elaboration of the *nāma-rūpa* classification further emphasises the primacy of the *will* over the affective and intellectual factors of personality. The fourth aggregate *saṅkhāra* is directly and unambiguously defined in terms of *cetanā*. The question is raised in the suttas as to what constitutes the meaning of *saṅkhāra* and the Buddha is quoted as answering that *saṅkhāra* are so called because they decisively determine (*abhisaṅkharonti*) what is already purposively constructed and put together by the mind (*saṅkhataṃ*). What is thus mentally constructed and put together are the data of sensory perception and representative intellection.[2]

It is clear that the *will* is thus centred on the sensory data and sustains itself by feeding on forms, sounds, smells, tastes, tactile objects and mental constructions. Sensations provide the basic fuel for inflaming the fire of the *will*. *Saṅkhāra* as the equivalent of *cetanā* is thus a collective term for volitions associated with the objects of the sense organs. *Saṅkhāra* as *cetanā* determine the form and quality of the other aggregates, namely, *rūpa*,

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1 *...ahaṃ so mamedam ityevam manyamāno nibadhnāty ātmanātmānam jāleneva khecaraḥ ; ataḥ puruso' adhyavasāya-saṃkalpābhimānalingo baddhaḥ, atas tadviparito muktaḥ, tasmāt niradhyavasāyo niḥsaṃkalpo nirabhimānas tiṣṭhet, etam mokṣa-lakṣaṇaṃ... : Maitri Upaniṣad*, ch. vi, para. 30.

2 *Katamā ca bhikkhave saṅkhārā ? Cha-y-ime bhikkhave cetanākāyā : rūpasañcetanā saddasañcetanā gandhasañcetanā rasasañcetanā phoṭṭhabbasañcetanā dhammasañcetanā ime vuccanti bhikkhave saṅkhārā : S.* III, p. 60 ; *Saṅkhataṃ abhisaṅkharonti ti tasmā saṅkhārā ti vuccanti. Kiñ ca saṅkhataṃ abhisaṅkharonti ? rūpaṃ rūpattāya . . . vedanaṃ vedanattāya . . . saññaṃ saññattāya . . . saṅkhāre saṅkhārattāya . . . viññāṇaṃ viññāṇattāya saṅkhataṃ abhisaṅkharonti. Saṅkhataṃ abhisaṅkharontīti tasmā saṅkhārā ti vuccanti S.* III, p. 87.

vedana, *saññā* and *viññāṇa*. Hence, the *will* is the determinant of the incessant birth, decay and death of the self-centred personality of the man of the world. The *will* therefore conserves the cumulative heritage of every worldly individual and intensifies itself further.

The inter-relation and inter-action between the five *khandhas* help us to understand further aspects of the *will*. The affective aspect of the psychophysical complex of personality is denoted by *vedanā*. Stimulation through the sense doors brings about pleasant and unpleasant feelings. Where the feelings are pleasant there the volitional activation of the mind finds a fertile soil to grow up into continuous becoming.[3] Sensory stimulation thus brings about the operation of the *will* (*Phassasamudayā saṅkhāra-samudayo : S.* III, p. 60). *Taṇhā* and *sañcetanā* are co-eval, co-extensive and co-nascent. This being so, *dukkha* or the basic disharmony in wordly life becomes synonymous with *sañcetanā* or the self-centred operation of the *will* sustained by the craving for sense gratification(...*rūpasañcetanāya* ...*dhammasañcetanāya uppādo ṭhiti*...*abhinibbatti pātubhāvo dukkhassesso uppādo rogānaṃ ṭhiti jarāmaraṇassa pātubhāvo : S.* III, p. 230). The attachment to the objects of the *will* brings about the defilements of the mind (...*rūpasañcetanāya* ... *dhammasañcetanāya chandarāgo cittassesso upakkileso: S.* III, p. 234).

The ideational aspect of personality is denoted by *saññā* under the *khandha* doctrine. The volitional and the ideational factors interact together. These two factors mutually determine the direction and development of the personality. The ideational function which is exemplified by the perceptual and conceptual activity of the mind informs and determines the cognitive character of the *will*. Accordingly, the *will* which is informed by a mistaken view of reality and which expresses itself through mental, verbal and bodily actions invariably brings about disharmony in life.[4]

The *will* is the practical aspect of the intellect whose reflective and cogitative function based on perception and conception is denoted by the term *viññāṇa* under the *khandha* doctrine. The discriminative function of the mind is governed by the *will*. The suttas emphasise the fact that the *viññāṇa* arises and functions only as a collocation of a number of causal factors (*Aññatra paccayā natthi viññāṇassa sambhavo : M.* I, p. 259). Among these factors the most dominant is the *will* for it is specifically stated that *viññāṇa* becomes active only in so far as it is prompted by the activity of the *will* (*Viññāṇaṃ saṅkhāranidānaṃ saṅkharasambhavaṃ saṅkhārappabhavaṃ : M.* I, p. 261).

The interaction between *saṅkhāra* and *rūpa* under the *khandha* doctrine brings out the decisive role of the *will* in the formation and determination of the physical basis of personality.

iii. The *will* figures prominently among the four nutriments which nourish and sustain the physic l and psychic life of beings (*Kabaliṅkāro āhāro ... phasso dutiyo manosañcetanā tatiyo viññāṇaṃ catutthaṃ ime kho ... cattāro āhārā bhūtānaṃ vā sattānaṃ ṭhitiyā sambhavesīnaṃ vā anuggahāya : S.* II, pp. 11-12). The mere taking of food in material form is not sufficient for sustaining life. Material food can only meet some of the bare physical needs of life. Even the physical *wants*, distinct from the physical *needs*, are altogether explained by some other psychic factor. This is none other than *manosañcetanā*, namely, the ceaseless self-serving volitive effort of the mind. Mental volition is the primary determinant of verbal and bodily volition also. To understand mental volition is to understand the craving for sense gratification, for life and for death. (*Manosañcetanāya ... āhāre pariññāte tisso taṇhā pariññātā honti : S.* II, p.100). The four nutriments are inter-related. Material food keeps the *will* alive by providing it with the physical basis in personality. Sensory stimulation (*phassāhāra*) provides the *will* with the opportunity and ground for its operation. The *will* finds its psychic base in the ideational activity of the mind (*viññāṇaāhāra*).

iv. The causal doctrine of the Buddha emphasises the central role of the *will* in the determination of the conflict, discontent and disharmony characterising the entirety of worldy life, that is, the life of the self-centred individual. *Saṅkhāra* which has already been shown to be the equivalent of *cetanā* is the operative term in the causal formula which seeks to explain the origination and cessation of *dukkha* in the life of the individual. As a matter of fact the Buddhist causal doctrine may be summed up as the causality of *saṅkhāra* and the causality of its cessation. The self-centred and result-oriented *will* is caused and conditioned by the absence

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3 *Yaṃ loke piya-rūpaṃ sāta-rūpaṃ etth'esā taṇhā uppajjamānā uppajjati, ettha nivisamānā nivisati ... Rūpa-sañcetanā loke piya-rūpaṃ sāta-rūpaṃ ... saddasañcetanā ... gandhasañcetanā ... rasasañcetanā ... phoṭṭhabbasañcetanā ... dhammasañcetanā loke piya-rūpaṃ sāta-rūpaṃ. etth' esā taṇhā uppajjamānā uppajjati, etthā nivisamānā nivisati : D.* II, pp. 308-9.

4 *Micchādiṭṭhikassa ... yañ c'eva kāyakammaṃ ... yañ ca vacīkammaṃ ... yañ ca manokammaṃ yathādiṭṭhisamādānaṃ samādinnaṃ yā ca cetanā yā ca patthanā ye ca paṇidhi ye ca saṅkhārā, sabbe te dhammā dukkhāya saṃvattanti : A.* V, pp. 212-3.

of the knowledge of reality as it *is*, particularly in relation to the life of *dukkha* in the individual. The *will* is co-extensive with this ignorance of truth. Hence the disciple of the Buddha is enjoined to understand the *will*, its causality, its cessation and the path leading to this cessation.[5]

The *will* is the locus around which and upon which the cogitative mind sustains itself. Where the *will* intensifies itself there is the certainty of further becoming and rebirth (*Yattha atthi saṅkhārānaṃ vuddhi atthi tattha āyatiṃ punabbhavābhinibbatti* · *S.* II. p.101). Accordingly, where there is no intensification of the will there is no more possibility and occasion for further becoming and rebirth (*Yattha natthi saṅkhārānaṃ vuddhi natthi tattha āyatiṃ punabbhavābhinibbatti :* ibid. p. 102). The ceaseless activity of the cogitative mind bent on self-centred striving makes for continuous effort on the part of the individual to be and to become. Where the *will* does not provide the fuel there is no inducement to incline towards self-advancing and self-perpetuating effort, hence there is no question of the constant and recurrent birth, decay, death, grief, lamentation, disharmony and discontent inseparably associated with self-centred living.[6]

v. *Cetanā* in the specific technical sense of self-centred and result-oriented *will* appears beyond any reasonable doubt in the definition of moral action in the Pali nikāyas. In a celebrated and oft quoted passage in the *Nibbedhika-pariyāya Sutta* (*A.* III, pp. 410-17)the Buddha answers six questions dealing with his teaching on *kamma* and here occurs his famous definition of moral action : 'The will, O monks, I declare to be moral action ' (*Cetanāhaṃ bhikkhave kammaṃ vadāmi* : ibid. p. 415). The all too brief definition states expressly, precisely and concisely that *cetanā* and *kamma* are equivalent, and therefore, interchangeable as terms denoting the essential meaning of moral action. Since both terms are considered to be equivalent the only way to clarify the common meaning is to conclusively establish, in the first instance, the distinctive signification of either of the terms, and this may be done, without room for ambiguity, by examining the term *kamma*. In answer to the last of the six questions referred to above the Buddha lays down the path leading to the cessation of *kamma*, namely, the Noble Eightfold Path consisting of right view etc. It is obvious from this statement that *kamma* is some sort of activity to be overcome by the disciple set on the path to perfection. Why must this sort of activity be overcome in order that freedom and perfection can come about ? The answer to this is implicit in the second of the answers referred to above. In answer to the question as to causal origin of *kamma* we are told that the latter originates in sensory stimulation (*phassa*) which provides the data of sense gratification. This gratification becomes meaningful only in relation to the need for fulfilment and achievement. And that which craves for fulfilment and achievement is the self. And the craving for fulfilment and achievement is none other than the *will* which is obsessed by the idea of 'this is mine', 'this am I' and 'this is my soul, my self'. The behaviour and conduct of the individual thus obsessed expressing themselves through thought, word and deed, is action (*kamma*) which is evaluated as wholesome (*kusala*) and unwholesome (*akusala*) but which is nonetheless self-centred and result-oriented. To be self-centred is to be obsessed with the self and to be result-oriented is to seek gratification through grasping, striving and craving. It is therefore clear as to why *cetanā* is equated to *kamma*. The decisive factor in moral action is the *will* because it is the *will* that determines the moral character of action. The description of action as mental, verbal and bodily is merely an indication of the distinction between the means or the modes through which the *will* expresses itself. Hence the description of action as mental, verbal and bodily does not state anything about its moral character except its modus operandi. This is confirmed once again in the statement that the harmony and disharmony in the individual are due to the operation of the *will* as a common factor in mental, verbal and bodily action.[7] To identify action with its means is to miss altogether the meaning and significance of human behaviour. To do so would be to deny any difference between human behaviour and other animal behaviour involving situations where the former is impelled by motivation and the latter by innate instinct. Action, therefore, first arises in the mind in the form of volition. Thereafter it expresses itself through thought, word and deed (*cetayitvā*

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5 *Saṅkhāre avijjānīvaraṇā avijjāsamudayā avijjājātikā avijjāpabhavā. Avijjāya sati saṅkhārā honti. Avijjāya asati saṅkhārā na honti. So saṅkhāre ca pajānāti saṅkhārasamudayañ ca pajānāti saṅkhāranirodhañ ca pajānāti. Yā ca saṅkhāranirodhasāruppagāminī paṭipadā tañ ca pajānāti : S.* II, pp. 81–2.

6 *Yañ ca kho bhikkhave ceteti yañ ca pakappeti yañ ca anuseti ārammaṇam etaṃ hoti viññāṇassa ṭhitiyā. Ārammaṇe sati patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa hoti. Tasmiṃ patiṭṭhite viññāṇe virūḷhe āyatiṃ punabbhavābhinibbatti hoti . . . Tad appatiṭṭhite viññāṇe avirūḷhe nati na hoti natiyā asati āgatigati na hoti . . . cutūpapāto na hoti cutūpapāte asati āyatiṃ jātijarāmaraṇaṃ sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā nirujjhanti : S.* II, pp. 65–7.

7 *Kāye vā bhikkhave sati kāyasañcetanāhetu uppajjati ajjhattaṃ sukhadukkhaṃ, vācāya vā bhikkhave sati vacīsañcetanāhetu uppajjati ajjhattaṃ sukhadukkhaṃ, mane vā sati manosañcetanāhetu uppajjati ajjhattaṃ sukhadukkhaṃ anijjhāpaccayā vā : A.* II, pp. 157–8.

kammaṃ karoti kāyena vācāya manasā : A. III, p. 415). Volitional action takes precedence over the deeds which follow from it. In the commission of an unwholesome action, for instance, the relevant volitive action, as the Buddha assured the Jaina Dīghatapassi, is more crucial and decisive than its means of expression, namely, verbal and bodily action.[8]

From what has been stated thus far with reference to the texts in the Pali nikāyas it is now easy to form a clear idea of what constitutes the meaning of *cetanā*. The action of the *will* is the self-centred activity of effort. It is the desire for fulfilment. The individual seeks to fulfil himself, to become some thing that he is already not. He is this but he wants to become that. He is not this, therefore, he must become that. He therefore struggles to fulfil himself in a person, in a thing and in an idea. He strives after and seeks identification with sensual objects, events, views and persons. He feels inwardly empty and struggles to be and become something. The *will*, therefore, offers him an escape from the inner void through assertive and acquisitive action. The desire for power, position, acquisition and achievement spurs his ambition. This ambition manifests itself in a wide variety of ways not infrequently masquerading in moral and spiritual guise. *Cetanā* as the action of the *will* is an incessant process of becoming. It dominates the entire thought process. Because the *will* is for ever involved in being and becoming what the individual really is not, it constantly distorts and discolours reality to suit its purposes. Ignorance, therefore, becomes co-extensive with the operation of the *will*. On the other hand, the culture of inward awareness (*satipaṭṭhāna*) enables the individual to discover the nature and function of the *will* for what they really are. He then realises that the *will* is something put together (*saṅkhata*) and made up (*kata*) and that freedom consists in a state of tranquility which is not put together (*asaṅkhata*) and not made up (*akata*).

Cetanā is not an entity or agent but a mental co-efficient causally arisen (*paṭiccasamuppanna*). It is co-nascent with several other co-efficients such as *phassa*, *vedanā*, *saññā* and *manasikāra*. *Cetanā* or the *will* is a function of the personality which it organises into result-oriented action. It is vital to the survival and continuity of the fancied self which determines the life of the personality. The self-advancing personality is bound together by the purposeful effort of the *will*. When the self-centred *will* is overcome the ceaseless effort of becoming ceases and the individual enters an altogether different world of free action performed naturally and disinterestedly.

Cetanā or the *will* which is conditioned by affective and cognitive elements (*vedanā*, *saññā*) may either function as the consciously directed effort on the part of the individual or it may function, as it often does, without conscious deliberation by him. This is easily explained. The truth of the egocentricity of volitional effort is not affected by the question as to whether the individual is aware of it or not. It has been shown that the self-centred *will* is rooted in ignorance and it is precisely this ignorance which prevents him from realising that he is in fact being spurred on into activity by the self-serving *will*. This emphasises the bondage of the *will*. The *will* may, again, being conditioned by ignorance, be formed and directed by the individual himself or it may be formed and directed for him within himself by others.[9]

The *will* originates in the perceptual and conceptual process conditioned by it and conditioning it at the same time. Far from being the master of the situation the individual is held captive by this process.[10]

As long as a part of the volitional determination remains unknown to the individual there will continue to be a constant conflict between what he *wants* to do and what he *ought* to do although both considerations still continue to operate within the realm of self-centred activity. The effort to cultivate humility, for instance, comes into conflict with the need to remain proud. In such cases the individual knowingly asserts the need to feel humble and unknowingly and imperceptibly excludes from his consciousness the more persistent need to feel proud. The latent stage of *cetanā* is denoted by the term *anusaya* wherein the *will* lies dormant until spurred on into active manifestation (*pariyuṭṭhāna*).

Considered in more general terms *manosañcetanā* is the *will* to live, to continue, to become now and hereafter. It feeds the urge to survive and continue

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8 *Imesaṃ kho ahaṃ Tapassi tiṇṇaṃ kammānaṃ ... manokammaṃ mahāsāvajjataraṃ paññāpemi pāpassa kammassa kiriyāya pāpassa kammassa pavattiyā, no tathā kāyakammaṃ no tathā vacīkammaṃ : M.* I, p. 373.

9 *Avijjāpaccayā va sāmaṃ vā taṃ Ānanda kāyasaṅkhāraṃ ... vacīsaṅkhāraṃ ... manosaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharoti ... pare vāssa taṃ Ānanda kāyasaṅkhāraṃ ... vacīsaṅkhāraṃ ... manosaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharonti yaṃ paccayāssa taṃ uppajjati ajjhattaṃ sukhadukkhaṃ. Sampajāno ... vā taṃ Ānanda kāyasaṅkhāraṃ ... vacīsaṅkhāraṃ ... manosaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharoti ... sampajāno va kāyasaṅkhāraṃ ... vacīsaṅkhāraṃ ... manosaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharoti yaṃ paccayāssa taṃ uppajjati ajjhattaṃ sukhadukkhaṃ : S.* II, p. 40.

10 *Cakkhuñ c' āvuso paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇaṃ tiṇṇaṃ saṅgati phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, yaṃ vedeti taṃ sañjānāti, yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vitakketi, yaṃ vitakketi, taṃ papañceti yaṃ papañceti tatonidānaṃ purisaṃ papañcasaññāsaṅkhā samuddacaranti atītānāgatapaccuppannesu cakkhuviññeyyesu rūpesu ... manoviññeyyesu dhammesu : M.* I, pp. 111-112.

to become now and hereafter. It feeds the urge to survive and continue to survive so that the individual can become more and more of what he really is not. It functions by way of mental construction directing the mind in the spheres of moral and immoral activity. Thus, *cetanā* becomes one with *kamma* creating consequences which serve to feed the further intensification of the self-centred activity of the *will*. *Cetanā* which represents the generic form of volitional activity largely manifests itself through specific volitional activities which have been grouped in the suttas under the collective and comprehensive terms, *lobha*, *dosa*, *moha* and their opposites. All these activities produce consequences which sustain the general processes of birth and rebirth.

The teaching on *cetanā* in the suttas clearly indicates that conative development is inseparably connected with cognitive development of the personality. As a matter of fact conation and cognition appear to be different aspects of the same mental process. The levels of the conative process are connected with different levels of mental development and the suttas distinguish between the low (*hīna*), middling (*majjhima*) and subtle (*nipuṇa*) *cetanās* in the spheres of *kāma*, *rūpa*, and *arūpa* (*A*.I, p. 224). The development of ideational thought marks a further stage of sophistication in the conative activity of the individual. The growth of the obsessions 'this is mine' (*etam mama*), 'this am I' (*eso'ham asmi*) and 'this is my self' (*eso me attā*) accounts for the development of the *will*. In the conscious activity of the self the individual is guided by various criteria or considerations such as public opinion (*lokādhipateyya*) the authority of a teacher or his teaching (*dhammādhipateyya*) or his own consciences (*attādhipateyya*).

Cetanā is not passive and reactive but active and creative. It stimulates and arouses persistent activity. It binds the individual to a specific pattern of conduct consistent with its general direction. It sustains activity of the mind until it seeks and obtains the fulfilment of its purposes. In its drive towards a specific objective it also arranges and affects all other associated mental factors. It provides the motive force to the life of the individual in his perennial quest for the achievement of his self-serving ends.

In so far as the teaching on *cetanā* in the suttas is concerned there remain for discussion and exposition only the topics pertaining to the so-called freedom of the *will* and freedom from the *will*.

The expression 'freedom of *will*' or its equivalent is not found in the suttas or other authentic texts recording the teachings of the Buddha and its use in modern expositions only reflects an unstated wish to interpret Buddhist thought in terms of the categories of Western thought. In the expression 'freedom of the *will*' the word 'freedom' appears to be used to mean the ability of a 'morally free agent' to choose between alternative courses of moral action. But the crucial point to remember in respect of the Buddhist teaching on *cetanā* is that no matter what course of moral action is chosen after oscillation and upon deliberation it still continues to be governed, determined and directed by the self-centred *will*. In the Buddhist view the difference between moral and immoral action is that the former conduces to one's betterment (*sugati*) and the latter conduces to one's deterioration (*duggati*). The most that one could expect in consequence of performing good deeds is birth in better states of life whereas freedom is assured only to those who have overcome and extinguished the fire of the self-centred *will* (*Saggaṃ sugatino yanti parinibbanti anāsavā* : *Dhp. v.* 126). Hence the ability to choose between courses of moral action, far from constituting a 'freedom' merely expresses an empirical truth, verifiable and demonstrable that the average individual has the capacity for initiating the life of moral action. This undoubtedly the Buddha does not deny, for he has been specifically described in the suttas as a teacher of moral action in contradistinction to other teachers such as Makkhali Gosāla who have been described as those denying the possibility for such moral action (*Samaṇo khalu bho Gotamo kammavādi kiriyavādi* : *M*. II, p. 167). But the recognition of the capacity for initiating moral action cannot be strictly considered as a basis for saying that the Buddha teaches that the *will* is free. This statement does not make much sense. If we may conceptually distinguish between the individual and his *will* it is more appropriate to ask whether the individual is in bondage or in freedom as long as his actions are guided by the *will* That which is willed and that which wills is mentally constructed, put together, made up, causally arisen and conducive to disharmony (*Yaṃ kho pana kiñci bhūtaṃ saṅkhataṃ cetayitaṃ paṭiccasamuppannaṃ tad aniccaṃ yad aniccaṃ taṃ dukkhaṃ* : *A*. V, p. 187). The personality of the individual, as shown already, is a psycho-physical complex governed by causal relatedness. This causal doctrine only asserts that all mental and material factors are determinate rather than deterministic in the sense of a thorough-going fatalism (*niyatisaṅgativāda*). That which determines is *saṅkhāra*. That which is determined

is *saṅkhata*. But the determined (*saṅkhata*) in turn determines other factors. Stated in other terms what this means is that the *will* performs the twin functions of determining and being determined. However, to be involved in willing is one thing. To be aware of willing without approbation and condemnation, without evaluation and comparison is quite another. This is where knowledge and insight come in. By way of gradual training or by a flash of insight it is possible for the individual to see, in himself, by himself and for himself, the nature and function of the *will* at work yearning and striving, all the while obsessed by the idea of self. The *will* may be directed towards wholesome action (*kusala*) but notwithstanding this discrimination the *will* is seen through insight merely to have changed its pasture.

In the light of the above considerations it is now easy to examine the Buddha's teaching on the freedom resulting from the cessation of the *will*. Freedom of action, in the Buddhist view, can and ought to mean only one thing, namely, the ability to act disinterestedly rather than react interestedly in response to sensory stimulation which constantly offers opportunities for sensual gratification. To be guided by the unfettered *will* is to come into conflict with the suppressed impulses and to yield and succumb to the innate instincts. These mental factors have been categorised under the terms, *saṃyojana, nīvaraṇa, anusaya, āsava, kilesa, upakkilesa, ogha, yoga* etc. These are excluded from the conscious mind but they lie dormant beneath its conscious layer and in view of their deceitful nature and function have been described in the later texts as *vañcakadhamma*. The cessation of willed action and its results can only be brought about by insight leading to the cessation of *dukkha* itself. The Buddha emphatically states that without insight there can be no possibility of the cessation of the volitional activities.[11]

Through volitional activity one clings to the objects of sensory stimulation. Hence detachment from these can come about only through non-clinging to them through such activity (*Anabhisaṅkharonto anabhisañcetayanto na kiñ ci loke upādiyati anupādiyaṃ na paritassati aparitassaṃ paccattaññeva parinibbāyati khīṇā jāti vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ nāparaṃ itthattāyāti pajānāti : S.* II, p. 82). This statement of the Buddha very clearly establishes that the inward peace of Nibbāna comes about only upon the utter cessation of volitional activity of the mind.

It may be recalled that *cetanā* has been equated to *kamma* in the *Nibbedhika-pariyāya Sutta* (*A.* III, pp. 415 ff.). The same sutta also records the Buddha as teaching the path leading to the cessation of *kamma* and it is but legitimate to conclude, on the basis of equivalence, that this means also the path leading to the cessation of *cetanā*. On the basis of the equivalence between *cetanā* and *saṅkhāra* it also follows that the path leading to the cessation of *kamma* is identical with the path leading to the cessation of *saṅkhāra* (*saṅkhāranirodhagāminī paṭipadā : S.* III, p. 60). The three paths leading to the cessation of *cetanā*, *kamma* and *saṅkhāra* are identical with the Noble Eightfold Path (*ariya aṭṭhaṅgika magga*) itself.

Cetanā in the Theravāda Abhidhamma

In the Theravāda Abhidhamma we have a greater elaboration and formulation of the teaching on *cetanā* as given in the suttas of the Pali nikāyas. The Abhidhammikas who were avowed analysts (*Vibhajjavādi*) have provided us with more detailed definitions and classifications in respect of *cetanā*. These definitions and classifications yield to us deeper philosophical insights into aspects of *cetanā* which were but implicit in the suttas. Buddhaghosa, in his commentary to the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, the first book of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, uses the well-known four-fold Abhidhammika formula of Characteristic (*lakkhaṇa*), Function (*rasa*), Mode of Manifestation (*paccupaṭṭhāna*) and Proximate cause (*padaṭṭhāna*) which is used widely by all Theravādin commentators for the comprehensive determination of the essential aspects of meaning of a given term, for the purpose of elucidating the import of the term *cetanā* (*Atthasālinī*, pp. 111-12). Volition is that which co-ordinates, that is, it binds closely to itself associated states as objects. This constitutes the essential characteristic of *cetanā*.[12] The distinctive function of *cetanā* is conation. There is no such thing as volition in the four planes of existence (*catubhūmakacetanā*) without the characteristic of co-ordination and construction because all volition has it. Volition as self-centred effort is found only in moral and immoral states. By this statement Buddhaghosa clarifies beyond any doubt that this *cetanā* is altogether absent in the liberated individual.

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11 *Nāhaṃ bhikkhave sañcetanikānaṃ kammānaṃ katānaṃ upacitānaṃ appaṭisaṃviditvā vyantibhāvaṃ vadāmi . . . na evāhaṃ bhikkhave sañcetanikānaṃ kammānaṃ katānaṃ upacitānaṃ appaṭisaṃviditvā dukkhassantakiriyaṃ vadāmi : A.* V, p. 298.

12 *Cetayatī ti cetanā. Saddhiṃ attanā sampayuttadhamme ārammaṇe abisandahatī ti attho. Sā cetayitalakkhaṇā cetanā bhāva-lakkhaṇā ti attho : Dhs.A.* p. 111.

The sense of accumulation implicit in mental construction and co-ordination is brought out in the use of the term *āyūhana* denoting effort. Hence it can only occur in the goal-directed sphere of moral action (...*āyūhanarasattā pana kusalākusalesu eva hoti* : loc. cit). This volition is exceedingly energetic and it makes, so to say, a double effort, a double exertion (*Cetanā pana atireka-vāyāmā ti diguṇa-ussāhā diguṇavāyāmā*). In order to better elucidate the function of *cetanā* Buddhaghosa gives us three similes, one of a landowner, one of a student monitor and the other of a carpenter. Volition is like the nature of a landowner or proprietory farmer who goes down to his fields together with fifty-five other strong men. He is exceedingly energetic, full of volunteering zeal. He orders his men about in the performance of acts such as reaping with sickles whilst himself taking a prominent part in them. The simile is used to suggest that volition is like the role of the landowner and that the fifty-five moral states which arise as factors of moral consciousness are like the fifty-five strong men. The mode of manifestation of *cetanā* is by way of direction and organisation (*Sā panesā saṃvidhānapaccupaṭṭhāna*). This function is clarified with reference to that of the student monitor or the head-carpenter. The student monitor, seeing his teacher coming from afar, himself recites his lessons whilst also making the other students recite theirs. When he takes the lead in recitation the others follow. Similar is the case of the head carpenter who cuts the wood and also gets his assistants to do likewise, the whole operation depending on his direction and organisation. To drive home the import of the term *cetanā* a fourth simile is also added, namely, that of the general of an army who does battle himself and who at the same time also directs his soldiers into battle. These similes serve to show that the *will* or conation is associated with other mental factors but that it plays the dominant role by way of direction and organisation (... *evam esā pi attano kiccena ārammaṇe vattamāne aññe pi sampayuttadhamme attano attano kiriyāya pavatteti*).

In his exposition of *cetanā* in the *Visuddhimagga*, Buddhaghosa identifies the function of *cetanā* with that of *saṅkhāra*, namely, the function of mental construction and accumulation (*Yā kāci vā pana cetanā bhavo, sampayuttā āyūhanā saṅkhārā nānaṃ : Vism.* p. 580). By virtue of its function as construction and accumulation, *cetanā* is *bhava* and it constitutes one of the five factors in the determination of the causality of rebirth (...*cetanā bhavo, iti .... āyatiṃ paṭisandhiyā paccayā* : loc. cit.) In his analysis of the factors involved in wholesome thoughts in the sphere of *kāmāvacara* consciousness, Buddhaghosa lists as many as twenty-seven mental co-efficients the dominant among them being *cetanā* which is described as functioning regularly and naturally in its specific capacity (*niyatā sarūpena āgatā* : ibid. p. 462).

Buddhaghosa clearly identifies *cetanā* with *kamma*. It cannot be said that volition is anything other than *kamma* (.... *ayaṃ nāma cetanā kammaṃ na hotī ti na vattabbā : Atthasālinī*, p. 87). Even the volition associated with the cognition of the five external senses constitutes *kamma* (*Antamaso pañca viññāṇa-sampayuttā pi hi cetanā Mahāpakaraṇe kammante va nidassitthā* : loc. cit.). In this connection Buddhaghosa asks and answers his own question as to what constitutes the meaning of *kamma*. 'What does *kamma* do ? It harmonises, co-ordinates, arranges, thinks upon, stimulates and decides. This being so, what does volition harmonise, arrange and co-ordinate ? The co-existent factors. For volition harmonises, arranges, co-ordinates, thinks upon, stimulates and decides the associated aggregates that are co-existent.[13] In order to authenticate his views on this subject, Buddhaghosa cites a number of quotations from the suttas which include the *Nibbedhika-pariyāya Sutta* already referred to above (*Atthasālinī*, p. 88 : quotations from *A*. II, p. 157 f., p. 230 f.; *A*. III, p. 415; *S*. II, p. 39 f.; *M*. III, p. 208 f.).

If the *will* of the worldly individual is self-centred and result-oriented, how can its resultant *kamma* be made to cease ? Wholesome and unwholesome *kamma* do not result in cessation of *kamma* but only in further purification and impurification. Knowledge and insight, however, help us to see and understand the self-serving function of *cetanā* in its natural state. The resolve born of this knowledge and insight may also be called *cetanā* but of a different order altogether. This *cetanā* activates *kamma* of a different order, that is, action of a non-moral kind, which is neither wholesome nor unwholesome, productive of neither purity nor impurity and which, though itself *kamma*, conduces to the destruction and cessation of *kamma*.[14]

The insightful ability to overcome the self-centred *will* is yielded by the cultivation of the eight steps of the Noble Path as well as by the

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13 *Kammaṃ nāme'tam kiṃ karoti-ti. Āyūhati abhisaṅkharoti piṇḍam karoti ceteti kappeti pakappeti. Kenaṃ evaṃ pañcaviññāṇacetanā kiṃ āyūhati abhisaṅkharoti piṇḍam karoti ? Sahajāta-dhamme. Sā pi hi sahajātasampayuttakhandhe āyūhati abhisaṅkharoti piṇḍam karoti ceteti kappeti pakappeti* : op. cit. p. 87 f.

14 *Tatra bhikkhave yam idaṃ kammaṃ kaṇhaṃ kaṇhavipākaṃ tassa pahānāya yā cetanā,...yaṃ pidaṃ kammaṃ kaṇhasukkaṃ kaṇhasukkavipākaṃ tassa pahānāya yā cetanā idaṃ vuccati bhikkhave kammaṃ akaṇhamasukkaṃ akaṇhamasukkavipākaṃ kammaṃ kammakkhayāya saṃvattati : A*. II, p. 232.

qualities listed under the Seven Factors of Enlightenment (*satta sambojjhaṅga : A.* II, pp. 236-37 quoted in *Atthasālini*, p. 89). Awareness and contemplation reinforced by critical introspection help us to get outside the rapid course of self-centred volitional activity and the resultant insight helps us to have a dispassionate over-view of the mainsprings of action impelling our selfish lives. In view of the polarity in meaning between the self-centred *cetanā* and *cetanā* as a factor of enlightenment, Buddhaghosa has seen the unsatisfactoriness of using the same term in both senses. Accordingly, in the commentary to the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* where the relevant passage occurs, this latter *cetanā* has been suitably qualified to convey the specialised meaning (*Pahānāya yā cetanā ti ettha vivaṭṭagāminī maggacetanā veditabbā. Sā hi kammakkhayāya saṃvattati : Manorathapūraṇī* : III, p. 213).

This latter *cetanā* is not identical in meaning with the *cetanā* used in the famous definition '*Cetanāhaṃ bhikkhave kammaṃ vadāmi*'. Here the meaning is that coordination and construction of associated mental factors by the self-serving *will* (*Cetanāhaṃ ti cetanaṃ ahaṃ : idha sabbasaṃgāhikā vidahanacetanā gahitā* : ibid. III, p. 408). This *cetanā* given to mental construction does not avail in the case of action leading to cessation of moral and immoral action (*Na cetanāya karaṇīyan ti na cetetvā kappetvā pakappetvā kātabbam* : ibid. V, p. 1). Self-centred volition assures morally significant consequences whereas the *cetanā* of the liberated person is altogether free of such consequences (*Khīṇāsavassa ... cetanā avipākadhammatam āpajjanti* : ibid. III, p. 146). In order to distinguish between these *cetanās* Buddhaghosa has divided them under four distinct types as follows :—

1. *Kusala cetanā*
2. *Akusala cetanā*
3. *Vipāka cetanā* and
4. *Kiriya cetanā*.

The fourth type, namely, *Kiriya cetanā* covers the mentation involved in the life of the liberated individuals or *ariya* (ibid. II, p. 274).

It is generally but erroneously assumed that the *will*, apart from being anything else, is conscious deliberation on the part of the individual. But it need not be known to the individual in all instances of its operation. This has already been stated with reference to the Buddha's own sayings. Buddhaghosa clarifies and emphasises this matter further. On the basis of canonical authority he has distinguished clearly between four types of *cetanā* : 1. *Sayaṃkatamūlakā cetanā* 2. *Aṇattimūlakā cetanā* 3 *Sampajānamūlakā cetanā* and 4. *Asampajānamūlakā cetanā* (ibid. III, p. 145). The first type includes all volitional activity impelling the individual from within himself. The second type includes volitional activity induced within the individual by others prevailing on him. The third type includes volitional activity which arises and operates within the individual with his knowledge that it does so arise and operate, while the fourth type includes those volitional activities which operate without such knowledge.

Contrary to the views of the other Hīnayānist teachers (referred to and discussed in the sequel) Buddhaghosa does not make a basic distinction between the *cetanā* and *cetayitvā* as denoting two different types of *kamma*. The essential function of volition is construction and this is common to *kamma* distinguished as *manokamma*, *vacīkamma* and *kāyakamma* (*Cetanā kāyakammaṃ nāma .. cetanā vacīkammaṃ nāma ... cetanā manokammaṃ nāma : Atthasālinī*, p. 96). A volition constitutes *kamma* even if it is not carried out physically. For instance the mere harbouring of criminal intent to kill amounts to *kamma*, and that by ill-will, not by actual life-taking (*Manodvāre pana vadhakacetanāya uppannamattāya eva kammapathabhedo hoti, so va kho vijjāpādanavasena na pāṇātipātavasena* : ibid. p.90).

Buddhadatta's exposition of *cetanā* is practically identical with that of Buddhaghosa even to the extent of the use of simile in the illustration of points. It is very likely that the Ā hidhammika exegetists had little scope for additions to doctrine as they had to conform to the tradition of interpretation persistently upheld by the orthodox Mahāvihāra. But in a comment on his definition of *cetanā* in the *Abhidhammāvatāra* (p.18) his commentator Sumaṅgala has made an attempt at further clarification of meaning. Remarking on Buddhadatta's definition of *cetanā* as one of co-ordination, Sumaṅgala says that this co-ordination must be understood in terms of construction and application as well as inducement of other associated states towards corresponding activity.[15] The active effort involved in *cetanā* is likened to the agitated motions of one at the moment of being awakened from his sleep (*Cetayitalakkhaṇā ti vuddokkantassa pabuddhakkhaṇe sambhamapavatti viya cetaso ussāhabhāvalakkhaṇā* : loc. cit).

15 *Abhisandahatī ti pabandhati pavatteti, gaṇhatha gaṇhatha ti vadanti viya sampayutta-dhamme ārammaṇe pavojeti, sakasakakicceru vavatthapeti ti attho : Abhidhammattha-vikāsinī*, p. 115.

Ānanda, the author of the *Abhidhamma-mūla-ṭīkā*, who shows far greater familiarity with the Indian Buddhist philosophical traditon than any other Pali writer in Sri Lanka, has shown considerable interest in the further clarification of the meaning and scope of operation of the *will* in regard to both moral and non-moral action. As already briefly noted above, the Buddha's all too brief defintion of *cetanā* as *kamma* lent itself to interpretations that appear somewhat divergent in regard to distinction and classification. Ānanda takes up this matter for a fresh examination. In what sense is *cetanā* equivalent to *kamma* ? *Cetanā* is considered the forerunner of *kamma* only from a temporal point of view. As a matter of fact, however, *kamma* shares the nature of *cetanā* all the time. The expression 'having willed one does action' (*cetayitvā kammaṃ karoti ti*) is to be understood only in the context of a temporal sequence where firstly one wills and thereafter one does an act. Though *cetanā* and *kamma* are in reality co-eval and concurrent still it is not unfair to consider one as anterior when viewed as cause and the other as posterior when viewed as result. It is in this sense that one could say intelligibly that one wills with the *will*, expresses it through verbal and bodily impulsions and, say, craves with the mind. The definition which identifies *cetanā* with *kamma* must be understood clearly with reference to this consideration.[16] *Cetanā* certainly is *kamma* in view of the canonical statements to the effect that it is productive of happiness and misery. As exemplified in the suttas in so far as speech and limbs are considered bases of action by way of physical motions it is fair to consider mental volitional acts such as craving as 'doors' of the mind. It is also however possible to consider speech and limbs as instrumental causes for bringing about the result of volitional expression such as craving in the same way that axes can be considered as instrumental causes for cutting operations. Therefore, expressions such as 'if one has done acts with one's body' may be accepted as meaningful statements.[17]

In the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* of Anuruddha we come across the fully-fledged Theravāda theory of the psychology of perception wherein *cetanā* occurs as one of the seven essential psychic elements present in every conscious, ethically significant thought. These seven mental factors are technically referred to as the *sabbacittasādhāraṇadhammā*, literally, factors that are common to all thoughts or attitudes, whether moral, immoral or merely operative without being productive of consequences. The seven are *phassa* or sensory stimulation, *vedanā* or feeling, *saññā* or cognition, *cetanā* or volition, *ekaggatā* or mental focus, *jīvitindriya* or vitality and *manasikāra* or attention. This theory of the seven factors is already anticipated in the *Milindapañha* where it is specifically introduced as one that is proper to the A hidhamma.[18] These seven factors are said to spring into play only on occasions of perception. If this be so then it follows that between any two perceptions they are in abeyance in a dormant or latent stage and this stage is none other than *anusaya*. We may, therefore, recognise that in respect of *cetanā* with which alone we are here concerned there are three distinct stages corresponding to the time before, during and after any given perception. These three stages are technically called *anusaya*, *pariyuṭṭhāna* and *vyatikkama*, namely, the latent stage, the active stage and the passing stage.

The Abhidhamma also recognises three distinct stages in an act of *kamma*: 1. volitional preparation, 2. the act proper and 3. the consequence. Moral responsibility attaches to all three of these stages. In passing moral judgement on an act one is called upon to take into consideration the subjective as well as the objective elements involved and the opportunities for doing so are amply provided for in the thorough-going psychological analyses of the Abhidhamma. Moral judgement is in direct relation to the volition but its expression in deed and word and its consequences are not left out of account.

Cetanā in the Sarvāstivāda

Later Buddhist thought of the Hīnayāna as well as the Mahāyāna concerning the exposition of *cetanā* is in basic agreement with that of the suttas of the Pali nikāyas and the Theravāda Abhidhamma, the differences pertaining largely to details of classification. The Sarvāstivādins quote the

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16 *Cetayitvā kammaṃ karoti ti ettha yasmā purimacetanāya cetayitvā sanniṭṭhānakammaṃ karoti tasmā cetanāpubbakaṃ kammaṃ taṃ cetanāsambhavaṃ sā ti cetanaṃ ahaṃ kammaṃ vadāmī ti attho. Atha vā samānakālaṭṭe pi kāraṇakriyā pubbakāla viya vattuṃ yutta. Phalakriyā ca aparakāla viya. Yasmā ca cetanāya cetayitvā kāyavacīmanokammaṃ upacinoti tasmā cetanāya kriyaṃkarotīti tasmā tassa kriyāya cetanaṃ ahaṃ kammaṃ vadāmī ti attho : Abhidhammamūlaṭīkā*, p. 58.

17 *Cetanā ca sukhadukkhuppādikā vuttā ti tassa kammabhāvo siddho. Yathā pana suttāni ṭhitāni tathā copanakriyānisayabhūtā kāyavacībhijjhādikiriyānissayo ca manodvārāni. Yāya pana cetanāya tehi kāyādīhi kāraṇabhūtehi copanābhijjhādikiriyāni karonti vani ādīhi viya chedanādīni sā cetanā kammanti dvārapavattiyampi kammadvārabhedanañca dissati. Evaṃ sati kāyena ce kataṃ kammanti gāthāyo ativiya yujjati* : loc. cit.

18 *Thero abhidhamma-saṃyuttāya kathāya rājānaṃ milindaṃ saññāpesi : Idha mahārāja cakkhuñ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇaṃ tamsahajātā phasso vedanā saññā cetanā ekaggatā jīvitindriyaṃ manasikāro ti evaṃ ete dhammā paccayato jāyanti : Milindapañha*, p. 56.

Buddha as saying that *cetanā* is equivalent to *kamma* (*Uktaṃ hi bhagavatā : cetanā karma cetayitvā. tat punaḥ tridhoktaṃ kāyakarma vākkarma manaskarma ca iti : Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*, p. 121). But they interpret the Buddha as having made a distinction between two kinds of *karma*, *cetanā-karma* and *cetayitvā karma*, namely, volition proper and resultant volitional action (*Sūtre dve karmāni nirdiśyoktam dve karmāni cetanā karma cetayitvā ca iti* : ibid. p. 118). Vasubandhu in his *Abhidharmakośa* confirms that *karma*, which explains the diversity characterising the world, is thus two fold, namely, volition and its result, and that *cetanā* is, therefore, purely mental (*Karmajaṃ lokavaicitryaṃ cetanā tatkṛtaṃ ca tat, cetanā mānasaṃ karma tajje vākkāyakarmani : AbhK*. IV, p. 1). Yaśomitra, the Sautrāntika, in expounding the Sarvāstivāda view, agrees that *cetanā* is mental construction, the vibration, as it were, of the mind inducing it towards purposeful activity (*Cetanā cittābhisaṃskāra iti cittapraspandaḥ. Praspanda iva praspanda ityarthaḥ : Sphuṭārthābhidharmakośa-vyākhyā*, II, p. 42). This same gloss is repeated in the *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*, the commentary on the *Abhidharmadīpa*, which appears to have been written to affirm the orthodox Vaibhāṣika views particularly for the purpose of refuting the heterodox views expressed by Vasubandhu in the name of the Vaibhāṣikas (*Cittābhisaṃskāra cetanā : Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*, p. 69).

Consistent with the teaching in the suttas of the Pali nikāyas, the Sarvāstivādins also explain *saṃskāra* in terms of *cetanā* basing themselves on the word of the Buddha (*Sūtre ṣaṭ cetanākāya ityuktam iti. Saṃskāraskandhaḥ katamaḥ ? Ṣaṭ cetanākāya iti : Sphuṭārthābhidharmakośavyākhyā*, I, p. 42). Here *cetanā* is said to be equivalent to *saṃskāra* on account of the fact that it is the dominant factor in mental construction. It is clearly emphasised that mental construction is purposeful becoming which makes the individual to resolve thus : 'I shall become this, I shall become that'. The entire range of such mental construction is collectively referred to as the aggregate of *saṃskāra*.[19]

In regard to the content of volition there appear to have been differences of interpretation between the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas. This difference of opinion is in respect of the interpretation of a passage in what both parties accept as the *Sañcetanīya Sūtra* whose Pali parallel is found in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (V, p. 293). The Sautrāntikas hold that according to this sūtra *abhidhyā*, *vyāpāda* and *mithyādṛṣṭi* are purely mental acts, and therefore, ought to be included within *cetanā* proper. The Sarvāstivādins, however, vehemently disagree with this interpretation and hold that these three mental factors are rather *kleśas* that produce *karma* than *karma* itself. More specifically they hold that these *dharmas* are *mano-duścarita* and not *manas-karma*. To say with the Sautrāntikas that *kleśa* and *karma* are identical is also to say that the crow and the crane are also identical. The vehemence with which the Sarvāstivādins opposed the Sautrāntikas in this and other matters has given rise to a rare instance of *odium theologicum* when the latter are castigated for misinterpreting the content of *cetanā* and are called men with dogs' tails which never lose their kink.[20] The Theravādins, incidentally, hold the view, in relation to this controversy, that *abhijjhā byāpāda* and *micchādiṭṭhi* are *dhammas* associated with volition rather than volition itself. (*Atthasālinī*, p. 89).

In regard to the theory of perception the Sarvāstivādins agree with the Theravādins to the extent that *cetanā* is an essential element in all thoughts and attitudes irrespective of whether these are moral, immoral or merely operative although they differ from each other as to the number of such essential elements, the former holding that these are as many as ten while the latter hold, as already stated, that these are only seven.[21]

Cetanā in the Mahāyāna

Compared to the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins, the idealistic schools of the Mahāyāna have shown relatively less interest in detailed analysis of the data of empirical psychology. This task they left to the great analytical teachers of the realistic schools, and the Mahāyāna expositions of *cetanā* reflect the formative influence exercised upon them by the teachings in the suttas and the exegeses of the Hīnayānists.

Following the interpretation of the Sarvāstivādins the Yogācāra retains the distinction drawn earlier

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19 *Abhisaṃskaraṇe pradhānā iti evaṃ sati cetaso 'syāṃ ityabhisaṃskaraṇe pradhānā. Chanda-prāptyādayastu nānuvidhāyitvāt tadākāraheturbhāvānanuvidhānataḥ saṃskāraskandha eva veditavyaḥ. Tad evaṃ sati saṃskaraṇe pravṛtto dharmarāśiḥ saṃskārā ityuktaṃ bhavati* ; loc. cit. ; *Abhkvy*. p. 42.

20 *Abhidhyābhiaya eva karmasvabhāvāni iti sthitibhāgiyāḥ. Tacca na, karmaklekaikatvadoṣāt. Sthitibhāgiyā nāma śakyāḥ śvalāṅgulikadvitīyanāmānaḥ. Te khalvabhidhyādīni manaskarma-svabhāvānicchanti. Teṣām karmaklekaikatvasaṃkaraḥ prāpnoti. Yadi kaścit kleśaḥ karmapi syād vāyasaḥ sāraso syāt : Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*, p. 148.

21 *Vedanā cetanā saṃjñācchandaḥ sparśo matiḥ smṛtiḥ-manaskārādhimokṣaśca samādhiḥ sarvacetasi : Abhidharmakośa*, II, 24 ; *Daśadharmā mahābhaumā nityaṃjñācetanāsmṛtiḥ-chandaḥ sparśo'dhimokṣaśca dhiḥ samādhir manaskṛtiḥ : Abhidharmadīpa*, v. 112.

between *cetanā-karma* and *cetayitvā-karma*. Asaṅga, the author of the *Abhidharma-samuccaya*, however, provides us with a set of definitions which shows that *cetanā* is to be interpreted morally whereas *cetayitvā-karma* is to be taken instrumentally (*cetanā-karma katamat? puṇya-karma, apuṇya-karma, ānijya-karma ca. Cetayitvā-karma katamat? kāyakarma, vāk-karma, manas-karma ca: Abhidharma-samuccaya*, p. 53).

Sthiramati, in his Bhāṣya on the *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi* of Vasubandhu, identifies *cetanā* with *saṃskāra. Cetanā* is mental action in terms of mental construction. The mind begins to agitate in relation to purposeful activity only in the presence of *cetanā* just like the agitation and attraction of iron in the presence of magnetic power.[22]

The Mādhyamikas agree with this exposition of meaning of *cetanā*. Chandrakīrti, the celebrated commentator of Nāgarjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, recognises the distinctive character of *cetanā* to consist in its activity of mental construction (*Cittābhisaṃskāramanaskarmalakṣaṇā cetanā ca iti: Prasannapadā, Mdhvṛ.* p. 311).

W. S. KARUNARATNA

CETAS. See CITTA.

CETASIKA (Skt. *Caitasika, Caitta*). Generic term in Buddhist phychological analysis denoting, in its widest sense, all aspects of mentation considered variously as psychic function-events, mental co-officients, mental concomitants, mental constituents, mental factors, mental adjuncts, mental elements, mental faculties, etc. In its more specific technical signification, the term denotes one of the classes of ultimate elements of existence into which the universe is objectively classified, *cetasika* being considered a species under the genus *dharma* and the concept it thus embodies is essentially a creation and formulation of the later Abhidharmikas. Since the classifications of *cetasikas* are an outcome of scholasticism, there is considerable divergence among the schools of Buddhism in respect of their order and arrangement, content and nature and total number of their classes and sub-classes. The history of Buddhist philosophy records three major classifications of *cetasikas*, each compiled independently of the others, and these are listed in the classical thought of the Theravādins, the Sarvāstivādins and the Yogācārins.

Cetasika in the Pali Nikāyas

The Abhidhamma theory of the *cetasikas* is unknown to the suttas of the earlier nikāyas, where the word *cetasika* first occurs as an adjectival form in the singular in the literal sense of mental as opposed to physical — *kāyika* (*D.* II, p. 306; *M.* III, pp. 287–8; *S.* V, p. 209; *A.* I, pp. 81, 157). There is as yet no technical distinction drawn between *citta* and *cetasika* and specific reference to the expression '*citta-cetasika*' occurs for the first time only in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* (p. 84) which, though formally a part of the Sutta Piṭaka, is decidedly an analytical composition sharing all the essential characteristics of the works of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka.

Almost all mental states, which were later classified by the Abhidharmikas under the generic term *cetasika*, occur in the suttas under their identical nomenclature with this significant difference that in the suttas they are called not *cetasikas* but *dhammas*. The word *dhamma* is, of course, used in a wide variety of senses already in the sutta, but its application to mean objects of mind in general certainly appears to be earlier than its application to mean ultimate elements of existence covering both physical and mental objects. When *dhamma* superceded all other terms as the most generic term comprehending all objects of mind and matter alike, the early Buddhist phychologists were compelled to seek another generic term whose signification could be limited to factors of mentation alone. Thus, in the interests of system and consistency, the Abhidharmikas finally adopted *cetasika* as their generic term to cover all mental objects in general, both sensuous and non-sensuous.

The origin of the classical theory of *cetasikas* can be traced, in the final analysis, to the fundamentally anti-metaphysical outlook of the Buddha, resulting from his insight into the causality and conditionality of existence, including mentation. Consistent with this insight, life is understood to be in constant flux and the belief in a soul as a changeless substance is discarded as a myth effectively preventing insight into reality as it is (*M.* I, p. 137 f.). Accordingly, the mind itself is recognised in a dynamic sense. Consciousness as a process of awareness is seen to be nothing more than a collocation of causal factors (*Aññatra paccayā natthi viññāṇassa sambhavo: M.* I, p. 257). This non-substantialist teaching encouraged among the Buddha's disciples a genuine and serious interest in the critical observation, investigation and analysis of the data of psychological life. The function of the religious life, at the contemplative level, was itself defined as the choiceless awareness of the nascence, persistence

22 *Cetanā cittābhisaṃskāra manaskṛtiḥ. Yasyāṃ satyāṃ ālambanaṃ prati cetasaḥ prasyanda iva bhavati upekṣānubhavādir eva svabhāvaḥ: Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya*, comment on verse 3.

and cessance of the multitude of mental states that arise in consciousness at different stages of ecstatic development. The *Anupada Sutta* (*M.* III, pp. 25–29) which may be considered the earliest literary source of the theory of *cetasikas*, quotes the Buddha commending Sāriputta for his exercises in the introspective awareness of mental phenomena as follows: 'Here, monks, Sāriputta, aloof from pleasures of the senses and unskilled states of mind, enters on and abides in the first meditation which is accompanied by initial and discursive thought, born of aloofness, rapturous and joyful. And those mental states which belong therein, namely, initial thought (*vitakka*), discursive thought (*vicāra*), rapture (*pīti*), joy (*sukha*), onepointedness of mind (*cittekaggatā*), impingement (*phassa*), feeling (*vedanā*), perception (*saññā*), will (*cetanā*), desire (*chanda*), determination (*adhimokkha*), effort (*viriya*), mindfulness (*sati*), equanimity (*upekkhā*), attention (*manasikāra*) are uninterruptedly set up by him; known to him these states arise, known they persist, known they disappear. He comprehends thus: Thus indeed states that have not been in me come to be; having been they pass away. He, not feeling attracted by these states, not feeling repelled, independent, not infatuated, freed, released, dwells with a mind unconfined. He comprehends: There is greater freedom further on' (*M.* III, p. 25; *Middle Length Sayings*, III, p. 78). This intensive culture of introspective awareness brought to light a wide variety of mental states which then had to be named and classified and the suttas bear witness to the multifarious ways and means devised by the ancient teachers for this purpose. This wealth of data which in the later Abhidhamma was neatly and conveniently classified under the generic term *cetasika* is found scattered in the nikāyas listed under a wide variety of overlapping classifications including *khandha*, *āyatana*, *dhātu*, *indriya*, *bala*, *nīvaraṇa*, *saṃyojana*, *kilesa*, *mūla*, *jhāna*, *magga* and *brahmavihāra*.

The elements of mind and matter have lent themselves in Buddhist thought to classification under two distinct types, namely, the subjective and the objective. The categories of *khandha*, *āyatana* and *dhātu* constitute subjective classifications of the component parts of a personality. The classification of *cetasikas* into distinct classes and sub-classes was beyond the scope of the *khandhas* which were but aggregates. Moreover, the *khandha* classification could accommodate only three distinct *cetasikas*, namely, feeling, perception and will under the *vedanākkhandha*, *saññākkhandha* and *saṅkhārakkhandha* respectively. The categories of *āyatana* and *dhātu* were found to be equally ill-equipped to handle the classification of the growing number of *cetasikas* for these had all to be dumped indiscriminately either under the *dhammāyatana* as objects of *manāyatana* or under *dhammadhātu* as objects of *manodhātu*. The inadequacy of these categories was increasingly realised as the interest of the Buddhist phychologists shifted gradually from subjective to objective classification of all phenomena, both physical and mental.

Cetasika in the Pali Abhidhamma

The Abhidhamma Piṭaka marks the second stage in the development of the Theravāda theory of *cetasikas*. The *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, earliest of the works of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, reflects a stage which is prior to the formal adoption of *cetasika* as a generic term for all mental states. After the manner of the *Anupada Sutta*, the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* continues to enumerate mental states which arise in different stages of consciousness. By defining and classifying these mental states, the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* is able to determine the exact and distinctive character of various types of consciousness relevant to the culture of moral and religious life. As in the *Anupada Sutta* mental states are here referred to as *dhammas*. The *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* adds considerably to the number of *dhammas* but no attempt is yet made to define and determine a final number of such *dhammas*. As a matter of fact, far from claiming dogmatic certitude in this respect, the compilers of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* concede the point that the list of *dhammas* enumerated under each type of consciousness need not be considered altogether exhaustive and they have been thoughtful enough to add a saving clause at the end of each such enumeration as follows: '... these or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced states there are on that occasion' (*ye vā pana tasmiṃ samaye aññepi atthi paṭiccasamuppannā arūpino dhammā*). The opening words of such saving clauses were coined into a technical term '*Yevāpanaka*' by later compilers who found in it a convenient point of entry to augment the number of *cetasikas*.

The multiple enumeration of *cetasikas* involving the repetition of parallel factors point to a lack of system and philosophical sophistication in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*. But this lack of system, noted by Buddhaghosa himself (*Atthasālinī*, p. 135), is more apparent than real for the *cetasikas* constitute a relational system of factors each of which has multiple internal relations within a single moment of consciousness as well as multiple external relations to past and future moments. The list of fifty-six

cetasikas enumerated under the first type of wholesome consciousness of the sensuous sphere (*kāmāvacara*) could, for instance, be reduced to thirty-one by the elimination of apparently superfluous factors but in reality each of the fifty-six *cetasikas* is claimed to represent a distinct and vital relational value.

Reference to the dual division of *citta-cetasika* is found only in the later portion of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* (§§ 1187–90, 1282, 1284) and this can be regarded as anticipating the later philosophic need for a more systematic scheme of classification of the elements of the mind. The definition of *cetasika* given in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* (§ 1189) as the *khandhas* of feeling, perception and will adds nothing new to our knowledge drawn from the suttas.

The *Kathāvatthu*, the last of the works of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, reflects a stage wherein the term *cetasika* had gained currency as the generic term for all coefficients of the mind. It records the first ever definition of the term *cetasika* in its new technical signification as 'mental phenomena which are concomitant, co-existent, conjoined with consciousness, have their genesis and cessation, physical basis and object in common with it' (*dhammā cittena sahagatā sahajātā saṃsaṭṭhā sampayuttā ekuppādā ekanirodhā ekavatthukā ekārammaṇā : Kvu.* II, p. 338).

In their anxiety to authenticate and validate the terminology of *citta-cetasika* in its new technical signification, the compilers of the *Kathāvatthu* have sought to father it on the Buddha himself, but it is significant that the statement that they attribute to the Buddha in the course of a dispute which they had with some of their own co-religionists who denied the separate existence of *cetasikas*, has not been traced in any canonical scripture (*Kvu.* II, p. 339).

Buddhaghosa on the Cetasikas

The exposition of the mental factors (*cetasikas*) in the *Visuddhimagga* has been undertaken, as in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, primarily in relation to the classification of the types of consciousness. In contrast to the exposition in the *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu, the interest here is more pragmatic than theoretical, the emphasis more psychological than philosophical, the approach more ethical and religious than critical and scientific and the classification more subjective than objective. Consistent with his formal allegiance to the venerable canonical traditions in the matter of scholastic exposition, the mental factors are here classified by him not under the new-fangled objective category of *cetasika* but under the term *saṅkhāra* within the ancient framework of the five *khandhas*. '*Saṅkhāra*', however , as the name of the fourth *khandha* carried only the restricted signification of 'volition' as attested in the suttas accepted as authentic by all the schools. The wealth of mental factors yielded by further psychological analysis had to be accomodated under a new category but orthodoxy prevented any addition to the number of *khandhas* to take in the fresh material. The Ābhidharmikas found an ingenious way to satisfy their own needs as well as the demands of orthodoxy. The restricted conative signification of *saṅkhāra* was widened to include all mental factors and accordingly *saṅkhārakkhandha* was treated anew and transformed into the most spacious and accomodating category among the *khandhas*. Hence in treating mental factors under *saṅkhāra* Buddhaghosa was only following the vogue current in all Abhidharma schools during his time.

Since the mental factors are listed under types of consciousness, Buddhaghosa has not attempted to establish a final number of objective mental elements enumerated in a single list as done by Vasubandhu in his *Abhidharmakośa*. A significant feature in Buddhaghosa's exposition of *saṅkhāras* is that the two *cetasikas*, namely, *vedanā* and *saññā*, do not occur among them for the simple reason that these constitute two distinct *khandhas* in their own right and cannot and need not be brought under a third *khandha*, a method followed uniformly by exponents including those of the Mahāyāna such as Asaṅga as will be shown in the sequel. This again served to emphasise the inadequacy and clumsiness of the *khandha* as a category for the newer needs of systematic classification.

Buddhadatta on the Cetasikas

The Theravāda classification of *cetasikas* assumed its classic form during the period of the great Abhidhamma commentaries, finally crystalised by Anuruddha during the medieval period. *Cetasika* becomes the generic term for all mental factors superceding the original canonical terminology of *khandha*, *āyatana* and *dhātu*. The *cetasikas* were drawn up as part of an over-all theory of *dhammas* wherein *cetasika* become a species under the genus 'dhamma', which covered all ultimate elements of mind and matter as well as the unconditioned element of Nibbāna.

Buddhadatta, the contemporary of Buddhaghosa, who summarised the contents of the Abhidhamma commentaries into a single compendium, called the *Abhidhammāvatāra*, is the first Theravādin to undertake the exposition of the entire range of early

Buddhist thought under the four ultimate categories of *citta* (mind), *cetasika* (mental factors), *rūpa* (matter) and *Nibbāna* (the Absolute). According to Buddhadatta, the total number of *cetasikas* is fifty two, and these are claimed to have been taught by the Buddha (*Sabbe cetasikā vuttā buddhenādiccabandhunā, nāmasamaññāto yeva dve paṇṇāsā bhavanti te : Abhidhammāvatāra, v.* 89). These two and fifty *cetasikas* are, therefore, enumerated in a single list without, however, any attempt at classification under distinct classes (ibid. p. 29). The number and the names of these *cetasikas* have remained unaltered to the present day within the Abhidharma tradition, in all Theravāda countries.

Anuruddha on the Cetasikas

The classification of *cetasikas*, set out by Anuruddha in his *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* represents the Theravāda Abhidhamma thought on this subject in its most systematic and comprehensive form. The fifty-two *cetasikas*, which together constitute a wide assortment of mental factors consisting of neutral psychic factors, function-events and emotions and qualities of a morally decisive character, are here for the first time classified on a rational and intelligible basis. The *cetasikas* are here distributed under three distinct basic classes, each class consisting of two sub-classes as follows :

1. General psychological factors : (*a*) Primary factors and (*b*) secondary factors.

2. Wholesome mental factors : (*a*) Primary and (*b*) secondary .

3. Unwholesome mental factors : (*a*) Primary and (*b*) secondary.

1 (*a*) The primary psychological factors are seven in number : *phassa* (mental contact), *vedanā* (feeling), *saññā* (porception), *cetanā* (volition), *ekaggatā* (one-pointedness), *jīvitindriya* (psychic vitality) and *manasikāra* (attention). These seven factors are invariables common to all classes of consciousness and are therefore called the universal factors (*sabbacittasādhāraṇa*). They are present in all the types of thoughts, eighty-nine in number, as enumerated in the Theravāda Abhidhamma. Of these factors *phassa* is bare awareness of the presence of an object ; *vedanā* is the feeling tone which makes sensation agreeable, disagreeable or neutral ; *saññā* is the recognition of an object, following on its bare awareness through *phassa ; cetanā* here is devoid of ethical value, for it indicates volition determined by the causality of past behaviour. *Ekaggatā* is the factor that delimits the object of consciousness, thus playing a negative role in eliminating what is not in sensory focus. *Jīvitindriya* is the factor that makes possible psychic life and unites all other factors into one integrated whole. Though these factors are by themselves neutral in the moral sense, yet they are capable of becoming morally decisive factors depending upon whether they are associated with wholesome or unwholesome states of consciousness.

1. (*b*) The secondary psychological factors are six in number : *vitakka* (initial application of thought), *vicāra* (sustained application of thought), *adhimokkha* (decision), *viriya* (effort), *pīti* (rapture) and *chanda* (active urge). These six factors may be found in all *classes* of consciousness but not in all *types* of consciousness. Hence they are not to be regarded as universal. Therefore, they have been called the particulars (*pakiṇṇaka*). But in as much as these particulars and the above universals are generally found in all classes of consciousness, the thirteen factors taken together are called 'those that are common to each other' (*aññasamāna*).

2. (*a*) The wholesome primary factors are common to all classes of wholesome consciousness. The wholesome is also the beautiful. Hence these factors are called the beautiful universals (*sobhanasādhāraṇa*). These are nineteen in number : *saddhā* (confidence), *sati* (mindfulness), *hiri* (shame), *ottappa* (scrupulousness), *alobha* (detachment), *adosa* (goodwill), *tatramajjhattatā* (equanimity), *kāya-passaddhi* (calmness of psychic factors), *citta-p°* (calmness of mind), *kāya-lahutā* (buoyancy of psychic factors), *citta-l°* (buoyancy of mind), *kāya-mudutā* (pliancy of psychic factors), *citta-m°* (pliancy of mind), *kāya-kammaññatā* (fitness of psychic factors), *citta-k°* (fitness of mind), *kāya-pāguññatā* (proficiency of psychic factors), *citta-p°* (proficiency of mind), *kāya-ujukatā* (rectitude of psychic factors), and *citta-u°* (rectitude of mind).

2. (*b*) The wholesome secondary factors are six in number : *sammā vācā* (right speech), *sammā-kammanta* (right action), *sammā-ājīva* (right livelihood), *karuṇā* (compassion), *muditā* (sympathetic joy) and *paññā* (wisdom). It may be noted that only three of the steps of the Noble Path are specifically referred to here. The reason for this is that the other five steps of the Path have already been listed in the foregoing classes under other names. Thus, *sammāsamādhi* (right concentration) is included under (*ekuggatā*), *sammāsati* (right mindfulness) under *sati*, *sammāvāyāma* (right effort) under *viriya*, *sammāsaṅkappa* (right aspiration) under *vitakka* and *sammādiṭṭhi* (right views) under *paññā*. It may also be noted that only two

out of the four *brahma-vihāras* are listed here. Again the reason is that the other two, namely, *mettā* (kindness) and *upekkhā* (equanimity) have already been listed as *adosa* and *tatramajjhattatā*, respectively. The first three of these wholesome factors listed here reconsidered negatively, as refraining from false speech, action and livelihood, and are on this ground called the abstinences (*viratiyo*). Since compassion and joy are spread over all beings of the universe they are called the illimitables (*appamaññā*). These abstinences and illimitables are considered as ' inconstants '(*aniyatā*) in view of their occasional and singular occurrence. The last of the secondary factors here, namely, *paññā*, is enlightened reason considered as the guiding principle of the mind.

3. (*a*) The primary unwholesome factors found invariably in all classes of unwholesome consciousness are four in number : *moha* (delusion), *ahirika* (shamelessness), *anottappa* (unscrupulousness) and *uddharca* (restlessness). *Moha* is one of the unwholesome root-causes. Delusion prevents one seeing the unworthiness of one's behaviour in thought, word and deed and this makes one shameless ; further, delusion prevents one from perceiving the consequences of such unworthy behaviour and this makes one unscrupulous. The lack of security and balance resulting from these makes one constantly restless and distracted. This truth clarifies the universality of these four factors in all classes and types of unwholesome consciousness. Hence they are called the unwholesome universals (*sabbākusala-sādhāraṇa*).

3. (*b*) The secondary unwholesome factors are ten in number : *dosa* (hate), *issā* (envy), *macchariya* (meanness), *kukkucca* (worry), *lobha* (greed), *diṭṭhi* (erroneous views), *māna* (conceit), *thīna* (sloth), *middha* (torpor) and *vicikicchā* (perplexity). These do not occur in all unwholesome classes of consciousness. Moreover, of these ten secondaries as many as six are considered, as in the case of the abstinences and illimitables referred to above, as inconstant (*aniyatā*) since they are only occasionally associated with the states of consciousness in question and also then only one at a time. These six are : envy, jealousy, worry, conceit, sloth and torpor.

Anuruddha gives us a clear and precise definition of *cetasika*. Mental factors are those that arise and cease together with consciousness, are associated with consciousness and share the same object and basis with consciousness (*ekuppādanirodhā ca ekālambanavatthukā cetoyuttā . . . dhammā cetasikā matā : Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, II, p. 2).

It is clear from this definition that *cetasikas* are not to be considered as properties inhering in a substance of mind. The mind cannot, and does not, occur alone except accompanied by the secondary phenomena of *cetasikas*.

Cetasikas are a species of *dhamma*, that is, more specifically, immaterial elements (*arūpino dhammā*). *Dhamma* is the ultimate in simplification of existence. As the Theravāda Abhidhamma explains, *dhammas* bear their own nature, they are borne by their own conditions(*Attano pana sabhāvaṃ dhārentīti dhammā. Dhāriyanti vā paccayehi dhāriyanti vā yathāsabhāvato ti dhammā : Atthasālini*, p. 39).

Considered as psychological ultimates, the *cetasikas* are, in the Theravāda Abhidhamma, brought under the category of *paramattha*. This characterisation of *cetasika* as *paramattha* is not intended, however, to mean that the *cetasikas* are a kind of ' psychic atoms ' in the literal sense of indivisibility or metaphysical monads enduring in eternity. Being *dhammas*, the *cetasikas* are equally evanascent (*anicca*), subject to conflict (*dukkha*) non-substantial (*anatta*) and altogether devoid of any independent existence of their own (*suñña*). Being conditioned phenomena (*saṅkhataddhammā*), the *cetasikas* are subject to origination (*uppāda*), decay (*vaya*) and constant transformation (*ṭhitassaññatattaṃ*). Hence, in describing the *cetasikas* as *paramatthas* all that the Theravādins mean is that they are the simplest elements into which the data of psychic life can be reduced. *Paramattha*, in the context of conditioned existence, refers to impersonal reality which can be predicated only in terms of simple flux, not in terms of agency or instrumentality (*sabbesampi paramatthadhammānaṃ bhāvasādhanaṃ yeva nippariyāyato labbhati... kattubhāvo ca... karaṇattaṃ ca pariyāyato'va labbhati : Abhidhammatthavibhāvinitikā*, p. 4). In the Buddhist view, to understand oneself is to understand the world. The macrocosm is nothing but the microcosm writ large (*Api cāhaṃ āvuso imasmiṃ yeva byāmamatte kaḷebare saññimhi samanake l kañ ca paññāpemi loka-samudayañca loka-nirodhañca loka-nirodhagāminim paṭipadan ti : A*. II, p. 48). Accordingly, in the Abhidhamma the complex psychic events have been broken up, reduced to their simplest forms and the resulting mental elements inventorised as aids to meditation leading to the final realisation of perfect insight.

It is clear from the foregoing that the Theravāda Abhidhamma theory of *cetasikas* reflects considerable doctrinal development without, however, amounting to a radical departure from the original teachings as contained in the suttas of the Pali nikāyas.

The Sarvāstivāda Theory of Caitasikas

The classification of *caitasikas* (*caittas*) which gained the widest currency and exercised the greatest degree of impact on all schools of Buddhism of the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna alike is that of the Sarvāstivādins. Though the Theravādins developed their doctrines in the relative isolation of Sri Lanka, a critical comparison of their list with that of the Sarvāstivādins points to mutual influence on account of their contemporaneous development and to their common inheritance of a legacy of psychological investigation. There are, to be sure, several points of agreement and divergence between the two schools in respect of their expositions of the *caitasikas*. The points of agreement relate to essentials, and those of divergence to arrangement and classification, order of enumeration, number and content of classes and sub-classes and details of terminology.

The classical list of the *caitasikas* in the Sarvāstivāda is fully set out in the *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu (See *Abhk.* II, *vv.* 23—34; together with comment in *Sphuṭārthābhidharmakośavyākhyā*, II, pp 41—60; also *Abhidharmadīpa*, II, *vv.* 112—125) The total number of *caitasikas* is fixed at forty-six and they are grouped under six main classes which are as follows :

(1) General mental factors (*cittamahābhumika*)

(2) Wholesome mental factors (*kusalamahābhūmika*)

(3) Fundamental passions (*kleśamahābhūmika*)

(4) Universal unwholesome mental factors (*akusalamahābhūmika*)

(5) Subsidiary passions (*upakleśaparittabhūmika*)

(6) Indeterminate mental factors (*aniyatabhūmika*)

1. The Sarvāstivādins list only ten general psychological factors as compared to the thirteen of the Theravādins. No distinction is drawn, as by the Theravādins, between primary and secondary factors. Of the Theravāda list of thirteen factors, eight are common with the Sarvāstivādins, who, however, classify *vitarka* and *vicāra* under their Indeterminates, include *prīti* under *vedanā* and assign *jīvitindriya* among the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāradharmas*, outside the classification of the *caitasika dharmas*. The term *samādhi* which the Sarvāstivādins use in place of *ekaggatā* is reserved by the Theravādins for ecstatic stages of tranquillity. A significant addition to the list of general psychological factors by the Sarvāstivādins is *mati*(=*prajñā*) in the sense of understanding and discrimination, that is among objects of perception and conception.

2. The Sarvāstivādin list of wholesome factors is much less elaborate than that of the Theravādins but decidedly more coherent and systematic. As against the twenty-five factors of the latter, the former set out here only ten factors. The Sarvāstivādins eliminate altogether the ten factors dealing with buoyancy, pliancy, fitness, proficiency and rectitude of psychic factors and of mind that were listed by the Theravādins. The two illimitables of the Theravāda are here replaced by the single factor of *ahiṃsā* (non-violence). It is interesting to note that the factor of effort (*viriya*) which the Theravādins listed among the general psychological factors, is here listed by the Sarvāstivādins among the wholesome factors. A noteworthy Sarvāstivādin addition to the list of wholesome factors is *apramāda* (moral diligence) which is absent in the corresponding list of the Theravādins.

3.4.5. The Sarvāstivāda classification of the unwholesome mental factors follows a method altogether different from that of the Theravādins. Whereas the Theravādins have given a single list of fourteen unwholesome factors, the Sarvāstivādins have taken pains to arrange them under three distinct classes, namely, those of fundamental passions, universal unwholesome factors and subsidiary passions. The fundamental passions are six in number: *moha* (ignorance), *pramāda* (indolence), *kauṣīdya* (inattention), *aśraddhā* (absence of faith), *styāna* (sloth), *auddhatya* (restlessness). These factors tend to obstruct the path to moral and spiritual progress some times directly, at other times indirectly. Only two factors are considered to be universally unwholesome and these are *ahrīkya* (shamelessness) and *anapatrāpa* (unscrupulousness).

The Sarvāstivāda list of subsidiary factors contains a number of items which do not occur in the classification of the unwholesome factors by the Theravādins. The following is the list of the subsidiary passions: *krodha* (anger), *mrakṣa* (hypocrisy), *mātsarya* (meanness), *īrṣyā* (envy), *pradoṣa* (malice), *vihiṃsā* (violence), *upanāha* (enmity), *māyā* (deceit), *sā'ya* (dishonesty) and *mada* (arrogance). It is important to note that these subsidiary passions are purely mental (*manobhūmika eva*) and so are never associated with other forms of sensuous consciousness (*na pañcavijñānakāyikāḥ*). They are invariably associated

with ignorance and not with the alternating passions of attachment, hate, conceit and perplexity. In view of these and other limitations, these factors have been called factors of limited scope (*parittabhūmika*).

6. The inclusion of a class of indeterminate factors is an innovation by the Sarvāstivādins. This class consists of eight factors which are all recognised as *cetasikas* by the Theravādins, too, but listed within other classes. These are initial and sustained application of mind, worry, torpor, greed, ill-will, pride and perplexity.

As stated earlier, there does not appear to be any essential difference between the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins in respect of the classification of *caitasikas*. But there certainly is a vital difference in respect of the philosophical interpretation of the nature of the *caitasikas*. The Theravāda interpretation of their philosophical nature has already been clarified above. The Sarvāstivāda classification of the *caitasikas* is part of their classification of all elements of existence, both conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) and unconditioned(*asaṃskṛta*) within the framework of their own theory of *dharmas*. The nature of *dharma* is expounded on the basis of a system of naive realism and radical pluralism. Accordingly, the Sarvāstivādins draw a distinction between *dharmasvabhāva* and *dharmalakṣaṇa* which amounts briefly to a distinction between immutable nature and momentary manifestation in respect of *dharmas*. The immutable nature of *dharmas* exists at all times, namely, during the past, present and future. Consistent with this theory that everything exists (Sarvāstivāda) the *caitasika*, which really are aspects of mentation, analysed originally as aids to introspective awareness, are now regarded as separate elements (*pṛthagdharma*), each preserving its unique nature for all time. It is clear from these facts that, unlike the Theravāda theory of *cetasika*, the Sarvāstivāda exposition diverges considerably from the philosophical standpoint underlying the teachings contained in the suttas of the Pali nikāyas.

The Yogācāra theory of the Caitasikas

The Yogācāra, last of the major philosophical systems of Buddhism, is also the only Mahāyāna system which evinced a serious interest in the study of the Abhidharma and built up its own tradition in psychological analysis. In view of this interest in the Abhidharma it is not surprising that the Yogācāra formulated its own list of *caitasikas*, the only one available among the Mahāyāna traditions.

The Yogācāra interest in the Abhidharma was prompted by its desire to build up a complete system of cosmology consistent with its own fundamental doctrines. Their eclectic and synthetic abilities helped them to draw upon the basic material prepared by the Hīnayānists, particularly the Sarvāstivādins. The Yogācāra classification of the *caitasikas* shows to what extent they profited from the analytical labours of the Sarvāstivādins.

Philosophically, the Sarvāstivādins were at opposite poles with the Yogācārins, the naive realism of the former being contradictory to the subjective idealism of the latter. The Yogācāra accepted the reality of mind only. In their view, therefore, the *dharmas* had no independent objective existence of their own. In the interests of pragmatism, however, they were constrained to ascribe to *dharmas* a measure of relative reality (*paratantrasvabhāva*).

The *caitasikas* have been classified in a number of Yogācāra works, some of the most important of these being now available only in Chinese and Tibetan. Different works give varying lists and varying totals of the number of *caitasikas*. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, which is available in Sanskrit, gives an enumeration of fifty-four *caitasikas*, fifty-two of them under *saṃskāraskandha* and one each under *vedanāskandha* and *saṃjñāskandha*. The standard number of *caitasikas* became fixed at fifty-one, particularly in the major works of Vasubandhu.

The classical Yogācāra list of *caitasikas* is set out under six classes which are as follows :

(1) Universal mental factors,
(2) Particular mental factors,
(3) Wholesome mental factors,
(4) Fundamental passions,
(5) Subsidiary passions,
(6) Indeterminate mental factors.

1,2. It may be noted that the ten universal factors, enumerated in a single list by the Sarvāstivādins, are here more rationally distributed under two distinct classes. In this matter, the Yogācārins are closer to the Theravādins than to the Sarvāstivādins with whom they were directly connected.

3. Here the Yogācārins retain the ten wholesome factors listed by the Sarvāstivādins but they add an eleventh factor called *amoha* (wisdom).

4. The enumeration of the fundamental passions here marks a divergence between the Sarvāstivādins and the Yogācārins. Of the Sarvāstivāda fundamental passions the Yogācāra rejects as many as five

(*pramāda*, *kauṣīdya*, *aśruddhā*, *styāna*, *auddhatya*) and retain only one (*moha*). In their place the Yogācārins bring in five other factors, four of which were classified among the indeterminates by the Sarvāstivādins (*lobha*, *dveṣa*, *māna* and *vicikitsā*), the fifth being *asamyagdṛṣṭi* (erroneous views). In naming *lobha*, *dveṣa* and *moha* together with *māna* among the fundamental passions, the Yogācārins once again show their closeness to the earlier teachings enshrined in the suttas of the Pali nikāyas.

5. Of the twenty subsidiary passions listed here, the first ten are identical with those of the Sarvāstivādins. The two unwholesome factors of the Sarvāstivāda list are also included here, as well as the four factors which the Yogācārins eliminated from the Sarvāstivāda list of fundamental passions referred to above. The new factors, added to this list by the Yogācārins, are three and they are *muṣitasmṛtitā* (forgetfulness), *vikṣepa* (confusion) and *asamprajñā* (erroneous judgement).

6. The four factors listed here are identical with the first four factors listed by the Sarvāstivādins among their eight indeterminates.

The Yogācāra interest in *caitasikas* led them to intensive studies in the subtle and multifarious relationships that exist between them. Among their many analytic and synthetic studies in this regard, reference need be made only to their interesting classification of the relations of the *caitasikas* to each of the *vijñānas*, recognised in their theory of subjective idealism, namely, the *ālayavijñāna*, the *pravṛttivijñāna*, the *manovijñāna* and the five *vijñānas* associated with the sense organs.

W. S. KARUNARATNA

CETIYA (Skt. *caitya*). In general Indian usage the word stands for a funeral mound or monument, a tree growing on such a mound and serving the purpose of a memorial or a territory of land associated with such a monument. With the Buddhists, it came to denote a special monument (more regularly referred to as stūpa, q.v.) erected over the bodily remains of the Buddha, Pacceka- uddha or a Buddhist disciple (*D.* II, p. 142). This honour of having a stūpa built over the bodily remains, the Buddha extends to the Universal Monarch or Rājā Cakkavatti as well.

In the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* of the *Digha Nikāya* (*D.* II, p. 102), the Buddha extols the beauty of some of the pre-Buddhist *cetiyas* such as Udena, Gotamaka, Sattambaka, Bahuputta, Sārandada and Cāpāla. Of these, some like Udena, Gotamaka, Cāpāla and Sārandada (*DA.* II, p. 521; *UdA.* p. 322 f.; *DhpA.* III, p. 246) were *yakkha* shrines, represented in many instances by a tree (*rukkha-cetiya*) at which people worshipped and prayed for the purpose of personal security and for the favour of gifts like children. Perhaps, it is not unreasonable to relate some of these pre-Buddhist *yakkha* shrines to an ancient ancestor cult of tribal origin.

In Buddhist usage the term *cetiya* meant much more than a funeral mound. That its use was not restricted to refer only to a stūpa from the earliest times is evident from the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* itself where it appears to be used to denote in general a place of religious sanctity. Speaking of journeying on pilgrimage to the places of Buddha's birth, Enlightenment, first expounding of the doctrine and his final passing away the word used there is *cetiya* in the expression *cetiya-cārikam-āhiṇḍantā* which means 'going round, visiting *cetiyas*' which in this context refers to places of religious sanctity (*D.* II, p. 141).

As a result of this flexibility of the term two developments have taken place with regard to its use. In the Pali commentaries and the Pali chronicles of Sri Lanka, the term *cetiya* is used indiscriminately to refer to stūpa and *vice versa*. The following account in the *Mahāvaṃsa* which describes the funeral rites carried out on the demise of the Elder Mahinda illustrates this clearly.

Citakamhi ṭhapāpetvā sakkāraṃ antimaṃ akā
cetiyaṃ c'ettha kāresi gāhāpetvāna dhātuyo.
Upaḍḍhadhātuṃ gāhetvā cetiyapabbate pi ca
sabbesu ca vihāresu thūpe kāresi khattiyo.

(*Mhv.* ch. xx, *vv.* 44,45) ". .and when he had caused it (bier) to be set upon the pyre he carried out the rites of the dead. And here did he build a *cetiya* when he had caused the relics to be gathered together. Taking the (other) half of the relics the monarch caused *thūpas* (stūpas) to be built on the Cetiya-mountain and in all the vihāras" (*Mahāvaṃsa*, tr. W. Geiger, p. 140, *vv.* 44, 45). Likewise, the celebrated Mahāthūpa of Anuradhapura in Sri Lanka is referred to both as Mahāthūpa and Mahācetiya in the *Mahāvaṃsa* (*Mhv.* ch. xxix, *vv.* 13, 15, 17, 46). Further, three different types of Buddhist shrines come to be included under the term *cetiya*. The most truly representative and perhaps the earliest of these is the stūpa.

In the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*, the Buddha appears not only to have sanctioned the building of a stūpa over his bodily remains or *sarīrāni* (*D.* II, p. 164 f.) which later came to be regularly referred to as *dhātu* (*Cātummahāpathe Tathāgatassa thūpo kātabbo* : *D.* II, p. 161) but also to have approved the veneration and worship of that monument,

adding that such acts could turn out to be a source of inspiration and happiness (*Tattha ye mālaṃ vā gandhaṃ vā cuṇṇakaṃ vā āropessanti abhivādessanti vā cittaṃ vā pasādessanti tesaṃ taṃ bhavissati dīgharattaṃ hitāya sukhāyāti*: loc cit.).

Canonical Buddhist texts seem to know no more about other objects of worship. Nevertheless, the Bodhi-tree under which the bodhisatta attained Enlightenment, i.e., became the Buddha, appears to have rapidly gained recognition as an object of religious veneration.

A story in the *Jātaka* collection, *Kāliṅgabodhi Jātaka* (*J*. IV, pp. 228-230), tells us that while the Buddha was still alive his close disciple and personal attendant Ānanda had a seedling of the original Bodhi-tree at Gayā under which the Buddha attained Enlightenment planted at the entrance to the Jetavana monastery. This he did, it is claimed, in order to provide an object of worship (*pūjanīyaṭṭhāna*), in the absence of the Master from the monastery, to the thronging crowds who came to pay him homage. This shrine subsequently gained wide popularity as the Ānanda-Bodhi (q.v.).

The Buddha, while sanctioning this act of Ānanda, goes on to speak about the possibility of three different types of Buddhist shrines or *cetiyas* (ibid. p. 228). They are: (1) those connected with the bodily remains of the Buddha : *sāririka* (Pl. XX), (2) those connected with objects used by him : *pāribhogika* (Pl. XXII) and (3) those which portray or depict his likeness *uddesika* (Pl.XXI). It is further pointed out that obviously *sārīrika-cetiyas* would not appear during the life-time of a Buddha. However, an interesting exception to this rule is provided by the *Mahāvaṃsa* which speaks of the construction of a miniature stūpa of sapphire in Sri Lanka over the handful of hair said to have been gifted by the Buddha himself to the chief of devas, Mahāsumana, during his visit to the island (*Mhv*. ch i, *vv*. 34-36).

Perhaps, one has also to reckon in the same tradition the story narrated in the commentary to the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* of Tapussa and Bhallika who are said to have received eight fistfuls of hair from the Buddha which they enshrined in a *cetiya* at the entrance to the city of Asitañjana (*AA*. I, p. 383). What is of interest here to note is that the *Vinaya Mahāvagga* which records the visit of Tapussa and Bhallika to the Buddha during the fourth week after his Enlightenment knows of no such gift made to them by the Buddha (*Vin*. I, p. 4 . However, the *Samantapāsādikā* (*VinA*. V, p. 961), commenting on this *Mahāvagga* narrative expands it to read that Tapussa and Bhallika received from the Buddha a handful of hair to be used as an object of veneration (*abhivādana-paccuṭṭhāna*). Yet this commentary does not go so far as to speak of the construction of a *cetiya* over them.

The above story in the *Kāliṅgabodhi Jātaka* appears to mark the origin of the second category of *cetiyas*, namely, the *pāribhogika*. It is indicated there that the Bodhi-tree (*Mahābodhi*) which the Buddhas make use of (*paribhutto*) in the attainment of Enlightenment would serve as a *cetiya* both during the life time of the Buddhas concerned and after their Parini āna. One is not certain whether it could be conceded that the Bodhi-tree as a Buddhist shrine preceded the first stūpa built over the bodily remains of the Buddha after his Parinib āna. At any rate, the veneration of the Bodhi-tree as a Buddhist symbol, as a symbol closely associated with the Buddha, seems to go back to a considerably early date in Buddhist history, as is borne out by the bas-relief carvings at the Barhut stūpa (circa second century B. C.) which show worshippers honouring the Bodhi-trees of Buddha Gotama and several Buddhas of the past. It is, however, to be appreciated that at this stage of aniconic representation the tree, like the wheel, stands for the Buddha.

The third category of shrines or the *uddesika-cetiya* which portray or depict the likeness of the Buddha, generally *paṭimā* or image, was perhaps the last to be evolved. Since it is essentially the product of an artist's creation, what is created, at best, is no more than a conjectured likeness through one's own mental projection. This, coupled with the idea of the illimitability of the Buddha within a human frame, led to the *udaesika-cetiya* being evaluated in the above context in the *Kāliṅgabodhi Jātaka* as being 'without a corresponding object and merely mentally produced' (*uddesikaṃ avatthukaṃ mana-mattakena hoti*).

These three-fold *cetiyas* are also referred to in the *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā* (*DhpA*. III, p. 251). In their hierarchical set-up the stūpa or *sārīrika-cetiya* stands supreme (*Paribhogacetiyato hi sarīracetiyaṃ mahantataraṃ : AA*. II, pp. 6-7). However, all three shrines are held to be inviolable. The Pali commentaries take up the position that whosoever breaks up a stūpa, cuts down a Bodhi-tree or assails a Buddha image is guilty of an unpardonable heinous crime (*Bhīriyaṃ kammaṃ hoti ānantariyasadisaṃ : AA*. II, p. 6). At the same time, sanction is given to cut branches of the Bodhi-tree, if it were necessary, in order to safeguard any one of the other two shrines, the stūpa and the image.

J.D.

CETIYAGHARA, a house for a *cetiya*, the word *cetiya* being used in the sense of a stūpa and not a general shrine (e.g., a Bodhi-tree). A *cetiyaghara* in this sense, is synonymous with *thūpaghara* and *thūpageha* (Sanskrit: *caityagṛha, caityaprāsāda*). Terms with similar connotation like *cetiyageha, dhātughara* and *dhātugeha, vaṭṭadhātughara* (Sinhalese: *vaṭadāge*) are freely used for such a house built over a stūpa.[1] The term 'cetiyaghara' occurs both in inscriptions and in Pali writings.[2] The best surviving examples of such shrines are the well-known apsidal caitya-halls in India and the piller-ringed circular shrines (*vaṭadāge*) of Sri Lanka. One, of very much later historical times, is known in Burma.[3] The sole example surviving from ancient times, existing whole (though with periodical renovations) and in daily religious use, is probably the *vaṭadāge* at Attanagalla in Sri Lanka.[4] *Cetiyagharas* are seldom constructed now and the type may have gone out of vogue, possibly with the preference for the larger type of stūpa. Nevertheless, a few examples for the continuance of the practice of building *cetiyagharas* upto the Kandyan period in Sri Lanka's history (i.e., 18th century) are not rare, e.g., Attanagalla, Dambadeniya (Pl. XXVI, Fig. 2) Gaḍalādeniya and Hindagala.

A *cetiyaghara* must stand by itself, being the house for the *cetiya* by its own right, so that when a *cetiya* is in the room of a house which is built primarily for another purpose, the name should, properly speaking, not be applicable to such an annex, as it were.[5] It would be also more appropriate for a *cetiyaghara* to be small rather than large, and to assume the circular form to harmonise with the lines of its special feature, the stūpa. And, indeed, the earliest known Indian examples which are noted below, were circular — a shape which was more common in Sri Lanka in the ancient times.

Indian designers next developed the idea of an elongation of the house, and (perhaps) the result was the caitya-hall with its nave and two side aisles. The siting of a *cetiya* in an excavated cave must have lent itself to this development; for, if only the *cetiya* were in the cave, the approach would be too abrupt. This, of course, would not apply to a constructed house, which would have a certain degree of seclusion and privacy. The apsidal *cetiyaghara* of India, whether cave or free-standing, was called by the same name, as noted above.

In India, shrines of this class are known from Taxilā in the north to Nāgārjunikoṇḍa in the south. The best of them were fashioned out of caves, and elaborately. Ajantā (Pl. XXIII), Bāgh, Bhājā, Ellora and Kārlī (Pl. XXIV) provide the most splendid examples of these, the more familiarly called caitya-halls. The type is apparently found in China, too.[6] But, the earliest examples were circular, as known from Bairat (q.v.) and from a shrine in the Tulja Lena group which are presumed to be of the time of Asoka.[7] This earlier form which had later developed into the caitya-hall in its home, has prevailed in Sri Lanka from the earliest times as evident from the several *vaṭadāge*, shrines with rows of stone pillars encircling the *cetiya* to support the roof, according to the most recent archaeological opinion. Examples of these are seen at Thūpārāma and Laṅkārama (Anuradhapura), Ambasthala (Mihintale), Mādirigiriya, Tiriyāy and Polonnaruva (Pls. XXV & XXVI, Fig.1). They, of course, are roofless today, being monuments archaeologically conserved. With roofs and within a house there are *cetiyagharas* which, probably dating back to a few centuries, are still in everyday use; the shrines at Attanagalla and Dambadeniya are instances. Evidence has been archaeologically obtained which shows that the examples from Sri Lanka had tiled roofs and their inner parapets have had murals.[8]

The circular *cetiyaghara* generally had an entrance at each cardinal point in a parapet which sometimes joined up the pillars and sometimes stood out of them. That was on its immediate terrace. There are instances, too, of an outer and larger terrace, enclosing the other, and of a single entrance direct from the main yard. The inner terrace running round the shrine was an ambulatory or processional path (*pradakṣiṇā-patha*). Facing each inner entrance, but unattached to the *cetiya*, there was invariably a Buddha image.

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1 S. Paranavitana, 'The Stupa in Ceylon' (*ASCMem.* V) provides a great deal of information (ch. vi, particularly) which has gone into the present article.

2 Nāgārjunikoṇḍa inscriptions (J. Ph. Vogel, *EI.* XX, 22); *Mhv.* xxxvi, v. 9, give instances.

3 The 'Circular pagoda' at Mengan (*ASCAR.* 1903, p. 26).

4 *Hatthv.*, introd. p. xii and ch. ix ff.

5 Well-known Sri Lanka examples are in the Temple of the Tooth (Daḷadā Māligāva, Kandy) and Potgul-vihāra (Hanguranketa).

6 *Xiandai Foxue* ('Modern Buddhism,' Peking), No.4, for 1962, p. 47, where Caves Nos. 5 & 6 of a group in Kumutura in Kucha district, are mentioned as caitya-caves done by the Han people.

7 See BAIRAT.

8 S. Paranavitana, op. cit.

The general plan of an apsidal caitya-hall did not greatly differ in arrangement. The entrance, which was ornamented to display a rich façade, led into a long hall (comprising nave and aisles), at the end of which stood the *cetiya* to which was 'prefixed' the Buddha image. Sometimes, an outer wall enclosed such free-standing buildings. The roofs of cave-halls are barrel-vaulted. With such a roof as the basis, a tentative reconstruction from Sri Lanka displays a large domical roof for a circular shrine.

As to why *cetiyagharas* went out of vogue in Sri Lanka a guess may be hazarded. That is to say, the image of the Buddha came to be more and more in the forefront, albeit this class of 'cetiya' was originally considered the least deserving to be reckoned in importance. Thus, the image-house took the first place. The value of the relic-shrine proper (the stūpa) diminished with the rise of the image-house. In India, the displacement of Buddhism halted religious works. Other lands influenced by the religion are not known to provide examples, except for those already mentioned, viz., China and Burma.

D. T. DEVENDRA

A more recent addition to *cetiyagharas* in Sri Lanka is the titanic structure that is being built near the Bodhi-tree shrine at Kalutara (Pl. XXVII). After completion it would be undoubtedly the world's biggest *cetiyaghara* ever built. The stupendous stūpa, recalling the colossal stūpas of ancient Sri Lanka, is in actuality an edifice meant to house a real stūpa built inside its hollow core. The outside stūpa-like structure is marked by its enormous proportions and simplicity of design, while the real stūpa within its chamber is designed to give all the archaic features of the stūpa symbolism as found in any early stūpa built in Sri Lanka, e.g., the three 'pesāvalalu' at the base and rising above these the buble-shape 'aṇḍa' (dome), the square platform above the dome, 'muddhavedi' (Sinh. *hatarās'oṭuva*), the truncated octagonal base holding miniature figures of angels (Sinh. *devatākoṭuva*) and the 'chatrāvali' (Sinh. *kotkarālla*) crowned with the jewel-crested finial.

For detailed descriptions and specific instances see further, AJANTĀ, ELLORA, BEDSĀ, BĀGH, BHĀJĀ JUNNĀR (in India) and TIVCPĀRĀMA, VATADĀGE at Polonnaruva, MĀDIRIGIRIYA, AMBATTHALA (in Sri Lanka).

A D T E.P

CETIYAPABBATA. See MIHINTALE.

CETOKHILA. This is a compound term implying an unproductive state of mind, inimical to development in the Buddhist religious sense. In the early Buddhist texts the term *cetokhila* has come to mean the fallowness or the barrenness, through non-cultivation, of mind (or heart), while the productive potential of the human mind is in no way denied. Subsequently, 'mental obstructions' or factors causing such barrenness have also come to be reckoned under the term, and it is on them that the Buddhist texts have focussed greater attention.

In its early application in Indian literature the term *khila* (masc. and neut.) denoted "a piece of waste or uncultivated land situated between cultivated fields," or a stretch of "desert" or "bare soil".[1] This implies that *khila* was a gap[2] or space not productively filled up. Buddhism has taken the term in its figurative sense of 'barrenness' and hence the meaning for *cetokhila* as 'barrenness of mind', implying an uncultivated gap, so to say, between one's mental and moral achievements reached upto a point, on the one hand, and the final goal in one's upward way to perfection, on the other. As one who has overcome or was never subject to this condition, the Buddha, for instance describes himself as *vigatakhila* (*Sn. v.* 19). Whenever the negative form *akhila* (i.e., 'without *khila*') is used with reference to the Buddha or as an epithet for the arahant,[3] and sometimes when the term *khila* itself is used in the singular,[4] as for example when it is said that the Venerable Channa broke up the fallowness of his mind (*khilaṃ pabhindi* : *S.* III, p. 134) the term carries this sense.

1 M. Monier-Williams, *A Sanskrit—English Dictionary*, New ed., Oxford, 1951, s.v. 'Khila', where *Atharvaveda*, VII, 115 4, *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa*, VIII, *Śāṅkhāyana Brāhmaṇa* and *Kauśika Sūtra* have been cited for this sense.

2 In Sanskrit literature, from this sense a transference of meaning has also occurred, whereby the term *khila* has come to mean 'that which serves to fill up a gap,' such as the supplement of a book or an addition made to a regular collection of Vedic hymns.

3 Cf. *Sn. vv.* 212, 477, 1059 *et* 1147.

4 Cf. D. II p. 261; *S.* I, p. 27; III, p. 134; IV, p. 118; *Sn. v.* 973.

As factors causing mental barrenness *khilas* are placed in two categories of five (*pañca*) and three (*tayo*) — categories mutually differing both in concept and magnitude. Firstly, *khila* may be said to result through a lack of the pre-requisite for the cultivation of the mind in the Buddhist sense — the factor promoting the germination of good states of mind. This is the inclination or desire of the bhikkhu for striving as expressed by the terms *ātappa* (ardour), *anuyoga* (application), *sātacca* (perseverance) and *padhāna* (exertion) which, it is implied, stems directly from the absence of doubt and the presence of faith, trust and reassurance one has in the Teacher (*Satthā*), the Doctrine (*Dhamma*), the Community (*Saṅgha*), the Training (*Sikkhā*) and good-will and friendliness towards one's fellows in the Higher Life (*sabrahmacārisu*).[5] Therefore, the absence of such inclination (*cittaṃ na namati*) for striving resulting from doubt and lack of faith, trust and reassurance (*kaṅkhati, vicikicchati, nādhimuccati, na sampasīdati*) in the first four and through anger, dissatisfaction, unfriendliness and callosity (*kupito hoti anattamano āhatacitto khilajāto*) towards the fifth is itself an obstruction to mental progress (*evaṃ ... ayaṃ ... cetokhilo appahīno hoti : M.* I, p. 101 f.) Thus, the texts speak of 'five mental obstructions' (*pañca cetokhilā*),[6] taking each one separately. The identical situation is said to result from what is described as 'the five bondages of the mind' (*pañca cetaso vinibandhā*), viz., attachment to sense pleasures (*kāmesu rāgo*), attachment to one's body (*kāye rāgo*), attachment to beauty of form (*rūpe rāgo*), addiction to sleep after heavy meals (*udarāvadehakam bhuñjitvā seyya-sukhaṃ anuyogo*) and leading the Higher Life with a view to rebirth among the gods (*aññataram devanikāyaṃ paṇidhāya brahmacariyaṃ*) usually enumerated immediately after the five *cetokhilas*.[7] It is maintained that the five *cetokhilas* (together with the 'five bondages') are states of mind (*dhammā*) leading to ones' downfall (*hānabhāgiyā : D.* II , p. 278), and the bhikkhu or bhikkhunī who has not overcome them should day and night expect a decline and not progress in everything good (*hānī yeva pāṭikaṅkhā kusalesu dhammesu no vuddhi : A.* V, p. 17). Such a person cannot expect a growth (*vuddhiṃ*), a furtherance (*virūḷhiṃ*) and a full development (*vepullaṃ*) in the Buddhist religious life (*M.* I, p. 101).

As three factors causing mental barrenness (*tayo khilā*), there are the three fundamental blemishes of character, viz., passion (*rāga*), ill-will (*dosa*) and delusion (*moha : S.* V, p 5 ;), the eradication of which constitutes emancipation. As technical terms of Buddhist philosophy and ethics these three often appear in combination with other terms too, when dealing with the obstacles to the attainment of Nibbāna However, their classification as 'the three *khilas*' is referred to only once in the nikāyas, where it is said that in order to recognize them (*abhiññāya*), to understand them (*pariññāya*), to destroy them (*parikkhayāya*) and to completely give them up (*pahānāya*) the Noble Eightfold Path has to be followed (*ayaṃ ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo bhāvetabbo* : loc cit.)

Apart from the fact, as already noted, that the group of five *khilas* is different from that of the three, both in concept and magnitude, the former group appears to be the older. It is referred to in many contexts in the early nikāyas, and is also having a sutta fully devoted to it.[7] It is accepted by the Abhidhamma (*Vbh.* p. 377) and the Theravāda commentarial tradition too.[8] However, the fact that both categories were duly recognized before the Pali Canon reached completion is to be inferred from the *Niddesa* which mentions them side by side (... *pañca'pi cetokhilā ... tayo'pi khilā : Nd. I*, p. 63).

As an antidote to the five *cetokhilas*, the practice of the Four States of Mindfulness is prescribed (*...pañcannaṃ cetokhilānaṃ pahānāya ...ime cattāro satipaṭṭhānā bhāvetabbā : A.* IV, p. 460). This is obviously due to the fact that the practice of the latter is expected to lead to the destruction of the *saṃyojanas*, of which the first two (viz., *sakkāyadiṭṭhi* and *vicikicchā*) have a direct bearing on the five *cetokhilas*. It will be noted that this holds good for the group of three *khilas* as well, since the *satipaṭṭhānas* involve the developing of a completely detached and de-personalized attitude towards the body (*kāya*), the sensations (*vedanā*), the mind (*citta*) and mental objects (*dhammā*) resulting in the elimination of the delusion of self-hood (*sakkāyadiṭṭhi*) of which *rāga, dosa* and *moha* are the by-products. It is not without significance that the practice of the Four States of Mindfulness is looked upon as the surest guarantee to the attainment of purity. The path of psychic orientation and mental development advocated by the Buddha demands that one should purge oneself of all *khilas*.

L. P. N. PERERA

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5 *D.* III, p. 237 f.; *M.* I, p. 101 f.; *A.* III, p. 248 f. *et passim.*
6 *D.* III, p. 238 ; *M.* I, p. 103 ; *A.* III, p. 249 ; IV, p. 461, 463 sq.; V, p. 17 · *Vbh.* p. 377.
7 *Cetokhila Sutta : M.* I, p. 101 ff.
8 *Vism.* p. 211 ; *J.* III, p. 291 *et SnA.* p. 262.

CETOPARIYAÑÑĀṆA or *paracittavijānana*, (Skt. *cetaḥparyāyajñāṇa* or *paracittajñāṇa*), the knowledge that penetrates the minds of others, is the third of the sixfold superknowledge (*abhiññā*, q.v.), the other five being *iddhividha*, (q. v.) *dibbasota* (q.v.), *pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇa* (q.v.), *cutūpapātañāṇa* (q.v.) and *āsavakkhayañāṇa* (q.v., *D.* I, p 79 ff.). The texts explain that the monk, attaining concentration of the mind (*samādhi*, q.v.) or the bases of psychic power (*iddhipāda*, q.v.), directs his mind towards knowledge and vision (*ñāṇa-dassana*), and acquires the power to penetrate and read others' minds (*D.* I, p. 79 ; *Ps.* I, p 113).

This knowledge is acquired by the monk on entering the fourth *jhāna* which is a result of the development of concentration of the mind (*samādhi*). Suttas say that when the mind, on being purged of defilements, becomes pure and supple and is ready to be used, as a result of the power of concentration, the monk applies and directs it towards the knowledge that penetrates the minds of others ; he understands the minds of others in sixteen ways, i.e., whether the mind of a particular individual is passionate or calm, whether it is angry or peaceful, confused or clear, attentive or wondering, broad or narrow, mean or loftly, concentrated or diffused and free or enslaved (*D.* I, p 79 ff ; *M.* I, p 34, II, p 19 ; *Ps.* I, p. 113).

This knowledge, according to the commentarial tradition recorded by Buddhaghosa, is one of the several functions performed by the divine-eye or clairvoyance (*dibbacakkhu*, q.v.). It is generated by *dibbacakkhu*, he says, which constitutes its basis. On entering the fourth *jhāna*, he explains, the monk should, by means of the light-device (*āloka-kasiṇa*), first examine the colour of the blood present in the heart (*hadaya-vatthu*, q.v.) of another person and thereby determine the state of his mind at that particular moment. The different colours indicate the different states of the mind ; whether it is happy, unhappy or neutral. When the mind is happy the blood is red like the fruit of the banian-tree while grief darkens it to the colour of a rose-apple fruit ; and equanimity gives it the golden hue of sesamum-oil. This is the first stage in the development of the knowledge (*Vism.* p. 409). In the second stage the monk can gradually come to understand the general states of the mind not only of beings living in the sensuous sphere (*kāmāvacara-bhūmi*) but also of those in the other two spheres, namely, the sphere of materiality (*rūpāvacara-bhūmi*) and the sphere of immateriality (*arūpāvacara-bhūmi*) without any more examining their hearts (loc. cit.). So, he understands all sixteen states of minds as given in the suttas.

Thus, *cetopariyañāṇa*, like *cutūpapātañāṇa* is a faculty of *dibbacakkhu* ; only a person endowed with the latter is able to develop *cetopariyañāṇa* and read others' minds. It should be mentioned in this connection that persons should penetrate, by means of *cetopariyañāṇa*, the minds only of those whose attainments are lower than their own, and not *vice versa*. The Buddhas, for example, are able to read the minds of all beings, but the arahants who are able to penetrate minds of those below them are unable to penetrate the mind of the Buddha. Individuals of lower attainments are incapable of penetrating the minds of those of higher attainments because those higher attainments are beyond their grasp.

Another point to be noted in this case is that by means of *cetopariyañāṇa* one could know the general state of the mind of others, i.e., whether a particular mind is passionate or not and so on. This is compared to observing one's face in a mirror or a pan of water and noticing whether there is a mole or not (*D.* I, p. 80). This seems to imply that only the general states of the minds of others are known by this *ñāṇa*. It cannot read specific thoughts (*vitakkitaṃ vicāritaṃ*) of another person prevalent at a given moment. It is by means of another psychic power that a specific thought of another person could be read ; and this power is called *ādesanā-pāṭihāriya* (q.v., *D.* I, p. 213 ; *A.* I, p. 170 f.. This knowledge is not included in the stock phrase that describes *cetopariyañāṇa*. See ABHIÑÑĀ.

U.K.

CETOSAMĀDHI. See SAMĀDHI.

CETOVIMUTTI, emancipation of mind, in the highest sense, refers to perfect freedom of mind attained by following the Noble Path (*ariya-magga*) or by living the Noble Life (*brahma-cariya*). In this context, the term is almost always coupled with another term, *paññāvimutti*, to read *cetovimuttiṃ paññāvimuttiṃ* (*D.* I, p. 156 , III, p. 78 ; *S.* I, p. 120 ; *A.* I, p. 123 ; *Vbh.* p. 344 ; *Netti.* pp. 40, 41). In this state of freedom, mind becomes perfectly free from all passions (*āsavehi cittāni vimucciṃsu* : *M.* III, pp. 20,280), namely, the passions of sense-pleasures (*kāmāsava*), passions for continued existence (*bhavāsava*), passions of views (*diṭṭhāsava*) and passions of ignorance (*avijjāsava* : *D.* I, p. 84 ;

II, p. 8). This refers to the attainment of arahantship, the highest and the noblest state (*D*. I, p. 156) which is the final release from saṃsāra (*DA*. I, p. 313) The term *paññāvimutti* appears to be complementary to the first term *cetovimutti*, and stresses the fact that emancipation of mind is attained by insight (*paññāparibhāvitaṃ cittaṃ sammadeva āsavehi vimuccati: D*. II, p. 81, etc.). The person whose mind is thus emancipated is called *vimuttacitta* (*M*. I, p. 140); he is not further urged by the Buddha to go on persevering. He has passed beyond such a need; there are no more hindrances for him to eliminate and the Teacher calls him the Diamond-minded (*vajirūpama citta: A*. I, p. 124).

Cetovimutti, according to Buddhaghosa, is synonymous with *cittavimutti*, and is a name for the consciousness of the fruit of arahantship (*arahatta-phala-citta*) which is free from the bondage of all passions; and, *paññāvimutti* is to be understood as insight of the fruit of arahantship (*arahatta-phala-paññā*) which is also free from the bondage of all passions (*DA*. I, p. 313).

The term *cetovimutti* is also used in different contexts in the suttas with reference t variant degrees or stages of emancipation of mind which are lower than the perfect freedom referred to above. The different names by which these stages of emancipation are referred to indicate rather the means by which they are attained.

Appamāṇā-cetovimutti, emancipation of mind through infinitudes, for example, is attained by practising the four infinitudes (*appamaññā*), also called divine states (*brahmavihāra*), namely, *mettā*, *karuṇā*, *muditā* and *upekkhā* (*M*. I, p. 297, III, p. 146 ff.; *S*. IV, pp. 296-297). *Cetovimutti* attained by practising *mettā* is referred to as *mettā-cetovimutti* and those by practising the other three *brahmavihāras* are termed *karuṇā-cetovimutti*, *muditā - cetovimutti* and *upekkhā - cetovimutti*, respectively (*D*. III, p. 248). The person who attains emancipation of mind through the practice of *brahmavihāras* becomes a non-returner (*anāgāmin*), but not an arahant, because he has yet to eliminate some passions and be free from them (*A*. V, p. 300). This emancipation of mind is one that is produced, generated by the mind and is, therefore, impermanent and liable to cease (*A*. V, p. 344).

Ākiñcaññā-cetovimutti is attained by concentrating on the state of nothingness (*ākiñcaññāyatana*, q.v.) while *suññatā-cetovimutti* by considering existence to be devoid (*suñña*) of self (*atta*) or of things connected with the self (*attaniya: M*. I, pp. 296–297; *S*. IV, p. 296). Another stage in the emancipation of mind, called *animittā-cetovimutti*, is attained by ignoring all signs (*nimitta*) and by thinking of the state which is signless (*animittā dhātu*), i.e., Nibbāna (*M*. I, pp. 296–298; *S*. IV, p. 296).

Emancipation of the mind attained by the three means referred to above is, if directed on correct lines, capable of reaching the state of perfect freedom, and when it does reach, it is called the firm and unshakable emancipation of mind (*akuppā cetovimutti: M*. I, p. 293; *S*. IV, p. 297); it is the goal of *brahmacariya* (*M*. I, pp. 197, 205) and is identical with the highest and the noblest state, i.e., arahantship (*MA*. II, p. 232). See VIMUTTI.

U. K.

CEYLON. See SRI LANKA.

CHABBAGGIYĀ BHIKKHŪ (Skt. ṣaḍvargika, ṣaḍvargiya; Tib. drug-sde), groups of Buddhist monks under six leaders, who are noted for their non-conformist views and behaviour, living in India during the life time of the Buddha. Six monks — Assaji, Punabbasu, Paṇḍuka, Lohitaka, Mettiya and Bhummaja — as given in the Pali texts (*VinA*. III, p. 613 f.), were their leaders. Buddhist Sanskrit texts, e.g., *Mahāvyutpatti* (*Mhvyut*. 9471–6), give a slightly different list, viz., Nanda, Upananda, Punarvasu, Chanda, Aśvaka and Udâyin (*BHS*. Vol. II, s.v. ṣaḍvargika). In the *Divyāvadāna* (*Divy*. pp. 307, 329) the first two Nanda and Upananda, are compounded into a single name, Nandopananda, and treated as one person. Whatever the variations in the names of the leaders, the 'groups of the six' are, in practically all traditions, described as the rabble of the Order.

According to the *Samantapāsādikā* (*VinA*. loc. cit.) all the six leading monks were natives of Sāvatthi and acquainted with one another. Finding a living hard to obtain, they, as laymen, entered the Order under Sāriputta and Moggallāna, the two Chief Disciples. After staying at Sāvatthi for nearly five years and gathering quite a number of followers, as well as nuns, they decided to form themselves into three sections, each under two of the leading monks, and live at three different places where food was plentiful. The first under Assaji and Punabbasu, hence referred to as Assaji-Punabbasukā, went to reside at Kiṭāgiri, the second

under Paṇḍuka and Lohitaka (Paṇḍuka-Lohitakā) at Jetavana and the third under Mettiya and Bhummaja (Mettiya-Bhummajakā) at Rājagaha.

Incidents relating to the misdemeanour of these chabbaggiya-monks, and consequent laying down of additional ecclesiastical rules and even prescribing punitive measures to deal with the offenders by the Buddha are abundant in the Pali texts, specially of the Vinaya. The chabbaggiya-monks are found challenging the validity of ecclesiastical acts correctly performed by the Saṅgha (*Vin.* IV, p. 126). They are reported as having made false accusations against innocent monks, the most reprehensible example in this respect being the conduct of Mettiya-Bhummajaka bhikkhus who falsely accused Dabbamallaputta thera of a *pārājikā* (q.v.) offence (*Vin.* III, pp. 166 ff.). Paṇḍuka-Lohitaka bhikkhus were found guilty of inciting groups of monks to fight others (*Vin.* II, p. 1 f.). Similarly, the chabbaggiya-bhikkhus, as a whole, came to be accused of indulging in tale-bearing with a view to creating dissensions in the Saṅgha (*Vin.* IV, p. 12). Mention is also made of their attempts to get rid of some of the monastic regulations in the *Pātimokkha* (*Vin.* IV, p. 142), and their practice of holding separate recitals of the *Pātimokkha* (q.v.), among themselves was prohibited by the Buddha (*Vin.* I, p. 104 f.). Their ceaseless endeavour to undermine the authority of the Vinaya is evident in the history of the *pācittiya* rule lxxii of the Theravāda Vinaya texts (*Vin.* IV, p. 143).

Even by way of personal conduct the chabbaggiya-bhikkhus are said to have been unethical. They wore different kinds of ornaments, grew their hair long, combed it and applied oil, used mirrors, applied cosmetic powders and ointments (*Vin.* II, p. 106 f.), wore sandals (*Vin.* I, p. 194) and robes of various colours (*Vin.* I, p. 306) and used high couches (*Vin.* II, p. 149 f.). They recited the Dhamma in a singing fashion (*Vin.* II, p. 108). When the Buddha permitted a little liquor to be mixed with medicine, they used it excessively and got intoxicated. Thereupon, the Buddha laid down the special circumstances under which liquor was to be used even therapeutically (*Vin.* I, p. 205). They are even reported to have sought sexual pleasure, and once attempted to attract the attention of nuns by sprinkling water on them and exposing their person in the presence of nuns (*Vin.* II, p. 262). The nuns belonging to the chabbaggiya groups, too, behaved in a similarly unseemly manner.

Assaji-Punabbasuka monks of Kiṭāgiri had once become very popular among the people of the neighbourhood and misled thereby the laity with regard to the proper behaviour of monks. Their numerical strength and the consequent power they weilded had become such a threat that Sāriputta and Moggallāna were asked by the Buddha, when informed of the situation, to go reinforced with sufficient numbers in order to deal with the miscreant monks (*Vin.* II, p. 12 ; III, p. 182).

According to the *Karmavastu* of the *Mūla-Sarvāstivāda Vinaya* (which corresponds to the *Kosambaka-vatthu* of the Pali Vinaya *Mahāvagga*), the monk Senāṃjaya, who is known and respected for his hospitality, heard about the questionable behaviour of the ṣaḍvargika-monks. So when they turned up at his monastery, he gave them the cold shoulder. Enraged at this, the ṣaḍvargika-monks carried out the *utkṣepaṇa-karma* (Pali, *ukkhepaniya-kamma*), i.e., act of total boycott (see DAṆḌAKAMMA), on Senāṃjaya. This was declared illegal by the Buddha (*GM.* III, Pt. 2, p. 201 f.). The *Pāṇḍu-Lohitaka vastu* of the same text (Pt. 3, pp. 1–30) describes some of the offences committed by Pāṇḍu-Lohitaka and Aśvaka-Punarvasuka monks. As punishment, the Buddha prescribed such acts as *tarjanīya-karma* (Pali, *tajjanīya-kamma*) and *pravāsanīya-karma* (Pali, *pabbājanīya-kamma*). When Upananda, who was in the habit of appropriating robes and other articles belonging to dying monks, was reported the Buddha decreed that the property of monks who pass away should devolve on the Saṅgha as a whole (op. cit. Pt. 2, pp. xviii f., 117 ff.; cf. *Vin.* I, p. 305 f.).

The chabbaggiya-monks, who are generally regarded as guilty (*sāpattika*) members of the Order (*Vin.* I, p. 125 f. ; II, p. 241), continued their reprehensible conduct even after the demise of the Buddha. For, their attempts to have the 'lesser and minor' rules (*khuddānukhuddakāni sikkhāpadāni*) abolished at the First Buddhist Council mentioned in the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya (*Taishō*, Vol. 22, p. 492 b and c) is evidence of their unabated zeal to rebel aganist the disciplinary set up of the Sāsana.

K. D. SOMARATNA

CHĀKMĀ. The Chākmās form the largest Buddhist community in East Pakistan. Living in the central part of the district Chittagong Hill Tract, the Chākmās are a people with distinct cultural and historical traditions and even their own national script which, however, is being more and more replaced by Bengali script. Their language is a peculiar dialect of Bengali. Anthropologically the Chākmās belong to the peoples of South-east Asia.

There is a number of customs which hint at a form of 'animism' which is very similar to that of the peoples of the Burmese and Shan groups as their religion before their conversion to Buddhism.

The then existing historical records of Chākmā history have been collected by S.C. Ghosh and made use of in his book on the history of the Chākmā people published in 1909. Already in the first half of the 18th century the Chākmā kings ruled over the northern and central parts of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. According to their own historical tradition the earlier seats of the Chākmās were in the southern part of the Chittagong Hill Tracts along the river Matamuri. From the Arakanese chronicles we know that in the first half of the 16th century Chākmā kings fought against the Arakanese near Ramu in the southern part of the present Chittagong district.

The earlier history of the Chākmās can be traced from Burmese sources. During the 14th century, Chākmās lived in the hills of Central Arakan, west of Thayetmyo. During a still earlier period, the ancestors of the Chākmās had migrated to these hills from Upper Burma. Together with the Pyu and the Burmese proper the Sak (Thet) — this is the Burmese form of the name of the Chākmās — are considered as the three ethnical groups of Tibeto-Burman stock that had come to Burma before the formation of the Burmese nation. References to Sak are found in a number of Old Burmese inscriptions of the 12th and 13th centuries. The Sak did not only come under the influence of Burmese and Shan culture during the period from the 12th to 15th centuries, but part of them was even assimilated by the Burmese. There can be no doubt that the taking over of Bengali by the Chākmās as their language was a rather recent development. A small population group called Sak living in some villages in the southern part of Chittagong Hill Tracts has preserved their old language which is related to the Lui or Loi group of languages. The Kadus in Upper Burma speak a language belonging to this group and call themselves Asak or Sak.

Thus, the Sak must have come under the influence of Buddhism already during their earlier residence in Burma. This fact is testified to by the Tibetan historian Tāranātha who mentions Tsagma among the peoples converted to Buddhism by Indian Buddhists emigrating to Indo-China when the Muslims conquered Bengal at the end of the 12th century and destroyed the Buddhist monasteries there.

Today, the Chākmās are adherents of orthodox Theravāda. This, however, is a consequence of the reform movement in East Bengal Buddhism led by the Saṅgharāja Sāramedha. Sāramedha who had travelled from Arakan to Chittagong in 1856 in order to purify Buddhism among the Bengali Buddhist communities was invited by the Chākmā queen Kālindī Rānī to the then capital of the Chākmās in Rājnagar (27 miles to the North East of Chittagong) and made Saṅgharāja or Thathanabaing of the Chākmā kingdom in 1857. Since that time, the bhikkhus of the Chākmās belong to the Saṅgharāja-Nikāya of East Benga Buddhism. The head of their monastic communities is the Rājguru appointed by the Chākmā Rāj.

Buddhism of the Chākmās had been quite different from orthodox Theravāda before this reform initiated by the Saṅgharāja. The Chākmās had no bhikkhus but Buddhist village priests called Rari (usually spelt Raulee). These Raris are today considered a lower order of Buddhist priests in relation to the bhikkhus, but they still perform traditional religious rites. They wear a yellow robe slightly different from the robes of a bhikkhu, and Raris are initiated by a Rari guru. During the performance of the traditional rites, they read out the ancient holy scriptures called Akhar Tārā from palm leaf or paper manuscripts. The language of these books is not understood today, and they are written in the Chākmā alphabet which shows similarities to Shan and earlier Burmese alphabets. From an analysis of these texts it becomes clear that they consist of excerpts from Pali texts and passages in an unknown language which seems to belong to the Sino-Tibetan group of languages. The extreme distortion of the texts in the manuscripts available today has made it impossible so far to classify this language beyond doubt. From the Pali passages we can conclude that these texts represent Pali *parittas* with a commentary of the type represented by Burmese *nissayas* or Sinhalese *sannayas*. Thus, e.g., Silmagal-tārā is based on the *Siṅgālovāda Sutta* and it is read out during marriage ceremonies like the corresponding Pali text in other Buddhist countries. We can definitely reject the suggestions of some Bengali scholars that the Āgar Tārās represent texts of the tradition of Tantric Buddhism. Chākmā Buddhism had always been of the Theravāda type and the texts of the Āgar Tārā collection must have been adopted from the collection of *parittas* current in Upper Burma and Arakan when the

ancestors of the Chākmās had still lived there.

HEINZ BECHERT

CHAḶABHIJĀTI. See ABHIJĀTI.

CHAḶABHIÑÑĀ. See ABHIÑÑĀ.

CH'AN. See ZEN.

CHANCE. See ADHICCASAMUPPANNA.

CHANDA, impulse, conation, a psychological phenomenon (*dhamma*) that is the cause for impelling one towards an object. The ancient teachers have defined it as ' will to act ', ' desire for action' (*kattukāmatā : Vism.* p. 466 : *Kartukāmatā* : L. de la Valèe Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, Paris and Louvain, 1925, V, p. 294 ; *Abhsy.* p. 6). Its characteristic (*lakkhaṇa*), says Buddhaghosa, is the will to act ; its function (*rasa*) is scanning an object ; it is manifested (*paccupaṭṭhāna*) as need for an object, that same object is its proximate cause (*padaṭṭhāna : Vism.* p. 466). *Chanda*, according to Asaṅga, is the will to act with regard to desired objects ; its function is to put forth energy and provide a basis for the latter (*Chandaḥ. . . īpsite vastuni tatladupasaṃhatā kartukāmatā, vīryādānasannisrayadānakarmakaḥ : Abhsy.* p. 6). Its basis is in turn provided by *śraddhā*, faith, in the accessibility of the object cognised (*śraddhā . . . chandasannisrayadānakarmikā* ; loc. cit). Buddhaghosa further explains that *chanda* should be regarded as the extending of the 'mental arm' in the apprehension of an object (*Vism.* p. 466). Both in Pali and in Sanskrit, *chanda* represents the stage in a process of perception at which the percipient mentally 'jumps' at the object which is being perceived. It may, therefore, be described as volition (*cetanā*, q. v.) in action.

Chanda seems to consist of two aspects, impulsive and conative. It is impulse when it is in action, i.e., when *chanda* as a *cetasika* (q.v.) operates on an object. It is conation, i.e., dynamism of impulse, the force behind the action, when *chanda* as a pure *saṃskāra* generates the impulse.

Chanda is a mental phenomenon of amoral import, a force which is intrinsically neither good nor bad in the ethical sense. The sense-objects, too, are neither good nor evil in the ethical sense. It is the attitude that people adopt towards objects that is considered good or bad. Although *chanda* by itself is an amoral phenomenon yet it is capable of turning good or bad by association ; it is good when it is associated with a morally good thought (*kusala-citta*) ; it is bad when it is associated with a morally bad thought (*akusala-citta*).

It is natural that, in the process of perception, people form opinions about objects they cognise, depending on their characteristics and attributes (*nimitta, anuvyañjana*). The natural reaction, on the part of the percipient in such a situation, is to develop a liking towards objects which he feels are agreeable and pleasurable. In perceiving such an object desire arises in the percipient's mind. At the root of this lies what is called unwise attention (*ayoniso-manasikāra*), an aspect of *moha*.

It is *chanda* that impels the person towards the object. It is bad when it is associated with improper activities like *ayoniso-manasikāra* and defiled by such qualities as *moha*. The percipient jumps at the object with a view to grasping it, and he becomes attached to it. In this context *chanda* becomes synonymous with desire and attachment (*chando vā rāgo vā pemaṃ : Nd.* 1. p. 181 ; *kāmasaṅkhāto chando : NdA. SHB.* p. 11).

This, according to Buddhism, is a wrong way of looking at things as it leads to a host of ethical problems. People are, on the contrary, free to adopt a totally different attitude towards objects they perceive. Some may ignore the beauty or otherwise of the perceived objects and consider them to be impermanent (*anicca*) and so on. This is the result of wise attention (*yoniso-manasikāra*), an aspect of *paññā*, directed towards objects cognised. This, according to the Buddha, is the correct way of looking at things ; it ultimately results in the knowledge of things as they really are. *Chanda* in this instance is good because it is associated with wholesome psychic factors such as *paññā* and contemplation of impermanence.

The role of *chanda* in these processes of perception is to impel the percipient towards the object he happens to cognise. It is associated with attention (*manasikāra*), wise (*yoniso*) or unwise (*ayoniso*), as the case may be. If it is unwise attention that is associated, *chanda* is directed towards a course of action which is detrimental to one's own spiritual welfare and that of others ; it is, therefore, bad in the ethical sense. If it is wise attention that is associated, *chanda* is directed towards a course of action which is conducive to one's own spiritual progress and that of others ; i.e., to cultivate *kusala* and abandon *akusala*. It is, therefore, good in the ethical sense.

The analysis of this psychic process from its beginning to the rise of *chanda* is made from a purely empirical point of view. From the rise of *manasikāra* that is associated with *chanda*, the process is analysed from the Buddhist point of view; hence its ethical significance. And it is in this context that the term *chanda* is employed in numerous passages in the early Pali suttas.

As a bad quality, *chanda* is synonymous with desire and attachment (*chando vā rāgo vā pemaṃ : Nd.* I, p. 181; *kāmasaṅkhāto chando : NdA. SHB.* p. 11; *DhsA.* p. 370). It is sometimes described as feeble attachment (*Chando'ti dubbalarāgo : NdA. SHB.* p. 11). Thus, it is the initial stage in the process of attachment. According to the *Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā* (MSS. Burnouf et de La Societe Asiatique, 236, d 8, quoted in *Mdhvr.* p. 52), *chanda*, in its bad sense, is the desire for things to be acquired in the future while attachment to things already acquired is *rāga* (*aprāpteṣu viṣayeṣu prārthanā chandaḥ, prāpteṣu rāgaḥ* : cf. *anāgate prārthanā : L'Adhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, Vol. I, p. 281).

This *chanda*, according to the scriptures, arises in the mind of human beings with regard to things they feel desirable; to things they cherish. It arises, for instance, with regard to the world they live in (*lokasmiṃ chando : Sn. v.* 866), to the continued existence (*bhave chandaṃ : Thig v.* 14), to the body (*kāyasmiṃ chando : S* V, p 181), to the sense objects (*rūpesu chando...S.* IV, p. 195), to sex (*methunasmiṃ chando : Sn. v.* 835) and so on.

All phenomena, i.e., the five aggregates of grasping, have their origin in *chanda* (*chandamūlakā sabbe dhammā : A.* IV, p. 339, V, p. 107; *chandamūlakā khandhā : S.* III, p. 100). These five aggregates cover the entire field of objects which the sentient beings grasp and cling to, and are, therefore, described as aggregates of grasping (*upādānakkhandha*, q.v.). Here, *upādāna* represents the active side of *chanda*. It is because of *chanda* that the being clings to *khandhas*. This clinging is, therefore, none other than *chanda* in action.

This whole process of grasping and clinging constitutes the cause of continued existence (*bhava saṃsāra*), which is characterised by impermanence and, therefore, by suffering (*dukkha*) *Chanda*, as such, is the cause of suffering (*chando hi mūlaṃ dukkhassa : S.* IV, p. 328 ff.).

Thus *chanda*, as the cause of continued existence, is an impediment to the attainment of freedom from *bhava* and therefore, from suffering; it is a passion that has to be eradicated before one attains freedom (... *chandaṃ virājetvā evaṃ dukkhā pamuccati : S.* I, p.16). It is for the purpose of eradicating *chanda*, that the higher and noble life is lived (*chandapahānatthaṃ brahmacariyaṃ vussati : S.* V, p. 27).

As a good quality, *chanda* has to be aroused with regard to things which are good (*kusala*). Once it is aroused for the good, one is able to put forth one's energy in the direction of cultivating and developing *kusala* and suppressing and eradicating *akusala* (... *kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ uppādāya chandaṃ janeti vāyamati viriyam ārabhati* ...*M.* II, p. 11; *A.* IV, p. 462).

This *chanda* is described as desire for the good (*dhammacchanda : NdA. SHB.* p. 12; *PsA. SHB.* p. 515; *DhsA.* p. 370; *kusalacchanda : PsA. SHB.* p. 117). It is the will to act in good things (*kusala dhammesu kattukamyatā dhammacchando : NdA. SHB.* p. 133).

This aspect of *chanda* is best illustrated in a passage in the *Caṅkī Sutta* where the process of the realisation of truth is discussed. There are number of stages one has to pass before one comes to realise the truth, and *chanda* occupies an intermediary stage in the process. The process begins with faith (*saddhā*), faith in the teacher and his teaching. With faith, the sutta says, one approaches (*upasaṅkamana*) and associates himself (*payirupāsana*) with the teacher, pays attention (*sotāvadhāna*) and listens to him (*dhammasavana*). He bears the dhamma in mind (*dhammadhāraṇa*), and examines the meaning of it (*atthūpaparikkhā*) Based on understanding, he develops a liking

towards the dhamma (*dhammanijjhānakkhanti*) and a will to act (*chanda*). Then he puts forth effort and realises the truth (*saccānupatti : M.* II, p 174 ff.).

This *chanda*, coupled with *viriya*, *citta* and *vīmaṃsā*, also acts as a predominant factor (*adhipateyya : DhsA.* p 359, *Vbh.* p. 288, etc.) in the development of *kusala* in the mundane sphere and culminates in the attainment of a base of power (*iddhipāda*, q.v.: *D.* III, p 77 ; *M.* II, p. 11, etc.) in the supramundane sphere.

People are normally carried away by emotions rather than by the intellect. Urge to gratify pleasures of the senses is innate in human beings. It is natural for man to develop a liking towards attractive objects, go after them and be attached to them. It is like drifting with the current (*anusotagāmi*). Impulse towards attractive objects thus naturally ends in one's being attached to them. In this sense it is correct to understand the term *chanda* as a synonym of *kāma* or *rāga*.

According to the teaching of the Buddha, it is extremely difficult to adopt a correct attitude towards objects of the senses. It is said to be comparable to swimming against the current (*paṭisotagāmi*). This requires wisdom to distinguish between what results in good or bad and also the determination to shun the bad and choose the good. This is made possible by the practice and cultivation of good qualities not only in the present life but also in previous lives. This is why, in admonishing the bhikkhus, the Buddha always emphasised the fact that the impulse towards good thoughts have to be aroused (*chandam janeti: M.* II, p. 11, etc.), while the impulse towards the bad that naturally arises (*rūpesu uppajjeyya chando . . . .: S.* IV, p. 195) has to be deliberately suppressed. This is also the reason why the Master thought it necessary to make the guarding of the senses (*indriya saṃvara*) an essential prerequisite for the higher life (*brahmacariya*).

This dual character of *chanda* is indicated by Buddhaghosa by bringing it under two categories of *saṅkhāras*, namely, *kusala-saṅkhāra* and *akusala-saṅkhāra* (*Vism.* p. 466), and by Anuruddha by characterising it as a *cetasika* which is intrinsically neither good nor bad but acquires its ethical character by association with the corresponding phenomena (*Abhs.* p. 6). What Buddhaghosa meant was that *chanda* is a *saṅkhāra* which can be either a wholesome force (*kusala-saṅkhāra*) or an unwholesome force (*akusala-saṅkhāra*) in particular circumstances. It is the moral colouring of circumstances in which it occurs that decides its ethical character. In Anuruddha's terminology, *saṅkhāras* are called *cetasikas*, and *chanda* is a *cetasika*, a mental coefficient, of amoral import, i.e., neither good nor bad in the ethical sense, but becomes good or bad as it combines itself in a moral or immoral thought (*aññasamāna*). It is not, therefore, invariably present in every psychic process (*pakiṇṇaka : Abhs.* p. 6).

Vasubandhu considers *chanda* to be a general mental coefficient present in every moment of consciousness (*cittamahābhūmika cetasika : Abhk.* ch. ii, *v* 24 ; Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, Calcutta, 1956, p. 84). It means that *chanda* is present in thoughts, both good and bad.

Thus, as *dhammacchanda* or *kusalacchanda*, *chanda* is ethically good ; hence it is combined with good thoughts. But, as *kāmacchanda* or *chandarāga*, i.e., when it stands for the passion of desire, it is ethically bad. *Chanda* in the first instance represents will to do good while in the latter it is almost synonymous with desire for immoral action which is ethically bad.

U. L.

CHANGE. The concept of change is of fundamental significance in the religion and philosophy of Buddhism. As a generic term of the widest signification change describes variation, evolution, alteration, modification, transformation and mutation in form, state, quality or essence of any and every existent, both animate and inanimate, conscious as well as unconscious. In this generic sense change is viewed in Buddhism as an objective fact which manifests itself in a variety of forms such as motion, movement, succession, sequence, continuity, birth, growth, origination and cessation. Buddhist philosophy which recognises the objective fact of change as the universal feature of all nature provides us with a most illuminating exposition which establishes a causal connection and positive correlation between bondage and subjective evaluation of change and which points out how freedom can be realised through the total awareness of the truth of change as it really is, altogether free from such evaluation. The terminology of change characterises the distinctively dynamic philosophy of Buddhism in contrast to other systems of substantialist philosophy.

The idea of change is expressed in the suttas of the Pali nikāyas through the use of a number of words, the most frequent in attestation being

aññathatta: otherwiseness in persistance, and *vipariṇāma*: evolution and transformation. (For the study of change in Buddhism considered under the negative aspect of impermanence see ANICCA.) The suttas frequently use identical terminology to convey the generic sense of change as objective fact and activity as well as the specific sense of change as subjective evaluation and judgement. The words *aññathatta* and *vipariṇāma* are themselves used in either sense each of which is discernible only in terms of its own context. Among other words used in the suttas as evaluatives of change are *vipariyāya*, *vipallāsa*, *viparivattara*, *vikāra* etc. in the sense of reverse, vicissitude, inversion, perversion, corruption, distortion, travesty, disturbance, perturbation, fickleness, transitoriness, ephemerality, evanescence etc.

Change as the essential and universal character of nature is a theme that is constantly emphasised and repeated throughout the Buddhist scriptures. This emphasis is due to both historical and doctrinal reasons. The age of the Buddha was firmly conditioned by the doctrines of substance (*ātman*), permanence (*nityatva*) and identity (*tādātmya*) which constituted the cornerstone of the systems of orthodox Indian philosophy. The substantialist thesis is as old as the *Ṛgveda* and it found its classic expression in the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads*. Apart from those initiated into this absolutist philosophy, the generality of people, the learned as well as the unlettered, were immersed, then as now, in the belief in 'self' as the essence of personality which is seen to persist, endure and continue inspite of discernible changes in mind, body and environment. Against this background of what he considered to be illusory, erroneous and harmful beliefs, the Buddha was called upon to dedicate himself to a life-long public ministry through which he emphasised his revolutionary teaching on the universality of change. This also explains the doctrinal reason for the dominance assigned to the philosophy of change in the formulation of the teaching of Buddhism.

Change constitutes the central truth underlying the famous doctrine of the Five Aggregates (*pañcakkhandha*). This doctrine was utilised by the Buddha as an effective pedagogic device to drive home to his disciples and his other contemporaries the truth of the essentially composite nature of the human personality. The five aggregates which together organically constitute the personality, namely, corporeality (*rūpa*), feelings (*vedanā*), cognitions (*saññā*), volitional activity (*saṅkhāra*) and consciousness (*viññāṇa*) are shown to be subject to change (*vipariṇāmi, aññathābhāvi*) and, therefore perishable (*pabhaṅgu: S.* III, p. 33). The sense organs, namely, eye (*cakkhu*), ear (*sota*), nose (*ghāna*), tongue (*jivhā*), body (*kâya*) and mind (*mano*) as well as their objects, namely, material objects (*rūpa*), sounds (*sadda*), smells (*gandha*), tastes (*rasa*), tactile objects (*phoṭṭhabba*) and thoughts and feelings (*dhammā*) together with cognitions, volitions and cravings born of, and associated with the objects of the sense organs are also subject to change. The five elements (*dhātu*), namely, earth (*paṭhavī*), water (*āpo*), heat (*tejo*), air (*vāyo*) and space (*ākāsa*) are no less subject to change. The truth of change extends and applies to the three periods of time, namely, the past (*atīta*), present (*paccuppanna*) and future (*anāgata*). The aggregates of the past have ceased having been subject to change (*niruddha, viparinata*). The aggregates of the future which are yet to be born and to appear (*ajāta, apātubhūta*) are also certain to be subject to change and destruction. As for the present aggregates, they are easily and clearly seen to be subject to change and destruction (*S.* III, p 39 f.).

All data of empirical knowledge, namely, all phenomena, are causally arisen, dependently originated (*paṭiccasamuppanna : S.* II, p.26). To be is to be related. There is nothing and none whatever that is not related. Therefore, all things are conditioned by universal relativity (*idappaccayatā*). All things are non-permanent (*sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā*). All existents (*dhammā*) are without substance (*sabbe dhammā anattā : M.* I, p. 228). All things are subject to change (*vayadhammā : S.* I, p. 158). It is in the nature of all things to be subject to origination and cessation (*uppādavayadhammino : S.* I, p. 6). Whatever is of the nature of arising must necessarily be also of the nature of cessation (*Yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhammaṃ : S.* IV, p. 47).

The world is without a protector or lord (*attāṇo loko anabhissaro : M.* II, p 68). All life is unstable and draws to a close (*upanīyati loko addhuvo*: loc.cit.). Body and mind are non-eternal (*asassatā*), of short duration (*appāyukā*), having to be abandoned (*pahāya gamanīyā*) and subject to departure and disappearance (*cavanadhammā*). Everything is of the nature of being born (*jāyati*), decaying (*jīyati*), dying (*mīyati*), abandoning and departing (*cavati*) and again arising (*uppajjati : M.* I, p. 326).

Change has different degrees and levels of acceleration, such as, from the macrocosmic to the microcosmic, from the atomic to the sub-atomic.

Body and mind indeed are both subject to change but the rate, speed and velocity of change of mind and mentality are infinitely more advanced than those of matter. The Buddha says: 'I consider, monks, that there is no phenomenon that comes and goes so quickly as mind. It is not easy to find a simile to show how quickly mind comes and goes (*Nāhaṃ bhikkhave aññaṃ ekadhammaṃ pi samanupassāmi yaṃ evaṃ lahuparivattaṃ yathayidaṃ cittaṃ yāvañcidaṃ bhikkhave upamā pi na sukarā yāva lahuparivattaṃ cittan ti : A.* I, p. 10). The mind (*citta*) is constantly throbbing and wavering (*Phandanaṃ capalaṃ cittaṃ : Dhp. v.* 33). The mind is not an entity identical through time. The consciousness of the mind, far from being self-existent, is brought about by a collocation of a wide variety of causal factors, both physical and mental (*Aññatra paccayā natthi viññāṇassa sambhavo : M.* I, pp. 256–7).

All things that are put together, made up and conditioned (*saṅkhata*) have three essential characteristics: arising, transformation and otherwiseness in persistence (*Tīnimāni....saṅkhatassa saṅkhatalakkhaṇāni, uppādo paññāyati, vayo paññāyati, ṭhitassa aññathattaṃ paññāyati : A.* I, p. 152). Although we speak of substantives and nouns they occur only in the constructed world of grammar. In truth there are no nouns in nature except verbs, that is, in the sense of ceaseless activity and mutation. The idea of thing, state or discrete element is a false construction. Life is a continuous movement which is arbitrarily divided into segments and transformed into substantives. An object, event or person so called is nothing but a series in flux. What are called cause, effect and condition are but different moments conceived by the mind. But the rapidity in the succession of moments cause the illusion of substance and permanence. As with substance so with agency which is merely a superimposition by the mind. In truth there is no doer but a doing, no feeler but a feeling and no actor but an acting. Self, soul, god etc, are verbal creations and are at best convenient intellectual fictions either to avoid circumlocution or to lull people into a false sense of security and solace. Expressions such as being or individual are purely conventional. The organic integration of the five aggregates is conventionally referred to as 'person' just as a particular functional integration of certain parts goes to form the convention called 'chariot'. (*Yathā hi aṅgasambhārā hoti saddo ratho iti evaṃ khandhesu santesu hoti satto ti sammuti : S.* I, p. 135).

The emphasis on the philosophy of change in Buddhism is made on unambiguously pragmatic and utilitarian grounds. The assertion of the universality of change is directly related to religious training and spiritual realisation consisting in purification, wisdom and freedom. In the Buddhist scheme of training, the realisation of the dynamic nature of life is a primary condition for the birth of the religous life of virtue and understanding. When the truth of change is increasingly realised the attachment to sense pleasures (*kāmarāga*), material appearances (*rūparāga*), becoming (*bhavarāga*) and therewith ignorance (*avijjā*) is progressively exhausted (*pariyādiyati*). When these are thus exhausted the notion and conceit of 'self' is also exhausted and destroyed (*sabbaṃ asmimānaṃ pariyādiyati samūhanti : S.* III, p. 155).

The teaching on change is integrally built into the systematic methods formulated for the incessant development of total awareness. This is most conspicuously exemplified in the system of meditation on the four-fold practice of mindfulness (*cattāro satipaṭṭhānā*). The disciple is herein enjoined to apply his mindfulness to his body, feelings, mind and its objects consisting in a wide variety of mental phenomena. He considers the body either internally or externally or both internally and externally. He then sees that his body is something that comes to be and passes away. Mindfulness is then established far enough for the purposes of knowledge and self-collectedness. And he abides independent, grasping after nothing in the world whatever. This *modus operandi* is repeated thereafter in respect of his feelings, mind and its objects. These four forms of mindfulness, (namely, *kāye kāyānupassī, vedanāsu vedanānupassī, citte cittānupassī* and *dhammesu dhammānupassī D.* II, p. 293 f.) effectively assist the disciple to re-discover the deep and fruitful meaning of the truth of change and allow him the possibility for perfectibility. From the gross body to the subtle mind and thereafter to the subtler propensities in the deeper recesses of his mind the disciple is enabled to develop insightful awareness of the all-pervasive truth of change. The primary obstacles to inner purification are the *nīvaraṇas* and the *saṃyojanas*. But the fact that they are subject to change, that is, origination and cessation, makes it possible to adopt ways of eliminating them altogether and this is precisely what the way of mindfulness seeks to realise. The disciple sees through awareness that a particular obstacle or fetter is arisen. He sees that unborn obstacles could arise. He sees how those obstacles which are already arisen could be made to fade away. And he also sees how it is possible to ensure that those obstacles which have faded away will not

again arise. The *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* sets out at length the way in which the awareness of the fact of change may be called upon to do duty in the culture of progressive spiritual betterment.

The Buddhist philosophy of change applies no less rigorously to society, culture, history and mythology. Consistent with the truth relating to the universality of change, the Buddha set himself against any static view of society. Instead, he expounded a doctrine of social dynamics according to which society is evolutionary in its origin and development and functional in its organisation and stratification. He held to ridicule the pretentious claims of Brahmins who sought to affirm a static view of society depending on its divine origin and divine sanction of social structure and economic function. The Brahmanic thesis that the Brahmin class was pre-eminent among the four created by Brahmā was clearly calculated in their own economic interest. In an instructive parable recorded in the *Dīgha Nikāya* (*D.* I, p 17 f.) the Buddha relates a humorous but edifying story in the idiom of the current mythology according to which the claim of Mahā Brahmā, the Creator God of the Brahmins, to the effect that he is the 'Lord, Maker, Disposer, Master and Father of all that have and will become' (*Vasavattī issaro kattā nimmātā seṭṭho sañjitā vasī pitā bhūtabhavyānaṃ : D.* I, p. 18) is as mistaken as the faith of those credulous beings who accept such claim.

Social change clearly explains all historical alterations of social structure. There is regularity and continuity in social, cultural, political and economic change. Revolutionary processes are nothing but greatly accelerated change. There are no static, unchanging hierarchies in respect of people or their institutions. Human institutions are as much subject to change as human beings. Change of state is an invariable characteristic of natural, social and cultural systems. The illusion of an identical unchangeable social system or a hierarchy of cultural values is created by a nexus of relations, spatial, temporal, material and psychological that appear to remain constant. Evolutionary or revolutionary changes in political, economic and religious systems bring about changes in the patterns of culture. Change is not altogether exhausted by the purely involuntary process. Change can be directed, determined, governed and influenced by voluntary decision and endeavour. The understanding of the nature of change gives us mastery over change, and Buddhism utilises this possibility and capacity to the maximum. Individual behaviour does influence social behaviour and social behaviour in turn does inform and inspire individual behaviour. Change in the individual has its impact on society, and social impact conditions the individual in a wide variety of ways, perceptible as well as imperceptible.

While people are prepared to concede the reality of change in the ordinary course of worldly life, most of them are determined to hold that there are unchangeable eternal verities such as souls and gods and multifarious pantheons. The Buddhist analysis shows that these have been understandable but unacceptable contributions to historical, religious and mythological fiction. The gods, deities and other denizens of other realms who have been accomodated for the religious and moral edification of the Buddhist laity and clergy and who prominently figure in the didactic literature of Buddhism are all subject to change and live in spheres where the all-pervasive universality of change is unredeemed by any kind of stability. The suttas refer to the brahmanhood of Brahmā (*brahmatta*), sakkahood of Sakka (*sakkatta*) and the mārahood of Māra (*māratta*) thereby suggesting that these posts are neither permanent nor personal to the holders (*M.* III, p. 66).

Buddhism distinguishes clearly between change as objective fact and change as subjective evaluation. By far the most effective impediment to the understanding of the truth of change is the tendency on the part of the worldling (*puthujjana*) to judge change in terms desirable and undesirable. Change *per se* is value-neutral but nonetheless it lends itself to evaluation and judgement on ethical, religious, social, cultural, economic, political and other grounds. The distinction drawn between change for the better and change for the worse results in a wide variety of pairs of opposites which, according to Buddhism, must be finally overcome with the realisation of wisdom and freedom. The worldling distinguishes between different aspects of change or between different stages in the history of change and indicates his attitude towards them in the form of likes and dislikes on the basis of his needs and wants. In the involved world of everyday life choice and preference are understandable and perhaps inevitable. But it is also equally true that conflict and suffering in our lives are basically born of our attitudes and outlooks. We may consider in this connection our ordinary attitude to the whole history of change in the life of an individual from the cradle to the grave. His very birth, which itself is a stage in the history of change, is desirable. His growth through infancy and childhood to virile manhood is very desirable. But his transformation into old age and decrepitude,

finally ending in death, is indeed not desirable or acceptable to us. We use the term 'growth' only for the stage extending from infancy to manhood. The stage from manhood to old age and death is by no means called 'growth'. The appropriate expression for this latter stage is 'decline' or 'decay'. But the whole history of the individual from conception to death is one of uninterrupted change. Old age, debility and death are as natural as birth and growth. The acceptance of change as simple mutation is a simple action but the evaluation of change as transformation for the better or worse is a complex reaction. Buddhism teaches that reaction binds us in bondage and that action liberates us into freedom. But the worldlings are embroiled in their attachments and immersed in the quagmire of their ignorance (*avijjā*) and confusion (*moha*). Rooted in this ignorance the worldling distinguishes between pairs of opposites such as development and decline, improvement and deterioration, persistence and transitoriness, progress and regress, youth and old age and life and death.

The Buddha's exposition of the causal relation between bondage and this worldly evaluation of the fact of change is amongst his most original contributions to the legacy of human wisdom. We may in this connection consider his analysis of the phenomena of birth (*jāti*), decay (*jarā*) and death (*maraṇa*). The concept of birth becomes meaningful, that is, in respect of individuals, only in terms of the assumption (*maññita*) of the concept of 'I', ego and self. Without this concept or assumption birth is a mere arising (*uppāda*). The worldling is obsessed by the thoughts 'I am' (*asmīti*), 'this am I' (*ayaṃ ahaṃ asmīti*), 'I will be' (*bhavissāmīti*). This assumption is a disease (*roga*), an abscess (*gaṇḍa*) and a veritable sting of poison (*salla*). The silent sage is altogether free from these assumptions and is, therefore, called pacified (*santa*). The sage who is at peace is not born, does not decay, is not agitated and does not envy. (*Muni .. santo na jāyati na jiyyati na kuppati nappiheti*). In as much as there is nothing of which can be said 'was born', not being so born, how could he decay ? Not decaying how could he die ? Not dying how could he be agitated ? Not being so agitated how could he envy ? (*Tam pissa... natthi yena jāyetha ajāyamāno kiṃ jiyyissati, ajiyyamāno kim miyyissati amiyyamāno kiṃ kuppissati akuppamāno kissa pihessati ? : M.* III, p. 246). What is clear from this exposition is that *jāti*, *jarā* and *maraṇa*, far from denoting physical events of birth, decay and death, really connote the birth, decay and death of the five aggregates of grasping (*pañcupādānakkhandha*). Through the constant recurrence of the thoughts of self, the worldling is incessantly born, incessantly decays and incessantly dies. The disciple who has understood the truth of change is endowed with the excellent aryan wisdom (*paramā ariyā paññā*). This wisdom is the knowledge and understanding of the cessation of all conflict and suffering (*sabbadukkhakkhaye ñāṇaṃ : M.* III, p. 245).

To the Buddha and his circle of disciples change was not a theme of academic or philosophic interest. Far from being a problem calling for philosophic investigation, change was a truth of immediate realisation. One who is endowed with spiritual sensitiveness discerns, as they truly are, the origination and cessation of all factors that generate conflict and suffering (*...sabbesaṃ yeva dukkhadhammānaṃ samudayañca... yathābhūtam pajānāti : S.* IV, p. 188). This awareness of change gives rise to the critical outlook which refuses to come to unchanging conclusions in a changing world. A conclusion does violence to constant awareness by sending the mind to sleep. To conclude, therefore, is to cease to be intelligent. It is the essential function of a conclusion to reach a static decision to be held and defended with rigidity. This mentality gives rise to bigotry, arrogance and intolerance. It encourages the tendency towards dogmatism and multifarious doctrinaire attitudes. All this leads to the birth, growth and crystallization of ideology, social, economic, cultural, religious, poltical etc. Buddha's relentless rejection of ideological dogmatism is consistent with his inculcation of an earnestness for the development of awareness of the immediacy and constancy of change. To him the only reality in phenomena was the reality of change. To attach oneself to the ideal is to escape from the real. Emphasis on the ideal leads to the negligence of the immediate and the real and that is change. The understanding of ceaseless mutation is the vision born of the insight into reality as it truly and really is (*yathābhūtañāṇadassana*).

The Buddhist philosophy of change encourages a progressive outlook for man in society. The belief in immutability, substance and permanence affects not merely the life of religion but every other endeavour of both individuals and groups. Religious life and philosophic inquiry are as much the product of society as any other human activity. Philosophy is a reflection of the needs and wants of society and those brahmins and other philosophers who from the time of the Buddha to the present day oppose change in their philosophies are precisely those who oppose change in their own societies. Those who hold reality to be fixed and immutable but are aware

of the fact of ceaseless change around them and within them seek to reconcile the contradiction by reducing change to a mere appearance and illusion born of ignorance. To hold that reality is fixed and unchanging is at once to set a limit to the development of man and his society. The Buddhist philosophy of change, on the other hand, allows the individual and society limitless possibilities for development and perfection. In view of the fact of universal change man discovers his inexhaustible capacities and capabilities in religious, philosophic and other realms. In the Buddhist view the very solar system of ours, like countless other solar systems and galaxies, is in no wise fixed and static. These stupendous systems have their own origination, duration and cessation. In the famous *Aggañña Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya*, where the Buddha expounds the evolution of galactic systems specific reference is made to their subjection to the inexorable truth of mutation and transformation.

(*Hoti... samayo yaṃ kadāci karahaci dīghassa addhuno accayena ayaṃ loko saṃvaṭṭati. Hoti... samayo yaṃ kadāci karahaci dīghassa addhuno accayena ayaṃ loko vivaṭṭati : D.* III, p. 84.)

The Buddha's teaching on change exercised a fundamental impact on the history of Buddhist philosophy. Apart from its direct relevance to religious training and spiritual insight, the doctrine of change gradually became the object of philosophic investigation on the part of the later schoolmen. Even before the rise of the Abhidharma schools, the early Buddhist philosophers have s own evidence of their awareness of some of the philosophic implications of change on the ethics, epistemology, logic and metaphysics of Buddhist thought.

One of the first philosophic problems arising out of the teaching on change was that of continuity and identity in the midst of ceaseless flux. Already in the time of the Buddha, the monk Sāti misunderstood the Master as declaring that the mind remained identical inspite of constant change (*viññāṇaṃ saṃdhāvati saṃsarati anaññaṃ : M* I, p. 256). The Buddha corrected the monk's error by pointing out that the mind was causally arisen and did not, therefore, remain identical. The later literature shows that this reply did not altogether stifle further philosophic speculation on the possibility of reconciling change with identity. The need to insist on the necessity for identity through change appears to be compelled by the ethical problem in relation to freedom and moral responsibility. If change is total transformation how can we posit the identity of personality which is imperative for purposes of justifying moral deserts ? The post-canonical text, the *Milinda-pañha*, raises and answers this question for and on behalf of the Theravādins. King Milinda is perplexed by the question as to how the personality (*nāmarūpa*) can be held responsible for good actions and bad if his mental (*nāma*) and physical (*rūpa*) make-up is never the same during two consecutive moments on account of ceaseless change. "If sir, there is no reunion of *nāma* and *rūpa* (in the course of change) does not a man become free of culpability for immoral actions performed by him ?" (*Yadi bhante na imaṃ yeva nāmarūpaṃ paṭisandahati na nu so mutto bhavissati pāpakehi kammehi ti* (*Milin.* p. 46 f). Nāgasena, the Buddhist elder, assures him. that were it the case that there is no such reunion there would be no such culpability but that as a matter of fact there is such reunion and, therefore, culpability (*Yadi na paṭisandaheyya mutto bhaveyya pāpakehi kammehi, yasmā ca kho mahārāja paṭisandahati tasmā na mutto pāpakehi kammehīti* : loc. cit.). The matter is further clarified by resort to the simile of a mango. A man steals a mango from another and the former is arraigned before the king. Taking advantage of the fact of ceaseless change he pleads not guilty on the ground that the tree from which he plucked the mango is not identical with the tender mango plant out of which it grew later on ! The king however finds the man guilty on the ground of the numerical identity between the first tree and the second in as much as there has been inseparable and continuous causal connection between them. Nāgasena sustains the simile by asserting that, given the truth of ceaseless change, man is responsible for his actions which are causally related to, and positively correlated with, his previous pattern of actions impelled by the continuum of his volitions. The concept of identity is really a verbal problem due to an ideational confusion. The illusion of identity is created by the pattern of organic integration of mind and body which appears to remain constant in the midst of change. It is due to this illusion that King Milinda inquires from the elder Nāgasena whether the baby that is born is not the same person as the man he grows up to be in later life. The celebrated answer of the elder was 'Not he, not another' (*Na ca so na ca añño: Miln.* p. 40). The answer is reinforced by resort to the simile of the flame which appears to be the same but is, none the less, not the same on account of ceaseless change.

Talking about the simile of the flame, we find that it is, in the nikāyas, first applied to only mind and mentation. Therein material phenomena are described only as being impermanent (*anicca*). But the later philosophical elaboration of the earlier doctrine produced the famous Theory of Moments (*khaṇavāda*) wherein matter and mind are both conceived in terms of moments or point instants. The Abhidhammikas of the Theravāda formulated their own theory of *dhammas* according to which each *dhamma*, material or mental, consists of three stages of change, *uppāda* (nascence), *ṭhiti* (persistence) and *bhaṅga* (dissolution: *Vism.* p. 613 f.). Things endure in time and extend in space where time is conceived as the experience of duration and space as the experience of extension. Although mind and matter are both spoken of in terms of moments due cognizance had to be taken of the obvious differences between the velocity of change in respect of the transformation of mental and material phenomena. Buddhaghosa, the pre-eminent Theravāda commentator, recognises this difference and says that matter ceases slowly and moves heavily (*rūpaṃ dandhā-nirodhaṃ garuparivatti*: loc. cit.) whereas mind ceases quickly and moves lightly (*cittaṃ khippanirodhaṃ lahuparivatti*). Although there is this difference in velocity it is clear that the rate of change of mind is altogether immeasurable and the Buddha himself, as already noted above, had said that not even a simile could be adduced to suggest it adequately. But the Theravādins were compelled to measure the immeasurable on account of the fact that the medieval theory of the Abhidhammikas in respect of perception enumerated seventeen thought moments as constituting the duration of a given perceptual situation. Hence Buddhaghosa conforms to the prevailing Abhidhamma dogmatism by saying that the mind arises and ceases sixteen times during the period of persistence of matter (*rūpe dhārente yeva hi soḷasavāre bhavaṅgacittaṃ uppajjitvā nirujjhati*: loc cit.). The three stages in a moment of mind are similar in terms of their period of duration (*cittassa uppādakkhaṇo pi ṭhitikkhaṇo pi bhaṅgakkhaṇo pi ekasadisā*: loc. cit.). But in respect of matter the position is somewhat different. In regard to a moment of matter, the stages of nascence and dissolution are shorter but the period of persistence is longer as much as it has to last through as many as sixteen moments of mind. (*rūpassa pana uppādabhaṅgakkhaṇā yeva lahukā. Te hi sadisā. Ṭhitikkhaṇo pana mahā. Yāva soḷasacittāni uppajjitvā nirujjhanti tāva vattati*: loc. cit.)

If change is ceaseless, how can we talk about the 'present'? If every moment is an infinitesimal point instant in what precise sense can we speak of the 'now'? Does this make the 'present' anything more than a convenient intellectual fiction? If the perceiver, the perceived and the perception are all subject to change, can the complex process of knowledge ever yield to us information about any object that may truthfully be called as existing in the 'present'? These and other questions indicate the extent of the epistemological problems that crop up when we go into the philosophical implications of the doctrine of change in Buddhism. The Theravādins, however, were not prepared to pursue philosophic inquiry at the expense of ethical and spiritual exertion and satisfied themselves by an analysis of the concept of the 'present' in so far as it sufficed their limited needs. Buddhaghosa distinguishes between three senses of the 'present' (*paccuppanna*): (i) the momentary present (*khaṇa-paccuppanna*), (ii) the serial present (*santati-paccuppanna*) and (iii) the continuous or transitional present extending over a whole life-time of an individual (*addhā-paccuppanna*: *Vism.* p. 431). The Abhayagirivāsins, who interpreted change in more radical ways, did not subscribe to any concept of persistence and denied the existence of a moment of persistence as the Theravādins had conceived (*Abhidhamma-mūla-ṭīkā*, p. 140).

The Buddha's doctrine of change disallows the possibility for the existence of any universals as opposed to particulars. Their attempts at the formulation of a doctrine of the whole distinct from the parts prompted the Sarvāstivādins to compromise with the Buddha's doctrine of change and four such attempts are recorded in Buddhist literature. Dharmatrāta propounded the theory of the change of manifestation (*bhāvānyathikavāda*) wherein the changes in a *dharma* through the past, present and future do not affect the unity of its universal and cited the example of gold and milk which preserve their distinct colours inspite of modifications in time. Ghoṣaka propounded the theory of the change of aspect (*lakṣaṇānyathikavāda*) wherein change in a *dharma* becomes meaningful only in terms of its transition as a universal through the three periods of time, just as the love for a particular woman is only an intensification of a love for women in general, and not the absence of love for all other women. Vasumitra propounded the theory of the change of condition (*avasthānyathikavāda*) wherein a *dharma* changes its condition as it courses through the past, present and the future

This theory posited the concept of *kāritra* (efficiency) which is present in the interval between the past and the future (*Abhidharmadīpa*, p. 259 f.; comment of *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti* on stanzas 302-3) Buddhadeva propounded the theory of the relativity of existence (*anyathānyathikavāda*) according to which there is neither change of state (*bhāva*) nor change of substance (*dravya*) just as a woman is called mother, sister and daughter by others at one and the same time. The orthodox Sarvāstivāda accepted only the third theory and rejected the others as not being quite consistent with the doctrine of change.

The Sautrāntikas, the school of semi-idealists and the precursors of the later Buddhist schools of idealism and subjectivism of the Mahāyāna, opposed the naive realism of the Sarvāstivādins. They denied the existence of discrete stages within moments or point-instants. There is only one uninterrupted flow (*pravāha*) of which the initial stage is called arising (*utpāda*) and the subsequent is called decay or cessation (*vyaya*). What is called persistence (*sthiti*) is nothing but the course of the flow. The expression 'otherwiseness in persistence' refers to the earlier and later aspects of this same flow (*Na hi kṣaṇasyotpādādayaḥ prajñāyante... tatra pravāhasyādirutpādo nivṛttirvyayaḥ. Sa eva pravāho'nuvartamānaḥ sthitiḥ. Tasya pūrvāparaviśeṣaḥ sthityanyathātvam*: *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: comment on II, *v.* 46).

The Sautrāntikas held that all sense data subsumed under the generic term *dharma* are momentary flashes of energy. These do not endure through the past, present and future in the form of universals (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). Change is the essence of reality. Time, space and motion are only concepts built on the basis of generalising the inter-relations between point instants of mind and matter. Time and its duration, matter and its extension and motion and its movement are superimpositions of the mind. In view of the unredeeming universality of change all concepts are only conventions (*prajñapti*), the truly real being only the particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*).

The Sautrāntika doctrine of 'universal flux (*kṣaṇabhaṅga*) proves the utter untenability of substance and permanence. Śāntarakṣita in his *Tattvasaṅgraha* and Kamalaśīla in his *Pañjikā* to this text have shown at great length how the main doctrines of god, soul, substance, universal, quality, word and meaning, physical elements etc. can all be negated with the help of this basic doctrine of change (*Tattvasaṅgraha*, viii, *vv.* 350–475). If a thing continues to remain the same, that is without change, we cannot speak of causes and effects. Destruction of a thing is not present at the time it exists nor earlier than its existence. Hence the causality of origination and cessation is possible only on the basis of the truth of change. Space and other so-called permanent things are devoid of potentiality (*śaktiviyoga*) and have to be classed among such non-existents as the 'son of a barren woman' (*vandhyāputra*). Whatever exists must necessarily be momentary and space, time, god etc. cannot be classed among existents if they are held to be non-momentary. Permanent things cannot have any fruitful activity either successively or simultaneously (*...vyomakāleśvarādayaḥ kṣaṇikatvaviyoge tu na sattaisāṃ prasajyate, krameṇa yugapaccāpi yasmādarthakriyākṛtaḥ na bhavanti sthirā bhāvā niḥsattvāste tato matā*: i id. *vv.* 393–4).

The doctrine of change came in for a radical dialectical examination by the Mādhyamikas. They showed not merely the untenability of the concept of permanence but also the unintelligibility of the concept of motion. Āryadeva gives us a brilliant dialectical analysis of the false notion of permanence in chapter ix of his *Catuśśataka*. There is no non-causal origination of anything, anytime, anywhere; hence there cannot be anything permanent anytime, anywhere (*apratityāsitā nāsti kadācit kasyacit kvacit, na kadācit kvacit kaścid vidyate tena śāsvata*: *Catuś.* ix, *v.* 2). If change and permanence are both posited it becomes necessary to show the relation between the two. If it be held that change follows permanence then it is equivalent to saying that the impermanent issued out of the permanent. But this would place us in a situation where the cause and effect are altogether different from each other. If, in order to counter this argument, it be held that both cause and effect partake of the nature of both permanence and impermanence, then we are in an absurd situation where we have to make the self-contradictory statement that the permanent is also partly impermanent!

The law of change is the dependent origination of things and this principle Nāgarjuna showed dialectically to be both inexplicable and unintelligible. Change, for instance, is exemplified by motion. Now motion is meaningful only in terms of rest just as 'shorter' is meaningful only in relation to the 'longer' (*hrasve dīrgham yathā sati*). Motion itself involves mover, movement and the space moved in. Each one of these is relative to the others since it would otherwise be meaningless to talk about movement *per se*. On closer examination we find that a man has either moved or

has not moved or even that he is yet to move. Is there a middle position between the gone (*gata*) and the not gone (*agata*). In what sense is it possible to say that apart from these two states namely, the gone and the ' not gone ', there is a third situation of 'going'. Who is the one who is going? We cannot say that the goer goes or even that the non-goer goes The non-goer cannot obviously go The goer is inseparable from the going for otherwise he cannot be called a goer. The basic purpose of the dialectic is not to deny change in order to arrive at a nihilistic position but to radically disabuse the minds of people of the tendency to ignore the antinomial conflict in reason and uncritically accept the results of conceptualisation through the media of language and logic.

The Buddha's doctrine of change is expounded by the Yogācārins in terms of their thoroughgoing idealism. In the interests of the mystic realisation of the highest wisdom (*prajñāpāramitā*) they refuse to be embroiled in the categories of origination and cessation yielded by the conceptual tools of language and logic In the highest mystic sense there is neither origination nor non-origination and they must be abandoned because they are the result of indulgence in the proliferation of views (*utpādaṃ anutpādaṃ varjayet dṛṣtihetukaṃ: Laṅkv.* x, *v.* 393). To one who does not involve himself in arising (*utpāda*) to him there does not happen cessation (*nirodha*). The concepts 'is' and 'is not' do not occur to one who discerns the world with detachment (*yasya notpadyate kiñcin na kiñci taṃ nirudhyate, tasyāstināsti nopaiti viviktaṃ paśyato jagat*: ibid. *v.* 196). This is reminiscent of the words uttered by the Buddha: The world, O Kātyāyana, is mostly given to the indulgence in assertion and negation (*Dvayanissito khvāyaṃ Kaccāyana loko yebhuyyena atthitañceva natthitañca : S.* II, p. 17). Perversion of the truth is present whereever the indulgence in dualism is present. This dualism is purified by the enlightened. The truth is that all *dharmas* are void, momentary, non-substantial and, in the deeper sense, non-originating (*dvaye sati hi doṣaḥ syād dvayaṃ buddhair visodhitaṃ, śūnyāśca kṣaṇikā bhāvā niḥsvabhāvā hyajātikā : Lank.* x, *v.* 701).

The Yogācāra doctrine of non-origination (*anutpāda*) has to be understood in the context in which the truth of change may be viewed in relaton to *sambodhi* and Nirvāṇa. Consider the following words of the Buddha: There is an unborn (*ajāta*) un-become (*abhūta*), un-made (*akata*), unconditioned (*asaṃkhata*). Were there not this un-born, un-become, un-made and un-conditioned there would not appear the freedom from the born (*jāta*), become (*bhūta*), made (*kata*) and conditioned (*saṃkhata*). Because there is the unborn, un-become, un-made and un-conditioned therefore, there is this freedom from the born, become, made and conditioned. Such freedom is tranquil (*santa*), beyond logic (*atakkāvacara*), steady (*dhuva*), non-arise (*asamuppanna*), blissful (*asoka*), free from blemish (*viraja*), cessation of conflict and suffering (*nirodho dukkhadhammānaṃ*) pacification of all self-centred effort (*saṃkhārūpasama*) and happiness (*sukha : Itivuttaka*, pp. 37-8 ; cf *Ud.* p. 80).

Change does not apply to Nirvāṇa which is the inner peace (*ajjhatta santi*) that passeth all worldly understanding.

W S KARUNARATNA

CHANNĀGARIKA (var. Channagārika, Chandāgārika, Ṣaṇṇagarika), the name of one of the eighteen schools of Buddhism. The Channāgarikas (lit. The Six Towners) was a sub-division of the Vajjiputtaka school that branched off in the second century B.C. The *Kathāvatthu* does not record any particular views of this school as they were not participants in any of the controversies recorded therein. When the commentary to the *Kathāvatthu* was written this school had fallen in to oblivion.

Bhavya does not mention them in his list of the eighteen schools, but introduces Vaibhādyavādins instead. Vasumitra mentions Ṣaṇṇāgarikas, and Rockhill says that the Vaibhādyavādins of Bhavya's list is the same as the Ṣaṇṇāgarikas of Vasumitra (Rockhill, *The Life of the Buddha*, London, 1907, p. 183 n. 1). Bhavya enumerates a different division followed by others, according to which the Ṣaṇṇāgarikas are mentioned as a sub-division of the Vātsīputrīya school (Rockhill, op cit. p. 180). Thus, this division makes the Ṣaṇṇāgarikas one of the six divisions that arose out of the Sthavira school. Some say that the Ṣaṇṇāgarika school is a division of the Mahāgiriya ; others say that it is a division of the Sammitīya (Rockhill, op.cit. p. 194). According to Warder, Saṇṇāgarika was one of the four new schools that branched off from Vātsīputriyas owing to difference of opinion in the interpretation of the Abhidharma of that school (Warder, *Indian Buddhism*, India, 1970, p. 275).

M. K.

CHAPAṬA (var. Chapada, Chappaṭa), name of two Burmese theras who are said to have been in Sri Lanka at different times — removed from each other by three centuries. The name occurs only in Burmese records. There is much confusion in regard to their identity.

(i) Upon completing the requisite number of years in the *upasampadā* in Sri Lanka, the earlier monk was elevated to the higher rank of ' thera ', and is called Mahāthera Chapaṭa in the Kalyāṇi inscriptions, both in the Pali (Taw Sein Ko, *IA.* XXII) and the Mōn (C. O. Blagden, *Epigraphia Birmanica*, III) versions of them, indited (1476 A.C.) at the instance of king Dhammazedi or Rāmādhipati (1472–92 A.C.). In order to obtain a clearer picture of each, the epigraphic name is continued ni the present account.

The name Chapaṭa of the Mahāthera perpetuates that of the village in Kusima district (Bassein) where his parents resided. When a novice of twenty years, Chapaṭa joined Uttarajīva Mahāthera (First Pilgrim of Sri Lanka) on the journey to Sri Lanka where he was given the higher ordination at a ceremony performed by monks representing both countries. However, according to the *Sāsanavaṃsa*, the monks of Sri Lanka ordained him once again in their country (*Sav.* p. 65). At the time his teacher was about to return home, he obtained permission to remain behind in order to complete his studies of the Tipiṭaka and the commentaries. Upon completing them after ten years and, having been designated ' thera ', he returned home with four other theras who had accepted his invitation to go to Burma. These four (Second pilgrims of Sri Lanka: *Glass Palace Chronicle*, p. 144) were Sīvalī (of Tāmalitthi), Tāmalinda (son of the ruler of Kamboja), Ānanda (of Kañci) and Rāhula (of Sri Lanka).

Mahāthera Chapaṭa went to Sri Lanka six years after the Purification of the Saṅgha in Sri Lanka by King Sirisaṃghabodhi Parakkamabāhu (the first of the name, 1153-86 A. C.). This reform of the Order was effected about the year 1165 A. C. (*EZ.* II, pp. 205, 259). According to the Kalyāṇī inscriptions on the other hand, the Sri Lanka event took place in the King's 18th year, which would be about five years later. The Sinhalese chronicle, which places it about 1165 A. C. is the *Nikāya Saṅgraha*. It was compiled in the century preceding the Kalyāṇī inscriptions which must have obtained these facts from Sinhalese records. The Sri Lanka sources are, therefore, more reliable on these points. The discrepancy has been satisfactorily disposed of in the *EZ.* (p. 205, n. 4). Thus, it appears that Mahāthera Chapaṭa was in Sri Lanka about 1171 A. C. The Burmese records agree remarkably well with those of Sri Lanka (*EZ.* II and *Mhv.* lxxviii, v. 6) that Mahākassapa of Udumbaragiri (Diṁbulāgala, q. v.) presided at the deliberations. This measure of agreement is further strengthened by the correct chronological order in which the Burmese records have consistently placed two Sri Lanka kings, namely, Vijayabāhu III and his son, Parakkamabāhu II, who effected subsequent reforms (*EZ.* II, p. 262). Furthermore, the title of ' Sirisaṃghabodhi ' given in the Burmese inscriptions to Parakkamabāhu I, though not so freely used for him in Sri Lanka writings, nevertheless appears exactly as in the contemporary Sri Lanka epigraph (*EZ.* II). Thus, Sirisaṃghabodhi Parakkamabāhu was none other than Parakkamabāhu I of Sri Lanka. Any doubt regarding Mahāthera Chapaṭa's visit to Sri Lanka at this time is again dispelled by the fact that the royal patron of him and of his companion theras is named as Narapatiyasūra, i.e., Narapatisithu (1173-1210 A. C.).

The Kalyāṇī inscriptions give some information of Mahāthera Chapaṭa after his return home. With his companions he spent the first *vassa* in Kusimanagara, in a monastery situated on the southern part of the city ; its site and walls were surviving at the time of the inscriptions. This too, affords some testimony that the event had taken place at a much earlier period than a few decades. (The later Chapaṭa Saddhammajotipāla has said that he had gone to Sri Lanka in the Buddhist year 1990 or 1447 A. C., that is, only 28 years before the inscriptions.) After the *pavāraṇa* ceremony they went to Pagān (Pugāma, Arimaddana) where they learnt that Uttarajīva had died a few days before their arrival. Chapaṭa Mahāthera paid his respect at the tomb of his venerable teacher. The party then took counsel as to with whom they should be associated in the Saṅgha ceremonies and thereafter " through pride, Chapaṭamahāthera declined to associate with the priests of Pugāma in the performance of ecclesiastical ceremonies, and he performed such functions separately " (*IA.* XXII, p. 30).

The ordination from Sri Lanka was established by them in Pagān in the (Sakkarāj) year 543 (1181 A. C.), when Narapatisithu was king of the region. At his request they held a great ordination on the river Irawaddy. As time passed, the band of theras grew in influence and the numbers of their followers rapidly increased.

Of the Mahāthera Chapaṭa an incident is described, involving Rāhula (his Sinhalese colleague), which shows his character as that of an earnest and dignified member of the Saṅgha. Rāhula saw a beautiful dancing-girl at an almsgiving and, becoming enamoured of her, was intending to revert to the lay life. The Mahāthera with three of the others who came with him from Sri Lanka pleaded strongly with Rāhula against taking a step, in that place itself, which was bound to affect the standing of the new Sīhala Saṅgha. Rāhula heeded them and went away to Malaya. All that the inscriptions have thereafter noted of Mahāthera Chapaṭa is his death, even the year of which has been unnoticed.

In the subsequent recital, however, there is information that the three other companions of Mahāthera Chapaṭa, (Sīvalī, Tāmalinda and Ānanda) tended to have each his own group of followers. From the silence regarding any special group under himself, it seems that the division occured after Mahāthera Chapaṭa's death. The Sīhaḷa fraternity was designated '*pacchima*' because it came into the country later than the already existing group who, by virtue of their priority, called themselves '*purima*' (*IA.* XXII, p. 31).

(ii) The other Chapaṭa belongs to the 15th century. He was the author whose name in the Saṅgha was Saddhammajotipāla. Information concerning him is found in his own works, particularly in the colophon of his *Saṅkhepavaṇṇanā*. This shows him as a resident of Pagān who went to Sri Lanka in the Parinibbāna year 1990 (1447 A. C.). He claims to have purified the religion with the help of King Parakkamabāhu, caused a *sīmā* to be consecrated, by monks qualified for this solemn act, in the city of Jayavaḍḍhana.

King Parakkamabāhu of his account was the sixth o' that name in Sri Lanka history and the city mentioned by him, which was the capital at the time, is now known as Kotte.

There is no likelihood of confusion between the two Parakkamabāhus or the two Chapaṭas. The Kalyāṇī inscriptions are dated only 29 years after Chapaṭa Saddhammajotipāla, for the purpose of dealing at length with religious matters in Burma as a direct result of a mission despatched to Sri Lanka. This mission was received by Bhuvanekabāhu VI of Sri Lanka who called himself the son of Parakkamabāhu VI of Kotte (*IA.* XXII, p. 45). Thus, the names of the Sri Lanka kings are not likely to have been confused in the inscriptions. It is to the same period that Chapaṭa Saddhammajotipāla is assigned by the Siamese thera Ratanapaññā in his *Jinakālamāli* (p. 96) which was composed only 40 years after the Kalyāṇī inscriptions. Of this Chapaṭa Saddhammajotipāla several works are known: *Vinayasamuṭṭhānadīpanī*, *Pātimokkhavisodhanī*, *Vinayagūḷhatthadīpanī*, *Sīmālaṅkārasaṅgaha-ṭīkā* (a new commentary on the main work) and *Visuddhimagga-gaṇṭhi* The last-named elaborates many stories left unexplained in the *Visuddhimagga*. In the Abhidhamma section he wrote *Mātikatthadīpanī*, *Paṭṭhānagaṇanāyana*, *Nāmacāradīpaka* and, the best known of all, the *Saṅkhepavaṇṇanā* on the *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha*. This last was written on the invitation of Mahāvijayabāhu of Sri Lanka whose qualities he extolled; it has been suggested that this person was none other than the head of the pariveṇa of the same name, who was later to rise to high position as the Saṅgharāja Rāhula. There were two other works by the same Chapaṭa, namely, *Gandhasāra* (apparently an anthology of religious texts) and *Suttaniddesa* (on the grammar of Kaccāyana).

As to the claims he has made, on the other hand, although some names (e.g., Mahāvijayabāhu) could be confirmed from other sources, the conditions in Sri Lanka itself were exceedingly prosperous for the Saṅgha. Parakkamabāhu VI had no need to look for help outside his own country for religious work. In fact, it was in the reign of his son that the Kalyāṇī ordination ceremony was held for monks from Burma. The Sīhaḷa Saṅgha of the inscriptions already referred to arose from Sri Lanka and it was other lands which needed Sri Lanka's help.

It would have been noticed that Kalyāṇī inscriptions make no mention of any literary works by Mahāthera Chapaṭa and do not refer to Chapaṭa Saddhammajotipāla. The purpose of the inscriptions was to give a record of the institution of *sīmā* on orthodox lines as followed in Sri Lanka. The introductory information is concerned with only as much of background matter as is relevant to demonstrate the ecclesiastically acceptable nature of that orthodoxy. It is particularly seen in the statements that treatises compiled in Sri Lanka embodying the versions of reform in that island by three kings, and of the covenants which the Saṅgha had entered into at royal request for ensuring proper religious observance, were brought to king Dhammazedi as more or less an integral part of the mission's work (*IA.* XXII, p. 46). Thus, the inscriptions could not be expected to mention

literary works by either Chapaṭa, nor was there any relevancy in naming any other Chapaṭa (there may have been several who hailed from the village), if he had no bearing on the subject of the *sīmā* established in the country at Dhammazedi's instance. Finally, the work of either Chapaṭa was of no momentous importance for the Saṅgha of Sri Lanka. That is probably why Sri Lanka's records are silent about these two Burmese theras.

D. T. DEVENDRA

CHARACTER. The word comes directly from ancient Greek, and originally meant the tool employed for drawing and stamping, as well as the impression made therewith, e.g., the distinctive mark used in the minting of coin. In course of time the word has acquired a variety of meanings in English. The Buddhist interest in the term character here ranges over the areas of philosophy, psychology and sociology.

In western philosophy the term 'character' is applied to refer to the mental life as a whole,[1] and is also used at times to refer to phases of it as mental or moral character. But to ethical philosophers character is co-terminous with virtue, and as Kant holds, moral character alone is character in the proper sense ; which is to be viewed as a whole and not be separated into different strands. Man's biological character, embracing his natural disposition and temperament, represents merely what nature has made of him ; and his moral character is what he makes of himself. "Simply to have a character — i.e., a moral character — implies that property of the will by which the subject binds himself to certain practical principles unchangeably laid down for himself by his own reason." Thus, "the foundation of a character is absolute unity in the inner principle of conduct as a whole."[2] This exposition of character is not alien to Buddhism. The concept of natural disposition and temperament mentioned here is equivalent to that of *carita*[3] in Pali Buddhism; *carita* in the sense of *rāga-carita*, *dosa-carita*, and *moha-carita* and not in the sense of *sucarita* and *duccarita* as in *kāyaduccarita* etc. 'Character' is equivalent to *sīla*,[3] often in the sense of moral character as in the enumerations *sīla-samādhi-paññā*, *saddhā-sīla-cāga-paññā*, etc. It should be noted that even in usages like *dussīla* (bad character), *parisuddhasīla* (excellent character), *sīlavisuddhi* (purification of character) etc., *sīla* stands for moral character. The ethical philosophers after Kant, too, likewise take character to mean solely moral character.

In psychology, character might be defined as "an enduring psychophysical disposition to inhibit instinctive tendencies in accordance with regulative principles."[4] And in sociology the term character is applied "to the distinctive organization of traits setting off one individual from all others."[5] In Buddhism, this is only one aspect of character which may be termed as *carita* (*vide infra*).

Thus, it seems, as the term *character* is co-terminous with *virtue*,[6] among philosophers, it is co-terminous with *individuality*[6] among sociologists. And *conduct*[6] (*caraṇa*) distinguished from *behaviour*[6] (*cariyā*), it is said, "is the expression of character."[7] The word '*temperament*'[6] generally is used to designate those general motivational characteristics that are inborn, and the word 'character' to designate those that are acquired. The sum total of these various traits — the directional and the motivational, the inborn and the acquired — integrated into one unique and distinctive whole, is termed 'personality'.[8] This summing up made in the 1973 edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (U.S.A., Vol. 5, p. 283) is very close to the concept of *sīla* (character) formulated in Buddhism over 2500 years ago.

The history of the term character, in a way, illustrates the spiritual evolution of mankind. "The one persistent element in its connotation has been the attribute of stability, which, however, pertained first of all to the symbol, then to the thing symbolized, and which, while originally a property induced from without, came at length to denote one generated from within ; finally, this stability was at first regarded as in the main a gift of nature, and subsequently as a product of self-activity."[8] This "individualistic trend, implying a more or less inborn element is discernible in the doctrine of the temperaments, whether envisaged under the purview of the humours (Hippocrates, Galen) or as determined by constitutional differences (Cabanis, Halle, G.G. Carus), and may be seen again in the

1 *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, ed. J. M. Baldwin, New York, 1925, s. v. character.
2 *ERE*. s.v. character.
3 *PED*. s.v.
4 A. A. Roback, *The Psychology of character*, New York, 1928.
5 *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, New York, 1950, s. v. character.
6 It is beyond the scope of this article to deal with these terms in detail.
7 *Encyclopaedia of Britannica*, Great Britain, 1953, Vol. 5, p. 242.
8 *ERE*. Vol. 3, p. 365.

modern treatment of human typology (Jung, Spranger)."[9] Thus, the signification of the term character has been transferred by degrees from the external to the internal, and from the sphere of necessity to that of freedom. The conspicuous position of the term character in every system of ethics has caused it to be identified frequently with virtue, at other times with will and sometimes even with conscience. As the term began to be employed more frequently, references are increasingly made to character traits, type and structure ; character neurosis ; neurotic character ; character disorder ; character formation ; and character purification. In Buddhism, when these are viewed in relation to *sīla*, the Buddhist equivalent of character, they imply either its fulfillment or its absence. But considering the connotation of the term character and its application in Buddhism, character types and character purification will absorb the reader here.

Generally speaking, typology of character seems to involve a combination of biological, social, and psychological phenomena. And the classifications of the types of character differ according to the field of study and the research done. For example, the types designated by Freud differ from those of Horney. However, it is agreed now that character types do not occur in pure form ; each type would include mixtures from the others. This factor, that has come to light in modern research, has been taken into consideration in formulating character types in Buddhism from the earliest times. Thus, the major division of character types into 1. *rāga-carita* (one with passionate temperament), 2. *dosa-carita* (one with malice temperament), 3. *moha-carita* (one with infatuate temperament), 4. *saddhā-carita* (devotional character), 5. *buddhi-carita* (intelligent character), and 6. *vitakka-carita* (speculative character) are further subdivided as *rāga-dosa-carita, rāga-moha-carita* and so forth, considering that each type of character actually contains an admixture of responses that would have to be classified in the other categories. This typology of character is based on the temperaments (*carita*) of individuals. In Buddhism, it is quite significant to know the types in the above sense, for the choice of a subject of meditation, to correct extremes of moods and temperaments should be in accordance with one's character. (For a detail discussion on the types referred to above, see CARITA.)

The ideal or the goal of Buddhism being Nibbāna, which is the elimination of all defiling 'traits of character' or *āsavas*, the way (*paṭipadā*) leading to it is said to consist of three stages or parts usually called the three *sikkhā* or stages of training. The first of these stages is *sīla* or development of moral character. Having established oneself in *sīla*, one passes on to the next stage of the path, namely, *samādhi* or development of concentration. Finally, to reach the goal one must go through a still higher stage of development which is technically known as *paññā* or wisdom. In this process of *sīla-samādhi-paññā*, it is clear that *sīla* or moral character is not an end in itself ; but it is the first accomplishment needed to reach the goal ; and it is not to be merely talked about, but to be tested by personal touch and realised in the exercise of the three-fold discipline.

The perfection of *sīla* (*sīlesu paripūrakārī : D.* II, p. 204) or the purification of character through *sīla* (*sīla-visuddhi*[10]) is to overcome the undesirable character-traits ; and to overcome such character-traits one should get rid of the unhealthy inclinations. They are classified into coarse, medium and subtle, presumably on the basis of their detectability and facility of their elimination. Under the coarse category are listed wrong action, wrong speech and wrong thinking (*kāyaduccarita, vacīduccarita* and *manoduccarita*). In the medium category are sensual, hostile and aggressive thoughts (*kāma-vitakka, vyāpādavitakka* and *vihiṃsāvitakka*). Subtle and therefore least suspected as being defilements or unhealthy inclinations of the mind are concern for identification of oneself with a group with the motive of self-elevation (*ñātivitakka*), for association with one's land (*janapadavitakka*) and for personal prestige (*anavaññattipaṭisaṃyutta-vitakka*).

And to get rid of these inclinations one should first make their driving forces conscious. These driving forces are called *cetanā* (which may be, translated as intention, inclination, drive, striving, direction, tendency, motivation, volition or will) classified as *kāya-sañcetanā, vacī-sañcetanā* and *mano-sañcetanā* (the driving forces of one's action, speech and thought: *S.* II, p. 39 f.) ; *rūpa-sañcetanā, sadda-sañcetanā, gandha-sañcetanā, rasa-sañcetanā* and *phoṭṭhabba-sañcetanā*, (the reaction to different sense stimuli : *S.* III, p. 60) ;[11] *dhamma-sañcetanā*

9 *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, New York, 1950, Vol. 3, p. 335.
10 This is the first of seven *visuddhis*.
11 Freud's 'cathexis', i.e., the investing of an object with libido.

(the reaction to ideas and their cathexis : *S.* III, p. 60); and *atta-saññcetana* and *para-saññcetanā* (attitude towards ourselves and others : *D.* III, p. 231).

Depth psychology shows that character is largely formed in early childhood, and many traits, together with their drives (*cetanā*), are acquired at that time. However, Buddhism is not primarily concerned with the 'actual character of human conduct' but with its ideal, not so much with what human conduct is as with what it ought to be. In investigating inner hindrances, if insight penetrates sufficiently deep it gradually brings about a change of heart as the mental conflicts are overcome. The kernel of the purification of character (*sīla-visuddhi*) is expressed in a very concise résumé of the whole teaching of Buddhism which runs :

Sabbapāpassa akaraṇaṃ — kusalassa upasampadā
sacittapariyodapanaṃ — etaṃ buddhāna sāsanaṃ

(*Dhp. v.* 183)

"The ceasing from all evil ways, acquisition of wholesome traits of character and purging one's mind of all defilements, this is the teaching of the Buddhas."

It is further noted that the ideal here is not the negative avoidance of evil but the positive performance of good and inward cleansing. In other words, in popular language, it is the building up of a good moral character.

See SĪLA.

E. H. P.

CHARITY. This term (derived from Latin *caritas*) which originally meant love or more precisely the love of our fellow beings has now somewhat lost that meaning and acquired the secondary meaning of acts of charity done to the poor. This in fact is a form of practical demonstration of the feeling of charity. Now the term love itself is more commonly used to connote the original sense of the term charity. However, the concept denoted by the term love, as it is in vogue at present, appears too narrowed down and limited to personalized attachment. Therefore, it seems, that of the two terms 'charity' in its original sense is far more appropriate to convey the altruistic, sublime feeling embodied in the Buddhist concept of love mainly denoted by the Pali terms *mettā*, *karuṇā* and *muditā*.

Hatred (*dosa*), enmity (*vera*), ill-will (*vyāpāda*), anger (*kodha*) are all allied emotions that stand in opposition to charity. Thus, their counterpart love (*adosa*), friendship (*avera*) and so on are almost synonymous with charity. Uncharitable emotions, whether one labels them as hatred or enmity, spring from *dosa*, one of the three immoral bases of action (*akusalamūla*) which defile one's character. Thoughts of ill-will (*vyāpāda*), of harm (*vihiṃsā*) and of sense-desire (*kāma*) comprise wrong thought (*micchā-saṅkappa*) while their opposites, namely, thoughts of good-will (*avyāpāda*), of non-injury (*avihiṃsā*) and renunciation (*nekkhamma*) constitute right-thought (*sammā-saṅkappa*); and *sammā-saṅkappa* is an item in the Noble Eightfold Path (*Ariya-aṭṭhaṅgika-magga : M.* I, p. 118, *Dvedhā-vitakka Sutta*). These unfriendly, uncharitable thoughts lead the individual to evil (*pāpa, akusala*), and the basic aim of Buddhism is to show the way to shun all such evil and cultivate good (*Sabba-pāpassa akaraṇaṃ kusalassa upasampadā : Dhp. v.* 183), and thereby purge the mind and gain the necessary equipoise (*sacitta pariyodapanaṃ*: loc. cit.).

As pointed out above the Buddhist conception of charity consists of *mettā*, *karuṇā* and *muditā*. In commentarial literature *mettā* is defined as the desire to bring about the happiness and well-being of all beings; *karuṇā* is explained as the desire to dispel suffering and adversity, and *muditā* as the desire to promote and further the happiness and well-being that is being enjoyed by others (*SnA.* p. 128).

The Buddha and his eminent disciples were embodiments of charity. It is partly out of charity (*sattesu ca kāruññatam paṭicca : M.* I, p. 169) that the Buddha finally decided to preach the doctrine and show the others the way to deliverance.

At the very outset of his missionary career he admonished the disciples to wander about spreading the doctrine for the happiness and well-being of many (*bahujanahitāya bahujanasukhāya : Vin.* I, p. 21). Emphasis laid on the cultivation of charity is clearly seen from a statement in the *Itivuttaka* (p. 19 f.) wherein it is said that none of the good works employed to acquire religious merit are worth a fraction of the value of freedom of the mind through charity (*mettā cetovimutti*). This great importance attached to the cultivation of charity is due to the fact that it is a mental attitude that influences all actions of an individual. As such it is closely connected with the Buddhist theory of karma (q. v.) and consequently with such allied problems as motivation (*cetanā*, q. v.). The *Ambaluṭṭhikā Rāhulovāda Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 414 ff.) quite clearly states that any action becomes good only if it is motivated by the feeling of charity. In

the *Mahā Rāhulovāda Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 424) the Buddha admonishes Rāhula to cultivate charity in order to dispel hatred. The *Dhammapada* repeatedly urges all to cultivate charity (*Dhp. vv.* 3, 4, 5, 223, 291).

A very clear enunciation of the Buddhist concept of charity is found in the *Metta Sutta* of the *Sutta-nipāta*. It is also found embodied in the brahma-vihāra (q.v.) concept. From these enunciations it is clear that the Buddhist concept of charity is not the same as love in the general sense which designates a feeling of personal attachment motivated by desire (*kāma, rāga, taṇhā*), and quite often by desire for personal advantage. This emotion of love, motivated as it is purely by self-interest, is generally referred to in Pali by the term *pema* (Skt. *prema*). Very often *pema* appears in the guise of *mettā*, and unless one remains extremely cautious one tends to confuse the two.

Unlike *pema*, *mettā* is never regarded as a form of desire. On the contrary it is closely associated with and supported by the thought of dispassion, detachment, renunciation (*nekkhamma saṅkappa*). And also unlike *pema* which is an unfailing source of sorrow and fear (cf. *pemato jāyatī soko pemato jāyatī bhayaṃ : Dhp. Piya-vagga*), *mettā* is a definite source of serene happiness.

The Buddhist concept of charity is different from the concept of love extolled in theistic religions. In some such religions love (=charity) is conceived as being of divine origin, and the love or charity that prevails among men is considered as an extension of divine love. Buddhism does not claim divine origin for charity. Very often writers refer to *mettā* as a 'divine-state'. But here the word divine — employed to render into English the Pali term *brahma* which can be more aptly translated as sublime — is used only in its metaphoric sense connoting the idea of the highest, the best.

According to Buddhism charity for others begins with a true appreciation of one's own identity, a position which prevents the exaggeration of the ego. One who is incapable of extending the feeling of charity to oneself is certainly incapable of extending it to others. The words uttered by the Buddha in approval of a statement made by queen Mallikā, wife of King Pasenadi of Kosala, clearly states this point. Herein, the Buddha endorsing the sentiments expressed by Mallikā says, 'traversing over all regions with one's thought a man will in no place find anything dearer than his own self. The self is equally dear to others and therefore, let a man who regards his own self as dear not injure others.' (*S.* I, p. 75; *Ud.* p. 47; cf. also *Dhp. vv.* 129–130). Thus, charity according to Buddhism is not divine love but love that one invariably directs towards one's own well-being that is extended to others. Though it originates from self-love it is not selfish, not desire-motivated or bent on seeking personal advantage. As it is purified through the feeling of detachment, dispassion (*nekkhamma*) and unselfish generosity (*cāga*) it becomes purged of selfish motives. Yet it does not amount to either self-negation or self-sacrifice. According to Buddhism both the well-being of the self (*attahita*) and the well being of the others (*parahita*) go hand in hand (*A.* II, p. 95). In order to practice charity, as enunciated in Buddhism, one need not give up all self-interest. What one should not do is to make charity towards others (*parahita*) subservient to self-charity (*attahita*).

Unlike personal attachment which is narrowed down and limited the Buddhist conception of charity, is boundless, immeasurable (*appamaññā :* D. III, p. 223), and as enunciated in the *Metta Sutta* it is universal and all-encompassing. It does not reckon with factors such as nationality, caste, creed, rank, power or position. It is neither divine in origin nor a gift of divine grace. And as such it is not involuntary. According to Buddhist teaching this altruistic, boundless feeling of charity has to be voluntarily and deliberately cultivated, and gradually and methodically developed to the high level of an active unifying force that radiates throughout the universe, suffusing one and all.

Cultivation of charity is not merely considered an antidote against hatred and such other evil mental tendencies. Nor is it considered simply as a negative state characterised merely by the absence of hatred.

By cultivation of charity is meant the development of altruistic love, friendliness, sympathy and compassion; development of a mental attitude that strives to promote happiness and well being of others without expecting personal advantage; a mental attitude that prompts one to take action to dispel the suffering undergone by others; a mental attitude which enables one to feel happy at the success of others. When thus cultivated, it promotes harmony where there is disharmony, unity where there is disunity, agreement where there is conflict. It invariably forms the base of numerous other virtues such as generosity and benevolence which are practical demonstrations of this mental attitude.

Cultivation of charity could be made a subject for meditation. The *brahmavihāra bhāvanā* concept very lucidly enunciates the method one should follow in order to cultivate this meditation. When earnestly and methodically cultivated this meditational process enables one to raise *mettā*, *karuṇā* and *muditā* to a sublime level of development and bring them into culmination in equanimity (*upekkhā*, q.v.). When raised to this highest state of development, charity becomes completely cleansed of even the slightest tinge of egoism that it may have had before it reached culmination in *upekkhā*.

See further BRAHMAVIHĀRA, KARUṆĀ, METTĀ, MUDITĀ.

S.K.N.

CHARMS, understood as practices supposed to bring magical results, in Buddhist literature fall into four groups or categories, viz., (1) the singing or uttering of incantations or other formulae which brings about the desired result; (2) the wearing on the person, of objects or articles, mainly for protection (see AMULETS); (3) meditating or resolving, i.e., an act of thought made with the purpose of bringing about an intended effect; (4) virtuous living or performing a virtuous or meritorious act which is said to have its own supernatural powers inherent in it. Of these, the last two seem to have been spoken of with approval in Buddhism and sometimes recommended by the Buddha, while the first two are mentioned as prevalent practices, for some of which the Buddha recommends his own substitutes.

Nevertheless, even as regards those charms mentioned as prevalent practices, Buddhism enunciates its own attitudes, often informed by its own philosophy and ethical stand. The *Brahmajāla Suttanta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* (I, pp. 9, 11 f.) names several practices of contemporaneous brāhmans and recluses as low arts (*tiracchāna vijjā*) and as wrong means of livelihood (*micchā ājīva*) which, according to Buddhaghosa, involved the use of charms. They are, as interpreted by him (*DA.* I, p. 93 f.): *aṅga-vijjā*, the science of prognostication by appearance, such as looking at the knuckles, etc., and after muttering a spell, divining whether a person is well-born or low-born, lucky or not; *bhūri-vijjā*, knowledge of the charms to be used when lodging in an earth-house (*bhūmi-ghara*); *ahi-vijjā*, charming of snakes; *visa-vijjā*, practice of charms for poisoning or removal of poisons; *saraparittāna*, use of charms to ward off arrows; *viruddha-gabbha-karaṇa*, practice of charms to procure abortion; *saṃvadana*, fixing lucky times for peace-making, using spells and *vivadana*, likewise for war-making; *saṅkiraṇa* charm for success in gambling; *vikiraṇa*, charm to defeat the opponent (in gambling which involves such); *subhaga-karaṇa*, using of charms to make people fortunate, and *dubhaga-karaṇa*, use of charms to make people unlucky; *jivhā-nitthaddana*, charming to cause dumbness in an enemy; *hanu-saṃhanana*, charming to cause lock-jaw; *hatthā-bhijapana*, charming to cause the enemy to throw up his hands and *kaṇṇajappana*, charming to cause deafness in a rival.

This formidable list of magical practices stated in the suttanta as being the profession of many contemporaneous recluses and Brahmins involved apparently, judging from Buddhaghosa's interpretations, the utterance of incantations or verses, *manta*, a word which in earlier times, and among the Vedic Brahmins, seems to have been used merely to connote secret doctrinal formulae of their exclusive creed (as illustrated for instance by the use of the word by the Brahmin Caṅkī: *M.* II, p. 166), but which later comes to connote magical incantations, in which sense Buddhism seems to have understood it generally.

The reason is not explicitly stated in this suttanta, or perhaps anywhere else in the canonical literature, as to why the Buddha treated these 'arts' with contempt, naming them low arts and wrong means of livelihood. But, it may be inferred from the context that one reason may have been that they were already considered by the people as those from which a recluse worthy of the name would abstain. Yet another reason is also suggested by certain characteristics noticeable in the condemned practices. Most of them, though not all, are those that cause distress to others. Some, however, are protective in nature and intention and at times meant to work the welfare of others. The only characteristic common to all is the use of spells. Hence, it is possible that this was the feature which prompted the Buddha's disapproval of them.

Other reasons for the disapproval of this particular practice may also be suggested. Some of the charms mentioned in the *Brahmajāla Suttanta* are found in the *Atharvaveda* and some may be identified in the Jaina Scriptures (e.g., *Ath.* III, *v* 30; VII, *v.* 52; X, *v.* 3: XVI, *v.* 3). It is thus fairly clear that the Vedic Brahmins and niganṭhas utilised these magical practices either for professional purposes or for displaying their prowess. It is suggested by the *Kevaddha Suttanta* (*D.* I, p. 212 f.) and hinted at by several other sutta references that certain religious teachers of the Buddha's time

went about trying to prove the truth or efficacy of their preachings, their spiritual superiority or their moral purity by a display of magical feats, through the use of charms. There is no doubt that the Buddha considered this an abuse, a way to destruction, lacking a moral basis, as a false means to their ends, pure proselytisation leading to moral depravity on the part of the user, as well as on the part of those whom it is designed to impress. That attitude is well-seen in the *Kevaḍḍha Suttanta* already cited, where the Buddha refuses to perform any miracles by the power of *iddhi*, lest some sceptic or cynic should attribute his acts to his possession of a charm, which seemed to have been believed in at the time — the charm known as the Gandhara charm (*gandhāra-nāma-vijjā*) or another known as the 'jewel charm' (*maṇiko-nāma-vijjā*). Should he, he suggests, perform by the aid of his spiritual powers (*iddhi*) the miracle of becoming multiform from being one, from being multiform becoming one, from being visible becoming invisible and *vice versa*, or of going through a wall or of sitting cross-legged in the air, all of which he could well do by these powers, some unbelieving and undiscerning person might mistake him as using the Gandhara charm. Likewise, should he perform the miracle of manifestation (*ādesanā-pāṭihāriya*), by reading the minds of others, may once again, be mistaken as using the 'jewel charm'.

It may be noted in passing that Buddhaghosa points out that neither the Gandhara charm nor the 'jewel charm' could actually perform those wonders which the Buddha in this suttanta claims he, by the power of his *iddhi*, could. That Buddhaghosa was interested in proving that *iddhi* powers were greater than these two charms, and that the sceptic would be merely overestimating their power, can be understood.

In the *Ambaṭṭha Suttanta* (*D.* I, p. 94 f.) mention is also made of the practice of a charm which obviously is the *sara-parittāna* of the *Brahmajāla* list. This, probably after Buddhaghosa's commentary on this suttanta, came to be known as the *Ambaṭṭha* charm (*DA.* I, p. 265).

Here, the Buddha refers to Kaṇha as a great seer (*ṛṣi*) who went down to the southern districts (*dakkhiṇa janapada*) which T. W. Rhys Davids (*Dialogues of the Buddha*, I, p. 118) translates as the Dekkan. The Buddha says that he returned to the kingdom of Okkāka with mystic verses (*brahma-manta*) which he had learnt in the south. He also tates that Kaṇha was the son of Okkāka's slave-girl, Disā, and that he was so dark as to merit his name Kaṇha, which means 'black'. This Kaṇha, on his return, demands of Okkāka his daughter as wife, and is rebuffed on the grounds of his low birth. The infuriated Okkāka tries to shoot Kaṇha with his arrow, but finds it stuck in the bow-string, whereby it is proved that Kaṇha possesses a charm to ward off arrows.

Whatever the ethnic origin of Kaṇha may have been, this episode certainly suggests the source of some of the charms of the *Brahmajāla Suttanta*, at least of a *saraparittāna*, the charm to ward off arrows. Kaṇha claims for this spell the power of drying up the earth where the arrow falls or of causing no rain to fall for seven years if the arrow is shot skywards. Buddhaghosa dismisses all this as idle boast and exaggerated talk about a very limited charm, but Kaṇha, on the Buddha's own statement, seems to have demonstrated at least that he could control the arrow and its effects when its target is a human being. Be that what it may, the significant essential that emerges from all this is that the dark-complexioned son of the slave-girl of an Aryan king surprised the Aryan Sākyas with an occult science from the south, the home, as the Aryans thought, of savages — 'folk rough of speech, back-biters, murderers, brigands and the crafty-minded (*D.* III, p. 197)'. It seems relevant also to note that there is another Kaṇha, Kaṇha Dipāyana mentioned in the *Jātakas* (*J.* IV, p. 27 f.) who effects a magical cure for snake-bite. Relevant also is the fact that scholarly opinion holds that a fair deal of the Atharvavedic lore came from folk-lore and folk superstition, and had not, at the Buddha's time, been codified into a fourth Veda. The Buddha always speaks of the three Vedas. It may well be that the magical practices which came from the less developed southern peoples gradually percolated northwards and were gradually assimilated by the Brahmin intelligentsia, later to be sanctified enough to go into the *Atharvaveda*.

Another sutta of the *Digha Nikāya* is noteworthy. This is *Āṭānāṭiya Suttanta* (*D.* III, pp. 194 f.) which is described as a *rakkhaṇa*, a protection, and the rune contained in it is reported to have been given to the Buddha by Vessavaṇa in order that his disciples may ward off fear when meditating in lonely places or when assailed by yakkha-rebels, and that yakkhas who have no faith in the Buddha may find faith.

The rune consists of an expression of faith in the seven Buddhas and of a statement that the Four Regent Kings (*cattāro mahārājāno*) and their hosts are all faithful adherents of the Buddha Gotama. Recitation of this rune was the charm

and it brought about its effects by causing the offending yakkha to be ostracised by his fellow yakkhas. Vessavaṇa explains this to the Buddha in a very anthropomorphic description. The offending yakkha " would not win, either in village or township, hospitality or respect. Such a creature, dear Sir, would obtain at my royal city of Āḷakamandā neither site nor dwelling. He would not be received in any assembly of yakkhas. And he would not be taken or given in marriage. And when his trial was over, the public of creatures non-human would heap contumely upon him, and they would bend down his head like an empty bowl and split it in seven pieces "(*Dialogues of the Buddha*, III, p. 195). Later in the suttanta, Vessavana reveals a list of names of ' great yakkhas ' to whom a Buddhist in distress may appeal for protection.

Thus, it may be inferred from the substance of this suttanta that the Buddha does not totally deny the efficacy of charms, but only discriminates between one kind of charm and another. The Buddha recommends Vessavaṇa's gift : " Memorize, brethren, the *Ātānāṭa* wardrune, master it and recollect it. This rune pertains to your good ..." (*D.* III, p. 206). But it is difficult to reconcile some of the mythological and anthropomorphic beliefs that would then receive confirmation, with the general import of Buddhist literature on the subject of charms, unless viewed in the light of C.A.F. Rhys Davids' attempted explanation She states : " It may be that Buddhism was compelled to adopt and then adapt, in the *paritta*, the *rakṣamantras* dear to its converts. There was wisdom shown by the teachers of the new successful Dhamma in making friends out of certain traditions and prejudices very hard to overcome" (*Dialogues of the Buddha*, III, p 186). The plausibility of this hypothesis is strengthened by the fact that throughout his career, the Buddha is never seen to be iconoclastic, but always prepared to use tradition for reformative ends. If in this suttanta the Buddha was utilising such traditional beliefs, the belief must have been the popular one that by incantatory formula (*manta*), divine intervention may be invoked for protection from onslaughts by demons (*yakkhas*). The need was to supply the confidence which all people in hour of peril need, of being protected by some guardians more powerful than themselves, preferably divine. The *Āṭānāṭa* rune supplies this confidence by its insistence that the four Regent Gods, themselves being devotees of the Buddha to whom they pay homage, would from the four quarters protect any Buddhist in distress.

Protection of a similar sort is suggested in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (*S.* I, p. 218), but there is a shift of position in the fact that faith in the power of the gods to give assured security through magic is questioned. The Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha are placed as being able to ensure this security. For here, in the *Dhajagga Sutta*, the Buddha shows that Sakka and the other Vedic gods, to whom people obviously went to look for protection, were incapable of supplying it, being imperfect and, therefore, themselves subject to the emotions of panic and fear and that faith in Triple Gem was the only reliable ' magic '. This ' magic ' was performed by meditation on the virtue of these three refuges.

From this substitution of *saddhā* as a spell we come to another sutta which advocates the efficacy of *mettā* as a charm.

This is the *Ahinda Sutta* of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (II, p. 72) also found in the *Vinaya* (II, p. 109 f.) as the *Khandha-paritta*. It is a protection against injury from snakes and other animals who are a danger to man, and was advocated by the Buddha on the occasion of the death of a monk from snakebite. The Buddha states that had this monk suffused with love (*mettā*) the four royal families of snakes, viz., the Virūpakkha, Erāpatha, Chabyāputta and Kaṇhā-Gotama, he would not have been harmed by the snake. He advises his monks that for their self-protection they should suffuse with love these four royal families by reciting the stanza :

May I have kindness with Virūpakkha,
May I have kindness with Erāpatha,
With Chabyaputtas may I have kindness,
With Kaṇhā-Gotamas may I have kindness,

May I have kindness with the footless,
With those of two feet may I kindness have,
With quadrupeds may I have kindness,
May I have kindness with the many-footed.

Let not the footless do me harm,
Nor those that have two feet,
Let not the four-footed do me harm,
Nor those with many feet.

All creatures, living things, may all that has become,

May one and all see luck and may not harm befall,
Infinite is the Buddha, infinite is the Dhamma, infinite is the Saṅgha,

Finite are creeping things, snakes, scorpions, centipedes,

Finite are spinning spiders, hare-lizards, rats and mice.

The latter part of the rune circumscribes creatures other than snakes within the circle of this spreading *mettā*.

The other variety of charm which receives confirmation in Buddhism is the 'act of truth' or asseveration (*saccakiriya*) which seems to depend on the virtue of (or some virtuous act performed by) the person invoking the magical results, or the virtue of the person on whose behalf the results are invoked The outstanding instance is that of Aṅgulimāla. The *Aṅgulimāla Sutta* (*M*. II, p. 104 f.) describes the event. The thera Aṅgulimāla is so moved by the sight of a woman in her labour-pains that he reports it to the Buddha, and the Buddha advises him to wish her well by declaring that he had never in his life killed a living being. Aṅgulimāla points out that it would not be, accurately speaking, the truth The Buddha points out that Aṅgulimāla had not killed a living being since his Aryan birth, that is, his attainment of arahantship and that would be perfectly true. The *Majjhima Nikāya* sutta does speak of the effects of the charm, and elaborates that, as soon as Aṅgulimāla makes his asseveration before the woman: "Sister, from the day I was born of the noble birth, I am not conscious of having deprived any living thing of life. If this be true, may health be to you, health to your unborn child", then straightaway there was health to that woman, health to her unborn child.

This illustrates the usual pattern of the declaration involved in the use of *saccakiriya* as a charm, of which further instances are found in the *Jātaka* (see below) and the commentaries, particularly the *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā*.

The jātakas are profuse with references to charms. They contain a store of information which may serve as historical data for forming an idea of the charms prevalent at the time this body of Buddhist literature was composed. Some of these charms are those which have been mentioned already in the *Brahmajāla* list of low arts. For instance, the *Mūsika Jātaka* (*J*. III, p. 215) mentions a spell in the form of a stanza to be recited, composed by the bodhisatta himself after prognostication by *aṅga-vijjā* of the danger that was to befall prince Yava. *Ahi-vijjā* is mentioned in the *Campeyya Jātaka* (*J*. IV, p. 454), spells and magical herbs being used for trapping a snake. The spells to bring victory, spoken of in the introductory story to the *Vaḍḍhakisūkara Jātaka* (*J*. II, pp. 403 f.) probably are those used in *Vivadana* (see above).

The 'jewel charm' (*cintāmaṇi-nāma-vijjā*) of the *Padakusalamāṇava Jātaka* (*J*. III, pp. 502 f.), given as her gift to her son by a yakkhiṇī, is identified by Buddhaghosa as the Jewel Charm (*manikonāma-vijjā*) mentioned in the *Ambaṭṭha Suttanta* (loc. cit.), and the Gandhara charm of the same sutta is surmised to be that mentioned in the *Ayoghara Jātaka* (*J*. IV, p. 496 f.). But neither of them seems to possess the powers ascribed to them in the sutta. Here the *cintāmaṇi-vijjā* is merely a spell to enable lost footsteps to be traced and the Gandhara charm merely enables one to cause invisibility.

Apart from these charms mentioned already in the nikāyas, there are many others, some of them probably fictitious, invented by the myth-makers whose fables the Buddhist writers were re-orienting, while others may have referred to actual practices or current beliefs. The *Vedabbha Jātaka* (*J*. I, p. 253) mentions a charm which, if repeated at a certain conjunction of the planets, was able to cause a shower of jewels from the sky. The *Sabba-dāṭha Jātaka* (*J*. II, p. 243 f.) mentions a charm which enabled world-conquest, *paṭhavijayamanta*; the *Sañjīva Jātaka* (*J*. I, p. 510) a charm for raising the dead to life; the *Kharaputta Jātaka* (*J*. III, p. 275 f.) a charm giving knowledge of all sounds, probably the same as that mentioned in the *Parantapa Jātaka* (*J*. III, p. 415) as a charm to understand animal cries (*sabba-ravajānana-manta*); the *Brahā-chatta Jātaka* (*J*. III, p. 116) a spell to bring to light buried treasure (*nidhi-uddharana-manta*). It is evident from a sub-story in the *Padakusala-māṇava Jātaka* (loc. cit.) that it was believed, that these were spells which could be used to drive away yakkhas, and from the *Kaṇhadīpāyana Jātaka* (*J*. IV, p. 27 f.) it may be inferred that people believed in the existence of charms which could cure snake-bite. The parents of Yaññadatta, who is bitten by a snake, appeal to Dīpāyana: "Religious people know simples and charms. Please cure our son." In contrast to the hint in the *Ambaṭṭha Suttanta*, most of these jātakas suggest that these charms were learnt at Takkasilā (e.g., *J*. I, p. 510; III, pp. 116, 215, 415) from Brahmin teachers, among the liberal arts that were part of the curriculum there.

The attitude which the jātaka writers adopted regarding these charms is, however, perfectly consistent with the attitude of the nikāyas. There seems to run beneath their stories a vein of tolerant scepticism and ironical but gentle laughter, while at the same time asserting the Buddhist position. The unintelligent use of the Vedabbha charm (*J.* I, p. 253 f.) leads to the possessor's destruction. In the hands of a jackal the charms for world-conquest brings about his own ruin (*J.* II, p. 243 f.). The same is true of Sañjīva who brings a tiger to life but does not know how to undo his magic. Charms are in brief a danger to those who use them unwisely, a weapon of destruction in the wrong hands. They may be abused, as perhaps the recluses and brāhmans referred to in the *Brahmajāla Suttanta* did, being without the proper wisdom or the correct moral base. The *Kharaputta Jātaka* and the *Mora Jātaka* (*J.* II, p. 33 f.) are intended to illustrate how, without the moral strength, the charms they possessed became a source of danger to their possessors. The *Brahāchatta Jātaka* laughs at the learning, which enabled Chatta to steal by means of his knowledge. The bodhisatta in this story says "here learning too is vanity !" A stanza in the *Ayoghara Jātaka* (*J.* IV, p. 496) sums up the Buddhist position succintly :

> "Some who in spells and magic lore are wise
> Can walk invisible to others eyes.
> Yet not so invisible but death can see.
> So I'm resolved—a holy life for me."

The emphasis on the superiority of *sīla*, of *saddhā* and of *mettā* and their unerring efficacy is maintained to the last. The meditating peacock in the *Mora Jātaka* and the *Mahā-mora Jātaka* (*J.* IV, p. 333 f.) is protected by his virtue from the hunters until he falls from his virtue. The *saccakiriya* of Dīpāyana, who uses the pure life he led for fifty seven days as his asseveration, helps to draw the snake-poison from Yaññadatta. The *Khandha-vatta Jātaka* (*J.* II, p. 144 f.) which repeats the ward-rune of the *Ahinda Sutta* glorifies the emotion of loving-kindness. But the classical example of the success of virtue as a charm is in the *Kulāvaka Jātaka* (*J.* I, p. 199 f.) where Magha and his followers, who had led a life of public service and charity, are brought to be trampled by elephants, but are left unharmed by them. Asked by the amazed king for the spell they had used, the bodhisatta replies : "We have no other spell than this, that not a man among us destroys life, resorts to adultery, lies or drinks. We do charity, construct roads and tanks and build public halls. This is our spell (*manta*), our safe-guarding incantation (*paritta*), our strength."

Thus, once again the Buddha uses a traditional concept, the concept of charms, used by Brahmanical and Vedic teachers to butress their vested interests, to feed on the superstitions of the weak and ignorant, and to assert their own bigotry and dogmas. But he uses it, giving it an ethical twist, leading men from the paths of darkness to the paths of righteousness and light. It appears that on this subject of charms the whole literature of Buddhism was saying 'let there be magic, if there be, and let those who believe, believe, but there is no greater magic than the magic of virtue, of goodness, truth and loving-kindness, which, while the other may lead to worldly success or to destruction at a whim, leads unfalteringly and unfailingly to the solution of the true problem of our existence, suffering.' See also AMULETS, PARITTA.

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CHĀRSADA, a modern township in Pakistan in the Kabul valley, on the east bank of the river Swat (Subhāvastu in ancient texts, Su-po-fa-su-tu in Chinese, Arrian's Soastos river), which has become important to the study of Buddhist art and sculpture of the Gandhara period on account of recent discoveries at the site.

Chārsada has now been identified as lying on the site of the ancient Puṣkalavatī[1] (Peukelaotis, Peukala in Greek, see J. W. Mc Crindle, *Ancient India as described by Megasthenes and Arrian*, Calcutta, 1960, p. 184), the capital of Gandhara or

1 Alexander had sacked the city and established a Greek garrison here under Philippos. (*ASIAR.* 1902-03, p. 142).

Udyāna proper, which shared equal status with Taxila before Puruṣapura (modern Peshawar) was founded by the Imperial Kusans.

General Court who had visited the place before 1826, refers to the villages Chārsada and Prang under the name Ashnagar (Hashtnagar; *JASB*, Vol. V, 1836, p. 479 f.; Vol. VIII, 1840, p. 312). Court identifies the site with Nysa of Alexander's historian. In 1863 Cunningham thought it to be the site of the ancient city Puṣkalavatī[2] which identification was later accepted by Foucher and others (*Archaeological Survey Reports of Cunningham*, Vol. II, p. 89; *JRAS*, October, 1896, p. 655; M. Foucher, *Extract du Bulletin de l' Ecole francaise d' extreme Orient*, Hanoi, 1962, p. 18 ff.). Both Fa-hsien and Hsüan-tsang speak of the wealth of the kingdom which was especially due to the healthy terrain of the country (S. Beal, *Chinese Accounts of India*, Indian edition, Calcutta, 1958, p. 166 ff.). The strategic position of the city, being midway between the ancient trade route that joins East and West in the Kabul-Kyber pass had undoubtedly resulted in the great wealth the region had accumulated in the pre-Christian and early Christian eras.

As a centre of Buddhist art and architecture Chārsada area has reached very high limits as evident from the antiquarian discoveries. It was also an important centre of Buddhism in the Kingdom of Udyāna (Chinese U-Chang-na) under Kuṣānas and other Buddhist royal dynasties in North-West India. The references made by the Chinese travellers testify to this fact (loc. cit.).

However, Buddhism was in the decline here in the seventh century when Hsüan-tsang visited the place. This was probably owing to Hūna attacks (*Rājatarangani*, I, ed. M. A. Stein, p. 289 and note). The ancient city had fallen into complete oblivion in the mediaeval period. Albiruni in the eleventh century, makes no reference to Puṣkalavatī or any other important centre here, in his description of the route, between Kanauj to Gazani, which lies across Puṣkalavatī. Although Cunningham had instructed H. W. B. Garrick to explore the site, real scientific archaeological excavations were undertaken by J. Marshall and J. Ph. Vōgel in the first decade of this century. (*ASIAR*. 1902–03, p. 141 f.; *ASIAR*. 1903–04, p. 244 ff.).

Four archaeological sites were explored by Marshall and Vōgel, namely, Bala Hisar, Mir Ziyarat, Palatu Dheri and Ghaz Dheri, which had all yielded ruins of Buddhist art and architecture of the Gandhara period ranging from the first century A. C. From the plateau of Bala Hisar were discovered broken pottery, terra-cotta figurines, coins of Kaniṣka and other Indo-Scythian rulers, and a metal mould depicting a figure riding on a swan.[3] Among the discoveries from Mir Ziyarat are coins of the Bactrian King Menander (King Milinda of the *Milindapañha* fame), several bronze utensils probably belonging to Buddhist monasteries, terra-cotta figurines and miniature heads of the Buddha.

The most important finds were excavated at Palatu Dheri and Ghaz Dheri. From Ghaz Dheri was discovered a fragment of a stucco railing, reminiscent of the famous stone railings at Buddhagayā, Bārhūt and Sāñcī. The railing had originally encircled a stūpa of which only the base could be traced now. But the discovery was unique as at the exact centre of this supposed base of the stūpa was discovered a relic casket of rich craftsmanship, containing some relics. The excavators were less interested in the relics than in the container which was made of schist stone and, placed in a larger casket of the same material. The whole was wedged tightly into a long narrow earthen vessel (Pl. XXVIII, Fig. 1). The two caskets yielded exquisite decorative motifs and these motifs were designed so skilfully that the lids are indistinguishable.[4] Within the stūpa precincts were unearthed a lower half of a standing bodhisattva on a pedestal with a Kharoṣṭhi inscription. An attempt has been made by Marshall and Vōgel to trace a hint at the Puṣkala district (i.e., Puṣkalavatī Kingdom), in this pedestal inscription (ibid. p. 176).

It is from the Palatu Dheri site that the famous headless Buddha image to which the so-called Hashtnagar inscribed pedestal belongs (*ASIAR*, for 1903–04, p. 258, Pl. LXIX, fig. *a*). The Hindu community of Rajar had appropriated this image and converted it to an image of goddess Kālikā. But, in 1883, Mr. W. King managed to get the pedestal sawn off and presented it to the British Museum (Vincent Smith, *Indian Antiquary*, XVIII,

2 For the legendary history of the city of Puṣkalavatī see *Rāmāyana*, VII, 100, 10; Kālidāsa's *Raghuvaṃśa*, XV. 87–89; Varahamihira's *Bṛhatsaṃhitā*, XIV, 26.

3 John Marshall thinks that this could be a local variation of the Greek Appollo (*ASIAR*. 1902–03, p. 154). This is also interesting to the study of the evolution of the iconography of Hindu god Brahma who plays a no less significant role in Buddhist narratives. Brahma is believed to possess a *haṃsa vāhana*, the mythical swan as his vehicle.

4 These Chārsada reliquaries show close resemblance to early Anuradhapura, Sri Lanka stone relic-caskets, which factor demands the necessity of a comparative study that would help to glean more facts about the cultural links between these early Buddhist Sovereign states (see *History of Ceylon*, University of Ceylon Publication, Vol. I, Part I. Pls. XIII, *c*, XIV, *a*).

8189, p. 257 ; *ASIAR* 1902-03, p. 160). The image depicts the Buddha with both shoulders covered. The pedestal shows five figures, four in the form of worshipping a central figure supposed to be that of a Bodhisattva.[5] (Pl. XXVIII, Fig. 2.)

Numerous stone and stucco sculptures discovered at the site are evidence of a large Buddhist establishment that was once there which was later destroyed by fire as evident from masses of charcoal and burnt iron found at the site. The stone basreliefs depicting scenes from the Buddha story found here are common to other early Buddhist sites too (*ASIAR*, 1902-03, Pl. XVII).

A terra-cotta torso of a Buddha image showing the robe covering only the left shoulder is important for the study of the iconography of the Buddha. It is a common feature in the Gandhara school of Buddhist art to portray Buddha images in the preaching attitude (*Dharmacakra* or *Vitarka*) depicted as above.[6]

Another important discovery from the Chārsada ruins is the stone image of the Mahāyāna mother goddess, *Hārītī* (q.v.). An inscription on the pedestal of this image identifies the figure and describes her as being capable of curing small-pox (*ASIAR* 1903, p. 255).

Some observe that the Buddhist antiquities of Chārsada are unique in comparison with other sites of Gandhara art, (A. K. Coomaraswamy, *History of Indian and Indonesian Art*, New York, 1965, p. 55) and it has become noteworthy that at least five of the very few inscribed sculptures of the Gandhara school have come from this area.

Apart from the sculptures mentioned above, friezes common to other Gandhara sites, e.g., seated atlantes behind stunted pilasters, garland bearing erotes, undulating wine-creepers, etc. are also found (*ASIAR* 1902–03, Pl.XXVII, Nos.9, 11).

Several sculptures supposed to be those of Hindu divinities, too, have been discovered (*ASIAR*, 1914–15, Pl. XVI d, p. I ; *ASIAR*, 1913–1 Natesa Aiyar, *Trimurti in the Peshawar Museum* from Chārsada.[7]

The Buddhist art of Chārsada has to be evaluated along with other Gandhara sites in the Kabul-Swa (Udyāna) valley like Jamalgarhi, Takhtibahi Bimārān, Haḍḍa, Peshawar, Jelālābād (Nagar-hāra.

A.D.T.E.P.

CHASTISEMENT. See TAJJANIYAKAMMA.

CHASTITY, the virtue of not being guilty of unlawful or improper sexual behaviour. Since Buddhist monasticism, both of the male and female orders, i.e., bhikkhu and bhikkhuni, implies a total abstinence from sex gratification, chastity, rightly speaking, comes within the range of lay life. However, in terms of monastic behaviour too, such sexual intimacies or liberties, although not amounting to a breach of the vow of celibacy for which the punishment would be complete expulsion under the offence of *Pārājika*, would be regarded as unchaste behaviour. Under these come promiscuous and licentious behaviour in the company of members of the opposite sex as well as lewd talk containing improper suggestions leading to sexual indulgence. In the case of the monks, the first category of the four inviolable offences or *Pārājika* includes the act of sexual intercourse. In the next category of *Saṅghādisesa*, remediable offences of the highest severity (thirteen in number), we find three regulations (Nos. 2, 3, and 4 ; *Vin.* III, pp. 120, 128, 133) relating to laxity in word and deed which verge on sexual impropriety. In the case of nuns, two regulations relating to similar offences of physical intimacies with laymen are upgraded and placed in the category of *Pārājika* (Nos. 5 and 8 ; *Vin.* IV, pp. 213, 220 f.) leading to the expulsion of the offender from the Order. With them a few more regulations, legislating against the cultivation of unhealthy friendships with laymen

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5 J. Ph. Vogel identifies the central figure with Maitreya bodhisattva. The occurrence of the word 'Arog' too often in the worn out inscription has to be further investigated. Buhler and H. Luders have attempted to improve the translation but no special interpretation of the word 'Arog', was made (*ASIAR*.1903–04, p. 249 f.). Foucher has found 'Arogya' as an epithet for Avalokiteśvara. Compare the statement *Sinhaladvipe Arogyasala lokanthe* as found in early Malayani Manuscripts. There is doubt that this is an early reference to the epithet of Avalokiteśvara and the central bodhisattva figure is a representation of Avalokiteśvara. Incidentally figures of Avalokiteśvara bodhisattva were found in abundance in the Swat valley.

6 Ninety per cent of Gandhara Buddha images in the preaching attitude show both shoulders covered (compare, H. Ingholt and E. Lyons, *Gandhara Art in Pakistan*, New York, 1957, Plates, 125, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 253, 254, 255, 257 ; cf. also with the same type of the Barabudur Buddha images, W. F. Stutterhein, *Studies in Indonesian Archaeology*, The Hauge, 1956, fig. 5, no. 6).

7 The identification of icons with manifold hands carrying various objects as Hindu divinities is rather doubtful as in the later decadent phase of Buddhism too Buddhist bodhisattva images have been represented in the like manner. R. C. Kak identifies the so-called Chārsada Hindu images as those of Mahāyāna bodhisattvas (see R. C. Kak, *Handbook of the Archaeological numismatic sections of the Sri Pratap Singh Museum*, Sri Nagar, London, 1923).

which would invariably lead to sexual offences, are placed in the category of *Saṅghādisesa* (Nos. 5, 6 : *Vin.* IV, pp. 233, 234).

Thus, in the case of the monastic community, while the major regulations totally forbid the gratification of sex desires (*dvayandvayasamāpattimethunapatisevana* or sexual intercourse), several additional rules, some of lesser severity, attempt to safeguard against laxities which are unworthy of and disruptive to the higher training undertaken. Freedom from these would build up the chaste life of the monk and a carefully graded system of legislation seems to have been evolved to contribute towards chastity in monastic life.

As far as the laymen are concerned, chastity in Buddhism is a concept of wider significance. Its socio-religious relevance is viewed with considerable seriousness on account of which one might rush to conclude that the ethics of Buddhism are highly circumscribed in terms of time and place, influenced by the prevailing political ideology or social philosophy. At a stage in history when provincial variations were still respected as a reality, Buddhism appears to tolerate and even endorse social norms of differing groups. But this is not to deny that underlying all this, there were the Buddhist religious values, filtering and determining as to what could be fitted within its own framework. Of these, the general attitude to *kāma* or the gratification of sense desires seems to rank above others. This implied the cultivation of virtues like restraint and self-control and the exercise of the capacity to assess, in terms of the social and religious values accepted, the consequences of any action.

It is reasonable to assume that by the time of the Buddha, marriage in India had acquired a validity and sanctity in the social context. The Buddha sought no further for a divine sanction for it. Most considerations of chastity in Buddhism seem to radiate from marriage. Following, more or less, the Brahmanic religious tradition of the *caturāśramadharma*, marriage is looked upon as opening the doors to the enjoyment of sex pleasures. The first *āśrama* of *brahmacarya* or studentship (see CELIBACY) would naturally have shut out any possibility of pre-marital sex relationships. This appears to have been accepted by the Buddhists as a norm and utilised to serve as the foundation of unmarried chastity. To the Buddhists, marriage is a two-way contract, involving mutual relationships. Hence chastity centering on marriage has honesty or conjugal fidelity as its basis. Assuming that one has sensibly chosen one's mate, it is expected that sexual gratification should be found within this socially standardised institution of marriage. 'Find pleasure in the company of your own wife' (*sakena dārena ca hohi tuṭṭho· DhpA.* I, i. p. 26), is a recurrent injunction. Behaviour which is contrary to this appears to be stigmatised, irrespective of the question whether the source of pleasure outside the home is a public one like a courtezan (the Indian equivalent of the word, *gaṇikā*, means 'a woman who belongs to the crowd') or otherwise. The *Parābhava Sutta* takes note of such a situation with the following remarks :

> "Ninth comes the lecher, not satisfied with his own wife, is seen about with whores, or caught in dalliance with others' wives" (*Sn.* v. 108).

Greater attention seems to be focussed on the social aspect of this crime. Peace and harmony of marital love, born of conjugal fidelity, shall not be disturbed either by use of pressure and violence or through secret alliances and connivance. Buddhist ethics condemn such action in no uncertain terms.

> "By force, or with consent, the wastrel holds commerce with wives of kinsmen or of friends" (*Vasala Sutta : Sn.* v. 123). They show great concern about such adulterous behaviour and using the social yardstick chastise one who violates these norms, referring to him as an outcaste or *vasala*.

Counselling about the problem from the religious angle, continence is held out as a desirable goal to be pursued. Even if this ideal evades the average layman he is not to fall as low as the level of adultery.

> And shun incontinence
> as 't were a pit of fire,
> or, failing continence,
> debauch no wedded wife (*Sn.* v. 396).

A brief statement in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*A.* V, p. 264) tells us that unchaste behaviour, brought in this context under the term *kāmesu micchācārā*, could also stretch in yet another direction. Unlawful sexual intercourse, we are told, could be sought with eight different kinds of females. There is perhaps no need to presume that this list is comprehensive. However, it reveals one important fact, namely, that these females with whom sex gratification might be sought include both married and unmarried persons, the latter including girls under the care

of parents, brothers and sisters as well as relations. Even girls coming under institutional care (*dhammarakkhita. . .sahadhammika* : this means co-religionist, implying perhaps persons like inmates of a convent) seemed to be reckoned with.

It is also possible to infer from this, that as far as the males are concerned, this quest for sexual pleasure might be extra-marital or pre-marital.

In the face of all these sociological analyses which the Buddhist texts appear to have taken up, directly or indirectly, it is difficult to concede that incontinence which has a basic relevance for religion is deemed the sole lamentable feature of an unchaste life. Like many other Buddhist virtues, chastity makes of society a better place in which the fundamental Buddhist life may be practised with greater ease and assured success.

J.D.

CHAṬṬHA SAṄGĀYANĀ, the sixth Theravāda Buddhist council held in Burma from 1954–1956. The first Buddhist council was the one held at Sattapaṇṇi-guhā in Rājagaha about three months after the Parinibbāna of the Buddha. The second was held about a hundred years later at Vālukārāma in Vesāli and the third under the patronage of Asoka at Pāṭaliputra. According to the Theravāda tradition the fourth council was the one held in Sri Lanka during the reign of Vaṭṭagāmaṇi Abhaya (89–77 B.C.). It was at this council that the scriptures were first committed to writing. The fifth was held in 1871 at Mandalay under the patronage of King Mindon. The council held during the reign of Kanishka is not taken into reckoning by Theravāda schools as it is considered to be a council sponsored by the Mahāyāna school.

At a meeting of the Burmese Saṅgha held in 1952 it was unanimously decided to hold a Buddhist council to rehearse the Tripiṭaka. It is apparent that the holding of the council was so timed to coincide with the Buddha Jayanti celebration of 1956 which marked the completion of 2,500 years after the Parinibbāna of the Buddha.

The Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyanā which was held under the auspices of the government of the Union of Burma was sponsored by the Union Buddha Sāsana Council of Burma. The government of the Union of Burma,through its Ministry of Religious Affairs and National Planning, provided a good portion of the funds needed to organise this Council. A special hall called the Mahā Pāsāna Guhā, providing accomodation for the participants and observers, was built near Kaba-aye Pagoda near Rangoon. Besides this magnificent hall, four hotels by the names of Jambudīpa, Aparagoyāna, Pubbavideha and Uttarakuru were specially set up to cater to the needs of the participants.

The sessions of the Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyanā which was ceremoniously opened on the full-moon day of May (Wesak) 1954 (Buddhist Era 2,498) continued for two full years and came to a close on the full-moon day of May 1956 (B.E. 2,500), the day marked for the celebration of the Buddha Jayanti. In the introduction written to *The Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyanā Souvenir Album* (pu lished by the Union Buddha Sāsana Council of Burma), the following objectives of the sixth Buddhist council are mentioned : (1) To revise the texts which contain some mis-spellings and omissions due to repeatedly copying the Five Nikāyas; (2) To print these e lited Piṭakas to recite them at the Sixth Great Buddhist Council and to distribute them all over the world with the object of preserving the dhamma ; and (3) To enable the Union of Burma, in co-operation and collaboration with all Buddhist countries, to promote the Buddha Sāsana. The Prime Minister U Nu in his address to the council made it clear that the purification of the *sāsana* is also an objective of this council (ibid. p. 63). U Win, Minister for Religious Affairs and National Planning, expressed the view that Buddhism has been on the wane for about a century during the foreign domination of Burma and that the Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyanā would help to reinstate Buddhism to its former glory and that it would also help to preserve Buddhism for another 2,500 years (ibid. p. 30).

It is also recorded in the Introduction to the *Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyanā Souvenir Album* that 2473 Burmese monks and another 144 monks from Theravāda Buddhist countries such as Cambodia, Laos, Sri Lanka and Thailand participated as reciters in this Saṅgāyanā. At the opening ceremony which lasted for three days there were, besides the reciters, many others — monks, nuns, laymen and women from numerous Buddhist countries — who participated as observers.

The reciters or the saṅgītikāraka monks were led by the Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyanā Ovādācariya Saṅgha Nāyaka Council formed from among the Mahātheras of all Theravāda countries who in turn elected twenty-five Bhāranitthāraka Mahātheras. These twenty five monks constituted the Bhāranitthāraka Committee, the executive body which conducted the proceedings of the council. Agga Mahā Thiri

Thudhamma Dr. Ba. U, President of the Union of Burma acted as the chief patron on behalf of all the Theravāda Buddhist countries. Venerable Nāgavaṃsa (Bagaya Sayadaw) Agga Mahā Paṇḍita, one of the Hon. Joint secretaries of the Bhāranitthāraka Committee acted as the Master of Ceremonies. Its other Hon. Joint secretary Venerable Visuddha requested the 90 year old Venerable Ma-ngay Sayadaw, Vanna Mahāthera to act as the temporary *Saṅgha Nāyaka* of the assembly. The latter was also requested to propose to the assembly the name of Venerable Abhi Dhaja Maha Raṭṭha Guru Revata, Nyaungyan Sayadaw as the presiding *Saṅgha Nāyaka* of the Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyanā.

After these preliminaries were completed numerous eulogies and congratulatory messages from representatives of numerous Buddhist and non-Buddhist countries were read to the assembly. In the afternoon session of the first day itself began the recital of Vinaya. The *Saṅgha Nāyaka* proposed to the assembly the names of Venerable Agga Maha Pandita Javana (Pakakku Sayadaw) and Venerable Tripiṭakadhara Dhammabaṇḍāgārika Vicittara-sāra to serve as the questioner (*pucchaka*) and replier (*vissajjaka*). Subsequently, Venerable Agga Maha Paṇḍita Sobhana (Mahāsi Sayadaw) acted as the *pucchaka*.

At this Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyanā which lasted for two full years the whole of the Tripiṭaka was recited. It is seen that prior to the recital all the texts were systematically edited by editorial groups set up in Burma by collating the Burmese editions with the editions found in other Theravāda Buddhist countries such as Cambodia, Thailand and Sri Lanka. The texts published by the Pali Text Society of London were also consulted. The texts thus edited were once more re-scrutinised and re-edited by editorial committees set up in Theravāda Buddhist countries. One such committee called the Lanka Uttaritara Sabhā, consisting of monks versed in the Tripiṭaka, was founded in Sri Lanka. This editorial committee helped the organizers of the Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyanā by comparing the Burmese Tripiṭaka with numerous Pali manuscripts available in the vihāras of Sri Lanka and suggesting correction whenever necessary.

The importance of the Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyanā is mainly due to the fact of its being an international undertaking. Unlike the previous councils which were conducted by individual countries, the sixth council obtained the collaboration and active participation of all Theravāda Buddhist countries.

S.K.N.

CHATTRA (Pali *chatta*): parasol or umbrella. In Buddhist iconography this object has assumed a significant symbolical character from the earliest period of Buddhist art. A perusal of Buddhist art would show that all schools of Indian Buddhist sculpture, e.g., Mathurā, Amarāvatī and Gandhara have used the *chattra* with symbolic significance.

The *chattra* as a symbol of power and authority appears even in pre-Buddhistic art.

In Asia, and particularly in India, the *chattra* has been a symbol of sovereignty, authority and power from pre-Buddhistic times. The *chattra*, especially in the form of a white umbrella (*setacchatta*), was one of the five *insignia regis* (*J*.I, pp. 177, 267; *DhpA*. I, p.167, III, p.120). Buddhist literature (e.g., *J*.III, p. 407; *DhpA*. III, p. 307 ; *VvA*. p. 66) refers to the coronation festival as a *chatta-maṅgala*. The king was seated on a fine chair of fig-wood (*udumbara-bhadda pīṭhaka*) and was sprinkled with auspicious water from a conch with spirals turned clockwise. Then the white umbrella with its festoons was uplifted (Ratilal Metha, *Pre-Buddhist India*, p. 106).

In the *Mahāsīlava Jātaka* (*J*. I, p. 267) the king is said to be seated in majesty and splendour beneath a white canopy of sovereignty upon a throne of gold. The *Mahā-Ummagga Jātaka* (*J*. VI, p. 329 ff.) refers to an interesting incident of a deity who is said to have dwelt in the royal parasol of King Videha of Mithilā. This deity, no longer hearing the discourses of Mahosadha determined to bring the sage back, and one night appeared through a hole in the circuit of the parasol and asked four questions from the king which only Mahosadha could answer and threatened to kill him (the king) if he failed to find the answers for them.

The Buddha in one of his discourses where he recalled his early life as a prince is reported to have said: "Monks, I was delicately nurtured... by night and day a white umbrella (*setacchattaṃ*) was held over me, lest cold or heat, dust or chaff or dew, should touch me..." (*A*. I, p. 145).

The *Nidāna-kathā* of the *Jātaka* commentary (*J*. I, p. 72) states that Mahābrahmā himself held a white parasol over the Buddha as he sat under the Bodhi tree on the day of his enlightenment (*Mahābrahmā setacchattaṃ dhārayamāno aṭṭhāsi...*).

Originally perhaps, the purpose it served was to offer protection from "cold or heat, dust or chaff or dew" (cf. *A.* I, p. 145) but gradually in the form of the white umbrella, perhaps bejewelled, held over the king as he sat on his throne it assumed its symbolical character of authority, power and sovereignty. Incidentally it is noteworthy that a bas relief from Jaggayyapeta, assigned to the first century B.C., representing a universal monarch with his 'jewel' shows him underneath a *chattra* (cf. *The Way of the Buddha*, Govt. of India, 1956, p. 144, fig. 37 and p. 310). Jeannine Auboyer ('The Symbolism of Sovereignty in India According to Iconography (parasols-thrones)' in *Indian Arts and Letters*, Vol. XII. pp. 26 ff.) refers to a legend about King Asoka who expressed his intention of sheltering the entire world beneath his parasol which may be interpreted as that he desired to possess the whole world. Numerous inscriptions of the epoch of the Guptas state that the white parasol of the king covers the utmost limits of the earth (cf. *CII.* III, p. 207).

It is opportune here to examine the importance attached to the *chattra* in ancient and mediaeval times in Sri Lanka. The *Mahāvaṃsa* (*Mhv.* xi, *v.* 28) records that a *chattra* was one of the presents sent by King Asoka of India to King Devānampiya Tissa (cir. 250 A.C.) for his coronation ceremony. In festive assemblies the umbrella was held over the king's head by an official of high rank whose title was *chattaggāhaka*, i.e., parasol-bearer (cp. *Mhv.* lix, *v.* 16). Even in battle, the king riding on the elephant was recognised by the white umbrella.

W. Geiger (*Culture of Ceylon in Mediaeval Times*, Wiesbaden, 1960, p. 44 f.) points out that in Sri Lanka in mediaeval times the umbrella was apparently an attribute of rank and dignity. They may have been different in form and colour according to the social position of the owner. The Sinhalese nobles when they appeared in public were always attended by some of their domestics carrying over them an umbrella. In festival processions umbrellas, fans, fly-wisks and other emblems made of gold and silver and studded with pearls and jewels were carried and these were intended to show the high rank of their owners.

It is obviously a mark of honour and respect and symbolic dedication of royalty and sovereignty to hold the royal parasol over the Buddha himself or an object venerated by the Buddhists. The *Dhammapada* commentary (*DhpA.* III, p. 226) states that Mahā Brahmā held a parasol over the Buddha as he descended from the heaven to the city of Saṅkassa after the preaching of the *Abhidhamma*. The *Mahāvaṃsa* (*Mhv.* xix, *v.* 59) records that King Devānampiya Tissa himself dedicated the white umbrella to the eight-shoots of the Sacred Bodhi tree to honour them like kings and bestowed the royal consecration upon them. The former of these incidents is depicted in a mediaeval painting from Sri Lanka (cf. D. B. Dhanapala, *Story of Sinhalese Painting*, Ceylon, 1957, pp. 33, 34), a bas-relief from Boro udur and a painting from Tibet (*The Way of the Buddha*, Govt. of India, p. 95, fig. 34) in all of which the *chattra* is prominently shown.

The *chattra* has been very widely used as a symbol of sovereignty as well as of high esteem in Buddhist art, both secular and religious, from earliest times. In secular Buddhist art it is held over a royal personage, either male or female and in religious Buddhist art it is held over the Buddha, shown either in person or by a symbol, or over an object of veneration. It is also significant that the *chattra* by itself is never depicted as a symbol representing the Buddha.

Thus in a bas-relief from Amarāvatī where King Suddhodana's visit to Māyā is shown a *chattra* is held over the king by an attendant (*The Way of the Buddha*, p. 35, fig. 18). The same incident depicted at Borobudur also has a *chattra* with a longer staff (ibid. p. 36, fig. 19). Another bas-relief from Borobudur showing queen Māyā proceeding to the Lumbini garden has a *chattra* in front and behind the charriot (Pl. XXIX, Fig. 1). A beautiful and prominent illustration of a *chattra* is seen in a bas-relief from Nāgarjunikoṇḍa depicting the birth of prince Siddhārtha where the *chattra* appears over the head of queen Māyā (Pl. XXIX, Fig.2). A wall-painting from Ajaṇṭā also shows the infant and the mother sheltered by an umbrella (ibid. Pt. II, Pl. I). Some of the other bas-reliefs and paintings in which the *chattra* takes a prominent place to denote the royalty of a lay person are those showing the archery contest of prince Siddhārtha (Borobudur:ibid. pp. 46-7, fig. 39), prince Siddhārtha proceeding to the pleasure garden (Borobudur: ibid. p. 50, figs. 45, 46), the Great Departure, from Amarāvatī, Nāgarjunikoṇḍa and Gandhara (ibid. pp. 55-7 figs. 51, 52, 53). King Bimbisāra's visit to the Buddha (Borobudur : ibid. pp. 60-1, fig. 60), King Suddhodana paying homage to the Buddha (Sañcī: ibid. p. 88, fig. 19), the War of the relics (Sāñcī: ibid . p. 115, fig. 75), King Asoka's visit to the Bodhi tree. (Sāñcī), the *Vessantara Jātaka*, beautifully illustrated in bas-relief at Sāñcī and Goli (ibid. pp. 132-3, 142, 158, figs. 16, 35, 62, 63)

and also in a wall-painting at Ajaṇṭā, a palace scene, and the march of the royal army which are two paintings from Ajaṇṭā. In all these instances it is the *chattra* that distinguishes the royal personage from the others in the scene.

Instances where the Buddha himself, appearing in person or represented by a symbol is shown overshadowed by a *chattra* are equally numerous in Buddhist art. Of them the symbolic representation of the Buddha like at Sāñcī belongs to the earlier period of Buddhist art when it was considered improper to portray the Buddha in human form. Of such representations, for instance, a bas-relief from Sāñcī which shows the renunciation of prince Siddhārtha has a *chattra* over the prince on horse-back in human form but finally, after renunciation a *chattra* over the foot-prints. Another bas-relief from the same site shows the Bodhimaṇḍa and the Bodhi tree overshadowed by a *chattra* from which two garlands hang on either side This sculpture depicts the enlightenment of the Buddha. A bas-relief from Bhārhut also shows the Bodhi-tree with superimposed *chattras* in the middle of the Bodhi-tree amidst its foliage. A bas-relief from Amarāvatī also depicting the enlightenment of the Buddha shows the Bodhi-tree, the Vajrāsana and the sacred footprints overshadowed by three *chattras*. In a bas-relief from Sāñcī showing the Buddha receiving homage from animals in the forest the Buddha is represented by the Bodhi tree which is overshadowed by a *chattra* (*The Way of the Buddha*, p. 99, fig. 42). In another scene from Sāñcī, showing the worship of the Buddha's head dress, the head dress is overshdowed by a *chattra* (ibid. p. 129, fig. 12).

It was referred above to the descent of the Buddha to Saṅkassa, which incident is portrayed in bas-relief and in painting with a large *chattra* held over the Buddha, who in these instances is shown in human form. In another bas-relief from Borobudur (*The Way of the Buddha*, p. 82, fig. 7) showing the Buddha's journey to Benares, a person is holding a *chattra* over the Buddha, from behind. In an Ajaṇṭā painting from cave No. XVIII, identified as showing the Buddha's appearance before Yasodharā and Rāhula a sky figure holds a parasol for the Buddha.

In these bas-reliefs and paintings of the *chattra* two types of ceremonial umbrellas are shown, viz., the large, domed *chattra* and the usual wheel-shaped *chattra* (See A.H. Longhurst, op. cit. frontispiece). Longhurst (op cit. p 1 f.) observes that these two types of ceremonial umbrellas are still in use in India and are normally very large, measuring from 4 6 feet in diameter with a staff about eight feet long and made of wood and covered with coloured cloth or silk, ornamented with a fringe and surmounted by a brass or gilt-copper finial.

The *chattra* was then a symbol of sovereignty, both secular and religious, and it was the reverence and honour that the kings had shown to the Buddha that probably connected it with the religion This would also lead to the surmise that the *chattra* not merely represented the sovereignty of the Buddha but more probably, also symbolized the fact that the Buddha, wherever he was, received the protection, reverence, honour and patronage of the sovereign.

While thus the *chattra* occupies a significant position in Buddhist sculpture and painting, in the sphere of Buddhist architecture the *chattra* was the crowning member of the early Buddhist stūpas.

For the symbolic significance of the *chattra* in the stūpa, see STŪPA.

H. R. P.

CHIH-I (also Chi-i) or Chih-K'ai (538-97 A.C.) was the founder of the T'ien-t'ai (Jap. Tendai) school of Chinese Buddhism. His secular surname was Ch'en, and after founding the school he was known by several other names, most of them epithets, e.g., Chih-i-ch'an-shih, Chih-chê-ta-shih, T'ien-tai-ta-shih. In Japan, the Tendai school calls him Koso daishi, to distinguish him from Dengyō-daishi, the founder of the school in Japan.

Chih-i was born in 538 A.C., the 4th year of Ta-tung, in the reign of Wu-ti of the Liang dynasty. His father, Ch'en-ch'i-tsu was an officer of the state and his mother was a devout Buddhist. One day, when Chih-i was seven years old, he went to the temple where he listened to the reading of the Samantamukha chapter of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra*. As if by intuition he grasped the full import of the sūtra, and this happened to be the first turning point of his career. After the death of his parents, he entered the Order at the age of eighteen, under Fa-hsu of Kuo-yuan-ssu temple at Hsiang-chou in the Nan province. Studying the disciplinary rules under Hui-K'uang-lu-shih, a disciple of Ch'ên-ti, he soon became well versed in Mahāyāna doctrines, and an expert in Ch'an (Zen) practices.

The greatest event in Chih-i's career was his meeting in 560 A.C. the famous Zen master Hui-ssu-ch'an-shih who was at the time living in seclusion

at Ta-su-shan mountain, practising deep meditation. Following the instructions of Hui-ssu, Chih-i practised meditation and religious practices, specially those of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, for seven years undergoing severe hardships. Chih-i, thus became the greatest disciple of Hui-ssu.

In 567 A.C., on the instructions of his teacher, Chih-i went over with 27 other monks to Chin-ling, the capital of Chiang-su province, and stayed at Wa-Kuan-ssu temple. Here, he devoted his full energy and time to the edification of both monks and laymen. He had by now attained such renown as a teacher of discipline and an exponent of the doctrine that all the leading monks of Chin-ling — Ta-jên, Hui-pan, Fa-sui, Ching-shao, Chih-ling, Fa-an and others — became his pupils and ardent admirers. Tradition has it that, on one occasion when he expounded the teachings of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra*, so many court nobles and officials attended it that the conduct of the affairs of the state had to be suspended for a whole day.

After several busy years of service to others at Chin-ling, in 575 A.C., in spite of appeals to stay on, Chih-i moved to the Tien-t'ai mountains ('the platform of heavens') which was an ideal place for solitude and meditation. The period he stayed here, at Mount Hua-ting-fêng, was a most fruitful period, second only to that at Ta-su-shan under Hui-ssu. He put up several religious buildings, including the meditation hall, and when the disciples gathering around him increased in number, he was able to secure an imperial order from Hsuan-ti of Ch'en for the expenses of the temple to be defrayed with the revenue from Shih-fêng-hsien (district) in Hsi-chiang-shêng (province). His discourses were so convincing that, according to the biography (*Su-kao-sêng-chüan* by Tao-hsüan : *Taishō*, No. 2060 ; *Nanjio*, No. 1493), fishermen, after hearing him preach, refrained from killing and gave up their fishing traps and tanks at 63 places in the rivers and brooks, and turned these places into 'pools of the Dharma'. It was as a result of the teachings and studies based mainly on the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra*, made by him that the Tien-t'ai school was founded, deriving the name from the mountain.

After repeated requests, Chih-i returned to Chin-ling in 585 A.C. The emperor gave him the Chan-chung -ssu temple and invited him to preach at the Council Hall in the Imperial Palace where he lectured on the Jên-wang-ching (sūtra of the Benevolent Kings which is a part of the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra : Taishō*, No. 1708 ; *Nanjio*, No. 17) to the emperor and court nobles. Later on, he moved to the Kuan-chai-ssu temple, where, too, he received royal patronage. He also administered the bodhisattva precepts to the crown prince Yüan, and lectured on *Fa-hua wên-chu* (*Commentary on Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra : Taishō*, No. 1718 ; *Nanjio*, No. 1536). When political trouble broke out and the Chên family was overthrown, Chih-i went away to Lu-shan mountain. The new royal family, too, sought his religious instruction and he, in 591 A.C., administered the bodhisattva precepts to Chin-wang-kuang, second son of emperor Wen-ti, at a ceremony attended by a thousand monks at Tsung-Kuan-chin-ch'êng-tien. The next year he returned to Su-shan and visited Hêng-shan to pay his respects to Hui-ssu. From there he proceeded to Ching-chou where he constructed a temple at Yu-chuan-shan as a mark of esteem of his birth-place, and had the Shih-chu-ssu temple repaired. According to tradition more than five thousand have been ordained by him in this region.

In the spring of 596 A.C., after an absence of twelve years, Chih-i returned to Tien-t'ai, where a rousing welcome awaited him. At Tien-t'ai, much of his time and energy was spent in effecting repairs to the temple. In October 597 A.C., Ching-wang sent messengers inviting Chih-i, who set off with them. On his way, Chih-i fell sick and aware of approaching death, offered a part of his belongings to the image of Maitreya at Shih-ch'êng-ssu temple and died on 24th November, invoking the name of Amita-Buddha.

Chih-i regarded the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra* as the one work embodying the highest teachings of the Buddha and in addition to founding the Tien-t'ai school based on these teachings, he wrote numerous treatises commenting on and expounding this sūtra, popularly known as the Lotus Sūtra. Of these, not less than twenty-two works are embodied in the Chinese Tripiṭaka. Three of these, *Miao-fa-lien-hua-ching-hsüan-i* (The Profound Meaning of the Lotus Sūtra : *Taishō*, No. 1716 ; *Nanjio*, No. 1534), *Miao-fa-lien-hua-ching-wên-chu* (Commentary on the above : *Taishō*, No. 1718 ; *Nanjio*, No. 1536) and *Mo-ho-chin-kuan* (*Taishō*, No. 1911 ; *Nanjio*, No. 1538) are known as the 'Three Great Works'. The teachings embodied in these numerous works show that the new school, more than any other, was an independent attempt of the Far-East to deal with the literary and metaphysical problems of Buddhism, marked by its catholic, many sided and almost encyclopaedic character (Sir Charles Eliot, *Japanese Buddhism*, London, 1959, p. 171). Thus, it is not correct to present the teachings of the

school as a more amplification or development of Zen. The ecclesiastical biographies, nevertheless regard Chih-i, as well as his teacher, Hui-ssu, as Ch'an-shih, i.e., teachers of Zen (*Taishō*, No. 2060; *Nanjio*, No. 1493; *Su-kao-sêng-chuan*, Obaku edition, Vol. XXI, sheets 7, 11-12, and 16-17).

The greatness of Chih-i does not lie in his literary and scholarly endeavours alone. He was a great organiser and a builder, too, for he is credited with the building of thirty-five monastic establishments at the places he sojourned. With his great popularity and powers of persuation he was able to raise sufficient funds for the transcription of fifteen complete copies of the canon (L. C. Goodrich, *A Short History of the Chinese People*, London. 1948, p.104).

K. D. SOMARATNA

CHINA.* When Buddhism actually reached China has been a matter on which opinion is varied. The earliest record in Chinese history of the introduction of Buddhism relates that two years before the Christian era I-ts'un, an envoy of the king of Yüeh-chi arrived in Chang-an (modern Sian), taught Buddhist scriptures orally to Ching Lu, a scholar of the Imperial Academy.[1] Tradition puts the date as far back as 217 B.C., when the Buddhist missionary activities of Asoka were being spread over practically the whole of South and South-East Asia. As Johnston points out,[2] 'the truth of the matter probably is that it (Buddhism) had to be introduced on several different occasions before it succeeded in gaining a firm foothold . . . there is some reason to believe that the religion first reached China in the third century B.C., possibly as a result of the missions sent out by Asoka, but that it speedily disappeared under the discouraging influence of the book-burning and wall-building emperor Ch'in Shih-huang-ti. The next attempt of Buddhism to enter China seems to have taken place in the year 2 B.C.[3]

According to yet another version of the tradition, during the reign of the first emperor of the Chin Dynasty, some Indian śramaṇas, a group of eighteen, Shin-li-fang and others, arrived in China with some Buddhist scriptures. Being imprisoned by the Emperor, they were set free at night by a golden figure sixteen feet tall, who broke the prison to rescue them.

Again, popular accounts ascribe the commencement of the continuous history of Buddhism in China to nearly half a century later. Emperor Ming Ti (57–75 A.C.) of the Han Dynasty, after his famous dream of being visited by a 'Man of Gold' sent a mission of twelve to the 'Western Regions' (Central Asia) to seek Buddhism. They returned in 67 A.C. with two Indian monks, Kāśyapa Mātaṅga (Kai-shê Mo-têng) and Dharmarakṣa or Gobharaṇa (Chu Fa-lan), who were accommodated at Lo-yang, the capital, in a building which later came to be known as the famous White Horse Monastery (Pai-Ma Ssu). They started translating the Buddhist scriptures into Chinese and it is said that the extant *Sūtra of Forty two Chapters*, an excerpt of the *Āgamas*, was the result of their labours.

The first Buddhist monastery in China was built at Lo-yang, then the capital of China. This is the White Horse Monastery, already mentioned, which derives its name from the fact that Buddhist scriptures and images were carried into China on a white horse. This monastery is still in existence and bears evidence of the fact that Buddhism had found its way into China very early and that its foundations as a religion, acknowledged and supported by the government, were already established in that period. Further, according to Chinese chronicles, Prince Ying of Chu, a younger brother of Emperor Ming Ti was a Buddhist follower whose offerings to the emperor were returned to him by order of the emperor that they be used to help maintain monks. This occurred before the arrival of Kāśyapa Mātaṅga and Dharmarakṣa and shows that Buddhism had long been the adopted religion of the royal family of the time.[3]

China, or to give its official name, Chung-hua-jên-min-kung-ho-kuo (i.e., The People's Republic of China) being a vast country with over eight-hundred million inhabitants and the world's largest cultural unit (see *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1955, Vol. 5, p. 508), the history of Buddhism there, over a period of nearly two millenia, is a story that would require several volumes to do justice to the topic. It is, therefore, almost impossible to give a complete or even an adequately over-all picture within the necessarily brief compass of this article which attempts to give only a mere outline of the more salient facts. To get the complete picture, it will, perforce, be

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
*The invaluable suggestions and corrections of Dr. Chao Pu-chu in the preparation of this article are gratefully acknowledged.

1 Chao Pu-chu, 'Buddhism in China,' *Presence du Bouddhisme*, France-Asie, ed. Rene de Berval, Tome XVI, 1959; R. F. Johnston, *Buddhist China*, London, 1913, pp. 22-??, 135 f.

2 R. F. Johnston, op. cit. p. 135.

3 *Records of the Lineage of Buddha and Patriarchs* by Chih-pang of the Sung Dynasty.

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necessary to consult individual articles on the personalities, institutions, sects and topics of doctrine mentioned herein.

Although a decisive, yet modest, beginning was made by the two great missionaries, Kāśyapa Mātaṅga and Dharmarakṣa, in the middle of the first century A.C., it was not till about the fourth century that Buddhism began to emerge as a recognisable force in the spiritual life of the peop'e. During these early years the main religious activity which formed the basis of the spread of Buddhism for centuries to come was the translation of Buddhist scriptures from the original Sanskrit into Chinese. The pioneering work of Mātaṅga and Dharmarakṣa, in this respect, was continued by later missionaries, notably An Shih-kao (147–70A.C.), Lokārakṣa (1478–6. A. C.), Chin-ch'ien (223–53 A.C.) and An-haïlan (181 A.C.), all from Central Asia like their illustrious predecessors.[4]

During the latter part of the Han Dynasty (i.e., late second century) Buddhism spread in many parts of China. The casting of Buddha images and the building of Buddhist monasteries like the White Horse Monastery already noted, and according to some tradition the Hsien-tung Monastery on Mount Wu-tai too, commenced during this period.

As with any religion introduced into a new land, Buddhism, too had to contend with much opposition from the existing systems, Confucianism and Taoism. Taoist monks, in particular, wreaked vengeance by even inciting ruling monarchs against Buddhism.[5] But, gradually a process of absorption and assimilation took place, and it is even found that the Buddha and Lao-tze were worshipped together in the same monastery.[6]

During the period of the Three Kingdoms (San Kuo, 221–80 A.C.) — Wei in the north, Shu in the west and Wu in the south — not only was the translation of Buddhist scriptures into Chinese continued by missionary monks from Central Asia, but native monks, too, started their travels towards the west (India, Tibet etc.) in search of Buddhist texts. Of the first category, noteworthy are Dharmakāla from Central India who translated the *Prātimokṣa* of the Mahāsaṅghika school, Kang Sêng-kai and Dharmasatya, translators of the *Dharmagupta-nikāya-karma*.[7] The first Chinese monk who journeyed to the western countries in quest of scriptures was Chu shih-hsing. While in Khotan he copied some ninety chapters of Sanskrit sūtras, viz., the famous *Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā* and sent them back to Lo-yang (the Chinese capital) through his disciples. The history and development of Buddhism during several subsequent centuries was greatly influenced by and closely linked with the practice thus established by Chu shih-hsing of traversing the western regions in search of Buddhist texts.

By this time Buddhism had spread all over the central part of China, and its propagation in the south was mainly due to the proselytizing activities of Chih-ch'ien, master of six languages. Chih-ch'ien translated nearly thirty sūtras in forty-eight fascicles, most important of which are the *Daśasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā*, the *Vimala-kīrti-nirdeśa*, the *Vaiśa Sūtra*, and the *Brahmajāla Sūtra*. The Indian monk Vighna who went to China in 224 A.C. translated the *Dharmapada* into Chinese with the assistance of Chu Chiang-yen. Another notable monk of this period was Kang Sêng-hui, a Sogdian who came to China in 247 A.C. He established the Chien Ch'u Monastery and is credited with the translation of fourteen books, including the famous *Saṭpāramitā-saṅgraha Sūtra*.

During the period of the Western Tsin Dynasty (265–316 A.C.) which followed that of the Three Kingdoms, the main development was the great popularity gained by the *Prajñā* literature, which, nearly two centuries later, reached its climax with the work of Kumārajīva.

Chih-tun (or Tao-lin 314–66 A.C.), a native of Chen-liu who wrote the *Chi-sê yu-hsüan Lun* (*Treatise on Wandering in the Mystery without Departing from Matter as such*), Chu Fa-tai (320–87 A.C.), Chu Fa-ya, who enunciated the method of analogy, Chu Tao-chien or Fa-shên (286–374 A.C.) a native of Lang-ya, Chin hsiao-lung, Pai Fa-tsu and K'ang Sêng-yüan were notable literary figures of this period. But still more famous was Chu Fa-hu or Dharmarakṣa from Tokhara, a master of thirty-six languages including Chinese and Sanskrit, who is said to have translated 211 texts, among which are the *Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā*, the *Lalita-vistara*, the *Vimala-kirti-nirdeśa Sūtra*, the *Ratnacūḍa-paripṛcchā*, the

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4 *A Collection of Records of translations of the Tripiṭaka.*
5 *Hardoon Edition of the Chinese Buddhist Canon*, XXIV, Vol. V, pp. 1-2; *Nanjio*, Nos. 1471, 1472.
Records of the Western Lands of the Book of the Han Dynasty by Pan-ku.
Record Concerning the Three Precious Things (Triratna) under Successive Dynasties.

Dharmadhyāna Sūtra and the *Mahākāśyapanidāna Sūtra*.[8] Noteworthy as an evangelist was Buddhadana, a native of Central Asia, who came to Lo-yang in 310 A.C. and with whom were associated the first two nuns of China, Ching-Chien and An-ling-shou.[9] The two nuns were responsible for the erection of two temples, of which the famous Chien-hsien Monastery at Hsiang-kuo (then capital of the Chao State) was by An-ling-shou. In the capital Lo-yang itself there were by this time, ten monasteries.

During the period of the Eastern Tsin Dynasty (317–420 A.C.) great emphasis was laid on the Vinaya, not only in the matter of textual studies but also in the practical adherence to its canons on the part of Chinese monks of North China. In both these directions an enormous amount of pioneering work was done by Tao-an (312–85 A.C.), the most outstanding religious figure of the day. As a prelude to establishing the Saṅgha on a firm footing, he searched assiduously for Vinaya books to complete the Vinaya literature which was then available in China only in part. He succeeded in securing copies of most of the texts belonging to the four schools Sarvāstivāda, Dharmagupta, Mahāsaṅghika and Mahīśāsaka. He also instituted systematic translation and interpretation of Buddhist texts. He arranged all the translated scriptures and compiled the first catalogue of the Chinese Buddhist Canon, namely, the *Tsung Li Chung Ching Mu Lu* (*A Catalogue of Examined Buddhist Texts*), completed in 374 A.C. Under his guidance many texts were translated and he assembled and educated many scholars and translators thus providing favourable conditions for the large-scale translation work by Kumārajīva of a later time. His greatest contribution to the progress of the religion was his establishment of the Chinese Saṅgha as a monastic institution. He initiated the custom of Chinese monks (and nuns ?) relinquishing their original surnames on entering the Order, and assuming a new surname of Shih (for Śākya), in accordance with the spirit of the Buddha-word found in the Vinaya :

"And even monks, as those great rivers, that is to say the Ganges, the Jumina, the Aciravati, the Sarabhu and the Mahi, which, on reaching the great ocean, lose their former names and identities and are reckoned simply as the great ocean, even so, monks, (members of) these four castes noble, brahman, merchant and low, having gone forth from home into homelessness, in this *dhamma* and discipline proclaimed by the Truth finder, lose their former names and clans and are reckoned simply as recluses, sons of the Sakyans..." (I.B. Horner, *The Book of the Discipline*, Vol. V, London, 1952, p. 334).

During this period China continued to be visited by foreign scholar-monks, notably Saṅghabhūti and Saṅghadeva from Kashmir, Dharmapriya from Central Asia, and Dharmanandi from Tokhara, all of whom continued to translate Sanskrit Buddhist texts into Chinese. Saṅghabhūti's greatest translation is that of the *Abhidharma-vibhāṣā Śāstra*, while Dharmanandi worked on the four Āgamas, Saṅghadeva on the *Abhidharma-jñānaprasthāna Śāstra* and Dharmapriya on the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra*.

Associated with these foreign scholar-monks was a great figure among Chinese monks of the South, Hui-Yüan (334–416 A.C.), pupil of Tao-an and founder of the Tung lin Monastery of Lu-shan. He propagated and introduced into South China the three great literary and religious movements of this period — the Abhidharma philosophy of Saṅghadeva, the Dhyāna (Ch'an) of Buddhabhadra and the Tri śāstra of Kumārajīva. He also founded the Lotus School and is regarded as the First Patriarch of China.

Two great events in the history of Buddhism in China took place at the turn of the century. In 399 A.C. the great itinerant monk, Fa-hsien together with several others, set off to India from China in search of Buddhist texts, particularly of the Vinaya. He came back to Nanking in 413 A.C. bringing with him a load of books, mainly belonging to the Vinaya of the Mahāsaṅghikas and the Sarvâstivādins. The success of this journey gave a great impetus to many other Chinese monks to embark on similar undertakings for centuries to come.[10] Fa-hsien's itinerary, the *Fo-kuo-chi* (*A Record of the Buddhist Countries*), is the only complete account of such travels that has survived in its entirety.

The other great event that had a tremendous effect on the development of Buddhism in China was the arrival of Kumārajīva (343–413 A.C.) from Central Asia to Chang-an in 401 A.C. As already mentioned it was Kumārajīva who commenced large-scale and systematic translation of Buddhist scriptures and their commentaries into

8 *loc. cit.*
9 *Memoires of Bhikshunis* by Pao-chang.
10 For details see under the names of the monks in *Presence du Bouddhisme*. ed. Rene de Berval. "The Chinese Pilgrims," p. 487 ff.

Chinese, with the active support of the government which his predecessors were not fortunate enough to have. According to the *Memoirs of Eminent Priests* (*Kao Sêng Chuan*), Kumârajîva is said to have translated more than seventy texts in over three hundred fascicles with the assistance of hundreds of scholars and more than five hundred clerks working under him. Chief among his translations are the *Mahâprajñâpâramitâ Sûtra*, *Saddharmapuṇḍarika Sûtra*, *Vimalakîrti-nirdeśa Sûtra*, *Mahîprajñîpâramitâ Śâstra*, *Mâdhyamika Śâstra*, *Sata Śâstra*, *Dvâdaśa-nikâya Śâstra*, *Prâtimokśa Sûtra*, *Saṃyuktâvadâna Sûtra*, *Daśasâhasrikâ-prajñâpâramitâ Sûtra*, *Satyasiddhi Śâstra*, *Vajracchedikâ-prajñîpâramitâ*, *Śûraṅgama-samâdhi*, *Daśa-bhûmi-vibhâsâ Śâstra*, and *Sûtrâlaṅkâra Śâstra*. His original works are *Treatises of Realism*, *The Golden Meaning of Mahâyâna*, *Notes on Vimala-kîrti-nirdeśa Sûtra*, and *Notes on Lao-tze*. In his literary work, Kumârajîva was assisted not only by his Chinese colleagues but also by two of his own masters, Vimalâkśa, a native of Kashmira, and Buddhayaśas who came to Chang-an to join him. Buddhayaśas himself rendered the *Dharmagupta Vinaya* into Chinese.

In three other respects, too, Kumârajîva has made a profound impact on Chinese Buddhism. He initiated the Tri-âstra school, introduced and propagated the Mâdhyamika system and trained a formidable number of pupils (traditionally about 3000), who were themselves distinguished figures in religious and literary fields. Among them were, to mention only a very prominent few, Chu Tao-shêng, Sêng-chao, Sêng-jui (Hui-jui), Tao-yung, Tan-ying, Tao-hêng, Hui-kuan and Hui-yen.

The progress of the religion for the next century and half, generally known in Chinese history as the period of the Southern and Northern Dynasties (420–589 A.C.), continued, more or less, on the same lines as during the preceding age, with Chinese monks voyaging to India and other 'Western' lands on pilgrimage and in search of Buddhist texts in greater numbers, and with Indian (and Central Asian) masters propagating the faith in China. Of the latter, notable were Buddhabhadra who translated the *Mahîsaṅghika Vinaya*, *Mahâparinirvâṇa Sûtra*, and *Avataṃsaka Sûtra*, Guṇavarman who popularised the doctrines of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarika Sûtra* and the *Daśabhûmika Sûtra*, Guṇabhadra who introduced the Dharmalakṣaṇa theories of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu and translated the *Saṃyukta Âgama*, *Ratnakâraṇḍakavyûha Sûtra* and the *Laṅkâvatâra Sûtra*, Saṅghavarman, Dharmamitra, Kâlayaśas, Dharmarakṣa, Paramârtha and the greatest of them all Bodhidharma. Dharmarakṣa was a great scholar who is credited with over a hundred volumes which include translation of the *Suvarṇaprabhâsa Sûtra* and the *Mahâparinirvâṇa Sûtra* (northern version). Paramârtha, who came from Ujjain, revived the original teachings of Aśvaghoṣa and Vasubandhu and is famed for his renderings of the *Vajracchedikâ*, *Madhyanta-vibhâga*, *Śraddhotpâda Śâstra*, *Mahâyâna-samparigrâha Śâstra* and the *Abhidharmakoṣa-vyâkhyâ Śâstra*. Bodhidharma is regarded as the celebrated founder of the Ch'an or Zen (Dhyâna) school in China (s.v. BODHIDHARMA). Envoys from Burma (including an artist) and from Sri Lanka too, were entertained in China during this period. A large number of monasteries were also built and it is said that in the capital, Nanking, alone there were more than seven hundred of them. In 576 A.C. Chih-yi founded the Tien-tai school.

During the period of the Sui Dynasty (590–617 A.C.), too, numerous Indian monks carried on religious propagation in China. Narendrayaśas and Vinîtaruci from Ujjain, and Jñânagupta from Gandhara are the best known among them. The greatest local literary figure of this period was Chi-tsang (549-623 A.C.) who wrote commentaries on the *Mâdhyamika Śâstra*, the *Sata Śâstra*, and the *Dvâdaśa-nikâya Śâstra* which contributed in no small measure to the development of the Tri-âstra school. At least three catalogues of the Chinese Buddhist canon were also compiled — *Sui-chung-ching-mu-lo* (*Catalogue of Buddhist Sacred Books under the Sui Dynasty*) enumerating 2,257 works in 5310 fascicles compiled by Fa-ching and others, *Li-tai-san-pao-chi* (*Record of the Triratna under Successive Dynasties*) enumerating 1,076 works in 3,325 fascicles compiled by Fei Chang-fang, and the third also called *Sui chung-ching-mu-lo* enumerating 2,109 works in 5,058 fascicles.

Next dawned what is generally regarded as the golden age of Buddhism in China, the period of the T'ang Dynasty (618-906 A.C.) which flourished up to the beginning of the tenth century. Kao-tsu (617–626 A.C.), the first ruler of this dynasty himself had built the monasteries of Wei-chang, Shêng-yeh, Tze-pei and Chêng-kê at Chang-an, the monastery of Ling-hsien at T'a-yuan and the monastery of Ye-hsing at Pien-chou. On ascending the throne T'ai-tsung (627–649 A.C.) too, built, in memory of those who lost their lives in his war against other chieftains, ten monasteries of which the following seven still exist — Monastery of

Luminous Humanity (Chao-jên Ssu) at Yu-chou, Monastery of Luminous Bodhi (Kuan-po-ti Ssu) at Lo-chou, Monastery of Luminous Welfare (Chao-fu Ssu) at Lo-chou, Monastery of Enormous Help (Hung-chi Ssu) at Fên-chou, Monastery of Merciful Clouds at Chin-chou, Monastery of Universal Help at Chü-chou and Monastery of Universal Mercy at Chin-chou.

As in the preceding periods, large numbers of foreign scholar-monks continued to propagate the faith in China. Prabhākaramitra, Atigupta, Nādi, Subhākarasiṃha, Divākara — all from Central India, Deva Prajñā and Śikṣānanda from Khotan, Buddhapāla from Kashmira and Bodhiruci from South India were the most eminent among them.

The greatest pilgrim monk of China, Hsüan-tsang (596–664 A.C.), as well as the lesser known I-tsing (634–713, A.C.) both belong to this period. Hsüan-tsang studied Buddhism in India for sixteen years (629–45 A.C.) during a brilliant period in Indian history, the reign of Harṣavardhana. The graphic account of his wide travels known as *Ta-t'ang hsi yü-chi* (Records of the Western World, translated into English by Samuel Beal as *Buddhist Records of the Western World*) is justly regarded and consulted as an authentic record of the condition of Buddhism in the regions of his travels. But, his literary contributions by way of translations and original works, his profound expositions of Buddhist doctrine and his training of a galaxy of brilliant pupils are still more memorable. In this respect he is on a par with Kumārajīva of the preceding age. Hsüan-tsang also laid the foundations of the Dharmalakṣaṇa school in China. He is said to have had about three thousand pupils of whom Kuei-chi, Yen-tse, Pu-kuang, Fa-pao, Shên-T'ai, Ching-mai, Hsun-chin, Chia-shang, Hui-li, Yen-tsung, Shên-fang and Tsung-chê are well known. For details see HSÜAN-TSANG.

During this period the different schools of Chinese Buddhism (*vide infra*) also made much headway—the Dharmalakṣaṇa school under the guidance of Hsüan-tsang and his numerous pupils (as already mentioned); the Avataṃsaka school under its Chinese founder Tu-shun, Fa-tsang and Chêng-Kuan; the Tri-śāstra under Chi-tsang; Ch'an under Bodhidharma's successors: Hui-kê, Sêng-tsan, Tao-hsin, Hung-jên and Hui-nêng; the Lotus school, which split up into two sects under Tze-min and Shan-tao; the Vinaya school under Tao-hsüan and the Esoteric school under Vajramati and his pupil Amoghavajra. Vajramati (also known as Vajrabodhi) was a native of South India who studied in Sri Lanka, became a great scholar and took with him to Lo-yang, Amoghavajra (or Amoghajñāna), the scholar from Sri Lanka.[11]

This period of the T'ang dynasty, which lasted for nearly three centuries, was, however, not uniformly favourable for Buddhism. Particularly in the reign of the Emperor Tai-tsung (627–649 A.C.) Buddhism had to contend with Nestorian Christianity, Manichaeism, Islam and Zoroastrianism. All of them were introduced from Western Asia which then formed a part of the T'ang empire. And the Emperor Wu-tsung (841–846 A.C.) who was favourably disposed towards Taoism, issued a royal decree to discourage Buddhism. This was later withdrawn by his uncle, Hsüan-tsang (847–859 A.C.) who succeeded him.

Buddhism in China suffered a temporary setback during the comparatively short period of the Five Dynasties (907–60 A.C.), which was politically unstable. But, it prospered again, with added vigour when the Sung Dynasty (960–1279 A.C.) witnessed the publication of the first printed edition of the Chinese Tripiṭaka (*Annals of the Sung Dynasty*) and the establishment of the Imperial Translation Hall in Pien-liang (present Kai-pêng in Honan province) and to its east, the Imperial Printing Hall. By an imperial decree intelligent young boys were recruited to learn Sanskrit and work in the Imperial Printing Hall.

Several foreign monks rendered distinguished service in the propagation of the religion during this period. Dānapāla from Ujjain translated altogether one hundred and eleven works, mostly dhāraṇīs, and some works of Nāgārjuna. Dharmadeva who had come from the Nālanda Monastery in Magadha is credited with forty odd works. T'ien Hsi Tsai from Gandhara was the celebrated translator of the *Mañjuśrīmūla-tantra* and the *Dharmapada Udāna-varga*. Dharmarakṣa, who translated the *Bodhisattva Piṭaka* and the *Hevajra*, Sūryayaśas, Suvarṇa-dhāraṇi and Tsu-hsien were all from Magadha.

One of the interesting features of the Sung period, particularly as regards literature, was the remarkable development of Buddhist historiography. A large number of works were published containing stories of thousands of men, their deeds and motives, successes and failures in the cause of Buddhism, covering a period of over a thousand years. These volumes recorded not only details of

11 *The Catalogue of Buddhist Books Collected at the Chen-yuan Period*, fascicle 15.

Buddhist events and personalities but also touched upon various aspects of the Chinese society and reflected the main tendencies of Chinese culture during the period. The philosophical contents of these works, their methods of writing and their literary expressions, all had serious impact on the writers, especially historians, of later generations. Within the period of the Sung Dynasty (960–1279 A.C.) at least five works on Buddhist history were compiled.

In this great movement of Buddhist historiography, the name of Tsan-ning (919–1001 A.C.) stands out most prominently. He became a Master of the Nan-shan sect of the Vinaya school and earned the nickname of 'Tiger of the Vinaya'. In 982 A.C., at the command of the Emperor, he began to compile the *Biographies of Eminent Monks* (*Kao-sêng-chuan*), completed the work in six years and submitted it to the throne. This was followed by another work, *An Outline of the Sangha* (*Sêng-shih-lüeh*) and later, when Su-I-chien (957–95 A.C.) was asked to compile a history of the sages and virtuous ones of the Three Religions, Tsan-ning was ordered to deal with the part concerned with Buddhist events. This he did in a book of fifty fascicles, entitled a *Record of Sages and Virtuous Ones of the Buddhists* (*Chiu-ling-shêng-hsien-lü*), a work now unfortunately lost. Tsan-ning is credited with the authorship of seventeen other works on various subjects. Besides Tsan-ning, there were other authors who compiled histories of Buddhism, chiefly biographies, among them Hui-chiao (496-554 A.C.), Tao-hsüan (595–667 A.C.), and Hui-hung (1071–1128 A.C.) Apart from these biographers, there were also authors of Buddhist chronicles who sought to give chronological details of the history of Buddhism in China. Among them may be mentioned Fei-chang-fang and Tsu-hsiu. Tsu-hsiu's chronicle in twenty-eight fascicles recorded religious events from the period of the later Han Dynasty to the year 960, thus covering a span of ten centuries. Apart from history, this chronicle contained matters of doctrinal interest, e.g., the difference between the Ch'an monks on the one hand and those of other sects on the other. He did not hesitate to criticise members of his own Ch'an sect. Another Buddhist chronicle, compiled by Pên-chüeh still exists. The work of the historians of the Sung period inspired lay writers, too, like Nieh-chang (1282–1342 A.C.), Hsi-chung (cir. 1336), Chüeh-an (1286–1355 A.C.) of the Yüan Dynasty and Huan-lun (cir. 1638) of the Ming Dynasty. But their works are of an inferior quality, as compared with those of the Sung period. Huan-lun seems to have been the last of the Chinese Buddhist chroniclers.

While there was a general awakening of cultural and religious activities with great emphasis laid on philosophical traditions during the latter phase of the Sung Dynasty, there was also a regeneration of Buddhist schools. The teachings and the literature of the Tien-tai and Avatamsaka schools in particular were restored, with the assistance of Ti-kuan and I-tien from Korea. The Pure Land school, too, gained wide popularity due to the efforts of Yu-yen and Chu-chien, pupils of Hui-yuan.

When the Mongols, led by Temujin who became known by the name of Jenghis (Genghis, Chinghiz) Khan (1206–1227 A.C.), invaded north China the fate of Chinese civilization seemed doomed, as did practically every civilized country overrun by this marauding tribe. But Jenghis Khan's adviser, Ye-lu Ch'u-ts'ai (1190–1244 A.C.), who was a fervent admirer of China's culture, succeeded in dissuading the great Khan from committing a massacre, by pointing out the vast economic benefits by way of revenue that could be derived by sparing the conquered country and her people.

The Sung Empire, indeed, remained untouched until many years after the death of Jenghis, for it was screened to the north by the Chin and the Hsia kingdoms. Once this barrier was removed, the fate of the Sung was merely a question of time. The invasion of the Sung empire began in 1235A.C. but the last of the dynasty was not subjugated until 1279 A.C., the date from which the reign of the Mongol Yüan dynasty is reckoned. In actual fact the establishment of a separate Mongol Empire over China coincides with the accession of Kubilai (Khubilai, Kublai) Khan (1216–94 A.C.) and the foundation of a new capital at Peking in 1263 A.C. (C.P. Fitzgerald, *China, A Short Cultural History*, London, 1954. p. 435).

Kubilai, who was probably the sovereign (at least nominally) of a greater population than had ever acknowledged one man's supremacy, and the first of his race to rise above the innate barbarism of the Mongols, was a patron of literature and culture. Marco Polo who was in China from 1275 to 1292 A.C. and had served the great Khan, mentions that Kubilai instituted charitable relief for older literati, orphans and the sick, and himself distributed largesse to thirty thousand poor every day.

Ch'iu Ch'u-chi (1148–1227 A.C.), a Taoist monk who had won honour and favour from Jenghis Khan did much for Taoism at the expense of Buddhism. Through his influence, Taoists were able, without the interference of authorities, to occupy many

of the Buddhist temples that had been laid waste during Mongol invasion. When, however, Kubilai came to power, Buddhists won the day. In 1255 A.C. a great public debate was held between the Buddhists and the Taoists. Though the Buddhists were declared to have won, the Taoists refused to give in and Kubilai ordered them to return all the Buddhist properties taken prior to 1227 A.C. (L.C. Goodrich, *A Short History of the Chinese People*, London, 1948, p. 179).

With the patronage extended by Kubilai, Buddhism became the State Church for the first time in Chinese history. However, it was not the traditional form of Buddhism based on the scriptures translated into Chinese which he particularly favoured but that form based on the scriptures translated into Tibetan, generally known as Lamaism. Tibetan Buddhism, thus, penetrated China, and a young lama of intelligence and learning, Blo-gros rgyal-mtshan or Phags-pa (Mati Dhvaja), was installed as head of the Lamaist church, and eventually also prince of Tibet, by Kubilai. On one occasion Kubilai received in state envoys from the king of Sri Lanka who brought him relics of the Buddha.

By an imperial order of Kubilai Khan texts of the Chinese Tripiṭaka were collected and published in 1287 A.C. All the texts were compared with the corresponding Tibetan versions, and Sanskrit titles taken from the latter were translated into Chinese and incorporated into the Chinese collection.

Rulers of the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644 A.C.), too, were for the most part, favourably disposed towards Buddhism. Chu Yüan-chang known as emperor T'ai-tsu who drove the Mongols away in 1368 A.C., and the emperor Ch'êng-tsu are the most important in this respect. With his tolerant attitude towards practically every religious faith, Chu Yüan-chang (1328–98 A.C.) invited learned monks to write commentaries on and study the texts. He set up a state-supported organisation with a hierarchy of officers drawn from the Chinese Saṅgha to control and administer Buddhist monasteries.

In an attempt to encourage the study of religious texts emperor T'ai-tsu summoned a great Buddhist Assembly at the Chiang Hills in Nanking in 1372 A.C. to revise the Nanking edition of the Chinese Tripiṭaka. As a result, this edition was enlarged and reprinted in 1385.

Emperor Ch'êng-tsu, interested and knowledgeable in Buddhist philosophy and literature as he was, himself wrote two important books — *The Imperial Preface and laudatory verses of Emperor Tai-tsu Wên-huang-ti of the Great Ming Dynasty* (cir. 1410–15 A.C.) and the *Memoirs of Spiritual Priests*, the latter containing biographies of foreign and Chinese monks from Kāśvapa-Mātaṅga of the Han Dynasty up to those of the Yüan Dynasty.[2] He also gave all encouragement to the Buddhist movement in Tibet and extended his personal patronage to the great Tibetan scholar Tsong-kha-pa (1357–1419 A.C).

The progress of Buddhism, which was thus accelerated by imperial patronage, continued throughout the Ming Dynasty and even extended well into the period of the Manchu Ch'ing Dynasty (1644–1911 A.C.). The first Manchu ruler of the Ch'ing Dynasty, Shun-chih (1644–62 A.C.), was a patron of Buddhism, specially the teachings of the Ch'an school. He received personal instruction on Dhyāna doctrines from T'ung-hsiu who was specially invited to Peking for the purpose. This practice of consulting eminent monks was followed by the emperor Yung-chêng (1723–35 A.C.), too. Shun-chih's son and successor, K'ang-hsi (1662–1722 A.C.) himself a literary figure of note, having directed the compilation of the popular K'ang-hsi's *Chinese Dictionary*, though not versed in Buddhism, encouraged the faith. The succeeding rulers, a majority of them being men of letters, gave a great impetus to the production of religious literature. Under imperial order the writings of Buddhist monks were selected to be incorporated into the Chinese Tripiṭaka, which by this time had been enlarged to comprise commentaries as well as other non-canonical works. Thus, a new edition was planned and publication commenced in the reign of emperor Yung-chêng (1723–35 A.C.). This work running into 7,174 volumes, known as the Dragon Edition, was completed during the reign of emperor Ch'ien-lung, who also decreed that it be translated into the Manchu language.[3] Under similar conditions was compiled *A Comprehensive Collection of Dhāraṇīs from the Tripiṭaka in Manchu, Han, Mongolian and Tibetan Languages*, with an appendix on the languages in six volumes, an index of the alphabets in one volume and reading instructions going into a further volume, making a total of ninety-six volumes.

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12 *A General Catalogue of the Dharmaratna or Buddhist Sacred Books of the Chih-yuan Period under the Yuan Dynasty* edited by Ching Chih hsiang and others in ten volumes.

13 *National Language of the Tripiṭaka* in 2444 vols.

Generally speaking, during this period, too, the work of propagation of the different schools of Buddhism was carried on apace as in the two preceding periods. Ku-hsin, San-mei and Chien-yüeh of the Vinaya school, Yüan-wu, Yüan-hsiu, Tung-hsiu, Hung-li, Hung-chu, Chih-hsien, Fu-yi, Chêng-tao, Yüan-hsien of the different sects of the Dhyāna school, Pai-shou, Ta-yi and Yüeh-hsia of the Avataṃsaka school, Ling-ch'êng, Ling-yao, Ti-hsien of the T'ien-tai school and Shên-an, Mêng-tung, Ku-kun and Yin-kuang of the Pure Land school were the memorable monks in this respect.

Though Buddhism declined almost half way through the Ching Dynasty (1644–1911 A.C.), a revival took place towards its end. Eminent scholars, such as Chêng Hsüeh-ch'uan, who devoted a good portion of his later life as a monk to the task of printing and engraving Buddhist canonical works, Yang-wên-hui (better known as Yang Jên-shan, 1837–1911 A.C.) who collaborated with Bunyui Nanjio in cataloguing the *Chinese Tripiṭaka* established a Buddhist institute named 'Jetavana Vihāra' at Nanking and guided the destinies of the newly formed Association of Buddhist Studies and the Chin Ling Buddhist Text Society. They and Tan Ssu-t'ung, author of *The Science of Love*, were the key figures of this revival.

The modern period in Chinese history commenced in 1911 A.C. when the Ching Dynasty, the last of the imperial dynasties, was overthrown and a National Council representing the revolutionaries assembled in Nanking and elected Dr. Sun Yat-zen as the President of the Republic. In order to face the new challenges resulting from this change which Buddhism had to face in a united effort by all the Buddhists of China, the Buddhist Association of all China was formed with headquarters at Nanking, under the leadership of the great Buddhist scholar and poet, Ching-an of Tien-t'ung Hills. As a preliminary measure, Ching-an appealed to the Provisional Government of the Republic for the protection of monastic properties, which was granted by General Yüan Shih-kai. Sun Yat-zen's successor, though long after Ching-an's death. The general also instructed the Ministry of Home Affairs to recognize the regulations of the Buddhist Association of all China and a proclamation was issued giving effect to those decisions.

Thus set in a Buddhist revival which paved the way for the setting up of new institutions, such as the Buddhist Upāsaka Grove, the Buddhist Vocational Association of Pure Land in Shanghai, the Kuan Tsung Preaching Hall of Ning-pò, the Avataṃsaka College of Ch'ang-chou, the Buddhist Institute of Wu-chang, the Sino-Tibetan Buddhist College, the Ching-ling Buddhist Academy, the Cheena Institute of Inner Learning (Nei-hsüeh Yüan) in Nanking. Most of these new centres had their own journals, e.g., the *Hai Chao Yin* or the *Ocean Tide Voice* of the Wu-Chang Buddhist Institute, *Pure Land Vocation* of the Buddhist Vocational Association or Pure Land and the *Inner Learning Journal* of the Cheena Institute of Inner Learning.

The Boards of Engraving Canons, at Peking and Tien-tsin, were engaged in printing and publishing the *Epitome of Chinese Tripiṭaka*. Other organisations too, like the Kālaviṅka Vihāra of Shanghai and the Commercial Press Limited undertook printing and publishing Buddhist texts, mainly belonging to the Buddhist canon.

During the second decade of the twentieth century reforms on modern and organisational lines were brought about in order to meet new situations that arose. In 1912 Ou-yang Ching-wu (1871–1943 A.C.) organised, for Buddhist laymen, the China Buddhist Association for the purpose of fighting the proposal to make Buddhism the state religion which had come up in Parliament. The clergy, as a countermove, founded a society of their own, the Buddhist Association of China, under the leadership of T'ai-hsu (1889–1947 A.C.), popularly known as the 'Buddhist Pope' and 'St. Paul' of Chinese Buddhism. This latter was the first national organisation of Chinese monks in Chinese history. T'ai-hsu, in his efforts to 'revolutionize' the religious movement and make Buddhism humanistic, scientific, demonstrative and world-wide,[14] assiduously studied the Buddhist canon and presented their teachings in a new scientific light in his publications[15] like *Evolution Rightly Explained*, *The Absolute Meaning of Philosophy*, *New Conception about Education* and others.

In spite of a great deal of good work, and after much rivalry, both associations fell into oblivion. And in 1929 a new organisation called the Chinese Buddhist Society was formed. It progressed steadily and by 1936 had 476 branches, of which 118 were in the province of Szechuan alone. After the war the society was revived by T'ai-hsu in 1939, and by 1947 it claimed to have a membership of 4,620,00. But as is the case with Buddhist organisational

14 T'ai-hsu, "Developments and New Movements, in Buddhism." (In Chinese) *Hai-chao yin*, Vol. X, No. 1, (March, 1929) 5-8.
15 For T'ai-hsu's works see Frank R. Millican, "T'ai-hsu and Modern Buddhism," *Chinese Recorder*, LIV, No. 6 (June, 1923), 326-33.

movements anywhere in the world, in modern China, too, the proposal for a national church with a national monastery in the capital did not receive universal support. This was perhaps due to the fact that Buddhism has not been broken up into competitive and antagonistic denominations and its divisions into schools is largely academic and a necessity for a centralised, national setup was never felt.[16]

However, Tai-hsu succeeded in gaining for Chinese Buddhism international recognition, himself representing China at international Buddhist conferences in Japan, Kuling and other places. He initiated and conducted with the patronage of the Chinese government goodwill missions to Burma, Sri Lanka, India and Malaya. An exchange programme for Buddhist scholars as well as students with other Buddhist countries like Sri Lanka and Siam was also successfully conducted. It was under this programme that the monk scholar Fa-fang went as a visiting professor to Sri Lanka where he worked until his death in 1951. Noteworthy events of this period were the founding in 1953 of the Buddhist Association of China as the unified organisation of Chinese Buddhists of all nationalities and sects and the formation of the World Buddhist Laymen Association at Shanghai. On the whole this reformation movement was almost exclusively intellectual in character.

This trend of establishing close contact and exchange with other Buddhist countries and of restoring, maintaining and improving monasteries continued up to the Cultural Revolution of 1966. During the Cultural Revolution there was general disruption in the religious sphere, as in other spheres of Chinese life. However, most of the extensive damage done to Buddhist institutions and places of worship were, according to Chinese reports, unfortunately due to certain misunderstandings and misrepresentations in the minds of those who carried out the policy, and were, in certain cases, averted by the prevalence of sanor counsel.

After the revolution steps have been taken to protect and maintain officially by the state and the Chinese Association for the Protection of Relics (Shanghai) most of the important monasteries. For example, the Buddha's Tooth Relic monastery in Peking where daily devotional offerings and chanting of sūtras are conducted, the Big Wild Goose monastery in Si-an in Shensi Province where Hsüan-tsang lived and worked (vide supra) and the Lamaist Young Ho Kung monastery in Peking where examinations and debates on scriptural knowledge are held, are in a wonderful state of preservation and upkeep. At the Kuang-chi Ssu monastery in Peking the old library where three copies of the Ming Edition of the Tripiṭaka are found is still well maintained (John Strong, "Buddhism in China", *The Atlantic*, Boston, Vol. 231, No. 1, Jan, 1973, p 16 ff.).

Monks (and nuns ?) play an active part in the social and economic life of the community. In the Hsing Chiao monastery in Ch'ang-an in Shensi province, for example, the chief incumbent (abbot) is also a deputy to the Ch'ang-an County People's Congress, the Buddhist representative in the Political Consultative Conference of the county and a traditional style doctor who treats patients with acupuncture and Chinese medicine in his consulting room just off the main image-hall of the temple (Strong, op. cit. p. 19).

Buddhist Schools and Sects

As the Buddhist scriptures and commentaries were being introduced, translated and even enlarged in voluminous proportions in China, the different Buddhist schools in India, too, found their way into the country. After a fairly long period of absorption and assimilation, these schools, interacting upon the national cultures of China, developed on distinctly individual and creative lines, quite independent of the developments in the land of their origin. Particularly from the end of the sixth century to about the middle of the ninth century (periods of the Sui and T'ang dynasties) a host of different schools and sects emerged one after another, reaching a brilliant and flourishing state.

The Theravāda system was mainly prevalent in the region inhabited by people of Tai nationality in Yunnan province where popular customs and habits are not very different from those in the Southern Buddhist countries. As the people there could read the Pali texts there was hardly any necessity to translate them. But they did make great efforts to study the Dhamma and propagate it.

The Triśāstra (San-lun) school was formed on the studies of the *Mādhyamika Śāstra*, *Śata Śāstra* and *Dvādaśanikāya Śāstra*, which were trans-

16 Wing-tsit Chan, *Religious Trends in Modern China*, New York, 1953, p. 58; A. Eustace Haydon, ed. *Modern Trends in World Religions*, Chicago, 1934, p. 98; G. P. Malalasekera, 'Nirvana or Fulfilment,' *Main Currents in Modern Thought*, New York, Vol. 16, No. 3, Jan. 1960, pp. 51-52.

lated by Kumārajīva. The doctrinal basis of this sect is acceptance of the unreality of all *dharmas* and of the five *skandhas* through the realisation of true voidness and the complete destruction of the delutions of the 'three evils' so as to establish the right conception of the Middle Path in which everything is non-existent. This school is in fact a branch of the Mādhyamika system of India.

The Dharmalakṣaṇa (Fa-hsiang) school has been formed on the teachings of the *Sandhinirmocana Sūtra*, the *Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra* and the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi Śāstra*, all translated by Hsüan-tsang. This school gives a wide analysis of the nature and manifestation of all dharmas and an exposition of the causal and conditional nature and function of all things. It enjoins the practice of contemplating on *Vijñaptimātratā*. It is a branch of the Yogācāra system and the direct successor to the theories of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu.

. The T'ien-tai school, taking the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra* as its basis, expounded the contemplation of the 'single thought in three thousand realms,' the theory of 'the perfect harmony of the three *satyas*', and specially the division of the Buddha's teachings into 'five periods and eight classes'.

Taking the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* as its basis, the Avataṃsaka (Hua-yen) school expounded the theory of the conditional arising of the Dharmadhātu and the methods of practical meditation

The Ch'an or Dhyāna school is an intuitive school that does not depend on texts and canons. What is practised by its adherents is not the traditional gradual medita ion (*catur-dhyāna*) but an immediate 'way' by which one obtains direct and instant realisation of the nature of the mind. From the eleventh century this school and the Pure Land school have been the two most widely prevalent Buddhist schools in China.

The Pure Land (Ching-t'u) school is founded on the teachings mainly of the *Sukhāvativyūha Sūtra*, which promotes meditation on and the recitation of the name of Amitābha Buddha so that one may be reborn in the Pure Land. Because it is easy to practise and is acceptable to the masses this school had a special and spectacular development in China (See AMITA).

The Vinaya (Lü-tsung) school is founded upon the exposition of the *Caturvarga Vinaya* of the Dharmagupta, according to Mahāyāna teachings. It is owing to the prevalence of this school that in the practice of *śīla*, *samādhi* and *prajñā*, the Chinese Buddhist monks also lay emphasis on the observance of good deeds. This school seems to have originated in China and not to have been imitated from the Theravāda Vinaya.

In addition to these main schools there were also the school of Tantra (Chen-yen), based on the tantric teachings of the Yogācāra system, the Abhidharmakoṣa (Chü-shê or Kusha) school intended for the exclusive study of the *Abhidharmakośa Śāstra*, the Satyasiddhi (Ch'êng-shih-tsung) school, having the *Satyasiddhi Śāstra* as its main text of study, and different schools devoted to the study of the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra Śāstra*, and the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra*. All these schools were in existence at one time or another, but were shortlived and then either lost in oblivion or absorbed into the other major schools.

Some of the chief events relating to these schools have been mentioned wherever appropriate in the course of the brief historical sketch already given. The general information supplied here could be supplemented by the detailed discussion under the corresponding headwords. One general observation which merits noting here is that most of these schools and their underlying principles were neither mutually exclusive nor diametrically opposed to one another to prevent ready and gradual a sorption.

Buddhist Literature and its Influence

As already observed, the enthusiasm of Tao-an and his disciples in seeking Buddhist texts gave an impetus to the completion of the Vinaya Piṭaka in the early period of Buddhism in China. During the lifetime of Tao-an himself a large quantity of Vinaya books was obtained and most of them translated, but unfortunately the majority of these early translations have not survived. A little later Puṇyatara and Dharmaruci arrived and helped Kumārajīva at different times in translating the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya which gained wide popularity in South China, mainly on account of the efforts of Kumārajīva's teacher, Vimalākṣa. The Dharmagupta Vinaya was translated by another Kasmirian, Buddhayaśas in the early fifth century. Saṅghabhadra was instructed by Buddhaghosa to go to China and there translated the *Sudarśana-vinaya-vibhāṣā*. It was chiefly for the purpose of seeking Vinaya books that Fa-hsien travelled to India and Sri Lanka at the beginning of the fifth century. Besides other texts, he took back with him the Mahāsaṅghika Vinaya and the Mahīśāsaka Vinaya. The former was translated jointly by Fa-hsien and Buddhabhadra from Kapilavastu, and the latter

after Fa-hsien's death by Buddhajīva from Kashmir. In the seventh century, I-ching, too, travelled abroad to find Vinaya books and took with him eleven works of the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya and translated them into Chinese. Thus, we have in China the translations of the following Vinaya texts—Dharmaguptaka Vinaya in sixty seven volumes, Sarvāstivāda Vinaya in one hundred and fifty-seven volumes, Daśādhyāya Vinaya in sixty-one volumes, Mahāsaṅghika Vinaya in forty volumes and the Mahīśāsaka Vinaya in thirty volumes. There are altogether about five hundred volumes including the *Karmavastu*, *Prātimokṣa* and commentaries in exposition of the Vinaya and more than five hundred volumes of subsidiary literature on the Vinaya written by Chinese monks of later times.

Mention has already been made of the painstaking efforts of Kumārajīva of the fifth century. He and Hsüan-tsang of a later time, were the two great masters of translation in China. Kumārajīva's translations of almost four hundred volumes constitute not only a Buddhist treasury, they are also a priceless legacy of Chinese literature.[17]

Not long after the time of Kumārajīva, the Indian Buddhist scholar Paramārtha went to China from Fu-nan (modern Cambodia) at the invitation of Emperor Wu (502–49 A.C.) of the Liang dynasty With the assistance of the king of Fu-nan, he took with him a large shipment of Sanskrit Buddhist scriptures. Unfortunately, soon after his arrival, a war broke out in China and due to the ensuing disturbances he was unable to carry on translation work on a large scale. However, he succeeded in translating more than a hundred volumes of important texts, from the *Abhidharmakośa Śāstra* to the works of the Vijñānavāda school of the Yogācāra system in India. Hsüan-tsang, whose renown as a great traveller has eclipsed his fame as a literary figure, translated one thousand three hundred and thirty-five volumes of Sanskrit scriptures and commentaries, mainly belonging to the Yogacāra. His precise and scrupulous system of translation and his assiduity set a splendid example which fired the enthusiasm of his followers.

Translation work thus commenced continued for over ten centuries and more than one thousand four hundred texts of the Sūtra, Vinaya and Abhidharma Piṭakas have been translated into Chinese. There were no less than two hundred reputed Chinese and foreign translators. Besides those mentioned above Dharmarakṣa of India, Jñānagupta and Dānapāla of Pakistan, Prājña of Kashmir, and Saṅghapāla of Cambodia were the better known of the foreign translators.

Similarly, multi-lateral was the influence of this vast literature of Buddhism on the general literature, culture and art of the Chinese whose civilisation is one of the oldest, yet practically uninterrupted, in the whole world. Amongst this literature itself, such works as the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra*, *Saddharmapuṇḍarika Śūtra* and *Śūraṅgama Śūtra* have been held precious by men of letters of different ages and been studied purely for literary purposes, too. Allegories contained, for example, in the *Sūtra of One Hundred Parables*, have frequently been translated into popular dialects and appear in recent newspapers and other publications

The scriptural tales excavated from the Tun-huang caves were all popular works of literature of the time. The origins of early novels, dramas, operas and other forms of indigenous literature can be traced to them. An entirely new genre of literary writing, the analects, too, originated from the conversations and minutes of religious instruction given by learned monks—"In short, Buddhism has found rich and colourful expression in the field of Chinese literature."

Through Buddhism, astronomy, medicine and music were also introduced into China. During the fifth and sixth centuries Indian astronomy aroused a great deal of interest among Chinese scholars and many Indian books on the subject were rendered into Chinese. Yi-hsing the monk astronomer who formulated the Ta-yen Calendar of the K ai yuan reign and whose name was perpetuated by a special postage stamp issued in his honour in 1958 by the Chinese Government, was a disciple of Subhākarasimha who went from India to preach the doctrines of esoteric school.

It was through Buddhism that the Indian system of medicine, Āyurveda, found its way into China in the middle of the fifth century. The Chinese noble, Ch u-ch'u Ch ing-shêng, who brought from Khotan the *Chê-chan-ping-pi-yao-fa* (Method of Curing Diseases) was a Buddhist. Later, in the eleventh century, the *Rāvaṇa-Kumāratantra* on the diseases of pregnant women was translated into Chinese.

As early as the second century after Christ, Sanskrit ballads are said to have been sung in China. At the beginning of the seventh century, the kingdom

1. Chao Pu-chu, 'Buddhism in China' in Rene de Berval (ed.), *Presence du Bouddhisme*, France-Asie, Tome XVI, Saigon, p. 726.

of Piao, now a part of Burma presented to China ten pieces of Buddhist music, together with thirty-two Buddhist musicians. Chinese music of the T'ang dynasty contained borrowings from such Buddhist countries as India, Parthia, Samarkand, Burma and Campa, and fragments from them are to be heard even today in some Chinese Buddhist temples.

It is of particular interest to note that the first book to be printed in China was the Buddhist text, the *Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā Śūtra* (88 A.C.), a copy of which has been found recently walled up in a temple at Tun-huang, perhaps, the oldest book in the world.[18]

The Monastic Order (Saṅgha)

Unlike in Theravāda countries, in China the first step in renouncing the world and entering the monastic Order is to undergo the ceremony of tonsure (ti-tu), which does not involve the undertaking of any vows (see PABBAJJĀ, UPASAMPADĀ, SAṄGHA). After a person has undergone the tonsure ceremony he is generally regarded as a novice (Skt. *śrāmaṇera*, Chin. *shi-mi*). Some novices however, obtain the formal status of novice through ordination (*chüan-chieh* or *shou-chieh*) under the tonsure master himself or at an ordaining monastery. But, formal ordination is generally a separate ceremony which nevertheless, does not constitute an essential part of initiation.[19]

The Vinaya prescribes a minimum age of twenty years for full ordination. However, there are exceptions to this; for example at Pao-hua Shan monastery a person could be fully ordained even at the age of sixteen if he looked mature, which practice is known as *fang-pien-chieh*[20]. When entering the Order a person gives up his lay name and uses the surname which, being the first syllable of the word Śākyamuni (*Shih-chia-mou-ni*), indicates 'a son of the Buddha' and any other personal names chosen for him by his master, by which names he will be known thereafter.

The period of training for a novice is prescribed to be three years, but, here, too, in practice it is far less, three months or even three days, in exceptional cases. During this period the master looks after the novices in fatherly fashion, attending to all their material needs, teaching them how to lead the monastic life and imparting knowledge of the texts.

The system of training, however, involved two more stages in the process of entering the Order, namely, as a lay servant and then as an untonsured novice, which meant that tonsure was deferred to the point usually reserved for ordination and ordination was deferred to a still later point.[21]

The proceedings of ordination (*chüan-chieh, shou-chieh*) consisted of two periods, known as the 'hall of sojourn' (*chi-t'ang*) and 'division into classes' (*fen-t'ang*). In the first period ordinands arrived at the ordination monastery and registered themselves, supplying such personal details as the name of the tonsure master and the year of tonsure. From this it was possible to ascertain the period and degree of training undergone by the ordinands and to group them accordingly. Each group had to move into its respective hall and then begin the second period. Each hall that constituted one of six classes had sixty to seventy ordinands. There were separate classes for the four types, bhikṣus, bhikṣuṇis, upāsakas and upāsikās, with at least three classes for bhikṣus alone. After spending nearly two weeks of training in deportment, religious observances and study of the texts and night of repentance and purification,[22] the clerical ordinands would assemble early in the morning for the first ordination. 'The head novice' and 'tail novice' would go into make obeisance, and, as deputies for their fellows, to ask the three masters (*san-shih*) and seven honoured witnesses (*tsun-chêng*) to come forth and administer the vows.[23] In the presence of the masters and the witnesses the clerical ordinands would recite the Three Refuges and the Ten Vows of the śrāmaṇera. The new śrāmaṇeras would then receive their robes and bowls, and this concludes the first part of the triple ordination.

Next, after a further two weeks of concentrated study, and a second night of penance, followed by ritual bathing and cleansing, the 250 vows of the *Prātimokṣa* are administered on a secluded ordination platform (*chieh-tai*) which is barred for outsiders. After undertaking the vows collectively, the ordainees would go up to the three ordination masters who would examine them and accept them as fully fledged members of the order.[24] In keeping

18 Chou Hsiang-kuang, *A History of Chinese Buddhism*, Allahabad, 1956, p. 11.
19 Holmes Welch, *The Practice of Chinese Buddhism*, Cambridge-Massachusetts, 1967, p. 275 f.
20 The term means 'expedient ordination': Holmes Welch, op. cit. p. 275.
21 Ibid. p. 284.
22 This was in addition to, and perfection of, the similar training received under the tonsure masters.
23 Holmes Welch, op. cit. p. 289.
24 This roughly corresponds to the *upasampadā* (q.v.) in Theravāda.

with the Mahāyāna practice, these new bhikṣus had to take, in about another week's time, another fifty-eight vows of the *Fan-wang-ching* known as the 'Bodhisattva Vows'[25] which imposed a higher stratum of discipline and a commitment to lead all sentient beings to Nirvāṇa before attaining it themselves.[26] Copies of the *Prātimokṣa*, *Fan-wang-ching*, and *P'i-ni-jih-yung* and certificates of ordination are handed over to the newly ordained monks. The ordination is wound up with a farewell address by the abbot.[27] (Pl. XXXII)

The vows undertaken by monks at their ordination involved exemption from various civic duties, especially military service and payment of taxes, which was recognised and granted by successive dynasties. But this left room for abuse and the government had to formulate laws to restrict the number of persons entering the Order. As a result, imperial authorization was necessary to conduct ordination. As time went on, in actual practice, such legal requisition was not strictly adhered to, specially in the smaller monastic institutions in remote areas.

In China, it was more a custom than a regulation to hold ordination in a large public monastery. Ordination ceremonies are, in fact, held even at hereditary temples where tonsure as well as training are conducted. Tz'u-chou (died 1957), an authority on the Vinaya and head of An-yang Ching-shê temple in Peking, made a conscious effort to revive the original practice of Indian Buddhism, found in Theravāda countries, that is, to give the novices ordination at the time of tonsure and delay bhikṣu and bodhisattva ordinations till the novice attained the age of twenty.

The career of a monk in China, specially in the large monasteries, was also in marked contrast to that in other Buddhist countries, particularly of those following the Theravāda tradition. Starting his career as an acolyte, a monk could serve for many years in three of the four departments of a monastery, namely, the sacristy, guest department and business office, and end up as the abbot. In the small temples which have neither land nor generous and prosperous patrons, however, the monks had to earn their living by performing rites for the dead.[28] However, in the case of small temples which could maintain themselves with income from land or patrons, monks were free to devote their time for scholarly pursuits, run a school and train disciples. Such a temple was termed a 'hermitage' (*ching-shê*). In the large temples which had separate meditation halls, such as Chin Shan and Kao-min Ssu, monks could, if they choose, spend their time in practising meditation. Nevertheless, monks could change over from any one of these 'avocations' to any other; 'different kinds of life were alternating rather than alternative', as Welch puts it.

Wandering and pilgrimage also constituted an important phase in the career of a monk. Though popular, they were arduous undertakings, mainly due to poor transportation facilities. The 'four famous mountains', E-mei, in the province of Szechwan, Wu-t'ai in Shansi, P'u-t'o in Chekiang and Chiu-hua in Anhui were the Mecca of Chinese pilgrim monks.

Another important deviation from the practice in other Buddhist countries (mostly Theravāda) is that Chinese monks hardly ever go out begging for alms. Instead their meals were prepared in the monastery itself with the stuff grown, bought or collected as rent. Abstinence from partaking of meat, eggs, dairy products, vegetables of the onion family and all intoxicating beverages was a hallowed practice meticulously observed in Chinese Buddhist temples.[29]

The monastic hierarchy consists of two types of ranks — Eastern ranks (*tung-hsü*) and Western ranks (*hsi-hsü*). In the first type there are five positions. The lowest is verger (*hsiang-têng*), then acolyte (*shih-chê*), third recorder (*chi-lu*), next thurifer (*shao-hsiang*) and the highest deacon (*tsu-shih*). In the Western ranks the nine positions, in ascending order are — water-bearer (*shu-shui*), contemplative (*ts'an-t'ou*), canon prefect (*chih-tsang*), librarian (*tsang-chu*), secretary (*shu-chi*), assistant instructor (*t'ang-chu*), associate instructor (*hou-t'ang*), senior instructor (*hsi-t'ang*) and rector (*shou-tso*).[30]

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25 See De Groot, *Le Code du Mahayana*, pp. 14-88 for a translation of these vows.

26 Holmes Welch, op. cit. p. 294.

27 Several foreign scholars have witnessed the ceremonies held in connection with ordination in China. For their accounts see the following: J. Prip Meller, *Chinese Buddhist Monasteries*, Copenhagen, 1937, pp. 297-352; Karl Ludwig Reichelt, *Truth and Tradition in Chinese Buddhism*, Shanghai, 1929, pp. 234-47; J. J. M. De Groot, *Le Code du Mahayana, en Chine, son influence sur la vie monacal et sur le monde laïque*, Amsterdam, 1893, pp. 207-55.

28 A monk used to be paid a dollar for a day for this: Holmes Welch, op. cit. pp. 201, 303.

29 "... dietary abstinence was an ancient Chinese tradition that antedated the arrival of Buddhism." Holmes Welch, *Taoism: The Parting of the Way*, Boston, 1966, pp. 91, 108, 116, 119. The rigorous care of the Chinese monks in this respect may also account for their lack of hospitality (*vide supra*).

30 For details see Holmes Welch *The Practice of Chinese Buddhism*, Cambridge-Massachusetts, 1967, p. 87 f.

It has been estimated that there were, by 1967, over five-hundred thousand monks in over eighty-four thousand temples and two-hundred thousand nuns in over one-hundred and thirty-four thousand nunneries in the various provinces of China proper. This means that a percentage of 2.3 of the male population are Buddhist monks and 2.3 per centum of the female population comprise nuns.[31]

An area in which both monks and lay devotees worked together, during practically every period of history, was in the formation and functioning of religious societies or clubs. These institutions were broadly of two kinds, known by the generic names 'fa-shê' and 'i-i.' The 'fa-shê's, the first of which was organised in 402 A.C. by the famous Hui-yüan (*vide supra*) under the name of Pai-lien-shê, attached importance to professional practices of Buddhism and adherence to its precepts. Their members were drawn from among a coterie of well-educated laymen, including nobles and high officials, and professional priests. The 'fa-shê's gained popularity in those regions of China south of the Yang-tze river.

The 'i i 's, on the other hand, prospered chiefly in Northern China, after being first established during the Northern Wei period, and their members comprised commoners, mainly. They laid emphasis on the installing of Buddha images and holding of ceremonies, such as those for purification and reciting of sūtras. The abundance of Buddha images, both large and small, in Northern China, is a direct result of the concerted efforts of these societies.

As time went on, these two types of societies, however, shed their differences, regional as well as functional, and by the time of the T'ang period, it was almost impossible to tell one from the other.

Most of the names given to these societies, for instance Pai-lien-shê, were not strictly proper names, but common ones that could be applied to any organization with similar purposes and functions. From this nomenclature, as well as from the composition and functioning of these societies, it could be said that they resembled the Young Men's (and Women's) Buddhist Associations formed in recent years in southern Buddhist countries (e.g., in Sri Lanka). And the impact of these societies in propagating and popularising Buddhism was such that they inspired other religionists, too, to form similar organisations, such as the Taoist San-chiao-ch'i-pao-hui organised by Wang Cheh at T'ang-chou.

31 Ibid. pp. 411-16.

Laity

As already mentioned, there is an element of institutionalism regarding the Buddhist laity in China. As in the case of the monk, the lay Buddhist, too, for example, would receive a religious name on first initiation which is taking the Threefold Refuges. Ordination of laymen and laywomen is administered in a monastery along with that of monks. This ordination consisted of taking the five Vows and later on the Bodhisattva Vows. During the Republican (modern) period, however, the practice of administering the Five Vows outside of monasteries, came into vogue. We have the instance of T'ai-hsu administering the vows at the headquarters of the Right Faith Buddhist Society in Hankow in 1929 to four hundred members of the society. Observance of the vows is also as rigid as in the case of monks.

Pilgrimages, too, form an essential part of the life of a lay Buddhist. In addition to the 'four famous mountains', popular places of pilgrimage are T'ien-tai-shan in Chekiang (where the T'ien-tai sect originated), and Nan-yüeh (Hêng Shan) in Hunan province. Long pilgrimages are undertaken, usually, as in other countries or even in other faiths, for special purposes such as redeeming vows.

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CHINA PAGODA, name loosely given to the remains of a vihāra on the shore of Nāgapaṭṭaṇam. It had stood for some centuries when it was demolished in the year 1867 by Jesuits, with the permission of the government authorities in Madras. According to the Kalyāṇī Inscriptions (1476 A. C.) of the Burmese king Dhammazedi, it was considered by the Burmese as marking the site of the heap of sand wherein the Tooth Relic of the Buddha had been secreted prior to its despatch to Sri Lanka where it was transferred about the year 309 A. C. The relevant passage in the inscriptions (*IA.*, XXII, p. 45) states that one party of Burmese theras, returning from Sri Lanka after *upasampadā* at Kelaniya in Sri Lanka, was shipwrecked off Colombo. They managed to reach the Indian coast on rafts and, travelling on foot, arrived at Nāgapaṭṭaṇam where they paid their devotions at the site of the Padarikārāma, before the Buddha image "in a cave, constructed by command of the Mahārāja of Chīnadeśa on the spot, on the sea shore, where the Holy Tooth was deposited in the course of its transit to Laṅkādīpa in the charge of Daṇḍakumāra and Hemamālā who were husband and wife". (loc. cit.). In regard to the hallowed associations given above there is no separate reference from Indian (or other) sources, presumably because of the disappearance of Buddhism in India, a century or more after the Burmese description. But, called the 'China Pagoda', the surviving part, described as a solid four sided tower of at least two storeys, was standing when a British notable saw it in 1846 (Sir Walter Elliot, *IA.* VII, p. 224 ff.). It was also, erroneously, considered by some to have been a Jain temple and was locally known as Puduveli-gopuram. It had apparently been part of the Cūḍāmaṇivarmma vihāra of which the chief incumbent thera was Buddhappiya (12th cent. A.C.), the author of *Rūpasiddhi*, the commentary to which supplies the information (S. Paranavitana, *JGIS.* XI, p. 17 ff.). The establishment itself was the work of the Śailendra Buddhist king, Śrī Māravijayot tuṅga-varman, who named it after his father. Benefactions were made to it at the time by Rājarāja I, the Chola emperor.

A large number of Buddhist antiquities were obtained from the site and have been fully described (T. N. Ramachandran, *Bulletin of the Madras Government Museum*, New Series. General Section. VII, No. 1, which deals exclusively with the locality and antiquities).

D. T. DEVENDRA

CHING-TU. See JODO.

CHITTAGONG, a region in the easternmost part of India where several Mahāyānist images have been discovered at varying depths below the ground, indicating the prevalance of Buddhism in this region at some early date.

The images, all of which except one, were metallic, were examined by Narendra Nath Law in 1927 at a Buddhist monastery in Chittagong, the residence of the thera Agga mahā-paṇḍita Dhammavaṃsa, where they were collected and preserved.

In this collection there were eight figures of Gotama Buddha, seven seated and one standing. The seated figures are usually on a *vajrāsana*, with a *vajra* on the seat, and are in *bhūmisparśa-mudrā* (earth-touching attitude). One of the seated figures has the *vyākhyāna-mudrā* (preaching-attitude). The height of these figures vary from 3 ins. to 9 ins. The standing figure which is 6 ins. in height has its right hand in the *abhaya-mudrā* and the left hand in the *varada-mudrā*.

Of the rest of the images, one is of Padmapāni Avalokiteśvara in *lalitāsana* (the right leg hanging down), the left hand bearing a lotus with stem. A Dhyānī Buddha appears on the head-dress. The height of the image is 6 in. Another image, that of Mañjuśrī bodhisattva (8 in.), seated in easy posture with a *Sanāla Utpala* flower in his left hand has in its head dress a miniature figure of the Dhyānī Buddha Akṣobhya in *bhūmisparśa-mudrā*. A figure of Jambala (4 in.), Buddhist god of riches, and two figures of Tārā in *lalitāsana* (5 in. and 7 in.), the consort of Avalokiteśvara and symbolic representation of Prajñāpāramitā, are also among this collection.

Almost each one of these images contains an inscription on its pedestal. The language is Sanskrit and the characters are those of 11th to 14th cent. A.C.

Commenting on the merits of these images, Narendra Nath Law states that artistically they can be attributed to the eastern school of art which flourished in Bengal and Bihar from the 9th to 13th centuries A.C. In their physiognomical characters, especially the facial, they bear a close resemblance to

similar images unearthed at Sârnāth, Nālandā, the frontiers of Assam and the hills of Arakkān, but some of the images display a lack of liveliness in their facial and physiognomical expressions and artistic flexibility in the treatment of the locks of hair and the folds of the robe. This lack of artistic maturity in some of the images is attributed to the failure in the local artists' ability in their attempts to produce replicas of what they saw elsewhere.

Narendra Nath Law states that all these images are undoubtedly reminiscent of a Mahāyānic religious wave that passed over Chittagong in about the 11th or the 12th cent. A.C. It is believed that Mahāyāna Buddhism did not establish itself in Chittagong, as inferred from the absence of any old temple or site which may be pointed out as a permanent place of the Mahāyānists. The probability is that there were only stray families or teachers at Chittagong who professed the Mahāyānic faith. Most of them could have hailed from Kāmākhyā and Orissa which had become important centres of Tantric Buddhism from the 9th or the 10th century A.C. It is also possible that there were ancient Buddhist temples in Chittagong and that they were later converted into Hindu temples when Hinduism superceded Buddhism in most regions of India. The Buddhists of Chittagong even today pay annual visits to Candranātha hill where a temple of Śiva has been erected by the Hindus in later times.

The close resemblance of the Buddhist images from Chittagong to similar images from Nepal suggests that they belonged to the eastern school of art which reached Nepal from Bengal. It is probable that this transmission occurred in the 9th cent. A.C. when King Devapāla of the Pāla dynasty, who was a patron of Buddhism, was the ruler of Bengal.

Certain practices of even the present day in Chittagong suggest that this later phase of Mahāyānic Buddhism has left a lasting influence in Chittagong. For example, most of the Buddhist villages here have a small piece of land set apart for the worship of the goddess called by them *Mā Magadheswari*. One particular feature in this worship is that the officiating priest is invariably a Buddhist layman. This practice of worshipping a goddess unknown in Mahāyāna, it is observed, cannot but be a relic of the Mahāyāna worship of goddesses. Other practices, like the worship of Sarasvatī and the utterance of *Phrā Tārā Saṅgha* (i.e., the Buddha, Prajñā and Saṅgha, in other words, the Triple Gem) when they start on a journey, go to bed or apprehend any danger are also said to be the result of Buddhist influence in Chittagong.

It is recorded that in the seventeenth century, with the decadence of Buddhism in Bengal and the Hinduization of Chittagong, a leading Buddhist monk of Arakkān arrived in Chittagong on his way back to Arakkān from Bodhgayā, and by his great personal influence gave an impetus to the decadent Buddhism by persuading the people to his own faith, i.e., Hīnayāna. As a result, it is said, the Arakkān-Burmese school prevailed upon the people of Chittagong and made them followers of the type of Hīnayāna Buddhism prevailing in Sri Lanka and Burma (*IHQ*. VIII, p. 332 ff.)

At present, Chittagong is an important port in what is now known as Bangladesh. Recently, there have been a great deal of Buddhist activities and signs of a Buddhist renaissance in Chittagong.

H.R.P.

CHOICE as a concept in ethics refers to an agent's act of volition in deciding between two or more alternatives. Choice is made sometimes between courses of action, and sometimes between ends of action. In either case it is maintained that choice is deliberate and coupled with knowing as compared with preference which might be spontaneous; and that it is one's choices that both determine and express one's moral character (see D. D. Runes, *Dictionary of Philosophy*, s.v.).

Ethical emphasis in Buddhism seems to have been well noticed by scholars who have delved deep into the subject. No one would dispute the view that comes from Mrs. C.A.F. Rhys Davids that Buddhist Philosophy is ethical from the first to the last. But it must be stated at the same time that in Buddhism ethics is only a means to an end but not an end in itself. So the ethical statements in Buddhism are presented as a means of providing a basis for the cultivation of a way of life conducive to the attainment of Nirvāṇa (Release) as the highest ideal.

The Buddha has presented the Middle Path to the world in his very first discourse and given the reasons for following it in preference to the two extremes of self-indulgence and self-mortification. In the course of the discussion he has equated the Middle Path with the Noble Eightfold Way which consists of 1. Right Understanding, 2. Right Thought, 3. Right Speech, 4. Right Action, 5. Right Livelihood, 6. Right Effort, 7. Right Mindfulness and 8. Right Concentration.

Applicability of choice could be exemplified in discussing any one of these eight items of the Eightfold Way. Now let us take the fifth factor, Right Livelihood (*Sammā ājīva*). In terms of the traditional threefold division of the Eightfold Way this falls under the category of morality (*sīla*) which includes Right Speech and Right Action as well. When the individual disciplines himself under the guidance of the above-mentioned Right Livelihood, if he is a layman he has to shun five types of trade and if he is a monk he has to desist from the twenty one forms of searchings (*anvesanā*) among other things. This means that when one determines to follow the Middle Path one has to make a choice between different courses or ends of actions.

The sum and substance of the Buddha's message is given in the following instructions reported to have been issued by all Buddhas: "Not to do any evil, to cultivate good and to purify one's mind – this is the teaching of the Buddhas" (*Dhp. v.* 183). Recommendations like these which are purported to guide the follower towards the goal would be meaningless if there is no freedom to carry them out. For if one's present choices, decisions and actions were mere mechanical responses to stimuli or they merely reflected the hereditary structure or the constitution of one's physical framework or were strictly determined by one's psychological past or by the capricious will of a Divine Power, then it would not make sense to say that one's conduct was right or wrong, since it is constrained and not free.

According to Buddhist ethics one's conduct is deemed to be right or wrong because one's choices, decisions and actions are viewed to be causally conditioned and not strictly determined. It is important to remember in this context that the Buddha posited the principle of conditionality (*idappaccayatā*) in opposition to determinism and indeterminism. In this sense one is endowed with the freedom to act within certain limits in the universe in which one is born and continues to live in. Thus, ethical statements become significant and meaningful when it is assumed that there is human freedom in this sense.

The concept of choice is directly relevant to that of freedom or free-will since the former forms a part of the latter which is a wider concept.

The psychological process of choice in relation to moral and immoral action has been discussed by the Buddha when he recounted some of the experiences he underwent during his period of trial and error before the attainment of Enlightenment. According to this biographical note related in the *Dvedhāvitakka Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 115), the bodhisattva had then tentatively divided the thoughts that occurred to him into two categories and evaluated them in terms of their consequences, whether these thoughts were beneficial or not to oneself or to others or to both etc. When he was reflecting on the evil consequences, it is said that these thoughts had subsided enabling him to get rid of them. The Buddha in this sutta refers to the psychological effect of cultivating the good thoughts when he mentions that continuous reflection on a particular point whether it is moral or immoral generates a bias for or a prejudice against it as the case may be. This, the Buddhists concede, stretches through the saṃsāric process, from one life to another. Therefore, the mode of life chosen on the basis of a particular goal, will take the individual to the target if due effort is made for its fulfilment.

The Buddhist concept of choice can be understood by considering (1) the theoretical side of the problem as is found in the early Buddhist texts and (2) the Buddha's attitude towards various situations where the problem cropped up.

(1) Once a certain Brahmin approached the Buddha and informed him that he was of the opinion that there was no free-will in the case of oneself or that of others. The Buddha expressed his astonishment on hearing the theory and began to question the Brahmin of the justifiability of upholding such a view, by showing that he himself had the choice of either walking in or walking away. He further built his argument by adducing in his own favour the presence of factors such as initiative, organisation, endeavour, strength, perseverance and volitional effort (*A.* III, pp. 337–338).

On the authority of the Buddha once Ānanda in his discourse to a group of ascetics made an analysis of other religions. In the course of the address he rejects two types of religions, one which denied moral responsiblity (*M.* I, p. 517) and the other which denied the efficacy of action (*M.* I, pp. 517–518) and terms them as false religions. In the *Apaṇṇaka Sutta* (*M.* I, pp 407–410) the Buddha presents the case of an intelligent person who argues for the desirability of believing in the efficacy of action.

One of the four exertions the *Saṅgīti Sutta* enumerates (*D.* III, pp. 225–226) is *anurakkhaṇā*, i.e., guarding one's character. According to this concept one's character is shaped and moulded when one chooses deliberately to abstain from evil and to give effect to what is good. So even the teaching of

the Buddha is presented as a path to be chosen for treading along. The Buddha categorically denies that he is a saviour. Accordingly, he is only a teacher and those who choose to follow him must make the effort (*Dhp.* v. 276). So the teaching of the Buddha is presented to the world on the principle that no one can save another, each must save himself by his own effort (*Dhp.* v. 165).

The problem of choice, as pointed out earlier, is connected with the wider concept of free-will. Those who denied the efficacy of action, together with free-will, in India at the time of the Buddha were called Ahetuvādins and Akiriyavādins. In opposition to this class of thinkers, the Buddha was known as a teacher of the efficacy of action. The attitude of the Buddha towards Makkhali Gosāla who denied the efficacy of action together with free-will shows very clearly the Buddha's standpoint on the issue.

(2) Coming to the second aspect of the problem of choice, it can be maintained, without any fear of contradiction, that both the method of preaching adopted by the Buddha as well as the long history of Buddhism since its inception down the ages clearly show how strictly and consistently the theory has been followed. As one notable instance, the conversion of Upāli, the Jain lay-supporter of Mahāvira, to Buddhism can be cited (*M.* I, p. 379). Commenting on this aspect of Buddhism, T. W. Rhys Davids has the following compliment : "Of all religious orders mentioned in the history of religions, the Buddhist was the one in which there was the greatest freedom, the greatest variety, of thought" (*ERE.* Vol. XI, p. 307).

S.W.

CHORTEN (Tib. mch'od-rten), meaning a 'receptacle of offerings,' is the Tibetan name for the very important religious monument which developed from the Indian stūpa. Chortens originally served as receptacles of relics of the Buddha and his chief disciples. Later, these were erected to mark spots of religious significance and as cenotaphs in memory of renowned lamas. Still later, these became structures symbolizing the *maṇḍala* (mystic circle) and immanence of the Buddha.

In form, the early chorten of about the eighth century A. C. resembles to a great extent the Nepalese stūpa of that period (Pl.XXXIV, Fig.1). It is built of brick, stone and clay and its base is in the form of a cubical structure which sometimes consists of as many as five stepped plinths. When compared with the spherical domes of the Indian stūpas, the dome of the chorten shows a unique feature. In shape it appears like a closed fist. On the dome is a square block which corresponds to the *harmikā* of the Indian stūpa and on this is erected the conical spire consisting of as many as thirteen discs which were taken to symbolise the thirteen stages in the path of Enlightenment. Sometimes, this spire is crowned by a bell-shaped copper-plated structure which is almost like a miniature stūpa, the base of which is adorned with a gilt canopy. But, more often, it is surmounted with an object in the form of a lotus bud or a crescent moon with a sun disc in it or a triple canopy is finally crowned by a flame-shaped jewel, which is said to represent the sacred light of the Buddha. Either one or two or all these objects are used to crown the conical spire. Sometimes a roof is built to cover the dome.

Each side of the square structure that is between the dome and the conical spire is very often marked with two eyes which are regarded as symbolising the all-seeing eyes of the Ādi-Buddha. Lama Anagarika Govinda (see *Some Aspects of Stupa Symbolism*, Kitabistan, Allahabad and London, 1940, Pt. ii, p. 11) points out that the detailed description of the chorten, from the base up to the *harmikā*, as found in the Tengyur, seems to follow the description of ten factors of Enlightenment, for example, in the *Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha*. Thus, the five step-like plinths of the base symbolise, in order, the fourfold mindfulness (*cattāro satipaṭṭhānā*), the fourfold effort (*cattāro sammappadhānā*), the four psychic powers (*cattāro iddhipādā*), the five faculties (*pañcendriyāni*) and the five forces (*pañca-balāni*). The dome stands for the seven factors of Enlightenment (*satta-bojjhaṅgā*) and the *harmikā* for the eight fold path (*aṭṭhaṅgika magga*).

But, later, the major parts of the chorten are taken to symbolise the five great elements (*mahā-bhūta*). Sometimes these parts are actually painted in those particular colours that represent the great element which each symbolises. Thus, the square base, which is taken to represent earth, is painted yellow. The dome, which symbolises water, is painted white, whereas the conical spire, which symbolises fire, is painted red. Generally, the crescent moon and the sun disc are taken to symbolise air and space, respectively. (For a slightly different interpretation by Lama Anagarika Govinda see his essay on *Solar and Lunar Symbolism in the development of Stūpa : Marg*, 1950). Chorten is a popular object of worship by circumambulation

and in Tibet they are found in plenty. Sometimes chortens are erected at the end of *mendons* or *mani-dom* which are large cairns or dikes.

There is another kind of chorten, called the 'entrance chorten' (*ka-ni-chorten*), which is not always of the normal pattern. Though generally considered a chorten, architecturally it is more like an entrance porch, erected at the main entrance to a village or town. In these, sometimes, the normal dome is replaced by a structure in the form of a double tier. Normally, these are painted inside on the ceiling and on the four walls with figures of deities held in high esteem.

Besides these large chortens, miniature chortens made of clay are, also, used as objects of worship. These are, often, placed on altars in monasteries and in houses and sometimes even in the niches of the domes of large chortens. As they are made of clay they are known in Tibetan as *sa-tch'a* (lit. earth caitya). Miniature chortens are also made of metal or wood. Metal miniature chortens cast in moulds and inscribed with holy prayers are consecrated by the lamas and sold to lay devotees, who either place them in niches of large chortens or use them as amulets.

There are also miniature chortens with small images of deities in the niches and in inner compartments with folding doors and these are called 'the glorious (chortens) of many doors (*ta-shi-go-man*)'. Lamas carry these chortens from village to village for the purpose of exhibiting them to the lay devotees (see *ERE.* III, p. 569; L. A. Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet or Lamaism*, London, 1895, p. 262 ff.; David Snellgrove, *Himalayan Pilgrimage*, Oxford, 1961, pp. 34, 35, 44, 63, 98, 189). See Pls. XXXIII and XXXIV. See also CETIYA, STŪPA.

S. K. N.

CHRONICLES. A chronicle is a historical work containing information set out in order of time. This information is generally based either on author's own knowledge of contemporary events or on tradition handed down from the past. A chronicle may deal with universal history or with a single epoch, nation, city, an individual, or a movement, philosophical, religious, political etc.

Ancient and medieval chronicles were almost wholly religious works written by monks who generally began their works with an account of the life of the Founder of the religion followed by an abridged history of events leading to the immediate subject of their narration.

These ancient and medieval chronicles do not generally distinguish clearly between fact and fiction and are largely based on traditions, legends and folk memories. As such early chronicles contain a good deal of mythology and various miraculous events are brought in to explain a variety of 'historical' phenomena.

Religious chronicles have been written not merely for information and instruction, but also for edification of the faithful for whom they constituted a vehicle of moral and spiritual upliftment.

Chronicles appear in a variety of literary forms, in prose, in verse or in a combination of both. Chronicles reflect a wide variety of views of history.

The chronicles of the Buddhists reflect all the above features consistent with Buddhist values.

Chronicles of India

The Tripiṭaka is, in principle, a record of important Buddhist episodes in the life of the Buddha, including the discourses in which he formulated his doctrines and events connected with the foundation of the Buddhist Order and of its rules and discipline. It provides us with a great deal of information about India during the life time of the Buddha. There is much information on contemporary society and cultural life as well as on economic matters and references to relevant political events.

The Vinaya Piṭaka, particularly the *Khandhakas*, narrates the history of Buddhism. It begins its narrative with the Enlightenment of the Buddha at the Bodhi-tree and continues to a hundred years after the Buddha's passing away, i.e., up to the summoning of the second Buddhist Council at Vesālī.

After the Vesālī Council (380 B.C.) the canonical texts, i.e., of the Dhamma and the Vinaya were closed, so that no further additions or alterations could be incorporated. But the work of chronicling and interpreting events which seemed important to the Sthaviras went on. It was essential for the school to have its authorized version of the schisms and of its own history after the second Buddhist Council. Therefore, they incorporated those along with the legends which grew up round the canon in the Aṭṭhakathā (commentaries).

A historical tradition called *Vaṃsa* was not included in the commentaries. *Buddhavaṃsa* of the *Khuddaka Nikāya* was the earliest of the

Theravāda contributions to the *Vaṃsa* literature. The following main chronicles in Pali could be listed under the category of *Vaṃsa*: *Dīpavaṃsa* by an unknown author, *Mahāvaṃsa* by Mahānāma, *Cūlavaṃsa* by Dhammakitti and others, *Mahabodhivaṃsa* by Upatissa, *Dāṭhāvaṃsa* by Dhammakitti, *Thūpavaṃsa* by Vācissara, *Sāsanavaṃsa* by Paññāsāmi, *Gandhavaṃsa* by Nandupañha and *Hatthavanagallavaṃsa* by an unknown author. The following commentaries on canonical texts contain a great deal of historical information on the life of the Buddha, the early schools and the evolution of the Order of monks: *Samantapāsādikā* (Buddhaghosa's commentary on the Vinaya),[1] the *Nidānakathā* (the historical introduction to the collection of Buddhist Jātaka tales) and *Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa-aṭṭhakathā* (the commentary on the fifth book of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka dealing with the points of controversy between the Theravādins and the early schools of Buddhism). The following sub-commentaries (*ṭīkā*) may also be considered as chronicles of events associated with various aspects of the evolution of Buddhism; *Sāratthadīpanī* on the *Samantapāsādikā* referred to above and *Vaṃsatthappakāsinī* on the *Mahāvaṃsa*. Among other independent chronicles may be listed the following: *Sihaḷavatthuppakaraṇa* by Dhammanandin, *Sahassavatthuppakaraṇa* by Raṭṭhapāla, *Saddhammasaṅgaha* by Dhammakitti and *Rasavāhinī* by Vedeha. Among chronicles by anonymous writers may be listed *Pi akat'humain* of Burma and *Buddhaghosuppatti*. (For details see SRI LANKA: Buddhist Literature of Sri Lanka.)

The history of the schools of Buddhism in India is recorded in a number of special chronicles. Indian Buddhist historians such as Vasumitra, Bhāvaviveka, Paramārtha and Vinītadeva wrote chronicles on the history of their own schools just as the Theravādins of India and Sri Lanka produced historical records of their own tradition.

The Buddhist schools also produced a class of chronicles called *Avadānas*, such as *Divyāvadāna* and the *Aśokāvadāna*. The latter deals with the life and work of the great Mauryan Emperor. The *Apadāna* (q.v.) included in the *Khuddaka Nikāya* of the Pali Sutta Piṭaka is the Theravādins' own contribution to the voluminous *Avadāna* literature of the Buddhists.

Still another class of chronicles among the Buddhists is the *Vastu*. Brief reference need be made only to the *Mahāvastu* of the Lokottaravādin sub-sect of the Mahāsaṅghikas and the *Kathāvatthu* of the Theravādins.

The Sanskrit chronicles which are now available only in Tibetan and/or Chinese versions could be listed as follows:

(1) *Samayabhedopacaraṇacakra*[2] by Vasumitra which deals with the origin and development of the schools of early Buddhism.

(2) *Nikāyabhedavibhaṅgavyākhyāna*[3] by Bhāvaviveka available only in Tibetan also deals with the history of the early Buddhist schools.

(3) *Samayabhedopacaraṇacakre Nikāyabhedopadarśanasaṅgraha*[4] by Vinītadeva, also available only in Tibetan, deals with the above schools.

(4) *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa* in its section entitled *Rājavyākaraṇaparivarta*[5] deals with the history of Buddhist rulers of India.

(5) Saṅgharakṣa's *Buddhacarita* (available in Chinese), Śākyaprabha's *Prabhāvatī* (available in Tibetan), Bhāvaviveka's *Madhyamakahṛdaya* and *Tarkajvālā*, Padmākaraghosa's *Bhikṣuvarṣāgra-paripṛcchā* and several works by Paramārtha, Dharmasvāmin, Bhaṭṭaghaṭī and Indradatta[6] also deal with different aspects of the history of Buddhism.

Kalhaṇa's *Rājataraṅgiṇī*, a chronicle of the kings of Kashmir, is the oldest and the fullest record of Kashmir history. It possesses the character of a true chronicle and it includes the aspects of the history of Buddhism in Kashmir.

Chronicles of Sri Lanka

Among the specialized chronicles of Sri Lanka the most important and the oldest is the *Thūpavaṃsa* already referred to, which deals with the story of the building of the Mahāthūpa (Pali: Ratnamālicetiya; Sinhalese: Ruvanvälisäya). The main part of the work deals with the story of King Duṭṭhagāmaṇī and the anecdotes connected with the building of the Mahāthūpa. The work has been written in the form of a sermon to be read aloud at the festivals connected with the Mahathūpa.

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1 See B. C. Law, *A Manual of Buddhist Historical Traditions*, University of Calcutta, 1941.
2 Translated by A. Bareau, *JAs.* 1954, p. 235 ff.
3 Translated by A. Bareau, *JAs.* 1956, p. 167 ff.
4 Translated by A. Bareau, *JAs.* 1956, p. 192 ff.
5 Translated by K. P. Jayaswal in *An Imperial History of India*, London, 1934.
6 Works of Bhaṭṭaghaṭī and Indradatta now appear to be lost. But they have been utilised for other historical writings by Tibetan Buddhist historians.

Mahāvaṃsa (q.v.), together with its continuation the *Cūlavaṃsa*, forms the great chronicle of Sri Lanka. It is a continuous record of over twenty centuries of history commencing with the legendary inhabitants of the island of Sri Lanka in the 5th century B. C. and ending with the capitulation of the Kandyan kingdom to the British in 1815 A. C. This chronicle arose out of an incipient tradition of history, and the nucleus of this tradition centred on the facts of the Buddha's life and the development of Buddhism. This group of historical traditions was brought to Sri Lanka with the introduction of Buddhism. *Sīhala Aṭṭhakathā* (var. *Sīhala-Aṭṭhakathā Mahāvaṃsa*) incorporated these historical traditions of Buddhism. *Dīpavaṃsa* (q.v.) composed in the 5th century A. C. is the earliest extant attempt to write a history of the Island from the *Sīhala-Aṭṭhakathā Mahāvaṃsa*.

Daḷadāsirita written in Sinhalese embodies the rites which are to be performed in honour of the Tooth Relic. The author of this work is unknown. This work consists of seven chapters. In the first five chapters the story of the Relic is narrated up to its arrival in Sri Lanka and the offerings made to it by King Kīrtiśrīmeghavarṇa. At the beginning of the work a brief sketch of the bodhisattva as the ascetic Sumedha during the time of Buddha Dīpaṅkara, the life of the bodhisattva up to the Enlightenment, and that of the Buddha up to the Parinirvāṇa are given. Thereafter begins the history of the Relic. *Daḷadāpūjāvaliya* written in Sinhalese gives an account of the offerings made to the Tooth Relic up to the time of King Parākramabāhu IV. This book concludes with an admonition to the future kings and their ministers that they should continue to pay their honour to the Tooth Relic. *Dāṭhāvaṃsa* (Sinhalese: *Daḷadāvaṃsaya*) continues the history of the Tooth Relic up to King Kīrti Śrī Rājasiṃha. The author is unknown. *Daḷadāhaṭana* written in Sinhalese is another poetical version of the story of the Tooth Relic.

Laḷāṭadhātuvaṃsa (Sinhalese: *Dhātuvaṃsaya*) compiled by the monk Kakusaṅda is a chronicle relating the history not only of *laḷāṭadhātu* (frontal bone) but also of several other relics. This work begins with the life of the Buddha and the early story of his relics. At a later stage the emphasis is placed on these relics which were enshrined in the monuments of Ruhuna of Sri Lanka. This work also supplies evidence of the existence of a chronicle of Ruhuna which may have been called *Rohanavaṃsa*, and which is not extant. The first chapter of *Laḷāṭadhātuvaṃsa* begins with the stories of the Buddha's three visits to Sri Lanka and about the gods he appointed to keep guard over the sites where the relics were enshrined. The important section of the book gives an account of the building of the thūpa at Seruvila, enshrining the frontal bone of the Buddha.

Another chronicle of Sri Lanka is the *Mahābodhivaṃsa* (Sinhalese: *Mahābodhivaṃśaya*), describing the planting ceremony of the sacred Bo-tree at Anuradhapura, and the establishment of Buddhism in Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese version was written by Vilgammula Saṅgharāja during the reign of King Parākramabāhu IV. The history of the Bo-tree is continued up to the reign of Kīrti Śrī Rājasiṃha in a work called the *Cūla-bodhivaṃsa*. This work gives an account of the places where the shoots from the Bo-tree at Anuradhapura were planted.

Hatthavanagallavihāravaṃsa (Sinhalese: *Eluattanagaluvaṃśaya*), written in Pali, deals with the history of the Hatthavanagalla-vihāra, a monastery in the village called Hatthavanagalla (Sinhalese: Attanagalla), in the western province of Sri Lanka. This place had been the site where King Sirisaṅghabodhi of Anuradhapura who had abdicated the throne lived in disguise and made an offering of his head to a poor man, so that he might obtain a price from the new king.

Nikāyasaṅgrahaya written in Sinhalese is a work by Jayabāhu Devarakṣita Dharmakīrti, which deals with the history of Buddhism in India and Sri Lanka, from its rise up to about the fourteenth century. This is also known as *Śāsanāvatāraya* and it is extra important not only as a history of religion but as an authentic record of events relating to the past. In this work pride of place is given to those Sinhalese kings who worked devotedly for the welfare of Buddhism.

A later work called *Śāsanāvatīrnaya* written in Sinhalese relates the services of Välivita Saranaṅkara Thera who reorganized the Buddhist order after it had been in a state of neglect for a number of centuries. The author of the work is unknown.

Chronicles of Burma

Of the Burmese chronicles the most popular is the *Glass Palace Chronicle*. It is so called because it was compiled in the front chamber of the Palace of Glass in Burma. This was undertaken by a committee of scholarly monks, Brahmins and ministers appointed by the Burmese king Bagyidaw

in 1829. It consists of five parts of which the first two are based almost entirely on Pali chronicles, merely retelling the story of Buddhism and of the Buddhist kings of ancient India. The political and the religious history of Burma is discussed in the other three chapters.

The oldest Burmese chronicle is *The Celebrated Chronicle* of Samantapāsādikā Sīlavaṃsa of the 15th century A. C. Of the three parts of this work, the first deals with the kings of Buddhist India and Sri Lanka, while the second and the third deal with the conquest of Sri Lanka as given in the *Mahāvaṃsa* together with an account of the kings of Sri Lanka upto the visit of Buddhaghosa in the 5th century A.C., and the Burmese history respectively.

The *Old Chronicle of Pagan*, begins with a genealogy of the Buddha. The author is unknown.

The Great Chronicle, a work of Maung Kala composed in the 18th century A. C., is similar to the *Glass Palace Chronicle*. *The Middle Chronicle* of the same author is an abridgement of *The Great Chronicle*.

The *New Pagan Chronicle*, compiled in 1785 A. C. connects the lineage of the Tagaung kings of Burma with the Săkyan family.

The *Rahkaing Chronicle* gives further information about the Săkyan migrations (to Burma). This work contains many dialogues between the king and the ministers on questions of religion, politics and ethics.

The *Hngeppyittaung Chronicle* is a short chronicle on the history of the clergy at Hngeppyittaung (monastery in Burma). It gives the succession of theras and the boundaries of this monastery.

The *Pagan Chronicle* of Gunasamisirilanka begins with the Buddha's genealogy. In this work the history of Burma begins with the Buddha's visit.

The *Pali Paukkan Chronicle* which is attributed to Vajirabuddhi is a chronicle of Pagan in Pali. It agrees closely with the *Great Chronicle*.

Vaṃsadīpanī is an exposition of the chronicles by Methi Sayadaw, and it was printed in Rangoon in 1916 A. C. This work confirms the introduction of Buddhism into Tharekittara and Thaton (in Burma), five years after the Enlightenment of the Buddha through Gavampati and later through Soṇa and Uttara. It mentions that Buddhism did not fade in Burma and that there was no schism.

A history of Buddhism in Burma is given in the *Sāsanavaṃsa* already mentioned, written in Pali by the famous monk Maung Sayadaw Pannasami in 1861 A. C. He has based his work mainly on *Śāsanā'aṅkāra*, which gives a history of Buddhism in Burma. The author of this work who is known as Mahā Dhamma Thingyan, was a great scholar of Pali and Sanskrit.

Chronicles of Tibet

Tibetan Buddhists have also made significant contribution to Buddhist historiography.

Deb-thar dmar-po (Red Annals ; var. *Deb-dmar* ; *Tshal-pa'i deb-ther*) was composed by Mi'i bdag-po kun-dga rdo-rje in 1346 A. C. It is mentioned among other things in this chronicle, how a great official went to Imperial Courts in Peking and received from the Emperor Quablai, (Khubilai) an Imperial Edict to supervise the restoration of temples in some of the districts of Tibet.

Deb-thar-snon-po (The Blue Annals) the historical chronicle of Tibet which gives its full name as *Bod-kyi yul-du chos-dan chos-smra-ba ji-ltar byun-ba'i rim-pa Deb-ther snon-po* (The Blue Annals, the stages of the appearance of the Doctrine and the preachers in the Land of Tibet), was composed by the well-known scholar and translator Gos-lo-tsa-ba gzon-nu dpal in 1478 A.C. This work is very important for its attempt to establish a firm chronology of events of Tibetan history. It contains lists of names of famous religious teachers and their spiritual lineage and the names of their monasteries etc. This work is classed as a religious history.

The chronicle *Bde-bar gsegs-pa'i bstan-pa'i gsal-byed chos-kyi byun-gnas gsun-rab rin-po che'i mdzod* was composed by Bu-ston Rin-po-che in 1322 A. C. This work is especially important for the history of Buddhist chronicle literature and the propagation of Buddhism in India and Tibet. This has been tanslated into German by Dr. E. Obermiller in the *Materialia zu Kunde der Buddhismus*, parts 18 and 19, Heidelberg, 1931-2.

In the *Tun-huang* chronicles found in Tun-huang (W. Kan su), an account of the great Buddhist king, Sron-btsan sgam-po, is mentioned.

Chos-hbyun-che-mo is one of the early Buddhist annals written by Bu-ston in 1322 A. C. This has been translated into English by E. Obermiller under the title *The History of Buddhism in India and Tibet* by Bu-ston.

Ljoń-bzań (var. Dpag-bsam Ljoń-bzań) of Sun-pa Mkhan-po ye-śes Dpal-ḥbyor is a later work on Buddhist annals. This work mentions that King Glan-dar-ma with his ministers Spas-stag-sna and others destroyed the doctrine of the sūtras.

Tāranātha, the celebrated historian of Tibet who lived in the 17th century A. C., is the author of several historical works, the chief among them being the *Rgya-gar chos-hbyung* (History of Indian Buddhism). This great chronicle was translated into German as early as 1869 by Dr. Schiefner under the title '*Geschichte des Buddhismus in India*' and published by the Imperial Academy of Sciences at St. Petersburg. Tāranātha compiled his chronicle on the basis of a number of historical records of Indian origin. Tāranātha's account of the Buddhist royal dynasty of Pālas from the 8th century A. C. onwards is especially valuable in as much he has made extensive use of Indian records now lost. Tāranātha gives a detailed account of the history of the final phase of Buddhism in India describing the Turkish invasions, the wiping out of Buddhism from the land of its birth and the flight of Buddhist refugees to neighbouring countries including Tibet. For the purpose of understanding the history of India before the advent of the Buddha, Tāranātha refers his readers to the great Hindu Epic, the *Mahābhārata* and the eighteen *Purāṇas*.

Chronicles of Thailand

As for Thai (Siamese) chronicles it could be mentioned that there are no reliable native chronicles now available, since they were destroyed by the Burmese in 1767 A. C.

Jinakālamālī which is also called *Jinakālamālinī*, 'The Garland of Epochs of Buddhism', is a historical treatise written in 1511 A. C. by a Thai monk named Ratanapañña who lived in Rattavanavihāra at Chieng Mai (Nabbisipura) of upper Thailand. This work deals with some historical facts of Buddhism. This is one of the few Pali works dealing with the international affairs of Buddhism.

Chronicles of China

The earliest Chinese Buddhist attempt in writing a Buddhist history based on Buddhist ideology is the *Li-tai-san-pao-chi* (Record of the Three Jewels under successive dynasties) completed by Fei Ch'ang-fang in 597 A. C. This work is arranged according to Chinese rulers and the Chinese sexagenary cycle of computing dates. The first three chapters of this work give a characteristically Chinese version of the history of Buddhism. The Buddha is here referred to as being one who was born in 688 B. C.

Fo-tsu-t'ung-chi (General chronology of the Buddha and his patriarchs) by Chi-p'an, printed in 1271 A.C. is a general history written from a Buddhist point of view. The author includes in this work a list of earlier historical writings consulted by him. The first chapter expounds the Buddhist doctrine. The next three chapters describe the life of Buddha whose date of birth here is given as 1027 B.C. Chapter five gives an account of the twenty-four Indian Buddhist patriarchs. The following two chapters are devoted to the Chinese Buddhist patriarchs. Chapters nine and ten give a history of the Chinese Buddhist sects including biographies of prominent laymen. Chapter twenty-three relates the history of Chinese rulers upto the 13th century A.C. and their contribution to the history of Buddhism. Chapter twenty-five is a valuable bibliography containing a catalogue of Chinese Buddhist monks classified according to the schools.

Fo-tsu-li-tai-t'ung-tsai (Encyclopaedia of the Buddha and his patriarchs under successive dynasties) by Nien-ch'ang, completed in 1334 A.C. is an annalistic history from the earliest times. The work begins with a mythological account of the various Buddhas and Buddhist cosmogony. This work gives lengthy accounts of Buddhism in the northern Chinese states of Yuan and Hsi-hsia.

Shi-shih-chi-ku-lüe (Abstract of historical researches on Buddhism) by Chi'eh-an, completed in 1355 A.C. is a work covering the whole of Chinese history from remote antiquity upto the year 1276 A.C.

San-chiao-chu-ying-(Gems and Blossoms of the Three Doctrines) is a historical encyclopaedia completed by Liu Chih-chi in 699 A.C. dealing with Buddhism as well as Taoism and Confucianism. This work was sponsored by the Emperor Wu.

Chronicles of Japan

The Japanese chronicles were inspired by Chinese models and the earliest Japanese chronicles are therefore all written in Chinese. The most splendid of them all is *Nihon Shoki* (Chronicle of Japan) composed in the 8th century A.C. and carrying the narrative upto 697 A.C.

Shoku Nihongi is a continuation of the above covering the Nara period. *Nihon koki* (Later Chronicle of Japan), *Shoku Nihon koki* (continua-

tion of the above), *Montoku Tenno Jitsuroku* (Veritable Records of the Emperor Montoku) and *Nihon San Dai Jitsuroku* (Veritable Records of the Three Reigns of Japan) are also chronicles belonging to the same class as the *Nihon Shoki*. These works are not exclusively Buddhist histories but they contain notices of the history of Buddhism in Japan based on a variety of sources including inscriptions.

Specifically Buddhist chronicles of Japan are of a denominational character and among these may be mentioned numerous chronicles, annals and diaries kept by monks belonging to the different sects and temples of Japanese Buddhism.

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I. K.

CINTĀ, thinking, cogitation , is one of the three sources of wisdom (*paññā*), the other two sources being *suta*, hearing, and *bhāvanā*, meditation (*D.* III, p. 219 ; *Vbh.* pp. 324 25 ; *Netti.* pp. 8, 50, 59–60 ; *Vism.* p. 439). It is explained as inquiring (*vimaṃsā*) into an object cognised, and estimating (*tulanā*), scrutiny (*upaparikkhā*) and observation (*manasānupekkhanā*) of same (*Netti.* p. 8).

The use of the term *Ajjhatta-cinti*, one who introspects (*Sn. vv.* 174, 388), requires special attention because it is to be understood in the context of the fourfold application of mindfulness (*satipaṭṭhāna*, q v.) in the practice of which one has to introspect (*anupassanā*) one's own body (*kāyānupassanā*, q.v.), feelings (*vedanānupassanā*, q.v.), the nature of mind (*cittānupassanā*, q.v.) and psychological phenomena (*dhammānupassanā*, q.v. : *D* II, pp. 290–315 ; *M.* I, pp. 55–63 ; III, pp 78–88).

There are several terms in Pali that refer to various aspects of thinking. A term that deserves special mention in this connection is *upavicāra* which involves eighteen ranges of mental application (*manopavicāra*, q.v. : *D.* III, p. 245 ; *M.* III, p. 239 ; *S.* IV, p. 232 ; *A.* III, p. 363 ; *Ps.* I, p. 17 ; *Vbh.* p. 381). Other aspects of thinking are signified by terms like *paccavekkhanā*, consideration, *paṭisaṅkhā*, contemplation, *ūhanā*, reasoning, *vicāra*, discursive intellection, *vicaya*, analytical examination and *vitakka*, reflection. All these terms represent some aspect of thinking, and *cintā*, for all intents and purposes, may therefore be considered a general term embracing different aspects of the mental act of thinking.

In some suttas, such thinking or cogitation is referred to as *manasikāra*, mentation (*M.* I, p. 294 ; *A.* I, p. 87), as is evident from the identification made of the two in the *Nettippakaraṇa* (p. 8). According to these suttas, *manasikāra* is one of the two causes — the other being *parato-ghosa*, hearing from another (i.e., *suta*) — for the arising of right-views (*sammā-diṭṭhi*) as well as wrong-views (*micchā-diṭṭhi*). Right-views arise from correct mentation (*yoniso manasikāra*) while wrong-views are said to arise from wrong mentation (*ayoniso manasikāra*).

In other words, thinking as far as ethics is concerned is of two kinds , i.e., right thinking and wrong thinking. Thinking of the Four Noble Truths, i.e., suffering (*dukkha*), its cause (*samudaya*), its cessation (*nirodha*) and the path leading to its cessation (*magga*) is good because such thinking results in the attainment of freedom. Thinking of the world (*loka-cintā*) and holding speculative views about the world is bad because such views do not lead to freedom. Such wrong-views given in the texts are that the world is eternal, that it is not eternal, that it is both eternal and not eternal and that it is neither eternal nor not eternal ; that the world is finite, that it is infinite, that it is both finite and infinite and that it is neither finite nor infinite ; that the soul is identical with the body, that it is different from the body ; and, that the Tathāgata exists after death, that he does not exist, that he both exists and does not exist and that he neither exists nor does not exist after death (*S.* V, p. 447).

Speculative thinking about the world, i.e., metaphysics (*loka-cintā*) is therefore declared to be useless in so far as it deals with one of the four unthinkables (*acinteyya : A.* II, p 80).

In the Abhidhamma the term *cintā* occurs as a synonym of *vipassanā, paññindriya, aññindriya, paññā, sammā-diṭṭhi* and so on (*Dhs.* pp. 16, 20, 62, 117). According to the commentary, *cintā* here means 'thinking of impermanence', etc. (*DhsA.* p 147). Cintā, in these contexts signifies the correct aspect of thinking. Such correct thinking is a characteristic of the wise (*paṇḍito sucintitacinti hoti : A.* I, p 102). There is also the opposite sense in which the word is applied. In the phrase: *dhammo asuddho samalehi cintito* (*S.* I, p. 137), 'doctrine thought out by the impure people' the form *cintita* refers to wrong thinking. It is a characteristic of the foolish (*bālo duccintitacinti hoti : A.* I, p. 102) whose mind is full of *abhijjhā, vyāpāda* and *micchā-diṭṭhi*, covetousness, ill-will and wrong-views (*AA* II, p. 169). This way of thinking is due to *ayoniso manasikāra.*

It should be pointed out that it is the way one thinks, and not the objects one thinks of, that is good or bad. The Four Noble Truths are true and the speculative topics given above are false. Thus, to think of the Four Noble Truths as true is good while to think of them as false is bad. Similarly, to think of the world as impermanent is good while to think of it as permanent is bad. To think of anything, good or bad, as it really is (*yathābhūta*) is good because it is correct thinking and to think of anything otherwise is bad because it is wrong thinking. Whereas right thinking ends in wisdom wrong thinking ends in bewilderment of the mind (*moha*), the major hindrance to Freedom. See PAÑÑĀ, AVIJJĀ.

U. K.

CINTĀMAYĀ PAÑÑĀ, knowledge produced by rational thought, one in the threefold division of knowledge, made on the basis of origin or source; the other two being *bhāvanāmayā paññā* (q.v.) and *sutamayā paññā* (q.v.; *D.* III. p 219; *Vbh.* p. 324 f.; *Nett.* pp 8,50,60; *Vism.* p. 439; *DA. SHB.* p 733; *VbhA. SHB.* p. 290). It is knowledge (*paññā*) based on thinking or cogitation (*cintā*). It is explained as knowledge one gains by oneself by means of thinking without learning from another (*Vbh.* p. 324 f.; *Vism.* p. 439; *DA. SHB.* p. 733; *VbhA. SHB.* p. 290).

According to Buddhaghosa, this knowledge obtains on two spheres; one is the knowledge pertaining to the mundane sphere which includes the knowledge of arts and crafts and science and technology; the other is the transcendental knowledge of the ultimate truth (*Vism.* p. 439; *DA. SHB.* p. 733; *VbhA SHB.* p. 290).

Knowledge of the mundane sphere is acquired, according to the *Vibhaṅga*, without the help of others, only by great beings and the bodhisattas, while transcendental knowledge is acquired without the help of others, by the bodhisattas alone. Knowledge thus acquired without outside help is referred to as *cintāmayā paññā*; it is the knowledge gained by means of original and creative thinking. This may therefore be described as intrinsic knowledge.

This is the position taken up in the *Vibhaṅga* with regard to *cintāmayā paññā*; and it is upheld by Buddhaghosa in his commentaries

Thus, *cintāmayā paññā*, in so far as it refers to transcendental knowledge, is the prerogative of the Sammāsambuddhas and Paccekabuddhas; for it is these two categories of persons who discover by themselves through reflection the knowledge of the ultimate truth and of the path that leads to its realisation. The arahants do not possess this knowledge; they all come to realise the truth with the help of the doctrine which the Sammāsambuddhas have taught; the arahant's knowledge of the way to the realisation of the ultimate truth is based on learning from another (*suta*) and not on thinking (*cintā : DA SHB.* p. 733; *VbhA. SHB.* p. 290).

The *Nettippakaraṇa*, on the contrary, takes a different view in its treatment of this knowledge. According to it, this knowledge, too, has hearing (*suta*) as its basis in addition to thinking (*Netti.* p. 8).

Although these two views, the *Vibhaṅga*-view and the *Nettippakaraṇa*-view appear to be contradictory, a close study of the subject would show that it is not so. The contradiction is only apparent and not real. The author of the *Nettippakaraṇa* is evidently referring to the different means by which the disciples of the Buddha acquire knowledge; he does not seem to be interested, in this context, in explaining how the Buddha gained knowledge.

Knowledge of the disciples is entirely based on listening to the Buddha or learning from a senior monk who in turn has learned from the Buddha.

The *Nettippakaraṇa* explains that *sutamayā* (°*yī*) *paññā* is the knowledge a disciple acquires by inquiry (*vīmaṃsā*), interest (*ussāhana*), estimating (*tulanā*) and scrutiny (*upaparikkhā*) of the dhamma he has learned from another while *cintāmayā paññā* is the knowledge he acquires by inquiry, estimating, scrutiny and pursuing thought to its logical conclusion (*manasānupekkhanā*) of the same dhamma,

that is taught to him (*Nett*i. p. 8). In a word, *cintā-mayā paññā* arises through reasoned mentation (*yoniso manasikāra*) of the dhamma that is taught.

The position taken up by the author of the *Nettippakaraṇa* is that mere listening to dhamma does not produce any knowledge and that one has to give some kind of thought to what one hears if one were to acquire knowledge Thus, both *sutamayā paññā* and *cintāmayā paññā* presuppose certain amount of mental reflection

And, at the same time, it should be emphasised that even *cintāmayā paññā* has hearing as its starting point. It is only after listening to the dhamma that one starts thinking. The difference between the two is that in the case of *cintāmayā paññā* one does draw conclusions from what one has heard after reflecting on it, whereas in the case of *sutamayā paññā*, one only reflects on the dhamma, but does not pursue thought to its logical conclusions. See PAÑÑĀ.

U.K.

CIRCUMAMBULATION. See PRADAKṢIṆĀ

CITRABHĀNA (var. Citrabhānu), one of the ten great scholars of the Vijñānavāda (= Dharmalakṣaṇa) school of Buddhism. He wrote a separate commentary on the *Vijñaptimātratā-triṃśatkārikā* (or the *Triṃśikā-vijñapti-kārikā*) of Vasubandhu, who was his senior contemporary. Abstracts from this, together with abstracts from nine other commentaries on the same text by nine different scholars were put together and translated into Chinese by Hsüan-tsang (see *MOC*. I, p. 766; *Nanjio*, No. 1197; M. Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature*, II, p. 360, n. 4).

Elsewhere he is referred to as Citrabhānu and is described as a colleague of Vasubandhu (*DCBT*. p. 162 a).

S.K.N.

CITTA. Generic term in Buddhist psychology, ethics, epistemology and metaphysics denoting the active element in mind and mentation and the conscious element in ultimate reality. The term is common to all schools of Buddhism and is attested in a wide variety of meanings varying according to textual context and philosophic tradition. It occurs in all strata of Buddhist literature ranging from the earliest authenticated Pali texts down to the latest tantric works on Buddhist mysticism and the complexity of its usage has sometimes defied all attempts of modern scholarship at determining the specificity of its signification. Scholars, both medieval and modern, have rendered it variously to mean mind, thought, heart, conception, consciousness, mood, emotion, spirit, idea and attitude. Judged by its general usage in the Pali nikāyas, *citta* appears basically to refer to the centre and focus of man's emotional nature as well as to the seat and organ of thought in its active, dynamic aspect. *Citta* plays a more central and crucial role in Buddhism than in any other Indian system of philosophic thought and religious practice.

Citta in the Pali Nikāyas

(*a*) *Definition : Citta* in its most general sense as the invisible and incorporeal energiser of the body and as the activator of the personality of man is everywhere assumed by the Buddha : hence nowhere defined by him in his discourses as embodied in the suttas of the Pali nikāyas. The term *citta*, however, has been, by him, equated to two other cognate terms, namely, *mano* and *viññāṇa : Yañ ca kho etaṃ bhikkhave vuccati cittam iti pi mano iti pi viññāṇam iti pi* (*S*. II, p. 94) ; *Evaṃ pi te mano, itthaṃ pi te mano, iti pi te cittaṃ* (*D*. III, p. 103). Although *citta*, *mano* and *viññāṇa* are here considered to be equivalent in meaning, actual usage in specific contexts tends to confirm the view that these terms convey, already in the earliest texts, three distinct aspects of mentation. The term *mano* may thus be said to represent the rational faculty of man, that is, the intellectual functioning of his consciousness ; the term *viññāṇa* represents the field of sense and sense-reaction, that is the sphere of sensory and perceptive activity (*vijānātī ti kho bhikkhave tasmā viññāṇaṃ ti vuccati : S*. III, p. 87), and the term *citta* accordingly represents the subjective aspect of consciousness.

(*b*) *The nature of citta* : The suttas abound in expositions by the Buddha relating to the multi-faceted nature of *citta* and these more than make up for the absence of a formal definition of the term. Says the Buddha : " I consider, monks, that there is no phenomenon that comes and goes so quickly as mind. It is not easy to find a simile to show how quickly mind comes and goes " (*Nāhaṃ bhikkhave aññam ekadhammam pi samanupassāmi yam evaṃ lahuparivattaṃ yathāyidaṃ cittaṃ yāvañcidaṃ bhikkhave upamā pi na sukarā yāva lahuparivattaṃ cittaṃ ti : A* I, p. 10). " Just as a monkey faring through the dense forest catches one bough and, letting it go, catches another, and then another, even so, monks, with what is called thought or mind or consciousness, by day as by night, one arises when another perishes" (*Seyyathā pi bhikkhave makkaṭo araññe pavane caramāno sākhaṃ gaṇhiti, taṃ*

muñcitvā aññaṃ gaṇhāti ; evam eva kho bhikkhave yad idaṃ vuccati cittaṃ iti pi mano iti pi viññāṇam iti pi, taṃ ratiyā ca divasassa ca aññad eva uppajjati aññaṃ nirujjhati : S. II, p. 95).

Citta, in the Buddhist view, is thus a series of events in an incessant process of mentation. *Citta* as a unitary term is nothing more than a convenient collective noun to comprehend a wide and complex nexus of mental states in flux. The Buddha's teaching on *citta* yields to us the results of the first empirical investigation recorded in the history of human thought into the nature of mind and recalls the words of the celebrated British empiricist philosopher, David Hume : "The mind or self is nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement "(*A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, Part iv, Sec. 6).

Citta is analysed as to its nature, psychologically, ethically and naturalistically. The *citta* or mind of the worldly individual is constantly throbbing, trembling and wavering (*Phandanaṃ capalaṃ cittam : Dhp. v.* 33) . It is exceedingly difficult to be protected and to be saved from falling into moral lapse (*durakkhaṃ dunnivāraṇaṃ* : loc. cit.). It quivers like a fish out of water distracted by a multiplicity of stimuli (*Vārijo'va thale khitto okamokata-ubbhato, pariphandatidaṃ cittaṃ... : Dhp. v.* 34). It is verily hard to control, assuredly light and quick and attaching itself to whatever it craves (*dunniggaha, lahu, yatthakāma nipāti . . : Dhp. v.* 35). It is difficult to be seen or understood and very subtle (*sududdasa, sunipuna : Dhp. v.* 36). It travels far, fares alone, is incorporeal and resident in the cave of the heart (*dūraṅgama, ekacara, asarīra, guhāsaya : Dhp. v.* 37).

The mind of the worldling is constantly frightened, terrified and alarmed as well as agitated, flurried and anxious (*Niccaṃ utrastam idaṃ cittaṃ, niccam ubbiggam idam mano : S.* I, p. 53). In view of the incessant uneasiness of mind, the individual is exhorted to be abidingly attentive to, and conscious of, his own mind (*Abhikkhaṇaṃ sakaṃ cittaṃ paccavekkhitabbaṃ : S.* III, p. 151).

(c) *The functions of citta : Citta* plays a central role in the moral and intellectual behaviour of the individual. In the untrained worldly individual *citta* is afflicted with morally reprehensible needs and emotions. Its attributes in this condition are extensively referred to in the Pali Nikāyas. Considered functionally *citta* has been subjected to a three-fold classification represented by the distinction between the affective (*vedanā*), cognitive (*saññā*) and the conative (*cetanā*) . It is categorically stated that the affective and the cognitive are mental states dependent on *citta* (*Saññā ca vedanā ca cetasikā ete dhammā cittapa ibaddhā : S.* IV. p. 293). And *cetanā* clearly is the causative form of *citta* (*cinteti > ceteti, cetayati > cetanā*). The affective aspect refers to the feeling tone of *citta* : the cognitive aspect is concerned with knowing, believing, reasoning and perceiving ; and the conative aspect is concerned with acting, willing, striving, and desiring. These three aspects do not of course function separately. As mental processes all three aspects operate all at once by way of concurrent action and inter-action. Cognition is associated with conation which in turn is bound up invariably with the hedonic quality of feeling. Manifold are the functions of *citta*, moral as well as epistemological. These functions are brought out in the suttas by the use of a wide variety of verbs. The *Saṃyutta Nikāya* alone records over thirty different functions. The most distinctive function of *citta* is to think (*cinteti : S.* I, p. 57). It can lead one to the truth (*tathattāya upaneti : S.* IV, p. 294). It pleases, propitiates and convinces (*ārādheti : S.* II, p. 107). It stretches forth, holds out, takes up, exerts, strains and vigorously applies itself in relation to its objects (*paggaṇhāti : S.* V, p. 9). It disposes, collects, brings together, heaps up, gathers, arranges, focuses and concentrates, in a variety of ways (*upasaṃharati : S.* V, pp. 213–216). It bends, directs and applies (*namati : S.* I, p. 137). It springs forward jumps on to, takes to and rejoices in its object (*cittaṃ pakkhandati, pasīdati, santiṭṭhati : S.* I, p. 98). It calms down and quietens (*passambhati : S.* V. p. 33). It can agitate, disturb, crush, harass and upset an individual (*matheti : S.* IV, p. 210). It can shake, unsettle, waver and be in doubt (*vikampati: S.* IV, p. 71). It keeps back, holds back, restrains, refuses, obstructs, forbids and warns (*nivāreti : S.* I, p. 7). It can strike, kill, destory and beat down (*paharañati : S.* IV, p. 73). It aspires, longs for, prays for and intends (*panidahati : S.* I, p. 133). It can be burnt and get scorched (*paridayhati : S.* I, p. 188). It clings to, and gets bound up with its objects (*sajjati, gayhati, bajjhati : S.* II. p. 198). It defiles, corrupts and tarnishes (*vyāsiñcati: S.* IV, p. 178). It is drawn to, feels attached to, is inclined towards and indulges in its object (*adhimuccati : S.* V pp. 409–410). The functions of *citta* are both active and passive. *Citta* is overcome easily by the animal emotions and the untutored passions. Lust, for instance, degrades the *citta* (*rāgo cittaṃ anudhaṃseti : S.* I, p. 186).

Perhaps, the most pre-eminent function of the mind, in relation to the worldly individual and society, consists in its ideological leadership. All schools of Buddhism agree on the primacy of *citta* in this respect. Says the Buddha : "The world, monks, is led by thought, is swept away by thought. The world comes under the power of thought" (*Cittena kho bhikkhave loko niyyati, cittena parikassati, cittassa uppannassa vasaṃ gacchati : A*. II, p. 177: also *S*. I, p. 39 : *Cittena niyyati loko cittena parikassati, cittassa ekadhammassa sabbeva vasam anvagū*).

(*d*) *Causality of citta* : The Buddha gives a strictly causal explanation of mind, its origin, function, and cessation as well as its defilement and development without recourse to any metaphysical concepts whatsoever. *Citta* is not a metaphysical entity in the sense in which the latter is defined as a thing's existence as opposed to its qualities and relations. *Citta* is included under the generic term *dhamma* and all *dhammas* which consist of the five Aggregates of Grasping (*pañcupādānakkhandhā*) arise invariably as a result of the collocation of a wide variety of causal factors (*Paṭiccasamuppannā kho panime yadidaṃ pañcupādānakkhandhā : M*. I, p. 191). The Buddha has in various ways spoken of the dependent origination of the mind and has also stated that there is no arising of the mind except through the collocation of causal factors (*Anekapariyāyena h'āvuso Sāti paṭiccasamuppannaṃ viññāṇaṃ vuttaṃ bhagavatā : aññatra paccayā natthi viññāṇassa sambhavo : M*. I, pp. 256–257). The *Madhupiṇḍika Sutta* sets out clearly the causal connection between the conceptualising activity of the mind and the birth of illusions, obstacles, obsessions and hindrances to spiritual progress : dependent on mind and mental object there arises mental consciousness : the coming together of these three is contact ; conditioned by contact there arises feeling ; what one feels one cognises ; what one cognises one reasons out ; what one reasons out one becomes obsessed with ; on account of these obsessions the individual is assailed by imagined notions in respect of what can be known by the mind in the past, present and future (*Manañcāvuso paṭicca dhamme ca uppajjati manoviññāṇaṃ tiṇṇaṃ sangati phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, yaṃ vedeti taṃ sañjānāti, yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vitakketi, yaṃ vitakketi taṃ papañceti, yaṃ papañceti tatonidānaṃ purisaṃ papañcasaññāsaṃkhā samudācaranti atītānāgatapaccuppannesu manoviññeyyesu dhammesu : M* I, p. 112).

Buddha is the first psychologist to 'psychologise' without a soul and the teaching on *citta* is squarely based on the doctrine of the non-substantiality of all phenomena. The *Kathāvatthu* quotes the Buddha from a sutta (not traced in the present Sutta Piṭaka) wherein it is stated very clearly that *citta* and *cetasika* are verily void of soul for one who understands (*Cittaṃ hidaṃ cetasikā ca dhammā anattato saṃviditassa honti : Kvu*. vii, 3. *Points of Controversy*, p. 197).

The worldly individual is often led to identify his *citta* with his self and the Buddha has been very categorical in his denial of this identification. The worldling is unable to detach himself or free himself from this notion. The reason for this inability is that for a long time he is obsessed by the notion 'this is mine, this am I, this is my soul', in respect of his *citta*. It were far better for him to consider his body as his soul rather than his *citta* for the former tends to endure for a hundred years and more whereas the latter, by day and by night arises as one thing and perishes as another (*Yaṃ ... vuccati cittaṃ ... tatrāssutavā puthujjano nālaṃ nibbinditum nālaṃ virajjituṃ nālaṃ vimuccituṃ. Taṃ kissa hetu ? Dīgharattaṃ hetuṃ bhikkhave assutavato puthujjanassa ajjhositaṃ mamāyitaṃ parāmaṭṭhaṃ etaṃ mama eso'hamasmi eso me attā ti ... Varaṃ bhikkhave assutavā puthujjano inaṃ cātumahābhūtikaṃ kāyaṃ attato upagaccheyya na tveva cittaṃ. Taṃ kissa hetu ? Dissatāyaṃ kāyo ... vassasataṃ pi tiṭṭhamāno ... Yañca ... cittaṃ .. aññad eva uppajjati aññaṃ nirujjhati : S*. II, pp. 94–95).

(*e*) *Defilement of citta* : The mind is the determinant of purity and impurity. Beings become defiled on account of the defilement of their minds and, therefore, they become purified on account of the purification of their minds (*cittasaṃkilesā bhikkhave sattā saṃkilissanti, cittavodānā visujjhanti : S*. III. p. 151). Because the mind is given to pleasure and is overwhelmed with pleasure and also is in pursuit of pleasure, therefore beings are infatuated with pleasure, are bound with pleasure and being in such bondage are thereby defiled and corrupted by pleasure. This is the reason, this is the cause for the defilement of beings. In this way through causes and causal factors beings defile themselves (*Yasmā viññāṇaṃ sukhaṃ sukhānupatitaṃ sukhāvakkantaṃ anavakkantaṃ dukkhena, tasmā sattā viññāṇasmiṃ sārajjanti sarāgā saññujjanti saññogā saṃkilissanti. Ayaṃ ... hetu ayaṃ paccayo sattānaṃ saṃkilesāya, evaṃ sahetu-sappaccayā sattā saṃkilissanti : S*. III, p. 70).

Citta is in bondage in so far as it is bound to the senses and their objects, perceptual as well as conceptual. *Citta* is enslaved by the depravities (*āsavā*) on account of its subjugation by craving (*taṇhā*).

Citta is viewed as an arsenal of dispositional properties which take the form of mental predispositions, proclivities, tendencies and dormant and latent forces which activate themselves at the subliminal level of consciousness. This tendency and potentiality to act as and when occasion and opportunity dictate is termed *anusaya*. The moment of explosion and active manifestation is called *pariyuṭṭhāna*.

In the Pali nikāyas *citta* is viewed as a conscious centre for activity, purposiveness, continuity and emotionality. In the context of the teaching on non-substantiality (*anatta*) *citta* may be considered as the best single psychological term most appropriate for denoting the character of man's personality. Since the Buddha emphasised the basic position of virtue (*sīla*) in his graduated path to perfection, it is natural to find that in his analysis of *citta* he has largely dealt with the emotional aspect of the mind. The ills of the mind are primarily traced to intellectual distortion arising from sensation, perception and conception. Ignorance and perversion are the fuel which feed the fire of the emotions. The course of conceptual proliferation is co-extensive with the course of the six sense-spheres (*Yāvatā . . . channaṃ phassāyatanānaṃ gati tāvatā papañcassa gati, yāvatā papañcassa gati tāvatā channaṃ phassāyatanānaṃ gati : A.* II, pp. 161 f.). The resultant perversion of the mind is referred to as *citta-vipallāsa* (*A.* II, p. 52). The covetousness and malevolence of mind is described as the tragedy of *citta : citta-vipatti* (*Kathamā ca bhikkhave citta-vipatti ? Idha bhikkhave ekacco abhijjhālu hoti vyāpanna-citto. Ayaṃ vuccati bhikkhave citta-vipatti : A.* I, p. 268). The suttas describe at great length the immoral predicament of *citta* when assailed by the three basic unwholesome roots (*akusalamūla*) namely, covetousness (*lobha*), malevolence (*dosa*) and confusion and ignorance (*moha*). *Citta* in the morally unwholesome state is described variously as being sick (*ātura*), corrupt (*saṃkilesa*), stained, deprived and impure (*upakkiliṭṭha*), obsessed (*pariyādinna*), longing, eager, greedy and unsteady (*lola*), unbalanced, disturbed, agitated and shaken (*uddhata*), clinging, sticking, slow, sluggish and dull (*līna, atilīna*), difficult to direct on a steady course (*duppavattiya*), wavering, wandering, straying, and confused (*pariyuṭṭhita*) debased, low (*nikaṭṭha*), beaten, afflicted (*ahata*), upset and unhinged (*khilta*), defiled, corrupt and tarnished (*vyāpanna*), impassioned (*sāratta*), misdirected (*duppaṇihita*), malevolent (*vyāpanna*), swerving, swaying, staggering and deviating (*bhanta*) and bound and fettered (*avimutta*). For a long, long time indeed the mind is said to be corrupted by attachment, animosity and confusion (*Dīgharattaṃ idaṃ cittaṃ saṃkiliṭṭhaṃ rāgena dosena mohena : S.* III, p. 151).

As a psychic factor *citta* carries the traces of the experiences of the individual. *Citta*, therefore, may be viewed as the storehouse of each man's psychic heritage transmitted through the cycle of birth and rebirth (*saṃsāra*). In this sense *citta* is most intimately connected with the teaching on Kamma, namely, the law of moral causation taught by the Buddha. Moral action is defined in terms of *cetanā* (q.v.) which is a causative verbal noun derived from the root whence the word *citta* itself is derived.

Citta is said to be pure and resplendent in its original nature. It is corrupted by adventitious defilements (*Pabhassaraṃ idaṃ bhikkhave cittaṃ tañca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭhaṃ : A.* I, p. 10). Because defilement is not an integral part of the nature of mind, therefore such defilement could be got rid of.

The nikāyas refer to more than one list of the defilements of the mind (*cittassa upakkilesā*) indicating thereby the increasing emphasis placed on their classification. In the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* these defilements are identified with the five hindrances (*pañca-nīvaraṇā*) to spiritual progress : excitement of sensual pleasure (*kāmacchanda*), ill-will or malevolence (*vyāpāda*), sloth and torpor (*thīna-middha*), flurry and worry (*uddhacca-kukkucca*) and doubt and perplexity (*vicikicchā : S.* V, pp. 92, 96).

The *Majjhima Nikāya* records a more elaborate classification of the defilements of the mind (*M.* I, pp. 36–40). Here the Buddha enumerates as many as sixteen defilements : covetousness (*abhijjhāvisamalobha*), malevolence (*vyāpāda*), anger (*kodha*), enmity and grudge (*upanāha*), rage (*makkha*), malice (*palāsa*), jealousy (*issā*), avarice (*macchariya*), deception (*māyā*), treachery (*sāṭheyya*), obduracy and obstinacy (*thambha*), impetuosity (*sārambha*), pride (*māna*), conceit (*atimāna*), intoxication and sensual excess (*mada*) and indolence (*pamāda*).

These thorough-going analyses of the *citta* in the unwholesome state are offered by the Buddha to his disciples so that they may understand the nature of the worldly mind as it truly is and put forth effort and exertion for the purification and perfection of their own minds.

(*f*) *Training and development of citta* : If *citta* is the cradle and vehicle of bondage and misery (*dukkha*), it is also the means and locus of full

enlightenment (*sambodhi*) and emancipation (*nibbāna*). *Citta* is freed from all depravities and defilements through the development of wisdom (*Paññāparibhāvitaṃ cittaṃ sammadeva āsavehi vimuccati . . : D.* II, p. 81). But wisdom cannot arise in *citta* until and unless it is detached and purified for it is detachment that ensures the possibility for freedom from the depravities (*Cittaṃ virajjati vimuccati anupādāya āsavehi : S.* III, p. 46). The entire teaching of the Buddha is a life-long attempt to enunciate various means to the systematic training of *citta*. Buddha recognises that this training is capable of being set out in graduated stages to accommodate the needs of sundry individuals (*Sakkā brāhmaṇa imasmiṃ dhammavinaye anupubbasikkhā anupubbakiriyā anupubbapaṭipadā paññāpetuṃ : M.* III, p. 2). The defiled mind clearly calls for systematic means of purification (*Upakkiliṭṭhassa . . . cittassa upakkamena pariyodapanā hoti : A.* I, p. 207). In a memorable sermon addressed to Visākhā, the celebrated benefactress of Buddhism, Buddha has described at length a graduated path to the purification of *citta* (ibid. p. 207 ff.).

The awareness in respect of *citta* (*citte cittānupassanā*) and its mental objects (*dhammesu dhammānupassanā*) is included among the four ways of mindfulness (*cattāro satipaṭṭhānā*) which together are declared to constitute the only way leading to the purification of beings and their final emancipation (*Ekāyano ayam bhikkhave maggo sattānaṃ visuddhiyā . . . nibbānassa sacchikiriyāya . . . citte cittānupassī viharati ātāpi sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassaṃ . . . : M.* I, pp. 55–56).

Freedom of mind consists in eliminating the restrictions which it imposes upon itself. The system of Buddhist meditation points the way in which *citta* can outgrow its own confines. The *Anupada Sutta* contains the following passage which illuminates the way to the emancipation of the mind : He (the trainee) comprehends thus : Thus indeed states that have not been in me come to be ; having been they pass away. He not feeling attracted by these states, not feeling repelled, independent, not infatuated, freed, released, dwells with a mind unconfined. He comprehends : there is greater freedom further on (*So evam pajānāti evaṃ kira'me dhammā ahutvā sambhonti, hutvā pativedenti ti. So tesu dhammesu anupāyo anapāyo anissito appaṭibaddho vippamutto visaṃyutto vimariyādikatena cetasā viharati. So atthi uttariṃ nissarananti pajānāti : M.* III, p. 25).

The nikāyas make plentiful reference to the qualities of the wholesome mind. The trained *citta* is variously described as being healthy (*anātura*) fully developed (*paribhāvita*), unattached (*asallīna*), contented (*santussita*), active and pliable (*kammaniya*), straight and upright (*sammujjāta*), detached (*viratta*), steady (*ṭhita*), free from covetousness, malevolence and confusion (*vītarāga, vītadosa, vītamoha*), free from perversion (*avipallattha*), pure (*visuddha*), resplendent (*sappabhāsa*), full of inward calm and serenity (*ajjhattaṃ vūpasanta*), tranquil (*upasanta*), concentrated (*samāhita*), cleansed (*pariyodāta*), free from blemishes (*anaṅgana*), purged of adventitious defilements (*vigatupakkilesa*), supple (*mudubhūta*), unperturbed (*āneijjappatta*), freed (*mutta*) and utterly released (*patinissaṭṭha*).

The following compound expressions are indicative of the objectives of Buddhist meditation in respect of the training and development of the *citta : Citta-kallatā* : readiness of mind ; *citta-anupassanā* : introspective awareness of mind ; *citta-ujjukatā* ; rectitude of mind ; *citta-ekaggatā* : one-pointedness of mind : *citta-passaddhi* : calmness of heart and serenity of mind : *citta-bhāvanā* : development of mind ; *citta-kammaññatā* : pliancy of mind ; *citta-pāguññatā* : proficiency of mind ; *cittalahutā* : buoyancy of mind ; *cittavisuddhi* : purification of mind ; *citta-samādhi* : concentration of mind ; *citta-samodhāna* : calming of thought ; *citta-vimutti-cetо-vimutti* : freedom from mind ; *citta-vūpasama* : tranquillity of mind ; *citta-sampadā* : attainment of bliss by the mind.

According to the teachings embodied in the nikāyas it is thus clear that the purified *citta* alone is capable of understanding what is best for oneself, what is best for others and the truth that transcends the sphere of the untutored mind (*Anāvilena cittena attatthaṃ vā ñassati paratthaṃ vā ñassati ubhayatthaṃ vā ñassati uttariṃ vā manussadhammā alamariyañāṇadassanavisesaṃ sacchikarissati : A.* I, p. 9).

Citta in the Theravāda Abhidhamma

The simple but profound teaching of the Buddha on *citta* as recorded in the suttas of the Pali nikāyas came in for greater elaboration and exceedingly detailed classification at the hands of the Abhidhammikas. Whereas the Buddha's own expositions of *citta* appear to be immediately relevant to, and meaningful in, the life of each individual, the exegesis of *citta* by the Abhidhammikas appear to be wholly academic and scholastic. Inspite of this stricture, however, it may be readily conceded that the Abhidhammikas did indeed succeed in making a number of significant and insightful contributions to our understanding of the facts relating to the

mind and its multifarious phenomena. What appears to be of permanent value are the results of psychological investigations based soundly on empirical foundations. Consistent with the earnestly ethical outlook of the Buddha, the Abhidhammikas' analyses of *citta* are informed and inspired by moral considerations relevant to the ideal of philosophic detachment and religious emancipation. In terms of philosophic interpretation, the expositions of *citta* contained in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka as well as the later commentaries and compendia mark several significant points of departure from the teachings of the Buddha as recorded in the Pali nikāyas.

The Abhidhammikas consider *citta* as one of the four ultimate categories with which the Abhidhamma is concerned, the other three being *cetasika* or mental states, *rūpa* or matter and *Nibbāna* or ultimate reality (*Cittaṃ cetasikaṃ rūpaṃ nibbānaṃ iti sabbathā, paramatthaṃ pavakkhāmi ...: Abhs.* p. 1). All that is considered in the suttas under the terms *citta* and *viññāṇa* is here considered under the term *citta* which is adopted as the most generic of them all.

The Abhidhamma recognises *citta* as an abstract reality (*paramattha*) in the sense of being a fact true in the ultimate philosophic sense. *Citta* is a reality both empirically as well as transcendentally. At the empirical level the only realities recognised by the Abhidhammikas are mind and matter (*nāmarūpa*). The terminology of 'being' and 'individual' expresses only conventional truths. That which remains as *dhamma* after the elimination of false assumptions such as 'I' or 'I am' alone is to be accepted as an object of true understanding (*Satto puggalo ti vohāramattaṃ hoti, paramatthato ekekasmiṃ dhamme upaparikkhiyamāne: asmī ti vā ahan ti vā ti gāhassa vatthubhūto satto nāma natthi, paramatthato pana nāmarūpamattam eva atthī ti evaṃ passato hi dassanaṃ yathābhūtadassanaṃ nāma hoti: Vism.* p. 594).

Citta is defined in the Abhidhamma from several points of view. The Abhidhamma speaks of three different ways of predication, namely, predication by agency (*kattu-sādhana*), predication by instrumentality (*karaṇa-sādhana*) and predication by simple flux (*bhāva-sādhana*). Each one of these predications has been used in the definition of *citta* although the only way of predication admitted by the Abhidhammikas as yielding true knowledge is the predication by simple flux. Buddhaghosa, making skilful use of etymology, has offered four definitions of the term *citta*. He says: 'By *citta* is meant that which thinks of its object, is variously aware. *Citta* is so called again because it arranges itself in a series by way of apperception in a thought process. *Citta* also refers to its resultant thought because it is accumulated by *kamma* and the *kilesas*. Furthermore, all classes of thought are called *citta* because they are variegated according to circumstances. The meaning of *citta* may also be understood from its capacity to produce a variety of effects (*Cittan ti ārammaṇaṃ cintet ti cittaṃ, vijānātīti attho. Yasmā ca cittan ti sabbasaṅgāhikāṇo esa saddo tasmā ... taṃ javanavithivasena attano santānaṃ cinoti ti cittaṃ. Vipākaṃ kāmakilesehi citan ti cittaṃ. Api ca sabbam pi yathānurūpato cittatāya cittaṃ cittakaraṇatāya cittaṃ ti evaṃ pettha attho veditabbo: DhsA.* p. 63). A careful scrutiny of Buddhaghosa's definitions shows that they are all attempts at predication by agency and instrumentality only and not by simple flux. Buddhadatta, on the other hand, has given a definition that comes strictly under predication by simple flux. He says that *citta* is so called because it constitutes awareness of objects (*Tattha cittam iti visayavijānanaṃ cittaṃ: Abhvt.* p. 1). Sumaṅgala, his commentator, has dwelt on the significance of this definition. He says that this brings out three distinct features of *citta*: its causal dependence on the object, its impermanence and its non-substantiality. The absence of an agent (*akārakabhāvaṃ*) is clearly elucidated by the reference to mere awareness (*vijānanamattadīpanato*). To say that *citta* is that which thinks or that *citta* is that with which one thinks is to use conventional modes grounded on agency and instrumentality. These latter are nothing more than superimpositions: hence a true and undistorted definition must indicate their total absence from reality as it is (*Visayavijānanaṃ cittan ti yaṃ visaya-saṃkhātassa ārammaṇassa vijānanaṃ upalabdhi, taṃ cittaṃ ti attho. Iminā pana cittassa arammaṇapaṭibaddhavuttitaṃ aniccataṃ akārakatañca dīpeti ... Bhāvaniddesena pana vijānanamattadīpanato akārakabhāvaṃ: yathāpaccayaṃ hi pavattita mattaṃ evetaṃ yadidaṃ sabhāvadhammo nāmāti. Etañca katvā sabbesam pi cittacetasikadhammānaṃ bhāvasādhanam eva nipphannato labbhati. Yaṃ pana cinoti ti cittaṃ vicārotīti vicāro ti ādinā kattukaraṇavasena nibbacanaṃ vuccati Tam pariyāya-kathan ti veditabbaṃ. Sakasmakakiccesu hi dhammānaṃ attappadhānatāsaṅkhāropaṇena kattubhāvo, tadanukūlabhāvena tamsampayutte dhammasamūhe kattubhāvasaṅkhāropaṇena paṭipādetabbadhammassa karaṇattañca pariyāyato labbhati ti. Tathā tathā nilliṅgam pana dhammasabhāvato aññassa kattādino abhāvaparidīpanatthaṃ ti veditabbaṃ: Abhidhammatthavikāsinī*, pp. 76-77).

The essential aspects of *citta* are analysed in the A hidhamma commentaries in terms of a stock formula of four heads, namely, nature and characteristic (*lakkhaṇa svabhāva*), function (*kicca, rasa, sampatti*), consequence and manifestation (*paccupaṭṭhāna*) and proximate cause (*padaṭṭhāna*) and this analysis tells us more about *citta* than can be had from the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* of the A hidhamma Piṭaka where *citta* is defined merely by enumerating a large number of synonyms altogether lacking in precision and discrimination (*Katamaṃ tasmiṃ samaye cittaṃ hoti? Yaṃ tasmiṃ samaye cittaṃ mano mānasaṃ hadayaṃ paṇḍaraṃ mano manāyatanaṃ manindriyaṃ viññāṇaṃ ... cittaṃ hoti : Dhs.* p. 10). The distinctive characteristic of *citta* is cognising the object, its function is the fore-running, its manifestation is connecting and its consequence is the sustenance of mental and material organism (*Lakkhaṇādito pana vijānanalakkhaṇaṃ cittaṃ, pubbaṅgamarasaṃ, sandhānapaccupaṭṭhānaṃ nāmarūpapadaṭṭhānaṃ : DhsA.* p. 112). Buddhaghosa has explained each of these aspects of *citta* at length. He emphasises the fact that there can be no *citta* or consciousness of any kind without the characteristic of cognising an object or objects. When *citta* reaches a sense door, it then becomes a forerunner or precursor. A visible object seen by the eye, for instance, is cognised by the *citta*. This applies in respect of each of the six sense doors. *Citta* arises always in inseparable connexion with its preceding *citta* thereby forming a connected, continuous series. Given the organism of the five *khandhas*, *citta* always arises as a result of the causal inter-dependence of mind and matter (*DhsA.* pp. 112-113).

Citta does not arise singly or in isolation. When it is said that 'the King has arrived' it is clear that he has come with a retinue and not alone, even so *citta* is to be understood as having arisen together with a number of different mental states (*cetasikā*) of which the Theravāda Abhidhamma enumerates and recognises as many as fifty two (s.v. CETASIKA : *DhsA.* p. 67). Although external to one another in analysis, *citta* and *cetasika* (mind and mental states) are in reality recognised to be intimately, invariably and inseparably connected with one another. *Citta* in its purest form does not in life function in utter isolation and separation ; it is always and everywhere accompanied by other mental phenomena. *Citta* as part of the *viññāṇakkhandha* is regularly accompanied by elements of mind and mentation included under the other three immaterial *khandhas*, namely, *vedanākkhandha, saññākkhandha* and *saṃkhārakkhandha*. The Abhidhammikas have discerned four inseparable relations between *citta* and *cetasika* : they arise together ; they perish together ; they share a common object and they have a common basis (*Ekuppādanirodhā ca ekālambanavatthukā, cetoyuttā dvipaññāsa dhammā cetasikā nāma : Abhs.* Chapter ii, v. 1).

The Abhidhammikas recognise *citta* as representing the psychic order in a grand five-fold cosmic order, namely, the germinal (*bījaniyāma*), the caloric (*utuniyāma*), the moral (*kammaniyāma*), the psychic (*cittaniyāma*) and the natural-phenomenal (*dhammaniyāma : DhsA.* p. 272). Buddhaghosa explains the psychic order as follows : When an object strikes the sentient organism there is no doer or instigator who says : you shall advert etc. From the time the object strikes the sentient organism, each according to its own nature, adverting by the five doors agitates the life-continuum ; visual cognition accomplishes the function of seeing ; the resultant mind-element accomplishes the function of receiving, the resultant mind-cognition-element accomplishes the function of examining etc ... All this is understood as the psychical order (ibid. p. 274).

The Abhidhammikas who sought to formulate an all-encompassing theory of *citta* divided it under four broad classes which correspond to the four spheres, the sensuous (*kāmāvacara*), that with form (*rūpāvacara*), formless (*arūpāvacara*) and the transcendental (*lokuttara*)—(*Tattha cittaṃ tāva catubbidhaṃ hoti : kāmāvacaraṃ rūpāvacaraṃ arūpāvacaraṃ lokuttarañcāti : Abhs.* Chapter i, para 3). The *cittas* which come under these spheres are also ethically evaluated as wholesome (*kusala*), unwholesome (*akusala*), neutral (*abyākata*), resultant (*vipāka*) inoperative (*kiriyā*) endowed with moral/immoral roots (*sahetuka*) and rootless (*ahetuka*).

The Theravāda A hidhamma contains a comprehensive classification of *citta* based on the above considerations. This may be given in the brief and systematic form in which it is set out in the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* of Anuruddha (For a more intensive and extensive examination of this classification the reader is referred to the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* of the A hidhamma Piṭaka, the *Atthasālinī* of Buddhaghosa, the *Abhidhammāvatāra* of Buddhadatta, the *Abhidhammatthavibhāvinī Ṭīkā* and the *Abhidhammatthavikāsinī* of Sumaṅgala). There are fifty four distinct types of *citta* in the sensuous sphere, fifteen in the form sphere, twelve in the formless and eight in the transcendental. In terms of moral evaluation there are twelve distinct types of *citta* described as morally unwholesome, twenty-one types as morally wholesome,

thirty-six types as resultants and twenty as functional or inoperative. Of the twelve types of unwholesome *citta*, eight are rooted in attachment, two in ill-will and the remaining two in ignorance and delusion. The *citta* divide themselves depending on whether they are prompted (*sasaṃkhārikaṃ*) or unprompted (*asaṃkhārikaṃ*), accompanied or not with pleasure (*somanassasahagataṃ*, *domanassasahagataṃ*) or with indifference (*upekkhāsahagataṃ*), connected or disconnected with wrong view (*diṭṭhigatasampayuttaṃ*,-*vippayuttaṃ*) or connected with ill-will (*paṭighasampayuttaṃ*) or doubt (*vicikicchāsampayuttaṃ*) or restlessness (*uddhaccasampayuttaṃ*). There are eighteen types of *citta*, without roots, of which eight are immoral resultants, five are moral resultants and three are functional. There are twenty-four types of beautiful consciousness (*sobhanacitta*) in the sensuous sphere, of which eight are moral, eight are resultant and eight are functional (*kriyācitta*). In the sphere of form (*rūpāvacara*) there are fifteen types of *citta* of which five are moral, five are resultant and five are functional. In the formless sphere there are twelve types of *citta* of which four are moral, four are resultant and four are functional. And finally in the sphere of transcendental consciousness there are eight types of *citta* of which four are moral and four are resultant. In all there are thus eighty-nine types of *citta* which are again classified into hundred and twenty-one types after further elaboration (*Abhs*. Chapter i).

In the later Theravāda A hidhamma, the theory of *citta* appears to be firmly built upon the basis of a new theory of moments (*khaṇavāda*) and this is illustrated in the theory of perception as expounded in Anuruddha's *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*. A thought-process (*citta-vīthi*) is said to consist of several thought moments each of which is again said to consist of three point-instants, namely, nascence (*uppāda*), persistence (*ṭhiti*) and cessation (*bhaṅga*). The duration of a thought moment is so brief and the rapidity of succession of such thought-moments is so great that they cannot even be imagined, let alone described. But the rate of change in thought has been determined specifically relative to the rate of change in matter for it is claimed that as many as sixteen thought-moments arise and perish during the period that matter endures (*Rūpe dharante yeva hi soḷasavāre bhavaṅgacittam uppajjitvā nirujjhati. Cittassa uppādakkhaṇopi ṭhitikkhaṇo pi bhaṅgakkhaṇo pi ekasadisā: Vism.* p. 614. Anuruddha has identified fourteen distinct functions of *citta* extending from the moment of conception to the moment of death. They are the moments of rebirth conception (*paṭisandhi*), life-continuum (*bhavaṅga*), apprehending(*āvajjana*), seeing(*dassana*), hearing (*savana*), smelling (*ghāyana*), tastiag (*sāyana*), contact(*phusana*),receiving(*sampaṭicchana*) investigating (*santīraṇa*), determining (*voṭṭhapana*), ethically significant active thought (*javana*), retention (*tadārammaṇa*) and death (*cuti*). The later concept of *bhavaṅga-citta* as well as the concept of momentary stages in the process of a single unit of consciousness (*cittavīthi*) are nowhere found in the Pali nikāyas or in the early Abhidhamma thought and make their appearance for the first time in the scholastic literature of the medieval commentators. Attempts were, however, made to read new meanings back into the more ancient texts and some teachers are said to have interpreted *citta* in the nikāyas as denoting *bhavaṅga-citta* (*Cittan ti ekacce tāva ācariyā bhavaṅgacittan ti vadanti: AA*. I, p. 59). Where *bhavaṅga* is considered to be free from defilements it is positively identified with the *pabhassara-citta* referred to in the nikāyas (*Cittan ti bhavaṅgacittaṃ....idam pi nirupakkilesatāya parisuddhaṃ ti pabhassaraṃ*: ibid. p. 60 .

In respect of the physical basis of *citta*, the Theravādins devoloped a cardio-centric theory according to which the heart (*hadayavatthu*) is the locus of mind and mental consciousness (*Manodhātu - manoviññāṇadhātūnaṃ nissayalakkhaṇaṃ hadayavatthu, tāsaṃ yeva dhātūnaṃ ādhāraṇarasaṃ, ubbahanapaccupaṭṭhānaṃ, hadayassa anto..lohitaṃ nissāya...vatthubhāvaṃ sādhayamānaṃ tiṭṭhati: Vism.* II, p. 447). The Theravādins appear to be alone in holding this theory and this is confirmed by the statement of Yaśomitra that it is confined only to the school of Sri Lanka Buddhism (*Tāmraparṇīyā api hṛdayavastu manovijñānadhator āśrayaṃ kalpayanti: Sphuṭārthābhidharmakośa-vyākhyā*, p. 39).

Citta in the later Schools of Buddhism

The Sarvāstivādins, consistent with their philosophical realism, accept *citta* among the ultimate existents whose distinctive nature and characteristics endure for all time. It is called *sad-dravya* and *paramārtha* because it is endowed with a natural quality which it does not abandon (*Yasya khalvarthavastunaḥ svabhāvasiddhasvarūpasyāviparītakarayā dharmopalakṣaṇāya parikalpitanaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ upalakṣyate tat saddravyaṃ ityucyate... paramārthena yannityaṃ svabhāvena saṅgṛhitaṃna kadācit svam ātmānaṃ jahāti... : Vibhāṣāprabhā-vṛtti*, pp. 262-263). *Citta* is counted among

ultimate truths because it endures as an abstract reality after the elimination of all gross elements (*Anyadharmāpohe pi buddhayā tat paramārthasat : Sphuṭārthābhidharmakośabhāṣya*, comment under Chapter vi, *v* 4).

Consistent with the usage in the sūtr s, the Sarvastivādins hold that *citta*, *manas* and *vijñāna* are synonymous in meaning (*Cittam mano'tha vijñānaṃ ekārthaṃ ..Abhk.* II, *v.* 34; *Yaccittaṃ tad eva manas tad eva vijñānaṃ ityeko'rtho-'syetyekārthaṃ nirvacanabhedas tūcyate : Sputārthābhidharmakośavyākhyā*, II, p. 56). *Citta* is so called because it accumulates (*cinotīti cittaṃ iti*), that is it accumulates both wholesome and unwholesome effects of action (*kuśalākuśala vā cinotītyarthaḥ*). Or *citta* may be so called because it is many-hued with the elements of the good and the bad (*Citraṃ śubhāśubhair dhātubhir iti cittaṃ*).

The Sarvāstivādins state that the distinction between *citta* and *caitta* is exceedingly subtle (*sukṣmaviśeṣa*) and difficult to distinguish between (*duḥparicchedo*). Altogether there are five features common to *citta* and *caitta*, namely, that they share the same basis(*āśraya*), same object (*ālambana*) same form (*ākāra*), same time (*kāla*) and same reality (*dravya*) : *Sphuṭārthābhidharmakośavyākhyā*, II, p. 56).

The Sarvāstivādins diverge considerably from the Theravādins in their classification of *citta*. The *Abhidharmakośa* records three different classifications. A shorter list attempts to include the contents of *citta* under four groups, the defiled (*kliṣṭa*), resultant (*vipākaja*), worldly wholesome (*laukikā ca kuśalā*) and the first noble (*prathamāryā : AbhK.* II, *v.* 60). A second longer list divides *citta* into twelve types under the categories of the sensual (*kāma*), form (*rūpa*), formless (*ārupya*) and the undefiled (*anāśrava*). In the most comprehensive classification, *citta* is divided into twenty types under these four categories. There are eight types of *citta* in the sensual sphere called (1) wholesome-acquired (*kuśalaprāyogika*), (2) wholesome inherited (*upapattilābhika*), (3) unwholesome (*akuśala*), (4) impure but neutral (*nivṛtāvyākṛta*), (5) resultant (*vipākaja*), (6) behavioural (*airyāpathika*), (7) technical (*śailpasthānika*) and (8) resultants of wisdom (*abhijñāphala*). There are six types of *citta* in the sphere of form ; wholesome acquired, wholesome inherited, impure but neutral, resultant, behavioural and resultants of wisdom. In the form-less sphere there are four types of *citta* : wholesome acquired, wholesome inherited impure but neutral and the resultants. The transcendental sphere has only two types of *citta*, namely, that of the trainee (*śaikṣa*), and that of the emancipated (*aśaikṣa : AbhK.* II, *vv.* 71–72).

The Sautrāntikas, who claim to base themselves only on the sūtras (*Kaḥ Sautrāntikārthaḥ ? Ye sūtrāntaprāmāṇikā na tu śāstraprāmāṇikās te sautrāntikāḥ : Sphuṭārthābhidharmakośavyākhyā*, I, p. 13) and therefore. reject the *Śāstras* and the Abhidharma showed no predilection to compile elaborate classifications of *citta*. On the other hand, they took great pains to counter the claims of the Sarvāstivādins that *citta* is an ultimate reality considered either empirically or transcendentally. The later Sautrāntikas, however, being increasingly inclined towards idealism, tended to emphasise the primacy of mind in relation to both bondage and freedom. In this attempt they sought only to render explicit what they claimed to be implicit in the sūtras already. Bondage was defined as the imprisonment in the causal nexus overwhelmed by the subjugating power of ignorance, and freedom consisted in the purity of mind (*Kāryakāraṇabhūtāś ca tatrāvidyādayo matāḥ, bandhas tad vigamā diṣṭo muktir nirmalatā dhiyaḥ : Tattvasaṅgraha*, *v.* 544). Saṃsāra or bondage is nothing but *citta* itself in so far as it is sullied and defiled by the depravities such as attachment and greed. Hence Nirvāṇa or freedom is the very same *citta* altogether devoid of such defilements (*Cittaṃ eva tu saṃsāro rāgādimaladūṣitaṃ, tad eva tair vinirmuktaṃ bhavānta iti kathyate : Tattvasaṅgraha-pañjikā*, p. 184).

The *Prajñāpāramitā* literature, which constitutes the immediate literary source of the Mahāyāna, contains an exposition of *citta* which informs and inspires the subsequent teachings of both the Mādhyamikas and the Yogācārins. In this extensive exposition which is embodied in a number of *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras* the emphasis is placed on the reality of the transcendental nature of *citta*, the empirical *citta* as the means, content and receptacle of conceptual knowledge is rejected as being devoid of any reality. The practice of the perfection of wisdom is said to be not born of *citta* (*Na hi . . . prajñāpāramitācaryā cittajanikā : Suvikrāntavikrāmiparipṛcchā*, p. 49). The obsessions are born of the perversion of *citta*. Hence the categorical declaration is made that the perfection of wisdom is completely devoid of *citta* (*cittāpagatāhi prajñāpāramitā* : ibid. p. 50). The transcendental *citta* is resplendent and pure by nature and there is in reality no origination of the conceptualising mind therein (*Yā ca cittasya prakṛtiprabhāsvaratā prakṛtipari-*

śuddhatā, tatra na kācit cittasyotpatti : loc. cit.). The foolish worldlings originate this false *citta* as a reaction to stimuli. But the odhisattva who discerns and understands the truth realises the nature of the perversion involved. He, therefore, brings about neither the origination nor the cessation of *citta*. His *citta*, therefore, becomes undefiled, pliant, utterly pure. Whosoever thus does not originate the conceptualising *citta* verily walks in the path of the perfection of wisdom (*Yā ca cittasya prakṛtiprabhāsvaratā prakṛtipariśuddhatā, tatra na kācit cittasyotpattiḥ. Ārambane sati ... bālapṛthagjanās cittaṃ utpādayanti. Tatra bodhisattvo' pyārambanaṃ prajānannapi cittasyotpattim prajānāti ... sa evam prajyavekṣate : prakṛtiprabhāsvaram idam cittaṃ. Tasyaivaṃ bhavati : ārambanam pratītya cittam utpadyate iti. Sa ārambanam parijñāya na cittam utpādayati nāpi nirodhayati. Tasya cittam prabhāsvaram bhavati asaṃkliṣṭaṃ karmanyam pariśuddhaṃ ... ya evaṃ carati bodhisattvaḥ sa prajñāpāramitāyāṃ carati* : loc. cit.). Those who do not understand the detachment of *citta* and the detachment from the object of *citta* alone become obsessed by *citta* in this wise : " I am the *citta*, my own *citta*, *citta* of this and *citta* from this ". Thus obsessed by *citta*, they get obsessed by what is assumed to be wholesome *citta*, unwholesome *citta*, pleasant *citta*, unpleasant *citta*, the annihilation and permanence of *citta*, etc. (*Te cittavivekam ajānantaḥ ārambanavivekam ajānantaḥ abhiniviśante : ahaṃ cittam, mama cittam asya cittam, asmāc cittam iti. Te cittam abhiniviśya kuśalam iti vā akuśalam iti vā sukham iti vā aduḥkham iti vā ucchedа iti vā śāsvata iti vā abhiniviśante* : ibid. p. 49).

The Mādhyamikas base their own exposition of *citta* on the above statements in the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras*. *Citta* is first etymologically defined as that which is said to accumulate what is claimed as wholesome and unwholesome and that which regulates the conferment of results and it is recognised that *cetas, manas and vijñāna* are the synonyms of *citta* (*Cinoty upacinoti śubhamaśubhaṃ karma vipākadānasāmarthye niyamayati iti cetas cittam mano vijñānamiti tasyaiva paryāyaḥ : Prasannapadā, Mdhvṛ*. p.303). Chandrakīrti quotes the Buddha from the *Āryaratnakūṭa Sūtra* to show that *citta* does not yield itself to inquiry and investigation. That which does not so yield is not experienced and that which is not thus experienced cannot be described as being past, present or future. If that be so, *citta* could have no independent nature of its own. That which has no independent nature of its own could not arise or cease (*Cittaṃhi ... parigaveṣyamāṇaṃ na labhyate, yaṃ na labhyate tan nopalabhyate yan nopalabhyate tan naivātītaṃ nānāgataṃ na pratyutpannaṃ, yaṃ naivātītaṃ nānāgataṃ na pratyutpannaṃ tasya nāsti svabhāvaḥ. Yasya nāsti svabhāvas tasya nāstyutpādaḥ yasya nāstyutpādas tasya nāsti nirodha iti vistaraḥ* : i id. p. 45). If *citta* arises dependent on an object, then it may be asked whether *citta* is one and its object another. If they are different from one another then we are faced with two *cittas*. If *citta* and its object are numerically identical, then we have a situation where *citta* is perceived by itself. But this cannot be. Just as it is not possible for the edge of a sword to cut itself or for the tip of a finger to touch itself, even so it is impossible for *citta* to perceive itself. Hence the nature of *citta* is unintelligible. The recognition of this unintelligibility constitutes the awareness and mindfulness in respect of *citta* (*Ālambane sati cittam utpadyate. Tat kim anyad ālambanam anyac cittam ? Atha yad evālambanaṃ tad eva cittaṃ. Yadi tāvad anyad ālambanam anyac cittam, tadā dvicittatā bhaviṣyati. Atha yad evālambanaṃ tadeva cittaṃ tat kathaṃ cittena cittaṃ samanupaśyati. Na ca cittaṃ cittaṃ samanupaśyati. Tad yathā nāma tayaivāsidhārayā saivāsidhāraṃ na sakyate chettuṃ, na tenaivāṅgulyagraṃ śakyate spraṣṭum. . .iyam. . . citte cittānupashyanā smṛtyupasthānam iti* : i id. p. 62-63).

The Mādhyamikas deny the agency of *citta* in any sense whatsoever. The term merely expresses in an impersonal sense the distinctive activity of what are generally taken to be mental processes (*Atha cittasya tatra kartṛtvam parikalpyate. Tad api nyāyyaṃ yasmād arthamātradarśanaṃ cittasya vyāpāro 'rthaviśeṣadarśanaṃ caitasānāṃ : . . jñānasya tu arthaviśeṣapariccheda iti nāsti jñānasya kāraṇatvaṃ nāpi cittasya kartṛtvaṃ* : i id. p. 65).

It is mere convention and convenience that makes people to refer to the objects of mind. It is by assuming an image or symbol that we can verbalise *citta* in relation to an object. Where in reality no object has arisen what is exactly the nature of the assumed image which assists in the verbalisation of *citta* ? Where *citta* has in reality not arisen, there is no image and where there is no image arisen, there simply cannot be any verbalisation. It is in this sense that the Mādhyamikas claim that the Buddhas have verbalised nothing to any person anywhere (*Yadi cittasya kaścid gocaraḥ syāt tatra kiñ cin nimittaṃ adhyāropya syād vācām pravṛttiḥ. Yadā tu cittasya viṣaya evānupapannas tadā kva*

nimittādhyāropo yena vācām pravṛttiḥ syāt ? ... Cittasyāpravṛttau ca kuto nimittādhyāropaḥ ? Tad abhāvāt kuto vācāṃ pravṛttiḥ ? ataśca na kiñci buddhair bhagavadbhir deśitam iti sthitam avikalam. Ata eva ca vakṣyate : Sarvopalambhopaśamaḥ prapañcopaśamaḥ śivaḥ, na kvacit kasyacit kaścid dharmo buddhena deśitaḥ : ibid. p. 304).

Śāntideva in his brilliant exposition of the Mādhyamika teachings affirms the primacy of *citta*. He quotes the Buddha from the *Āryaratnamegha Sūtra* to show that *citta* is the fore-runner of all things and that when the true nature of *citta* is understood everything else is thereby understood (*Cittapūrvaṅgamāśca sarvadharmāḥ. Citte parijñāte sarvadharmā parijñātā bhavanti : Śikṣ.* p. 86). *Citta* vibrates and moves like fire and like a horse. *Citta* carries one away as by a flood. It is, therefore, through constant awareness in respect of *citta* that one is able to master *citta* and gain ascendancy over it. When mastery is gained over *cittu* in this wise, one also thereby gains mastery over everything else. (*Cittaṃ bhramate' lātavat. Cittaṃ bhramate turaṅgavat. Cittam bhramate devāgnivat. Cittam harate mahāmbuvat. Sa evam vyupaparīkṣamāṇaś citte supratiṣṭhitasmṛtir viharan na cittasya vaśam gacchati. Api tu cittaṃ evāsya vaśaṃ gacchati. Cittenārya vaśībhūtena sarvadharmā vaśībhavanti iti* : loc.cit.).

The Yogācārins have built their system of absolute idealism on their own distinctive exposition of *citta* which forms at once the alpha and the omega of the philosophy of Mind Only (*Cittamātra*) as expounded in the *Saddharma-laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*. Contrary to the teachings of the Mādhyamikas, the Yogācārins firmly affirm that the mind can know and grasp itself and that mind as *citta* exists as reality in its purest nature. (*Cittena gṛhyate cittaṃ nānyat kiñcit sahetukaṃ, cittasya dharmatā śuddhā gagane nāsti vāsanā : Lank.* v. 100). The *citta* activates through obsession with itself. In fact there are no external objects and the only reality is *citta* only (*Svacittābhiniveśena cittaṃ vai sampravartate, bahirdhā nāsti vai dṛśyam uto vai cittamātrakaṃ* : ibid. v. 101). The Yogācārins define *citta* as being equivalent to *Ālayavijñāna* or Store-house Consciousness which has the additional functions of thinking and discrimination between sensory objects (*Cittam ālayavijñānaṃ manoyanmanyanātmakaṃ, gṛhṇāti viṣayān yena vijñānaṃ hi taducyate*. ibid. v. 102). Among beings *citta* activates itself through dependent origination but aside of this causal activity *citta* in its true nature does not yield itself to perception and conception (*Cittam pratyayasambaddham pravartati śarīrinām pratyayebhyo vinirmuktaṃ na paśyāmi vadāmyahaṃ:* ibid. v. 52). *Citta* creates the illusion of the existence of the external world but this latter does not in fact exist in the manner in which the fools imagine it to do so (*Cittaṃ hi khyāti cittasyu bahirdhā khyāti rūpinaḥ anyānna vidyate dṛśyaṃ yathā bālair vikalpyate* : ibid. v. 70). It is, therefore, through ignorance that fools imagine the existence of what are called constituent elements (*Anavabodhāt svacittasya bālāḥ kalpenti saṃskṛtaṃ* : ibid. v. 489). *Citta* appears as a multiplicity of external objects on account of the illusory function of the latencies stirred within itself (*Bimbavat khyāyate cittaṃ vāsanair bhramaṇīkṛtam* : ibid. v. 624). *Citta* and the latencies are inseparable because they are indistinguishably built into each other (*Na vāsanair bhidyate cittaṃ na cittaṃ vāsanair saha, abhinnalakṣaṇaṃ cittaṃ vāsanaiḥ pariveṣṭitaṃ* : ibid. v. 236). Because *citta* is constantly enriched and sustained by the latencies it becomes the vehicle of conceptualisation and *cittu*, therefore, gets attracted by illusory objects even as iron gets attracted by a magnet (*Vāsanair bṛhitaṃ nityaṃ buddhayā mūlaṃ sthirāśrayaṃ, bhramate yoare cittaṃ ayaskānte yathāyasaṃ* : ibid. v. 14). *Citta* is the receptacle of the heritage of moral action (*Cittaṃ vicitraṃ bījākhyaṃ khyāyate cittayocaraṃ* : ibid. v. 49).

The understanding of *citta* in this wise leads to the abandonment of the false notion of the existence of the external world and this itself constitutes the Middle Path enunciated by the Buddha (*Cittamātrāvabodhena bāhyabhāva vyudāsataḥ, vinivṛttir vikalpasya pratipat saiva madhyamā* : ibid. v. 358). Through the understanding of the truth of Mind Only one realises the purest wisdom of the Tathāgatas (*Cittamātrāvatārena Prajñā tathāgatī-'tmalā* : ibid. v. 294). *Citta* not only holds us in bondage but also sets us free (*Cittaṃ pravartate cittaṃ cittaṃ eva vimucyate* : ibid. v. 145). According to the Yogācārins, the Buddha taught the non-substantiality of personality (*pudgala-nairātmya*) as well as that of all dharmas (*dharma-nairātmya*) through this teaching on the reality of *citta* only (*Dharmapudgalanairātmyaṃ cittamātraṃ jayau muniḥ : Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa*, v. 6).

The teaching on *citta* in the schools of Buddhist Tantrism is based on a syncretism of the expositions of the Mādhyamikas and the Yogācārins. The Vajrayāna teacher Anaṅgavajra represents the distinctive teaching on *citta* current among all these schools. *Citta* is the means of both bondage and

freedom, of saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa. *Citta* which is overcome by the darkness of infinite views and beliefs and which is defiled by curruptions such as attachment which are difficult to eradicate has been described by the great *Vajrin* (Buddha) as saṃsāra itself. (*Anolpasaṃkalpatamobhibhūtaṃ prabhañjanan-matta-tadiccalañca, rāgādiduravaramalāvaliptaṃ cittaṃ hi saṃsāra uvāca vajrī : Prajñopāyaviniścaya-siddhi*, iv, *v* 22). This same *citta* itself is described as Nirvāṇa when it is resplendent, devoid of concepts, freed from corruptions such as attachment and altogether released from the dichotomy of subject and object (*Prabhāsvaraṃ kalpanayā vimuktaṃ prahīnarāgādimalapralepaṃ, grāhyaṃ na ca grāhakaṃ agrasattvaṃ tad eva nirvāṇavaraṃ jagāda* : ibid. *v*. 23).

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CITTALAPABBATA. See SITULPAVVA.

CITTAMĀTRA. See VIJÑAPTIMĀTRA.

CITTANIYĀMA. See NIYĀMA.

CITTĀNUPASSANĀ. See ANUPASSANĀ and SATIPAṬṬHĀNA.

CITTASAMĀDHI. See SAMĀDHI.

CITTASMṚTYUPASTHĀNA. See SATIPAṬṬHĀNA.

CITTAVIMUTTI, a term used in the post-canonical Pali literature as a synonym of *cetovimutti*. See CETOVIMUTTI.

CITTAVIPALLĀSA. See VIPALLĀSA

CITTAVISUDDHI, purity of mind, second of the seven stages of purity outlined in the *Rathavinīta Sutta* for the ultimate attainment of total release (*anupādā parinibbānattham : M*. I, p. 147 ff.) and elaborated in the *Visuddhimagga* (Ch. xi). It is given as a general name for the eight attainments or absorptions (*aṭṭha-samāpattiyo*) together with neighbourhood concentration (*sa-upacāra : Vism*. p. 85), and is equivalent to *samādhi* (q.v.).

Cetovimutti (q.v.) or the total emancipation of the mind from defiling traits of character is the goal of religious life in Buddhism. *Cittavisuddhi*, on the other hand, is a stage on this path of religious perfection from which the gradual purge of the mind becomes a reality. This, together with *sīlavisuddhi* or purity acquired through morality is declared to be the root on which the tree of wisdom grows (*Vism*. p. 443).

This state of purity of mind is attained by suppressing the defilements (*nīvaraṇa*, q.v.) such as sensuous desire (*kāmacchanda* or *kāmarāga*), ill-will (*vyāpāda* or *paṭigha*), sloth and torpor (*thīna-middha*), restlessness and remorse (*uddhacca-kukkucca*) and sceptical doubt (*vicikicchā*). The mind at this stage is, therefore, free from these defilements.

Two qualities are given as prerequisites for the attainment of this purity, namely, solitude (*paviveka*) and endeavour (*viriyārambha : MA. SHB*. II, p. 131).

According to a tradition preserved in the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* (*D*. I, p. 71) the aryan disciple who has reached the same stage of purity of mind through successive developments via morality (*sīla*), restraint with regard to the senses (*indriyasaṃvara*), mindfulness and awareness (*satisampajañña*) and contentment (*santuṭṭhi : D*. I, p. 71) proceeds thereafter to the attainment of the first *jhāna*.

It should be mentioned that this purity of mind is only a relative one. The absolute purity of mind which is the total emancipation of the mind (*cetovimutti*) is attained only on reaching the state of arahantship. This relative position of *cittavisuddhi* is made quite clear in the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* by applying the terms *parisuddha, pariyodāta, anaṅgana* and *vigatūpakkilesa* with reference to the mind at every stage of the process that culminates in the attainment of arahantship (*D*. I, pp. 71-83).

The purity of mind referred to in the *Rathavinīta Sutta* is, therefore, not the end in itself ; it is only the means to the attainment of the next stage in the purity outlined in the sutta, viz., the purity of views (*diṭṭhi-visuddhi*, q.v. ; *cittavisuddhi yāvadeva diṭṭhi-visuddhatthā*) which, again, together with other stages of purity, is the means by which the final goal, namely, the absolute freedom (*anupādā-parinibbāna*) is attained (*M*. I, p. 149 f.).

See VISUDDHI.

U. K.

CITTAVIŚUDDHIPPRAKARAṆA, a Vajrayāna text of 134 stanzas, written in Sanskrit. First brought to light in 1898 by H. P. Shastri and published in the *JASB*. 1898, p. 175 ff. A critical edition of the text has been published by P. B. Patel in the *Viśva Bhāratī* series in 1949. The original, as found by Shastri, had been written in the old Nevāri script with the first leaf missing and in many places the text itself completely obliterated. These missing places have been re-constructed with the help of the Tibetan text, of which two versions are available as *Sems-kyi-sgrib-pa-mam-par-sbyoṅ-ba-dses-bya-baḥi-reb-byed-pa* (*Cittāvaraṇaviśodhanaprakaraṇa*) and *Sems-rim-po-che sbyoṅ-bar-byed-par-dses-bya-ba* (*Cittaratnaviśodhana*), both of which, too, are printed along with the Sanskrit text in Patel's edition referred to above.

Regarding the authorship of the work the colophon at the end of the text itself says that it was composed by Āryadeva, who is held by some to be the same person as the famous author and teacher by that name, who was the successor to Nāgārjuna and who lived during 2nd-3rd centuries A.C., while others believe that he was a different person by the same name and lived much later during the 7th-8th centuries A.C. (For a detailed discussion of this question see the Introduction to the *Cittaviśuddhippakaraṇa* by Patel, already referred to.)

As regards the contents it is obvious that this is a work dealing with the tenets of Vajrayāna and hence has to be regarded as a text of the Tantric Buddhists, specially of the *Yogatantra* and the *Anuttarayogatantra* class.

One of the fundamental arguments of the Tantric Buddhists is that the motive behind an action always determines whether an action is ethically good or bad. An action regarded as the worst sin generally has to be treated otherwise if the motive is good. This idea is repeatedly emphasised in this text. Beginning the work proper with a salutation to Padmanarteśvara, it emphasises the importance of *citta*. To bring home his point the author here quotes the first two verses of the *Dhammapada* where the importance of the mind is brought out. Next the author gives an instance and says that an old man, ordered by a slumbering monk to go to a particular place, moves quickly, has a fall and dies. Here, although the responsibility for the death of the old man actually falls on the monk, it is not so because his order was with the best of intentions. If the intention is good any action is justified (*na doṣo'duṣṭacetasāṃ : v.* 13) and in this verse the authority of the *Vinaya* is also quoted in defence of this argument. Then in verse 16 it is said again that to decide whether an action is wholesome or unwholesome, the intention which motivated the action has to be examined and, as it is said in the *āgamas*, no action is unwholesome if done with a good motive. Thus, according to this teaching, an action, of whatsoever nature it may be, is by itself neither moral nor immoral, its value always being relative to the motive that prompted its commission. Thus, throughout the work, it is the purity of mind that is repeatedly emphasised. The title of the book itself is an indication of the importance attached by the author to this aspect of Tantric Buddhism, i.e., the purity of mind (*cittaviśuddhi*).

The next point the author discusses thoroughly is the enjoyment of pleasures. The position taken by the Tantric Buddhists is that for the yogin endowed with wisdom (*prajñā*) the enjoyment of pleasures itself is a means of escape from saṃsāra. Thus he says in verse 17 that the yogin who has made a god of himself by the universalisation of the self and whose activities are motivated by a spirit of benevolence towards the whole world, attains emancipation by the enjoyment of objects and is never tied down by such enjoyment. This idea of the enjoyment of pleasures for the achievement of one's salvation is based on the Vajrayāna tenet discussed earlier that the value of an action has to be decided solely by the motive that prompted its commission. Consequently, all the sexo-yogic practices, as advocated in the Vajrayāna, have to be understood not on their face-value but by the motives that impel them to adopt those practices. On the other hand, those who indulge in sexo-yogic practices without a pure motive will be subject to various forms of misery. The enjoyment of pleasures for the fulfilment of religious purposes being an unconventional practice not mentioned in the orthodox teaching of the Buddha, had to be justified by means of lengthy arguments, similes, metaphors etc. Hence it is said (verse 17) that a person versed in the science of poison knows poison as such and takes it in such a way that not only is he not poisoned but is cured of some disease. In the same way the expert yogin enjoys pleasures in such a way that instead of becoming tied down to saṃsāra, he escapes from it by such enjoyment. This is why it is said in verse 23 that what is real with the foolish (*bāla*) is unreal with the wise,

for, while the enjoyment of pleasures becomes an obstacle for the former to escape from saṃsāra, for the latter this same obstacle serves as the means for such escape. The *Mādhyamika* view, that both saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa are the same, is expressed in verse 24 where it is said that only those who do not see things as they really are (*atattvadarśinaḥ*) think of saṃsāra differently from Nirvāṇa. In this ocean of the world our thought-constructions (*vikalpa*) are the only binding force (*grāha*) and those who are free from such thought constructions (*avikalpāḥ*) escape from the bondage of the world (verse 25). Compassion (*karuṇā*) being one of the fundamental concepts in Vajrayāna, the real yogin who is free from all doubt is referred to as *karuṇātmaka* (verse 26).

The text continues to explain the original, pure nature of the mind by saying that as the crystal is coloured by the colour of other objects so also the gem of *citta* becomes coloured by the thought-constructions, whereas by nature this gem of mind (*cittaratna*) is free from the stain of imaginations, is pure from the beginning, is unconditioned, essenceless and stainless (verses 27–28). As the mind of the genuine yogin is pure in this way he should perform with care all those activities forbidden to the ignorant (verse 29). This is further explained in the next verse where it is said that when such true yogins enjoy women, it conduces to both enjoyment and liberation because their intentions are good (*śubhacetasā*). There is nothing that should not be done by the yogin who has produced *bodhi-citta* and is bent on achieving full enlightenment for the welfare of the world (verse 33). The Vajrayāna view that man is both bound to saṃsāra, through attachment (*rāga*) and is liberated through the same *rāga* is directly expressed in the line *rajyate rāgacittena rāgabhogena mucyate* (verse 35). The wise (*manīṣiṇaḥ*) should save themselves from the passions with the help of the passions (verse 37). To clarify the point further the author uses a number of similes: as the man affected with poison gets rid of it through poison, or as the water in the ear is removed by pouring more water into it, or as the thorn is removed with another thorn, or as the washerman removes the dirt in clothes by means of another kind of dirt, in the same way the wise should remove the filth of the mind by means of the filth of the enjoyment of objects (verses 36–38). A mirror when rubbed by a certain kind of rubbish becomes clean. In the same way those so-called bad things, when resorted to by the wise, become the destroyer of all wrong (verse 39). A lump of iron sinks down in water, but when it is shaped as a vessel, it not only floats, but ferries across others, too (verse 40). In the same way, when the mind is shaped and trained through *upāya* and *prajñā*, not only that particular individual is liberated, but relieves others, too (*v.* 41). *Kāma*, enjoyed by the ignorant, is an obstacle, but is a means of escape to the wise (*v.* 42). This happens in the same way as the poison-destroying milk is transformed into poison when drunk by a snake (*v.* 43). Sense-pleasures are to be enjoyed by the wise in the same way as the swan extracts and drinks milk out of a mixture of milk and water. For any action to yield beneficial results it has to be done in the proper way, just as even poison when taken scientifically, acts as ambrosia and even butter-cakes, when taken unscientifically by the fool, act like poison, so in the same way, the mind too, when purified, shines forth from all imaginations and attachment, in its original pure nature (*vv.* 45–46). The element of the *dharmas* (*dharmadhātu*) undergoes great change in combination with *prajñā* and *upāya* in the same way as a dim flame, when supplied with oil and a good wick, becomes bright and removes darkness; or the banyan seed with proper nourishment grows into a huge tree; or as the yellow colour, in combination with lime, undergoes change (*vv.* 47–49). As copper, rubbed with some chemicals changes into gold, in the same way, the defilements (*kleśa*) when purified with knowledge become beneficial (*v.* 51). Here also it is the importance of *prajñā* and of *śuddhi* (purity) that is emphasised. The superiority of Mahāyāna over Hīnayāna is expressed in the remaining two verses where it is said that those who follow Hīnayāna are afraid of death at every step, whereas the followers of Mahāyāna, being protected by the armour of compassion (saṃsāra) and with the bow of *prajñā* in their hands, and with the welfare of the world at heart, are great beings of very firm intelligence, who, after winning the battle of saṃsāra for themselves, save others, too (*vv.* 51–54). These ideas reveal the importance attached in Tantric Buddhism to the Mahāyāna idea of Universal compassion (*mahākaruṇā*) and to the bodhisattva-doctrine. The aim of the Tantric *sādhaka* should be first to save himself and then to save others, which is perhaps more important than saving oneself. The Hīnayāna concept of arahantship, where only the release of the individual is the aim, is attacked vehemently when it is said (*vv.* 55–56) that even beasts suffer for their own sake, but rare and blessed are those great beings who court affliction for the sake of the world; if one can bear cold and wind for one's own sake, why cannot one do the same for the sake of the world? questions

our author (*v.* 56). The thesis of the author being that salvation has to be achieved not through self-mortifying a cetic practices but through indulgence in pleasures in a special way, he attacks the religious rituals such as fasting, bathing in holy rivers, etc. His attack on the Hindu practice of ritual bathing is uncompromising. After analysing the body as full of impurities, he questions the possibility of its being purified by bathing in rivers. Then he says that a dog swimming in the holy Ganges is never considered clean and how can a man be cleansed by merely bathing in a holy ford? If such bathing brings about purity, then washermen and most of all fishes, are to be regarded as the cleanest: instead of sins being washed away, he says, that such pratices help to increase *rāga* and the root causes of all evil such as *rāga*, *dveṣa*, *moha*, *īrṣyā* and *tṛṣṇā* can never be got rid of by ritual bathing (*vv.* 58–65).

The influence of Vedānta philosophy on our author is seen when he says that as the perception of silver (pearl?) in the oyster-shell vanishes when one perceives it as the shell or as the perception of the snake is contradicted by seeing the rope as the rope, so also our ignorance vanishes with the realisation of the void(*nairātmyadarśana*) by adamantine knowledge (*vajrajñāna*, *vv.* 67–69).

The placing of various deities in different parts of the yogin's body for purposes of meditation is done in verses 76–78.

The statement that Buddhahood could be achieved in this very life is repeatedly made in verses 82, 85 and 86.

The concepts of *prajñā* and *upāya* and their relation to the true yogin are briefly discussed in the next few verses (90 ff.). The wisdom of the yogin who has *prajñā* and *upāya* duly combined is compared to the sun-crystal (a fabulous crystal supposed to give out light and heat when exposed to the sun: *sūryakāntamaṇi*) or to an illuminating fire resulting from the rubbing of two logs of wood (*vv.* 91–93). The proper combination of *prajñā* and *upāya* is the destroyer of both pleasure and pain (*v.* 97). In the next few verses is found a discussion on the selection of the *yoginī* for religious purposes. Here is found a discussion on the meaninglessness of caste distinctions which is followed by the statement that whatever the caste of the *yoginī* may be, she should be worshipped without caring for such distinctions (*vv.* 102–106). The enjoyment of pleasures as a means of salvation is again recommended in a number of verses that follow. The fact that such enjoyment would be guided by *prajñā* and *upāya* is also mentioned again (*v.* 114). Then again there is a discussion on the purity of mind and how it becomes soiled by thought-constructions. This is followed by a few verses in which the importance of *mantravāda* is emphasised.

The importance of the *guru* (teacher) in the performance of Tantric rites, specially the sexual ones, is extremely important for only the *guru* can give correct guidance on those rituals. Only he knows how to perform them in such a way that the expected good result would be achieved. It is only with the help of the *guru* that the secret meaning of the system could be understood and success achieved thereby. It is this importance of the *guru* that is explained at the end of the book (verses 129–30).

A. G. S. K.

CIVARA. A term used in Buddhist monastic circles to refer broadly to the different items of clothing approved for the use of monks and nuns. It means robe or monk's or nun's apparel. The word *ticivara*(*ti*=three), a word of frequent occurence in Vinaya literature (*Vin.* 1, pp. 109, 288 ff.),fixes the number of these garments at three. They consist of:

(1) The inner garment (*antaravāsaka*), to be worn extending below the knee (*Vin.* IV, p. 185) and kept in position with a belt (*kāyabandhana*: *Vin.* II, p. 136), tied at the waist.

(2) The upper garment (*uttarāsaṅga*), generally draped over the upper part of the body, covering both shoulders. (Pl. XXXV, Fig. 1) In showing respect to the older members of the Order and before paying homage to them, the Buddhist monks appear to have arranged this loose garment over one shoulder, thus baring the other (*ekaṃsaṃ uttarāsaṅgaṃ karitvā*: *Vin.* I, p. 46; Pl. XXXV, Fig. 2). That this was a convention adopted even by laymen in respectful salutation is shown in a number of instances (*M.* I, p. 168; *A.* I, p. 67). These two garments together formed a monk's or a nun's basic clothing and is collectively referred to as *santaruttara*: inner and upper garments (*Vin.* I, p. 298; III, p. 138; *Vin.* IV, p. 281). The Vinaya, apparently on grounds of propriety, does not look upon this as adequate clothing for members of the monastic order in which to appear in public (*na bhikkhave santaruttarena gāmo pavisitabbo*: *Vin.* I, p. 298; IV. p, 281).

(3) The *saṅghāṭī* or the double robe which, to all intents and purposes, appears to be an over-garment.

Available historical data leads us to the conclusion that considerations about the adequacy of a monk's garments both in terms of propriety of dress and protection from inclement weather was the underlying factor which led to the evolution and inclusion of the *saṅghāṭī* as the final article of a monk's clothing. The *saṅghāṭī* is a double robe (*diguṇa*) in contrast to the inner (*antaravāsaka*) and upper (*uttarāsaṅga*) garments which are single *ekacciya : Vin.* I, p. 289). In effect, the *saṅghāṭī* is a lined reversible robe. The decision to finish this third robe in this manner seems to have been arrived at as a result of a personal trial carried out by the Buddha himself to determine the maximum number of robes needed to protect oneself during the severest wintry nights (*Vin.* I, p. 288). He discovered for himself that four robes was the maximum needed, including the inner and upper garments. Hence in the *saṅghāṭī*, the third and the fourth are found to be combined into one garment as a double one.

With the bhikkhunis, the regular apparel seems to have consisted of five items which are collectively called *pañcacīvarāni* (*Vin*, IV, p. 281). To the *ticīvara* already discussed have been added the *saṃkacchika*, a kind of loose vest worn as an undergarment to cover the upper part of the body from the shoulders (*adhakkhakaṃ* : literally below the collar-bone) to the navel (*ubbhanābhi*), as well as the *udakasāṭika*, a regular bathing garment (see below). The Bhikkhuni Pācittiya 96 goes so far as to legislate that no bhikkhuni shall enter the village without being clad in a *saṃkacchika* (...*asaṃkacchikā gāmaṃ paviseyya pācittiyaṃ : Vin.* IV, p. 345). These five items of the *pañca cīvarāni* are listed together in the *Vinaya* to be announced as the belongings of a nun (... *pattacīvaraṃ ācikkhitabbaṃ ayaṃ te patto ayaṃ saṅghāṭi ayaṃ uttarāsaṅgo ayaṃ antaravāsako idaṃ saṃkacchikaṃ ayaṃ udakasāṭikā : Vin.* II, p. 272).

The word *cīvara*, in addition to the general usage to refer to all garments as in *ticīvara* and *pañcacīvarāni* is also used specifically to refer to the *saṅghāṭi* as in the following instances where a bhikkhu is referred to as leaving his *cīvara*, i.e., the *saṅghāṭi*, behind and going out on his rounds, clad only in his upper and inner garments (... *Andhavane cīvaraṃ nikkhipitvā santaruttarena piṇḍāya pāvisi : Vin.* I, p. 298 ... *bhikkhūnaṃ hatthe cīvaraṃ nikkhipitvā santaruttarena janapadacārikaṃ pakkamanti : Vin.* III, p. 198. The same is reported of bhikkhunis at *Vin.* IV, p. 281).

Originally, the material for these garments of the Buddhist disciples appears to have been derived from bits of cloth thrown away in places like the public cemeteries and dumping grounds, cloth which in this process had accumulated a lot of dust and dirt. Thus, it came to be called the *paṃsukūla cīvara*. It was the humblest of clothing with which the Buddhist disciple was expected to be content (*nissaya : Vin.* I, p. 58).

A robe thus made of material obtained from diverse sources and perhaps of varying colour and quality had to acquire a homogeneity and uniformity to accord with the spirit of simplicity of Buddhist monasticism. Hence, the early disciples, according to the evidence of the *Vinaya Pitaka* (*Vin.* I, p. 286) appear to be attempting to dye them in a single colour. Their technique turned out to be both primitive and rustic, using such material like dung and yellow clay. Perhaps, on account of this practice of dyeing the primitive dust-heap material the Buddhist monk's robes came to be called the *kāsāya vattha*, or dyed garment. It must here be pointed out that *kāsāya* does not etymologically mean yellow. The Buddha, however, soon discovered these to be unsatisfactory as dye and recommended for use by monks six different dyes, all of vegetable origin : from roots, stems, bark, leaves, flowers and fruits (*Vin.*1, p. 286). It is to be assumed that this dyeing process had a sobering effect on the original colours of the material used. In fact, this appears to be revealed in the ban the Buddha imposed, prompted by the group of six monks, *Chabbaggiya*, on the use of robes which are 'all blue' 'all yellow,' 'all red,' 'all crimson,' 'all brownish yellow,' and 'all reddish yellow.' These robes are criticised as resembling the garments of householders who enjoy pleasures of the senses (*Vin.* 1, p. 306). This ban was placed on the nuns too (*Vin.* II, p. 267). Likewise, tailored garments like jackets (*kañcuka*) were forbidden to both monks and nuns for the same reason (*Vin.* I, p. 306 and *Vin.* II, p. 267).

However, ere long, the Buddha sanctioned the acceptance of gifts of cloth made to the monks by laymen : *gahapaticīvara* (*Anujānāmi bhikkhave gahapaticīvaram : Vin*, I, p. 280). Thus, robes made of linen, cotton, silk, wool, coarse hemp and canvas came to be sanctioned as permissible acquisitions in the area of a disciple's clothing (*atirekalābho khomaṃ kappāsaṃ kambalaṃ sānaṃ bhaṅgaṃ:*

Vin. I, p. 58). This was not to be looked upon as a reflection of a proneness to luxury, for in both cases what was expected of the disciples was simplicity in dress and a spirit of contentment (....*itarītaracīvarena pi aham bhikkhave santuṭṭhim vadāmi* : loc.cit.). Although many a disciple chose to make the use of *paṃsukūlacīvara* a life long practice, the Buddha refused to compel his disciples to do so, even at the risk of incurring the displeasure of Devadatta who, as a disciple, claimed to be an exponent of the austere way in monasticism (*Vin.* II, p. 197).

These liberties granted to the Buddhist disciple for the acceptance of a wide range of clothing material normally used by laymen seems to have made it necessary for the Vinaya to safeguard him from losing his identity among laymen (*seyyathāpi nāma gihī kāmabhogino ti: Vin.* I, p. 287). Hence, the origin of the monastic legislation that the 3 robes of the monk should be made by stitching together pieces of cloth which have been cut apart : *chinnakaṃ* (*Anujānāmi bhikkhave chinnakaṃ saṅghāṭiṃ chinnakaṃ uttarāsaṅgaṃ chinnakaṃ antaravāsakaṃ:* loc.cit.). The resultant coarseness of the patched robe is said to accord well with the abstemiousness which is characteristic of the Buddhist disciple (*chinnakaṃ ca bhavissati suttalūkhaṃ samaṇasāruppaṃ* : loc. cit.). and the fact of the robe being a patched garment also makes it a much less coveted object (*paccatthikānaṃ ca anabhijjhitaṃ:* loc. cit.).

It is also to be remembered that the Buddhist disciple was expected to possess as personal belongings or private property only a minimum of requisites. But the laymen, on their part, taking advantage of the Buddha's sanction to the monks to accept gifts of clothing from laymen, appear to have been extremely lavish in their donation of robe material. In early monastic history, *Vinaya* legislation was quick to recognize the need to channel this lay generosity to provide adequately for the needs of the community (Saṅgha) as a whole. It is legislated that whosoever monk knowingly diverts for private use gifts made to the collective organization of the Saṅgha is guilty of an offence involving expiation (*Pac.* 82 ; *Vin.* IV, p.156). In order to ensure a proper distribution of the gifts received by the Saṅgha among the membership of its commune, the *Vinaya* (*Vin.* I, p.283 ff.) makes adequate provision by appointing responsible monks to be in charge of accepting (*cīvarapaṭiggāhaka*), depositing (*cīvaranidāhaka*) and storing up (*bhaṇḍāgārika*) such gifts of robe material. Safe storage was also provided (ibid. p.284), and procedure for the distribution of robe material among the membership of the Saṅgha was laid down (ibid. p. 285).

It is clear from what has been said so far that proper monastic habit of the Buddhist disciple consisted of three robes, the *ticīvara* for the monk and five or *pañcacīvara* for the nun. This meant that they should have them close at hand, within reach and within sight, in order that they may be assured of their safety as well as their availability in time of need. *Vinaya* legislation quickly safeguarded this position by providing that no monk shall keep his three robes out of his reach (*ticīvarena avippavāsa : Vin.* I, p. 109 f.), except in specified circumstances. Under Nissaggiya Pācittiya No. 2 (*Vin* III, p.198) whoever violates this injunction shall forfeit his right for the three robes. The parallel Nissaggiya Pācittiya rule for the nuns (No. 14) fixes the number at five (*pañcahi cīvarehi vippavaseyya*). On the otherhand, in order to accord with the frugality that is expected of the Buddhist disciple it is also legislated that no monk shall keep an additional robe, beyond his set of three, for more than ten days. It is incumbent on him to renounce his ownership of it (*anujānāmi bhikkhave atirekacīvaraṃ vikappetuṃ: Vin.*I, p.289; see also *Vin.* III, p 196, Nissaggiya Pācittiya No. 2 of the monks). The nuns, too, are bound by a parallel Nissaggiya Pācittiya which involves the forfeiture of the excess article (NP 13).

One also comes across the term *cīvara* used loosely in the *Vinaya* texts to refer to additional items of clothing besides the *ticīvara* and the *pañcacīvarāni*. They form an independent list of six items (*channaṃ cīvarānaṃ aññataraṃ cīvaraṃ. Vin.*IV, p. 154 p. 283 ; also p. 296 f.) and include not only additional and part-time articles of wear like the bathing-robe (*vassikasāṭikā : Vin.*I, pp.292, 296) of the rainy season but also articles made of cloth like serviettes and towels for wiping the face (*mukhapuñchanacolakaṃ : Vin.* I, p. 297.) In the case of the nuns, equivalent to the *vassikasāṭikā* of the monks which is a bathing garment restricted to the rainy season, the Buddha sanctioned, at the request of Visākhā, a bathing garment or *udakasāṭikā*, already referred to above, for their regular use (*Vin.*IV, p.278f.) Another item which goes under the name of these additional *cīvara* and is specifically sanctioned for the use of nuns only is the *āvasatha cīvara* (*Vin.*II, p. 271). It is a *cīvara* or length of cloth, presumably in the likeness of a bed spread, to be used by menstruating nuns to sleep on. Pācittiya XLVII of the bhikkunis

(*Vin.* IV, p. 303) sanctions its use by bhikkhunis for two or three nights. On the fourth day it is to be washed and passed on to others in similar need. Sanction is also given for the acceptance of unspecified gifts of bits of cloth (*parikkhāracolaka: Vin.*I, p. 296) out of which the monks and nuns were free to make articles of monastic use like water strainers (*parissāvana*) and bags (*thavika*).

J.D.

CIVARAVASTU, or the 'section on robes', is a chapter of the Sanskrit *Vinayavastu* of the Mūlasarvāstivāda *Vinaya Piṭaka*. The manuscripts were discovered near Gilgit and were published in *Gilgit Manuscripts*, Vol. III, pt. 2, edited by Nalinaksha Dutt.

In the main, the *Civaravastu* consists of stories of such personages as Bimbisāra, Jīvaka, Visākhā and Upananda, who are connected with incidents that led to the formulation of certain rules with regard to the robes of monks and nuns.

The chapter begins with a few verses which contain a summary of its contents. The first story relates the events that led to the marriage of King Bimbisāra with Celā, the daughter of Siṃha. Khaṇḍa who was at first the chief minister of the king of Videha, later fled to Vaisālī and became the Commander-in-chief of the king's army. Gopa and Siṃha were his two sons. After the death of Khaṇḍa, Siṃha assumed the duties of his father and Gopa became the chief minister of king Bimbisāra and arranged a marriage between the king and Upacelā, a daughter of Siṃha. But, by accident, it was her sister Celā that became the chief consort. To them was born a son, named, Ajātaśatru.

The next story is that of Āmrapālī, so named as she was born in the mango-grove of the nobleman Mahānāma, who adopted her. Later she became a courtezan and, by Bimbisāra, begot a son named Abhaya.

This is followed by the story of Jīvaka's birth, by Bimbisāra, to a merchant's wife. While Abhaya chose the profession of a chariot-builder, Jīvaka chose that of a physician. Numerous incidents are narrated to show his almost miraculous healing power. He became a lay disciple of the Buddha and on a certain rainy season offered the latter a shawl which he received from the king of Videha as his fee. The Buddha requested Ānanda to cut it into pieces and make robes for him. In the same rainy season other monks, too, received many garments from the householders. Yet they did not know how they should make robes out of them. The Buddha instructed the monks to cut the garments into pieces, dye them and make robes.

An incident narrated show how king Bimbisāra mistook an Ājīvaka to be a monk and worshipped him, and how the Buddha, at the request of the king, laid down special rules regarding the sewing of the robe. Since that time, the robe was sewn out of a number of pieces of cloth in such a manner that, when spread out it appears like a stretch of paddy fields.

The story of the marriage of Visākhā and also incidents revealing her wisdom are cited in detail. It was at Visākhā's request that the Buddha laid down the rule that the monks and nuns should wear bathing-dress (*udaka-sāṭaka*) while bathing.

It is said that the Buddha, while sojourning at Vaisālī, admonished the monks to keep clean the articles used by them. He also narrated the past story of a monk who misappropriated the belongings of the Saṅgha and suffered on that account. Further, he made certain directions regarding the use of seats, bed-covers and bandages, and also in connection with the segregation of monks suffering from leprosy. For instance, he advised the monks not to use bed-covers with beautiful designs but to dye them to be dark-brown or yellowish-red.

On another occasion he forbade his disciples to wear robes made out of silk (*kauṣa*), hemp (*bhāṅga*) etc. and related the story of the peacock who lost his bride due to his lack of modesty. He also prohibited the trimming of hair, use of garments made out of leaves, antelope-skin, bark garment (*tirīṭī*), loin-cloth (*aṅganāḍikā*), blue-robes, etc. The monks were advised to appoint another monk to receive gifts on their behalf, if they happened to be away on a journey.

While at Śrāvastī the Buddha made elaborate rules regarding the distribution of robes and enumerated the eight kinds of gifts (*lābha*, q.v.) that would be received by monks. It was generally accepted that the bowl and robes of a deceased monk, though he may be under suspension (*ukṣipta*), fall to the lot of a monk who is not under suspension. The mode of disposing and the functions that should precede the disposing of bowls and robes of a deceased monk are elaborately discussed in this chapter.

The story of a monk called Upananda is cited to show the evil of hoarding articles. The Buddha upheld the view that a monk could not allocate his

belongings to another, after his death, by the execution of his will. It is described how he himself attended upon the sick monks to set an example to others.

A monk died while taking part in the water-festival (*toyikāmaha*) held by king Prasenajit. He had entrusted his robes to a monk who did not attend the festival. The Buddha decided that the robes should go to the monk to whom they were entrusted. The chapter concludes with numerous rules regarding the proper manner of using robes when they are transitted from one monk to another.

The contents of the chapter also shed much light on the customs and social conditions, as well as on the relationship between the Saṅgha and the State.

The *Civaravastu* corresponds, to a great extent, to the *Civarakkhandhaka* of the *Mahāvagga* (vii) of the Pali Vinaya Piṭaka. But it is not a mere translation of the Pali text. Lengthy stories of the lives of Jīvaka, Ambapālī, Upananda and the episodes connected with the marriages of Visākhā and Bimbisāra are dealt with briefly in the Pali text. Even with regard to certain details mentioned, there are differences between the two texts, e.g., according to the *Civaravastu*, Jīvaka was born of a wife of a merchant of Rājagṛha, while the Pali text says that he was born of the courtezan, Sālavatī.

Yet, almost all the rules that occur in the *Civaravastu* could be traced to the *Civarakkhandhaka*, though, at times, the incidents which led to the formulation of particular rules are narrated differently, e.g., the Pali text does not mention the fact that it was at the request of king Bimbisāra, who mistook an Ajīvaka to be a monk, that the Buddha instructed the monks to sew their robes in such a manner, that when spread out each robe would appear like a stretch of paddy fields. But all the minor rules given in the Pali text are not found in the *Civaravastu*. (See also E. Frauwallner, *The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature*, pp. 97–101).

The work is also extant in its Chinese and Tibetan versions as a chapter of the *Vinayavastu*.

S.K.N.

CLAIRAUDIENCE. See DIBBA-SOTA and PARA-PSYCHOLOGY.

CLAIRVOYANCE. See DIBBA-CAKKHU and PARA-PSYCHOLOGY.

CLERGY. See BHIKKHU, PABBAJITA and SAṄGHA.

COGNITION, in the strict sense of the word, is used to mean the process of knowing. As a general term it covers all the various modes of knowing such as perceiving, imagining, remembering, conceiving, judging and reasoning. Cognition, along with affection and conation, are the three basic aspects or functions of consciousness. As an aspect of the conscious life, the cognitive function is generally contrasted with the affective and the conative.

This article will be mainly confined to a discussion of the Buddhist view in general concerning the nature and function of cognition. A detailed discussion on the perceptive process will appear under s. v. **PERCEPTION.**

The central problem of the Buddha, as it is seen in the discourses, is the eradication of suffering (*dukkha*). A perusal of the recorded teaching will show that the main emphasis was laid with that end in view. According to the Buddha, the holy life which is recommended as the ideal in the teaching is lived with the aim of putting an end to the existence of suffering. In the *Kimatthiya Sutta* of the *Saṃyutta*) *Nikaya* (S. IV, p.138) the Buddha maintains that the holy life is lived for the purpose of adopting a correct attitude towards things of the world in the process of sense-cognition. According to Buddhism the process of cognition is viewed to be operative in terms of cause and effect relations. The formula as given in the *Madhupiṇḍika Sutta* (*M*. I, p. 111f.) runs as follows: "Dependent on eye, and material objects there arises visual awareness(*cakkhuviññāṇa*) The concurrence (*saṅgati*) of the three (i.e., eye, material objects and visual awareness) is sensory impingement (*phassa*). Because of sensory impingement arises feeling (*vedanā*) ; what one feels one perceives (*saṃjānāti*) whatone perceives one reasons about (*papañceti*). "So on and so forth. In this well-known formula Buddhist psychology analyses the different stages through which one comes to acquire cognitive experience.

At the first stage, through one of the sense organs like the eye or the ear, one becomes aware of an impression. Then as a result of the concurrence of the three items as mentioned in the formula, one gets into direct communication with the external world. This process is referred to in the Buddhist texts as *phassa*. Consequent to this, there arises feeling or sensation (*vedanā*). What one feels about or senses, that one perceives. This marks the initial stage leading to human knowledge and experience.

The concept of causality in Buddhism being fundamental is applicable for the explanation of the origin of sense-cognition too. Thus in the *Mahāhatthi-padopama Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya*, visual awareness, for example, is said to result from the presence of the three factors (1) an unimpaired internal visual organ of sight, (2) external visual data entering into the range of vision and (3) an appropriate act of attention on the part of the perceiving mind. It is only when these factors come together it is said that there results the 'manifestation' of visual awareness (*M*. I, p. 190). According to the Cognitive Psychologists in the west numerous transformations occur between the stimulus and the experience of the percipient. That involves not only the transformations, for instance, of the light rays into some kind of visual image but also the processes that compare that particular image in question with others stored in memory. So it appears that what one perceives, for that matter even cognizes, depends to a large extent on past experience. All this would be compatible with the implication contained in the Buddhist theory of cognition and, the philosophically pregnant term *phassa* would cover all these subtle phases of the process. It is interesting to note that Cognitive Psychologists state that perception, imagery, problem-solving, remembering and thinking are all terms that describe hypothetical stages of cognition. Yet at the same time, as Professor O.H. de A. Wijesekara has shown, the visual cognition should not be taken as created *de novo* since then the Buddhist theory would be identical with the materialistic position which held that cognition is a by-product of matter.

It is maintained that all the above-mentioned three factors must be present for the production of the visual awareness. The sutta goes on to discuss the manifestation of the other remaining five senses of cognition. So it is the same with all the six forms of cognition. Sāriputta in the *Sammā-diṭṭhi Sutta* (*M*. I, p 53f.) mentions the arising as well as the cessation of the six kinds of cognition. In the *Mahā-taṇhāsaṃkhaya Sutta* he maintains that the six kinds of awareness, namely, visual, auditory, olfactory gustatory, tactile and mental are so named because of the different corresponding media through which they are effected (*M*. I, p. 259). In the *Mahāvedalla Sutta*, Sāriputta, by way of an explanation offered to Mahakoṭṭhita, states that the five sense organs have their corresponding relevant sensory fields and they do not intrude upon or share the sensory fields of one another. But the mind occupies a unique place since it is described as a sort of coordinating factor of the different kinds of cognition (*M*.I, p.295). This is the Buddhist explanation of the origin of cognition.

The ways of knowing recognized as authentic by the then contemporary thinkers are mentioned in some of the Upaniṣads. These have been listed in the Pali canon as *diṭṭha* (seen), *suta* (heard), *muta* (felt) *viññāta* (understood) and *patta* (attained) in *Alagaddūpama Sutta* (*M*.I, p.135). In the *Māgandiya Sutta* the traditional ways of knowing are criticized (*Sn. v.* 839).

The content of knowledge, has been referred to as *ñāṇa*. In the Nikāyas (*M*.I,p, 111) the Buddha is said to be an upholder of knowledge (*ñāṇavādī*). The *Kalahavivāda Sutta* (*Sn. v.*868) refers to an instruction given by the Buddha to a sceptic to proceed along towards the path of knowledge.

Though knowledge was valued as being necessary for salvation, at the same time it is admitted as inadequate for the purpose (*Sn. v.*789). This is not a contradictory position, as it can be understood to mean that as means of salvation, knowledge is not sufficient, yet it is necessary.

The significance of cognition seems to have been valued as a contributory factor towards the fulfilment of the general scheme of salvation. So Buddhism speaks of two kinds of cognition, both sensory as well as extra-sensory. Cognition, far from being allowed to take its own course, is made in Buddhism the basis of real religious culture. This consists mainly of a realistic understanding of things as they are (*yathābhūta ñāṇa*). But the true knowledge of things arises only when the mind is cleansed of all defilements. For it is said that when the mind is obsessed with the five impediments (*nīvaraṇas*) the advent of knowledge is hampered. On the other hand, the cultivation of the seven factors of Enlightenment (*satta bojjhaṅga*) is said to be the necessary condition for the arising of true knowledge.

S.W.

COHERENCE. See EPISTEMOLOGY and TRUTH.

COHESION is the 'sticking together'[1] or the 'force with which molecules cohere'[1] and is to be reckoned as an 'energy' among the properties of solids or liquids.[2] It is 'the tendency to remain united,'[1] the tendency producing solidity or rigidity

1 Fowler and Fowler, *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English*, Fifth Ed., Reprint 1972, s.v 'Cohesion'.

2 Modern science maintains that "In nature there is not a sharp boundary line between those substances that we commonly think of as ideal solids and those we think of as ideal liquids" s. v. SOLID STATE PHYSICS, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1962 ed., Vol. 20. Incidentally, cohesion as a bonding force, though with lesser magnitude has to be recognised at the gaseous state of matter, as well.

in matter. In Buddhist philosophical terminology, cohesion is known as *āpo-dhātu*, the element of wetness or fluidity or the essential element in water, i.e., the element of cohesion.

In the history of Indian thought, the beginnings of the theory of elements (*mahābhūtas*) constituting matter was pre-Buddhistic. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*,[3] for instance, refers to the three elements, (*a*) heat (*tejaḥ*), (*b*) water (*āpam*) and (*c*) earth (*annaḥ*), giving their qualities as (*a*) the redness of fire (*yadagne rohitaṃ rūpam*), (*b*) the whiteness, i.e., the colourlessness of water (*yac chuklam*) and (*c*) whatever is dark (*yat kṛṣṇam*),[4] respectively. These elements (which, incidentally, are said to emanate from *Sat* or the Original Being) are shown as producing in different combinations all existing things. Wind (*vāyu*) is sometimes mentioned as the fourth element ; and together with *vāyu*, Buddhism recognizes all the four (*cattāro mahābhūtā*)[5], and Buddhist scholasticism interprets them as follows:

paṭhavī	—	solidity and extension or expansion
āpo	—	viscidity or cohesion.
tejo	—	the temperature of heat and cold.
vāyo	—	motion, (and subsequently, the 'cause' of motion).

Post-Buddhistic Indian thought, in particular, considers space (*ākāśa*) as a fifth element.[6]

Buddhism counts viscidity and cohesion (i.e., *āpo-dhātu*) among the constituents of primary matter (*bhūta-rūpa*), although a few later day schools of Indian thought like the *Vaiśeṣika* came to regard *āpo-dhātu* only as an attribute of matter. The Buddhist position, however, as pointed out by students of the subject,[7] is parallel to the Sāṅkhya view that the three *guṇas* of that system go to form the constituents of *prakṛti*, i.e., primordial matter. Since the proper understanding of the aggregates of being (*khandhas*) among which matter or corporeality is one, is essential, according to Buddhism for the attainment of emancipation, [8] the analysis of matter into its constituents and the attitude that one should adopt towards them[9] are of great significance for Buddhist thought. Thus, in dealing with the elements of matter their characteristics have been carefully examined, especially in the Abhidhamma tradition. Furthermore, Buddhism being neither nihilistic nor idealistic in its interpretation of external reality, cohesion (together with the other constituents of matter) will no doubt continue to remain meaningful to the individual upto the attainment of Nibbāna.

While the Nikāyas mostly interpret *āpo-dhātu* at the popular level as "water" (*āpo*) or "whatever that is watery' (*āpo-gataṃ*), it is in the Abhidhamma that we meet with a clear-cut theory regarding it. According to the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* 'the element of *āpo*' (*āpo-dhātu*) implies the liquidity (*davatā*) or viscidity (*sineha*) and the cohesion or the binding together which is present in matter (*rūpassa bandhanattaṃ*).[10] On this point all the Buddhist schools concur.[11] The Commentary to the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* states that *āpo-dhātu* " gives solidity or rigidity by binding together " (*āpodhātu eva ābandhitvā thaddhāni karoti*)[12] such things as iron, stones, mountains, etc., and thereby they become rigid (*āpodhātuyā ābaddhattā'va thaddhāni honti*).[13] With rigidity comes continuity, and this is a point noted by the Vaibhāṣikas.

Cohesion should, therefore, be looked upon as the functional aspect of *āpo-dhātu*, and *āpo-dhātu* itself is said to manifest through such cohesion (*āpodhātu saṅgahapaccupaṭṭhānā*)[13]. Can cohesion be physically sensed ? The Theravādins answer in the negative[14]. Their position is that the presence of cohesion in primary matter has to be inferred through the fact of rigidity and continuity inherent in such matter with its duration in time and extension in space.

It has also to be noted that, in the Buddhist view, no primary element could exist by itself, i.e., independently of the remaining three. The

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3 *Chāndogya*, vi. 2 *et* 4.

4 Ibid. vi. 4.

5 *D.*I, p. 215 *et passim.*

6 Although *ākāśa* is sometimes enumerated together with the four *mahābhūtas* in Buddhist literature (cf. *D.*III, p. 247) its treatment is different from that of the rest. These, together with *viññāṇa*, are also reckoned as as the six elements (*cha dhātuyo*). Cf. D- III,247 ; M- III, 31, 62, 240 ; A. I, 175 sq. ; Ps. I, 136 ; Vbh. 82 sq.

7 Cf. art. 'ATOMIC THEORY' in Hastings, *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* ; and Y. Karunadasa, *Buddhist Analysis of Matter*, Colombo, 1967, p.22.

8 Cf. *D.* II, p.35 *et M.*I, pp.84 ff. Also cf. Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the word "Dharma"*, Second ed., Calcutta, 1956, p. 60.

9 Cf. *M.* I, p. 4 ff. Also cf A. II, p. 164 f.

10 *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, p. 177.

11 Y. Karunadasa, op. cit., p. 19

12 *Atthasālinī*, p. 335.

13 Ibid.p. 332.

14 The schools of Sanskrit Buddhism include all the four under tactile sensation (*spraṣṭavyāyatana*).

Tikapaṭṭhāna describes their relationship as 'reciprocally co-nascent' (*aññamaññasahajāta*).[15] Therefore, the cohesion found in *paṭhavī*, *tejo* and *vāyo* is due to the presence of *āpodhātu* in each. While this means that all the four primary elements are present in every instance of matter, the Abhidhammikas maintain that these elements, in equal proportion, go to form each and every material thing, and that the diversity between two given material objects is due to the 'intensity' (*ussada*) of any one primary element over the others. Furthermore, while *paṭhavī*, *tejo* and *vāyo* come within the range of tactile sensation (*phoṭṭhabba*), cohesion, as noted above, (at least according to the Theravādins), has to be inferred. Accordingly, the interesting fact that even regarding water the presence of *āpo-dhātu* has to be inferred may be seen through the remarks of S. Z. Aung, succintly expressed thus:

"... When one puts his hand into cold water, the softness of water felt is not *āpo*, but *paṭhavī*; the cold felt is not *āpo*, but *tejo*; the pressure felt is not *āpo*, but *vāyo*..."[16] Theravāda Buddhism, therefore, counts cohesion under *dhammāyatana*,[17] the field of the objects of ideation.

L.P.N.PERERA

COLAS were a South Indian people, who had formed, along with Pandyas and Keralas (Coras), the Tamil country of ancient India. Their origin is lost in the mists of antiquity, but they were believed to have ruled from time immemorial, in the country called after them (roughly the Tanjore and Tirucinapalli districts of the Kaveri valley) (*University History of Ceylon*, Colombo, 1959, Vol. I, Pt. I, p. 282).

The earliest references to the Colas in the Asokan edicts, in the *Periplus Maris Erythraci*, and by Ptolemy, the geographer, are few and meagre and do not throw sufficient light on the early origins of the Colas in the pre-Christian era (Nilakanta Sastri, *The Colas*, Madras, 1955, p. 21 ff.).

Colas appear in the annals of Indian history as an ethnic group denizened in S. India from very early times. But the part played by the Colas as a ruling dynasty in South India does not seem to be clearly manifested until the emergence of the Imperial Colas in the tenth century A.C.

In the study of Buddhism in South India Colas play an important part being both followers of Buddhism and patrons of the religion as well. The absence of any scientific analysis of South Indian Buddhist remains however makes it difficult to evaluate in full the contribution made to Buddhism by the Colas. It is only by assembling the available evidence and synchronising them with some survivals of Buddhist cultural remains in South India that one could obtain whatever relationship the Colas had with Buddhism from early times. However, both literary evidence and art remains could be found in regard to the contributions of Colas towards the Buddhist religion in and after the 10th century.

The legends of pre-historic Cola rulers referred to in the 'Sangam' epics seem to have been derived from Buddhist Jātaka tales, e.g., early Tamil epic references to Sambiyan, Manucola (K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, *The Colas*, Madras, 1955, p. 19 f.). The reference to Buddhist cultural remains in the post Sangam Tamil poems too is an index to the prevalence of Buddhism in the South Indian Cola territory from very early times. In the post-Sangam epic *Manimekalai* it is mentioned that an early Cola king, named, Killivalan (2nd century A.C.) converted a prison house into a charity house at the request of the Buddhist nun, 'Manimekalai,' and gifted it to Buddhists who utilized the building for a "Palli" and a charity house.

But the problem as to the early origin of Colas in the pre-Christian or early Christian era as a powerful dynasty in South India still remains unsolved despite references to a rich Cola civilization centered around the Cola capital 'Puhar' and other sites in the Sangam epics. No vestiges, other than some megalithic remains, of any cultural activities of such an advanced civilization in the Cola territory, belonging to the pre-Christian or early Christian centuries have so far been discovered and this makes it more difficult for the students of early Cola history to evaluate the antiquity of Cola civilization.

The seventh century reference to the country by the Chinese itinerant bhikkhu Hsüan-tsang too does not prove to be of any help to the student of Cola history. It is probable that Hsüan-tsang's narrative of many regions south of Dekkan, including Siṃhala (Sri Lanka) was made purely

15 *Tikapaṭṭhāna*, pp. 3 *et* 14.
16 *Compendium of Philosophy*, (*PTS*. 1910), Reprint, 1956 p. 155, n. 6.
17 *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, p. 179.

out of reports and mere hearsay without any personal experience obtained by the author himself having made visits to those regions. Scholars are of opinion that Hsüan-tsang did not travel in most of the southern parts of India. (S. Beal, *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, Indian ed., Calcutta, 1958, Vol. 4, p. 428 ff.). A painstaking recorder of historical facts as well as legends and myths, Hsüan-tsang, had, strangely enough, nothing much to say on the Cola country other than its sparse population sans a ruler, and a sole survival of a Buddhist saṅghārāma.

The historical chronicle of the Sinhalese, the *Mahāvaṃsa* speaks of early relationships between Sri Lanka and the Cola country, both cordial as well as hostile. A Cola prince named Elāra (var. E|ā|a, 205-161 B.C.) had conquered and ruled Sri Lanka for forty-four years in the pre-Christian era. Although he was not a Buddhist, he had been an impartial ruler and a patron of Buddhism according to the *Mahāvaṃsa*.

In the third century A.C. when king Goṭhābhaya was ruling in Sri Lanka a Cola monk named Saṅghamitta came over to Sri Lanka from the Kaveri region and caused much religious turmoil by trying to spread dissentient views unacceptable to the followers of orthodox Buddhism. This Cola monk, according to the chronicle, was instrumental in razing the Mahāvihāra to the ground by instigating the Sinhala monarch Mahāsena (cir. 275-301 A.C.). It is probable that the Cola country during this period (roughly the Tanjore and Tirucinapalli districts of the Kaveri valley) was under the rule of a dynasty of Buddhist kings known as Kāoḷābhrās.

Other than Saṅghamitta, there were however polymath bhikkhus who hailed from the Cola country in and after this period. The great theras Buddhadatta and Dhammapāla (contemporaries of Buddhaghosa) were residents of the Cola country. Buddhadatta was already in Sri Lanka before Buddhaghosa arrived in the island. His *Abhidhammāvatāra* shows much similarity with Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga*. The *Jinālaṅkāra* and *Madhuratthavilāsinī*, a commentary on *Buddhavaṃsa*, are also ascribed to him. The Cola monk Dhammapāla was unquestionably the greatest of Buddhaghosa's successors. He is the author of the commentaries on the works of the *Khuddaka Nikāya* (W. Geiger, *Culture of Ceylon in Mediaeval times*, ed. Heinz Bechert, Wiesbaden, 1960, paras 68-71; but see, *University History of Ceylon*, Colombo, 1959, Vol. I, p. 390 f.). The author of the commentary on the *Nettippakaraṇa* who resided in a monastery at Nāgapaṭṭinam in the Cola country is believed by some to be none other than this same Dharmapāla (*University History of Ceylon*, op. cit. p. 391). Another Cola monk named Dīpaṅkara was the author of *Rūpasiddhi*, a Pali grammar, and *Pajjamadhu*, a beautiful poem in Sanskrit style (loc. cit.; *Nikāyasaṃgrahaya*, text. ed. M. Cumaranatunga, Colombo, 1921 p. 22).

The rise of the Colas from Vijayālaya and Āditya onwards during the 9th century was followed by a successful establishment of Cola imperial authority over South India and subsequent expansion of Cola influence overseas. The available Buddhist remains in the Cola country show that Buddhism began to flourish in this region by about the 4th and the 5th centuries and had reached a remarkable development by about the 9th century. The advent of Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism in South India during and after the Pallava period eclipsed Buddhism in the Cola country but it is very probable that Buddhism had a considerable influence even up to late mediaeval times in the Kāveri basin over religious beliefs and practices.

The discovery of innumerable Buddhist icons and votive stūpas at possible vihāra sites in the Cola country has been studied by several scholars. T. N. Ramachandran, writing on *The Nāgapaṭṭinam and other Buddhist Bronzes in the Madras Museum* (*The Bulletin of the Madras Government Museum*, Madras, 1954) states, that these Cola Buddhist bronzes date from periods ranging from the 8th to the 17th century and he also sees in them the stamp of the Cola artist with several extraneous influences including those of the Andhras, Guptas, Pallavas, Sailendras, Simhalas and Pālas, i.e., Bengali (op. cit. pp. 47, 53, 55).

A close study of the earliest phase Cola icons and especially those belonging to Buddhist cults, show remarkable similarity with the products of the sculptor's art of the Sinhalese. These Buddhist icons of the early phase could be those that have been produced during the reign of Kālābhras when Sri Lanka and the Cola country had had religious intercourse as evident from the literary references. Buddhadatta, the author of the *Vinaya-vinicchaya*, who visited Sri Lanka before the great commentator Buddhaghosa, states at the end of his work that it was commenced and concluded during the reign of king Accyuta of the Kālābhra dynasty (*Buddhadatta's Manuals*, part II, p. 229, *v.* 3179).

The miniature bronze images of the Buddha and Avalokiteśvara bronzes discovered at Nāgapattinam could be well compared with the early bronzes of these types discovered at Anuradhapura in Sri Lanka. In regard to the Buddha images, the leg-posture, the *dhyāni-mudrā* in which both hands are kept, the way the *cīvara* (robe) is draped all go to indicate a close affinity with the early Sinhalese types. (Pl. XXXVIII, Fig. 1). Likewise the Avalokiteśvara figures too, in the Mahārājalilā, without much ornamentation are but crude copies of the early Anuradhapura types. (Pl. XXXVIII, Fig.2).

Several other available products of early Cola plastic art show similar traces of Sinhalese influence.[1] (Pl. XXXVI) A wide variety of stone Buddha images in *dhyāni* attitude and *padmāsana* leg-position dating from the 11th to the 13th century A.C. discovered at sites that were once in the Cola territory, all depict the peculiar pose of ancient Sinhalese seated Buddha images discovered both at Anurâdhapura and elsewhere in the Sinhalese kingdom.[2] (Pl. XXXVII). It could be definite that most of these seated Buddha images bear the stamp of Cola art, but the apparent influence of Sinhalese sculptor's art in them too could not be ignored. Several Buddha images of this type with the *Padmāsana* (right leg kept easily on the left as in the case of almost all ancient seated Buddha images of the Sinhalese repertoire) have been discovered in the South-east Asian region. But in these too, it has been proved that it was the influence of the Sinhalese sculptor's art that had paved the way for this particular type of cult image of the Buddha.[3] This particular type of the Buddha image (right-leg kept above the left and both palms are brought together and kept one above the other in the meditation attitude) is not completely absent in the Indian field. In the Amarāvatī and Nāgārjunīkoṇḍa bas-reliefs this type of the Buddha image is found. In every other Indian school of Buddhist art it was the *Vajraparyaṅka* (the difficult cross-legged posture) that was prevalent. Even in the Javanese school (of Śailendras or otherwise) the same type prevailed. If at all there had been art influences from the South Asian field it was the Śailendra Buddhist art that would have influenced the Cola artists, as it was the Srī Vijaya kingdom that the Colas brought under their yoke in the 11th century when Cola thalassocracy was at its height. But in the majority of the seated Buddha images referred to above, no traces of Javanese Buddha types are seen. The Cola supremacy over the Malaysian region would have resulted in bringing down Śrī Vijaya artists and craftsmen to the Cola kingdom. On the other hand, during peaceful times, the Śailendras had had the occassion to send their own craftsmen and builders to the Cola territory and caused to be built Buddhist monuments there. There existed at Nāgapaṭṭinam during this period (871–1250 A.C.) a colony of Malay (Javanese) Buddhists particularly from Śrī Vijaya who gave a new lease of life to the declining Buddhism of South India with the aid of subsidies granted by their Śailendra monarchs. Being patronised by the Cola kings they built at least two temples at the beginning of the 11th century. The former '*Rājarāja-perumpalli*' and the latter '*Rājendra Cola-perumpalli,*' were named after Rājarāja I and the latter after Rājendra Cola I during whose reign they were respectively built. The former was evidently the chapel of a vihāra, known as the 'Cūḍāmaṇivarma-vihāra', which, including its chapel, was built during the reign of Rājarāja I by Śrī Māra Vijayottungavarman, the son of Cūḍāmaṇivarman of the Śailendra dynasty, king of Kataha (Kadāram) and Śrī Vijaya and dedicated to the memory of his father. In Sri Lanka too, Colas have been patrons of Buddhism during their short span of military rule (cir. 1017–1070 A.C.). There is conclusive evidence to prove that Cola patronage extended to the great Buddhist monastic establishment at the ancient Velgam vihāra, near Trincomalee which the Colas had

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1 A. Aiyappan and P. R. Srinivasan, *The Story of Buddhism with special reference to South India*, A Government of India publication, Madras, 1960, Pl. VI, fig. 9, standing Buddha granite from Kāñcipuram 6–7th century A. C. now in the Madras Museum, show very close resemblance to many stone figures of the Buddha from ancient Sri Lanka (Cf. N. D. Wijesekera, *Early Sinhalese Sculpture*, Colombo, 1962, fig. 6, fig. 7, fig. 9, fig. 10, fig. 11; D. T. Devendra, *The Buddha Image and Ceylon*, Colombo and Kandy, 1957, Pls. VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII) ; in Pl. X, fig. 13, Maitreya, bronze, 9th century A. C. from Melayur, Tanjor District, Pl. X. fig. 14, standing Buddha on plain Padmāsana, bronze 10th century A. C. from Nāgapaṭṭinam, typical of early standing bronze and stone Buddha images from Sri Lanka. Dietrich Seckel too believes that this type of Buddha images may have been originated in Sri Lanka (D. Seckel, *The Art of Buddhism*, Methuen, London, 1964, Pl. 13, p. 168 f.)

2 A. Aiyappan and P. R. Srinivasan, op. cit. Pl. XIV fig. 18, Pl. XV, fig. 19, Pl. XVI, fig. 20, Pl. XVII, fig. 21, Pl. XVIII, fig. 22, Pl. XX, fig. 24, Pl. XXI fig. 25, Pl. XXIV fig. 28, Pl. XXV, fig. 29, in Bhūmisparsamudrā but the leg posture is Padmāsana, Pl. XXVI, fig. 30, Pl. XXVII, fig. 31, Pl. XXXIII, fig. 37, Pl. XXXIV, fig. 38, Pl. XXXV, fig. 39, seated below a double torana arch, Pl. XXXVII, fig. 41, Pl. XXXVIII, fig. 42.

3 Compare Sihinga Buddha in Thailand, the Dong-Duong Buddha and the Javanese standing images in D. Seckel, op. cit p. 168; A. B. Griswold, *Towards the history of Sukhodaya Art*, Bangkok, 1967, pp. 20–23; see further Siri Gunasingha, *A Sinhalese contribution to the development of the Buddha image*, The Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies, Vol. 3 for 1960, No. 1, pp. 59–60; D. T. Devendra, *The Buddha Image and Ceylon*, Colombo and Kandy, 1957.

named *Rājarājaperumpalli* after the great Cola monarch (S. Paranavitana, *Glimpses of Ceylon's Past*, Colombo, 1972, p. 161 ff. and Pl. XV). Nevertheless, there appears to have been a formidable attempt made by the Buddhists of Sri Lanka, particularly the members of the monastic order, to maintain their identity as well as orthodox character, against the overwhelming influence of Coliyan Buddhism. Vācissara Thera, a Sinhala ācariya (Sinhala scholar) of the 13th century, in the concluding verses of his *Sīmālaṅkārasaṃgaha* which is a Vinaya treatise on the main teachings on the subject of *sīmā*, is very critical of the dissentient views of the Coliyan monks on matters relating to *sīmā*. He claims that he has successfully argued against their views and established the *Sīhala sīmā* tradition. He prays that the unorthodox Coliyan views be rejected by those who desire the stability and well-being of the Sāsana (*Sīmālaṅkārasaṃgaha*, v. 97).

On the other hand, the powerful monarchy at Anuradhapura, established for more than a millennium before the rise of the Imperial Colas, would have had the opportunity of maintaining close cultural contacts with the neighbouring kingdoms in South India during peaceful times and when hostilities broke out there would have been instances of both art-pieces and artists being taken over to the other shore to enrich the religious monuments of the Colas, Pandyas and other South Indian potentates. This would be the most plausible explanation an art-historian could provide to explain the presence of innumerable discoveries of Buddhist images both in metal and stone, in the Cola territory, which have been identified as Cola masterpieces. Most of the Cola masterpieces of plastic art were often treated as showing traits of Pallava, Gupta, Andhra and even Pāla influences.

One cannot rule out the possibility of the influences of the above mentioned art schools on the Buddhist art of the Colas, but it would be an extremely inadequate treatment if the amount of influence by the Sinhalese school of Buddhist art on that of South India is not accounted for.[4] Several sculptural pieces of Cola art produced after the dynasty's imperial expansion show clear signs of Sinhalese influence. This was quite possible since, after their successful conquest of Sri Lanka, Colas would have also taken away the artists from Sri Lanka, along with the other booty and at the same time it is also possible that with the fall of the Sinhalese royal house, the artists of Sri Lanka had sought both the refuge and patronage in the court of their new imperial masters in South India, as had been the case of the Achaeminid artists in the court of the imperial Mauryas.

A.D.T.E.P.

COMMEMORATION OF THE DEAD. Death, according to Buddhism, is a natural event, a break in the process of continuity, marking the end of one life-span. One who is born inevitably succumbs to death and death is unfailingly followed by birth, except in the case of the arhant who has terminated the samsāric process of birth and death. Thus, the Buddhists are taught not to attach any special significance either to birth or death. The attitude that one should adopt with regard to these events is very tersely given in the verses ascribed to Paṭācārā (*Thig.* p. 136). Therein it is very succinctly pointed out that as beings are born into our midst uninvited and depart from hence even without sanction, weeping and grieving over their death is of no avail. It admonishes us to consider death as a normal, inevitable event. From this it becomes very clear that the Buddhist position is that one, without lamenting over the loss of those who are dead and gone, should adopt a disinterested, detached attitude towards them. Nevertheless, out of a sense of gratitude one is prompted to make expiatory intercessional offerings on their behalf, thinking of the good deeds done by them during their life time.

Evidently detachment is the ideal attitude. Yet it is seen that only a few who have overcome general human weaknesses and also acquired complete control over human emotions are able to put into practice such an attitude. Even during the time of the Buddha men who were mentally and spiritually so advanced were in a minority among the adherents of Buddhism. This became more and more the case when Buddhism became the religion of the masses. Most of the new converts were followers of Brahmanic religion prevalent at the time, and rites and practices connected with the dead played an important role in this religion. It is seen that those practices which were mainly motivated by filial piety were basically commemorative in nature, for these were performed by grateful sons to redeem the dead parents from their state of woeful existence.

4. See further *EW.* Vol. 20 1970 p. 138 on. 58.

The new converts to Buddhism brought along with them these practices which are alien to the spirit of original Buddhism. On the one hand, Buddhism could not afford to shut them out completely, for such practices happened to be deeply ingrained in the way of life of the masses. On the other, Buddhist teachings of Kamma, re-birth, after-life and filial piety appear to have unwittingly left the door partially opened for such beliefs to find their way into Buddhism. Thus, for practical, utilitarian and other inevitable reasons, Buddhism soon after its rise, had to accomodate certain rites performed in connection with the commemoration of the dead.

It is possible to surmise that the pre-Buddhistic indigenous practice of erecting tūpas over the remains of the dead was adopted by Buddhism to satisfy the needs of these converts. In adopting this practice, Buddhism gave it a new orientation in keeping with the ethical teachings of Buddhism and the needs of the Buddhists. The *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* (*D.* II, p. 142 f.) enumerating the types of persons deserving such commemorative mounds says that stūpas should be erected over the remains of a Buddha, a Paccekabuddha, an arahant as they did over the remains of a Cakkavatti king. Primarily, Buddhism, just as much as the prevalent local belief of the time, considered this a very appropriate way of showing honour and respect to the worthy. Undoubtedly, this also helped to keep alive the memory of such exalted persons worthy of reverence. Besides, Buddhism added a new dimension to the intended purpose of this practice by pointing out that such stūpas have a special commemorative purpose in that they help many to recall the memory concerning such reverential men and gain inspiration thereby. Such recollection, it is said, calms and gladdens the mind and eventually becomes instrumental in securing happy rebirth for the person concerned.

The Pali Nikāyas also indicate the adoption of other popular practices connected with the commemoration of the dead, for example, the *Siṅgālovāda Sutta* (*D.* III, p. 189) explicitly acknowledges that making of offerings to the dead is an incumbent duty of a child (*Atha ca pana petānaṃ kālakatānaṃ dakkhiṇam anuppadassāmi*). The *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (III, p. 43) also corroborates this. The exact nature of the practice is not clear from the above mentioned sources. These two sources appear to suggest that the Buddhists took over the prevalent brahmanic practice without much change of pattern or purpose. The major change that could have taken place is the substitution of monks in place of Brahmins, to whom the offerings were given and who then became the medium through which the offerings were transferred to the dead.

Another sutta in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (V, p. 269), which appears to be of late origin, too, support, the view that basically there was not much difference between the commemorative practices performed by the Brahmins and the Buddhists. Herein Jānussoni is represented as enquiring from the Buddha regarding the latter's view on making offerings to the dead. Jānussoni is made to declare that brahmins perform *śrāddha* sacrifices to the dead with the hope that kinsmen and blood-relations who are dead may enjoy such offerings. Jānussoni wished to know whether, according to the Buddha's opinion, these offerings really reach the dead and whether in fact they enjoy them. In answering him the Buddha is purported to have said that when there is good ground the offerings reach the dead and they enjoy them. Elucidating further the Buddha is said to have declared that only those who are born in the realm of *petas* (*pettivisaya*) benefitted by such rites. If one is to accept that Jānussoni's description of the brahmanic practice represents a true picture of the practice as followed by the Brahmins, then according to the context, one has to conclude that the Buddhists, too, followed a very much similar practice. According to this particular context the Buddha himself endorses it with a few modifications, and this shows that the Buddhists of the time did not see much difference between the two practices. The importance of this sutta is seen by the fact that it is quoted in the *Petavatthu Aṭṭhakathā* (p. 27) as well as in the *Khuddaka-pāṭha Aṭṭhakathā* (p. 210) in support of the ideas presented therein. This sutta depicts, also, a stage of development of the commemorative rite under Buddhist influence, and the modification seen in the brahmanic mode of practice, as put forward by Jānussoni may have been due to this Buddhist influence. From this sutta it becomes clear, also, that by this time the Buddhists accepted the position that such commemorative rites are of benefit only to a particular category among the dead, i.e., to those who are born in the realm of the *petas*, and that these rites could be performed by any surviving relative and not necessarily by the son. According to the early brahmanic belief this was considered the sole right of the son and consequently the sonless parents were condemned to eternal suffering. Such a belief enhanced the position of the son in the family at the expense of the daughter. Undoubtedly, this Buddhist innovation was instrumental in raising the position of the daughter particularly in the family and generally in the society.

Rites performed for the purpose of commemoration and benefit of the dead became an important aspect of popular Buddhism. The popularity of the *Tirokuḍḍa Sutta* occurring in the *Petavatthu* (p. 4) and the *Khuddaka-pāṭha* (p. 6), both belonging to the *Khuddaka Nikāya*, bears evidence to this. In firmly establishing this practice, the sutta says that the sole source of nourishment for the *petas* is what their surviving relatives offer them. It admonishes the surviving relations to gratefully remember the kind services rendered to them by the dead when they were alive, thus inculcating in them a sense of gratitude and impelling them to perfom the due rites. Mahāyāna texts such as the *Avadānaśataka*, also, contain numerous references to *petas* receiving nourishment through offerings made by surviving relatives. The belief in an intermediary state (*antarābhava*, q.v.) between death and rebirth was also instrumental to a great extent in further establishing the practice of performing these rites.

The *Milindapañha* and the *Saddhammopāyana* point to a further stage of development in the belief connected with the commemoration of the dead. These texts state that there are four classes of *petas* and of these only the last class called the *paradattūpajīvī* (i.e., those who sustain themselves on what is given by others) could benefit by such offerings. This clearly is an extension of the view found in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (V, p. 269).

The main purpose behind these rites performed for the sake of the dead seems to be to provide them with their daily needs such as food, water and clothing which are not available in the realm of the *petas* (*PvuA*.p. 23; *Saddhammopāyana*, *JPTS*. 1887,p.64).

This is not different from the purpose behind the parallel brahmanic practice. The Buddhist belief is that to achieve this purpose, the surviving donor has to remember the dead and specifically assign to them the offerings made to the Saṅgha on their behalf. How these numerous items partaken by the Saṅgha get transferred to the particular *petas* is not explained in the texts. But it could be gleaned from references scattered in Buddhist texts that this happens through the efficacy of the merit generated by making offerings to the Saṅgha. The *Milindapañha* (p. 294) suggests that this takes place as a consequence (*vipāka*) of the good action of making offerings to the Saṅgha.

The *Petavatthu Aṭṭhakathā* (p. 27) also makes an attempt, though feeble, to show that it is merit that is offered to the *petas*. In quoting the sutta in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (V. p.269), it substitutes the phrase *mayam ..... brāhmaṇā nāma dānāni dema puññāni karoma*. It could be surmised that the substitution of *puñña* (merit) in place of *saddha* (Skt. *śrāddha* rites) is a deliberate attempt to elevate this commemorative rite from the level of sympathetic magic to that of an ethical duty. Merit is considered a generative force capable of bringing about the bestowal of desired objects. Perhaps, it is on this assumption that it came to be considered that the 'transference of merit' conduce to the well-being of the dead. Though the generative power of merit is recognised in Buddhism, the belief that one could employ one's own merit to the benefit of another appears to be alien to early Buddhist teachings. The fact that this belief did not go uncontested, even at a comparatively early period, is seen from the *Kathāvatthu* (p. 347 f.) which makes allusions to a controversy regarding the possibility of directing one's merit to benefit another. Inspite of the opposition this belief took firm root, and it is much in vogue in popular Buddhism.

It is quite evident that the form of Buddhism that spread from India to other countries contained in it a firm belief in the efficacy of the commemorative rites. This belief, it is seen, helped the rapid establishment and spread of Buddhism in foreign lands. This fact is quite evident from the history of Buddhism in Sri Lanka. A perusal of Mahinda's initial missionary activity in Sri Lanka shows how he purposefully employed the particular sutta, dealing with the dead and after-life. With the help of the ideas found in the *Petavatthu* and *Vimānavatthu* he cleverly grafted to Buddhism the local beliefs connected with ancestor-worship. He transformed the local practice of ancestor-worship into a practice which appeared more like a commemoration ceremony held to remember and benefit the dead. This idea gained much importance in popular Buddhism of Sri Lanka, and rites performed with the intent of commemorating and benefiting the dead are much prevalent even in present day Buddhism of the country. Thus, it is seen that before the disposal of the dead body, monks are invited and a ceremony is performed for the sake of the dead at which merit is transferred to the dead one. This, today, is an indispensable funeral rite of the Buddhists. Subsequently, usually on the seventh day after the death, an offereing of food is made to monks at the home of the deceased, and the merit accruing from this act is transferred to the dead for his benefit. Very often these rites are repeated at the end of three months and one year after the death. Generally this rite became an annual event at which all the

relatives of the deceased gather at the home where the commemorative rite is held and participate in the alms-giving ceremony to show their gratitude to the dead. See ANCESTOR-WORSHIP, ANUMODANĀ and DAKKHIṆĀ.

This process of assimilation of local beliefs connected with the dead took place wherever Buddhism spread. In China it was a fusion of memorial services found in Confucianism and Taoism with Buddhist beliefs. Korea inherited from China these syncretic practices which once again got blended with local practices. It is in Japanese Buddhism that commemoration of the dead occupies a very important place. The Japanese inherited Chinese Buddhist beliefs at the beginning through Korea and later directly from China itself. These Buddhist pretices connected with commemoration of the dead got amalgamated with the cult of ancestor-worship in Shintoism. What is prevalent in Japan today is a harmonious blending of all these beliefs. Commemoration of the dead has become an important institution in Japanese Buddhism that is performed on a national scale. Bon (q.v.) ceremony is a very popular Buddhist commemorative service held for several days under the belief that it will benefit the dead who call at the homes of the surviving relatives. An attempt is made to trace back its origin to an old Indian belief. However, scholars are not agreed on the question of its origin. Though Bon ceremony was at one time popular in China, too, at present it is considered as a completely Japanese practice. Besides this ceremony Japanese perform another memorial service called '*Segaki-e*' specially held for the repose of the dead who have no surviving relatives to conduct memorial services on their behalf. '*Kawa segaki*' and '*Umi segaki*' are two commemorative services held for the benefit of those who die by drowing. See also DEAD, THE DISPOSAL OF THE,

S.K.N.

COMMENTARIES. A commentary is defined as a treatise consisting of a series of comments on a text. Buddhist religious texts which have come down to us in diverse language media (see LITERATURE : Pali, Sanskrit, Chinese, Tibetan) evince the growth of a vast commentarial literature around them. We may begin with the literature in Pali whose canonical texts (see CANON : Pali) are believed to be older than those extant in any other language and whose authorship is generally ascribed to the Buddha himself. It appears that even in the Buddha's day many of his sermons were beyond the grasp of the average listener. This was due both to the depth and profundity of the basic problems he was analysing and to the fact that his disciples were drawn from a wide range of persons of varying intellectual capacity.

There is a statement of considerable historical significance in the *Madhupiṇḍika Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* in which one could trace the origin of the commentarial tradition with the early Buddhist disciples. The need for clarification of the words of the Buddha for a fuller comprehension of their meaning both for the perfection of the religious life and for the efficient administration of the Saṅgha community was accepted without question.

" Now, who can explain in full the meaning of this recital recited in brief by the Lord but whose meaning was not explained in full ? Then, Lord, it occurred to us : ' Now the venerable Kaccāna the Great is both praised by the Lord and revered by intelligent fellow Brahma-farers. The venerable Kaccāna the Great is able to explain in full the meaning of this recital recited in brief by the Lord, but whose meaning was not explained in full '. Then we, Lord, approached the venerable Kaccāna the Great ; having approached, we questioned the venerable Kaccāna the Great on this meaning. The meaning of those (words) was explained to us, Lord, by the venerable Kaccāna the Great by these methods, by these sentences, by these words. " (*Middle Length Saying*, I, p. 147 ; *M*. I, p. 113 f.). The method of analysis and explanation adopted by the venerable Mahā Kaccāna on this occasion is described as ' *imehi ākārehi imehi padehi imehi vyañjanehi attho vibhatto* '. Here we notice that the search is for *attha* or meaning. Hence the general body of commentaries in Pali came to be designated by the term *atthakathā* or more regularly *aṭṭhakathā* (q.v.), i.e., discussion of meaning. We also notice the use of the word *vibhatta* (past participle form of *vibhajati* : analyses) with *attha*, *attho vibhatto* : meaning was analysed. Another sutta in the *Majjhima Nikāya* (*Mahākaccānabhaddekaratta: M*. III, p.192 f.) wherein the venerable Kaccāna the Great appears again as a competent teacher of the dhamma, does use the word *vibhaṅga* for the detailed explanation of the doctrine in contrast to *uddesa* which is its brief presentation. This literary process seems to be finally crystalized in a sutta by the name of *Uddesa vibhaṅga* (*M*. III, p.223 ff.). As its very name suggests, the *uddesa* which is briefly introduced by the Buddha has to be commented upon in detail and it is again to the venerable Kaccāna the Great that the bhikkhus go for

this. They invite the venerable Kaccāna to explain in detail the meaning of the Buddha's brief sermon (*Vibhajat'āyasmā Mahā-kaccāno atthakaritvā: M.* III, p. 225). He acknowledges his competence to explain to them the Buddha's word (*Imassa kho aham āvuso Bhagavatā saṅkhittena uddesassa uddiṭṭhassa vitthārena attham avibhattassa evam vitthārena attham ājānāmi:* loc. cit.). At this early stage, these explanatory comments appear to have been contained almost within the frame work of the text itself. In addition to the elucidation of difficult doctrinal points, etymological analysis of words and the use of synonyms in the face of increasing obscurity of words would have made their appearance gradually as an integral part of commentarial activity. As Winternitz puts it 'Grammatical and laxical explanations go hand in hand with instruction in the dogma' (M. Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature*, II, p. 157).

Thus, the first beginnings of commentaries or commentarial tradition, on the one hand, go back to the explanation and clarification of abstruse points of doctrine in the Dhamma. On the other, we have evidence to believe that with regard to the Vinaya too, the situation was not very different. Rules of the Vinaya, laid down for the guidance of the monastic life of the Buddhist disciple, had to be understood thoroughly both by those who vowed to observe them for their own edification as well as by those whose duty it was to enforce their proper observance and mete out punishments in their breach. These rules which form the core of the Vinaya have come down to us under the collective name of *Pātimokkha*. Two separate collections exist, serving the needs of monks and nuns. It is stated in the *Vinaya* as a necessary qualification of monks who are to be elected to offices of high responsibility (*Vin.* 1, p. 65) that they should know both Pātimokkhas in detail (*ubhayāni kho pan'assa pātimokkhāni vitthārena svāgatāni*), including the explanatory comments (*suvibhattāni*) and the rulings given on the application of these disciplinary rules (*suvinicchitāni*). In view of the pattern of detailed explanation evolving within the texts themselves, which we have already observed with regard to the contents of the *Sutta Piṭaka*, we feel justified in arguing that the word *suvibhatta*, used here with references to the rules of the Pātimokkhas, is not very different in meaning to *vibhatta* used in the suttas in relation to their meaning: *attho vibhatto* (*M.* I, p. 114). It is in fact the presence of these details and explanations in the more comprehensive *Vinaya* code which includes the rules (which have been subsequently extracted to form the *Vinaya* manual called the *Pātimokkha*) which gave it the name *Suttavibhaṅga*, i.e., an analytical study of the rules of discipline, a work which it really is.

After the demise of the Buddha and with the lapse of time, the need was obviously felt to determine and fix authoritatively the meaning of the vast collection of points of doctrine left behind by the Master. The homogeneity of the *sāsana* was already showing signs of shattering, and the elders of the orthodox group apparently collected together whatever traditional commentarial matter they had inherited from the time of the Buddha and the early disciples. It is perhaps leaning on such a belief that Buddhaghosa assumes the existence of a commentarial literature, even in fragmentary or miniature form, at the time of the first Buddhist Council—*Atthappakāsanatthaṁ aṭṭhakathā ādito vasīsatehi-pañcahi yā saṅgītā anusaṅgītā ca pacchāpi* (*DA.* I, p. 1). The *Niddesa*, the commentary on the older portions of the *Suttanipāta*, viz., the Aṭṭhaka and Pārāyana vaggas, perhaps fittingly answers to this description, although it is included in the *Khuddaka Nikāya* as a canonical text according to the listing of Buddhaghosa (*DA.* I, pp. 15, 17). For the history of development of Pali commentaries hereafter, see AṬṬHAKATHĀ.

Besides the Pali Tripiṭaka, Buddhist texts of both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna traditions preserved in Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan, etc. have numerous works of commentarial nature which have grown around them. The Sarvāstivādins, for instance, have a host of commentaries which are written in Sanskrit which go under the name of *vibhāṣā*. This wave of commentarial activity was set in motion after the Buddhist council held under the patronage of King Kaniṣka, circa A. C. 100. The *Mahāvibhāsā* or the Great Commentary on the *Jñānaprasthāna* which was composed by Pārśva and Vasumitra ranks foremost among them. Their Vinaya too, contains several commentaries with different descriptive titles like *vibhāṣā*, *vṛtti* and *vyākhyāna* (cf. *Vinayavibhāṣā*, *Vinayavibhaṅgapadavyākhyāna*, *Prātimokṣasūtravṛtti*: A. C. Banerjee, *Sarvāstivāda Literature*, Calcutta, 1957, pp. 36-43).

Other major Buddhist texts in Sanskrit like the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras* with their distinct drift towards the Mahāyāna have given rise to series of independent commentarial works. In many cases, the Sanskrit originals of these works are lost and they are preserved to us only in their Chinese

and Tibetan translations. *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra* is one such commentary of enormous proportions, known only in a Chinese version. Proliferation of commentarial works was perhaps in response to the needs of the times. We find Haribhadra producing two commentaries on Maitreyas' *Abhisamayālaṅkāra*, viz. Sphuṭārtha, the "Small Commentary" and *Abhisamayālaṅkārāloka*, the "Great Commentary".

Nāgārjuna, having written the *Madhyamaka-kārikās*, himself wrote a commentary on them which is called the *Akutobhayā*. This literary tradition of the author himself writing a commentary to his own work is seen again with Vasubandhu who himself writes a Bhāṣya to his *Abhidharmakośa*. Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṅkāra-kārikās* carry the author's own commentary, *Madhyamakālaṅkāravṛtti*. One is here in a position to observe that this style of the author himself commenting on his own work (the *kārikās* being themselves in a terse and mnoonic style) seems nearer in spirit to the earlier Buddhist commentarial tradition of *uddesa* and *vibhaṅga* seen evolving within the suttas themselves where briefly expressed ideas are discussed further in detail than to the works of commentators like Buddhaghosa.

It is obvious that with the steadily stretching time interval between the original compilation of texts and the subsequent schools of followers there sets in both an obscurity of the original teachings and a consequent diversity in their interpretation which legitimizes the increasing output of commentarial works. Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka follow Nāgārjuna with their commentaries on the *Madhyamakakārikās*. Both Nāgārjuna's own *Akutobhayā* and the commentaries of Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka are preserved only in Tibetan. Candrakīrti who follows with the *Prasannapadā*, his commentary on the *Madhyamakakārikās*, criticizes his predecessors. Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* which was written from the standpoint of the Sarvāstivāda school of the Hinayāna also gave rise to an extensive literature of commentaries, Yaśomitra's *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* being pre-eminent. Vasubandhu himself wrote a large number of commentaries on Mahāyāna sūtras, on the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra*, the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* and the *Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra*.

With the spread and expansion of Buddhism in China we find commentaries being written in Chinese on Sanskrit texts of Indian origin. A commentary on the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra* (*Miao-fa-lien-hua-ching-wên-chü*) is said to have been spoken by Chih-i, the founder of the Tien-tai school. Similarly, a commentary on the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* was compiled by Ch'ên-kuan, the fourth Patriarch of the Hau-yen school. On these commentaries, sub-commentaries were often written: *Fa-hua-wên-chü-chi* was written by Chan-jan of the T'ang dynasty on the former. Ch'ên-kuan who wrote the commentary on the *Avataṃsaka*, himself wrote a sub-commentary too, on it. In China, these works which are of secondary nature, nevertheless, by virture of their being connected with the canonical texts as part of a living tradition, came to occupy a canonical position, even though in a new *Piṭaka* called the Miscellaneous Collection or *Tsa-tsang* This collection is sometimes referred to as the Supplementary Canon. (See LITERATURE: Chinese).

In Tibetan Buddhist literature too, the commentaries both on the sūtra and the tantra sections of the Kanjur have a canonical standing, being included in the second major division of the Tibetan canon, the Tanjur, which is regarded as a supplement to the former. (See LITERATURE: Tibetan).

J. D.

COMMUNISM is a term used to denote a certain type of social organization based upon the system of common property, equal distribution of wealth and income.

The concept of communism seems to have arisen in the minds of those who observed that the competition for private property was the cause that led to vice, crime and disorder in society.

Throughout the history of social science, the term has also been used in a loose sense. In 1848 the word acquired a new meaning when it was used as identical with socialism (which itself had a number of alternative terms) by Marx and Engels in their famous joint work. The Manifesto of the Communist Party. Here these classical Marxists summed up the theory of communism in a single sentence: the abolition of private property. So it is obvious that the term is pre-Marxian. In 1875 Marx distinguished the higher phase of the communist society by proposing the following succinct description as its general feature: "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs." Here, we confine ourselves to a comparative study of the main elements of the basic theory of Communism with the teachings of the Buddha as depicted in the Pali canon.

In contradistinction to the static conception of society with its divine sanction as held by the Brahmins, Buddhism views it as being dynamic and classifies it into a fourfold order, namely the monks nuns, laymen and laywomen. Though the ultimate aim of Buddhist ethics is the same for all the above-mentioned units of society, ethical implications and evaluations of acts are dependent on the standing of each member of a particular unit and his bearing in the context of the whole society. It is obvious that the ethics promulgated for the laity cannot be wholly applied to the clergy. Yet some of the basic concepts are universally applicable in principle. One of them is the concept of stealing (*Adattādāna*) acknowledged in Buddhism and this implies the concept of property as well. But really speaking the concept of property means two different things to two different units of the clergy and the laity in the classification of Buddhist society.

The utility of wealth and also its earning through righteous means are acknowledged in the case of the laity. Plain living with no recourse to ostentation was the consistent way of life permissible for them. Certain types of job avenues are discouraged (*A.* III, p.208). It is quite true as Schumacher says that Right Livelihood (*sammā ājīva*) in the Noble Eightfold Path implies a theory of economics (*Small is Beautiful*, p. 44). But with regard to the details and complexities of a theory there cannot be anything Buddhistic. A lay Buddhist can conform to or adapt himself to any prevailing scientific and progressive theory while being careful not to transgress the basic requirements necessary for remaining a Buddhist.

But the case is different for the Saṅgha, the community of monks and nuns of the Buddhist Order. The members of the Saṅgha are not wage-earners and as such they are economically dependent upon the laity. It is interesting to note this dependency for the nature of one's sustenance is one of the subjects that have been recommended for constant recollections by a monk (*parapaṭibaddhā me jīvikā ti pabbajitena abhiṇhaṃ paccavekkhitabbaṃ: Dasadhamma Sutta*, *A.V*, pp.87–88). This does not mean that the Buddhist clergy was looked upon as a parasitic body, for their field of contribution is directed to the fostering of higher spiritual values. The introduction of the communist system in the sense of owning things in common to Buddhist monasticism is a well known historical fact. But being a monastic community it was confined only to ownership and consumption and not to production of wealth.

Now let us see how this system was put into practice. It becomes all the more obvious when we consider the ways in which the ownership and consumption of the four requisites (*catu paccaya*) were managed in terms of set principles.

Here it is interesting to recall how the Buddha reacted to the first land donations to him at the very beginning of his mission. King Bimbisāra in whose realm the Buddha started his activities perceived the importance of the new movement and wanted to extend the royal partronage by offering the Buddha and his disciples a place of residence. The Buddha accepted it not as a personal gift but as a common property bestowed upon the whole community of the monks (*bhikkhu-saṅgha*). The members of the Saṅgha could not have been very much at this time, but the concept of *cāturddisa saṅgha* (the members of the Saṅgha from the four quarters) meant to include not only the members who were physically present but also those who were in residence elsewhere. This is how the Buddha applied the communist principle in the sense of common ownership to the area of the property of residence (*senāsana*). A similar attitude was adopted by the Buddha for the remaining three requisites : clothing (*cīvara*), food (*piṇḍapāta*) and medicine (*gilāna paccaya*).

As the institutions founded by the Buddha began to win the hearts of the people, the gifts in terms of above mentioned four requisites came in abundance. Then by adhering to the original idea of common ownership he devised ways and means of diverting the excess gifts to the common pool which was under the supervision of the whole community of the Saṅgha. But this ideal of possessing the minimum of personal requirements like robes and begging bowls, and holding most others like places of residence in common ownership with the corporate body of the Saṅgha (*cāturddisa saṅgha*) could not be maintained very long even within the monastic community. The avowed purpose of monasticism for which a life of renunciation was chosen was apparently lost sight of. An increasing desire to accrue and possess, much in excess of the basic requirements (*nissaya*), began to show itself up. Legislation, in fact, had to be introduced to maintain an equitable distribution of the basic articles of use within the community which was essentially sustained on public charity (See NISSAGGIYA).

Though this is the original position of the Buddhist clergy, certain historical developments occuring in the society (societies) of different countries has brought about considerable changes.

The landlordism of the Lamaist monks in Tibet and the Buddhist Temporalities pertaining to the Saṅgha in Sri Lanka can be cited as vivid examples of changes of the original poeition.

But according to the ideal *sāṅghika* (that which is of the Saṅgha) system whatever is gifted to the Saṅgha, is vested in the community of monks and nuns. The donation to the Saṅgha was more valued in terms of merit accruing from such a gift. An individual member of the community was allowed only a very few items as personal belongings. They too, after the death of the user became the common property of the Saṅgha.

Property has become an institution supplying the basic material needs of man. The idea of possession is crystallized into the idea of property, but the theory of *Anatta* as well as the concept of *Suññatā* logically negate the idea of a 'possessor'. Popular expressions like 'He himself is not his own, Whence sons and daugthers? Whence wealth? (*Attā hi attano natthi, Kuto puttā ? Kuto dhanaṃ ? Dhp. v.*62) are based on this philosophical approach of Buddhism. But like Proudhon, Buddhism would not say that all property is theft.

The functions, according to Buddhism, expected of these broad categories of society, the laity and the clergy, with regard to the affairs of the world presuppose an ethical attitude. This attitude has got to be deduced from the philosophy of *anatta* (soullessness) as well as that of *suññatā* (voidness) on the one hand and the social implications of *adattādāna* (stealing) on the other, though the central problem of Buddhism is that of suffering (*dukkha*).

As the institution of family is held sometimes responsible for the origin of competition for and the perpetuation of private property, it is opportune to consider the Buddhist attitude to it.

Buddhism admits the fact that the family is a natural institution. As the family life is considered a hindrance to spiritual progress because of the resulting encumbrances and obligations (*sambādho ayaṃ gharāvāso*) one who is inclined towards that aim is instructed to leave the household life and to enter the Order. But generally family life is not despised, and the graduated course of Buddhism first begins at the stage of family life. So the layman as a familied man when starting to practise Buddhism is bound by its ethics. His conduct is to be guided according to the preliminary code of ethics leading ultimately towards the realization of Nirvāṇa. As the monk or nun starts his or her life after renouncing the household life, the problem of family life are out of the question. The members are bound by the obligatory rules and regulations and the community is deemed to be administered in the interests of the community and the outside world, as well as the furtherance of its religious aspirations.

The Buddhist analysis of the events of the phenomenal world does not maintain a one cause theory. According to it, there are several conditions that are necessary and together sufficient for producing an event. But the most prominent factor among them is singled out as the cause. As such Buddhism would not hold competition or property alone responsible for the ills of the world.

The last point that deserves our attention is the concord of society and its administration. In the *Aggañña Sutta* (*D.* III, pp. 80-98) the Buddha has presented an evolutionary theory of society. There it is shown that at the beginning of society things were held in common. In this primitive communistic community consumers' ethics was adhered to. But human nature being what it is, the ascetic consumption in the sense of voluntary adherence to the use of sources only for the basic requirements was transgressed. Thus arose individual rights of property. In order to uphold these rights protective and punitive measures had to be taken up. This as the sutta mentions led to the institution of monarchy for maintaining order in society. In the *Cakkavattisīhanāda Sutta* (*D.* III, pp. 58-79), the Buddha shows how maldistribution of wealth led to disorder in society.

In the *Kūṭadanta Sutta* (*D.* I,pp. 127-49), there is a very significant passage on this point.It has been put into the mouth of the Bodhisattva by the Buddha. According to it, there was lawlessness in the kingdom of Mahāvijita due to poor economic conditions. The king thought of performing a grand sacrifice involving a lot of food stuff and thus restore law and order in the realm. He consulted the bodhisattva, who happened to be his chaplain, on the matter. The Bodhisattva advised the king not to venture upon such a course of action but to distribute the foodstuff among the poor. Further he instructed him to supply seeds and other necessary things to farmers, provide capital to traders and make payment to those in government service. Thereby, he pointed out,the economic conditions of the people would continue to imporve. As a result there would be peace and order and the people would be happy and contented and the revenue of the king would also increase.

It is not clear from the texts of the Pali canon whether the administration of the Saṅgha was presented as a model for that of lay society. It is well to note the distinction between a Religious Teacher who reveals spiritual truths and the ruler of a worldly kingdom. At the same time the Buddha seems to have conceived the possibility of ruling a country in accordance with the Dharma without resorting to harsh punitive measures or engaging in military conquests. The ideal Universal monarch depicted in Buddhist texts rules the world without resorting to arms. He instructs and guides his subordinates by administering the five precepts. Of the two forms of administration then persisting in India, the monarchy and the republic, the Buddha has not expressed any preference to either. But order and peace he always upheld as ideals to be achieved.

This shows how far within the community of monks and nuns the communist system was adhered to and to which extent the Buddha as the teacher participated in the proper administration of that particular section of the society. As the theory of communism advocates, the Buddha too seemed to have wished the voluntary observance of the codes of social and general ethics by the members of the Saṅgha individually and collectively for the good of the world, without having recourse to the use of force on them.

Looking back in history, it can be maintained that the Buddhist Saṅgha is one of the few communist societies that appeared from time to time and upheld and attempted to practise the system of common property. But in reality, the communist ideal was in practice even within the community of the Saṅgha only at the early stage of the history of Buddhism. In spite of the intricate machinery which grew up in course of time as a result of the experience of administering such a community, it collapsed, yielding to the pressure of factors (e.g., the socio-economic factors etc.) operating in the wider society. Thus the Buddhist ideal of founding a communist society was originally confined only to the clergy and at present continues only as a noble idea.

S.W.

COMPASSION (*karuṇā, kāruñña*), the sentiment which inclines one to spare or help those in distress. Buddhism being a religious philosophy and a way of life meant to relieve human suffering, this sentiment occupies a significant place in it. It ought to occupy an important place in any religion as it is natural and proper that human suffering and misfortune should generate compassion in fellow human beings who witness it. Thus it is an important social virtue the practice of which could be extended to embrace sufferers not only of the human but also of the animal world as well.

The Pali word *Karuṇā* expressing this concept of compassion is accordingly described as "the desire to remove what is detrimental to others and their unhappiness" (*ahita-dukkhāpanayanakāmatā : SnA.* p. 128 on *Sn. v.* 73). According to another definition given by Buddhaghosa, "the feeling that causes the good people's hearts to be moved when they see others' suffering is compassion : " (*Para-dukke sati sādhūnaṃ hadayakampanaṃ karoti'ti karuṇā : Vism.* p. 318). The same authority (loc.cit.) also says "that which combats, attacks and demolishes others' suffering is compassion" (*Kiṇāti vā paradukkhaṃ hiṃsati vināseti' ti karuṇā* : loc. cit.). Another definition of his (loc. cit.) is "it is called compassion because it is scattered upon those who suffer, it is extended to them by pervasion" (*kiriyati vā dukkhitesu pharaṇavasena pasāriyatīti karuṇā :* (loc.cit.): "Compassion is characterised by promoting the aspect of allaying suffering " (*Dukkhāpanayanākārappavattilakkhaṇā* : loc. cit.) ; "Its nature is not bearing others' suffering" (*paradukkhāsahanarasā*) and "is manifested as non-cruelty" (*avihiṃsāpaccupaṭṭhānā*) ; "its proximate cause is to take note of the helplessness in those overwhelmed by suffering" (*dukkhābhibhūtānaṃ anāthabhāvadassanapadaṭṭhānā*) ; it succeeds when it makes cruelty subside and it fails where sorrow is produced (*Vihiṃsūpasamo tassā sampatti. Sokasambhavo vipatti* : loc. cit.).

These definitions clearly show that the main idea behind the Buddhist concept of compassion expressed by the Pali term *karuṇā* is the desire to remove the suffering of others. It results from the thought "How unhappy beings are." It is the general sense of the English term "Compassion" as well. As a lovely phase of character, it gives tone and quality to the complex of virtue.

In the psycho-ethical social philosophy of Buddhism, this concept of compassion has two main aspects. First, as a desirable quality in human character, it is meant to regulate our attitude to other people. This mundane aspect of compassion is developed into a semi-transcendental level in the theory of the four divine abodes (*brahmavihāra* , q. v.), of which compassion occupies the second place.

Secondly, it has its purely transcendental analogue in what is designated as great or grand compassion (*mahā-karuṇā*) found only in released saints like Buddhas and arhants. It is the higher kind and is super-individual in scope and covers all beings in their entirety, as a sign of the infinite goodness of those saintly beings. It 'seeketh not its own' and hence is the result of coming into contact with spiritual reality. Cleansed of individualised exclusiveness, it becomes unlimited (*appamañña*). As the definitions of the term compassion given earlier show, if compassion is the desire to relieve the suffering of others, the best way to do so is to lead them to the freedom of Nibbāna and hence it is this kind of compassion that makes the concept truly meaningful.

This latter kind of compassion is shown towards a person in distress by one who is free from it for which reason its giver becomes the recipient s superior. The Buddhas rank foremost as belonging to this superior role, for they have solved this problem of suffering once and for all and become the compassionate ones *par excellence*. And from the Buddhist point of view all saṃsāric beings are entitled to be benefitted from this sentiment without discrimination, for which reason the Mahāyānic bodhisattvas are represented as postponing their own salvation till all suffering beings have obtained theirs. In this sense, the question whether a person is worthy of it or not does not arise.

This aspect of compassion can be said to have a mundane side as well when worldly leaders like kings exercise it towards their subjects. It would be a violation of Buddhist ethics if a ruler were to be unkind and merciless towards his subjects. The example of emperor Asoka who was moved with compassion at the horrors which the battle-field displayed is a good case in point. It grew out of the misfortune and misery of those who suffered in battle.

This is the aspect of compassion that is most commonly found in society. People who are spiritually superior to others are in a position to help them out of compassion, for it is natural that the sight of helpless suffering, which is so common in society, induces this sentiment in those who witness it. Those who are more fortunate than others in any aspect of life, be it wealth, education or anything else, give expression to their feelings of compassion in diverse ways. It may be individually or collectively through some charitable organisation. Even the concept of the Welfare State is based on this kind of altruistic philosophy.

Compassion is thus a virtue that can find expression in a myriad ways depending on the particular case that needs it. It may take the form of some material assistance or any other form of help. This kind of compassionate activity is quite common in day to day society. While they constitute a normal feature in one's social dealings, they become specially prominent in the religious field, particularly in charitable organisations related to religions. But from the Buddhist point of view, compassion *par excellence* would be the type prompted by the wish to relieve suffering beings by leading them to the freedom of Nibbāna. People qualified for this leadership, are those who have achieved their own freedom first.

To whatever field it belongs, whether transcendental as in the case of the Buddhas or mundane as in the case of Asoka, compassion is a beautiful virtue the presence of which ennobles the social order. It finds altruistic delight and comfort in relieving the sufferings of others. It has been and shall be a motive force behind many a charitable and philanthropic activity.

Buddhism teaches the necessity and the method of improving the sentiment of compassion from mundane to the sublime level of *mahākaruṇā* by becoming released and enlightened, and thereafter as individuals who have conquered the ego, of working for the welfare of others, fully knowing the ideal they need. This, in fact, is the foundation on which the Buddha established his first missionary project, when he sent out the first sixty arhants to work for the weal and welfare of gods and men (*atthāya hitāya devamanussānaṃ*). Although compassion in its most ordinary form referred to earlier also serves humanity in its own right, it is far inferior to this ideal of *mahākaruṇā*. People who work with this ordinary form of compassion are normal wordlings who have not overcome the diverse ties that bind them to society. Consequently, they cannot act with complete impartiality and selflessness. Being wordlings, their wisdom is also not fully developed. Thus they are bound to be selfish and partial and hence go wrong in the regulation of their relations with others.

In our attempt to understand this kind of compassion, the words addressed by the Buddha to his first group of sixty arhant disciples instructing them to work for the welfare of others are quite revealing. Here the Buddha says : " I, monks, am freed from all ties both divine and human and you monks are freed from all ties both divine and human. Walk on tour, monks, for the blessing of the masses,

for the happiness of the masses, out of compassion for the world, for the welfare, the blessing, the happiness of devas and men : let not two go by one way : monks, teach the dhamma which is lovely in the beginning, lovely in the middle, lovely in the end, endowed with the spirit and the lettter and self-complete : explain the higher life that is wholly pure." (*Mutto'haṃ bhikkhave sabbapāsehi ye dibbā ye ca mānusā ; tumhe'pi bhikkhave muttā sabbapāsehi ye dibbā ye ca mānusā : caratha bhikkhave cārikaṃ bahujanahitāya, bahujanasukhāya, lokānukampāya, atthāya hitāya sukhāya devamanussānaṃ : mā ekena dve agamittha : desetha bhikkhave dhammaṃ ādikalyāṇaṃ majjhekalyāṇaṃ pariyosānakalyāṇaṃ sātthaṃ sabyañjanaṃ kevala-paripuṇṇaṃ : parisuddhaṃ brahmacariyaṃ pakā-setha : Vin.* I, pp. 20–1).

This significant passage epitomises the philosophical basis of the practice of compassion as understood in Buddhism. True compassion results from the achievement of freedom and enlightenment, which have to be won through a struggle away from society. Gautama Buddha himself achieved it not while occupied with social problems but while engaged in a spiritual struggle all alone to find out a solution to the problem of life. For released saints like him, compassion becomes the main or even the only basis of action. Wishing the welfare of others expressed by several synonyms like *attha*, *hita* and *sukha* and actively working for its realisation without the least tinge of self-interest is the nature of this great compassion (*mahā-karuṇā*). As all cannot achieve this ideal state, it would be desirable that those who take to social service be motivated at least by a certain amount of enlightened compassion by practising it in the way prescribed in the *brahma-vihāras* (q.v.). In the absence of fully enlightened ones such people would be suitable for leadership among those who are totally unenlightened.

As the aim of the Buddhist way of life is the solution of the problem of suffering once and for all, the passage quoted also says that it is the dhamma that should be taught to the people by those who work for them out of compassion. This would lead to the total eradication of their suffering. Hence the statement "The gift of dhamma surpasses all other gifts" (*sabbadānaṃ dhammadānaṃ jināti : Dhp. v.* 354).

In this connection the following words of Milarepa, the Tibetan saint of the 11th century, may be quoted here : "One should not be over-anxious and hasty in setting out to serve others before one has oneself realised the Truth in its fullness : to do so would be like the blind leading the blind. As long as the sky endures so long will there be no end of sentient beings for one to serve and to everyone comes the opportunity for such service. Till the opportunity comes, I exhort each of you to have but one resolve, namely, to attain Buddhahood for the good of all living beings" (W. Y. Evans–Wentz, *Tibet's Great Yogi Milarepa*, 1928, p. 271, quoted by Edward Conze, *Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies*, 1967, p. 59).

Thus, the Buddhist point of view regarding the theory and practice of compassion would be that while not denying the validity of the ordinary, worldly aspect of it, the aim should be the ideal state of *mahā-karuṇā* so that one becomes truly qualified for its practice by being both enlightened and liberated. Those who receive it also would be led to the same goal.

The concept of *karuṇā* as the practice of compassion has been used as a means of mental development under the theory of the divine states which are four in number (i.e., loving kindness—*mettā* ; compassion—*karuṇā* ; sympathetic joy—*muditā* and poise—*upekkhā*). The Pali Nikāyas refer to them as mental freedoms (*ceto-vimutti*), the cultivation of which are said to result either in birth in a brahma-world (*brahma-loka : A.* III, pp. 129, 184) or in the realisation of various stages of sainthood (*A.* I, pp. 196–7 ; V, p.300). The theme of this exercise is the pervading of all the directions with compassion so that it embraces everything and becomes infinite (*appamaññā : D.* III, p. 223 ; *Vism.* IX, 110). Thus it is an exercise intended to make boundless (*appamaññā*) and well developed (*subhāvita*) the heart that is petty and circumscribed (*paritta*) and hence undeveloped (*abhāvita : A.*V, p. 300). Its constant practice would facilitate one's progress towards ultimate freedom. How it should be practised as a *bhāvanā* (q.v.) is given in great detail by Buddhaghosa in the 9th chapter of the *Visuddhimagga*.

The practice of this kind of compassion plays an important role in character formation too. Thus, for the person who has much cruelty in his heart, *karuṇā-bhāvanā* is recommended as an antidote (*Vism.* p. 321).

These facts regarding *karuṇā-bhāvanā* show how it could be made beneficial not only to those who receive compassion but also to those who practice it.

According to a passage in the *Visuddhimagga* (p. 203), one of the explanations of the Buddha's conduct (*caraṇa*) referred to in the epithet *vijjā-caraṇa* is his possession of great compassion (*mahā-kāruṇikatā*). Through omniscience he knows what is beneficial and what is harmful to all beings and through this compassion he exhorts them to avoid evil and do good. Thus, *vijjā* and *caraṇa* are identified with knowledge and compassion respectively. This is noteworthy because it is an identification that assumed great significance later in the Mahāyāna under the dual concept of *prajñā* and *karuṇā*, i.e., *karuṇā*, born of *prajñā*, as the basis of all good activity.

Compassion, which was a subordinate virtue in early Buddhism, became a cardinal virtue of prime importance in the Mahāyāna. The reason for this was that the Theravādins, by treating Perfect Enlightenment as an extremely rare phenomenon, went to such lengths as to show that it is well-nigh impossible, thereby making the disciple's way (*śrāvaka-yāna*) the general method of salvation. They emphasised this arhant ideal, thereby relegating the Buddha's ideal of great compassion to the background. The reaction against this was the creation of the bodhisattva-ideal according to which everyone should try to become a Buddha so that he can help others through his great compassion. The pendulum swung from one extreme to the other. In contrast to the ideal of the arhant which the Mahāyānists described as the lower way (*Hīnayāna*) on account of the pursuit after personal salvation, they created the figure of the bodhisattva whose compassion makes him serve others at the expense of his own salvation. The Mahāyānists on their part, forgot the Buddha's own words quoted earlier where he advised those who engage in social service first to achieve their own salvation. The result was that the Mahāyāna Buddhists, specially of the Far East, made the Buddha an all-compassionate God, a Father of all mercies, whose compassion flows towards the devotees and who can thus save them from suffering. The danger of this idealisation of selfless service was that instead of achieving salvation through one's own efforts as taught in early Buddhism, the devotees sought for a merciful Lord to save them. Thus, the beautiful virtue of compassion was turned into a vice by making it an obstruction to human effort. On the basis of this doctrine of divine Fatherhood they created the figure of Avalokiteśvara who refuses his salvation until all the creatures of the universe obtain theirs! Vicarious suffering, unknown to early Buddhism, thus found a place in the Mahāyāna.

This Mahāyānist concept of Grand Compassion which is not the same as the *mahākaruṇā* of early Buddhism explained earlier is common to Tantric Buddhism as well. Buddhist Tantric works define compassion as the determination on the part of the bodhisattva to lead to Nirvāṇa all beings including those born from eggs, the uterus, perspiration, etc. etc. (B. Bhattacharyya, *An Introduction to Buddhist Esoterism*, India, 1932, p. 102).

This bodhisattva-compassion was given a more realistic appearance by the Mahāyānists when they combined it with his wisdom (*prajñā*). Like knowledge (*vijjā*) and conduct (*caraṇa*) in early Buddhism *prajñā* and *karuṇā* were given as the sum-total of the Buddha's Enlightenment. While *prajñā*, standing for the intellectual aspect representing the qualities of the head, shows him what is beneficial or detrimental for beings, *karuṇā*, standing for the emotional aspect representing the qualities of the heart, makes him do the needful for their benefit. The perfect combination of the two would be found only in an Enlightened One. In creating a character like the all-compassionate bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara what the Mahāyānists have actually done is to graft these two essential qualities of the Buddha on to the bodhisattva. And in order to avoid the resulting contradiction they propounded the theory that Bodhisattvas postpone their entry into Nirvāṇa until all those in saṃsāra attain it, thereby making their ideal hero both a Buddha and a bodhisattva simultaneously.

The following words of Śāntideva, a Mahāyāna poet of the 7th century, may be quoted as a representative account of this compassion, which, owing to its extreme nature, has become somewhat sentimental:

"The merit I achieved by all these pious actions may that make me

Quite able to appease the suffering of all beings.

A medicine for the sick I'll be, their healer and their servant,

Until the day that sickness is a thing no more remembered.

With showers of food and drink I'll quench the pains of hunger and thirst;

In the dearth at the end of the aeon I'll turn into food and drink.

And for the needy I'll be a source of wealth quite unfailing,

Serving them well with all that their need may require.

Heedless of body, of goods, of the merit I gained and will gain still,

I surrender my all to promote the welfare of others."

(Quoted in translation by Edward Conze, *Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies*, Oxford, 1967, p. 58).

In general, the compassion of the Enlightened Ones is universal in its perspective because it is super-individual and accordingly infinite and boundless. It makes no distinction in its operation. Free from all possessiveness, it symbolises the embodiment of the love of Enlightened Ones towards all suffering beings, their selfless 'desire' to make others happy. It is out of this kind of compassion that embraces all living beings including animals that they serve the world. The 45 years of the historical Buddha's ministry is the perfect example of its practical realisation. Thus Matṛceṭa, a Mahāyāna poet of the 2nd century, addresses him fittingly (as quoted by Edward Conze in his *Buddhist Texts*, Oxford, 1954, p. 192):

"It was your compassion, given free course
which made you pass your time

Among the crowds, when the happiness of seclusion
suited you better so much."

A. G. K. S.

COMPREHENSION. See PARIÑÑĀ.

CONCEIT. The term 'conceit', derived, as it is, from the verb 'conceive' implies the looking at or measuring oneself with undue pride. This may be done in terms of accepted criteria or without reference to any. In early Buddhist literature the idea of 'conceit' is conveyed by terms like *uddhacca*, *thaddha*, *mada* and *māna*.

The first of these terms is a substantivised gerund from *ud*+√*dhṛ* meaning to raise, rise or lift up, and therefore to raise too much or overbalance. Thus *uddhacca* is 'overbalancing' in the sense of being haughty. The second is the past participial form of √*stabh* (=to become stiff) adjectivally and figuratively used to mean 'hardened' and 'obdurate'. The third is derived from √*mad* (to rejoice, be glad, exult, delight or revel in), and therefore, to be intoxicated. The fourth is the nominal form from √*mā* (to measure) meaning 'pride' or 'arrogance'. Etymologically, *māna* is the closest to the English word 'conceit' since both terms are derived from radical elements implying the measuring of oneself in one's own mind.

Uddhacca implies haughtiness since it conveys the idea of being 'upward-bent' (*unnata*) and therefore liable to overbalancing. It is *uddhata-bhāva* (*Vism.* pp. 137 *et* 469) or the condition of oneself being lifted up or raised to the point of being muddled and puffed up in mind. *Uddhacca* (together with *kukkucca* or worry) is the fourth among the five *nivaraṇas* or obstacles in the path of Buddhist ethical perfection, and is also the ninth among the ten *saṃyojanas* or bonds binding man to saṃsāra or cycle of existence.

The adjective *thaddha* is generally employed in combination with nominal forms. For instance, one may be said to be hardened or obdurate and therefore conceited due to one's birth in a so-called high caste (*jātitthaddha*) or due to great wealth (*dhanatthaddha*), or due to the pride one takes in the clan to which one is born (*gottatthaddha*). Such conceit is said to result in one's downfall (*Sn. v.* 104). Sometimes a person may be said to be obdurate with *māna* itself (*mānatthaddha : D.* I, p. 118 ; *J.* I, pp. 88, 224 ; II, p. 136).

The term *mada* amongst its meanings has the sense of 'intoxication' both literally and metaphorically (*vide supra*). In the latter sense, it is an epithet for *māna* (*māna-mada : DhsA.* p. 403 ; *Vism.* p. 293). The *Vibhaṅga* enumerates twenty-eight varieties of *mada* (*Vbh.* p. 345) of which ten in particular, viz., *jātimada*, *gottamada*, *bhogamada*, *sutamada*, *paṭibhānamada*, *rattaññumada*, *yasamada*, *sippamada*, *ārohamada* and *pariṇāhamada*, may be counted under forms of 'conceit'.

Māna is defined as *cittassa unnati* (*Nd. I*, p. 80), i.e., 'haughtiness of mind' and sometimes appears in combination with *atimāna* (i.e., as *mānātimāna* : *D.* III, p. 86 ; *Sn.* 245 *et passim*) which would mean excessive self-pride or all kinds of conceit. In the sense of actual egoism, the term employed is *asmimāna* (*D.* III, p. 273), i.e., pride of self. While the Buddhist texts refer to persons as being 'conceited by nature' (*mānajātika : J.* I, p. 88) or as 'cleaving to conceit' (*mānasaṭṭa : Sn. v.* 473), *māna* itself is considered an 'intoxicating draught' (*mada : J.* II, p. 259 ; *PvA.* p. 86), a 'bad tendency' (*anusaya : D.* III, p. 282 ; *M.* I, p. 486 ; also cf. *Sn. v.* 342), a 'fetter' (*saṃyojana : D.* III, p. 254 ; *Dhs.* 1116=1233) and a 'sting' or 'dart' (*salla : Nd. I*, p. 59). While the *Niddesa* gives a ten-fold division of *māna* (*Nd. I*, p. 80=*Nd. I*, p. 505), the *Vibhaṅga*

mentions nineteen types (*Vbh.* p. 346), showing that the term *māna* covers not only 'conceit' but a number of other mental predispositions, as well. The fact that these terms have been accorded a place in more than one classification of hindrances to mental perfection points to the seriousness with which conceit has been looked upon in the Buddhist scheme of salvation. Doctrinally speaking, conceit being an evil condition (*akusala-dhamma*) and, therefore, an obstacle to arahantship, a complete grasp of the nature of conceit (*sammā-mānābhisamaya : M.* I, p. 122 ; *S.* IV, p. 205 sq. 399 ; *Sn. v.* 342) with a view to its eradication, is recommended in the Buddhist texts.

The term *uddhacca* has as its opposite the negative past participial form *anuddhata* which is adjectivally used of a person who is unconceited, calm or subdued (*Sn. v.* 850 ; *It.* p. 30). The term *anuddhata* ultimately implies one who has attained Nibbāna (cf. *Dhp. v.* 363 — *nibbutacitta : DhpA.* IV, p. 93). 'Depriding' or crushing out one's pride (*madanimmadana*=disintoxication) is also an expression known to Buddhist literature (cf. *Bu.* I, p. 81 ; *Vism.* p. 293).

Conceit is a mental predisposition impairing balanced judgement. The latter being a pre-requisite for mental development which, in the ultimate analysis, is the Buddhist objective, psychological conditions affecting mental equipoise, whether positively or negatively, have been analysed and disposed of with great discernment in the Buddhist texts.

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CONCENTRATION as a form of religious exercise is known in Buddhism as *samādhi*. The Nirvāṇic goal of release from the cycle of births and deaths or saṃsāra is the product of the perfection of wisdom (*paññā* or *ñāṇa*) which gives an insight into the real nature of life. This in turn is generated through *samādhi* or perfect concentration. Perfect wisdom arises through perfect concentration and perfect release is the product of perfect wisdom (*sammāsamādhissa sammāñāṇam paholi sammāñāṇassa sammāvimutti paholi : D.* II, p. 217). Likewise, it is stated elsewhere that he whose mind is concentrated sees and hears things as they really are (*samāhito bhikkhave bhikkhu yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti : S.* III, p. 13 f.). The text here further defines the relevant area of knowledge as pertaining to the five aggregates which constitute a being, the basis of their origin, and the mode of bringing about their end (loc. cit.).

What then is the nature of concentration which is implied by the term *samādhi* in Buddhism and how is it achieved ?

It would be profitable to study this concept in relation to some of the major contexts in which it occurs. In the division of Buddhist spiritual culture which finally leads up to Nirvāṇa into three successive stages, concentration of mind or *samādhi* occupies the central position under the name of 'cultivation of higher mind' (*adhicitasikkhā*). It is aided by the cultivation of moral virtue (*adhisīlasikkhā*) which precedes it. This implies that the elimination of disruptive and disturbing elements of immoral activity is a prerequisite to the attainment of any composure of mind. It is with this purge alone, according to the tradition of the early Buddhist texts in Pali, that one could embark on any venture of efficiently mobilising the mind for the acquisition of perfect wisdom (*adhipaññā sikkhā*) which is necessary for the final release in Nirvāṇa. It is thus the conditioning, or rather the deconditioning, as shall be presently discovered, of the mind through various preliminary exercises.

There is another and perhaps more original scheme of religious development in Buddhism in which concentration of mind is included as the last stage. This is the path known as the *ariya aṭṭhaṅgika magga* or the 'noble eightfold way' leading to the cessation of *dukkha* (*dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā ariyasaccaṃ*) and constitutes the last of the Four Noble Truths. It is the practical formula of the Buddhist life and having perfected it one merits release from saṃsāra through the invariable perfection of wisdom. It starts with correct views or *sammādiṭṭhi* and through a gradual process leads finally to perfect concentration or *sammāsamādhi* through complete mindfulness or self-possession known as *sammāsati*. In the list of the eightfold way in which *samādhi* takes its position as the last, the seven preceding items are referred to as the seven conditions contributing to perfect concentration (*satta samādhiparikkhārā sammā samādhissa bhāvanāya samādhissa pāripūriyā : D.* II, p. 216). A passage in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, expressing this idea differently, speaks of perfect concentration as being based on and supported by other factors (*saupaniso saparikkhāro : S.* V, p. 21). In consequence of this state of concentration, perfect wisdom is generated, leading thereby to final release (*sammā samādhissa sammā ñāṇam paholi sammāñāṇassa sammā vimutti paholi : D.* II, p. 217).

Concentration could also be viewed in relation to yet another system of religious, or more precisely, psychological development in Buddhism referred to

as *jhānasamāpatti* or attainment of states of mental absorption. There are four of these, numerically reckoned as first, second, third and fourth *jhānas*. Further to these, there are four other higher or subtler planes of mental abstraction known as *āyatanas* (*ākāsānañcāyatana* etc.). It is the first four of these, popularly known as the *rūpījhānas*, which are relevant to the discussion here (*D*. I, p.73). Considered in a religiously technical sense, concentration can be viewed both as a prerequisite to the attainment of *jhānas* as well as a product of their attainment. Two other words, more or less synonymously used to refer to this concentrated nature of mind are *ekaggatā* (*citta ekaggatā* : one-pointedness of mind) and *ekodibhāva* (*cetaso ekodibhāva* : unified state of mind). *Cūlavedalla Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* uses *cittassa ekaggatā* in defining *samādhi*, more or less equating one to the other (*Yā kho āvuso Visākha cittassa ekaggatā ayaṃ samādhi* : *M*. I, p. 301). The *Mahāvedalla Sutta* (*M*. I, p. 294) is more specific in stating that *cittaekaggatā* is one of the five characteristics (*aṅga*) associated with the first *jhāna*, others being *vitakka*, *vicāra*, *pīti* and *sukha*. The *citta ekaggatā* or one-pointedness of mind referred to here seems to imply a singleness of purpose in the mind of the Buddhist disciple who is preparing to enter upon the path of religious development. Reaching this state of one-pointedness of mind is said to have been so even in terms of the spiritual attainments of the Buddha himself. According to the *Bhayabherava Sutta* (*M*. I, p.21), the Bodhisatta himself commences his spiritual pursuit with his faculty of striving set on gear (*āraddhaṃ viriyam asallīnam*), mindfulness well established (*supaṭṭhitā sati asammuṭṭhā*), body totally relaxed and not under strain (*passaddho kāyo asāraddho*) and the mind concentrated and set on one point (*samāhitaṃ cittam ekaggam*). It is from this state of body and mind, with this singleness of purpose of the mind, ably supported by a body which contributes to its sustenance that he embarks on the attainment of *jhānas* which are to serve as a basis for the acquisition of wisdom, threefold knowledge or *vijjā*, leading to final release.

The concentration of mind referred to here which is coupled with a singleness of purpose (*samāhitaṃ cittam ekaggam*) is more than what is implied in a merely worldly sense. It is achieved as a result of an inner purge, deliberately and purposefully carried out with unfailing vigour and vigilance. This concentration of mind which precedes the attainment of *jhānas*, according to the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* (*D*. I, p. 71), is the result of a process of continuous development, starting with moral virtue (*sīlakkhandha*) and proceeding through restraint of sense faculties (*indriyasaṃvara*) and mental and intellectual alertness (*satisampajaññā*). This development enables the Buddhist disciple to effect an inward purge and cleanse his mind of the five defiling traits called the *nīvaraṇas* (q.v.). It is at this stage that the mind is set on the path to concentration, in a really significant Buddhist sense. It seems to be then infallibly effective for it is founded, as has been pointed out, on the bed-rock of Buddhist culture. It is still, however, at the first stages of launching.

The way and the stages through which this concentration of mind is achieved is described as follows :

"As he realises that these five *nīvaraṇas* (which defile the mind and weaken the intellect : *cetaso upakkilese paññāya dubbalikaraṇe* : *M*. I, p. 181) have been eliminated and are no more within him, there arises joy (*pāmujjam*) which in turn produces elation (*pīti*). In this state of elation, the body calms down and gains tranquility (*passambhati*) ; tranquilled in body, he experiences comfort (*sukham*), and as he is in comfort (*sukhino*), his mind reaches a state of concentration (*samādhiyati*)" (*D*. I, p. 73 f.).

Stressing, as it were, the need of the composure of body for the proper attainment of concentration of mind, and elaborating on the theme further, the Buddha, in the *Dvedhāvitakka Sutta* (*M*. I,p. 116 f.), points out that even inoffensive thoughts which in themselves can be positively constructive (not lustfully greedy: *nekkhammavitakka* and not violently aggressive : *avihiṃsā vitakka* and *avyāpādavitakka*) can lead to physical weariness, if indulged in for too long (*api ca kho me aticiram anuvitakkayato anuvicārayato kāyo kilameyya* : loc. cit.).

In a body that is thus grown weary, the mind is liable to be disturbed (*kāye kilante cittam ūhaññeyya* : loc. cit.). The mind then would be far from reaching concentration (*ūhate citte ārā cittaṃ samādhimhā* ; loc. cit.)

Realising the danger of this rambling of the mind (*anuvitakkayato anuvicārayato*) which wearies the body, an attempt is made to remedy this situation by unifying and gathering together the mind inwardly (*ajjhattam eva cittaṃ saṇṭhāpemi sannisādemi ekodikaromi samādahāmi* : *M*. I, p. 116). Here we see the word *ekodi* used together with *samādhi* to refer to concentration of mind. What is described here is again a mental exercise undertaken by the Buddhist disciple, prior to embarking or

the attainment of *jhānas*. However, this attempt at stopping the processes of *vitakka* and *vicāra*, i.e., initial application of thought and investigation, and bringing the mind to a state of complete inward concentration has to be viewed as being still only at an initial stage. Thus, as a means to the attainment of the religious goal, concentration is gauged and judged at different levels.

It has already been seen above that the pre-*jhānic* concentration of mind is characterised by the quality of *ekaggatā* : one pointedness or singleness of purpose. The fact that this *ekaggatā* is also a characteristic of the first *jhāna* makes it clear that *ekaggatā* also does not imply a total elimination of *vitakka* and *vicāra* which are characteristics of the first *jhāna*. This seems to justify Buddhaghosa's definition of concentration, invariably of this early stage, as fixing the mind steadily on a single object of thought (*kim idam samādhānaṃ nāma ekārammane cittacetasikānaṃ samaṃ sammā ca ādhānaṃ ṭhapanam ti vuttam hoti : Vism.* I, p. 84). A modern psychologist, quite independent of the Buddhist tradition, (Kroeger, T.C., 'The coping functions of the ego mechanisms', in R. W. White, ed., *The Study of Lives*, N. Y. Athenton, 1963, pp. 179–198) chooses to call this process by the name of *selective awareness* and observes that the need to focuss one's attention may result in the coping device of concentration. Thus, the Buddhist position that one-pointedness of mind is a prelude to full concentration is not without modern support.

Concentration of mind appears to be truly effective in Buddhist religious development as a post-*jhānic* attainment. It was seen above how the initial pre-*jhānic* concentration discussed so far gets the Buddhist disciple ready for the ascent through the *jhānas*. The reduction and elimination of disturbing elements being one of the key-notes of the process of concentration we witness the first *jhāna* being characterised by the absence of evil ways of thought (*akusala*) and of proclivity towards indulgence in sensual pleasures (*kāma*). Nevertheless, *vitakka* and *vicāra*, initial application of thought and investigation, inoffensive in themselves, range freely through the mind of the disciple. At the same time, a phrase which describes the achievements at the level of the first *jhāna*, clearly reveals an increase in the quantum of inner peace attained, for the phrase *vivekajam pītisukham* means the joy resulting from the severance from evil and sensuous thoughts. It is still later at the second *jhāna*, after *vitakka* and *vicāra* have been got rid of, that the resulting joy is described as being born of concentration (*samādhijam pītisukham*).

Although one could feel justified in assuming that at this stage of the second *jhāna* concentration has reached the peak of perfection because the second *jhāna* is characterised by joy resulting from concentration (*samādhijam pītisukham dutiyajjhānam : D.* I, p. 74), yet one could conceive of a finer processing of concentration as the disciple goes beyond this through the third and the fourth *jhānas*. On attaining the third *jhāna*, the disciple even eschews the joy (*pītiyā ca virāgā* : ibid. p. 75) he has obtained through concentration and gets to a near neutral position of equanimity (*upekhako*), experiencing through his body a physical ease and comfort (*sukham ca kāyena paṭisamvedeti* : loc. cit.), In the fourth and the last of this *jhāna* series, the disciple is in a perfect neutrality and mental state of equipoise for neither comfort nor discomfort, neither elation nor dejection of the mind affect him. His mind is in a state of unqualified purge or purity (*parisuddhena cetasā pariyodātena*: loc.cit.), and there is no part of his entire body which this purified mind does not pervade (*nāssa kañci sabbāvato kāyassa parisuddhena cetasā pariyodātena apphuṭaṃ hoti : D.* I, p. 76).

According to the Buddhist tradition, it is at this stage when the power and potential of the mind is increased by the elimination of defilements that the disciple begins to gather the highest rewards of concentration, namely, the different strata of penetrating and illuminating wisdom. The concentrated mind at this stage is described as being pure and free from defilements (*parisuddhe pariyodāte anaṅgane vigatūpakkilese*), pliable and malleable (*mudubhūte kammaniye thite*) and imperturbable by disturbing external stimuli (*āneijjappatte: D.*I, p. 76). The three forms of higher knowledge or *tisso vijjā* which successively pertain to a being's continuance in saṃsāra (*pubbe nivāsānussati ñāna*), the efficacy of karma (*sattānaṃ cutūpapātañaṇa*), and the elimination of all saṃsāric bonds, i.e., *āsavas* (*āsavānaṃ khayañāṇa*) and ultimately lead to the attainment of Nirvāṇa are acquired as a result of this concentration of the mind.

J. D.

CONCEPT, a term applied in philosophy to a general idea derived from and considered apart from the particulars and obtained by a process of abstraction. It implies the mental reconstruction and continuation of data given by the senses. A concept is thus the receptacle in which the act of conceiving an idea, called conception, takes place. Any fixed thought, with a fixed idea, is thus a concept

whether it be of a thing, an event or a quality. It is, therefore, the *sine qua non* for the exchange of information by speech and writing, for all knowledge is expressed through concepts. It becomes the basic constituent of logical thought and expression.

Thinking being an essential feature of sentient extistence, concept becomes a necessary constituent of empirical life, for no logical thinking is possible without concepts. And life, as understood in terms of a continuous flux (*santāna*), is more or less synonymous with perpetual activity for the fulfilment of the needs of man. Hence conceptual thinking is invariably present in all human action.

Since a term, which corresponds exactly to the English erm 'concept' in its psycho-philosophical sense is not found in Pali, several terms have to be employed to express its different aspects. Although the term *paññatti* came to be employed in this sense in later literature, it originally meant only the naming-aspect of conceptualising. Later, with the growth of terminological variants, the term (*paññatti*) was invested with new shades of meaning, specially in Abhidharma works. The immediate awareness of an idea in the process of sense-perception (which follows feeling: *vedanā*) is *saññā*: reasoning about it in one's mind is *vitakka*; subsequent prolific conceptualisation is *vicāra* in a limited sense and *papañca* in the widest sense; the nominal aspect of concept is *nāma-paññatti*, the vocal aspect is *sadda-paññatti* and the semantic aspect *attha-paññatti*.

Of the many Nikāya passages that deal with the origin of conceptualisation (e.g., *M*. I, p. 259; *S*. IV, p. 67 ff., p. 86 etc.) the best known is the one occurring in the *Madhupiṇḍika Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* (*M*. I, p. 108 ff.).

Sense-perception and the conceptualisation that follows is here explained thus: "Visual consciousness (*cakkhu-viññāṇa*) arises because of eye and material shapes; the meeting of the three is sensory impingement (*phassa*); because of sensory impingement there arises feeling (*vedanā*); what one feels one perceives (*saññjānāti*); what one perceives one reasons about (*vitakketi*): what one reasons about one proliferates conceptually; (*papañceti*); with what one proliferates conceptually as the basis, groups of prolific (or obsessionary) concepts (*papañca saññā-saṅkhā*) assail him in regard to material shapes cognisable by the eye, belonging to the past, the future and the present".[1]

By the application of this same formula to auditory, olfactory, gustatory, bodily and mental consciousnesses, respectively, the entire process of conceptualisation (*papañca-saññā*) through all the sense-organs is systematically explained.

A noteworthy feature about the process of conceptualised thinking, as explained in the above passage, is the mutually dependent nature of the whole process. This is in keeping with the Buddhist teaching of dependent origination and the relative nature of all phenomena. And behind this data of sense-experience, occurring in conditioned sequence, there looms large the illusive concept of the ego, the concept *par excellence*, of the agent (*attā*).

People think because they have to think. Thinking is an integral part of their existence. It is the various material and spiritual needs of man that prompt him to think. The original, un-civilised man became civilised by thinking and gradually improving upon his discoveries and inventions, both material and spiritual. Scientists and technicians think and improve the world in its material aspects, while philosophers and religious teachers try to improve it on the spiritual side. The world goes on, or progresses on these two aspects of mental activity (*cittena nīyati loko*: *S*. I, p. 39). And, in all this thinking, it is the concepts that serve as the vehicles of the ideas involved. While past concepts pave the way for present thinking, new concepts are formed and become established as thinking progresses. Conveying of ideas to others, accordingly, has to be through concepts (cf. The Buddha preaches the doctrine by means of different concepts: *bhagavā dhammaṃ paññattiṃhi vividhāhi deseti*: *Nett*. p. 56).

In this process of concept-making the mind is said to occupy the central position, while the other five organs occupy places of equality. Thus, in the making of a concept, all the sense-organs contribute their part with regard to past, present and future. This is because the time-element cannot be excluded as it is inseparably connected with thinking. Hence the empirical consciousness, in its process of thinking, will have all kinds of

1 *Cakkhuñcāvuso paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇaṃ tiṇṇaṃ saṅgati phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā*; *yaṃ vedeti taṃ sañjānāti, yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vitakketi, yaṃ vitakketi taṃ papañceti, yaṃ papañceti tato-nidānaṃ purisaṃ papañcasaññā-saṅkhā samudācaranti atītānāgate paccuppannesu cakkhuviññeyyesu rūpesu. Sotañcāvuso paṭicca sadde ca . . . ghānañcāvuso paṭicca gandhe ca . . . jivhañcāvuso paṭicca . . . rase ca . . . kāyañcāvuso paṭicca phoṭṭhabbe ca . . . manañcāvuso paṭicca dhamme ca . . . manoviññeyyesu dhammesu.*

concepts assailing it, with varying degrees of intensity, depending on the intellectual level of the person concerned.

Buddhism being a philosophy that aims at the alleviation of human suffering, it avoids all extremes, including those of materialism and idealism. It teaches that enslavement of the human mind to anything, whether to mere concepts or to material possessions, is a source of sorrow. If human suffering is to be overcome, all types of enslavements have to be obviated. That is the true freedom taught in Buddhism.

Conceptualised thinking is also the basis on which all knowledge is established. In Buddhism this thinking is broadly classified as right (*sammā*) and wrong (*micchā*). All thinking that paves the way for the liberation of man is called 'right', while that which leads to his enslavement is called 'wrong'.

Let us now examine how various concepts are formed in this process of communicating and thinking. When the eye, the visual object and visual consciousness come together there is contact (*phassa*) which in turn gives rise to feeling (*vedanā*). Up to this point there is hardly any concept-formation. From this point onwards the individual becomes the subject of the process, for when he feels he perceives (*sañjānāti*) and then reasons about (*vitakketi*). The next step in the process is the proliferous ideation or continued thinking, resulting in a series of obsessionary concepts (*papañca*) following one after another, in rapid succession. From this point, the individual (as he is devoid of true understanding: *apariññātakāraṇaṃ: MA.* II, p. 75), becomes the victim of all kinds of thoughts and concepts, belonging to the three periods of time and coming through all the six sense-organs. However, by manipulating the thought process logically and intelligently, man can control the process to his advantage and that is how great thinkers, scientists, philosophers and others appear in the world. What is important for the topic under discussion is that concepts are the chief constituents in this thought process. While old concepts are made use of, new concepts get fashioned and replace them, as thinking progresses. And sometimes old concepts become invested with new meanings in keeping with the changes that have taken place since the old concept was formed: Thus, "in the construction of logical concepts our aim is to establish one mode of arranging their manifold ideal contents for all thinking beings" (*ERE.* III, p. 793).

As regards *saññā*, there seems to be two meanings in its use. First, it means to know, to perceive, to cognise, etc. (*sam+jānāti*). In this sense, the term has a direct bearing on the realm of conceptualisation. The moment *vedanā* occurs, the individual becomes aware of it or knows it. Here, if the idea is a completely new one, a new concept may be made which, when made subject to *vitakka*, results in numerous conceptualisations. The second use of the term is when it refers to the becoming aware of an already established concept in which case *saññā* refers to recollection.[2]

Thus, this latter use of the term does not directly come under conceptualisation. However, whether of the former or of the latter kind, once *vitakka* sets in, the concept is made to proliferate and new ideations take place. And, in recognising these concepts, *saññā* sets in again. This shows that conceptualisation is present in all the three stages of *saññā*, *vitakka* and *papañca* with its peak, however, at the *papañca* stage.

It should be mentioned here that the term *saññā* is sometimes used in the sense of concept as an object of meditation. This usage is found in several lists of concepts given as subjects of meditation. One such list, for instance, is found in *D.* III, pp. 289–90 where nine such concepts are listed as *saññā*, i.e., concept of impurity (*asubha-s°*), of death (*maraṇa-s°*), of loathsomeness in food (*āhāre-paṭikkūla-s°*), of non-delighting in anything in the world (*sabbaloke-anabhirati-s°*), of impermanence (*anicca-s°*), of suffering in impermanence (*anicce-dukkha-s°*), of insubstantiality in suffering (*dukkhe-anatta-s°*), of abandonment (*pahāna-s°*), of passionlessness (*virāga-s°*). Similar lists, with the term *saññā* used in the sense of concept, are found with slight variations at *A.* V, pp. 106, 109. The term *saññā* in the sense of concept is also found applied to the six sense-objects (*rūpa-saññā, sadda-s°, gandha-s°, rasa-s°, poṭṭhabba-s°* and *dhamma-s°*: *S.* III, p. 227). For some other such uses see *A.* III. p. 443 and *M.* III, p. 104.

An important thing to be remembered in this regard is that no one concept can change into another. for definiteness and fixity of meaning are the characteristics of a concept. When a problem is considered, new concepts are made, while these new concepts in turn give rise to yet others in further

2 At *S.* III, p. 87, this meaning of *saññānāti* is clearly demonstrated.

analysis. As William James observes, " New concepts come from new sensations, new movements, new emotions, new associations, new acts of attention and new comparisons of old conceptions and not in other ways. Endogenous prolification is not a mode of growth to which conception can lay claim " (*Principles of Psychology*, p. 467). Thus, innumerable concepts get established in our formulations of doctrines, philosophies, theories etc., and it is seen that this proliferation of concepts is not endogenous but sequential.[3] It is also important to remember that in the process of logical thinking all concepts become relative to one another, for which phenomenon Buddhism provides its best illustration in the formula of dependent origination (*paṭicca-samuppāda*, q.v.).

The fact that no concept can be changed into another is closely connected with the concept of time (*kāla-paññatti*) whereby mental states are distinguished from one another in subjective thinking. Concepts cannot succeed in causative sequence if not for the presence of Time. It is the presence of this same Time which prevents one concept from changing into another. Thus, the concepts of the three times, past, present and future, have necessarily to be observed in all analysis of thinking. Accordingly, the *Nirutti-patha Sutta* (*S.* III, p. 71) states that the concepts of the past, present and future have held throughout by wise men distinctly, as three separate concepts, without confusing the one with another and used as the basis of expressing (*nirutti-patha*), designating (*adhivacana-patha*) and conceiving (*paññatti-patha*). It is the *sine qua non* of logical thinking. " Concepts, ideas and objects are artificial cuts in an uninterrupted flow of moments " (Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, II, p. 8).

Something may be said here about the implications of the controversial term *papañca*, as used in books. As indicated in the preceding discussions, *papañca* very generally means prolific conceptualisation. In its psychological import, the term implies the conceptualisations of the human mind in its most complex nature. Hence, in a discussion of concept, the conceptualising nature of the human mind is also dealt with automatically.

Coming from *pra* + √*pac* or √*pañc*, the term primarily means expanding, diffusing, spreading out, manifoldness, diversity etc. As used in psychological discussions on Buddhist ethics the term signifies the diffusive nature of conceptualising that proceeds from sense-perception, as shown in the *Madhupiṇḍika Sutta* given earlier. It is the nature of the ego, that, so long as it remains unconquered, the individual is not free. Unless and until he realises this fact and tries to escape this enslavement, his thinking proliferates or spread out through the formation of new concepts in a sequential manner. It is this prolific conceptualisation that is technically called *papañca*. To put it more simply, it is the speculative nature of the human mind, operating through concepts. The conceptualisation that proceeds from sense-perception leading to all types of further diffusive thinking or, in the words of Bhikkhu Ñāṇānanda[4], " this tendency towards proliferation in the realm of concepts ", is the general meaning of *papañca*. Thus, *papañca* ceases only with the conquest of the ego. Thus, a verse in the *Suttanipāta* says (*v.* 916)"having known that the thought : ' I am ', is the root of *papañca*, let one pluck out all that" (*mūlaṃ papañcasaṅkhāya mantā asmīti sabbaṃ uparundhe*). In other words, so long as empirical consciousness exists in the individualised form, *papañca* operates. Thus, all beings endowed with ordinary consciousness have the obsession of *papañca*. " Ordinary human beings are endowed with the notion of prolific conceptualisation : they approach (external objects) conceptualising prolifically : renouncing all that is mind-made and pertaining to the lay life one should resort to what is connected with renunciation "[5].

Ordinary consciousness (*saññā*) implies the subject-object duality which in turn means *papañca*. " The egoistic individuality, in its psycho-physical combination (*nāma-rūpa*) is characterised by *papañca*, the root cause of illness both in the individual and in society outside : he who comprehends this with his wisdom is released from the radical bond of all disease and is accordingly called the knowing one, the saint. "[6] The fact

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3 Bhikkhu Ñāṇānanda's (*Concept and Reality in early Buddhist Thought*, Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy, Ceylon, 1971, p. 10) reference to "the ever-prolific process of conceptualisation in all its complex ramifications" seems to need this qualification, i.e., that the proliferation of concepts is not endogenous but sequential.

4 Bhikkhu Ñāṇānanda, op. cit. p. 4.

5 *papañcasaññā itaritarā narā*
papañcayantā upayanti saññino
manomayaṃ pahāṇāsaṃ sabbaṃ
panujja nekkhammasitaṃ iriyati (*S.* IV, p. 71)

6 *anuvicca papañca nāmarūpaṃ*
ajjhattaṃ bahiddhā ca rogamūlaṃ
sabbarogamūlabandhanā pamutto
'anuvidito' tādi pavuccate tathattā (*Sn.* v. 530)

that the cessation of *papañca* is achieved by the complete cessation of the activities of the six sense-spheres which compose the human individuality is clearly stated in the following passage in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (II, pp. 162–3) : " Whatever is the range of the six spheres of contact, so far is the range of prolific conceptualisation : and whatever is the range of prolific conceptualisation so far is the range of the six spheres of contact. By the utter cessation of the six spheres of contact there comes about the cessation, the mastery of prolific conceptualisation. "[7]. Thus, prolific conceptualisation lasts so long as the sense-organed individuality lasts.

While the *Madhupiṇḍika* passage gives more or less the psychological process of conceptualisation, the *Kalahavivāda Sutta* (*Sn. v.* 862 ff.) presents an ethical sequence of the origin of *papañca*. Disputes, contentions etc. arise because of affections (*piya*) which in turn are brought about by desires (*chanda*) these are the result of what is pleasant and unpleasant (*sāta-asāta*) which is brought about by sense contact (*phassa*), which is the result of name and form (*nāma-rūpa*) ; when form ceases to function there are no sense-contacts and the whole series ceases to operate.

It is important to note that this state, wherein no matter or form functions, is the same invisible consciousness (*viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ*) in the state of Nibbānic freedom in which the four great elements which are responsible for the manifestation of form, do not find a footing (*na gādhati*) as described in the *Kevaddha Sutta* (*D.* I, p. 213). Thus, the fact that *papañca* is the conceptualisations of the empirical consciousness is further elucidated.

Ordinary worldlings are naturally fond of conceptualisation, for it is the nature of the empirical mind that it goes on weaving concepts in some direction or another in keeping with the temperament of the particular individual. This is elucidated in a passage, occurring in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (III, p. 292 f.). Here Sāriputta enumerates six kinds of activity by delighting in which a monk's spiritual progress is hindered. These are : work (*kamma*), talk (*bhassa*), sleep (*niddā*), company (*saṅgaṇika*), companionship (*saṃsagga*) and prolific conceptualisation (*papañca*).[8] The more he finds delight in these, the more declined spiritually does he become ; he becomes more and more engrossed in selfhood ; " the fool who engages in and finds delight in prolific conceptualisation is far removed from Nibbāna, the incomparable freedom from bondage ; and he who gives up prolific conceptualisation and delights in the path to non-conceptualisation attains to Nibbāna, the incomparable freedom from bondage."[9]

Freedom from prolific conceptualisation is one of the most important aspects of the complete freedom taught in Buddhism. Thus, the Buddha once gave utterance to the following pean of joy while reflecting on his achievement of freedom from conceptualising perceptions (*attano papañcasaññā-saṅkhā-pahānaṃ paccavekkhamāno*) : " That saint who has overcome craving and in whom prolific conceptualisations and fixity are no more, who has overcome bond and hindrance, as he fares on, cannot be contradicted by the whole world with its devas" :

yassa papañco ṭhiti ca natthi
sandhānaṃ paṭighañca vītivatto
taṃ nittaṇhaṃ muniṃ carantaṃ
nāvajānāti sadevakōpi loko (*Ud. v* 77)

Here, as quite aptly observed by Bhikkhu Ñāṇānanda (op. cit. p. 20), the juxtaposition of *papañca* with *ṭhiti* is significant : *ṭhiti*, as explained in the *Nettippakaraṇa* (*ṭhiti nāma anusayā* : p. 37) are the latent tendencies of the human mind which prompt all conceptualisations in an unconscious manner. With the removal of these *anusayas* (q.v.) all conceptualisations cease to operate. " The bhikkhu who neither hastens nor lags behind and who has overcome this obsessions of *papañca*, quits the bonds of both here and hereafter, like the snake that sheds its slough " :

ye naccasārī na paccasārī
sabbaṃ accagamā imaṃ papañcaṃ
so bhikkhu jahāti orapāraṃ
urago jiṇṇamiva tacaṃ purāṇaṃ (*Sn. v* 8)

It should become clear from the foregoing that *papañca*, as the prolifically conceptualising nature of the individualised, empirical consciousness can stand for all mental formations, for all conditioned thinking, in a general sense. In this comprehensive

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7 *Yāvatā āvuso channaṃ phassāyatanānaṃ, gati tāvatā papañcassa gati : yāvatā papañcassa gati tāvatā channaṃ phassāyatanānaṃ gati : channaṃ āvuso āyatanānaṃ asesa virāganirodho papañcanirodho papañcavūpasamati.*

8 This same enumeration minus *saṃsagga* is also found in the Buddhist Sanskrit work *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (p. 105) as practices to be avoided by the novice bodhisattva (*ādikarmikena bodhisattvena*).

9 *yo papañcaṃ anuyutto-papañcābhirato mago*
virādhayi so nibbānaṃ-yogakkhemaṃ anuttaraṃ
yo ca papañcaṃ hitvāna nippapañcapade rato
ārādhayi so nibbānaṃ - yogakkhemaṃ anuttaraṃ
(*A.* III, p. 295).

connotation the term can embrace all the congnitive functions of the empirical mind. Thus, in the commentaries and the later works this meaning has been definitely given to the term. The *Nettippakaraṇa* (p. 37), for instance, says : "*papañcas* are cravings, views and conceits and whatever volitional activities that are activated by them : (*papañca nāma taṇhā-diṭṭhi-mānā tadabhisaṅkhātā ca saṅkhārā*). The same work, elsewhere (p. 38) says : "Whatever is *papañca*, whatever are the volitional activities and whatever is the delighting in past, future and present — all these are the same : (*Yo cāpi papañco ye ca saṅkhārā ye ca atītānāgatapaccuppannassa abhinandanā idaṃ ekaṭṭhaṃ*). It is worth noting that the importance of the time element in conceptualisation is admitted here, for it is the basis on which all empirical thinking takes place. And, in this sense, *papañca* becomes an unending pursuit and it is defined exactly so in the same work (p. 38) when it says "*papañca* is called a pursuit" (*papañco nāma vuccati anubandho*). The analysing of *papañca* into craving (*taṇhā*), views (*diṭṭhi*) and conciet (*māna*), is only one of the many ways into which *papañca* can be analysed psycho-ethically. And even this three-fold classification could be explained as embracing all the different defilements taught in Buddhism. Thus, at *DA*. II, p. 121, it is explained as consisting of 108 kinds of craving, 62 views and the nine-fold conceit And, at *AA*. III, p. 348, it is called *kilesa-papañca*. In this connection, the following description of *papañca*, given by the commentator Dhammapāla may be quoted : "*Papañcas* are so called because they bring about delay ; wherever one is born, they lengthen out one's continuum, make one linger long. They are the defilements, particularly lust, hatred, delusion, views and conceit : hence it has been said *rāga-papañca, dosa-p°, moha-p°, diṭṭhi-p°, māna-p°*. Moreover, *papañca* has the sense of defilement. Therein the object of lust is the notion of pleasantness, that of hatred is the occasion for ill-will, that of delusion are the cankers, that of craving is feeling, that of views are perceptions, that of conceit is ratiocination. That perception concommitant with those *papañcas* is *papañca-saññā*. The number, the divisions, the parts of these *papañca-saññā* are called *papañca-saññā-saṅkhā*" (*UdA*. p. 372 : Quoted and translated by Bhikkhu Ñāṇānanda, op. cit. p. 113).

As against the worldliness inherent in conceptualisation, the non-conceptualising, trancendental condition of the released saint is generally referred to as non-conceptualisation (*nippapañca*), the allayment of *papañca* (*papañca-vūpasama*), and the cessation of *papañca* (*papañca-nirodha*). "The transcendental states are called *nippapañca* in the sense that they tend to allay those defilements such as lust" (*papañcā nāma rāgādayo kilesā : tesaṃ vūpasamatāya tadabhāvato ca lokuttarā dhammā nippapañcā nāma : ThagA*. III, p. 70). "Ordinary mankind finds delight in prolific conceptualisation while the Tathāgatas are free from it" (*papañcābhiratā pajā nippapañcā tathāgatā : Dhp. v.* 254) : the released saints find delight in non-conceptualisation (*nippapañcārāma : M*. I, p. 65 ; *A*. III, p. 431 ; *Miln*. p. 262).

The concept of *prapañca* in Buddhist Sanskrit works is not different from that of the Pali books. References to *prapañca* are found in such Buddhist Sanskrit works as the *Mādhyamika-kārikā, Bodhisattva-bhūmi, Śikṣāsamuccaya, Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* etc. The *Mādhyamika-kārikā* of Nāgārjuna (*Mdhvr*. pp. 349–51) says that karma and defilements (*karma-kleśa*) originate from vain imaginings (*vikalpa*), which, in turn, have their origin in *prapañca* and this gets dissolved in *śūnyatā*. The *prapañca* from which imaginings (*vikalpa*) have their origin is also described in this work (p. 350) as manifold (*vicitra*) and characterised by such varieties as those belonging to knowledge and the object of knowledge or, in the field of grammar, to such things as noun and adjective, subject and object, sound and verb, or, in ordinary conversation, to such things as pot, cloth, crown, chariot, form, feeling, man, woman, gain,loss, happiness, sorrow, fame, disgrace, praise, blame etc. These manifold (*vicitra*) constituents of *prapañca* have been established by usage down the ages (*anādimat-saṃsāra-abhyastha*). This empirical *prapañca* (*laukikaḥprapañcaḥ*) gets dissolved in *śūnyatā* once the individual obtains insight into the essencelessness of the nature of all phenomena. It is only with mental perception that there comes about the resultant tangle of *prapañca* (*prapañca-jāla*) : without mental perception there cannot be *prapañca* : for instance, the passionate do not create *prapañca* in their minds over the beautiful daughter of a barren woman. Without resorting to *prapañca* one cannot engage in vain imaginings (*vikalpa*) in regard to an object. Thus, there comes about *kalpanā-jāla*, followed by groups of defilements rooted in the personality-belief (*satkāya-dṛṣṭi*). All empirical activity takes place within this personality-belief with its groups of defilements. In this manner the accumulation of *karma* continues. It is those who do not perform actions (karma-makings), who cease to experience the desert of saṃsāra, which is one mass of birth, decay, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain and

despair. Thus, having attained to *śūnyatā*, which is characterised by the complete allayment of all *prapañca* of the net of imagination (*kalpanā-jāla*) and through the cessation of *karma-kleśa* combination, rebirth ceases. Therefore, *śūnyatā* itself, owing to its characteristic of the cessation of all *prapañca* is called Nirvāṇa (*tasmāśūnyataiva sarvaprapañcanivṛttilakṣaṇatvāt nirvāṇamityucyate:* p. 351).

Elsewhere in the same work (p. 11), in its examination of the theory of causality (*pratyaya-parīkṣā*), the Buddhist theory of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*) is identified with the state of the allayment of all *prapañca*, i.e., Nirvāṇa. This means that the true realisation (not intellectual understanding but practical experience) of the *pratītya-samutpāda* means the achievement of freedom and hence the allayment of all *prapañca* (*propañcopasama*). "Whatever is the *pratītyasamutpāda* that itself is the auspicious state of the allayment of all *prapıñca* " : (*Sa eva — pratītyasamutpādaḥ prapañcopaśama ityucyate* : loc. cit.). And also " it is that *pratītyasamutpāda* which is the auspicious allayment of all *prapañca* (*yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ prapañcopaśamaṃ śivaṃ* : loc. cit.). [10] The state of Reality is beyond all conceptualisation (*sarvaprapañcātīta*) as it is tranquil by nature (*prakṛti-śānta*) and it is owing to slow-wittedness (*manda-buddhitayā*) that people think of it in terms of duality (p. 448). Thus, it is said : " Those who conceptualise the Buddha, who has transcended the range of verbal elaboration and who decays not, will never see the Tathāgata, overcome as they are by concepts " :

Prapañcayanti ye buddhaṃ—Prapañcātītamavyayam te prapañcahatāḥ sarve—na paśyanti tathāgataṃ.
(ibid. ch. xxxiii, 15).

Candrakīrti's commentary on this verse is quite terse and illuminating when it presents the *Mādhyamika* view of conceptualisation in relation to the Tathāgata : " Fettering to substantiality is the nature of conceptualisation, whereas the Tathāgata is free from substantiality : hence how could there be any manifestation of *prapañca* (in relation to him) ? Thus, the Tathāgata has transcended conceptualisation ; he is *avyaya* (permanent) because he is both free from origination and from changing into something else. And those who conceptualise this kind of Blessed Buddha, by means of various sorts of false assumptions, through a mentality that is defiled by the taints of their own false imaginings, become the victims of their own conceptualisations and are removed far away from the range of the excellence of the Tathāgata-virtues. Becoming base in this manner in the Tathāgata-teaching, they fail to see him, just as those born blind fail to see the sun." Thus, the Tathāgatas are completely beyond the range of empirical conceptualisation.

This immutable state of *śūnyatā* wherein all conceptualisations lose their separate identities (*prapañcaḥ tu śūnyatāyāṃ nirudhyate* : ibid. pp. 350, 490) is not nothingness (*nāstitva*) and those who equate it with nothingness merely increase the tangle of *prapañca*, without knowing the purpose of *śūnyatā* (ibid. p. 491). The text (p. 491) explains *śūnyatā* thus : " uncaused by anything, tranquil, unconceptualised by any conceptualisations, beyond the range of false discrimination, not subject to different interpretations " is the nature of *śūnyatā*, which is characterised by the non-operation of conceptualisation (*prapañca-nivṛtti*) is, not nothingness or non-existence. Thus, Reality has non-conceptualisation as its major characteristic (*paramārtho niṣprapañca-svabhāvaḥ* : ibid. p. 494). This shows that *śūnyatā* is the unconditioned state of Nirvāṇa, so called because it cannot be conceived as an entity.

Another Buddhist Sanskrit work that deals with *prapañca* is the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* of Śāntideva. In an extract from a Buddhist Sanskrit work called *Adhyāśayasañcodana Sūtra*, occurring in this work, (*Śikṣ* . p. 105) it is said that the inexperienced bodhisattva (*ādikarmikena bodhisattvena*) should not indulge in six activities of which *prapañca* is the last. These six are gain and honour (*lābha-satkāra*), social company (*saṅgaṇika*), gossipping (*bhāṇya*), sleeping (*nidrā*), activity (*karma*) and conceptualisation (*prapañca*). [11] The evils of conceptualisation are also enumerated elsewhere in this work (pp. 114-5) in a series of verses in the following words : " To him who engages in *prapañca*, the eight inopportune births are not far away : the great fortune of opportune birth does not come his way ; seeing well these disadvantages the wise man should avoid all *prapañca*. Many are the evils that accrue to the one who engages in *prapañca*, therefore let one not resort to *prapañca*. It would be preferable to travel a distance of a hundred *yojanas* where *prapañca* or *vigraha* (seizing of objects by the mind) is not found. And let one not live even for a

10 Compare also *Madhyv.* ch. xxiv, vv. 18, 40 where the realisation of Truth is identified with both the *Pratītyasamutpāda* and *śūnyatā*.

11 These occur also at *A.* III, p. 292 ff. with slight variations.

moment in a place where defilements are many. The purpose of those who have gone forth is not material wealth but good qualities. With a wicked mind one should not fight with others; the thought that one does not have a field or some (other means of) agriculture, or some business brings about the increase of *prapañca*. Having gone forth one should not quarrel, thinking that one does not have a son or a daughter, a wife, a friend, relatives, female or male servants or suzerainty. Having donned the yellow robe with confidence one should resort to peaceful and calm places; enjoying such peace and tranquillity, one should avoid *prapañca* and produce *kṣānti*, (intellectual receptivity of the mind when it is prepared in advance to accept knowledge). Vicious thoughts which are like venomous serpents should be destroyed; hells, the animal kingdom and the realm of Yama are not far away for him who resorts to *prapañca*. Therefore, let one produce *kṣānti*. By this method one can attain to purity. After dissolving the obstructions arising from past actions (*karmāvaraṇa*) completely the courageous man who generates *kṣānti* in this manner crushes Māra, along with his agitating hosts."

The *Lalitavistara* uses the epithet *niṣprapañca* (free from *prapañca*) in describing the wheel of the Law (*dharma-cakra*): "The wheel of the Law which is unfounded, beyond conceptualisation, unborn and unoriginated, solitary and essenceless by nature, has been set arolling."

anālayaṃ niṣprapañcaṃ — anuppādamasambhavam viviktaṃ prakṛtiśūnyaṃ—dharmacakraṃ pravartitam. (ch. 26, *v.* 53).

Elsewhere in the same work (*Lal.* p. 306) the same use is found again "that wheel which is beyond conceptualisation and because of its being freed from all conceptualisations and blame" (*aprapañcaṃ taccakraṃ—sarvaprapañcopārambhavigatatvāt*).

The *Rāṣṭrapālaparipṛcchā* (p. 15 lines 2 and 15) describes the wise one as never intent on gain (*lābhena-anārthika*), always endowed with ready wit (*pratibhānavān sadā*), possessed of unobstructed intelligence (*asaṅga-buddhi*), expert in subtle truths (*gambhīradharmakuśala*) is devoid of conceptualisations (*vigataprapañca*). Searching after the incomparable state of *bodhi*, his mind is free from cunning (*aśaṭa*), from hypocrisy (*akuha*) and conceptualisation (*niṣprapañca*).

In the *Gaṇḍavyūha* also the term *prapañca* occurs several times. In one place (*Gvyu.* p. 253), Sumedha addresses a night-goddess, describing her as free from vacillation (*iñjana*), pride (*manyana*), palpitation (*spandana*) and conceptualisation (*prapañca*).[12] As such, she is said to lead along the path of virtue ordinary worldlings who find delight in conceptualisation. Elsewhere in the same work (p. 128), Bhikṣu Sudarśana is described as free from these four-fold characteristics of the empirical mind. Again, one of the bodhisattvas describes the assembly of bodhisattvas present there as unestablished, with all activity ceased, free from conceptualisation, without base, with mind unobstructed, luminous and intent on the sphere of religion.

apratiṣṭhān anāyūhān — niṣprapañcān anālayān asaṅgacittān virajān — dharmadhātuparāyaṇān (ibid. p. 25).

The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (*Bbh.* p. 51) attributes the process of evolution of all the worlds to lust (*rāga*), hatred (*dveṣa*) and delusion (*moha*), which in turn are brought about by personality-belief (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*) and egoism (*asmimāna*), which proceed from various imaginings (*vikalpa*), conceptualisations (*prapañca*) and objects of thought (*vastu*). The same work elsewhere (p. 42) refers to the bodhisattva who follows the path towards Buddhahood as being on the path of non-conceptualisation (*evaṃ niṣprapañca-nayārūḍho bodhisattvaḥ*). As such he is on the correct path which he follows for the sake of the fruition of his own *buddha-dharmas* and also of the three vehicles (*yāna*) of the others. A more important reference to *prapañca* in this work is where it says (p. 55) that the cessation of conceptualisation, which follows the cessation of imaginings (*vikalpa*), is the *Mahāyāna-parinirvāṇa* of the bodhisattva (*prapañcanirodho bodhisattvasya mahāyānaparinirvāṇamiti veditavyaṃ*), thereby implying that the cessation of conceptualisation occurs only on the unconditioned state of Nirvāṇa. Elsewhere it says (p. 266) that those bodhisattvas who remove all false perceptions and imaginings that cling on to conceptualisation through noble wisdom, attain to complete purity ((*pariśuddhi*).

The term *prapañca* occurs twice in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*. It refers to (*Lank.* p. 19) the Tathāgatas as transcending all imaginings and conceptualisings (*Tathāgatāḥ sarvavikalpa-prapañcātītāḥ*). Elsewhere (p. 186) it characterises those who delight in desire and conceptualising as fools: (*jalpa-prapañcaratāhi bālāḥ*).

12 All these qualities are often given as characteristics of the empirical mind.

In the Buddhist Tantric work called *Adhyardhaśatcka* (available in Tibetan) the Tathāgata explains the truth of the equality of all phenomenal matters and events (*sarvadharma-samatā*) with the fourfold non-conceptualisation of lust, hatred, delusion and all phenomena (*rāga-aprapañcatā, dveṣa-aprapañcatā moha-aprapañcatā* and *sarvadharma-aprapañcatā*).

Underlying our sense-perceptions, there are numerous kinds of biases and proclivities which consciously or unconsciously influence our thinking and, hence, our conceptualisations. These biases are collectively called *anusaya* in Buddhist psychology, until the extinction of which beings remain in bondage to their concepts. Coming from the verb *anuseti* (to lie along), the term means the latent dispositions of the human mind continuously cropping up and disturbing the individual in the form of an undercurrent of potential. When worldlings form and make use of concepts these underlying proclivities influence such concepts, keeping the thinkers bound to them. This bondage of worldlings to their concepts is well illustrated in the *Vepacitti Sutta* (*S.* IV, p. 202 ff.) where it is said that when one thinks egoistically (which a worldling cannot help doing), he gets bound to Māra (*Maññamāno kho bhikkhave baddho mārassa*) and when one refrains from doing so, one is freed from Māra (*amaññamāno mutto pāpimato*).

Buddhism shows how and why the thinking individual becomes the helpless victim of his own conceptualised thinking and also how to escape it. The answer is provided in the *Madhupiṇḍika Sutta* referred to earlier. In this *sutta*, the Buddha first claims that he has escaped the bonds of conceptualisation because of which worldlings fight among themselves. As a result of the great freedom he has thus achieved, he has no conflict with anyone in the world (*nakena ci loke viggayha tiṭṭhati*). The Buddha then explains why beings become slaves to their own conceptualisations : " Whatever is the origin of the numerous obsessions and perceptions which assail a man, if there is nothing therein to rejoice at (*abhinanditabbaṃ*), to welcome (*abhivaditabbaṃ*), to catch hold of (*ajjhositabbaṃ*), that is itself an end of the propensity to attachment (*rāgānusaya*), to repugnance (*paṭighānusaya*), to views (*diṭṭhānusaya*), to perplexity (*vicikicchānusaya*), to pride (*mānānusaya*), to attachment for becoming (*bhavarāgānusaya*), to ignorance (*avijjānusaya*), the end of taking the stick, of taking the weapon, of quarrelling, contending, disputing, accusation, slander, lying speech. In this way these evil and unskilful ways are stopped without remainder (*daṇḍādāna, satthādāna, kalaha, viggaha, vivāda, tuvantuva, pesuñña, musāvādānaṃ : ettho ete pāpakā akusalā dhammā aparisesā nirujjhanti*).

The theme of the Buddhist philosophy of freedom is found in this short passage. It teaches the significance of detached living (*virāga*), living without grasping the concepts, views, ideas etc, that characterise our living. By constantly practising that kind of detached thinking, we can gradually rid ourselves of all our latent evil propensities (*anusaya*). That is also how human disunity can be overcome.

It is the nature of empirically conceptual thinking that it has a tyrannical hold over the thinking individual. The subjective-objective duality, characterised by all kinds of bonds (*bandhana*), is a result of conceptual thinking which in turn, is the result of the ego. Bonds disappear only for him whose ego-concept is gone (*pahīnamānassa na santi ganthā*: *S.* I, p.14). If, when a sense-organ seizes its object, the individual can remain unmoved by the ensuing sense-perception and the subsequent thought processes, without grasping or identifying himself with them, his slavery to conceptual imagination ceases. Egoistic grasping makes him speculate, imagine and reason about (*vitakka-vicāra*), ending up in an obsessionary state of mind (*papañca*) which situation is quite graphically referred to as the 'inner tangle and the outer tangle, the state wherein people remain entangled in a tangle' (*anto jaṭā bahi jaṭā jaṭāya jaṭitā pajā : S.* I, p. 13). By the gradual realisation of the facts of life, this tangle could be systematically disentangled, ending up in the state when sense-perceptions cease to mislead the individual. The state free from conceptualised tangles of thought is well-described by the Buddha in his advice to Bāhiya as recorded in the *Udāna* (p. 8) " Then, Bāhiya, thus must you train yourself : in the seen there will be just the seen : in the heard, just the heard : in the sensed, just the sensed : in the cognised, just the cognised . . . then you will have no there : when you have no there then Bāhiya, you will have no therein : as you have no therein it follows that you will have no here or beyond or middle. That is just the end of suffering. " [18]. In this fascinating passage the egoism involved in the logic of the grammarian is will juxtaposed with the freedom of the released mind.

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18 *Tasmātiha te Bāhiya evaṃ sikkhitabbaṃ : diṭṭhe diṭṭhamattaṃ bhavissati, sute sutamattaṃ bhavissati, mute mutamattaṃ bhavissati, viññāte viññātamattaṃ bhavissati. . . tato tvaṃ Bāhiya na tena, yato tvaṃ Bāhiya na tena tato tvaṃ Bāhiya na tattha, yato tvaṃ Bāhiya na tattha tato tvaṃ Bāhiya nevidha na huraṃ na ubhayamantaraṃ : eso 'va anto dukkhassā'ti*

True reality, as the unconditioned (*asaṅkhata*) state, is beyond all conceptual thinking. It follows then, that all egoistic or empirical concepts are unreal in the ultimate sense. That is why all empirical quests are regarded as illusory (*māyā*) in Buddhism, for by pursuing them one can never attain to true happiness. Wealth, learning, fame etc. may be attractive but by pursuing them as ends in themselves, one cannot be truly satisfied. Whatever be the concepts through which we try to reach them they become otherwise (*yena yena hi maññanti tato taṃ hoti aññathā* : *M*. III, p. 44). True happiness is the non-arising of all egoistic concepts in the state of Nibbāna where no more desires are born and wherein, quite non-conceptually, one can remain without imagining oneself to be anything, anywhere or anywise (*na kiñci maññati na kuhiñci maññatina kena ci maññati* : loc. cit.).

The fact that true reality is beyond conceptualisation was the theme of the Mādhyamika and Vijñānavāda dialectics of the later Mahāyāna. Both these schools of thought launched a vigorous attack on all thought constructions. It was the result of mixing up the conventional and the absolute aspects of Reality. Apart from its fascinating dialectics, there was nothing philosophically new in this view, for transcending the egoistic conceptualisation of the human mind (*prapañcopaśama*) was the aim advocated in early Buddhism too.

Concept-formation is essentially a process of learning but, if we are not to become entangled in a confusing tangle of concepts (*papañcasaññā-saṅkhā*) these concepts have to be intelligently utilised in the solution of our problems. The wrong handling of concepts is like grasping a vicious serpent by its tail as has been explained in the *Alagaddūpama Sutta* (*M*. I, pp. 130–42).

When our concepts rest upon wants, hungers, desires, drives, etc. of various kinds, they rule over us, harass us and drive us quite relentlessly while we remain blissfully ignorant of the fact that it is our own underlying evil tendencies (*anusaya*) which dictate in this way. This is suffering in its true sense, with its inescapable slavery. We may rest satisfied with some kind of thought that our problem is solved or fix our freedom on some future hope. Both these are illusive. Until all conceptualisations are overcome, the drudgery of saṃsāra continues.

In the *Sakkapañha Sutta* (*D*. II, p. 263 ff.) is found another statement of the Buddha important for the topic under discussion. Here Sakka, the king of the gods, asks the Buddha why it is that different classes of beings such as Asuras, Nāgas, Gandhabbas and others live in enmity, hatred, hostility and malignity despite the fact that they wish to live without such enmity and hatred. The Buddha answers that this unpleasant situation is due to a series of mental states culminating in prolific concepts in the following order : envy and selfishness, things dear and not dear, desire, ratiocination and the prolific concepts(*issā-macchariya, piyappiya, chanda, vitakka, papañca-saññā-saṅkhā*).

In this causally-connected series could be seen man's 'concentration camp' of cause and effect, freedom from which is to be obtained by conquering the ego.

A good example of the evil nature of egoistic conceptualisation is the five-fold bondage of Vepacitti, the Asura king, mentioned in the *Vepacitti Sutta* (*S*. IV, p. 201 ff.). When Vepacitti was defeated in battle by the gods, he was brought before Sakka, bound neck, hands and feet. When Vepacitti thinks that the gods are righteous and the demons unrighteous and desires to remain in the deva-world, he finds himself free from the bonds and possessed of the five pleasures of the senses. But as soon as he thinks that the demons are righteous and the gods unrighteous and wishes to go back to the asura-world, he finds himself bound as before and divested of the five sensuous pleasures. Thus, his bondage is dependent on his thoughts. This passage, with its touch of idealism, shows not only the dangers inherent in empirical thinking, but also its subtlety (*sukhumatā*).

Man lives by his concepts. For instance, if we take the concept of substance as conceived by him, it would be seen that he cannot live without conceiving something as substantial. While one man considers wealth as the most substantial thing and pursues it, another would similarly pursue academic learning while yet another would pursue political leadership. In this way, people identify themselves with different concepts and journey in saṃsāra. And, if the causes of human suffering are examined, it would be seen that the concept of substantiality in things is at the root of it. This is why the Buddha preached his unique philosophy of non-substantiality in everything (*anatta, nairātmya*) as the state of true freedom.

The doctrine of non-egoistic and hence non-conceptual thinking of the released mind was sometimes misunderstood and the Buddha was accordingly, called a nihilist, as one defining nothing as certain

(*venayiko appaññattiko : A.* V, p. 190). This accusation which came from non-Buddhists, was a result of misunderstanding the Buddha's theory of being free from views (*diṭṭhi*). The charge is met by maintaining that the Buddha quite definitely lays down what is right and what is wrong (*kusalākusala*) and thereby he is not a nihilist but a definer of concepts (*sappaññattiko*). The necessity of concepts, definitions, views etc. for conventional purposes is never denied. What is emphasised is the danger of being bound to them. For instance, in referring to empirical concepts, the Buddha says to Poṭṭhapāda: "But these are only designations, figures of speech, expressions, concepts, belonging to the world and the Tathāgata makes use of them without being led astray by them" (*D.* I, p. 202). Similarly at *Nett.* p. 56 : "The Buddha preaches his doctrine by means of various concepts" (*Bhagavā dhammaṃ paññattīhi vividhāhi deseti*). But the limitations of language and of empiricism make the highest reality indescribable and hence the so-called silence of the Buddha.

A. G. S. K.

CONCEPTION (*gabbhāvakkanti, gabbhokkanti, gabbha + avakkanti* : also occurring as *gabbhassa avakkanti* : descent into the womb), in the biological sense could be defined as the coalescence of the male and the female generative elements, sperm and ovum, in the maternal womb producing, pregnancy. According to Buddhist psychology it is with the arising of rebirth-linking consciousness (*paṭisandhiviññāṇa*), resulting from the death-consciousness of the previous life (*cuti-citta*, q.v.), that this formation of new life in the form of the embryo takes place in the mother's womb.[1] It is the beginning of a phase of the regenerative process (*uppatti-bhava*) which is marked by its unceasing movement from womb to womb (*Sn.* v. 278).[2] According to a recurrent statement in Buddhist texts, both Pali and Sanskrit, (*M.* I, p. 265; II, p. 156 ; *Miln.* p. 123 ; *Divy. BST.* p. 286 ; *Avs.* p. 7) the embryo arises in the maternal womb through the concurrence of three factors which are (i) parents should have sexual union. (ii.) mother should have her fertile period and (ii.) the *gandhabba* must be present.

This passage is regarded as representing the standard Buddhist explanation of biological conception. The first two conditions given here, i.e., that there should be the sexual union of the parents thereby making it possible for the male sperm and the female ovum to coalesce and that the mother should be at the correct (i.e., fertile) time to conceive create no problems. They are simple scientific facts. It is the third condition that needs explanation. The term *gandhabba* (Skt. *gandharva*) in this context[3] is generally translated as 'the being to be born'. And the commentator Buddhaghosa explains it quite clearly when he says (*MA.* II, p. 310) "the term *gandhabba* denotes the being who is about to take conception ; it is not that there is anyone who remains in the proximity observing the union of the parents ; on the other hand what is meant is that a certain being is about to be born in that situation, being driven by the mechanism of kamma." Thus, *gandhabba* comes to mean the surviving factor or the rebirth-tendency in the saṃsāric individual. The karmic energy of a dying individual takes conception in a suitable maternal womb when the other necessary factors are satisfied. As a particular state of saṃsāric consciousness (*saṃvattanika-viññāṇa* : *M* II, p. 262 ff.) this refers to the mental content or the energy potential of the terminal thought (*cuti-citta*) of the dying individual which results in the psychologically important rebirth-linking consciousness (*paṭisandhi-viññāṇa*) which in turn becomes the embryo of the new life-process (*uppatti-bhava*) in combination with the parental sperm and ovum. "The dying individual, with his whole being convulsively clinging to life at the very moment of his death sends forth karmic energies which, like a flash of lightning, hit at a new mother's womb ready for conception" (Nyanatiloka Mahathera, *Karma and Rebirth*, Wheel Publication, B.P.S., Kandy, Sri Lanka, p. 2). It is the rebirth-linking consciousness that links the dying life with the new life at conception. It may also be noted here that while the sperm and ovum are two physical factors the third factor is a psychic one ; this also shows that according to Buddhism the animated existence of man begins from the moment of conception, although this consciousness of the pre-natal child is a bare state of subconscience (*bhavaṅga*). However, it may further be noted here that according to a Buddhist view which was gradually developing (*Kvu.* p. 493 and *KvuA.*) only the physical base (*kāyāyatana*) and the mind-base (*manāyatana*) appear at the moment of conception, while the

1 While the term *gabbhavakkanti* refers more to the physiological or the biological aspect of conception, *paṭisandhi* refers to its psychological aspect.

2 Buddhaghosa gives a graphic description of the suffering involved in conception and gestation in his *Visuddhi-magga* (xvi, 37 ff).

3 This problem of *gandhabba* has been discussed in detail by O. H. de. A. Wijesekera in an article "*Vedic gandharva and Pali gandhabba*" in the *UCR.* III, No. 1, April, 1945.

other four *āyatanas* (by which are meant distinct organs like eye, ear, nose and tongue) appear subsequently (see ĀYATANA). Unless the birth be in a spirit world where existence is incorporeal, the rebirth-linking consciousness seems to arise only in association with a physical counterpart as with sperm and ovum in the case of uterine conception. The being to be born selects the womb in keeping with his kamma while the parental combination also has a certain power of attracting a being suitable for the situation according to their kamma (e.g., their psycho-physical condition at the time of union, their genetic constitution, etc.), thereby providing the explanation for gene-action and heredity as understood in modern science. The parents provide the groundwork for the 'I' energy of the dead individual to start a new life. Unless this *gandhabba* or the rebirth-potential is found, no conception can take place.

It may be mentioned here that according to early Buddhist views the being seeking conception or passing from one existence to another has no intermediate state (*antarābhava : UdA.* p. 92) as it positively denies any spatial or temporal hiatus in saṃsāric continuity (*bhava-santāna*) even at death. But, in trying to explain the apparent hiatus between death and rebirth, some of the later schools of Buddhism (e.g., Vijñānavādins, Sammitīyas, etc. See ANTARĀBHAVA) postulated an intermediate existence.

According to an interesting tradition relating to different types of conception which is found recorded in the Buddhist texts (in a statement attributed to the Buddha at *D.* III, pp. 103, 231), the *gandhabba*, in the case of ordinary worldlings, may be driven to a particular maternal womb unconsciously while in the case of more developed beings it would select the suitable mother consciously as instanced by the bodhisatta Siddhattha selecting Māyā's womb after considering all aspects. There are four modes of conception in relation to this point : (i) one enters the womb, remains there and comes forth into the world, unconscious of the whole process, (ii) one enters it knowingly but is unconscious of the rest of the process, (iii) one enters and remains there knowingly but comes forth unknowingly, (iv) one does all three knowingly. The commentary (*DA.* III, pp 885–6) identifies (i) with ordinary worldlings, (ii) with the eighty great arhants, (iii) with the two chief disciples and pacceka-bodhisattas and (iv) with bodhisattas that would become omniscient Buddhas.

It was shown earlier that no biological conception is possible without its most vital aspect, viz., consciousness (*viññāṇa*). Accordingly the 12-fold formula of conditioned genesis (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) states that the psycho-physical organism of the individual is conditioned and produced by consciousness (*viññāṇa-paccayā nāmarūpaṃ*). It is also sustained by it through mutual interaction (*D.* II, pp. 63–64). The Buddha clarifies the point further (loc. cit.) when he says that if consciousness were not to descend into the mother's womb (*viññāṇaṃ va hi mātukucchiṃ na okkamissatha*) or, if having descended into it, were to leave it (*kucchim okkamitvā vokkamissatha*), then parturition would not take place. In another place (*A.* I, p. 176) the Buddha says that conception takes place (*gabbhassāvakkanti hoti*) as a result of the co-ordination of the six elements (*dhātuyo*) of which the first five are physical, being elements like earth, water, etc. while the last is consciousness or *viññāṇa*. He also adds that the psycho-physical organism (*nāma-rūpa*) of a being is produced through such impregnation (*okkantiyā sati nāmarūpaṃ*).

A. G. S. K.

CONCOMITANCE. See LOGIC.

CONDITIONALITY. The view that an effect is brought about by an assembly of conditions occurring together seems to have been considered, from the very earliest times, an indispensable element of causation as interpreted and understood by the Buddhists. The early Pali text, *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (*S.* II, p. 26) refers to four essential and distinguishing characteristics of causation, naming conditionality as the fourth and designating it by the term *idappaccayatā*. Elsewhere (*Vin.* I, p. 5 ; *D.* II, p. 36 ; *M.* I, p. 167 ; *S.* I, p. 136), the term *idappaccayatā* usually occurs prefixed to the term *paṭicca-samuppāda* which is the Buddhist canonical term for both the idea of causation (categorically excluding the idea of an agent behind it) and the formula of twelve factors (*avijjā, saṅkhāra, viññāṇa*, etc.) illustrating or exemplifying the Buddhist law of causation. This fact has given rise to the suggestion (*BHS.* p. 114 s.v. *idam-pratyayatā*) that the two terms, *idappaccayatā* and *paṭicca-samuppāda*, are synonymous and that they are merely two parts of a compound word, while the suggestion[1] has also been made that *idappaccayatā* has been prefixed to *paṭicca-samuppāda* in order to emphasize the importance of the fourth characteristic, conditionality, to the

1 D. J. Kalupahana, *Causality, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, Honolulu, 1975, p. 55.

Buddhist concept of causation. Whatever may be the correct interpretation, it is clear that the notion of conditionality is inseparable from the Buddhist concept of causation, if not identical with it. This view, that an effect is brought about by a confluence of conditions, or, to put it reversely, that a cause is the sum-total of conditions operating to give rise to an effect, is made explicit by the illustration of the abstract causal formula (viz., when this is present, that is present, *asmiṃ sati, idaṃ hoti*, etc.) through the list of twelve factors, the so-called 'chain' of causation (See PAṬICCA-SAMUPPĀDA).

The following list enumerates the conditions giving rise to suffering ("the whole mass of suffering', *dukkhakkhandha* as it is called in the texts) manifested in such phenomena as decay and death (*jarā-maraṇa*), sorrow (*soka*), lamentation (*parideva*), pain (*dukkha*), grief (*domanassa*) and despair (*upāyāsa*), namely, (1) birth (*jāti*), (2) the volitional process of becoming (*bhava*), (3) clinging or possessiveness (*upādāna*), (4) craving or insatiation (*taṇhā*), (5) feeling (*vedanā*), (6) contact (*phassa*), (7) the 'six bases' viz: the five sense organs and the mind (*manāyatana*) as a base (*salāyatana*), (8) mentality and corporeality or materiality (*nāma-rūpa*), (9) consciousness (*viññāṇa*), (10) volitional (karmic) formations (*saṅkhāra*), and (11) ignorance (*avijjā*). It is obvious from a close study of these eleven factors that these are to be understood as conditions independently necessary and together sufficient to produce the effect, *dukkhakkhandha*, and that their simultaneous concurrence is essential to produce that effect. The *dukkhakkhandha* does not occur unless all these eleven elements are present and they exist simultaneously whenever the *dukkhakkhandha*, the effect, is present. At the same time, each factor must be present for the other to be present, for instance *saṅkhāras*, or karmic formations do not arise unless *avijjā*, ignorance, is present. *Viññāṇa*, consciousness, does not arise unless karmic formations are present, and so forth. Thus, we have a series of twelve causal uniformities independent and inseparable from each other, forming a complex whose last and final manifestation is the *dukkhakkhandha*. Any one of them being absent, the *dukkhakkhandha* does not arise. A condition, then, would be defined, according to the Buddhists, as a factor or phenomenon which must be present together with several other phenomena definable in the same terms to contribute to the emergence or manifestation of an effect. Its singular presence is insufficient to produce this effect but its singular absence will debar the effect from arising. The presence of a condition will not necessarily or invariably produce an effect but its absence will necessarily and invariably obstruct the effect from taking place. This is in contrast to a 'cause' which must necessarily and invariably bring about the effect, but this cause is the plurality of conditions of the above defined kind.

The notion of a plurality of conditions constituting a cause which emerges from a study of the above-mentioned twelve-fold formula is supported by Buddhaghosa's definition of the term *paṭicca-samuppāda* as a mode of causes which is that according to which coordinate phenomena are produced. Explaining the term *samuppanna* 'arisen', Buddhaghosa says that it means "when arising, it arises together, that is coordinately, not singly or without a cause" (*Visnı.* p. 521). Thus in the *Visuddhimagga* (loc. cit.): "When it arises (*uppajjamāno*) it does so 'together with (*saha*)' and 'rightly ((*sammā*)', not singly or causelessly, thus it is a co-arising (*samuppādo*). Consequently, it is to be arrived at (*paṭicca*) and it is a co-arising (*samuppāda*), thus it is dependent origination (*paṭicca-samuppāda*). Again it arises as a togetherness (*saha*), thus it is a co-arising (*samuppāda*); but it does so having depended (*paṭicca* - ger.) in combination with conditions, not regardless of them . . ." (trsl. Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli, *The Path of Purification*, Colombo, 1956, p. 596). Buddhaghosa's definition of *idappaccayatā* also supports the same notion. "From the point of view of the condition (*paccaya*) or a group of conditions (*paccaya-samūha*) that give rise to such states as decay and death, as stated, there is said to be conditionality (*idappaccayatā*)." Buddhaghosa's commentarial notes confirm all the conclusions made above from the examination of the twelve-fold formula in relation to causation. No effect would arise in the event of the inadequacy of any of the several conditions that go to make up a cause. The conglomerate of conditions (*paccaya samūha, hetu samūha*) which operate in producing an effect are not capable of doing so when they are not mutually dependent or when some of them are absent. It is equally (*samam*) and together (*saha*) that they produce a result.

This idea of a plurality of conditions (*hetu-samūha*: *Visnı.* p. 521) has sometimes given rise to an erroneous distinction between the words (*hetu* and *paccaya*, taking the former to stand for the term 'cause' and the latter for the term 'condition'. The word *paccaya* in the twelvefold formula clearly

stands for the word condition, thus in the phrase: *Phassa-paccayā vedanā*, the word *paccaya* states that *phassa* (contact) is a condition (for the arising) of *vedanā*) (feeling), the latter being what Buddhaghosa (*Tkp.* p. 11) calls the *paccayuppanna dhamma*, the phenomenon arisen out of the condition, in this instance, *phassa*. Each *paccayuppanna dhamma* in the formula is the *paccaya* in the immediately following statement; thus while contact is the condition for the *paccayuppanna dhamma*, feeling, feeling is the *paccaya* for the arising of the *paccayuppanna dhamma*, craving (*taṇhā*). It may therefore be inferred that each *paccayuppanna dhamma* is considered the result not only of the *paccaya* mentioned as giving rise to it, but of all the *paccayas* and *paccayuppanna dhammas* preceding it. Thus, the term *paccaya* connotes a condition or, often, a number of conditions. When it is a number of conditions it refers to the complex of the elements mentioned in the formula. This description of *paccaya* is confirmed by Buddhaghosa in whose words 'whatever dhamma' (phenomena) which is a support for the persistence or origination of another is to be taken as the *paccaya* of the latter. *Hetu* occurs quite frequently in the Pali Nikāyas as a word interchangeable with *paccaya*, and Buddhaghosa lists *hetu* and *paccaya* in a list of six synonyms for the word cause, saying that although the words are different, they stand for the same meaning. This synonimity of *hetu* and *paccaya* is also confirmed by the contexts of the oft-recurring phrase in the Pali Nikāyas, *Ko hetu, Ko paccayo*: "What is the cause, what is the reason or condition?" No distinction of meaning is revealed by these contexts.

The tradition of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, however, seems to have made a distinction between *hetu* and *paccaya* but even this distinction does not make *hetu* stand for cause and *paccaya* for condition. Instead, *hetu* has been classed as one of the twenty-four conditions (*paccaya*) and is taken to denote the psychological motives of an action.

These scholastic studies also seem to have noted that each of the several conditions which total up to make a cause have a different kind of relationship to the final effect, and the most important last work of the Abhidhamma Pitaka, the *Paṭṭhāna*, devoted to the detailed elucidation of the theory of Dependent Origination, is concerned with the analysis of the various correlations between the condition and the effect (see CORRELATIONS). What is also interesting in this work is that it undertakes to deal with conditionality not only as applicable to the origination of human suffering but to all the mental and material phenomena of existence "which in their combinations are known by the conventional names of 'I', 'person,' 'world' (Nyānatiloka, *Guide through the Abhidhamma Piṭaka*, Colombo, 1938, p. 94).

See further CAUSALITY.

FURTHER READING:

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B. J.

CONDITIONS. See PACCAYA.

CONDUCT is a general term for the relation between the human organism and its environment when this relation is looked at from the point of view of the organism itself (*Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*, New York, 1950, Vol. IV, p. 177). But, what an individual suffers from the environment is not conduct; the way he bears up under it or reacts to it is conduct. In other words, only actions that are in some degree under voluntary control are included in conduct. Reflex actions are not included in conduct, but instinctive actions are. Conduct is the pattern of behaviour (*cariyā*) and the expression of character (*sīla*). The Buddhist equivalent of conduct, in Pali, is usually given as *caraṇa*. See CARAṆA; and also BEHAVIOUR, CHARACTER and SĪLA.

E. H. P.

CONFESSION. Primarily, Theravāda Buddhism has neither a concept of sin, as sin is understood in other religions, nor a concept of Supreme God. Therefore, confession as confession of sin, i.e., transgression of the divine law and an offence against God, is completely alien to Theravāda Buddhism. But, however, there is a form of confession of offences (*āpatti*), a violation of some religious or moral principle, which is to be performed by the monks of the Order. This confession of offence formed a very important feature in the *Pātimokkha* (q. v.) ritual. It seems that this form of confession is also connected with the accomplishment of the vow, 'not to tell lies" which is solemnly guarded by the monks.

At the earliest stage, confession of offences appears to have been the most important feature of the *Pātimokkha* ritual. During the recitation of the *Pātimokkha* the monks are requested thrice to confess if they happen to have violated any of the *sikkhāpada*. Yet, if there happens to be a monk who remembering his offence, does not confess it while the assembly is questioned up to the third time, he comes to be guilty of conscious lying. Conscious lying is regarded an obstacle (*antarāyika dhamma*) to spiritual progress.

The *Mahāvagga* account of the *Pātimokkha* ritual states that during the recital all the members of this assembly should be attentive and then ponder over its contents, and then whosoever finds himself to be guilty of any transgression should confess the same in the assembly (*Vin.* I, p. 103).

Confession of offences was not regarded as a sacramental rite which brought about remission and absolution of the evil results of the offences. Yet such confession had useful functions. On the one hand it served to ensure the purity of the individual monks and consequently the purity of the Saṅgha. On the other, it also helps a monk who has transgressed to disburden himself of the sense of guilt, without which no spiritual progress could be made (*Vin.* I, p. 104).

Acceptance of one's guilt is only one aspect of the virtue of this confession. The acceptance of penalties and punishments by the offender as well as his firm determination to abstain from repetition in the future are more significant aspects of its virtue. The ability to admit one's lapses and make amends for them and the resolve to abstain from committing such offences in the future is considered by the Buddha as the basis of progress (*Vin.* II, p. 192).

There is textual evidence to show that attempts were made by some transgressing monks to suppress and conceal their transgressions (*M.* I, p. 27). Perhaps the fear of punishment and loss of reputation may be the cause of this. There are instances when monks insisted that their transgressions should not be discussed in public (*Vin.* I, p. 114 ; III, p. 178). There is also the possibility of miscreants being non-co-operative by refraining from confessing their guilt even when called upon to do so. To counter such a situation it is decreed that wilful suppression of one's guilt is a serious offence hindering one's spiritual progress (*Vin.* I, p. 103 f.). It is also laid down that it is an offence involving expiation to help a follow-member to conceal from the Saṅgha a grave offence (i.e., a *pārājikā* or *saṅghādisesā*) which he has committed (*Vin.* IV, p. 127).

It is clearly stated in the *Mahāvagga* that the Buddha decreed that no monk who is guilty of any transgression should perform the *uposatha* (*Vin.* I, p. 125 ; cf. *Vin.* II, p. 240). On the other hand, it is also insisted that monks should not allow the performance of *uposatha* to lapse (*Vin.* I, p. 126 f.). To remedy this paradoxical situation it was decreed that prior to his attendance at the *uposatha* ritual a transgressing monk should go before a follow-monk and confess his transgressions (*Vin.* I, p. 126). This form of confession gave sufficient purity to enable such a monk to take part in the *uposatha* ritual.

Perhaps, this form of private confession was intended to remove the alleged harshness of the jurisdiction of the *Pātimokkhā* ritual. The monks who did not even make use of this simplified form of confession were prohibited from participating in the *Pātimokkha* ritual.

Vimativinodanī (p. 396) records that some members of the Order maintained that even grave offences (*garukāpatti*) were remedied by mere confession. This is, perhaps, an attempt to extract further concession.

With the lapse of time confession of one's transgressions during the recitation of the *Pātimokkha* became less important while preliminary duties of the ritual (*pubbakaraṇa, pubbakicca*) assumed greater significance. These changes in the *Pātimokkha* ritual seems to have made the *Pavāraṇa* ritual (a ritual held at the end of the rains-retreat) assume greater importance in maintaining the purity of the Order. Both rituals appear to be similar in purpose, and when confession lost its significance in the *Pātimokkha* ritual *Pavāraṇa* ritual gave erring monks an occasion to confess their offences. However, *Pavāraṇa* ritual, too, with the lapse of time lost its original spirit and acquired a mere ritualistic form.

Unlike the Saṅgha, the laity was not required by any religious decree to confess their offences. Yet, there are few instances of spontaneous confession on their part, too. One such instance is that of Ajātasattu who came to the Buddha and confessed his crime of patricide. The Buddha while commending his action explained the virtue of confession as an effective means of attaining restraint in the future (*D.* I, p. 85).

With the development of Mahāyāna the institution of confession, too, attained a different form. The process of this change was enhanced by the development of *bhakti* (q.v.) and bodhisattva cults. These developments brought into Buddhism the concept of blind faith in bodhisattvas and their power to save devout worshippers from any calamity. Soon, confession came to be regarded as a meritorious act which induces bodhisattvas to save the penitent worshippers. The original idea of confession for future restraint gave way to a different form of confession which came to be looked upon as an important institution having the power to absolve sin and make the offender free from future retribution.

Still later in Mahāyāna, confession came to be regarded as an atonement for absolving sin and this forms the very essence of denunciation by oneself of one's own past sins *vidūsaṇā-samudācāra :* atonement). The confessors entreated the Buddhas to wash them clean with their water of mercy and to absolve their sin. In this way the confessors invoked the Buddhas and bodhisattvas to absolve even the sin acquired by the five grave offences (*pañcānantaryakarma*).

In Sanskrit Buddhist literature confession of sin came to be referred to as *pāpadeśanā* and this was regarded as one of the prerequisites to the awakening of the thought of onlightenment (*bodhicitta*, q.v.).

In China and specially in Japan, where the concept of *bhakti* developed into an independent school, the institution of confession gained a more prominent place. Various rites and ceremonies centering round the doctrine of confession came into vogue. Repentance over one's sin became an important feature in these confessional services. Monks as well as laymen looked upon confession as an efficient means of absolving sin and also as a means of winning the favour of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas. Thus, the law of karma was relaxed in order to allow the doctrine of confession to supersede it in favour of the penitent confessor (W.M.de Visser, *Ancient Buddhism in Japan*, p. 249 ff.).

S.K.N.

CONFIDENCE is the mental attitude of trust, reliance, belief or faith that arises through conviction. Thus, it essentially refers to the cognitive aspect of faith.

In Buddhism, there are no articles of faith; instead there are three objects towards which confidence is recommended, i. e., the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Saṅgha. Doubt (*vicikicchā, kaṅkhā, vimati*) with regard to them is said to bring about mental barrenness or (*cetokhila*, q.v.). It is also one of the five hindrances (*nīvaraṇa*) to spiritual progress and consequently to the clear understanding of the truth (*D.* I, pp. 73, 246 ; II, pp. 83, 300). Therefore, in order to gain spiritual progress and to understand the truth, it is essential that one should get rid of doubt and gain confidence in these objects. In this sense confidence is a primary requisite for spiritual progress.

Just as Buddhism does not recognise belief in a Supreme God so does it reject revelation from such a source. In Buddhism there are no esoteric teachings, and the Buddha had nothing hidden in the 'closed-fist' of a teacher (*ācariya-muṭṭhi : D.* II, p. 100). Freedom of thought and investigation permitted and encouraged by the Buddha is unparalleled in the history of religions. Buddhism laid emphasis on seeing (*passaṃ*) and knowing (*jānaṃ*) and not on mere faith. The Buddha declares that the destruction of defilements is meant for a person who knows and sees (*jānato passato*) and not for one who neither sees nor knows (*S.* III, p. 152). Therefore, it is not surprising to find confidence taking precedence over faith in Buddhism.

The Buddha, by declaring doubt as a hindrance to spiritual progress, did not prevent his disciples from enquiring into the nature of the three objects. On the contrary, textual evidence shows that the Buddha did not object to doubting as a characteristic of the enquiring mind (*A.* I, p. 189). In his view, it is the persistence of doubt that formed a hindrance. Therefore, he encouraged his listeners to investigate, enquire and clarify all doubts with regard to these objects with the help of personal experience and insight (*paññā*). However, it is obvious that all do not have an equally wide range of personal experience and similar mental maturity. Therefore, what the Buddha meant is that one should, to the best of one's ability, test, clarify and personally satisfy oneself with regard to these objects. It is the personal satisfaction (*attamana : M.* I, p. 114) that is very necessary to gain confidence. As doubt is eliminated one's heart becomes amenable (*kalla-citta*), soft (*mudu-c°*) unobstructed (*vinīvaraṇa-c°*), exalted (*udagga-c°*) and placid (*pasanna-c°: A.* IV, p. 209). The mental attitude that arises with the clarification of doubt is confidence.

The three objects of confidence appear to have a reciprocal relationship. Confidence in the Buddha is the base on which confidence in the other two objects are built. Confidence in the Buddha amounts to having confidence in his teaching, i. e., his Dhamma. Conversely, confidence in the Dhamma, also, implies confidence in the Buddha. Confidence in the Saṅgha, too, means belief in the truth of their experience. Thus, confidence in all three objects ultimately implies confidence in the Dhamma.

There are a number of Pali words often used, in the Nikāyas, to connote the sense of confidence. Of these, most noteworthy are the words *saddhā*, *pasāda* and the terms *ākarāvatī saddhā* and *avecappasāda*. Beside these terms there are certain passages (*D.* I, p. 110) also conveying the same meaning. Analysis of these terms and passages reveal that (i) basically it is mere faith (*saddhā* in the broadest sense) that evolves into confidence and that (ii) these terms and passages quite often denote different levels of confidence varying in accordance with the spiritual progress and intellectual maturity attained by different individuals concerned.

The word *saddhā*, which is generally rendered into English as faith, is wide in meaning and includes conative, affective and cognitive aspects. It is often found used in this wide sense, though occasionally it is employed to denote the sense of confidence.

The *Visuddhimagga* (p. 107) describing a person of faithful temperament says that in such a person is found generosity, desire to see noble ones, desire to hear the dhamma, great delight, honesty and confidence in things that inspire confidence (*pasādaniyesu ṭhānesu pasādo*). It is this last mentioned characteristic that is noteworthy in this instance. The same source explains that it is only when faith is coupled with knowledge (*paññā*) that one is able to gain confidence on well-founded grounds. When cultivated in combination with *paññā*, the affective elements of *saddhā* fade out considerably while its cognitive element comes into prominence. Buddhaghosa explains this fact clearly when he says that one who is strong in faith (*saddhā*) and weak in knowledge (*paññā*) gains confidence foolishly while one who is strong in knowledge and weak in faith is bent towards the side of cunning (*kerāṭikapakkha*). With the proper balancing of the two (*ubbhinnaṃ samatāya*) one gains confidence only when there is good ground for it (*Vism.* p. 129).

This sense of the word *saddhā* is clearly brought out in a passage in the *Majjhima Nikāya* (III,p.33): "*pubbe kho ahaṃ, āvuso, agāriyabhūto samāno aviddasu ahosiṃ : tassa me Tathāgato vā Tathāgatasāvako vā dhammaṃ deseti, taṃ dhammaṃ sutvā Tathāgate saddhaṃ paṭilabhiṃ* (Formerly, your reverences, when I was a householder, I was ignorant. The Tathāgata or a disciple of his taught me the dhamma. When I heard the dhamma I gained confidence in the Tathāgata)." In this context *saddhā* does not mean mere faith but confidence arising through hearing the doctrine and understanding it. In this particular instance confidence was so firm and well-founded that it led to his 'going forth'.

The word *pasāda*, too, very often conveys a similar meaning. The *Milindapañha*, in fact, gives the generation of *pasāda* as one of the two main characteristics of *saddhā* (*Kiṃ lakkhaṇā saddhā ti 'sampasādana-lakkhaṇā ca mahā rāja saddhā sampakkhandanalakkhaṇā cāti : Miln.* p. 34). The word *pasāda* which is derived from the verb *pasīdati*[1] primarily means to settle down, to grow clear and bright, to be placid and tranquil (as in the case of a pond, the sea or the sky) is also, metaphorically applied to denote the placid state of the mind (*cetaso pasāda*) brought about by clarification of doubt through *paññā*. That the term *cetaso pasāda* indicates a mental state that results from intelligent study and clarification of thought is clear from Nikāya evidence itself. Failure to investigate and understand appear to result in lack of *pasāda* for, it is said that one shows lack of confidence in a situation in which one ought to have confidence as a result of not investigating and understanding (*ananuvicca apariyogāhetvā pasādanīye ṭhāne appasādaṃ upadaṃseti : A.* III, p. 139). Lack of *pasāda* is correlated to lack of knowledge, for it is said that the knowledge of a person who does not understand the good doctrine and whose confidence is fickle does not increase (*saddhammaṃ avijānato paripplava pasādassa paññā na paripūrati : Dhp. v.* 38).

As all are not of the same level of mental maturity the grounds on which two people gain confidence and, also, the levels of their confidence could vary considerably. Some may gain confidence by recollecting (*anussara*) the virtuous qualities of the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Saṅgha (*A.* I, p. 207 ; *M.* II, p. 51 ; *Vism.* p. 135). Though recollection

1 This term is often rendered into English as intellectual joy or mental appreciation. This translation is apt for, with the attainment of placidity of mind, through intelligent study and classification of one's thoughts, one feels also, a sense of satisfaction and joy. Cf. Note on the interpretation of *Pasidat* iby Edith Ludowyke — Gyomroffin *UCR*· Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 82

does not necessarily mean investigation, it denotes a conscious act of calling to mind all virtuous qualities said to be found in the three objects of confidence, and as such the cognitive element, too, is prominent in this act. By this concentrated recollection one's heart becomes placid (*cittam pasīdati*). And one begins to experience the height of emotional satisfaction (*pāmujjam uppajjati*). There are others who, without accepting another's testimony, may be even that of the Buddha, try to see for themselves (*attani sampassamānā*) whether these objects are truly endowed with the said virtuous qualities (*M*. I, p. 64). The cognitive element is more prominent in this act than in the simple act of recollecting (*anussaraṇa*) the virtues of the Buddha etc., and as such confidence gained by this means is based on firmer grounds. There can be still more developed persons who are able to read the thoughts of others. They are capable of investigating even the Tathāgata to see whether he is Enlightened or not (*M*. I, p. 320). Confidence gained by this sort of investigation is, obviously, on far more well-founded grounds, and consequently such confidence belongs to a higher level.

As pointed out at the outset confidence in the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Saṅgha ultimately implies confidence in the Dhamma. Thus, in order to find out the exact nature of confidence it becomes necessary to determine the attitude expected by the Buddha from his disciples and lay-followers, with regard to the Dhamma.

It is evident that it is *saddhā* that impels one towards the Dhamma (*M*. I, pp. 480-481). The *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*A*. I, p. 248) enumerates five benefits that result from hearing the doctrine. These are : i. one hears things not heard before (*assutaṃ suṇāti*) ; ii. cleanses things already heard (*sutaṃ pariyodāpeti*) ; iii. dispels doubt (*kaṅkhaṃ vihanati*) ; iv. straightens one's view (*diṭṭhiṃ ujuṃ karoti*) and v. the mind becomes placid (*cittaṃ pasīdati*). That the placidity of mind is attained only with the straightening of one's view is clear from the *Sammādiṭṭhi Sutta*, too. It is evident from numerous other references in the Nikāyas that gaining of confidence is a part of the process of the attainment of profound knowledge and as such it is brought about by a gradual process of training (*M*. I, pp. 479, 480 ; III, p. 1). The Nikāyas often describe in a stereotyped passage how the Buddha gradually inspires confidence in the hearts of listeners by preaching to them in a methodical way (*D*. I, pp. 110, 148 ; II, p. 41 ; *A*. IV, p. 209). Yet, the Buddha never attempted to impose his authority and force his teaching on listeners. This remarkable quality of his is very well seen from the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* which portrays the Buddha, in his last stage of life, as being anxious that his seeming authority should not stand in the way of the doubts of his disciples being dispelled by questioning (*D*. II, p. 155). Even when Upāli got convinced of his teaching, the Buddha cautioned him saying, "Of truth, householder, make a thorough investigation. It is good for well-known men like yourself to make a thorough investigation (*M*. I, p. 379 ; *S*. II, p. 117).

Textual evidence points to the fact that the Buddha expected of his listeners a critical approach to the doctrine. The *Kālāma Sutta* in often quoted by writers as illustrating this attitude recommended by the Buddha. But, it would be an over-simplification to take the spirit of this sutta as implying a complete denial of all authority.

In the first instance, it should be borne in mind that the *Kālāma Sutta* was preached to laymen who had no prior training in Buddhist thinking. Secondly, contextual evidence suggests that it was primarily directed at denouncing the then prevalent blind tradition (*andhaveṇūpamaṃ* : *D*. I, p. 239), propagated by Brāhmans, of accepting all statements on the grounds of revealed authority (*anussava*). Thirdly, it deals with matters that fall within the sphere of empirical knowledge, and as such the scope of its application is limited.

Though when taken at its face value the sutta appears to reject the acceptance of all forms of authority, a careful analysis however would reveal that it is not so. This sutta merely advocates against the practice of blindly accepting any statement on the grounds of authority, but in doing so, it does not commend the total rejection of all forms of authority. The texts say that one of the two conditions that help the arising of right understanding (*sammādiṭṭhi*) is the testimony of another (*parato ghosa*), the other being proper reflection (*yoniso manasikāra* : *M*. I, p. 294). The *Kālāma Sutta* itself allows one to take into consideration, when deciding between wholesome and unwholesome or good and bad things, the views of the wise (*viññū*).[2] Thus, what this sutta implies is that one, without blindly accepting another's

2 K. N. Jayatilleke (*Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, London, 1963, pp. 229, 375, 405) renders the term *viññū*, into English as 'the intelligent or rational ones' and adds that the Buddha seems primarily to have addressed this class of people and put his theories to test at their hands. This he considers as the reason why a good person (*sappurisa*) is defined as one who is blameless in the eyes of the *viññū*.

statements as true merely on the grounds of authority, should only provisionally accept them for the purpose of testing and personal verification to the best of one's ability (see also AUTHORITY).

To accept a statement provisionally one should merely have faith (*saddhā*), the impelling force within oneself. The stage of provisional acceptance of a statement is referred to as the 'safeguard of truth' (*saccānurakkhaṇa*). From this stage one proceeds to the next stage ensuring the honesty, unbiassed nature and the intelligence of the person from whom the statement is heard, for confidence in the teacher helps to gain confidence in the teaching. The *Vīmaṃsaka Sutta*, too, emphasises this fact. When one is satisfied with the teacher, one begins to consider the teaching seriously by testing and weighing the meanings by reasoning out and penetrating it with knowledge, (*paññāya tam ativijjha passati : M.* I, p. 480 ; II, p. 173) or with super-knowledge (*abhiññā : M.* I, p. 319). With this thorough investigation and reasoning of the doctrine one reaches the third stage of confidence kown as 'rational faith', (*ākāravatī saddhā : M.* I, p. 320). The commentary explains the technical use of *ākāravatī* here as taking into due consideration the grounds of assertion (*kāraṇaṃ pariyesitvā gahitattā sakāraṇā*). It is said that the confidence of one who has reached this stage is fixed, rooted and irremovable.

Rational faith, being a product of critical examination and reasoning, is apparently the opposite of baseless confidence' (*amūlikā saddhā*) which results from following the blind tradition (*andhaveṇi*) of the brahmins.

It appears that the mental attitude attained by one who has acquired 'rational faith' is virtually the same as the mental state reached by one who has 'gained confidence based on understanding' (*aveccappasāda*).[3]

From the foregoing account it becomes clear that, basically, confidence results from proper and balanced cultivation of *saddhā* and *paññā*. According to the teaching of the Buddha, it should be borne in mind that development of *paññā* is related to the development of moral conduct (*sīla : (D.* I, p. 124).

Vatthūpama Sutta, too, points out that one gains *aveccappasāda* only after one has eliminated many of the minor defilements of the mind (*M. I*, p. 36 ff.). Similarly the *Sammādiṭṭhi Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 46), also, shows how confidence gets more and more stabilized with the growth of *sīla* and *paññā*. The *Cūlahatthipadopama Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 182) elucidates this point further by describing how confidence in the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Saṅgha gradually increases with the cultivation of *sīla* and *paññā*, and how it ultimately reaches conclusion (*niṭṭhaṃ gacchati*) with the realization of the Truth. Therefore, it is possible to surmise, from these references, that the increase of *pasāda* (confidence) is, almost, in direct proportion to the increases of virtuous conduct (*sīla*) and knowledge (*paññā*).

As evident from the *Cūlahatthipadopama Sutta*, confidence goes on increasing till the person who possesses it gains conviction with the realization of the Truth, i.e., arahantship. Thus the attainment of the 'completion of confidence' appears to be a characteristic of the arahants. If so, what is the particular spiritual stage reached by those who have attained *ākāravatī saddhā* or *aveccappasāda* ?

It has already been pointed out that the mental attitude denoted by these two terms are almost similar. The *Vīmaṃsaka Sutta* describes *ākāravatī saddhā* using the term *dassanamūlikā* (based on insight) which the commentary explains as *sotāpattimaggamūlikā* (based on the career of the stream-attainment). *Dassana* (right insight) is said to be a characteristic of those who have reached the *sotāpatti* stage, and it is also said that, with the attainment of right insight, three fetters, viz., doubt (*vicikicchā*), belief in a soul (*sakkāya-diṭṭhi*) and ceremonial observances (*sīlabbata*) are got rid of (*Sn. v.* 231). Further clarification is necessary as to whether a person who has developed *ākāravatī-saddhā* or *aveccappasāda* is freed from all these fetters. It may be argued that such a person is freed only of doubt. The evidence in hand does not appear sufficient to conclude that one who has reached *aveccappasāda*, *ipso facto*, has attained *sotāpatti*.

Jayatilleke (op. cit. p. 394) is of opinion that the person who has developed *ākāravatīsaddhā* seems to be identical with the person who is described as being 'emancipated by faith' (*saddhāvimutta : M.* I, p. 478). This opinion is based on the identity of the language used to describe the *saddhāvimutta* with that of *ākāravatīsaddhā*.[4]

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3 The etymology of this word is doubtful. The *PED.* suggests *ava* + ger. of +i, to go, which is also adopted by K.N. Jayatilleke (op. cit. p. 386). Jayatilleke also suggests comparison with *avagata* from *ava* + *gam* to go.

4 Their identity is based on the similarity of language used to describe them (cf, *M.* I, p. 320 = *M.* I, p. 478 : *Tathāgate c'assa saddhā niviṭṭhā hoti mūlajātā patiṭṭhitā*).

CONFLICT. In the light of the discourses of the Buddha, the notion of conflict can be viewed from two standpoints. In the *Araṇavibhaṅga Sutta.* (*M.* III, p. 230 ff.), an ideal state of peace and absence of conflict and disturbance (*araṇa*) is contrasted with the condition of the *puthujjana* (the average man), which is a condition that incessantly generatee conflicts and disturbance due to the defilements. *Araṇa* (*a-raṇa*) means peace and quietude as contrasted with *saraṇa* (*sa-raṇa*) meaning disturbance, concomitant with war etc. *Araṇa* is sometimes rendered as the 'undefiled', but *araṇa* is more appropriately clarified as the peace and quietude that is a result of the absence of defilements.

The most prominent word for peace is *santi* refering to the absence of conflict in the individual, and in a more fundamental sense, the word *santi* refers to the absolute state of peace and quietude, as expressed by the term Nibbāna. There is a reference to Nibbāna as *santipada* (the 'place of tranquility' : *A.* II, p. 18), and *santivarapada* (place of supreme tranquility : *M.*I, p. 163) and the *Suttanipāta* refers to *santivāda* 'an advocate of mental calm' (*Sn. v.* 845). Thus, in these contexts, Nibbāna as signifying calm, peace, quietude, harmony etc. is contrasted with existence subject to *dukkha*, a state of unrest, tension, disturbance, conflict etc.

The other standpoint is that of the righteous householder who gets a degree of 'ease and pleasure' by way of the senses. For the man who considers the life of renunciation difficult, the Buddha recommends the life of the righteous householder. It is said of such a one, that he seeks wealth by lawful means, without greed and longing, gets ease and pleasure for himself and does meritorious deeds (*A.* V, p. 176). While the recluse seeking ultimate release from suffering will obtain inner peace (*ajjhatta-santi*), the righteous householder aims at harmonious living, *dhammacariya*, *samacariya* (*M.* I, p. 289 ; *S* I, p. 101). This is the concept of the well-adjusted and balanced person, who while he seeks pleasure, exercises a degree of restraint and limits his wants. Thus, while the enjoyment of pleasures as such is not condemned, excessive and illegitimate pleasures (*adhamma-rāga*, illegitimate passion, *visama-lobha*, excessive greed, *micchā-dhamma*, perverted lust : *D.* III, p. 70) are condemned.

If one violates the legal and the social order in the search for pleasure, one comes into conflict with the law and the interests of other individuals (*M.*I, p. 87). Unless the rights and interests of others are respected, there will be conflicts between individuals at social level. If a person commits adultery, his actions will conflict with the legal and the social order, and he will also be subject to a heavy conscience, guilt and the fear of punishment (*M.* III, p. 164).

There will be a difference in the types of conflicts also, according to the two standpoints. The righteous householder will be subject to conflicts within the accepted limits of his wants and desires — between two pleasure-giving objects of equal attractiveness both of which cannot be had, the conflict between the desire for security and the risks involved in making a livelihood, the need to control his hatred against one who has been mean etc. The recluse in search of inner peace will be liable to temptations that he has to master, and in general the 'conflict between the flesh and spirit'. The Buddhist perspective regarding temptations and guilt in relation to the religious life has a direct bearing on the therapeutic aspects of conflict. A recluse should not be subject to conflicts generated by an unhealthy guilt-conscience for it can have a paralysing effect on the person who is really capable of developing a healthy sense of shame of evil (*hiri*) and a healthy sense of dread of evil (*ottappa*).

If a recluse goes to the forest but is disturbed by passions he should remain calm, unshaken and strive to control any turbulent emotions. This can be done by the strength of his own conscience (*attādhipateyya*). It is also said that if thoughts of sensuality and malice arise in him, the concern for what the world will think of him will act as a spur to vigilance, this is referred to as *lokādhipateyya*. If, however, yet he cannot be vigilant and energetic, and is subject to sloth and negligence, he should be stirred by the respect for the Dhamma, which is referred to as *dhammādhipateyya* (*A.* I, p. 147).

The Buddhist concept of *hiri-ottappa* should not be confused with *kukkucca*, which refers to the uneasiness of conscience, worry and remorse. In fact, *uddhacca-kukkucca* (restlessness and worry) is considered as one of the five hindrances (*nivaraṇa*) to the development of tranquility, inner peace and insight. A clear grasp of the duality of these two standpoints is necessary to understand the psychology of conflict within the doctrine of the Buddha as a whole.

The Psychology of Conflict

Conflict in the psychological sense emerges in a situation where a person is impelled to engage in two or more mutually exclusive activities. The

alternatives present to the individual may be of an equal degree of attractiveness or unattractiveness. The proverbial donkey who was torn between two equally attractive bales of hay starved to death. Sometimes one has to avoid one out of two equally repulsive alternatives, like the man pressed between the devil and the deep sea. But the more complex situation where the same object has both a 'positive valence' and a 'negative valence' — pleasures are manifold and sweet (*kāmācitrā madhurā*), but yet they are of little gratification (*appassādā*), much suffering (*bahudukkhā*) and much turbulence (*bahūpāyāsa : Sn.v* 50 ; *M*. I, p. 91). To understand the nature of *taṇhā* conflicts, one has to grasp the notion of *taṇhā*, and place it within the dynamic psychology of early Buddhism.

The springs of human motivation are traced to six roots, which fall into two classes, moral and immoral. Of the immoral roots, *lobha*, rendered as greed or lust, generates the positive 'approach desires' ; *dosa* generates the 'avoidance desires' in the form of anger, hate and malevolence ; it is *moha*, rendered as delusion, that makes conflict a complex state, as lack of understanding regarding the genesis of one's motives converts a simple conflict state into an incessant tangle, a state of confused consciousness. While these immoral roots of action bring about conflicts within the individual and between individuals, their opposites bring about inner happiness (*ajjhatta sukha*) and peace (*santi*) within the individual and among a group of individuals. Charity (*alobha*), compassionate love (*adosa*) and wisdom (*amoha*) lead to inner harmony within the individual and cooperation and understanding at the social level.

Greed has three manifestations, viz., in the form of *kāma-taṇhā* (craving for sensual pleasures), *bhava-taṇhā* (craving for self-preservation), and *vibhava-taṇhā* (craving for annihilation). Hatred manifests itself in varied types of aggression. Delusion is the primary root of evil, preventing man from seeing the true nature of things.

Most of these conflicts can be understood in terms of the craving for sensuous gratification, which may be described (to use a Freudian term) as a 'pleasure principle'. Man is so constituted that he seeks what is pleasurable and shuns what is not pleasurable (*sukha-kāmo dukkha-paṭikkūlo : M*.I, p. 34)."If there were not this satisfaction that comes from the eye, beings would not lust after the eye. But in as much as there is satisfaction in the eye, beings lust after it." It is also said, " If misery pertained not to the eye, beings would not be repelled by the eye. But in as much as there is misery in the eye, beings are repelled by it "(*Kindred Sayings*, IV, p. 9). While a person feels attraction (*sārajjati*) for agreeable material shapes, he feels repugnance (*byāpajjati*) for disagreeable material shapes. Thus, possessed of like (*anurodha*) and dislike (*virodha*) he approaches pleasure-giving objects or avoids painful objects. (*M*. 1, p. 266).

The objects of pleasure are referred to as, 'delightful, dear, passion-fraught and inciting to lust' (*S*. IV, p. 60). When a person's passions are aroused by oncoming external stimuli, there emerges a tenacity to hold on to these objects of pleasure. This is the emergence of clinging (*upādāna*). Unless there is the persistence of clinging, excitation of the sense organs is not sufficient to rouse the individual to activity. The pursuit of sense pleasures are, however, fed by deeper undercurrents. When clinging emerges, some latent tendencies have already been excited. Pleasurable feelings induce an attachment to pleasant objects as they rouse latent sensuous greed (*rāgānusaya*), and painful feelings rouse latent anger and hatred (*paṭighānusaya*). The 'approach desires' emerge on the root greed and excite the *rāgānusaya*, the 'avoidance desires' emerge on the root hate and excite the *paṭighānusaya*. It is on this basis that we can understand the psychology of conflict according to Buddhism.

In searching for new methods of seeking satisfaction, men are torn between mutually attractive alternatives. The notion of *taṇhā* refers to an incessant thirst which can only be temporarily quenched, but emerges again in more subtle and variegated forms. In fact, the characteristics of tension, conflict and restlessness are built-in qualities of the notion of *taṇhā*. The 'approach-approach' conflict is simpler than the 'approach-avoidance' conflict which is more difficult to solve. Pleasure-giving objects have both a positive aspect which attracts people and a negative aspect that repels people-*kāmānam assādo* (the satisfaction in pleasures of the senses) and *kāmānam ādīnavo* (the peril in sense-pleasures: *M*. I, p. 85). In avoiding pain within the vicious circle of the pleasure principle man also gets caught between two painful situations, of which only one can be avoided ; to 'be joined with the unpleasant' is a facet of *dukkha* (*D*. II, p. 305). In situations of this sort, it is the root hate (*dosa*) that intensifies the conflict.

A significant linkage point between craving and conflict is the concept of frustration. Though we do not make a distinction between conflict and

frustration, it is the threat of frustration that intensifies the stress in a conflict situation. We have strong wishes and equally painful disappointments. We do not always get what we want, and even the things we possess are liable to change, decay and loss. In general, 'to be joined with the unpleasant', 'to be separated from the pleasant' and the 'failure in getting what one wants' are all expressions of *dukkha* (*D*. II, p. 305). A great deal of personal frustration could be understood in terms of *bhavataṇhā* issuing forth in a strong self-preservative drive, power, status, fame, glory etc. Achievement of ambition, fame and glory heighten man's superiority conceit (*seyyamāna*) ; failure and dejection might excite a feeling of inferiority (*hīna māna*), build up a sense of grudge (*paṭigha*) or even lead to aggression and violence. When frustration reaches an unbearable point, we come across an apparently rare phenomenon, the conflict between the desire to live (*bhava-taṇhā*) and the desire to destroy oneself (*vibhava-taṇhā*) clearly seen in cases of suicide. The craving for annihilation triggered off by states of frustration is first directed against repulsive objects and persons, and then deflected against oneself. Certain types of self-mortification are also a disguised expression of the craving for annihilation. Such contradictory attitudes to life, like the desire to live and the desire to destory oneself, can co-exist below the level of conscious awareness, and accounts for patterns of emotional ambivalence displayed in conflict situations.

Some of these conflicting attitudes to the self can only be cleared by an analysis of the root delusion. So far we have discussed psychological conflicts in terms of the roots greed and hatred, but the nature of delusion will reveal some of the complexity that underlie conflicts. Conflicts and anxiety are basically the result of holding on to a false conception of a 'self'. Out of the many wrong views that confuse people, the most powerful are the two forms of ego-illusion, eternity and annihilation doctrines. In a deeper sense man is incessantly tied to conflict situations as he is 'prone to anxiety', and anxiety (*is caused by*) an attachment to the belief in 'I' and 'me' which instead of giving us a feeling of security, creates worry and anxiety (*paritassanā*). Some remarkable insight into the meaning of anxiety on these lines is found in the *Alagaddūpama Sutta* (*M*.I, p. 130 ff.)."And what is impermanent, painful, subject to change, is it fit to be considered thus: 'This is mine, this I am, this is my self'" (*M*. I, p. 138). In summing up the psychology of conflict, we see that conflicts emerge in three types of relationships — the relationship between the self and the outer world, between the self and other selves and finally within the discordant aspects of one's own self. The difficulty to see through the conflicting welter of ego-attitudes and the ambiguities in these relationship is due to the condition of 'half-obscurity' and ignorance that colour the emotional conflicts of people. It is the root delusion that explains this phenomenon, by way of the diverse forms of ego-illusions, and they have been presented by the Buddha as the twenty forms of wrong personality-belief (*sakkāya-diṭṭhi : M*. I, sutta 44). In general, *taṇhā* (craving) and *avijjā* (ignorance, delusion) are considered as the two tap roots from which all suffering spring. The three roots of the springs of motivation may be reduced to the factors of *taṇhā* and *avijjā*.

The social and ideological aspects of conflict

In analysing the psychological bases of conflict, it has already been shown that the psychological make-up of the individual lends itself to conflicts in society. While accepting the fact that social conflicts emerge due to conflicting claims of individuals for power, status, scarce resources etc., the Buddha directs our attention to the psychological make-up of the individual rather than the social structures that nourish the acquisitive personality (*rāgacarita*). However, there are clear instances, when the social and economic factors that contribute to the emergence of social conflicts are admitted by the Buddha. In one of the discourses, the Buddha refers to the following factors affecting society — the psychological factor of craving, the economic factor of hunger and the bodily proclivity to sickness (*D*. III, sutta 26). Deteriorating economic and social conditions will cause strife and conflicts, and society will fall into a low ebb in morals. "... goods not being bestowed on the destitute poverty grow rife; from poverty growing rife stealing increased, from the spread of stealing violence grew space, from the growth of violence, the destruction of life became common ..." (*D*. III, p. 67). In speaking to Anāthapiṇḍika, the Buddha emphasises that economic well-being is necessary to lead a good life, and refers to four types of bliss to be won by the householder ; *atthi-sukha* (economic security), *bhoga-sukha* (enjoyment of one's wealth), *anaṇa-sukha* (debtlessness), *anavajja-sukha* (blameless moral and spiritual life : *A*. II, p. 69).

Conflicts between groups are often rooted in ideological factors, and they tend to be in general more violent when the contending individuals are 'collectively oriented', and specially when they feel that they are fighting for some ends which go beyond the individual. The Buddha has condemned the dogmatic adherence to views of people who think that only they have found the truth and all others are fools (*Sn. v.* 879). The futility of wordy warfare and mere intellectual debate has been pointed out well in the *Alagaddūpama Sutta*. Here, the person who is stuck in the mire of controversy and thereby preoccupied with pure intellectual debate as an end in itself is compared to the man who carries the raft on his head. The intellectual obstinacy of the men wedded to such ideologies are an expression of the person with a speculative turn of mind (*diṭṭhi-carita*). The very title of the sutta. "The Parable of the Water-snake' introduces another simile, where the person who does not have a correct grasp of the doctrine is compared to the man who does not hold the water-snake properly. If a man goes in search of a water-snake and after seeing one takes hold of it by the coil or the tail, the water-snake will turn round and bite him, thus bringing about his destruction. The man who skillfully holds the water-snake is compared to the one who had an intuitive and correct grasp of the Dhamma.

In the *Kalahavivāda Sutta*, these limited views (*diṭṭhi*) are said to be rationalisations that emerge on greed, hatred and conceits (*Sn. v.* 863). This sutta makes a pointed analysis of the motivational roots of ideological conflicts and once again emphasises the psychological aspect of conflicts. The one freed from the tangle of dogmatic views and the one in conflict with diverse ideologies is described thus :

> "There are no knots for him loosed from surmise,
> There are no errors for the wisdom freed :
> But they who both surmise and view accept,
> They wayfare in the world at odds with folk."
>
> (*Woven Cadences, PTS. v.* 847).

Conflict and therapy

The resolution of conflict is generally discussed from the stance of one seeking absolute peace and quietude in Nibbāna. As we have already seen, though even in the analysis of the genesis of conflicts this aim dominates, the Buddha does describe the psychological attitudes fostering peace and harmony in society. We shall briefly deal with both aspects.

If a person cuts down a tree and the tree stump remains, it will sprout again. If a person carelessly uproots a tree, while some of the strong roots remain in the soil, it can sprout again. But if the person carefully uproots the tree completely, it will not grow again. One who follows the path of the Buddha should aim at removing the roots lust, hatred and delusion in the same way. Thus, the kind of therapy undertaken by the monk is an extremely radical kind of therapy, while due to the layman's partial compromise with life, he has to adopt a less ardous path to mental well-being.

There are two life-perspectives that generate conflicts and tensions and both of these have been condemned by the Buddha. The *Araṇavibhaṅga Sutta* states that one should reject two extremes : the one 'intent on the happiness of the sense pleasures' (*kāmasukham anuyuñjeyya*) and the one 'intent on the practice of self-mortification' (*attakilamathānuyogam anuyuñjeyya*). Both these paths create tensions and conflict (*saraṇa*). They are ways of life that generate *dukkha* (anguish) *upaghāta* (annoyance), *upāyāsa* (trouble) *parilāh* (fret). We are advised to follow the middle way that leads to calm, self-awakening, vision and knowledge.

As the life of sense pleasures has been described by the Buddha as one inherently tending to suffering, people fall into the opposite extreme and misguided, like the Jains, follow the path of self-mortification. The deliberate attempt to live through painful experiences and the techniques of burning up and purging the effects of karma is criticised by the Buddha. Such violent attempts to deal with human suffering are an expression of displaced craving. An understanding of the concept of *upādāna* which may be rendered as 'entanglement' referring to an obsession with what we like as well as dislike, helps us to grasp the crucial point that the Buddhist path to liberation goes beyond the opposites pleasure-pain (*sukha-dukkha*), attraction-repulsion (*kāmacchanda-vyāpāda*), compliance-antipathy (*anurodhāvirodha*), greed and hatred (*lobha-dosa*). What we have discussed in terms of life-perspectives can also be discussed in terms of character-types—*rāga-carita* (person whose conduct is dominated by greed), *dosa-carita* (person whose conduct is dominated by hatred). The middle way discussed by the Buddha cannot be traversed by 'those who walk in greed' and by 'those who walk in hate'. There are specific meditational exercises that deal with certain unwholesome traits : and some meditations

are suitable for specific types. While the study of the genesis of conflicts help us to grasp the nature of these conflicts, the meditational exercises give guidance to deal with them at various levels. The defilements that produce conflicts are found in the form of certain dormant proclivities (*anusaya*). The *Visuddhimagga* says that they pass through three stages, the *anusaya-bhūmi* (period of latency) *pariyuṭṭhāna-bhūmi* (expression in thought-process) and *vitikkama-bhūmi* (expression in word and deed). Transgression by word and deed can be counteracted at the level of social morality (*sīla*), evil thought processes have to be suppressed by concentration, but they will not be completely eradicated till the latent proclivities are rooted out by understanding (*paññā*). The first phase is referred to as the eradication of defilements by substitution of opposites, the second as suppression by concentration, and finally the cutting off by understanding.

It is only when these defilements have been mastered in this manner, that external stimuli can be observed with complete detachment and objectivity, without either compliance or antipathy —" Then, Bāhiya, thus must you train yourself, in the seen there will be just the seen, in the heard just the heard, in the imagined just the imagined, in the cognised just the cognised." (*Verses of Uplift, P T S.* p. 8).

A final point that comes up regarding conflict and therapy is the Buddhist attitude to 'repression'. If a person by his own efforts generates a train of wholesome thoughts which conflict with some of his unwholesome habits, there emerges a healthy conflict which may result in the building up of wholesome activity. Even if such conflicts persist, if they come within the range of one's cravings and attachments are extended to the unconscious level. Such repressed conflicts which exist at the subterranean level are fed by the *anusayas*, and are causally related to the emergence of unconscious anxieties and fears. If a person 'feels anxious but knows not why', it is necessary to lay bare these repressed conflicts by a constant introspective understanding of one's mental states. Thus, while an ordinary conflict which comes within one's conscious awareness might be even a spur to the development of one's personality, repressed conflicts are damaging. According to Buddhism it is by methodical mental culture that one can reach these dark and hidden facets of mind.

Many forms of pathological behaviour are caused by repressed conflicts, and the five techniques of dealings with the removal of distracting thoughts deserve special attention here. If the recluse intent on higher consciousness is disturbed by distracting thoughts which conflict with the practice of meditation, the *Vitakkasaṇṭhāna Sutta* (*M.* I, pp. 119-122) recommends five methods to deal with them. The first is the method of *aññā nimitta* (different object); ideational activity(*vitakka*) associated with desire (*chanda*), aversion(*dosa*)and confusion (*moha*) can be eliminated by reflection on a 'different object' connected with the wholesome. The second technique, that of *ādīnavā* aims at scrutinising the peril of these evil, unwholesome thoughts; the third is that of *asati amanasikāra*, whereby unwholesome thoughts are eliminated by a lack of attention on them; the method of *mūla bheda* searches for the cause and source of unwholesome thoughts; and finally the method of *abhiniggaha* subdues and restrains evil thoughts. By the use of these methods, the mind becomes steady, calm and one-pointed. By repeated practice one can become "a master of the paths taken by the turns of thought" (*vasivitakka-pariyāya-pathesu*: *M.* I, p. 122).

Since all these five methods are used consciously, with full understanding and awareness, they can be clearly distinguished from the process of unconscious repression. The psychological sophistication betrayed in this *sutta* makes it highly relevant to the therapeutic aspects of the psychology of conflict.

Roots of social disharmony

The Buddha traces the roots of social disharmony, too, to greed and hatred, and the ego-illusions due to one's deluded state. But the remedy lies in a fusion of individual transformation and adequate social action. However, the 'social sense' is also individual in origin and it is only in practice that it takes a reciprocal form.

In fact, the Buddha cuts across the somewhat exaggerated dichotomy between the individual and society. It is said, "Protecting oneself one protects others, and protecting others one protects oneself" (*attānam rakkhanto param rakkhati, param rakkhanto attānam rakkhati*: *S.* V, p. 168). Emotions like greed, hatred, pride, jealousy and envy derive meaning in an interpersonal context, but if we begin with ourselves to restrain them, we do not spread the seeds of disharmony to others. If the others do not excite our sense of greed or hatred by their own greed and hatred, then greed and hatred lose meaning as forms of social encounter. Thus, if each one begins with himself to eliminate the potential seeds of social discord, the essential ground

clearing for a good society has already been done. But if we leave untouched the sources of social conflicts within us, no social institution can create the condition for peace and harmony.

The building of a good society has both a negative and positive aspect. On the negative side, if we do not excite the possessive and the acquisitive instinct in others, and on the positive side if we practise charity and generosity, we develop healthy relations with others.

A close analysis of the roots of social conflicts will show that this ideal of protecting others by protecting oneself, and protecting oneself by protecting others can be applied to all three roots of unwholesome behaviour. The "lustful types' excite the acquisitive instinct of man and kindles the flames of passion, the "hateful type" builds up the barriers of prejudice. This, in short, would be the Buddhist diagnosis of social disharmony.

The supreme equanimity and the way beyond conflict.

There are inspiring and vivid descriptions in the Buddhist texts about the one who has reached supreme equanimity, the one who has finally mastered the "heart's unrest" etc. But it is only by a close and intuitive undertsandmg of the psychology of conflict discussed earlier, that one could grasp the deeper import of these descriptions.

One of the finest descriptions of one who has mastered the conflicts caused by the polarities of pleasure-pain, attraction-repulsion and joy-grief is found in the *Samyutta Nikaya.* :

"Do you rejoice, recluse ?"
"On getting what, friend ?"
"Then do you grieve recluse ?"
"What is lost, friend ?"
"Well, then recluse, you neither rejoice nor grieve ?"
"That is so, friend".

(The Exalted One :)
"Yea, I, O fairy, am no wise depressed,
And yet not joy arises in me;
Nor yet, though I am seated lonely here,
Am I overwhelmed by discontent.
Joy is verily for him who is sad
Sadness is verily for the joyous one
But as for the monk, know this, O friend,
He is neither joyful nor is he sad"

(*Samyutta Nikāya, An Anthology, Part II*,
Trans. Ñānananda, pp. 6-7, B. P. S. 1972)

PADMASIRI DE SILVA.

CONSCIENCE, the faculty or principle which 'pronounces upon the moral quality of one's actions and motives, approving the right and condemning wrong' (*The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford*, 1970, p. 373 *b*.). It is a term with a moral import, though complicated with the intellectual, and implies also an emotional content at the same time. It is a name for the function of distinguishing between right and wrong, and of enforcing the one or preventing the other. In short, it is the consciousness or awareness of right and wrong which makes one choose between right and wrong alternatives and adopt the right course of action. It also means the ethical self-consciousness which indicates an awareness of restrictions on conduct imposed by external conditions. In theistic religious systems, the view is generally held that 'the voice of conscience is the voice of God and hence completely reliable.' According to them, God is believed to give, through conscience, a means for distinguishing right from wrong.

In Buddhism, with its denial of a Supreme 'other power' guiding the destinies of man, such a position is untenable. In the teaching of Theravāda Buddhism, the concept of conscience is expressed by two terms which are invariably employed together, viz., *hiri* and *ottappa* in Pali, with their Sanskrit equivalents *hrī* and *apatrāpya* which denote the sense of shame and the sense of fear for violating the norms of 'good conduct.' These two are described in the texts as good (*kusala*) mental forces or urges (*dhamma : Dhs.* pp. 27, 60 ; *saṅkhāra : Vism.* p. 463; *cetasika : Abhs.* p. 6) that are built into an individual's mainstream of mental phenomena, in the course of endless past lives as a result of personal development. In this sense, conscience in Buddhism is an 'acquired' trait,acquired not necessarily in one particular life, but through a series of past lives. Individuals are, however, born in their several lives with certain elements of conscience thus developed in their former lives. In this restricted sense, conscience could also be described as an inborn quality. The degree of development of conscience in individuals, and therefore its intensity, vary with regard to different individuals.

Conscience is an essential element in Buddhist ethics being a source of virtue rather than a virtue in itself. As a psychological attitude, its chief characteristic is said to be shame and fear of evil (*Vism.* p. 464). It is defined as 'being ashamed of

and being afraid of' doing evil (*Dhs*. p. 13 ; *DhsA* p. 124f. ; *Vism*. p. 464). Its proximate cause is the respect for oneself and for others. One shrinks from and avoids evil out of self-respect, as a young virtuous wife does, and out of fear of the opinion of others, as a courtesan does (*Vism*. p. 465). It is the basis of all morality (*sīla : Vism*. p. 8).

Conscience has both an internalised and externalised aspect. With an inner conviction when one desists from or revolts against doing any act of evil, it is said to be due to the quality of *hiri*. Here no external chastisement stands as a deterrent but an inner sense of revulsion (*pāpato jigucchanalakhaṇā hiri : Vism*. p. 464). When conscience is externally operative it is the dread of the consequences (*ubbega* and *uttāsana :* loc. cit.) which is the driving for and is referred to as *ottappana*. External causes that activate conscience are the fear of public opinion and of evil consequences (*DhsA*. p. 125).

A person having a sufficiently developed degree of conscience within himself will take into consideration a number of conditions before he chooses to do things of moral import ; he will consider his avowed policies and principles, his way of life (*A*. I, p. 147 f.), his family traditions, his age, his learning, his status in society and so on and refrain from doing such things as might go against those considerations ; he becomes ashamed and afraid of doing such things out of self-respect (*attādhipateyya*). If he does, he feels guilt and remorse. This is the manner in which conscience functions subjectively. In this instance he abstains from evil not so much for its external consequences, but rather for the sake of inner purity (*A*. I, p. 147 ; *DhsA*. p. 125 f.).

The external conditions that control one's conduct are the fear of public opinion and the fear of consequences. A person with conscience will pay heed to the opinion of the wise and the virtuous before he decides to do things of moral import (*Naca khuddaṃ sāmcāare kiñci yena viññū pare upavadeyyuṃ : Sn* v. 145). He avoids doing such things as might not be approved by the wise and the virtuous. He will also consider the consequences attendant upon bad actions that might be committed. He avoids doing such things as might not be approved according to the Dhamma (*A*. I, p. 148 ; *DhsA*. p. 125 f.). This is true also of the failure to do the correct thing at the correct time and place, since conscience covers not only the acts of commission, but acts of omission as well (*A*. I. p. 148 f.).

Thus, conscience in Buddhism is a psychological phenomenon which finds its expression in an individual's behaviour in the form of shame and fear of evil. This quality, is described as one which brings about the well-being, happiness (*D*. III, p. 212) and progress (*D*. II. p. 78) of humanity. It is a good (*sukka*) divine (*deva*) quality (*dhamma : J*. I, p. 29) which makes people good citizens and, thereby, maintains harmony of society. Were it not for conscience, people would behave like beasts ; there would be no respect for mother, the mother's sister, the father's sister and the teacher's wife (*A*. I, p. 51). Men would misbehave with them and *vice versa*. Conscience has therefore been described as the virtue which guards the world (*lokapāla* : loc. cit.).

There is something more. Conscience is not only an essential quality that maintains social harmony, it is also a quality which is the basis of all morality (*Vism*. p. 8). It is an essential element in ethics, both social and personal and it is also described as a quality which makes one a truly religious person (*samaṇa*, or *brāhmaṇa : M*. I, p. 271). It is said that restraint as regards the senses, *indriya-saṃvara*, which is the beginning of the spiritual path that leads to perfect freedom in Nibbāna , is possible only when there is conscience (*A*. IV, p. 99). Persons endowed with this quality will never degenerate, in the religious sense ; they will not only be reborn in heaven (*A*. III, p. 4), but are also destined to put an end to *dukkha* (*S*. I, p. 7) and attain Nibbāna (*A*. III, p. 331 ; IV, p. 29) after destroying the the *āsavas* (*A*. IV, p. 13).

See also ETHICS.

UPALI KARUNARATNA

CONSCIOUSNESS. (Pali *viññāṇa*).• The term consciousness, as used in Western philosophy and psychology, has very specific as well as broad implications. In the most recent writings of Western psychologists, it has come to mean specifically 'self-consciousness' (*vide infra*), without, of course, the implication that it stands for an underlying substantial ego or self. In the Buddhist context, the term *viññāṇa* (Skt. *vijñāna*) comes closest to the concept of consciousness, though terms like *citta* and *mano* are also occasionally used as synonyms.

After rejecting the Behaviourist hypothesis that the 'self-conscious mind' is part of the physical and biological worlds,[1] John Eccles, a leading

1 See Popper, Karl R. and Eccles, John C., *The Self and its Brain*, Berlin, New York, London: Springer International 1977.

neuro-surgeon of international fame, makes the following comment about the emergence of self-consciousness :

> "The coming-to-be of self-consciousness is a mystery that concerns each person with its conscious and unique selfhood. And our self-conscious forebearers with their creative imagination built the world of culture and civilization that has played a key role in enriching the formation of each one of us as human persons with our culture and our values. The coming to be of each selfhood lies beyond scientific inquiry, as I have argued elsewhere. It is my thesis that the unique selfhood is the result of a supernatural creation of what in the religious sense is called a soul."[2]

The early Indian thinkers, when confronted with the problem of consciousness, seem to have taken a similar view. O. H. de A. Wijesekera, after examining the terms for sense-functions in the earliest Indian philosophical and psychological tradition, makes the following observation:

> "The foregoing discussion should have made it amply clear that in the early Indian view the mind as the sense power *par excellence* is potentially superhuman as is indicated by the epithets *daiva*, *deva*, *devatā*, etc. and is the most important psychological aspect of individualized *prāṇa* or universal vital force identified as *prajñātman* with the empirical Brahman."[3]

The nature of consciousness, when coupled with the mystery of its emergence seems to have induced the early Indian thinkers, nay, even a modern scientist, not only to associate consciousness with the work of the divine, but also to identify the creative aspect of consciousness (i.e., self-consciousness) with 'selfhood'.

In the early *Upaniṣads*, although mind came to be considered potentially divine, the reality of matter or material form (*rūpa*) was recognized.[4] Mind and matter constituted two real entities, the former immortal and the latter mortal. But with the development of the idealistic trend of thought the reality of matter gradually faded out and the ultimately real (*sat*) came to be identified with a spiritual or mental substance (*manas*).[5] It is this 'selfhood' (*ātman*) residing in the inner recess of the human body that served as the eternal and immutable agent of all human activity.[6]

In the Materialist schools of India, as in the Behaviourist traditions of the West, consciousness or mental substance (*caitanya*) becomes a mere by-product of matter (*māhābhūta*) or an epiphenomenon and, therefore, enjoyed a position of lesser importance compared with matter which is looked upon as the ultimate basis of all phenomena.[7]

For the syncretist Jaina thinkers, 'spirit and matter,' 'soul and body' stood for a pair of equipollent substances quite on a par in weight and interest,[8] just as they were for the French philosopher, Rene Descartes, who is considered to be the father of modern Western philosophy.

Buddha, as a strong advocate of non-substantialism (*anatta-vāda* : see ANATTA), not only rejected the Upaniṣadic view that consciousness is the work of the divine, but also repudiated the notion that consciousness represents a spiritual self or substance (*ātman*), eternal, immutable and ultimately real. He also rejected the conception of matter presented by the radical Materialists. While denying the validity of the Upaniṣadic and Materialist theories, Buddha was not willing to subscribe to a radical dualism such as that of the Jainas or even of Descartes, that recognized both mind and matter as real entities. For the Buddha, consciousness and body, mind and matter, represented merely *functions* (see NĀMA-RŪPA) For example, consciousness or *viññāṇa* stood for the function of "being conscious" (*vijānātiti viññāṇaṃ, S. III, p 87*). Similarly, form (*rūpa*), which represents the manner in which we get to know what is called "matter" (*mahābhūta*), represents nothing more than the function of resisting (*ruppatīti rūpaṃ, ibid p. 86*).

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2 Eccles, John C., "The Human Brain and the Human Person," Plenary Address. The Seventh International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences. Boston, 1978 (to be published), pp. 21–22.

3 Wijesekera, O. H. de A., "Upaniṣadic Terms for Sense-Functions," *UCR*. Colombo, 2 (1943), p. 24.

4 See *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 1.6.3.

5 See *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, 2.2.2.

6 *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, 3.13.

7 *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, p. 2.

8 See Radhakrishnan, S. and Moore, C. A. *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy*. Princeton University Press, Princeton 1957, p. 251.

Having sounded this very important warning that consciousness is merely a function and not an entity by itself or an entity belonging to a substantial agent, a warning similar to one that was given centuries later by William James,[9] Buddha resorted to the use of nominal forms such as *viññāṇa*, *citta* and *mano* in his discourses. It is extremely important to realize that the different contexts in which these terms are used indicate that they have both a general and specific sense. In a general sense *viññāṇa*, *citta* and *mano* refer to conscious life and, therefore, are considered synonyms (*S.* II,p. 95). In a specific or limited sense *viññāṇa* refers to ego-consciousness or self-consciousness (*vide infra*), *citta* to thinking (*S.* V, p. 418) and *mano* to the faculty of mind (*M.* I. p. 112).

Consciousness is said to possess the characteristic of being 'luminous' (*pabhassara*) and yet being defiled by adventitious defilements (*āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭhaṃ*) or liberated from such defilements (*āgantukehi upakkilesehi vippamuttaṃ A. I. p. 10*). These statements taken independently of other statements and concepts in the early discourses have led to much confusion, some holding that 'luminosity' implies 'natural purity' (*prakṛtiprabhāsvara*) [10] and others implying a 'neutral' nature.[11] In the first place, the epistemological standpoint of the Buddha, which recognizes the 'inconceivability of the beginning' (*anamatagga*) of things (*S.* II, p. 178), certainly prevented him from subscribing to a notion of natural or original purity. Secondly, the negative statement that consciousness, as it occurs in the individual, lacks luminosity is to be found elsewhere (*A.* I, p. 253). Here consciousness is compared to gold-ore (*jātarūpa*, lit. 'the form in which it has come to be') which is to be purified by a process of washing and smelting before being converted to pure gold (*suvaṇṇa*). Similarly, consciousness, when it arises in the individual, is not completely pure, but contains within it the defiling elements (*kilesas*), just as gold comes to be in the form of gold-ore. When the Buddha maintained that consciousness is luminous, he was merely implying the possibility of it being purified. If this purification does not take place, it will continue to be defiled by adventitious elements. Then total deconditioning of the mind (*visaṅkhāragataṃ cittaṃ*) will not be a reality. Luminosity is best understood in terms of the capacity of consciousness to depict whatever is presented to it together with its own contribution to what is presented, like a crystal that reflects various shades of light, the objectively given as well as its own mixture of what is objectively given.

Three other characteristics of consciousness are enumerated in the early discourses (*D.* I, p. 223). They are the characteristics of being (*a*) unextended (*anidassanaṃ*), (*b*) infinite (*anantaṃ*) and (*c*) radiant all round (*sabbato pabhaṃ*).

In the Western world, Descartes is well known for his emphasis on the unextended character of consciousness as opposed to matter whose primary property is extension. Eccles argues that if the self-conscious mind is not a special part of the physical and biological worlds, it is likely to have different fundamental properties and that, though it is in liason with special zones of the neocortex of the brain, it need not have the property of spatial extension.[12] The term *anidassanam* when used to describe consciousness refers to this unextended property of consciousness in that it cannot be measured and *indicated* as we do in the case of space or spatial objects. This unextended character of consciousness renders it extremely fluid, leaving no crevices which it cannot penetrate, hence its infinite or unbounded (*anantaṃ*) and radiant (*sabbato pabhaṃ*) nature.

The question regarding the origin of consciousness is the most difficult. As mentioned at the very outset, the early Indian thinkers as well as some of the modern scientists who rejected the reductionist standpoint of the radical Materialists or radical Behaviourists have considered the origin or emergence of consciousness a mystery. This prompted them to attribute such origin to superhuman creation. While recognizing the difficulty of providing a philosophical solution to this age-old problem, and yet not assuming the existence of a superhuman creator, the Buddha explained the emergence of consciousness as a natural causal process (*paṭicca-samuppannaṃ viññāṇaṃ*) denying that consciousness would emerge in the absence of the necessary conditions (*aññatra paccayā n'atthi viññāṇassa sambhavo, M. I. p. 257f*) Here, the emergence of consciousness is compared to the arising of fire which depends upon various conditions such as dry-wood, etc. This analogy of fire should not be taken to mean that the Buddha accepted the reductionism of the radical Behaviourists who would consider fire to be

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9 James, William, *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1912, p. 3.
10 *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, ed. Nanjio, pp. 77, 200.
11 Rahula, Walpola, *Zen and the Taming of the Bull*, Gordon Fraser, London, 1978, p. 52, presents a completely confused analysis of this notion of "luminosity".
12 Popper and Eccles, op. cit. p. 376.

stored up in the form of energy in the material that goes to produce it. In fact, on another occasion, Buddha insisted that an extinguished fire does not get stored up elswhere (*M*. I, p. 487). This causal explanation of consciousness was, therefore,intended by the Buddha to replace the Upaniṣadic view that consciousnees is representative of an immutable and eternal self (*ātman*) and is the work of a superhuman agent.

Elaborating upon the manner in which consciousness comes to be, the Buddha says that it is dependent upon *nāmarūpa* (*D*. II, pp. 62–63). This use of the term *nāmarūpa* has led to much misunderstanding of the early Buddhist texts.[13] It may be observed that like many other terms, such as *viññāṇa*, the term *nāmarūpa* has both a general and specific sense. The two senses in which the term *nāmarūpa* is used can be best illustrated by the distinction made recently between a 'human being' and a 'human person'.[14] *Nāmarūpa* in a specific sense corresponds to the concept of a 'human being' *sans* self-consciousness (*viññāṇa*, in the specific sense), while in a general or more comprehensive sense it refers to a complete 'human person' who is endowed with self-consciousness.

Nāmarūpa in the specific sense is used to describe a being who is conceived in the mother's womb and it is emphasized that this being would not grow into maturity, i.e., to be a self-conscious human person, unless consciousness comes to be associated with or established upon it (*D*. II, pp. 62–63). The human being or foetus that comes to be associated with self-consciousnees is also referred to in the early discourses as *nāmarūpa*. Thus, when the human person is analysed into its component parts, the Buddha spoke of five aggregates (*khandha*) which include consciousness (*viññāṇa*) as well (*S*. III, p. 101). *Nāmarūpa* in this general sense would be most appropriately rendered into English as 'psychophysical personality.' In order to understand the nature and function of consciousness in early Buddhism, it is important to distinguish between these two senses of the term *nāmarūpa*, just as it is important to distinguish between 'being' and 'person' which are not always distinguished in English.

The foregoing analysis of the nature of consciousness (*viññāṇa*) as being unextended, as opposed to form (*rūpa*) which is extended, may leave the impression that the Buddha advocated a dualist hypothesis. Even if this is true, this dualist hypothesis cannot be compared with that of Descartes in Western philosophy since the Buddha did not come to the conclusion that they represent two substantially distinct entities. In fact, as mentioned earlier, the Buddha repeatedly pointed out that these were not substantial entities, but were functions only. Moreover, the Buddha tried to refrain from analysing the 'psychophysical personality' (*nāmarūpa*) into two distinct entities as *nāma* and *rūpa* but clearly presented them as two distinct groups of processes (See *M*. I, p. 53 ; *S*. II, p. 3 f.). Whenever the necessity arose for analysing them apart, the Buddha avoided a radical dualism by an epistemological reduction of these two to contact (*saṃphassa, D.11,p.62*), indicating that neither *nāma* nor *rūpa* would be known unless there were to be contact. This notion of contact (*saṃphassa*), like William James' 'pure experience',[15] is intended to avoid such a radical dualism. The significance of the Buddha's statement that the origin and cessation of this 'world lies in this 'fathom-long self-conscious body (*byāmamatte kaḷebare sasaññimhi samanake : A*. II, p. 48) needs to be understood in this context.

Consciousness (*viññāṇa*) that comes into existence in this manner thereupon determines the nature of human experience. The most important of these experiences is perception. The most authentic explanation of sense perception in the early discourses is as follows :

> " Depending upon eye and visible form, monks, arises visual consciousness. The harmonious combination of these three is contact. Depending upon contact is feeling. What one feels, one perceives. What one perceives, one reflects about. What one reflects about, by that one comes to be obsessed. What one is obsessed with, due to that, concepts characterized by such obsessed perceptions assail him in regard to visible objects cognizable by the visual organ, belonging to the past, the future and the present. [This is repeated with regard to other sense faculties, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind (*M.1.pp. 111–112*).]

According to this description, the sense organ and its object play a major role in conditioning perceptual consciousness. If so, as long as the different senses are not defective and as long as external objects continue to impinge on these senses, the different forms of consciousness that arise depending

13 Saratchandra, E. R., *Buddhist Psychology of Perception*, The Ceylon University Press, Colombo,, 1958 pp. 19–20.

14 Eccles, " The Human Brain and the Human Person ", op. cit. p. 7.

15 James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, op. cit.p. 4

upon these sensory inputs would be immense. Undoubtedly, it is this varied sensory input which elicited the now famous characterization from William James as 'a big blooming buzzing confusion'.[16] Confusion, in this description, does not imply any chaos or absence of order or uniformity, since, according to the Buddha, these come to be in terms of 'dependent arising' (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) and James would account for the order in terms of his radical empiricism. Confusion merely refers to the vastness of the material presented to or impinging upon the senses. This confusion or vastness is not easily handled by an ordinary man who, therefore, tends to make a selection from this vastness. Since the selection is done by a 'self-conscious mind', naturally it will be done according to its own likes and dislikes. Eccles says that one of the most important functions performed by the self-conscious mind is to select from this input according to attention and from moment to moment integrate its selection to give unity even to the most transient experiences.[17] The idea that the selection is done according to a self-conscious mind is very clearly implied in the Buddha's statement quoted earlier where up to the point of 'feeling' the process of perception is explained in very impersonal terms based on the general formula of causality (*paṭicca-samuppāda*). Thereafter it is changed to a personal statement suggestive of deliberate activity; hence the third person construction: "What one feels one perceives." This represents the intrusion of the ego-consciousness or self-consciousness which thereafter fashions the entire process of perception, culminating in the generation of obsessions like craving (*taṇhā*), conceit (*māna*) and dogmatic views (*diṭṭhi*). And the final stage of this process is the most interesting. It explains how a natural contingent process, converted to an activity deliberately directed, ends in an inexorable subjection of the perceiver to an objective process order of things, i.e bondage. The reverse process is also admitted in a passage from the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* where it is stated:

"Human beings are severally possessed of obsessed perceptions. [How this comes to be is explained in the earlier passage]. Having perception (of external objects) they approach things with obsession." (*S.* IV, p. 1).

The function of selecting and providing unity to experience according to one's likes and dislikes is generally attributed to that aspect of the psyche called *saṅkhāra* (dispositions) which represent one of its most important aspects. In fact, in the special application of the causal formula consisting of twelve ξfactors (s. v. PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA), consciousness (*viññāṇa*) is said to be conditioned by *saṅkhāra* (*saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇaṃ*). How this is done is explained in a passage in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* which reads:

> "*Saṅkhāra* is so-called because it processes form (*rūpa*) into its present state..... feeling (*vedanā*).... perception (*saññā*) ..... disposition (*saṅkhāra*) .... consciousness (*viññāṇa*) that has already been dispositionally conditioned." (*S.* III, p. 87)

In other words, the personality consisting of the five aggregates that has come to be as a result of the past activity of dispositional conditioning (*abhisaṅkhataṃ*) is continually provided with a unity of selfhood (*rūpatta*, *vedanatta* .... *viññāṇatta*) by the present activity of *saṅkhāra*. On the one hand, the dispositions (*saṅkhāra*) are themselves causally conditioned, and on the other, they process each one of the five aggregates into their present form. Contradicting the physicalist or radical Behaviourist hypothesis that the unity of personality is provided by the physical body, Eccles states that the experienced unity comes, not from a neurophysiological synthesis, but from the integrating character of the self-conscious mind.[18] When the Buddha reduced the notion of a metaphysical soul or selfhood (*atta*) to a "lump of dispositions" (*saṅkhārapuñja S. I, p 135*), he was attempting to explain the so-called selfhood in terms of the unity provided by the selective and unifying dispositions (*saṅkhāra*) rather than by positing an eternal and substantial entity, material or psychic.

The dispositions (*saṅkhāra*) not only carve out a unity out of the aboriginal sensible 'muchness',[19] but also provides a continuity to the experiences occurring at different times. Such a continuity of consciousness is to be found during one's life-span. This continuity of consciousness is variously termed as 'stream of consciousness' (*viññāṇasota*, *D. III p. 105*) or 'stream of becoming' (*bhavasota S. I, p. 15, ivp. 128*). In the Western world a similar conception is presented for the first time by William James and is considered to be one

16 James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, Longmans Green & Co., London, 1921, p. 50.
17 Popper & Eccles, op. cit. p. 326.
18 Popper & Eccles, op. cit. p. 362.
19 James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, op. cit. p.50.

of his most important contributions.[20] Yet, in the case of James this 'stream of consciousness' is confined to the present life alone. But in Buddha's case, this 'stream of consciousness' accounts, not only for the continuity of a personality from birth to death, but also for the continutiy of a person from one life to another, that is rebirth.

Consciousness (*viññāṇa*) thus becomes an important connecting link between two different lives. When this idea was expressed by the Buddha, a monk named Sāti confused it with the notion of an immutable and eternal self or soul (*M*. I, p. 256 ff.). The Buddha's doctrine of 'dependent arising' (*paṭicca-samuppāda*) as well as the theory of 'non-substantiality' (*anatta*) were intended to clarify this misunderstanding and confusion. The question would then be : How can one explain the continuity and unity of consciousness between two lives without admitting its permanence and immutability ?

It may be remembered that Eccles, as mentioned at the very beginning of this article, believed that the origin of self-consciousness is a mystery. Having admitted this and speaking about the dualist hypothesis proposed by him, he says :

> " Its central component is that primacy is given to the self-conscious mind. It is proposed that the self-conscious mind is actively engaged in searching for brain events that are of its present interest, the operation of attention, but it also is the integrating agent, building the unity of conscious experience from all the diversity of the brain events. Even more importantly it is given the role of actively modifying the brain events according to its interest or desire, and the scanning operation by which it searches can be envisaged as having an active role in selection."[21]

Finally, coming down to what he calls the 'ultimate picture', namely, death, he remarks :

> " Then all cerebral activity ceases permanently. The self-conscious mind that has had an autonomous existence in a sense in World 2, i.e., psychic world, now finds that the brain it has scanned and probed and controlled so efficiently and effectively through a long life is no longer giving any messages at all. What happens then is the ultimate question."[22]

Eccles' line of argument seems to be as follows : The emergence of a self-conscious mind associated with a neural process is a mystery. In spite of its mysterious emergence and its being associated with a neural process when arising, it has not only an autonomous existence, but is also able to influence or even modify the neural process. Yet when the neural process ceases, this very *active* self-conscious mind also ceases and we do not know what happens to it.

At this stage it is possible to ask the question : What would happen if such an *active* consciousnese were to get established on another neural process ? Would not a causal continuity be set up ? It may be said that on the basis of retrocognition spreading on to the past lives, the Buddha discovered such a causal continuity. Hence he spoke of the 'stream of consciousness' (*viññāṇasota*) as an unbroken (*abbocchinna*), not immutable but causally conditioned (*paṭiccasamuppanna*) process, not only to explain the continuity of the human personality from birth to death, but also from death to rebirth.

The next important question would be: How does the self-conscious mind store and retrieve the memories of the past ? Explaining this phenomenon, Eccles says :

> "We propose that the self-conscious mind can read out at will from the modules of that great area of neuronal activation in the dominant hemisphere (of the brain). From moment to moment only a minute fraction is so sampled, and much that is read is held only for seconds in the short term memory. Thus, the greater part of our conscious experiences are ephemeral. However, concentration on special deliverances of the self-conscious mind can start neuronal processes of storage that are the basis of intermediate and long-term memories. We would conjecture that the self-conscious mind is actively engaged in the process of laying down this memory storage and in retrieving from it."[23]

This explains what happens during a single life-term. If, at death, the self-conscious mind were to be associated with a fresh neuronal process, and because of the fact that the *active* self-conscious mind can influence and even mould this neuronal process, the same process of storage and retrieval could be re-established. It is this kind of retrieval

20 James, *The Principles of Psychology*, Macmillan & Co. London, 1980, pp. 224–290.
21 Popper & Eccles, op. cit., p. 373
22 Ibid. p. 372.
23 Ibid. p. 374.

that the yogin with his paranormal powers of concentration such as retrocognition (*pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇa*) is able to achieve. Rare cases when such a retrieval of past memories occurs, not by actively developing the paranormal powers, but as a result of a sudden upsurge of such memories especially in the case of children, have been reported and these memory accounts verified. [24] In addition valuable evidence is supplied by people under hypnosis, providing reasons for the possibility of human survival after bodily death.[25] Buddha, who developed paranormal powers of perception. therefore, explained the continuity of a human personality on the basis of the interaction between consciosness (*viññāṇa*) or 'stream of consciousness' (*viññāṇasota*) and the *nāmarūpa* in the specific sense mentioned earlier. He even emphasized the negative and stronger claim that if consiousness were not to find a foothold on the 'human being' (*nāmarūpa*), the latter would not grow into a 'human person' (*nāmarūpa*), in a general sens (*D. 11, p. 63*).

It was mentioned that dispositions (*saṅkhāra*) perform the function of selecting and unifying the human experiences and that this process of selecting and unifying is done according to one's likes and dislikes, desires and aversions. Buddha attributed the suffering or unsatisfactoriness (*dukkha*) in this world to the activity of the self-conscious mind leading to the generation of obsessions and bondage (*vide supra*). Freedom in this world would then be the result of the elimination of desires (*rāgakkhaya*) and of aversions (*dosakkhaya*) and of confusion (*mohakkhaya It. p.38*)and the consequent pacification of all dispositional tendencies (*sabbasaṅkhārasamatha*) or the realization of the evil effects of the functioning of the self-conscious mind (i. e., realization of *anatta*). This is the freedom from suffering (*Nibbāna*) achieved by a living saint and is called 'freedom with substrate' (*sopādisesanibbāna*). Furthermore, the elimination of desires and aversions and the consequent minimization of the dispositional tendencies or the process of selecting and unifying one's experiences would naturally eliminate the desire to establish one's self-conscious mind upon a fresh neuronal process, i.e., eliminate the desire for further existence (*bhavataṇhā*). Therefore, the saint who passes away is said to attain freedom from continued birth (*punabbhava*) and this occurs as a result of the 'self-conscious mind not being established on new grounds (*appaṭiṭṭhitena...viññāṇeṇa, S. 1, p 122*) and is called 'freedom without substrate' (*anāpadisesa-nibbāna, It. p. 38*).

The empirically based description of consciousness in the early discourses outlined above received a strictly analytical treatment in the last section of the canonical literature, namely, *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*. Although the initial tendency in these texts was to enumerate and classify among others the various states of consciousness discussed in the discourses *sans* their discursive treatment, yet the attempt to determine introspectively what transpires in the 'stream of consciousness' (*viññāṇasota*) at each moment led to further developments giving rise to philosophical problems the Ābhidhammikas had difficulty in solving satisfactorily.

The introspective analysis is very clearly presented in the first paragraph of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* (*Dhs.* p. 9), the first Book of the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*, as follows :

> "Which are the things that are good? *At a time when* a state of good consciousness belonging to the sensuous sphere has arison, accompanied by joy and associated with knowledge, relating to any one object, be it an object of sight, sound, smell or taste, be it a tangible object or a mental object—*at that time* are present contact, feeling etc. (the text enumerates fifty-six or more elements as possible associations.) "

This way of treating consciousness in terms of the moment of its occurence (as exemplified in the phraseology : At a time when... at that time—*yasmiṃ samaye...tasmiṃ samaye*) is continued throughout the first and the most comprehensive chapter in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, namely, the 'Chapter on the Arising of Consciousness' (*Citt'uppāda-kaṇḍa*: ibid. pp. 9–124). Human consciousness is here schematized as experiencing now one, now another of a certain number of *types* of content. These are then divided under three heads : (1) eight types of good or wholesome consciousness (*kusala-citta*), (2) twelve types of bad or unwholesome consciousness (*akusala-citta*) and (3) a whole range of morally indeterminate types of consciousness (*avyākata*).

So far this appears to be a harmless attempt to determine the nature of consciousness by enumerating the different types distinguishable in terms of the various elements associated with them. But unfortunately, the emphasis on the *immediacy* of the experience, the attempt to determine the nature

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24 See Stevenson, Ian, *Twenty Cases Suggestive of Re-incarnation*, University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville' 1974

25 See Broad, C.D., *Human Personality and the Possibility of its Survival*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1956, p. 1.

of consciousness in the light of its immediate occurrence, compelled the late Ābhidhammikas and the commentators to examine the nature of the *time-frame* within which consciousness occurs. The direct consequence of this is the emergence of the "theory of moments" (*khaṇa-vāda*; Skt. *kṣaṇa-vāda*), a theory which is conspicuous by its absence in the early discourses, but which dominated the entire Abhidharma tradition in India,[26] to be subsequently introduced into the Pali Abhidhamma tradition by the much-hailed commentator, Buddhaghosa[27]. This represents the beginning of the microscopic analysis of the stream of conscious experience, comparable to that found in the atomistic psychology of the Associationist School in the West and adopted by the famous British empiricist, David Hume.

In terms of this analysis, consciousness turns out to be bare sensation as yet undiscriminated by any selective activity. It is the mere awareness of the presence of the object[28] and does not produce knowledge of any sort.[29] E.R. Saratchandra (op. cit. p. 22) feels that even in the early discourses consciousness represents such a bare sensation and quotes the statement in which the process of perception is analysed with a view to disproving the existence of an immutable eternal soul. But it must be kept in mind that this analysis in the discourses is not done in terms of a metaphysical theory of moments and, therefore, for all intents and purposes, is different from the one appearing in the later Abhidhamma.

Consciousness, which came to be thus reckoned as bare sensation is, according to the Abhidhamma Scholiasts, followed by a series of point-instants of attending (*āvaṭṭana*), receiving (*sampaṭicchana*), examining (*santīraṇa*), determining (*votthapana*), registering (*javana*), etc. until a complete act of perception is achieved (*Abhs.* p. 19). Since the point-instants were so distinguished it became necessary for the scholiasts to resort to several methods by which they could explain satisfactorily the continuous nature of conscious experience. The first of these methods was to recognize an unconscious continuum called *bhavaṅga-citta* or 'unconscious mind' underlying the rapidly changing moments of experience (E. R. Saratchandra, op. cit. pp. 75–81). Consciousness, according to this explanation, consists of a dual process, one of momentary and discrete flashes of conscious experience. (*vithi-citta*) and the other of an unconscious continuum (*bhavaṅga-citta*) which naturally has to be a continuing mental base upon which the conscious experience leaves its imprint. The second method was to emphasize immediate contiguity (*samanantaratā*) as the only method by which these distinct elements are causally connected, a method adopted even by David Hume.[30] The final method was to posit the existence of an invisible power (*satti*; Skt. *śakti*) in the momentary element to produce the succeeding moment.[31] Of these different methods, the most popular was the recognition of the unconscious continuum (*bhavaṅga-citta*).

When the distinction between a conscious mind (*vīthi-citta*) and an unconscious continuum (*bhavaṅga-citta*) was accepted, the latter came to be considered the original or primordial consciousness (*pakati-mano, DhsA.* p. 812) which in turn is defiled by the adventitiouselements that gain entry by way of the consciousmind (*vīthi-citta*). Hence the unconscious conti uum was defined as a pure mind, shining in its own natural lustre (*pabhassaram*). It was therefore natural for the Ābhidhammikas to fall back upon the definition of consciousness in the early discourses (*A.* I, p. 10) although as pointed out earlier, that early definition implied no such original purity or primordiality.

The notion of the unconscious continuum (*bhavaṅga-citta*) was utilized by the Ābhidhammikas not only to explain the process of conscious experience, but also to account for moral responsibility (*kamma*) (*Vism* p. 601) as well as continuity of the individual in saṃsāra (*Vism.* pp. 457–458). When the unconscious continuum came to be understood as a primodial mind, pure and resplendent, providing a connecting link, not only between evanescent moments of conscious experience, but also between two different lives, it turns out to be not much different from the notion of a transmigrating soul or self posited by the non-Buddhist schools in India.

The Mādhyamika philosophers who endeavoured to establish an Absolute Reality (*paramārtha*) by

26 Kalupahana, David J., *Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, The University Press of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1975, p. 71f.
27 Kalupahana, David J., "Schools of Buddhism in Early Ceylon," *The Ceylon Journal of the Humanities*, Peradeniya, (1970). pp. 169–171.
28 *VobA*, p. 40. *Cakkhuviññāṇaṃ pan'ettha dassanamattam eva hoti, sotaviññāṇādīni savanaghāyanasāyanaphusanamattan'eva*
29 Ibid. p. 821. *Pañcahi viññāṇehi na kañci dhammaṃ paṭivijānāti.*
30 See Kalupahana, David J., *Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis*, The University Press of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1976, p. 196.
31 See Rhys Davids, C. A. F., *Buddhist Psychology: An Inquiry into the Analysis and Theory of Mind in Pali Literature*, Luzac-London, 1924, p. 196.

employing the relativity and, therefore, non-substantiality of concepts (*saṃvṛti*), remained aloof from any discussion of the nature of consciousness.

The Yogācārins or Vijñānavādins who were the idealists of the Buddhist tradition can be credited with having carried this theory of consciousness to its logical conclusion. Idealism in its unsystematized form is to be found in the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*. The Abhidhamma theory of *bhavaṅga-citta* has its parallel in the Yogācāra conception of *ālaya-vijñāna* or 'store consciousness'. Like *bhavaṅga*, *ālaya* too has two aspects. It is originally pure (*prakṛtipariśuddha*) and is at the sametime defiled by adventitious elements (*āgantukakleśopakliṣṭa*).[32] The major difference between the Ābhidhammika and Yogācāra theories is that the former maintains its realist standpoint by asserting that the originally pure consciousness is defiled as a result of its impact with the real external object, while the latter upholds its idealist point of view by maintaining that defilements are due to the subject-object discrimination which is an activity of the mind itself.

The problems inherent in this explanation attracted the attention of Vasubandhu who, in his *Vijñapti-mātratāsiddhi*,[33] attempted a systematic treatment of the subject of consciousness. He first distinguished consciousness which is pure (*vijñaptimātra*) from store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) that is impure. Having made this important distinction, he utilized the notion of store-consciousness to explain the vicissitudes of conscious experience.

The false belief in self (*ātman*) and real elements (*dharma*), according to him, is due to the evolution of consciousness (*vijñāṇa-pariṇāma*) which, in its turn, is due to its inherent power (generated by ignorance). This evolving consciousness undergoes a threefold modification or transformation as: (1) the resultant (*vipāka*), (2) ego-centric mental operation (*manana*), and (3) ideation or consciousness of external objects (*viṣaya-vijñapti*).[34]

The first of these is represented by the *ālay-a vijñāna* or 'store consciousness'. It is called 'resultant' (*vipāka*) because it represents the germination of the seeds (*bīja*), which are the dispositions (*vāsanā*) of good and bad actions and which have attained maturity (*paripāka*). The *ālaya*, therefore, is the receptacle of all dispositions (*vāsanā*) which, as seeds, ripen and produce their fruits. It is the basis of all the conscious and unconscious processes.[35] When it evolves, it develops touch or contact (*sparśa*), mental activity (*manaskāra*), feeling (*vedanā*), sensation (*saṃjñā*), and volitional activity (*cetanā*). This is the first transformation.[36]

The second transformation is the evolution of *manas* or 'mentation', the seventh consciousness according to the Yogācāra list, and different from *mano-vijñāna*, 'mind-consciousness', which is one of the six types of consciousness having their respective objective supports (*ālambana*). According to the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, "Depending upon the store consciousness and having it as the support, the consciousness called *manas*, which has the nature of cogitation, functions."[37] It is associated with four types of defilements : Perception of self (*ātmadṛṣṭi*) confusion with regard to the self (*ātmamoha*), self-pride (*ātmamāna*) and self-love (*ātmasneha*).[38] This is the second transformation as a result of which the *manas* comes to be associated with the false belief in a self.

The third transformation consists of evolution of the sixfold objective consciousness (*viṣaya-vijñapti*), namely, from (*rūpa*), sound (*śabda*), odour (*gandha*), taste (*rasa*), tangible object (*spraṣṭavya*), and concepts or ideas (*dharma*).[39] Although a form of consciousness of external objects is recognized, this consciousness is not produced by the activity of the external objects. They are better called objective consciousness and what is called external object is merely a mental projection. It is a wrong understanding of the nature of this consciousness that leads to the fasle belief in real external objects (*dharmā*, i.e., material elements, according to Abhidharma).

Existence (*saṃsāra*) is explained in terms of the 'store consciousness.' The evolution or transformation of this 'store consciousness' is without beginning (*anādikālika*). The cyclic evolution takes place in the following manner : As the seeds

32 *Lankāvatāra Sūtra*, op. cit. p. 222.
33 *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* (*Viṃśatika and Triṃśika*), ed. Sylvan Levi, Paris, 1925.
34 *Triṃś* 1.
35 *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 18.
36 *Triṃś* 3.
37 Ibid. 5.
38 Ibid. 6.
39 *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*. p. 25.

mature in the 'Store consciousness.' the second transformation, or evolution of *manas*, takes place. Then comes the third transformation—the evolution of objective or perceptive consciousness (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*), consisting of the subject-object discrimination. This perceptive consciousness leads to activity or behaviour (*karma*), good, bad or indeterminate. As a result, there is accumulation of dispositions (*vāsanā*), which are stored up in the 'store consciousness' and serve as the seeds for the repeated evolution of *manas* and the sixfold perceptive consciousness.[40] The complete stopping of this process is achieved with the attainment of Enlightenment. This enlightenment comes with the realization that everything is mere ideation (*vijñaptimātra*) or mere consciousness (*cittamatrā*).

This *vijñaptimātra* or ultimately undifferentiated reality is equated with the *dharma* of the Buddha.[41] Here we find not only a further development of the metaphysical theory of *bhavaṅga* as *ālayavijñāna* but also the culmination of the absolutist trend that gradually emerged in the Mahāyāna tradition.

D. J. KALUPAHANA

CONSECRATION. See ABHIṢEKA, CROWNED BUDDHA and DEDICATION.

CONSISTENCY. See EPISTEMOLOGY and TRUTH.

CONTACT. See PHASSA and SAMPHASSA.

CONTEMPLATION, as a spiritual exercise plays a significant role in Indian religious life. The word used in Sanskrit as well as in Pali Buddhist literature for contemplation (basically a mental exercise which is also associated with musing and meditation), stems from the root *dhyai* (Pali, *jhā*). Hence the terms *dhyāna* and *jhāna*. It means the act of keeping one's mind engaged or fixed on a specific theme. As a form of religious activity it is undertaken for the purpose of achieving greater concentration of mind (or *samādhi*) by purging it of its distracting and disturbing elements and thereby gaining the sharpness and strength of wisdom which is needed for final emancipation. It is this aspect of contemplation as a mental exercise for the attainment of a specific goal which Mrs. Rhys Davids has in mind when she refers to it as follows: "In contemplation (*jhāna*) and rapt meditation (*samādhi*) are contained the expression of that self-training in selective, intensive work of mind in which the Indian sought, by changing the usual conditions and procedure in cognition, to induce consciousness of a higher or different power" (*Buddhist Psychology*, London, 1924, p. 94 f.).

The Indians, even before the time of the Buddha, were apparenty familiar with this process of contemplation and were perhaps accustomed to refer to it by the term *dhyāna* (*jhāna*). The *Mahāsaccaka Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* (*M.* I, p. 246) records the very interesting incident of the Buddha himself recounting his childhood experience of reaching the stage of the first *jhāna*. Perhaps, it constituted part of the religious and cultural heritage of the contemplative Indian.

It is well to compare here the description given of contemplation in terms of western psychology as 'a phase of experience following on the mere having of the experience or enjoyment ..... and involving reaction of the individual in the form of attentive awareness of an object, ... used also in a semi-religious sense of the attitude of the mystic' (*A Dictionary of Psychology*, Penguins, 1953, p. 50).

In recent epistemology contemplation is *know edge* of an object in contrast to enjoyment, which is the mind's direct self-awareness (cf. S. Alexander, *Space, Time and Eternity*, Vol. I, p. 12). In Aristotelian thought, too, contemplation is one of the two forms of thought, the other being deliberation. Successful contemplation, here, terminates in conclusion, as opposed to decision or resolution arrived at by deliberation. The form of reasoning involved in contemplation is theoretical, whereas in deliberation it is practical (Paul Edwards, op. cit. Vol. 8. p. 100).

Thus, it will be seen that, to the Western mind, contemplation has a variety of implications which have parallels in many terms in Buddhist thought. Western writers have, therefore, used the term to refer to many interrelated Buddhist concepts. One of the earliest and best known, William James writing in 1902, says that for the Buddhists '*dhyāna*' is the special word for higher states of contemplation. Here, he goes on to describe the stages of the four *dhyānas* (Pali, *jhāna*) and the attainments (*samāpatti*) culminating in 'the end of both idea and

40 Ibid. p. 36-37

41 *Triṃś.* 30.

*The terms consciousness, mind, memory, the unconscious, will, motivation, etc. are of immense interest in the study of the Buddhist concept of liberation (*vimutti*). A comprehensive treatment of these including the history of their development through the ages in the different schools of Buddhism and scholastic traditions, is attempted in dealing with them under their Pali equivalents such as *viññāṇa, citta, sati, saṅkhāra, cetanā, etc.* The articles written under the English terms are particularly characterized by their analytical, comparative and evaluative approach—E-in-C.

perception' (*saññā-vedayita-nirodha : Varieties of Religious Experience*, London, 1945, p. 392 f.).

E. J. Thomas, on the other hand, uses the term contemplation to refer to the four *satipaṭṭhānas* or establishment of mindfulness (*The History of Buddhist Thought*, London, 1933, pp. 52, 55, 207, 270). Lama Anagarika Govinda, too, equating contemplation to *satipaṭṭhāna*, says : " These contemplations are chiefly analytical. They anticipate in many respects the methods and effects of modern psycho-analysis. But the Buddhist system of psychic culture goes one step further.

It does not confine itself to the analysis and control of consciousness as it *is*, but it proceeds to a higher synthesis or intensification of concentration through samādhi " (*The Psychological attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy*, London, 1961, p. 69).

It is of interest to note here that the Pali texts describe *jhāna* as a state of ecstasy arrived at by concentration of the mind amounting to the elimination of evil thoughts and disturbing and distracting tendencies (*Sāmaññaphala Sutta : D.* I, p. 73 ff.). The *jhānas* are only a means, not the end.

Thus, to get an idea of the full compass of contemplation as recommended for practice in Buddhism, the reader may profitably compare a series of interrelated articles —— BHĀVANĀ, JHĀNA, MEDITATION, SAMĀPATTI, SATIPAṬṬHĀNA and ZEN.

K. D. Somaratne

CONTENTMENT (*santuṭṭhi*), the mental condition of a person who is satisfied with what he has or the position in which he finds himself (*santussamāno itarītarena : Sn. v.* 42). Another term that is important in this connection is *appicchatā* meaning fewness of desires. Contentment and fewness of desires are two states of the mind that complement each other and if one is present the other inevitably follows. One cannot be had without the other.

The Buddha repeatedly says that craving (*taṇhā*) or the fever of unsatisfied longing is the source of sorrow (*dukkha*) and if higher life is to be lived this has to be rooted out. When the sense-organs come into contact with the outside world, there follow sensation and feeling and these, in the absence of mastery over them, result in *taṇhā*, which in turn binds the individual to the world. And until this *taṇhā* is completely eliminated, there is no freedom. Viewed from this point of view the aim of Buddhist life is the cutting of one's ties with the world by the elimination of *taṇhā*. It is then only that a person becomes fully satisfied and contented. Such a person is totally free. He lives in the world without being of the world (*tiṇṇam loke visattikam : S.* I, p. 1).

As an ethical virtue the benefits of contentment in our day to day life are quite obvious. Absence of contentment leads to the arising of many psychological defilements such as jealousy, hatred, pride, hypocricy and various other vices. A discontented man is always impatient. He is a grumbler everywhere. Even if he were to obtain the whole world, he would not be happy. This desire may take various forms such as desire for money and material gains, for fame and supremacy and so on. Whatever form it would take, such a person is a danger to himself as well as to others. Any kind of *taṇhā*, be it desire for political power or desire for material gains, when taken to extremes is bound to bring about serious consequences for the community at large.

Now a question might arise whether this kind of contentment means a kind of fatalistic resignation leading to a life of inactivity and lethargy.[1] In answer to this it can be pointed out that the Buddha's teaching never encourages that kind of inactivity or resignation to one's fate. According to Buddhism this kind of fatalism is a false philosophy and is condemned as *niyativāda*. Buddhism is a teaching that encourages true living, a life of true activity as Gotama himself led. It teaches neither hedonism nor asceticism but a way of sane living leading to absolute contentment culminating in the cessation of all conflicts (*dukkha*). To interpret contentment as fatalistic resignations would be a complete travesty of Gotama's teaching.

In explaining and praising contentment, Buddhist texts very often praise a bhikkhu who is content with the four requisites of his life, viz. robes, food, lodgings and medicaments. It is obvious that these are the four basic necessities of one's life (e.g., *M.* II, p. 6 ; *A.* V, p. 25. See NISSAYA).

1. Buddhist contentment is defined in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* as 'merely a fatalistic, joyless acceptance of things as they are'. Further it is said that 'the ideal of contentment proclaimed by Buddhism is remote from life' (*ERE.* IV, p. 86). Further Tachibana's (*Ethics of Buddhism*, p. 88) observation that although a man can improve his position he declines to do so because he is contented needs further clarification. Improvement of 'one's position, social or professional through some medium which lies in his power' can mean that one does so in the correct way, by following the Noble Eightfold Path, as done by a true Buddhist.

This applies to a layman as well. Whether monk or layman, true contentment is praised as a virtue of the wise (*Dhp. v.* 362). It is said that Gotama's teaching cannot be truly practised by those who have not cultivated this virtue.[2] To be content with what one has is rather difficult for one who does not have the correct attitude of mind (*sammā diṭṭhi*) as taught in the Noble Eightfold Path. In the first place, this kind of contentment does not mean, as pointed out earlier, fatalistic resignation without making a genuine effort at ameliorating one's lot. Wealth has to be earned but in the correct way (*dhammaladdha*) and also it should be used in the correct way (*sammā ājīva*). On the one hand if one is not satisfied with what he obtains he can never be happy. Such a person will try to obtain what he wants by whatever means that are open to him. Whether it is material wealth, political supremacy or fame the person who wants it and tries to obtain it by any means gradually becomes a psychological victim who never can be satisfied.

A question might arise as to how a man can remain content amidst numerous economic difficulties. From the Buddhist point of view economic questions cannot be divorced from moral questions. In other words immorality is a cause for economic difficulties. On the other hand, economic problems are responsible for much immorality, too. This is more or less a vicious circle and from the Buddhist point of view mere satisfaction of economic needs without spiritual development will never make people content. Just as poverty is responsible for much crime, wealth too is equally responsible for the ills and problems of man. The reason for this situation is that wealth is merely looked at from a materialistic point of view, the result of which is that its possessor is never satisfied. He does not have the correct attitude to it. The most important thing in Buddhism is that one must have the correct attitude to material wealth. Wealth should be made use of without attachment and also it should not be looked for as an end in itself. Material wealth is only a means to an end. For one who has noble aims and thoughts (*sammā diṭṭhi, sammā saṅkappa*) in life, material wealth is needed only for his bare necessities which he has to obtain by righteous means according to the social conditions of the period in which he lives. Briefly, it means a life in which spiritual values are given precedence over material values: in such a philosophy of life material values are looked at from a spiritual viewpoint. While being content with one's lot, one never ceases one's struggle towards perfection. Whether one is monk or layman, leading the higher life in its totality (*brahmacariya*) demands tremendous struggle. That kind of life cannot be led by a discontented man, a grumbler, because such a person's constant thought is not to put forth the correct kind of effort (*sammā vāyāma*) with the correct attitude (*sammā diṭṭhi*), but to grumble and fight with the world saying that the world is not what he wants it to be. He is never satisfied and he can never make up his mind to do the needful in a given situation. He does not know that the fault lies not in the world but in himself.[3] Thus, this kind of contentment as propounded in Buddhism is a psychologal virtue that has to be patiently cultivated and, if well realised, it is the highest kind of wealth (*santuṭṭhi paramaṃ dhanaṃ : Dhp. v.* 204).

A.G.S.K.

CONTIGUITY. See PSYCHOLOGY.

CONTINUITY, the state of being continuous or uninterrupted in time or sequence as a characteristic of all psychical and physical phenomena. This is one of the most fundamental concepts in Buddhism as it is directly related to the concepts of impermanence (*anicca*, q.v.), soullessness (*anatta*, q.v.) and becoming (*bhava*, q.v.) which lie at the basis of Buddhist ontological analysis. The *anicca* idea directly teaches the continuous change of condition or the impermanence of all phenomena. The *anatta* idea follows from this that if everything is in a flux there cannot be a permanent entity (*atta*) constituting the individual. From both these doctrines it follows that existence is a continuous becoming (*bhava*).

The Buddhist concept of existence is thus one of continuity (*santati, santāna*). This idea is synoptically expressed in a stanza occurring in late Pali works (e.g., *AA.* III, p. 206 ; *UdA.* p. 270 *Vism.* p. 544 ; *DhsA.* p. 10) which says :

> The endless chain of aggregates
> Of elements, of bases too
> That carries on unbrokenly
> Is what is called ' the round of births '

2. *Appicchassāyaṃ dhammo na'yaṃ dhammo mahicchassa : santuṭṭhassā' yaṃ dhammo na'yaṃ dhammo asantuṭṭhassa* (*A.* IV, p. 229).

3. Compare the significant words of Gotama occuring at *S.* III, p. 138 : that one who speaks in conformity with *truth* (*dhammavādi*) never quarrels with the world (*Na bhikkhave dhammavādī kenaci lokasmiṃ vivādati*).

Khandhānañca paṭipāṭi
dhātvāyatanānañ ca
abbocchinnaṃ vattamānaṃ
saṃsāroti pavuccati

The Pali term *paṭipāṭi* meaning succession and its further explanation *abbocchinnaṃ vattamānaṃ* meaning 'continuing unbrokenly' convey the necessary idea quite clearly. The aggregates (*khandha*), elements (*dhātu*) and bases (*āyatana*) referred to here constitute the basic components into which the individual and the external world (in relation to him) are analysed in Buddhism.

While the aggregates refer to the basic components constituting the individual, the *āyatanas* refer to the faculties of cognition (of the external world) and their objects (i.e., sense-organs and their objects). The meeting of these two is necessary for cognition (*viññāṇa*) and all these three factors are classified under the term *dhātu*. In this manner the human personality, including the external world with which it enters into relationship, is divided into these three *dhamma* (elements of existence), which are said to flow on (*sandahati*) as a series (*santati : Miln.* p. 40). Until the individual ceases his saṃsāric sojourning by attaining Nibbāna he is subject to this continuity, the nature of his different forms of existence being decided by his kamma. The continuity of this existence in a single life-time takes place through successive continuity of the consciousness in a conditioned sequence. It continues through an unbroken series of phases which are brought about in terms of the law of causation. The significant fact is that physical death does not break this continuity. Thus, as birth and death do not constitute the beginning and end of life, this phenomenon of continuity from one life to another could be best understood by understanding how death and rebirth take place. When a person dies his *passing-away consciousness* (*cuti-citta*), without terminating his life, takes on a new birth through *re-linking consciousness* (*paṭisandhi-citta*) and the continuity is maintained without a break (For details *sv.* DEATH). As it is through this continuity of consciousness that the continuity of existence is made possible, this consciousness is quite aptly described as saṃsāric or transmigrating consciousness (*saṃvattanika-viññāṇa : M.* II, p. 262 f.) and as a stream of consciousness' (*viññāṇa-sota : D.* III, p. 105) which is unbroken at both ends and established in both worlds (*ubhayato abbocchinnaṃ idha loke paṭiṭṭhitañ ca paraloke paṭiṭṭhitañ ca :* loc. cit.).

The following description of the entire process as found in the *Visuddhimagga* (*Vism.* p. 460; tr., Ñāṇamoli's *Path of Purification*, Colombo, 1956, p. 518) may be quoted here: "After death there is re-birth-linking again: and after rebirth-linking, life-continuum. Thus the unbroken continuity of the consciousness of beings who sojourn through various kinds of becoming, station and abode goes on. But when a man attains arhantship here, it ceases with the cessation of his passing away consciousness." (*cutito pana puna paṭisandhi; paṭisandhito puna bhavaṅgan' ti evaṃ bhava-gati ṭhiti-nivāsesu saṃsaramānānaṃ sattānaṃ avicchinnaṃ cittasantānaṃ pavattati'yeva : Yo pana ettha arahattaṃ pāpuṇāti tassa cuticitte niruddhe niruddham eva hoti*). In this manner the continuity of becoming is maintained despite physical death and existence is therefore conceived as a constant continuity (*santati nāma pavatti : Vism.* p. 449).

The constituents of life referred to earlier have come together through mutual causation to form what appears as the individual and this causal process of activity, of growth and springing up incessantly, of change, decay and destruction goes on continuously from birth to birth until causation is over-come at final cessation or *nirodha* (*sv.* CESSATION).

The celebrated statement 'all component things are impermanent' (*sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā*) states this idea of continuity axiomatically. The term *saṅkhāra* implies all that is composed or conditioned, thereby embracing all worldly phenomena in their entirety. While all living organisms 'exist' in this form of continuity as explained so far, all inorganic phenomena also continue changing according to the law of change (*vipariṇāmadhamma*) implied in the *anicca* concept. Continuity in any form is always marked by birth (*uppāda*) and dissolution (*vaya*) as explained in early works (*e.g., M.* III, p. 282) and with another stage called *ṭhiti* (duration) included later. Marked by these causal sequences, both in time and in space, continuity becomes successive occurrence (*pubbāpariyavasena vattamānaṃ : Vism.* p. 472), as understood in Buddhism. Thus, worldly reality is a continuous production and coming into being and consequent destruction and its totality appears as a permanent existence to those who fail to see the rise and fall of phenomena that is constantly taking place. As there cannot be definite identity or otherness in a continuing sequence of this nature, Thera Nāgasena could describe the reborn individual as being neither the same nor different from the one passing away

from the previous existence (*na ca so na ca añño : Miln.* p. 40).

As continuity of this nature cannot be conceived apart from time, every moment in our worldly existence is a transition to a new form of life, since in every moment something becomes past and dies while something new is born, in the same way as each revolution of a wheel on a track marks out a measurable movement in space from one point to another. Using this same idiom, the passage in saṃsāra is described as the rolling on of the wheel of life: *vaṭṭam vattati* (*D.* II, p.63.) One such length covered in a complete revolution marks out one cyclical phase of life.

As Buddhism does not formulate and present theories merely for their philosophical interest, the ethical significance of this doctrine of continuity is not to be forgotten. The most important fact in that regard is that this continuity prevents an individual from losing his identity and, therefore, personal responsibility. It is true that the continuing individual does not remain the same for two consecutive moments because he changes according to the law of karma,but his identity as an individual remains throughout. The nature of his karma decides the nature of his change. Thus, the moral responsibility of the individual for his actions is invariably maintained. The *na ca so na ca añño* idea referred to earlier is a clarification of this important point. Thus, the fact that there is no unchanging entity passing from one life to another like a soul has to be reconciled with this fact of unchanging identity. What appears as a soul to the ordinary individual in this process of continuity is the ego-concept, technically designated in Pali as *sakkāya-diṭṭhi*, which disappears once the individual enters the path of freedom.

Another valuable ethical point involved is that the person who sees this continuity correctly abandons both the annihilationist (*uccheda-diṭṭhi*) and the eternity (*sassata-diṭṭhi*) views. Such understanding also helps to realise the impermanence of all phenomena and also to see that the 'I-consciousness' is only an illusion that should be discarded at the earliest opportunity.

A.G.S.K.

CONTRADICTION, LAW OF—, sometimes also called the law of non-contradiction, is a law in logic according to which two propositions p and ~p negating each other cannot be simultaneously true, i.e., the two propositions A is B and A is not B are mutually exclusive. Symbolically, this law may be presented as (p.~p). (L. S. Stebbing, *A Modern Introduction to Logic*, London, 1945,p. 191). The oldest formulation of this law was given by Aristotle (384-322 B. C.). Modern logicians like Leibniz (1646-1716) and Kant (1724-1804) have, however, adopted a different formulation as a result of which the law has assumed a different meaning.

Logically speaking, the texts of the Pali canon seem to contain two types of statements. They are the one that is based on a two valued logic of two alternatives and the other that is also based on a two-valued logic of four alternatives. The latter type of statements which consists of four propositions, namely, is, is not, both is and is not and neither is nor is not has created a bewilderment in the minds of certain scholars who have examined Buddhist logic as revealed in the Pali canon.

L. De La Vallee Poussin (*The Way to Nirvāna*, Cambridge University Press, 1971, p. 111), puzzled by the latter type of statements (which he termed four-fold schema) expressed the opinion that "Indians never clearly recognized the principle of contradiction". Mrs. C. A. F. Rhys Davids writing on Buddhist Logic (*ERE.* Vol. 8, 1915. pp. 132-133) seems also to have tried to solve the puzzle by interpreting the four propositions as laws of thought. In the course of the discussion, she has identified the second proposition as the law of contradiction. In her own words,the second proposition stands as follows : (Is A B ?) If not, is A not B ? B. M. Barua (*A History of Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy*, University of Calcutta, 1921, pp. 47-48) too, followed the same line of argument. According to his formulation the so-called law of contradiction is stated as follows : (if A is B)....A cannot be both B and not B. But K. N. Jayatilleke (*Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1963, pp. 333-351) who has made an exhaustive study of this type of proposition, shows the difficulty of understanding their nature and function in terms of Aristotelian logic.

A careful survey of Indian logic from the earleist times to the period of the composition of early suttas of the Pali canon, shows clearly that the view held by Poussin, namely, that the Indians failed to recognize the principle of contradiction is erroneous. A close study of the trend as well as the flow of the arguments that run through the discourses in the canon reveal that consistency has been accepted as a criterion of truth. In the *Aṭṭhaka-vagga* of the *Suttanipāta*, which is one of the earliest

Buddhist texts, the *Cūlaviyūha Sutta*, a discourse on controversies, states that truth is one and not two (*ekam hi saccaṃ na dutiyam atthi : Sn. v.* 884). The dilemmas recorded in the canon(*M.* I, p. 393, *S.* IV, p. 323) are also based on the assumption of the principle of contradiction. The *Kathāvatthu*, chronologically the latest canonical text of the Pali Abhidhamma, contains a passage (*Kvu.* p.159,) which, according to Barua, maintains that it is self-contradictory to assert 'exists' and 'does not exist' in the same sense at the same time (*Kvu.* tr. *Points of Controversy*, pp. 108-109).

In his study, Jayatilleke has cited a passage from the canon (*S.* IV, pp. 298-299) which according to him is 'the formal statement of the principle of contradiction'. The passage in question is the result of an interesting situation where Citta, a lay disciple of the Buddha, arguing against Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, the Jain leader whose philosohphy is based on a non-categorical theory of truth, is anxious to show that the latter is contradicting himself.

The evidence adduced above clearly shows that the Indians, including the Buddhists, were not only aware of the importance of the principle of contradiction but also that they in fact applied it in their argumentations.

The attempt on the part of certain scholars to interpret these four propositions which were apparently problematic to them as laws of thought is the result of a misunderstanding of the nature and the purpose of these propositions. See further : LOGIC.

S. W.

CONTROL. As a term of much significance in religio-philosophical systems, control implies a deliberate act of restriction by which an individual conforms or is caused to conform, as far as possible, to a prescribed norm. Control is, therefore, either self-imposed or imposed on one by an external agency. In Buddhism, however, control is completely self-imposed. In any given situation the Buddhist assumes the responsibility for control since his moral development is considered to depend on his own initiative (*D.* I, p. 63 *et passim*).

In Buddhism, the idea of control is expressed by semantic nuances of verbal roots like *dam* (to subdue), *yam* (to restrain) and *nī* (to lead). Verbal and nominal forms from these and other allied roots occur quite often in the Buddhist texts. Verbs like *dameti*, *saṃyameti*, and *vineti*, and nouns like *dama*, *saṃyama*, *saṃvara* and *vinaya* are too well-known to need specific treatment.

Control occupies a central position in the psycho-ethical attitudes inculcated by Buddhism, for in the ultimate analysis, perfection for man is considered possible only through the proper control, direction and development of the human potential. Every other form of control taught in Buddhism is subservient to this main objective.

The development of the human potential, however, requires as a preliminary condition the control of one's psycho-physical personality. It is the Buddhist view that one's psycho-physical personality functions through the avenues of thought, speech and physical action. And, in the interests of both mundane well-being and spiritual uplift of the individual, Buddhism considers necessary the restraint of these avenues, which in turn, depends on the control of one's sense-doors (*indriya*).

Perhaps, with the exception of the Amoralists, Materialists and Agnostic Sceptics, the control of the senses is a theme common to every form of Indian religious thought. However, while the idea of sense-control could vary from one system of thought to another, as far as Buddhism is concerned it may be said that both in concept and magnitude such control is determined by the attitude of Buddhism to sense-perception, as a proper understanding of the latter is considered the key to wisdom and salvation[1]. Sense impressions, according to Buddhism, are of two kinds : the desirable (*sevitabba*) and the undesirable (*asevitabba*)[2]. Control, no doubt, has to be exercised in respect of the latter, although it cannot be maintained that all sense-impressions with an identical hedonic tone produce the same effect in an individual[3]. How such control is to be exercised is set out in the scheme of moral training prescribed for the bhikkhu. This scheme envisages firstly, a re-orientaion of

1. Cf. "*Yato kho bhikkhave bhikkhu channaṃ phassāyatanānaṃ samudayañca atthaṅgamañca assādañca ādīnavañca nissaraṇañcayathābhūtaṃ pajānāti ayaṃ imasmiṃ sabbeh'eva uttaritaraṃ pajānāti* " (*D.* I, p. 45).

2. Cf. "*Cakkhuviññeyyaṃ rūpamp'ahaṃ ..... duvidhena vadāmi sevitabbampi asevitabbampi ; sota-viññeyyā saddā ..... ghāna-viññeyyā gandhā ..... jivhāviññeyyā rasā ..... kāyaviññeyyā phoṭṭhabbā ..... manoviññeyyā dhammā p' ahaṃ ..... duvid-hena vadāmi, sevitabbampi asevitabbam piti*" D. II, p. 281. Also see *M.* I, pp. 303, 475 ; II, p. 237f. ; III, p. 55f.). This, it will be noted, is at variance with the Upaniṣadic view that all sense—impressions toll the death-knell of "the soul" (Cf. *Sarve svarāḥ mṛtyor āptānāḥ . Chān dogya*, II, 22.3).

3. For instance, it is said that even among pleasant sensations, it is not all (*na ..... sabbāya sukhāya vedanāya*) that lead to sensual obsession (*rāgānusayo anuseti : M.* I, p. 303. Also cf. *M.* I, p. 475 ; II, p. 237 f.

one's attitude towards sense-perception with a view to producing the psychological equilibrium necessary for the development of the mind. As the texts put it, "After one has become a recluse one lives restrained in terms of the restraints of the Pātimokkha, conducting oneself in the right-way, and seeing danger in the least of those things he should avoid. He adopts and trains himself in the precepts, encompassing himself with good deeds in act and speech. He leads a pure life, good is his conduct, guarded are his sense-doors, moderate is he in food, mindful, self-possessed and happy."[4] It will be noted that this initial stage of control is directed primarily towards the moral restructuring of two avenues, viz. those of physical and verbal deeds,[5] which would set the tone for the cleansing of the third, viz. the mind, which may be said to begin with what is called 'the putting away' of mental defilements[6].

Since the development of the human potential involves the development of the mind there is no gainsaying the fact that, for Buddhism, mental control is a *sine qua non*. The instances attaching significance to mental control, in the Buddhist texts, are too numerous to be cited here. This stems from the fact that Buddhism considers mental activity to be of greater significance than that of body and speech (cf. *M*. I, p. 373). However, as noted above, mental control, in the first instance, is dependent on one's attitude towards sensations comprehended through the sense-doors. And mental control may be said to have been actually achieved when sense-impressions, even when pleasant, cease to have on one any stimulating psychological impact[7]. The serenity and purity resulting from such control lead to mental suppleness, malleability and imperturbability, the conditions through which alone would blossom forth the human potential.[8]

What has been outlined above may be looked upon as the religio-philosophical aspect of control in Buddhism. As a social virtue too Buddhism sets a premium on control. This is necessary from the mundane point of view. Apt in this context is the dictum of the *Dhammapada* that 'the wise control themselves[9]. Possession of control is to be reckoned among those qualities which should guide the conduct of the Buddhist both within the family circles and in society outside. Therefore, the cultivation of this aspect of control forms an important part of the Buddhist social ethic. Also see CULTURE, DISCIPLINE.

L. P. N. PERERA

CONTROVERSIES. These are of two types: i. controversies that arose between the Buddha or his disciples and those who professed other faiths, ii. controversies that arose within the Buddhist Order itself. The first type was generally helpful in the spread of Buddhism whereas most of the second type were so grave as to bring about schism in the Order.

i. The Nikāyas shed much light on controversies the Buddha had with leading contemporary Brahmins, Jains and other exponents of religions and philosophical doctrines. These were centered on problems pertaining to the doctrine, ethics as well as on matters of social importance. Buddhism appears more or less to be a counter-movement against certain important doctrines of Brahmanism that were widely prevalent at the time.

The Buddha successfully argued against the Brahmanic view concerning authority of the *Vedas* and won over the disputants (*D*. I, p. 235 ff.). With the learned brahmin Kūṭadanta the Buddha engaged in a discussion and proved to him the futility of the sacrifice (*D*. I, p. 129 f.).

The Buddha also disputed the Brahmanic belief in a Creator God (*D*. III, p. 80 ff.). He refuted also the brahmin's claim to superiority over the rest (*M*. II, p. 148 ff.). The Buddha disputed the soul-

4. *"Evaṃ pabbajito samāno pātimokkhasaṃvarasaṃvuto viharati ācāragocarasampanno anumattesu vajjesu bhaya dassāvi samādāya sikkhati sikkhāpadesu kāyakammavacikammena samannāgato kusalena pari-suddhājīvo silasampanno indriyesu guttadvāro bhojane mattaññū satisampajaññena samannāgato santuṭṭho"* (*D*. I, p. 63).

5. It may be added that according to traditional Buddhist definitions the corpus of the Buddhist monastic rules is called the "Vinaya" since, amongst other things, it is meant to discipline body and speech (*vinayanato c'eva kāyavā cānaṃ: VinA*.p. 18. In organized Buddhist monastic discipline, however, it will be more accurate to say that mental control too has been taken into consideration.

6. *"So abhijjhaṃ loke pahāya vigatābhijjhena cetasā viharati abhijjhāya cittaṃ pariso. dheti ..... vyāpāda-dosā cittaṃ parisodheti ..... thīnamiddhā cittaṃ parisodheti ..... uddhaccakukkuccā cittaṃ parisodheti ..... vici icchāya cittaṃ parisodheti."* (*D*. I, p. 71.)

7. *"..... sutavā ariyasāvako sukhāya pi vedanāya nibbindati."* *M*. I, p. 500).

8. Cf. *"So evaṃ samāhite citte parisuddhe pariyodāte anaṅgane vigatūpakkilese mudubhūte kammaniye ṭhite āneñjappatte ñāṇadassanāya cittaṃ abhininnāmeti."* (*D*. I, p. 76).

9. *"Attānaṃ damayanti paṇḍitā."* (*Dhp*. v. 8).

theory adhered to by the Brahmins and Jains. He analysed the various aspects of the personality and contended that none could be identified with the 'soul' as postulated by brahmins and Jains (*D.* III, p. 230 ; *S.* II,p. 77). He categorically denounced clinging to either of the two extremes of self-indulgence (*kāmasukhallikānuyoga*) and self-mortification (*attakilamathānuyoga*), and instead adopted the Middle Path (*S.* IV, p. 330 ff.). This he made very clear to the Ājivaka named Acela Kassapa (*D.* I, p. 161 ff.).

He very convincingly disputed the karma-theory of the Jains who held that deeds of the body (*kāya-daṇḍa*) are the most important of the three kinds of deeds. He engaged in a disputation with the learned Jaina named Upāli and convinced the latter that deeds of mind (*mano-kamma*) are more important, and further explained that the ethical character of a deed depended upon the motive and not merely upon its external performance. Upāli accepted the Buddha's position (*M.* I, p. 371 ff.).

These controversies were very helpful for the firm establishment and rapid spread of Buddhism for, they provided the best means of publicity for the Buddhist point of view. Debates and controversies were regarded as being so important a feature in the spread of religion that there were special Debating Halls (*Kutūhala-sālā*, cf. *eka-sālaka* : *D.* I, pp. 178, 179 ; *M.* II, p. 22) erected to hold public debates (*kathojja* : *Sn. vv.* 825, 828) on controversial religious topics.

ii. There is early textual evidence to show that even during the life-time of the Buddha there were a few members of the Order who did not fully accept the principles laid down by the Buddha for the guidance of monks, especially with regard to matters pertaining to Vinaya. Upananda, Channa and the group of monks known under the appellation Chabbaggiya (q.v., Skt. *Ṣaḍvargiya*) are noteworthy in this respect. The Chabbaggiyas were of a rebellious character and they took advantage of even the most trivial incident to flout authority and create controversial situations. However, the most well known among those who openly strove to rouse controversies and create dissensions among the members of the Order is Devadatta (q.v.).

Most of the controversies that arose during the life-time of the Buddha pertains to minor problems of discipline. The first dissension among the bhikkhus took place when a monk of Kosambi, having committed an offence, refused to accept the fact that he had committed an offence. This became a much disputed issue and the Buddha failing to reconcile the two dissenting parties retired to a forest grove near Pāricyyaka. It was after the firm intervention of the lay community that a reconciliation was brought about (*Vin.* I, p. 352 f.).

On another occasion, Devadatta was successful in bringing about a temporary schism in the Order by raising a controversial issue with regard to five rules of discipline (*Vin.* II, p. 197).

Except for these sporadic instances there was harmony and general agreement among members of the Order. The establishment of *Adhikaraṇa-samathas* (which includes within its fold the *Vivāddādikaraṇas*) to settle disputes and controversies among the Saṅgha, and, perhaps also the adoption of the four-fold authority (*mahāpadesa*) for testing the authenticity of a Vinaya rule or a doctrinal point, may have helped, to a great extent, to maintain concord and agreement among the Saṅgha. Perhaps, it was this harmonious atmosphere that prevailed in the Order that induced Sāriputta to assure the members of the Order that the Buddha's teaching is well set forth and that no controversial issues will arise to bring about discord and disputes among the monks as it did happen among the disciples of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta when the latter passed away (*D.* III, p. 210). Yet, in spite of Sāriputta's assurance, soon after the Buddha's Parinibbāna uneasy rumblings were heard in the discontented words of Subhadda. It is recorded that when the Buddha passed away and the monks stood weeping, Subhadda asked them to rejoice instead, saying : " We are well rid of the Mahā-samaṇa ; we shall now do just as we like " (*Vin.* II, p. 284 ff. ; *D.* II, p. 162). Subhadda's words reflected the discontentment secretly nursed by some monks and this matter became so grave as to warrant a summoning of a 'Council' to rehearse the Dhamma and the Vinaya. Even this 'Council' was unable to settle all controversies for, theras like Purāṇa and his followers opted to adhere to the doctrine as heard by them from the Buddha himself (*Vin.* II, p. 289 f.).

Controversies and disputes were more frequent after the Parinibbāna of the Buddha. Spread of Buddhism paved the way for further controversies. With the spread of Buddhism there arose monasteries (*disā*) at distant places, separated from each other by thousands of miles. Members of these monasteries preserved the doctrine of the Buddha through oral tradition. In spite of the painstaking care taken by them in preserving the oral tradition in the purest form, numerous factors, most of them

beyond their control, caused new interpretations and individualistic opinion to creep in. Lack of proper means of communication was a great handicap, and there was hardly any means of comparing the traditions preserved in different monasteries and bringing about a uniformity among them. Further the monastic life induced the monks to adopt a life devoted more towards scholarship than towards spiritual development. This resulted in their becoming further engrossed in dialectics and controversies regarding doctrinal matters. The differences among traditions maintained in various monasteries gradually became wider and it is probable that these differences in traditions were also instrumental in bringing about the second 'Council,' though its immediate cause is said to be a controversy regarding some Vinaya rules. This becomes further evident from the conflicting accounts of the second 'Council' as recorded in such sources as the *Mahāvaṃsa* and the *Dīpavaṃsa* (See E. J. Thomas, *History of Buddhist Thought*, London, 1933, p. 32 f.; S. Dutt, *The Buddha and Five after-centuries*, London, 1957, p. 130). The fact that the second 'Council' resulted in a major schism in the Order, too, strengthens the presumption that there may have been more important controversial issues involved in this besides the Vinaya rules that are said to be the immediate cause of the 'Council.' Between the first and third 'Council,' the original single body of the Saṅgha, which adhered to one tradition, is said to have split into eighteen 'bodies' or 'schools' (*vāda*) and all these splits were caused by doctrinal differences. The chronicles refer to these schools as *ācariya-vāda* 'schools of teachers,' and this seems to suggest that these 'schools' were mainly due to the rise of prominent teachers who were more devoted to *Gantha-dhura* (doctrinal-obligation) than to *Vipassanā-dhura* (spiritual or inner-life obligation).

Three centuries after the demise of the Buddha the Order was split into so many 'schools', professing numerous 'heresies' that another 'Council,' was held to purge the Order of these 'heretical schools.' These 'schools' and the views held by them are referred to in the *Kathāvatthu* which also reflects the relation of Theravāda Buddhism to other 'schools.' The *Kathāvatthu* also makes clear extent to which the members of the Order had deviated from the original ideal of spiritual (inner-life) obligation and become devoted to scholarship.

It is a well known fact that the Buddha dissuaded his disciples from engaging themselves in hair-splitting disputes and controversies over matters which are not conducive to their emancipation. Some such questions, he left unanswered. The wandering ascetic Poṭṭhapāda placed before the Buddha the ten questions: Is the world eternal? Is the world not eternal? Is the world finite? Is the world infinite? Is the soul (*jīva*) same as the body? Is the soul distinct from the body? Does a Tathāgata continue to live after death? Does he not live after death? Does he both live and not live after death? Does he neither live nor not live again after death? (*D.* I, pp. 187–8; *M.* I, pp. 426, 484; *S.* III, p. 258; *A.* II, p. 41). The Buddha left them unanswered because on the one hand he considered them as not in anyway helping his followers to attain the goal and on the other he knew that the answers to such questions could not be conveyed because of the limitations of language (*D.* I. p. 187 ff.; *M.* I, p. 426 ff. See also K. N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, London, 1963, p. 476).

As the *Kathāvatthu* shows members of these numerous 'schools' engaged in controversies and disputes over problems which are not directly concerned with the attainment of Enlightenment. Some 'schools' engaged in controversies regarding the exact nature of an arahant. 'Schools' such as Vajjiputtakas, Sammitiyas, Sabbatthivādins and Mahāsaṅghikas held that an arahant may fall away, as against the early Theravāda teaching that the attainment of Nibbāna in arahantship is final and definite and can never again be lost. These' schools' disputed over the nature of the Buddha. The Andhakas argued that the Buddha's daily habits are supramundane. The Vaitulyakas went a step further and debated that the Buddha never lived as a human being on this earth. They even disputed over such problems as whether *iddhi* confer longevity, whether sex-relations may be entered on by any human pair (even recluses) with united resolve.

Among all tenets of Buddhism it is the *anatta* theory that gave rise to heated controversies and disputes among the adherents of different 'schools' of Buddhism. As the *Kathāvatthu* shows there were schools such as Vajjiputtakas and Sammitiyas who, as opposed to the early Theravāda, held that there is a persisting personal entity which they called by the term *pudgala*. This view was rejected by the orthodox Buddhists and the *Abhidharmakośa* devotes a whole chapter to dispute this new theory of the Pudgalavādins.

The controversial docetic theories and new interpretations of the old Theravāda doctrines put forward by the new 'schools' gradually paved the way for the appearance of Mahāyāna. This process

was greatly facilitated by suttas, found in the Theravāda canon, which lent themselves to a wide variety of interpretations. Each 'school' attempted to render explicit what was only implicit in the earlier discourses of the Buddha. These attempts differed from each other and controversies ensued. The disputes were no longer about rules of discipline but about abstruse points of psychology and logic. These attempts at new interpretations are seen in the Abhidhamma works that were being composed at the time.

Contrcversies and disputes were not settled once and for all even after the third Council. Disputes over doctrinal problems were fast brewing and this led to the convention of the fourth 'Council' during the reign of Kaniṣka. Perhaps, by this time Mahāyāna Buddhism was gradually emerging as a separate 'school.' Controversies that arose among the adherents of Mahāyāna Buddhism led to the appearance of two separate systems of Mahāyāna called Mādhyamika and Yogācāra. The beginnings of Mahāyāna can be traced to the new 'schools' that emerged after the second 'Council' specially to the Mahāsaṅghikas and the Pudgalavādins. Murti opines that the Mādhyamika emerged out of a sustained criticism of the Abhidharmika 'schools' (T.R.V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, London, 1955, p. 8). Thus, it is a criticism of both the *ātma* and the *anātma* theories. The Yogācāra or the Vijñānavāda school evolved out of criticism of the Mādhyamika thought. Both these systems became subject to new interpretations and this resulted in the development of Tantric Buddhism.

S.K.N.

CONVENTIONAL TRUTH See SACCA.

CONVERSION. In its narrowest sense the term conversion is used to denote a change of religion, the acceptance of a 'new' religion.

William James explains conversion as follows: "To be converted, to be regenerated, or to receive grace, to experience religion, to gain an assurance, are so many phrases which denote the process, gradual or sudden, by which a self hitherto divided, and consciously wrong, inferior and unhappy, becomes unified and consciously right superior and happy, in consequence of its firmer hold upon religious realities" (*The Varieties of Religious Experience*, London, 1945, p. 186; cf. also *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, s.v. CONVERSION). From the Buddhist point of view conversion denote a moral, a spiritual change which consists of a complete change of character, a complete revolution in values and attitudes, a regeneration into a new life far superior, and more organised around a central idea than the life of an ordinary worldling.

Conversion is not the monopoly of any religion. However, unlike in other religions in Buddhism the idea of conversion is more complex, and many types and different grades of conversion could be discerned.

People can broadly be divided into two categories as unconverted and converted. The unconverted are the ordinary worldlings (*puthujjana*) and the converted are those who have transcended the worldling state and attained a morally and spiritually higher state referred to in late canonical texts as *gottabhū* (Skt. *gotrabhū*, q.v.: *M*. III, p. 256; *A*. IV, p. 373). The term *gottabhū* denotes only one grade of those who have undergone conversion whereas there are others who belong to still higher grades. The religious and spiritual standing of a *gotrabhū* is still below that of one who is striving for the attainment of the fruit of sotāpatti (A. IV, 373). Nevertheless, what is primarily characteristic of a *gotrabhū* appears to be his membership in the 'religious order' thereby inheriting the right to receive gifts of food and clothing as well as homage and veneration from laymen who apparently are deemed to be below the former (See *M*. III, p 256). However, this spiritual quality does not appear to be a determinant in this context. According to the *Dakkhināvibhaṅga Sutta* (loc. cit), even though they may be counterfeit monks, lacking in moral virtue and evil by nature, gifts given to them collectively (as sangha) are reckoned to be superior to those given to single individuals (*paṭipuggalika*).

It is recorded in early Buddhist texts that during the very early years of the Buddha's dispensation itself the number of converts increased so rapidly that the people of Magadha, distressed by the alarming prospect of childlessness, widowhood etc. blamed the Buddha and the monks (*Vin*. I, p. 43). However, it is not possible to regard that all these converts had attained conversion in the higher sense of the term for, the mere acceptance of the Buddha's teaching by an unconverted worldling brings about his conversion only in the narrowest sense of the term. There were many who even after accepting the Buddha's teaching and entering the Order failed to attain higher conversion (i.e., to become a *gottabhū*). Such is the case of Cūla-kāla who even reverted to lay life when persuaded his by

erstwhile wives. Mettiya Bhummajaka monks are among the numerous converts who entered the Order but remained mere nominal converts as they failed to attain real conversion.

A higher form of conversion is seen in the cases of such monks as Yasa (*Vin.* I, p. 14 f.), the Bhaddavaggiyas (ibid. I, p. 23 f.), Sāriputta, Moggallāna (ibid. p. 39 ff.) and so on who after conversion lost all traits of the worldling-state, became regenerated into a new spiritual life and became endowed with the conditions that precede the realisation of the Noble Truth (*ariyadhamma*). Since their conversion spiritual ideas became the centre of their energies and their sole aim was the attainment of Nibbāna.

In Buddhism conversion can never be made by compulsion. Out of the worldlings only those who have the capacity for conversion could become candidates for conversion. Generally, a candidate for conversion could be spotted out from the rest by his being more devoted to religious life. When his knowledge of the Dhamma matures the prospective convert begins to feel the unwholesomeness, the incompleteness of the life so far led, the futile nature of the whole saṃsāric existence.

Gradually, these ideas get a hold on him, become convictions and form the centre of his spiritual energy, impelling him to seek for a way to escape all ills of life. This characteristic is evident in cases of such eminent monks as Sāriputta and Moggallāna who were convinced of the ills of saṃsāric existence and were seeking a path that led to end all suffering.

There are some in whom such religious ideas are not so prominent but lie latent in the subconscious. In such cases these latent ideas have to be awakened by an outside influence. This outside influence may appear in the form of a miracle performed by the Buddha or one of his disciples as in the case of Sāmaññakāni thera (*ThagA.* I, p. 103 f.) , who got converted after seeing the Buddha perform the Twin Miracle. It may be even an ordinary sight which unusually awakens the religious consciousness in the prospective convert as in the case of Yasa who got dejected of the worldly life by seeing the disgusting sight of his sleeping female attendants. The conversion of the brahmin named Ekasāṭaka shows how the religious ideas that lie latent in the subconscious come to the forefront and effect conversion. Ekasāṭaka one day listened to the Buddha's sermon, and being greatly pleased, wishing to make an offering , gave the Buddha his upper garment after a hard mental struggle as to whether he could afford the gift. Having made the gift he shouted with joy saying 'victory is mine.' (*DhpA.* III, p. 1 f.).

There are certain worldlings who are not prone to become converted. On the one hand, religious faith finds no place in their hearts and on the other, they resist any outside religious influence. They are thoroughly engrossed in the pursuits of the worldlings and as such they have not the predisposition essential for conversion. Devadatta and the group of rebellious monks known as Chabbaggiyā are examples of this type. Their religious inclinations were not sincere. Even if a religious teacher were to try to convert such people, he would not succeed for they lack confidence in the teacher and his doctrine.

One should not, however, take this to mean that according to Buddhism certain people are doomed for ever. This is not so, for Buddhism accepts the fact that all have the potentiality for conversion. The difference is that in some this potentiality is more covered, than in others, by the overgrowth of defilements. More time and more personal effort by them is required to clear the overgrowth of defilements. Texts also point out that certain periods, for example the period in which a Buddha appears, are more conducive to conversion. This shows that environment, too, has some influence on conversion. Faith or confidence (*saddhā*,q.v.) is the indispensable pre-requisite for conversion. This is evident from the words the Buddha is supposed to have spoken to Brahmā Sahampatī when the latter implored him to preach the Truth that he had discovered. The Buddha, acceding to Brahmā's request, is supposed to have made the following utterence :

" Open for those who hear are the doors of deathlessness. Let them effuse their faith (*pamuñcantu saddhaṃ*). Conscious of the (useless) fatigue of the exertion, O Brahmā, I have not preached the sublime and excellent Dhamma to men " (*Vin.* I, p. 7). By requesting the prospective converts to ' effuse faith,' the Buddha at the very outset stressed its importance as a pre-requisite for conversion. Its importance is also evident from the method adopted by the Buddha in preaching to the Pañcavaggiyā monks. When, after the Enlightenment, the Buddha visited these monks with the intention of preaching to them he found that though they were full of religious zeal, they lacked confidence in him and in his words. Therefore, before preaching to them, the Buddha awakened confidence in their hearts and made their hearts more receptive (*Vin.* I, p. 9 f.).

The conversion of Upaka, the Ājivaka, also illustrates the importance of confidence for conversion. Upaka happened to be the first person whom the Buddha met on his way to Isipatana after Enlightenment. Being questioned by Upaka the Buddha declared his identity. Yet Upaka did not have enough confidence in the Buddha's words (*Vin.* I, p. 8 f.). It was much later that he gained confidence in the Buddha. And it is this initial confidence that paved the way for his conversion (*Sn A.* I, p. 258 ff.).

In Buddhism, unlike in other religions, conversion is primarily voluntary. It is a fact that there are innumerable instances showing the Buddha taking a personal interest and even initiative in the conversion of others. A case in point is the conversion of Nanda, the half-brother of the Buddha (*Ud.* p. 21 ff.). Buddha had the power to spot out persons suitable for conversion and induce feelings in them that make them more amenable to the Dhamma. But the final act of conversion is always held to be the responsibility and the achievement of the person concerned.

Thus, in Buddhism conversion is never regarded as anything given by an external power, a product of divine grace. It is something achieved through personal effort. Undoubtedly a religious teacher can help to achieve conversion ; success depends on the personal effort of the would-be-convert. Confidence in the teacher is essential ; but this confidence is not blind-faith, and this in no way amounts to self-surrender. Sometimes the Buddha is said to have gone in search of would-be-converts to preach to them. This was not done in order to directly attempt their conversion, but to lead them to the appreciation of the truth of his teaching. It is said that those beings who are liable to be converted (*veneyya*) and who possess the requisite pre-disposition (*upanissaya*) appear before the Buddha's divine-eye (*Buddha-cakkhu : DA.* II, p. 470). When this happens the Buddha goes in search of such individuals.

Unless one has *upanissaya* one does not qualify for conversion, for such individuals lack the religious zeal and confidence. *Upanissaya* is not something one obtains in a single life-time. It has to be cultivated in the course of a number of births.

Though the actual act of conversion is sudden it requires a period of prior preparation. As already indicated the accumulation of *upanissaya* might even take a number of births. Thus, conversion is really the climax of a gradual process of inner evelopment and not a chance occurrence.

Backsliding or relapses take place only in the cases of nominal converts. Cūla-kāla, to whom reference has already been made, was a mere nominal convert, and that was why he reverted to lay-life. Cūlapanthaka was a dullard with regard to religious studies, yet his conversion was of a high grade (*A.* I, p. 24 ; *Dhp* I, *A.* IV, p. 180 f.). Therefore, he strove hard and attained arahantship. A true convert who has freed himself from mundane traits and reached the *gottabhū* state is usually destined to proceed along the path of spiritual progress and finally reach Nibbāna. Converts who belong to a still higher grade, i.e., those who have reached the *sotāpanna* (q.v.) state, never fall away, for they are not liable to fall back (*avinipātadhamma*).

Such a convert is endowed with unwavering devotion to the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Saṅgha and with virtues dear to the Ariyans (*S.* V. p. 390). Their conversion excludes them from being born in purgatory, among animals and petas, as well as in other places of misery (*D.* I, p. 156 ; II, p. 200). Such converts are destined to attain enlightenment (*niyato sambodhiparāyano*) the highest fruit that could be attained by a convert (*D.* I, p. 156 ; *S.* V, p. 390).

S.K.N.

CONVICTION is belief based on proof or logical reason and as such it is without any tincture of doubt. Such firm conviction brings about well-founded confidence (q.v.).

Thus, it is apparent that the presence of proof or logical reason and the absence of doubt are the salient features of conviction. The Buddha took note of the fact that doubting (*kaṅkhā, vicikicchā, vimati*) is a characteristic of the inquiring mind which searches for proof or logical reason. As such Buddhism, a religion which encourages inquiry and personal verification, does not consider the mere act of doubting (*kaṅkhā*) a hindrance to the productive harnessing of the mind. What it objects to is the persistence of such doubt which leaves the mind perpetually in a perplexed, unsettled state, preventing it from gaining conviction and becoming placid and pliable (cf. *Kālāma Sutta : A.* I, p. 188 ff.).

The Buddha, the Dhamma and the Saṅgha are the three objects of whose virtues all Buddhists have to be primarily convinced. This conviction, however, ultimately converges into the conviction in Dhamma. Doubt with regard to these objects

brings about an unsettled, diffused state of the mind. This results in mental obstruction (*cetokhila*, q.v.), in that it arrests or retards progress in thought, and actions ; such a mental state becomes a hindrance (*nīvaraṇa*, q.v.) to spiritual progress (*D.* I, p. 246; II, pp. 83, 300 f. ; *M.* I, p. 101 ; see DOUBT). Thus, the conviction of the virtues of these three objects is a primary requisite in the pursuit of spiritual advancement. Such initial conviction induces the convert to go deep into the realm of the Dhamma, and this leads to the furtherance of his conviction.

As pointed out at the outset, conviction is gained only when doubt is got rid of completely. This, however, is not accomplished by the substitution of mere baseless faith which is designated in Buddhist texts as *amūlikā saddhā* (*M.* II, p. 170) which is compared to the interrelationship of a family line of blind men (*andhaveṇiparampará*) who have never seen one another. Such baseless faith makes no demand for proof or logical reason. It denotes the blind acceptance of a belief. Though Buddhism considers that some form of faith (*saddhā*) is a pre-requisite for conviction, it never regards mere baseless faith as a means of conviction. Such baseless faith calls for reliance on an external power. Buddhism totally rejects the idea of dependance on an external power for deliverance and very clearly states that one is one's own refuge, one is one's own master (*D.* II, p. 100 ; *Dhp. v.* 160). See also FAITH, PASĀDA and SADDHĀ.

Buddhism aims at making faith (*saddhā*) culminate in knowledge or *paññā* (*A.* V, pp. 338 ; cf. *S.* IV, p. 298). As such it denounces outright the habit of blindly following the tradition (*A.* I, p. 189) and extols knowing and seeing (*ñāṇadassana*), personal verification, personal satisfaction, personal knowledge which leads to firm conviction (*D.* I, p. 165 ; *M.* I, p. 114 ; II, p. 44). It is in order to enable the followers to know and see personally (*sayaṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā*) that Buddhism grants freedom of thought to an extent unparalleled in the history of religions. The Buddha himself criticised the contemporary religious systems for their emphasis of mere faith at the expense of conviction arising out of personal verification (cf. *M.* I, pp. 92, 93). Even when the learned Jaina Upāli accepted the Buddha's teaching, the latter cautioned him saying that it is good for well-known men like Upāli to make a thorough investigation before taking a decision (*M.* I, p. 379).

Even the Dhamma preached by the Buddha is qualified as bringing results in this very life (*sandiṭṭhika*), subject to personal scrutiny (*ehipassika* : come and behold) and to be known by the wise individually (*paccattaṃ veditabbo viññūhi*. *M.* I, p. 37). Not only the Dhamma, even the Buddha was open for investigation (*M.* I, p. 318 f.).

Though emphasis is on conviction through personal verification some form of faith (*saddhā*) is not totally discarded. Such faith is of primary importance in the process of conviction as it is the basic impelling force that leads one to the Dhamma which ultimately is the most important of the three objects of conviction. Thus, faith is the first step towards conviction and consequently towards final deliverance. It is faith which spurs one to activity (*sampakkhandanalakkhaṇā : Miln.* p. 34) and clarifies one's vision in the process (*sampasādanalakkhaṇā :* loc. cit.).

The *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (III, p. 248) enumerates five benefits resulting from hearing the doctrine. These are (1) one hears things not heard before, (2) cleanses things already heard, (3) dispels doubt, (4) straightens one's view, and (5) the mind becomes placid. From this enumeration it is clear that with the dispelling of doubt one's views get straightened (*uju*). From the *Sammādiṭṭhi Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 46 ff.) is seen that straightening of views means the attainment of right view (*sammādiṭṭhi*). From this it could be surmised that gaining conviction is the same as attaining right view, for right view is attained through the testimony of others (*parato ghosa*) and proper reflection (*yoniso mānasikāra*). Acceptance of another's testimony as a means of gaining conviction does not mean that Buddhism indirectly advocates the practice of blindly following the tradition. What is meant here, as clearly explained in the *Cāṅkī Sutta* (*M.* II, p. 171), is the provisional acceptance of a statement with a view to testing it personally, verifying it through proper reflection.

Hearing the doctine alone does not suffice to bring about the afore-mentioned benefits. The *Caṅkī Sutta* describes how when one gets acquainted with the Dhamma through faith (*saddhā*) one bears the doctrine in mind and begins to examine it. It is this examination that dispels doubt and straightens one's view. It is pointed out in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*A.* III, p. 139) that when one does not investigate, examine and understand one naturally fails to gain conviction in such situations in which one ought to be convinced.

From the foregoing account it becomes clear that there is a close connection between faith, conviction and knowledge. Buddhaghosa points

out that it is only when knowledge (*paññā*) is developed in co-ordination with faith (*saddhā*) that it conduces to religious conviction (*Vism.* p. 107). It also should be noted that development of knowledge is connected to the development of moral conduct (*sīla : D.* I, p. 124). Thus, it is seen that these factors leading to conviction have to be developed gradually and methodically.

The Dhamma as a whole consists of numerous doctrinal teachings some of which are easily comprehensible and some others which are hard to comprehend owing to their subtle nature. The knowledge that enables one to comprehend a simple doctrinal point will not be sufficient to comprehend a subtle point in the doctrine. To investigate, verify and comprehend such a subtle doctrinal point and to gain conviction regarding that, one should possess a very profound knowledge or super-knowledge (*abhiññā*), and such knowledge is to be acquired by constant reflection and investigation.

Thus, it is apparent that conviction is of different levels, varying in accordance with the profundity of knowledge possessed by the convert. The initial conviction is only the starting point in a long process of conviction that finally ends up with the attainment of arahantsihp. Very often the Buddha himself found that it was necessary to convince the would-be-converts about the veracity of his own statements. A clear example of this is found in the case of Pañcavaggiyas. The Buddha first had to convince them about his truthfulness and win their confidence, and it was only after this that he was able to help them to achieve religious conviction.

The Nikāyas illustrate vividly how the Buddha convinced followers of other faiths by preaching to them methodically. In all such cases the Buddha had to channel their knowledge gradually into the Buddhist way of thinking bringing about a smooth transition. Preaching in due order to these learned would-be-converts the Buddha first dealt with such matters as generosity, right moral conduct, heaven, the degradation and danger resulting from the pursuit of pleasure (*kāma*), and also the advantages of renunciation. It is only after thus enabling them to gain initial conviction regarding the new faith that the Buddha proceeded to preach on the more subtle matters. By enabling them to gain this initial conviction the Buddha was able to prepare their minds to accept the new teachings. It is only when the Buddha noticed that their minds had become prepared, softened, unprejudiced, upraised and clear that he proclaimed the real essence of his teaching, namely, the Four Noble Truths. Having gained initial conviction regarding both the Buddha and the Dhamma they begin to consider this new doctrine by reasoning, testing, weighing the meanings and penetrating it with knowledge (*M.* I, p. 480 ; II, p. 173). As a result of these investigations they become able to further their conviction and even gain conversion (q.v.) and this, the text literally refers to as the acquisition of the eye of the doctrine (*dhammacakkhu*). In other words, their views which so far had been crooked became straightened (*uju*) and they become established in the right-view (*sammādiṭṭhi*). In the process their faith (*saddhā*) turns out to be rational faith (*ākāravati-saddhā*) ; their confidence becomes confidence based on understanding (*aveccappasāda*).

When one gets fully convinced of the teaching by clearly understanding it and dispelling all doubt, one is able to declare as Pokkharasādi did, " Most excellent ! Most excellent ! Oh Gotama, you have made the doctrine clear to me in many ways as if it were revealing what has been hidden away, or as if it were pointing out the right path to one who has gone astray or as if it were bringing a light into a place of darkness so that those who have eyes could see " (*D.* I, p. 110).

The more one investigates and critically examines the Dhamma the more one's conviction grows. Through investigation and critical examination one's knowledge too, increases and this enables one to examine still subtler tenets of the Dhamma. Thus, this process of conviction passes from one level to another increasing, almost, in direct proportion to the increase of knowledge and finally reaches the highest point with the attainment of arahantship (cf. *Cūlahatthipadopama Sutta : M.* I, p. 175 ff. ; *Sammādiṭṭhi Sutta : M.* I, p. 46 ff.). Once arahantship is attained one gains the conviction that destroyed is rebirth, lived is the religious life, done is what had to be done, and that there is no beyond after this present life (*khīṇā jāti, vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ, kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ, nāparaṃ itthattāya : Vin.* I, pp. 14, 35, 183 ; *D.* I, pp. 177, 203 ; *M.* I, p. 139).

S. K. N.

CORPOREALITY. See RŪPA (1).

CORRELATIONS. Broadly speaking, the Buddhism of the early Nikāyas emphasizes two kinds of correlations : (1) the correlations that it sees existing between phenomena, physical as well as psychological, which, operating together as a complex of

correlations, results in the phenomenon of suffering (*dukkha*). (2) the correlations that exist between the quality or character of one life-span and another, of the same individual. Both these kinds of correlation are seen as being causal, or more precisely, conditional, in character.

The former category is best illustrated in the doctrine of the *paṭicca-samuppāda* where each of the factors conditions the succeeding factor, i.e., a conditional correlation exists between each two factors. Thus, *avijjā* (Ignorance) and *saṅkhārā* (Karma-formations) are conditionally correlated, the arising of the latter being dependent on the arising of the former. So in turn are the *saṅkhāra* conditionally correlated with *viññāṇa* (Consciousness,) *viññāṇa* with Mentality and Corporeality (*nāmarūpa*) and so forth down the complete *paṭicca-samuppāda* until we come to the last link, the arising of a new life or rebirth (*jāti*) which, in Buddhism is equivalent to suffering and riddled with all its elements as manifested through such inevitables as decay and death, grief, sorrow, pain and lamentation.

This correlation conceived in the Nikāyas was thus a very simple causal one, the word *paccaya* standing to express a conditional relationship that carries with it a sense of invariability but at the same time falls short of a categorical deterministic necessity. This simplicity is true even of the more complex correlation that exists between *avijjā* and *dukkha* as the first and last links of a 'chain' or network of correlations. It still is reducible to a mere causal one-one relationship, where the condition *avijjā* being irradicated, its result *dukkha* ceases to be. (See CAUSALITY).

The other kind of correlation, that between one life-span of an individual and his preceding or succeeding life-span is said to be only comprehensible through extra-sensory perception. The data received through this clairvoyant vision is said to reveal a correlation between the behaviour of an individual in one life-span and the state of his survival in the succeeding one. In other words, a relationship is noticed to exist between the conduct of a person in one life and his suffering or happiness in another life. According to the *Dīgha Nikāya* (*D.* I, p. 82), a person who has acquired clairvoyant perceptivity sees some beings who indulge in bodily, verbal or mental misconduct or is possessed by false views and acts according to such false views being born in unhappy conditions after death while others who are of good conduct are observed as being born in happy conditions. A *Majjhima Nikāya* passage (M. I, p. 74) reveals that the correlation is seen as a definite and distinct one, so much so that the future state of happiness or unhappiness is predictable from the present observed behaviour of a person in the same way as someone with proper sight, seeing a man walking on the road leading to a pit of coals could foretell that this man would fall into the pit and experience extreme pain. It is thus seen that this correlation, like the other, is a causal one, but unlike the former which seems to describe a natural process, the present kind of correlation bears an ethical character. This becomes even more obvious when certain specific correlations are worked out between certain kinds of acts and certain other manifestations in the life of an individual, usually the next or some succeeding life, for instance, according to the *Majjhima Nikāya*, there exists a correlation between the duration of life of an individual and his acts of violence against the lives of others. A person who kills living creatures, it says, tends to be short lived, while a person who refrains from taking the lives of other creatures tends to be long-lived (*M.* III, p. 203). A person who harms creatures tends to be sickly and a person who is hot-tempred tends to be ugly while health and beauty go with those who refrain from those evil actions. It is obvious that it was therefore believed that any person possessed of these qualities in the present life had in the past performed acts correlated with them. Thus, an ugly person, it could be inferred, had in his immediately preceding existence, or in some other former existence, been a hot-tempered person.

The Buddha, however, seems to have pointed out that such a rigidly specific system of correlation would not present the total truth. A false picture may arise from the fallibility of the clairvoyant vision, which tries to spot the correlation within the range of an immediately preceding or succeeding life-span. Although as a rule the correlation between the ethical quality of acts and the future states of life exists, the act may have been performed not necessarily in the immediately preceding existence or the result may not be experienced in the immediately succeeding one. For that matter, acts may even bear their results in the very life-span in which it is performed. Rigid predictability is also excluded by the fact that there may be a sudden moral change taking place at the moment of death (*M.* III, p. 214), but even this admission does not nullify but only substantiates for the Buddhists the correlations between virtue and happiness and vice and misery.

By the time of the *Paṭṭhāna*, the nature of the causal correlation between the factors of the *paṭicca-samuppāda* has undergone a noticeable change. In fact, the term *paccaya* itself seems to have acquired a meaning different from its original one where it described the simple one-one relationship in which a preceding factor stood vis-a-vis the succeeding one. Thus, *avijjā* or ignorance is a *paccaya* for *saṅkhāras* or Karma formations. In the *Paṭṭhāna*, *paccayas* define a kind or type of correlation and are classifiable therefore. The causal relationships between phenomena are of different kinds and they are in fact classified by the *Paṭṭhāna* into 24. These 24 *paccayas* or conditions are given as follows:

(1) Root-condition	(*hetu-paccaya*)
(2) Object-c-	(*ārammaña-p-*)
(3) Predominance-c-	(*adhipati-p-*)
(4) Proximity-c-	(*anantara-p-*)
(5) Contiguity-c-	(*samanantara-p-*)
(6) Co-nascence-c-	(*saha-jāta-p-*)
(7) Mutuality-c-	(*añña-mañña-p*)
(8) Support-c-	(*nissaya-p-*)
(9) Decisive-Support-c-	(*upanissaya-p-*)
(10) Pre-nascence-c.	(*pure-jāta-p-*)
(11) Post -nascence:c.	(*pacchā-jāta-p.*)
(12) Frequence-c.	(*āsevana-p.*)
(13) Karma-c.	(*kamma-p.*)
(14) Karma-result-c.	(*vipāka-p.*)
(15) Nutrient-c.	(*āhāra-p.*)
(16) Faculty-c.	(*indriya-p.*)
(17) Jhāna-c.	(*jhāna-p.*)
(18) Path-c.	(*magga-p.*)
(19) Association-c.	(*sampayutta-p.*)
(20) Dissociation-c.	(*vippayutta-p.*)
(21) Presence-c.	(*atthi-p.*)
(22) Absence-c.	(*natthi-p.*)
(23 Disappearance-c.	(*vigata-p.*)
(24) Non-disappearance-c-	(*avigata-p.*)

Thus, distinctions seem to be drawn for different kinds of causal correlations. Root-conditions (*hetu-paccaya*), for instance, refer to the pschological motivies which are fundamental conditions for actions. Actions which have un-wholesome results are said to have as their root conditions, Greed (*lobha*), Hatred (*dosa*) and Delusion (*moha*), while Non-greed (*alobha*), Non-hatred (*adosa*) and Non-delusion (*amoha*) can lead to karmically wholesome or neutral actions. On the other hand, an object condition (*ārammanapaccaya*) implies a vastly different kind of causal relationship. Object condition is described by Nyānatilokā thus: "The 6 objects (*ārammana*: lit. 'props' or supports), i.e., visible object, sound, odour, sa d, tangible object, mind-object, past, present and future are to the 6 kinds of consciousness, (seeing, hearing, etc.) a condition, without which the latter never could arise, and on which they are necessarily dependent" (*Guide through the Abhidhamma Piṭaka*,, Colombo 1938, p. 99). See further PACCAYA.

B. J.

CORRESPONDENCE, THEORY OF—See TRUTH

COSMOLOGY. In the earliest Buddhist literature cosmological and cosmogonical speculation seems to be spoken of with disapproval by the Buddha. The *Brahmajāla Sutta* (D. I, p. 13 ff.)enumerates several contemporaneous cosmological theories which the Buddha depicted as arising from a misunderstanding or misinterpretation of experience —of mystic experience. The sutta mentions, for instance, the Eternalists (*Sassatavādin*) who were concerned with the problem of the world in time, maintaining that the world and the soul (which they apparently held to be a duality) were eternal. The Buddha describes this view as an erroneous one, a conclusion arrived at by its propounders owing, either to their limited vision and misunderstanding of certain experiences they had of their past births, or, on the other hand, owing to the sophistry in their logic.

According to this same sutta (op. cit. p. 17 ff.), he spoke in the same vein of another school of cosmologists who, again concerned with the existence of the world in time, maintained an eternal creator and an ephemeral creation, or held the world to be constituted of eternal gods ruling over ephemeral lesser beings. Both these viewpoints the Buddha denounced as resulting from the fallacy of holding some things to be eternal and some things not.

There were again the Extensionists (*Antānantanika*) who seem to have speculated on the existence of the world in space. They fell into four subdivisions, namely, (1) those who maintained that the world was spatially bounded "so that a path could be traced round it" (op. cit. p. 22), (2) those who maintained it was unbounded, (3) those who maintained it was vertically bounded and horizontally unbounded, and (4) those who believed it to be neither bounded nor unbounded. These cosmologists too, the Buddha depicted as being mistaken.

Two more schools of speculation, apparently more interested in cosmogony than cosmology, are also found mentioned in this sutta (op. cit. p. 28 ff.) under the broad classification called the Fortuitous-Originists (*Adhicca-samuppannika*), who maintained the world to be of uncaused-origin.

Of all these schools of opinion, the Buddha speaks with disapproval, declaring that he himself refrained from such speculations which began from faulty premises. These theorists, he says, started with a false epistemology. Their source of knowledge was a limited experience of their past existences. They saw only up to a point in the series of past lives they had and concluded that that point was the

beginning. The Buddha considers himself, according to this sutta, as having risen above these speculations, having realised the way of avoidance of them, and as being concerned with the more important problem of suffering in life and the freedom from suffering.

A sutta in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* defines the Buddhist position regarding the basic causes which led to the limited vision of these erring cosmologists of the *Brahmajāla Sutta*. The arahant Isidatta, in answer to a question by the householder Citta, declares: "As to those diverse views that arise in the world, such as eternal is the world, and (etc.) and as to these sixty-two heretical views that are set forth in the *Brahmajāla*, it is owing to the presence of the false view of permanent individuality (*sakkāyadiṭṭhi*) that they arise, and if such a false view of individuality does not exist, they do not exist" (*S* IV, p. 287).

Thus, it appears that the Buddhists held that these cosmological and eschatological speculations stem from a false cosmogony and that this false cosmogony, in the final analysis, results from thinking in terms of an abiding permanent self, i.e., from a false view of individuality, *sakkāyadiṭṭhi*. Their argument appears to have been that one thinks of eternity because one thinks of a beginning, and false conclusions are arrived at regarding the former because of the false conclusions made regarding the latter. For instance, the view that the world is partly eternal and partly not, i.e., the belief in an eternal creator and ephemeral creation, the Buddhists point out, arises from the fact that some recluse, in yogic contemplation, sees only up to a certain point in time, in the chain of rebirths, and seeing only thus far and no further, imagines that the first being who came to be reborn in this world, existed before him and his fellow-being, and therefore existed for all time. That 'first being' who was called Brahmā, and is referred to the Ābhassara world, is held to be eternal by his successors on earth. "He is steadfast, immutable, eternal, of a nature that knows no change," these beings would say, "and he will remain so for ever and ever. But we who were created by him have come hither as beings impermanent, mutable, limited in duration of life" (*D*. I. p. 18). "We must have been created by him," the lesser beings say. "And why? Because, as we see it, it was he who was here first, and we came after that" (loc. cit.).

All this, the Buddhists would claim, as shown by the *Isidatta Sutta*, is the result of thinking in terms of entities, with the self as the centric entity.

Having declared in the *Brahmajāla Sutta* that these contemporaneous cosmological speculations were erroneous, and having shown the causes which led to error, the Buddha himself refused, not only to speculate on such problems, but also to make any pronouncement in answer to them. In the *Pāsādika Sutta* (*D*. III, p. 137 f.), he re-enumerates all the cosmological viewpoints listed in the *Brahmājala Sutta* as those concerned with problems on which he himself has made no declaration (*na vyākata*). He maintains that these speculators have declared themselves wrongly on the question of the beginning and end of things, which, he says, has been rightly answered only by him, and this, in his analysis of the fact, the origin, the ending and the means thereto, of suffering (op. cit. p. 136). Thus, he claims, he grapples with the problems of origin, not on the same plane as the cosmogonists but on a higher plane. He declares only that which conduces to the good (i.e., to the cessation of suffering) and not that which is irrelevant to it (op. cit. p. 134).

The Buddha's refusal to make declarations on the cosmological problems of the eternity and infinity of the world, of its monistic or dualistic nature, is emphasised in the *Cūla-Māluṅkya Sutta* (*M*. I. p. 426 ff.), too, where he classifies these problems as three of the four undeclared or unanswered questions (*avyākata*, q.v.).

The very significant fact of the reasons for this refusal are also given in this sutta, and in another sutta, the *Aggi-Vacchagotta Sutta* (*M*. I, p. 483 ff.). In the former discourse, Māluṅkyaputta, naming four questions left unanswered by the Buddha, bids him make explicit his views or state, in all honesty, whether he did not in fact know. The Buddha, in reply, maintains that the question is, in the first instance, irrelevant, citing, with its allegorical suggestions, the celebrated example of the man who, wounded by a poisonous arrow, refuses to have it drawn out until he has had all the information about the arrow and the archer. The man would die, the Buddha points out, before ever these facts were explained or known to him. Thus, the Buddha, not denying his own knowledge of the answers, not only considers these cosmological problems as irrelevant, but also gives a second reason

for his refusing to disclose a view on them. Man's life, according to him, seems to be too short to waste upon such problems when the more pressing problem of human suffering is before him.

To Vacchagotta, too, he suggests the importance of this pragmatic attitude, adding, emphatically, that any views on those unanswered cosmological problems must needs be speculative, and, indulgence in them is conducive only to misery rather than to Nibbāna.

In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (II, p. 80) the Buddha seems to give an additional, and, perhaps, the most important reason for his discouragement of cosmological speculation. It is his inclusion of *loka-cintā* (literally, thought about the world) as one of the four unthinkables (*acinteyyāni*). *Loka-cintā*, Buddhaghosa interprets, as speculation as to who created the sun, the moon, the earth and the ocean, etc.—in short, as cosmogonical speculation, which, as we have been shown in the *Brahmajāla Sutta*, is the source of all faulty cosmologies. The Buddhist argument from this unthinkability of the problem seems to be that it is, therefore, futile. Whence the Buddha goes on to describe it as not merely unthinkable but as one which should not be thought on (*acintetabbāni*), for one thinking on such problems would go mad.[1]

It thus appears, from the above textual references, that the Buddha clearly disapproved of speculation on cosmological problems, on the grounds that such problems were (1) irrelevant and unpractical, (2) that they were unthinkable, and (3) that life was too short for them to be explained.

On the other hand, the Buddha does not seem to have refrained from expressing a view on the empirical world, 'the world of becoming,' in terms of cosmology, and from Buddhist literature may be gleaned the facts to build the Buddhist's own picture of the world-system.

See also BHAVA, DEVALOKA, DHĀTU, GATI, HEAVEN, HELL, LOKA-DHĀTU, NIRAYA, SAGGA.

B.J.

COUNCILS. See SAÑGĪTI.

COURAGE is figured as one of the prominent traditional virtues in every ethical system. It is either enjoined as a duty or praised as an excellence. When thus regarded as a virtue, courage is generally said to be a disposition, not merely instinctive, to exhibit a certain firmness, stopping short of rashness, in the face of danger, threat, temptation, pain, public opinion, etc. Under the scrutiny of wisdom, courage is essentially the 'strength of mind' which is particularly indicated by the Pali word *dhiti*, which makes obedience to the dictates of reason possible.

This idea has been justified in the *Appamāda Sutta* of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (*S.* I, p. 87) where the Buddha says to king Pasenadi Kosala that 'the strong in mind doth win the name of wise, because he grasps wherein his vantage lies' (*atthābhisamayā dhīro paṇḍito ti pavuccati*).

In the *Vepacitti Sutta* of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (*S.* I, p. 221) it is mentioned that a strong-minded (*dhīro*) person is able to restrain the fool. On one occasion the Buddha has referred to Godhika as a strong-minded person (*so dhīro dhitisampanno : S.* I, p. 122).

Courage may be described as the antidote to fear and anxiety and where there is courage, there is no fear, fright and dread. According to the *Dhammapada* (*Dhp. v.* 129), every one fears death and physical harassment, and this could be overcome only by courage. To him who lives in solitude in the thick forest fear comes only if his heart is filled with desire and longing, and if he is restless, witless and drivelling. But on the other hand if he is pure, resolute and free from corruptions of the heart he would live in the forest with courage and confidence and would develop meditation (*M.* I, p. 19 ff.). The Buddha is said to have mentioned that the monk who wishes not to be overcome by fear is considered to be a fulfiller of virtues (*A.* V, p. 132). Fear (*bhaya*) is spoken of as one of the four evil-impelling forces (*agati*), the other three being desire (*chanda*), dislike (*dosa*) and delusion (*moha*). Hence, understanding of the facts of life as they truly are results in the elimination of fear in every worldly individual. When he realises through wisdom the fact that birth, decay and death are the very essential marks of life, he sees the futility and baselessness of fear. Thus, wisdom enables the individual (with courage) to face life courageously as it is. He, therefore, cultivates resolution and puts forth energy and effort to realise within himself a state of being that is untouched by the worldly circumstances. According to the Buddha, a heart untouched by the worldly circumstances is free from sorrow (*Puṭṭhassa lokadhammehi cittaṃ yassa na kampati asokaṃ virajaṃ khemaṃ ..... : Sn. v.* 268). In the *Ratana*

1. "*Loka-cintā bhikkhave acinteyyā na cintetabbā yaṃ cintento unmādassa vighātassa bhāgī assa* .... " (*A.* II, p. 8)

Sutta, the Buddha has declared that just as Indra's deep sunk bolt defies all winds that blow, the steadfast stand the good who grasp the noble truths (ibid. *v.* 229).

Courage is a quality of mind and body that plays, and is assigned a crucial role in the psychology and the ethics of Buddhism. The *Viriyasambojjhanga* is presented as consisting of both these aspects (*D.* III, p. 252 ; *S.* V, p. 111). As a moral quality, courage is commended and enjoined as the motive force that propels the individual towards the path of Enlightenment.

Courage of convictions is rooted in intellectual honesty and is at once indicative of fearlessness. Since fear is born of both ignorance and attachment (*pemato jāyati bhayaṃ : Dhp. v.* 213) it is clear that courage, as conceived in Buddhism, is born of understanding and detachment (*pemato vippamuttassa natthi soko kuto bhayaṃ :* loc. cit.). In the *Udāna* (*Ud.* p. 41) it is mentioned that, to him whose mind is like a rock which does not tremble amidst mental states of attraction and repulsion sorrow does not arise.

yassa selūpamaṃ cittaṃ ṭhitaṃ n'ānukampati
viruttaṃ rajanīyesu kopaneyye na kuppati
yass' evaṃ bhāvitaṃ cittaṃ, kuto taṃ dukkhaṃ
essati

Courage is an essential quality which should be cultivated by each and every individual to face life as it is. On many occasions the Buddha has declared the fact that 'self is the saviour of every individual' (*attāhi attano nātho : Dhp. v.* 160) and since there is no other refuge every one should be like an island unto himself (*atta dīpā viharatha bhikkhave atta saraṇā anaññasaraṇā : D.* II, p. 100).

Courage is a composite of several qualities such as *viriya*. This is clearly brought out in the *Abhidhamma* where the term *viriya* is defined in terms of a wide variety of related moral qualities. All of them invlove in greater or lesser degree elements of what is considered as courage.

The term *viriya* which literally means 'effort' goes hand in hand with courage. One must be endowed with courage in order to put forth effort. This idea is well exemplified by the story of Thera Soma Kolivisa who was in despair in not being able to practise meditation on the topic given to him by the Buddha. When he was later taught by the Buddha how to temper energy with calm, he put forth fresh courage and attained arahantship. Buddha described him as a courageous person (*etadaggam bhikkhave mama sāvakānam bhikkhūnam āraddhaviriyānam yadidam Somo Koliviso : A.* I, p. 24). In the *Suttanipāta* (*Sn. v.* 79) Buddha explains to Kasībhāradvāja that *viriya* leads one to peace where anguish is no more. It has also been considered by the Buddha as the way to put an end to suffering (*viriyena dukkham acceti : S.* I, p. 214.) and to attain one-pointedness of mind (*M.* I, p. 21).

Dhiti as courage means strength in purpose and steadfastness. The Buddha is said to have declared to the demon *Āḷavaka* (*S.* I, p. 215) that courage as one of the four qualities that one who has faith should be endowed with, the other three being truthfulness (*sacca*), restraint (*dama*) and charity (*cāga*). Buddha has said that those who are strong in purpose and are steadfast overthrow the hosts of death by putting an end to craving (*so dhīro dhitisampanno jhāyī jhānarato sadā ahorattaṃ anuyuñjaṃ, jīvitaṃ anikāmayaṃ, jetvāna maccuno senaṃ anāgantvā punabbavaṃ samūlaṃ taṇhaṃ abbuyha .... : S.* I, p. 122).

The Buddha has named venerable Ānanda as the chief among those who were courageous (*eta daggaṃ bhikkhave mama sāvakānaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ dhiti mantānaṃ yadidaṃ Ānando : A. I., p 25*). It is recorded that inspite of the Buddha's disapproval Ānanda showed an extraordinary courage in his single-minded determination to realise the establishment of the *bhikkhuṇī-sāsana*. Kisāgotami and Paṭācārā could be listed as leading women disciples of the Buddha who have displayed tremondous courage.

Courage also results from confidence (*vesārajja*) which on the other hand results from right understanding (*sammādiṭṭhi*). A person who is self-confident has no need to depend on or fear others. It is said that a Tathāgata possesses four confidences by which he knows his place as leader of the herd, utters his lion's roar in the assemblies and sets rolling the Brahma wheel (*A.* II, p. 8 f).

The term *parakkama* denoting courage also occurs in the Buddhist scriptures. At one place the Buddha says that he has realised two things, namely, to be contented in good states and not to shrink back from the struggle. He says, "gladly would I have my skin and sinews and bones wither and my body's flesh and blood dry up, if only I may hold out until I win what may be won by human strength, by human energy, by human striving. By my earnest endeavour I won Enlightenment" (*yantaṃ purisathāmena purisaviriyena purisa-parakkamena pattabbaṃ na taṃ apāpunitvā viriyassa saṇṭhānam bhavissati ti : A.* I, p. 50).

Courage expresses itself through the three doors of action namely, thought, word and deed. In the realm of philosophical conception courage of thought is illustrated by the doctrine of *anatta* (q. v.), doctrine without parallel in the history of human thought. Courage in word may be illustrated in terms of the fearless expositions of truth that run counter to well-established conventions as embodied in the *Vedas* and in other scriptures.

The embodiment *par excellence* of courage in Buddhism is Buddha himself. In extolling the virtues of the Buddha, Sāriputta has mentioned that Buddha is endowed with qualities such as courage etc. (*D.* III, p. 113). The Buddha's courage of word was also in evidence in his famous encounter with the great Brahmanical teachers of his day including Soṇadaṇḍa and Kūṭadanta who were both vanquished in debate. By his cool composure, unruffled manner and supreme self-confidence born of courage rooted in wisdom he was able to take in all comers ranging from powerful monarchs to skilled dialecticians. The Buddha's courage in deed is ideally exemplified according to the Buddhist tradition by several memorable events in his life. An instance of rare courage is well brought out in the episode relating to the conversion of the mass-killer Aṅgulimāla (*M.* II, p. 103–104). Among other celebrated instances of the evidence of the Buddha's courage may be mentioned the episodes of Nālāgiri, the mad elephant who was rushed by Devadatta with a view to killing the Buddha (*Vin.* II, p. 194 ff.). No progress of any sort is possible without courage. In the *Ovāda Sutta* (*S.* II, p. 206) it is mentioned that a person who is devoid of courage in the matter of performing meritorious deeds would go to destruction, while the one who has courage in performing such good deeds would always prosper (*DhsA.* pp. 120–121).

I. K.

COVETOUSNESS. See ABHIJJHĀ, GREED and LOBHA.

CRAVING The word *craving* is used by translators of Pali Buddhist texts to render into English the idea conveyed by the Pali term *taṇhā* (Skt. *tṛṣṇā*. s.v. TAṆHĀ. See *The Book of the Kindred Sayings*; V, p. 357; *The Book of the Discipline*, IV, p. 16)

Tṛṣṇā is derived from *tṛṣ*—to thirst for. Hence, in the Buddhist sense, craving stands for the thirst which is given in the doctrine of Four Noble Truths as the cause (*samudaya*) which gives rise to suffering or *dukkha* (*S.* V, p. 421; *Vin.* I, p. 10). This craving or thirst is systematically graded and classified as (1) the desire for the gratification of the senses (*kāmataṇhā*), (2) the desire to prolong saṃsāric existence (*bhavataṇhā*), and (3) the desire for precipitous self-destruction (*vibhavataṇhā*).

As the second truth of the origination of *dukkha* (i.e., *samudaya sacca*), the main characteristics of craving are that it leads to regeneration in saṃsāra (*ponobhavika*), savours of lustful attachment (*nandi-rāgasahagata*) and pursues pleasures at every turn (*tatratatrābhinandinī*). For this reason, the Buddhist goal of Nirvāṇa is referred to as the extinction of craving (*taṇhakkhaya*). Conversely, it is stated that craving begets grief (*taṇhāya jāyati soko : Dhp. v.* 216), and that eradication or extinction of craving (*taṇhakkhaya*) makes one triumph over all grief (*taṇhakkhayó sabbadukkhaṃ jināti : Dhp. v.* 354).

In the formula of Dependent Origination or *Paṭiccasamuppāda*, craving is given as the cause which leads to grasping of things of the world (*upādāna*) which in turn prolongs the life process in saṃsāra (*bhava*).

Thus, while the general corpus of Buddhist doctrine holds that craving (i. e., *taṇhā*) stands contrary to the religious aspiration of terminating the saṃsāric process, a solitary but interesting passage in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*A.* II, p. 146) states that one makes use of craving to eliminate craving (*so aparena samayena taṇhaṃ nissāya taṇhaṃ pajahati*). Evidently, in this context the term *taṇhā* is used in the sense of 'wish' or 'desire'. It is said that a Buddhist disciple on hearing that another has reached arahantship gives expression to the idea; "When will I myself attain this state of arahantship?" The text then says that making use of (this) craving he gives up craving. In this context, the term craving (*taṇhā*) seems to be unquestionably used to indicate this first glimmer of wish or desire to improve one's spiritual lot. It is undoubtedly this desire which propels him into activity. It would not be incorrect to state that there is a total absence of the word *taṇhā* in such contexts in the early Buddhist suttas. It is discreetly avoided as it was believed to stand

averse to all that was conducive to release. To refer to such desire, stimuli, and stimulated activity, the early Buddhist texts repeatedly use the following expression : "*tesaṃ dhammānaṃ sacchikiriyāya chandaṃ janeti vāyamati*: *M*. I, p. 203) : he makes up his mind and strives for the attainment of those states." The earlier and more regular use of the word *chanda* instead of *taṇhā*[1] in these contexts is to be particularly noted.

The Commentary on the above quoted passage from the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*AA*. III, p. 136) appears to be fully conscious of the unorthodox use of the term *taṇhā* therein. So the commentator is driven to see in the context two different types of *taṇhā* : 1. One of the immediate persent (*evam pavattam paccuppannataṇham*), i. e., the craving (or desire) to terminate suffering in saṃsāra and 2. the long-range *taṇhā* which begets and promotes saṃsāra (*vaṭṭamūlaka - taṇham*). The latter being the standard use of the term, the commentator asks about the former, whether it is wholesome (*kusala*) or otherwise, whether it is to be made use of (*sevitabba*) or otherwise and whether it leads to rebirth (*paṭisandhimākaḍḍhati*) or not.[2] The answer to the last question being postitively in the negative it becomes clear that this *taṇhā* is the opposite of the basic character of *taṇhā*, viz., that it leads to rebirth (*ponobhavika*). However, it is finally added that the desire for this *taṇhā* too, should definitely be got rid of (*etissā pi pana paccuppannāya sevitabbataṇhāya nikanti pajahitabbā yeva*). See DESIRE, GREED, KĀMA, TAṆHĀ.

J. D.

CREATION, THEORY OF. Among the four unthinkables (*acinteyya* : *A*. II, p. 80) mentioned by the Buddha is the contemplation and brooding over the beginning and end of the world (*loka-cintā*). This inclusion of *loka-cintā* as one of the things unprofitable for a Buddhist to undertake has given rise to the description of the Buddhist position regarding the origin of the world as being an agnostic one.

This description, however, although broadly correct, is not precise. In the instances in which the Buddha mentions speculation on the eternity or non-eternity, etc. of the universe (e.g., *Brahmajāla Sutta*, *D*. I, pp. 1–46), the reason given for the need of the Buddhist monk to refrain from these is their irrelevance to the cessation of suffering, and the evil consequences such speculation would have on the attainment of that goal. The Nikāya literature, in fact, seems to indicate that the Buddha declares the beginning of things as unthinkable, or rather as that it should not be thought about, the search being fruitless or unprofitable. In point of fact, the Buddha, in the *Pāṭika Sutta* (*D*. III, p. 28) is shown to be claiming that he 'knows the ultimate beginning of things'. Here he says, "The ultimate beginning of things I know, Bhaggava, and I know not only that, but more than that. And while I know that, do not hang on to it." Having said this, the Buddha goes on to describe the process by which the once-aqueous earth came to be inhabited by beings from the Ābhassara world,[1] the gradual multiplication of the species, the differentiation of the sexes, the division of labour and the division of castes, the origin of kingship, and the acquisition of property. All this, however, is said to begin as a result of the involution (*saṃvaṭṭa*) and evolution (*vivaṭṭa*) of the universe, which is suggested to be cyclic. This *Pāṭika Sutta* story is one of several versions of it occurring in the Nikāyas, the most elaborate and comprehensive of them being in the *Aggañña Sutta* (*D*. III, p. 80 ff.).

There is no doubt, however, that this story of genesis is brought forward in these contexts with the purpose of refuting what the Buddha considers an erroneous view held by his contemporaries, that

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1. Incidentally it is to be observed that the above reference to *taṇhā* is contained in a sermon reported to have been delivered by Ānanda to a bhikkhunī who seems to have attempted to seduce him. Thus this statement does not come to be in the category of a Buddhabhāṣita or utterance by the Buddha

2. In the Chinese Tripiṭaka, the parallel of this AṅguttaraNikāya story is found recorded in the Saṃyuktāgama 564 (Taisho, 2, p. 148, a-c). Inspite of a few differences of detail the Chinese is very similar to the Pali. The Chinese text however, is very careful in its translation of the word *taṇhā* in the two places it occurs in the Pali texts. In the first instance, where the Pali uses *taṇhā* in the sense of a stimulus (*taṇhaṃnissāya*), the Chinese text cautiously uses the term *ai*, perhaps in the general sense of *Chanda* or desire and consequently less offensive than *yu*, which seems to stand for desire with a defiling quality (—*kaṇa*). This meaning of *ai* is evident in its use, coupled with *fa* as *fai* for " love inspired by dharma " (perhaps meaning dhammacchanda. See Soothill, *A Dictionary Chinese Buddhist. Terms*, p. 355 .).

In the second instance in Pali where the reference is to *taṇhā* which is to be got rid of (*taṇhāṃ pajahati*), the Chinese reinforces *ai* with the term *yu* as *ai yu*) which, as indicated earlier has associations of *rajas* or passion. See. Soothill, ibid. p. 365a.).

The Chinese text seems to re-echo, as it were, the observations of the Pali Commentary which attempts to differentiate the use of the term in the two places.

the world was a creation of a Supreme Deity. It is clear that the origin of things was being explained at the time of the Buddha by various philosophical schools in their own various ways. The *Pāṭika Sutta* classifies the different viewpoints into four, viz., those who:

(1) maintain the world as the creation of a Supreme Deity (*Issara-kuttaṃ*);
(2) ascribe the origin of the world to a debauch of pleasure (*khiḍḍā-padūsikam*);
(3) attribute the origin of the world to a debauch of mind (*mano-padūsikam*); and
(4) declare that the world came into being by no cause (*adhicca-samuppannam*).

All these views, the Buddha contradicts. The first, *Issaranimmāna-vāda*, he says, is held by certain recluses and brahmins who describe the Supreme creator-Deity as "Brahmā, the Great Brahmā, the Supreme One, the Mighty One, the All-seeing One, the Ruler, the Lord of All, the Controller, the Creator, the Chief of All, appointing to each his place, the Ancient of Days, the Father of all that are and are to be" (*Brahmā, Mahā Brahmā, abhibhū, anabhibhūto aññadatthu-daso vasavattī issaro kattā nimmātā seṭṭho sañjitā vasī pitā bhūta-bhavyānam yena mayam bhotā Brahmunā nimmitā so nicco dhuvo sassato aviparināmadhammo sassatisa-mam tatheva ṭhassati : D.* III, p. 30). This formula, which is recurrent in several sutta descriptions of Brahmā (q.v.) indicates that the Supreme Creator whose existence the Buddha questioned was not only a cosmological God-Creator but also a teleolo-gical one who was responsible for the design and purpose of the universe, 'appointing to each his place." He is also the Almighty, the All-Com-passionate and the Everlasting God. That this last attribute was emphatically ascribed to Brahmā is also well evidenced in the *Brahmanimantanika Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 326 ff.).

In criticizing these views of a God-Creator, the Buddha brings several arguments in various contexts. In the *Kevaḍḍha Sutta* (D.I.p.218) he tells of a bhikkhu who goes from the lowest to the highest of (Buddhist) heavens, seeking in vain an answer to the question where the four elements cease, and finally asks it of Brahmā himself who admits his own ignorance. Thus, the Buddha implicitly not only refutes the omniscience of Brahmā but also shows here that the doctrine of creation held by Brahmā as well as the brahmins of his day is based on ignorance of facts. The facts are, according to the Buddha, the evolution-story given in the *Pāṭika* and *Aggañña Suttas*. The misconception of the origin of the world from Brahmā is due to the inadequate comprehension of these facts. That is the Buddha's alternative to the theory of creation.

In the *Aggañña Sutta* the Buddha also gives the mere empirical fact that brahmins are seen to be born from the womb of human mothers as argument against the theory of creation by a Deity.

Ethically, according to the Buddha, the argument against the assumption of a Creator-Deity is that it leads to Inaction (*akiriyavāda*, q.v.). If a Creator is assumed 'there is neither desire to act, necessity to act, nor effort to act' (*A.* I,p. 174). Men, in that case, become murderers or saints according to some external cause and there can be no moral responsibility. Metaphysically, the theory of a God-Creator implies, for the Buddha, that all pain in the world is caused by the Creator-Deity, who then must logically be an Evil one. "If pleasure and pain which creatures undergo" he says, "were the work of an Issara, an overlord, certainly the Jains were created by an Evil One" (*M.* II, p. 222). Logically, this would also deny the attribute of a All-Compassionateness of the Creator-Deity.

The Buddha gives an explanation based on paranormal experience of the origin of the theory of creation in men's minds. Why people assume a God-Creator, according to him, is due to the fact of their imperfect retrospection of past births. That they can see only upto a certain point in their past births is the reason that those who assume an Issara-creation or Brahma-creation assume so. They can see no further than their existence in the Ābhassara world, from whence the first Brahmā came down to inhabit the lower world, on the commencement of its new phase of evolution even as those who attribute the origin of things to no cause (*adhicca-samuppanna*) do so, because they can see no further than their state of unconscious existence as Asaññasatta devas.

It is thus evident that, with regard to the creation of the world by a Supreme Deity, the Buddha is by no means vague in his rejection of the theory as was known in his time.

B.J.

1. What is probably meant here is the first peopling of the earth, which was assumed to be the beginning of the world. The denizens of the *khiddāpadūsika* and *manopadūsika* heavens were believed to have fallen from their heavenly state and to be born on the earth, where by retrocognition they see thier previous state of existence and conclude that their fall from that state was due to their debauchery, in pleasure in the former case and in mind in the latter. The Buddha points out that these beliefs are due to two errors, one retroco ition on the part of these traditional schools who could see no further than their previous existence and the other of their generalization on particulars that what is true of one is of all.

CREMATION. See DEAD, THE DISPOSAL OF THE—

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT. In view of the absence of any systematic treatment of this subject in Buddhist texts bringing out its legal import, the present article intends culling whatever information is available and deducing from them the general Buddhist point of view on it.

As the Nikāyas are predominantly concerned with doctrinal and philosophical problems, the concept of crime and punishment is treated in them only as a peripheral subject. Such peripheral subjects are discussed in so far as they are related to and are pertinent to particular doctrinal topics treated elaborately therein. Therefore, one does not find a strictly legal treatment of this subject in the Nikāyas.

The *Jātaka* contains some material that directly pertains to this subject. Yet, being popular and evangelistic in purpose and literary in style, it makes no pretensions to discuss this subject in depth. Besides, many Jātaka stories have nothing particularly Buddhistic in them, and as such cannot be cited as concrete evidence to establish the Buddhist point of view. The lateness of the *Jātaka*, too, preclude it from being considered a basic source of information regarding the early Buddhist point of view on crime and punishment.

Later Buddhist literature including the commentaries and such works as the *Milindapañha* contain a wealth of information. As these belong to a much later period references found in them cannot be used indiscriminately to substantiate the early Buddhist point of view. In view of these facts, whatever references found in the Nikāyas are used as the basic source of information regarding the early Buddhist attitude to crime and punishment. The *Jātaka* and later literature are used mainly when references found in them are corroborated by evidence from the Nikāya literature.

According to the modern definition, crime is an anti-social act, a failure or a refusal to live up to the standards of conduct deemed binding by the rest of the community, some act or omission in respect of which legal punishment may be inflicted on the person who is in default whether by acting or omitting to act (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, s.v. CRIME. This definition while illustrating the complex nature of the subject indicates, also, the correlation of crime and punishment. To what extent does the Buddhist point of view on this concept agree or disagree with this modern definition? What exactly is the Buddhist attitude to the concept of crime and punishment?

As this subject is treated on a non-technical and non-legal level in the Nikāyas, direct answers to the above two questions are not found in them. The terms used in discussing this concept are also not in strict conformity with the legal sense of the term crime. Numerous terms such as *accaya* (*Vin.* I, p. 315), *vajja* (*A.* I, p. 47) and *aparādha* (*J.* I, p. 264 ; III, p. 394) along with their derivatives do occur to denote crime. Quite often the phrase *pāpakāni kammāni* (unethical deeds : *A.* I, p. 48) is used to refer to criminal acts.

These terms and phrases indicate that Buddhism considers crime basically as an ethical problem. This surmise is supported by evidence gleaned from references scattered in the Nikāyas. Adopting a rather broad outlook Buddhism assigns all criminal acts to the general category of ethically bad deeds (*dukkaṭa*, *adhamma*, *pāpa*, *akusala*). Thus, whatever deed that is unethical, unwholesome, that goes against either the social law or even the cosmic law (*dhamma*) is, in a very broad sense, a crime. Though not approached from a legal angle, crimes against society, specially those against the security of one's person and property stood utterly condemned on moral and ethical grounds.

According to Buddhism deeds are of three types' viz., activities through body (*kāya-kamma*), speech (*vacī-kamma*) and thought (*mano-kamma*). Of these three types the most important are the mental activities, for these always underlie the other two (*M.* I, p. 373ff). Buddhism considers the mind to be the forerunner of everything[1]. The definition of *kamma* in early Buddhist texts also proves this point. Defining *kamma* the Buddha says, "volition, monks, I declare, is *kamma*. Having willed one acts through body, speech and mind".[2] Thus, volition, intention or will (*cetanā*) becomes an important factor in deciding the ethical value of any deed (See CETANĀ). In the *Ambalaṭṭhikā Rāhulovāda Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 414 ff.) the Buddha gives another very important criterion which has to be employed when judging the ethical value of any act. Therein it is laid down that an ethically good deed (*kusala*) would condoce niąher to the detriment of oneself, of another (*parabyābādhāya*)nor

1. *Manopubbangamā dhammā manoseṭṭhā manomayā manasāto.....(Dhp. v. 1)*
2. *A.* III, p 415.

to the detriment of both (*ubhayabyābādhāya*). All acts which do not reach up to this standard are regarded as unwholesome (*akusala*). This sutta also makes it clear that Buddhism attaches importance to the moral responsibility of an individual not only as far as it affects his own well-being but also to the extent it affects the well-being of the others and consequently the well-being and progress of the society as a whole.

This position is further elucidated in the *Cakkavattisīhanāda Sutta* (*D.* III, p. 58 ff.). Also, this latter sutta makes it quite clear that according to the Buddhist point of view not only the deliberate acts of breaking the accepted law but even individual failings such as idle talk, wanton greed and sexual, perversion are also considered crimes, for these acts, too, though not directly harming others, indirectly damage the fabric of the society's well-being and eventually bring about its complete ruin.

On these evidence it appears permissible to make a general deduction that any intentional breaking of the precepts[3] or the accepted norm or any act intended to harm either oneself or others, both oneself and others broadly amounts to commission of a crime. A large number of such unethical acts are enumerated in suttas such as *Vasala*, *Parābhava*, *Mahāmaṅgala* and *Āmagandha* all occuring in the *Suttanipāta*. The *Petavatthu* also cites numerous such crimes.

However, it should be born in mind that Buddhism by adopting this broad ethical standpoint has not completely overlooked the legal aspect of the problem of crime. This is clear from the fact that though all crimes are categorised as ethically bad deeds, all such deeds are not considered legally punishable. Evidence from the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (I, p. 47) further establishes this point. Therein ethically bad deeds (*vajja*) are sub-divided into two categories; (i) those which have results in this very life (*diṭṭhadhamma-vedanīya-vajja*) and, (ii) those which have results in some future life (*sāmparāyika-vajja*). Contextual evidence indicates that the first category specifically refers to legally punishable crimes. The term *daṇḍa* in the sense of punishment, and specifically in the sense of punishment for crimes committed is often found in the Nikāyas. (*M.* II, p. 88)[4] All this evidence points to the fact that according to Buddhism legally punishability is the one factor that turned any ethically bad act into a crime.

Prevalence of crime in society and effective deterrent punishments for the eradication of crime as a social menace is referred to in the suttas of the Pāli Nikāyas. It is evident from some suttas that Buddhism takes effective note of this. The *Cakkavattisīhanāda Sutta* (*D.* III, p. 58, ff.) which makes an attempt to trace the origin of crime clearly brings out this aspect. This sutta suggests that the origin of crimes could be traced to economic causes. Though not considered the ultimate cause it is viewed as the most palpable, the immediate cause which leads to a chain reaction. Therein it is said, "Thus from goods not being bestowed on the destitute poverty grew rife; from poverty growing rife stealing increased, from the spread of stealing violence grew apace, from growth of violence the destruction of life became common, from frequency of murder lying.....evil speaking, immorality .....incest ..... wanton greed..... and perverted lust grew apace" (*D.* III, p. 70 ff.) Class-rivalry and class-hatred is also viewed as another cause of crime in society (ibid. D.III, p. 69). However, this sutta itself suggests that beyond these causes is another one. This is the failure on the part of the ruler to live up to the expected norm (*dhamma*). Once again this indicates the extent to which the exemplary moral character of the leaders influence the well-being of the society as a whole.

In the *Aggañña Sutta* (*D.* III, p. 80 ff.), too, the economic cause is given as the most palpable one and beyond this is the wanton greed (*taṇhā*) of the individual. This sutta attempts to pinpoint *taṇhā* as the primary cause of all crime. From this it becomes clear that Buddhism considers criminality not merely as the result of economic need but also of psychological conditioning (cf. *Miln.* p. 220).

From the foregoing account, based on material gleaned from early Buddhist sources, it is apparent that according to the Buddhist view crime is a very complex problem rooted in socio-economic and psychological causes.

What are the measures approved and adopted by Buddhism to solve this problem?

There is not even a hint in Buddhist literature to the effect that the Buddha ever attempted to evolve a new system of justice based purely on

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3. These precepts are categorised as *pañcasīla* and *dasasīla* or *dasasikkhāpada*. Cf. *Miln.* p. 290.

4. On *Vajja* see *Ps.* I, p. 122 where it is defined as *sabbe kilesā vajjā, [sabbe duccaritā vajjā, sabbā abhisaṅkhārā vajj]ā, sabbabhavagāmikammā vajjā.*

Cf. also terms *daṇḍappatta* (convicted) and *daṇḍāraha* (deserving punishment) used in the *Jātaka* and later Buddhist texts to denote a criminal.

Buddhist principles. The Buddha did not concern himself very much over the judicial system prevailing at the time. There is no denying the fact that in the 6th century B.C. India had a judicial system and that this was nothing other than the traditions and precedents handed down from earlier times (*See Vedic Index of Names and Subjects*, Keith and Macdonell, s.v. Dharma, Dharman). Whatever innovations or modifications that took place in the prevailing system was, also, due to the social and ethical philosophy of Buddhism.[5]

The Buddhist texts themselves bear evidence to the existence of a judicial tradition. The king being the best among men (*Vin.* I, p. 246; *Sn. v.* 568) was regarded as the fountain head of justice.[6] Very often the king delegated his powers to *vohārikamahāmattas* (*Vin.* I, p. 74; II, p. 158; III, p. 45). These officers heard law-suits, a function originally carried out by the king himself. (*Vin.* IV, p. 223 f; *J.* II, p. 417; *D.* III, p. 63). Neither the king nor his officers dispensed justice at their whim and fancy (cf. *M.* II, p. 88; *A.* II, p. 240 f; *Miln.* pp. 193, 290). Though a comprehensive penal code as such was absent, the existence of traditions and precedents is obvious. The *Jātaka* (V, p. 125) makes reference to actual writing of the law. It is also said that cases should be decided by observing the rules laid down in the book of law (*J.* III, p. 292).

Theft and adultery appear to have been among the common crimes. The *Dhammapada* (*v.* 310) says that one should not commit adultery because the kings impose severe punishment on those found guilty of such crimes (cf. *J.* II, p. 309; V., p. 444). Numerous other crimes from murder to defamation are referred to in Buddhist texts.[7]

Nikāyas make references to numerous kinds of punishment. Thus, the *Aṇguttara Nikāya* (I. p. 47f.; II, p. 122) contains a long list of punishments (cf. also *D.* I, p. 98; III, p. 67; *M.* II, p. 88; *S.* II, p. 100). The *Jātaka* and the *Milindapañha* (pp. 197, 290 ff.) also make reference to varied types of punishment. Yet, it is doubtful whether many of these atrocious punishments were in vogue at the time of the rise of Buddhism. Buddhist literature does not contain specific references to kings or their officers ordering many of these tortures on criminals.

The Buddhist attitude to the problem of crime and punishment suggests that the imposing of such atrocious punishments on criminals may not have been endorsed by the Buddha. The *Aggañña Sutta* as well as the *Cakkavattisīhanāda Sutta* indicates that Buddhism has taken note of the fact that punishment was conceived by the society as a deterrent measure and ultimately as the only solution to the problem of crime. The publicity given to the actual act of meeting out these punishments show that the society considered punishment as an effective deterrent measure (*D.* III p. 67). Punishment was considered not only as being deterrent but also as being compensatory (*M.* II, p. 88). While granting it a certain amount of efficacy as a deterrent measure (cf. *A.* II, p. 241), Buddhism does not consider it an effective corrective measure, and as such it is not regarded as the solution to the problem of crime. This is the Buddhist attitude to all types of punishments in relation to crimes.

Firstly, it is illustrated in the *Cakkavattisīhanāda Sutta* itself that deterrent punishment is not a fool-proof method of preventing crime. Secondly, it is suggested that fear of punishment being the sole motive for the non-commission of crimes it is not only ineffective where there is no such fear as when devices can be found to avoid punishment, but it also does not conduce to the well-being of the individual concerned and eventually to the progress of the society.

Buddhism regards punishment only as a half-measure solution to the complex problem of crime. Knowing its somewhat effective deterrent nature, Buddhism does not completely denounce the use of punishment (*A.* II, p. 241; *Dhp. v.* 310). It endorses the attempts made by the secular authorities to prevent crime and rehabilitate criminals, e.g., by providing them their individual and social needs. The Cakkavattirājā is expected to adopt effective safeguards against crimes in his

5. For example Buddhism which did not uphold the traditional caste system may have been largely instrumental in evolving the concept of equity of justice. The Buddhist view upheld the fact that the social position did not provide any immunity from punishment (*M.*II, p. 88; cf. *ERE.* IV, pp. 283, 285). The influence of Buddhism on crime and punishment is seen, to an extent, during the reign Asoka. The appointment of officers called *Dharmamahāmātra* and the duties assigned to them show the sobering effect Buddhism seems to have had on the prevailing system of justice (see Radhakumud Mookerji, *Asoka*, London, 1982, pp. 218–220, 238; cf. also Pillar Edict IV). The fact that the judges also required to look into the mental state of the criminal, too,, suggests Buddhist influence (*Miln.* p. 221).

6. See *Cakkavattisīhanāda Sutta* (*D.* III, p. 58 ff.).

7. The frequenet occurrence of the term *coro guṭāri* which generally denoted a criminal, and also the term *aticariyā* which literally meant transgression but was extended to mean adultery or any crime indicate that these were two of the commonest crimes. (cf. *M.* II, p. 88).

kingdom (*D.* III, p. 61 ; *DA.* III, p. 850). This is made quite clear by the advice given by King Dalhanemi to his son who had been newly annointed as his successor (*D.* III, p. 61 ff.). In the *Kūṭadanta Sutta* (*D.* I, p. 134) it is said that before the ruler thinks of sacrifice to the gods he should think of his duty to the people. Buddhism seems to be aware, also of the fact that these preliminary measures prepare the ground for religion to operate more effectively in solving the problem of crime.

Being highly ethical in its purpose, Buddhism, while aiming at the general well-being of the individual and the society by no means loses sight of its final spiritual ideal. Therefore, it aims not at mere repression but at complete eradication of all causes that lead to unethical behaviour and commission of crimes.

Buddhism teaches that all unethical deeds, into which category all crimes too belong, are motivated either by greed (*lobha, taṇhā* or *rāga*), hatred (*dosa, vyāpāda* or *paṭigha*) and delusion (*moha* or *avijjā*) which spring from ego-consciousness (*asmimāna, ahaṃkāra, mamiṃkāra, mānānusaya*). Whatever deeds performed under the motivation of these root-causes of unethical deeds (*akusala-mūla*) are grouped in the broad category of *adhamma, pāpa* or *akusala*. And of these, such deliberate acts that become legally punishable are regarded as crimes.

These psychological tendencies that lead to unethical behaviour are acquired and nurtured during many a life-time. These tendencies persist in latent form in varying degrees in all people (*See* ANUSAYA). That is why almost everyone, at one time or another, tends to behave in an unethical manner. When influenced by economic, environmental or any other force of circumstance these latent tendencies come to the forefront and begin to activate, leading the individual to criminality.

By going deep into the problem of crime Buddhism adopts a very methodical treatment to eradicate the criminal tendencies in the individual. Primarily, it offers advice to counter-act the more palpable causes that lead to criminality. Thus it, praises living in suitable localities (*paṭirūpadesa-vāsa, Sn. v.* 260 ; *D.* III, p. 276) that conduces to ethical living ; extols association of sincere and wise friends (*kalyāṇamitta*)[8] ; lays down a code of ethics for laymen to organise their lives.[9]

Buddhism teaches not only the negative aspect of non-performance of unethical deeds but teaches also the positive aspect of performance of ethical deeds.[10] This positive approach greatly helps to eradicate unethical tendencies and develop in their place more wholesome ones. Thus, while establishing an individual in discipline (*sīla*) a serious attempt is made to give him a thorough Buddhist training (*sikkhā*, q.v.). This training helps an individual to eradicate gradually all unethical tendencies, even those that are latent, and attain the final spiritual ideal.

Thus, the Buddhist solution to crime is to bring about a complete change of character, a revolution in values and attitudes and to lead the criminal into a new life from which he never falls back. That this solution has been proved successful is seen from the case of Aṅgulimāla (q.v., *M.* II, p. 97 ff.). With regard to breaches in monastic discipline and consequent punishment : See DAṆḌAKAMMA and DISCIPLINE.

S.K.N.

CRITICISM is defined as the process of passing (especially unfavourable) judgement upon the qualities of anything. This immediately implies the existence and the acceptance of norms and standards. Early Buddhism, with its all-pervading theory of conditioned origination or *idappaccayatā* and its relentless rejection of a theory of grace or divine favour has as its mainstay scales of uncompromising values relating to different areas like monasticism and mind culture in terms of which the adequacy and efficiency of every religious venture is judged. Comments on the non-conformity to such standards or drawing attention to the falling away from them thus forms the core of the process of criticism in Buddhism. Criticism is seen to operate more in relation to the life of the monk whose life is regulated in terms of specific injunctions and legislation than that of the layman. In fact, it is said of the entire monastic community in Buddhism that it is built up on the principle of

8. See s.v. FRIENDSHIP.

9. The *Siṅgālovāda Sutta* is very important in this connection. So are the *Mahāmaṅgala Sutta* and *Parābhava Sutta* of the *Suttanipāta*.

10. cf. Dh.p. v. 183 : *Sabbapāpassa akaraṇaṃ.*
kusalassa upasampadā
sacittapariyodapanaṃ
etaṃ buddhāna sāsanaṃ

mutual comment or criticism and mutual correction (*evaṃ saṃvaddhā hi tassa bhagavato pārisā yad idaṃ aññamaññavacanena aññamaññavuṭṭhāpanena nāti: Vin.* III, p. 178)..

One who allows himself to be corrected thus is described as being *vacanīya* or 'one who could be spoken to', i.e., amenable to criticism (*vacanīyomhi āyasmantehi'ti : M.* I, p. 5). On the other-hand, one who resists correction or criticism is said to 'make himself unspeakable' (*attānaṃ avacanīyaṃ karoti : Vin.* III, p. 178). In fact, the *Vinaya* does legislate against the Buddhist monks adopting such an attitude (loc. cit.). It is stigmatized as 'not accepting instructions respectfully' (*appadakkhiṇaggāhī anusāsaniṃ : M.* I, p. 95).

A statement from the *Sutta Piṭaka* corroborates this. 'Let the venerable ones speak to (i.e., exhort and instruct) me, I should be spoken to by the venerable ones,' says the *Anumāna Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 95). The usefulness of this process of healthy criticism, both to the monk and layman, is again emphasized in the *Dhammapada*. 'Should one see a wise man, who, like a revealer of treasure, points out faults and reproves, let one associate with such a wise person ; it will be better, not worse, for him who associates with such a one' (*Dhp. v.* 76). This shows that even as far as the life of the layman was concerned, sub-standard behaviour did not go uncriticised. In these contexts, words like *upavāda* and *anuvāda* (*A.* II, p. 121) are used to convey the idea of criticism. *Parābhava Sutta* and *Vasala Sutta* of the *Suttanipāta* (*Sn.* pp. 18–20 and 21–25) provide the required norms, in certain specified areas, for such criticism. The following statement, also from the *Suttanipāta* (*Sn. v.* 145) offers an overall criterion for both monk and layman :

> 'and let him never stoop
> to conduct mean or low
> evoking grave rebuke.'

Closely associated with the idea of criticism in Buddhism is the basic critical attitude adopted by the Buddha himself and recommended by him to the disciples as a guiding principle in the pursuit of their religious life. The oft-quoted *Kālāma Sutta*, presented as a charter for free and independent thinking, rejects mere authority as a basis of belief and acceptance. Calling upon the Kālāmas to ascertain for themselves the truth of their beliefs (*attanā'va jāneyyātha : A.* I, p. 189) it is insisted on that they discard their reliance on tradition and authority (*mā anussavena mā paramparāya :* loc. cit.) or their personal dedication to a teacher whom they hold in affection and esteem (*mā samaṇo no garū'ti :* loc. cit.).

In relation to contemporaneous religious thought and practices too, the Buddha himself adopted this critical attitude. In the *Brahmajāla Sutta* he examines and criticizes the different views held about the soul and the world and rules them out as being untenable. This, in fact, is the theme that runs through the entire teaching of the Buddha, relating to all areas of belief. The *Duṭṭhaṭṭhaka Sutta* of the *Suttanipāta* succinctly expresses it as follows :

> As rooted prejudice
> is hard to quell, man
> should test ideas he holds. (*H.O.S.* xxxvii, p. 189, *v.*785)
>
> *Diṭṭhinivesā na hi svātivattā*
> *dhammesu niccheyya samuggahītaṃ* (*Sn. v.* 785).

J.D.

CROWNED BUDDHA is a term used to denote a particular type of Buddha image found in later (post-classical) iconography of the Buddhists. Scholars have sometimes preferred to use the term 'Bejewelled Buddha' in reference to this particular type of image but this later identification could not be wholly justified in view of the dearth of documentary evidence that would prove the affinity between the so-called 'Crowned Buddha' images and other types that are being referred to as 'Bejewelled Buddhas'.

At the beginning (cir. 3rd century A.C.) there was an attempt to crown the Buddha (in iconographic representations) at the moment of his attaining Enlightenment (*sambodhi*). According to tradition it is believed that the Buddha has gained supremacy over both mundane and supramundane realms from the very moment of his attaining *sambodhi*. Hence the epithet Dharmarāja—which is in opposition to the term Cakravartin (universal ruler).

Probably, in pursuance of the above concept the earliest representations of the Buddha being crowned are available from Kārlī and Ajaṇṭā sculptures. In these sculptures devas are shown hovering above the Buddha and holding a crown above his head. The Buddha is shown in the earlier Kārlī reliefs in the attitude of preaching the Dharma (*Dharmacakra mudrā*). In the Ajaṇṭā sculptures it is a standing figure of the Buddha that is being crowned. In like sculptures of the same early phase from the

same milieu are found Buddha being garlanded by gods hovering in the sky. In these instances the great sage (Mehāmuni) is shown as if he is about to be crowned or garlanded.

Thus, the theme that has been originated in the post-Christian era by the artists who have been patronised by the early Mahāyānists, has gained currency during the advanced phase of the Mahāyāna period in later centuries under the famous eastern Indian Buddhist rulers who go by their dynastic name *Pāla-Sena*.

It is in the art of this period (8th to 10th century A. C.) that the above theme has attained its final perfection to be copied by the neighbouring Burmese and Siamese artists in subsequent times. An elegent Fāla image of a standing Crowned Buddha is found in the inner sanctum of the top most tier of the famous Buddhagayā temple . The sanctum just below this, on the ground floor, depicts the Buddha seated in the *Bhūmisparśamudrā* (s.v.). It could be said that architects have installed the two images in their appropriate alcoves, the one on the ground floor depicting the Buddha on the verge of attaining *sambodhi* while the one above this sanctum, showing the Buddha standing and wearing a crown, a symbolic representation of the great achievement that is the attainment of Buddhahood.

A recent study of of 'Crowned Buddhas' tends to evoke much controversy on the subject as any Mahāyāna contribution towards the formation of this particular type of Buddha image has been categorically denied in this analysis, o wit "Thus the Crowned Buddha images do not represent any particular school of Buddhism. These were a natural product of the evolution of Buddha's sovereignty" (Y. Krishan, 'Origin of the Crowned Buddha Image,' *EW*. ISMEO, Rome, Vol. 21, Nos 1-2 for 1971, p. 96).

Y. Krishan has not observed that from the earliest phase when the iconography of the 'Crowned Buddha' was being formed the type was found when and where Mahāyāna prevailed and predominated over Theravāda.

In Fondukistan (B. Rowland, *Art and Architecture of India*, Harmondsworth, 1954, p. 103, PI. 62 A.), at Ajaṇṭā (*EW*. op. cit. Fig. I) at Kārlī (op. cit. Fig. 3) it was the Mahāyāna sculptors' art that produced these aberrant types that have been taken as the prototype of the '*Crowned Buddha Image*'. The particular rock-cut edifices at Ajaṇṭā and Kārlī were the products of the Mahāyāna phase of Buddhist art and as such the exuberant carvings in them were related in some way or other to the legends and narratives of the Mahāyāna texts. No emphasis is needed as to the school that produced Buddhist art in Fondukistan, as it is now generally accepted that it was the Mahāyāna school of art that had prevailed in this part which was once part of the famous Gandhāra region.

It was in the Bihar or Bengal school of Buddhism, that the iconography of the 'Crowned Buddha' fully developed. Here again the provenance speak of the affiliation to Mahāyāna. The available types of later origin both within India as well as in south east Asian countries are all related to the school of Bengal Buddhist art of the Pāla and Sena dynasties, in some way or other (*The Way of the Buddha*, Government of India, 1956, p. 29, fig. 6. from Bengal; p. 66 fig. 69 from Bihar; p. 195, fig. 16 from Bihar ; in both p. 66, fig. 69 f. p. 195 fig. 16 there is a double *vajra* carved on the seat *āsana* and the chief figure is in *Bhūmisparśa-mudrā* B. Rowland, op. cit. p. 103. See further, R. Chanda *Mediaeval Indian Sculpture in the British Museum*: London, 1936, PI. XIV, 'Crowned Buddha' in the earth touching attitude).

Benjamin Rowland remarks in regard tot hese Buddha image types, that 'this can best be explained as part of the process of the Buddha's deification in Mahāyāna Buddhism (op. cit. p. 146). Ananda Coomaraswamy, a pioneer critic of Buddhist art, in explaining the 'Crowned Buddha' type has identified it with the *Sambhogakāya* aspect of the Mahāyāna *Trikāya* doctrine. This identification seems most tenable (See A. K. Coomaraswamy, *JRAS*. 1928, p. 835 f.). Another early writer had likewise identified the 'Crowned Buddha' with the Primordial Buddha concept as found in the Mahāyāna, viz., the Ādi-Buddha (N. G. Mazumdar, *Annual Report of Varenda Research Society*, Rajsahi, 1926-27, quoted by A. K. Coomaraswamy, op. cit. p. 837).

The fact that this particular type appeared in the Theravāda Buddhist lands (e.g., Cambodia, Laos Burma, Siam) in the post-classical period could not be taken as a proof that it owes nothing to Mahāyāna (But see J. Krishan, op. cit. p. 93). None of the quoted examples of 'Crowned Buddhas' in the Theravāda field are dated before the 12th or 13th century A.C. at the earliest (e.g. M. Giteau, *Khmer Sculpture and the Angkor Civilization*, London, 1965 pp. 112, 145, 179, 182 for Cambodia; B. Ph. Groslier, *Indo-China*, Art of the World Series, London, 1962, p. 200, Pls. in p. 169 and in p. 225 from Laos; D. Seckel, *Art of Buddhism*, Art of the

World Series, London, 1964, Pl. 18, Pl. 19, from Siam; A. B. Griswold, *Towards a History of Sukhodaya Art*, Bangkok, 1976, fig. 68 A, 68 B, from Siam; R. Le May, *A Concise History of Buddhist Art in Siam*, Cambridge, 1938, pp. 76 from Siam; *Burma, Korea and Tibet*, Art of the World Series; Methuen, London, 1964, ed. A. B. Griswold, Ch. Kim, and P. H. Pott, p. 10, from Burma; see further Ph. Rawson, *The Art of South-East Asia* London, 1967, fig. 140). In support of the view that the 'Crowned Buddhas' were not dissociated from the Theravāda fold, Y. Krishan states, *inter alia* "If the Crowned and Bejewelled Buddha was really a product of Mahāyāna Buddhism, there is no reason why it could not be excluded from the Theravāda art tradition, when the representation of other dominating Bodhisattvas of Mahāyāna was eschewed" (op. cit. p. 5). The above argument is basically unfounded in view of the innumerable Mahāyāna and other divine cults that have crept into Theravāda Buddhism. In Theravāda countries like Sri Lanka, the tendency to absorb Mahāyāna divine concepts was very much earlier, but the syncreticism thus resulted in the process of absorption of Mahāyāna divinities was so confused that in the subsequent centuries, especially after the early centuries of Buddhism, most of the original Mahāyāna cults and forms of worship came to be regarded as belonging to the Theravāda.

This is clearly manifest in the cult of Avalokiteśvara, the all embracing Mahāyāna Bodhisattva that ramified into Nātha, Maitreya and other cults and finally has been absorbed into the fold of Theravāda cult worship (See. A. D. T. E. Perera, 'The evolution of a great Bodhisattva cult in Ceylon,' *The Buddhist*, Vol. xlii, No. I or 1971, pp. 18–20 Id; *EW*. op. cit. p. 142, note 68).

Both on analogical and art historical grounds, it is not impossible to locate the origin of the 'Crowned Buddha' in Mahāyāna, although it manifested itself in the Theravāda field of Buddhist art, also.

A.D.T.E.P.

CŪḶAVAṂSA. See MAHĀVAṂSA.

CULLANIDDESA. See NIDDESA.

CULLA-VAGGA, 'lesser section', consisting of twelve chapters (*khandhakas*), is the second book of the *Khandhaka* collection which belongs to the *Vinaya Piṭaka* its first book being the *Mahāvagga* or the 'greater section'.

The first nine chapters deal with the disciplinary proceedings in lesser matters with various atonements and penances, the adjustment of disputes among the monks, the daily life of monks, their dwellings and furnishing of dwellings, duties of monks towards one another and the exclusion from the *Pātimokkha* ceremony. The tenth chapter is devoted to the affairs of the nuns.

The offences dealt with in the *Cullavagga*, like those in the *Mahāvagga*, are named *dukkaṭa* (q.v.) and *thullaccaya* (q.v.), the nomenclature of the more legalised *Pātimokkha* not being taken over to the *Khandhakas*. Like in the *Suttavibhaṅga*, the promulgation of the rules is generally preceded by a history of the occasion on which the Buddha was supposed to have made them.

A number of 'Acts of the Order' (*saṅghakamma* q.v.) such as the Act of Censure (*tajjaniya*), the Act of Bainshment (*pabbājaniya kamma*), the Act of Reconcilliation (*paṭisāraṅiya kamma*), the Act of Suspension (*ukkhepaniya kamma*), etc., too, are to be found in the *Cullavagga*.

The last two chapters, in which the story of the first two councils (*saṃgīti*) of Rājagaha and Vesāli is told, are apparently a continuation of the story which had its start in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* of the *Digha Nikāya*. This accords well with the first chapter of the *Mahāvagga* with which the *Khandhakas* begin, tracing the history of the evolution of the Buddhist monastic Order, from the Enlightenment of the Buddha to the ordination of the would-be chief disciples, Sāriputta and Moggallāna. See VINAYA PIṬAKA.

UPALI KARUNARATNA

CULTURE. In the religious discipline of Buddhism, the concept of culture for which the Pali word used is *bhāvanā*, basically stands for development, reform and improvement of the human personality, to the point of elimination of the failings and frailties of the mundane life. It must be stated at the very outset that this refinement of character is its area of primary relevance, whatever else may come in the wake of culture that benefits the individual or enhances the glory of the community to which he or she belongs. It will be seen that this concept of culture of the Buddhist covers the development of both the body and the mind, for Buddhism accepts and

affirms the interdependence of body and mind not only in the biological phenomenon resulting in what is referred to as life (*D.* II, p. 63), but also in the regulation of the mental life of the human being so evolved (ibid., p. 290 f. See also *M.* I, p. 237ff.). In the teachings of the Buddha, the life process of man is explained without postulating the presence of an extraneous element, soul or ātman, extraneous to the extent that it is not affected by the vicissitudes of life, although such an element is believed in other creeds to play the major role of piloting an individual life and giving it identity and distinctness. Such a theory of self or soul is rejected in Buddhism.

In life that has come to be and of which the Buddhist comprehensively takes note (*S.* II, p. 10), one encounters the regular physical processes of growth and decay (*jāyati ca jīyati ca mīyati ca:* ibid). In addition to these, life of man proceeds and perpetuates itself on the basis of sensory activity and its consequent responses (*saṅkhāra*) which extend to the mental plane. This is what is repeatedly expressed in the chain of Causal Genesis or Dependent Origination in the expressions *saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇaṃ* as well as *vedanāpaccayā taṇhā..upādānaṃ..bhavo:* ibid). This gathering of *saṅkhāra* or *upādāna* is the continuous process of 'fuelling of life' which takes place while the wheels of life keep rolling on (see *M.* I, p. 389 ff). Happiness and unhappiness in life and in the life-after are pointed out to be dependent on this. Hence the concept of culture defined so far has both a meaning and validity to the Buddhist in that he can thereby put his body and mind on a new gear, or can make it function in a new way so as to reduce and eliminate the stresses and strains, the conflicts and contradictions in one's life which bring unhappiness and lead to unsatisfactory situations. In this sense the Buddha is referred to as having reached the highest point in the culture of body and mind: *bhāvitakāyo ca bhāvitacitto ca* (*M.* I. p. 240). In consonance with this it never did happen in the life of the recluse Gotama that from the time he shaved his head and beard and donned the dyed robes, neither a pleasurable feeling nor a painful one arising within him overpowered his mind.

What is indicated in Buddhism is that emotional disturbances resulting from elation on account of pleasurable feelings (*sukhā vedanā*) or dejection through painful ones (*dukkhā vedanā*) could be avoided through a proper culture of the body and the mind respectively. This is the primary and fundamental concept of culture in Buddhism. Pleasurable feelings are said to overpower the mind owing to a lack of culture of the body (*kāyabhāvanā*). On the otherhand, it is the cultivation of the mind (*cittabhāvanā*) that is recommended to keep painful ones from overpowering the mind. The vast majority of pleasurable feelings being derived through the five external sense organs and being responses to the stimuli upon the physical body, the Buddhist looks up to a culture of the body (primarily implied in concepts like *indriyasaṃvara* q. v. and *indriyabhāvanā* referred to below) to enable him to react with discrimination and judgement. Thus, one learns to avoid being over-elated or over-stimulated and consequently being put out of balance.

In the case of pleasurable feelings as far as the Buddhists are concerned, there seems to be nothing objectionable in the physical or the derivatively mental comforts they provide (*M.* I. p. 247), so long as they are free from lustful and evil associations (*aññatra kāmehi aññatra akusalehi dhammehi:* ibid.). But the complexity of the possible emotional responses to such feelings exposes the subject to danger (ibid. pp. 266, 270). Cognitive and social factors on the different contexts which often exaggerate the pleasures associated with them tend to produce in the subject involved warped and distorted reactions like attachment and aggression. A physiological disciplining (*kāyabhāvanā*) at this stage, which no doubt would be directed through the mind, is believed to be capable of modifying the emotional reactions. This is looked upon as the proper tuning of two complementary components to work as one single unit. One is thus not overpowered by emotions. Not being over-elated one avoids being excessively attached. Consequently, one is not thrown into confusion with regard to one's values, values which are specific to one's own creed. Thus, in the presence of pleasurable feelings one is steadfast and sensibly moderate in responding to and indulging in them. Subject as they are to the laws of change and impermanence, these pleasurable feelings cease to be and their loss causes pain of mind (*D.* II. p. 118f.). The inability to reckon with their natural and inevitable breakdown brings about grief and lamentation. It is to safeguard against such unpleasant states that one needs the culture or cultivation of the mind (*cittabhāvanā*). Both these forms of *bhāvanā* or culture which are calculated to bring about a state of equanimity or *upekkhā* in the face of disturbing emotions of pleasure or pain are dealt with under the concept of *indriyabhāvanā* or culture of sense-faculties in a sutta by that name (*M.* III, 298 ff.).

There is also the concept of culture which 'posits a definite relation between that complex whole of meanings and values acquired by man as a member of society and particular types of social and economic institutions.' It then transpires that 'culture inevitably includes the material organization of life and cannot be confined to the area of meanings and values.'[1]

This concept of 'material organization of life' as a basic ingredient of culture referred to above is evidently contained well within what might broadly be termed the culture of Buddhism. For it is to be noted that closely associated with the concept of *dukkha* or unsatisfactoriness in life, eradication of which is the major theme of Buddhism, are its opposites, namely comfort, happiness and security. And it goes without saying that 'material organization of life' in whatever context it occurs, must necessarily be geared to contribute to the attainment of these benefits at the worldly level. Hence we find in the economic planning in Buddhism the oft-recurring concept of both the need and the capacity through economic development to bring comfort and joy (*sukheti pīṇeti sammā sukhaṃ pariharati : A.* III, p. 45) to the total membership of society which includes the individual (*attānaṃ*) the family (*puttadāra*), the extended family which accomodates the parents (*mātāpitaro*), friends and relatives (*mittāmacce*) and all others who render service in divers ways (*dāsakammakāraporise :* ibid.). Food, clothing and shelter (*ghāsacchādana*) at relative and reasonable levels of satisfaction, freedom from disease, of both body and mind (*ārogyā paramā lābhā*), minimum stress and strain about the morrow, i.e., adequate means to eke out an existence (note the absence of this provision being highlighted in Buddhist texts as a possible cause of crime in society : *Saccam kira tvaṃ ambho purisa paresaṃ adinnaṃ theyyasaṃkhātam ādiyasi. Saccaṃ devā ti.. Kiṃ kāraṇā ti. Na hi deva jīvāmī ti : D.* III, p. 65). These pre-requisites have to be sought and found, both through individual and institutional effort, to foster the pursuit of higher ideals.

It is at this point that Buddhism, with its primarily transcendental aspirations and its uncompromising value-systems consequently acquired, steps in to organize material life of man 'for the good of many and welfare of many' (*bahujanahitāya bahujanasukhāya*), but in conformity with Buddhist norms or dhamma. Whatever be the outcome of this activity, expressed in terms of agriculture (*kasigorakkha*), trade or industry (*vānijja*) with adequate guidance and assistance of the state (see *Kūṭadanta Sutta, D.* I. p. 135 for further details of such meaningful state leadership), it has to be just and fair (*dhammika*) and has to be achieved through righteous means (*dhammena*). It is considered the duty and responsibility of every member of society, as already pointed out earlier, to make every constituent element of society consisting of the older generation of parents and teachers who form the elders of the group, the religious men who are dedicated to a life of spiritual upliftment, and the numerous grades of other workmen who contribute to build up the economy of the land happy and comfortable, keeping within the accepted religious norms in this process :

Mātāpitu kiccakāro puttadārahito sadā
antojanassa atthāya ye c'assa anujīvino..
vittisañjanano hoti dhammena gharaṃ āvasaṃ
(*A.* III, p. 78).

Thus respected and recognised, within this frame of Buddhist values, each man is at work without cunning and deceit and with an honesty and sincerity of purpose, intensifying production with the sweat of his brow (*bāhābalaparicitehi sedāvakkhittehi*) so that those above and below, i.e., employer and employee (and note that this reciprocal relationship is emphatically stated) may adequately benefit. At the same time, however attractive the ends be, there shall be no corrosion of ethics or damage to other social considerations, in the process of achieving these ends, owing to defects in the means adopted. In this process, any injury to life, human or otherwise, for instance, through acts of omission or commission, would under Buddhist cultural values be serious enough for rescrutiny and reassessment. There shall be nothing, in the more developed or less developed groups of humanity, in the name of which man shall do violence to man.

If culture were also viewed in terms of the artistic creativity and intellectual output of a people, then Buddhism, spreading over more than two millenia and stretching across almost the whole of Asia from the Caspian Sea in the west to the Japanese archipelago in the east, has every reason to be proud of its cultural record, both with regard to the quality of achievement and the magnitude of its output. It is however unfortunate that at times both man and nature have been hostile, especially in western and central Asia, to the preservation of cultural achievements of Buddhism in the fields of painting, sculpture and architecture.

1 See the Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Ed. Paul Edwards, 1972, Vols. 1 & 2, Art. CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION.

Historical records preserved in many ancient languages as well as archaeological discoveries enable us to ascertain and establish the true worth of Buddhist achievements in these areas.

Al Biruni, in a historical record which is about a thousand years old, testifies to Khorasan, Persia. Iraq, Mosul and the country up to the frontier of Syria being Buddhistic up to the arrival of Zarathustra from Azharbayjan. In these long lost lands of Buddhism, Buddhist art, specially painting and sculpture, seems to have reached an efflorescence, rivalled only in the Far East, in China, Korea and Japan. Taking us to the western most settlements of Buddhism in Asia, a writer on Iranian history says: 'In the later period cultural life of the Iranian world, Buddhist Iran played a part of no less importance than Zoroastrian Iran' (W. Barthold, Der Iranisch Buddhismus und sein Verhaltnis zum Islam, in "*Oriental Studies in Honour of C. F. Pavry*", London, 1933; p. 29. See also *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism*, Vol. IV, p. 21, B. A. Litvinsky, Art. CENTRAL ASIA).

What today are the deserts of central Asia, north of the Himalayas, have been from the early centuries of the Christian era veritable treasure-houses of Buddhist art. Pioneering archaeological work of scholars like Sir Aurel Stein has produced volumes of records about the Buddhist centres which flourished in this ancient civilization. A whole host of modern scholars are on this trail even today.

Speaking of the impact of Buddhism on Japanese culture, Dr. D. T. Suzuki observes: 'Buddhism was to them a new philosophy, a new culture, and an inexhaustible mine of artistic impulses.'[2] Summing up the role of Buddhism as a civilizing factor in the field, another writer concludes as follows: "Where Buddhism is there is culture. Wither in the world Buddhism goes, thither goes culture too. This is, indeed, one of the most obvious lessons of the spread of Buddhism throughout Asia".[3]

J. D.

CUTI is a term used i Buddhist works to mean 'death' along with the more popular term *maraṇa*. The term *cuti* (Skt. *cyuti*: from *cyu*, to move, shift, fall away etc.) primarily means falling away from, shifting, moving or passing from one existence to another. While the term *maraṇa* simply conveys the idea of terminating the visible existence (also referred to as *kāyassa bheda*: breaking up of the physical body) *cuti*, with its sense of motion, gives the additional idea of being born in another existence. This is exemplified by the use of *cuti* and *upapāta* together as *cutūpapāta* in referring to the knowledge (*ñāṇa*) of the vanishing and reappearing of beings in new manifestations of life which enables its possessor to see the phenomenon of death and rebirth of beings simultaneously. Accordingly the usual commentarial definition of the term is "it is called *cuti* in the sense of shifting" (*cavanaka-vasena cuti'ti vuccati*: *SA*. II, p. 12=*MA*. I, p. 216). In contrast to this phenomenon of falling away from or passing from one existence to another, the term *accuta*, together with *pada*, the state from which there is no falling off, is used to refer to Nibbāna (*Sn. vv.* 204, 1086).

It is also important to note that in contrast with the term *maraṇa* the term *cuti* appears to preserve another shade of meaning peculiar to itself. This is in the aspect of a being's falling away from a higher to a lower form of existence. Accordingly the passing away of heavenly beings (*deva*) is, expressed by this term (*cavati*: *It*. p. 77; *DhpA*. I p. 173). The term preserves this sense in Buddhist Sanskrit too (*BHS*. s.v. *cyavati*).

Cuti according to Buddhism, in the case of human beings, takes place with the abandonment by the living being of three things (*M*. I, p. 296); they are vitality or life (*āyu*), vital heat (*usmā*) and consciousness (*viññāṇa* which constitute life). In the case of gods (*deva*) it takes place owing to one of four reasons (*DhpA*. I, p. 173) which are: by the exhaustion of life-span (*āyukkhaya*), of merit (*puñña-k*), of food (*āhāra-k*·) and owing to anger (*kopena*).

A.G.S.K.

CUTI-CITTA, death-consciousness or the last thought of a person at the moment of death. In Buddhist psychology this *cuti-citta* is the last of the fourteen modes in which consciousness (*viññāṇa*) functions, (*Vism*. p. 457). However, out of these fourteen aspects, *cuti-citta* along, with *paṭisandhi-viññāṇa* (first in the series of fourteen) or rebirth-linking consciousness, have to be regarded as specially important because the remaining twelve aspects occur in the general perceptive process of the mind whereas these two are concerned with the

2 *Essays in Zen Buddhism* (Third Series), Rider, Lond, 1953, p.340.

3 Ven. B. Sangharakshita in *2500 Years of Buddhism*, Gen. Ed. P. V. Bapat, Government of India, 1956, p .457.

two aspects of death and rebirth respectively. "It is called *cuti* because of falling from that particular becoming" (*taṃ tato cavanatā cuti'ti vuccati* : ibid. p. 460). Except in the case of those who have attained final release, this *cuti-citta*, being the last manifestation of the life-continuum (*bhavaṅga*) of a particular existence as the final thought to be experienced in that life, is immediately followed by the rebirth-linking consciousness (*paṭisandhi-viññāṇa*). This in turn is followed by the life-continuum (*bhavaṅga*) of the new life. This rebirth-linking consciousness, which sets the new life in motion, is the result of the death-consciousness of the previous life. It may also be mentioned that all these, viz., *cuti-citta*, *paṭisandhi-viññāṇa* and *bhavaṅga* are nothing but successive phases of the continuous flow of saṃsāric consciousness (*saṃvattanika-viññāṇa*). See also BHAVAṄGA, DEATH and VIÑÑĀṆA.

A.G.S.K.

CUTŪPAPĀTA-ÑĀṆA (also called *dibba-cakkhu*, q.v., and in late commentarial literature *jātissara-ñāṇa*), the knowledge of the decease (*cuti*) and rebirth (*upapāta*) of beings, the fifth of the six forms of higher knowledge (*abhiññā*, q.v.) and the second of the three-fold saving knowledge (*tisso vijjā*). According to the classical account found in the Nikāyas (e.g., *D*. I, p. 82 ; III, p. 111 *M*. I, p. 248), when one's mind is made supple and pliant by attaining to the fourth *jhāna* (q.v.), one directs one's mind towards the attainment of this knowledge. "With his perfectly clear, paranormal, clairvoyant vision he sees beings dying and being reborn, the low and the high, the fair and the ugly, the good and the evil, each according to his kamma." (*So dibbena cākkhunā visuddhena atikkantamānusakena satte passati cavamāne uppajjamāne hīne panīte suvaṇṇe dubbaṇṇe sugate duggate yathā kammūpage satte pajānāti*). In the general order followed, this knowledge is pursued after one has recollected one's former existences (*pubbe nivāsa*) in their diverse details. He sees by means of the *cutūpapātañāṇa* how evil-doers are born in unhappy states of suffering and the virtuous ones in happy states. This is compared to a man looking out from the balcony of a house near a four-road junction being able to see clearly how some people enter and come out of their houses, some walk along the streets while some remain seated in the middle of the crossroads. This shows that by means of this knowledge one is able to see for oneself the operation of the law of kamma in its diverse forms.

A.G.S.K.

DĀGĀBA, the Sinhala word most commonly used in Sri Lanka to refer to a Buddhist stūpa. The other two being *caityaya* and *stūpaya*. The word is derived from the Pali compound word *dhātugabbha*, used in Buddhist literary works (e.g., *Mhv*. ch. xxx, *v*. 57 ; ch. xxxiv, *vv*. 49, 50, 51) to refer to the cavity or the chamber provided inside the dome of a stūpa for the relics or the bodily remains of the Buddha (*dhātu* means the relics or bodily remains, originally referred to as *sarīrāni* and *gabbha* means vault, chamber, cell). Thus, in early times the Pali equivalent of the Sinhala word *dāgāba* appears to have been used to refer only to one component part of the stūpa (as in *cetiyadhātugabbhatthaṃ*, i.e., for the relic-chamber of the *cetiya* : *Mhv*. ch. xxx, *v*. 57). It is relevant, therefore, to inquire as to how this word which originally denoted only one component part of the stūpa came in later times to be used to denote the whole.

Early references to the construction of stūpas in Sri Lanka amply show that the depositing of the Buddha's relics in the stūpa was the most significant and important act in the construction of a stūpa. In fact, the primary object of the construction of a stūpa was to enshrine the Buddha's relics (*dhātūṭhāpassā karaṇa* : *Mhv*. ch. xvii. *v*. 37). The stūpa and the relics are inseparably connected (*kāressāmi ahaṃ thūpaṃ tumhe jānātha dhātuyo* : ibid. ch. xvii. *v*. 4). The short account in the *Mahāvaṃsa* (*Mhv*. xvii. *v*. 1 ff.) of the construction of the Thūpārāma, the first stūpa to have been constructed in Sri Lanka after the arrival of Arahant Mahinda, makes this quite clear: "Long is the time, O Lord of men, since we have seen the Sambuddha. We lived a life without the Master. There is nothing here for us to worship." This is how Arahant Mahinda indicated to King Devānampiya Tissa of his desire to have a stūpa enshrining the relics of the Buddha made for the people to worhsip. The relics are equated with the Buddha himself. Likewise in the original stūpa of Mahiyangana, said to have been constructed by Mahāsumana of Sumanakūṭa, the hair-relics of the Buddha were laid upon a heap of many-coloured gems, seven cubits round and then covered with a stūpa of sapphire (*Mhv*. ch. i. *v*. 35 f.).

It is perhaps this significant position held by the relics and not the mound (*thūpa*) which was erected over it that led to the use of the word '*dāgāba*' to refer to a stūpa in Sri Lanka. That this word, and its Pali equivalent *dhātugabbha* were used in this sense from medieval times in Sri Lanka is quite

clear from medieval literary works. (*Mhv.* ch ix. *v.* 56, ch. lxviii, *v.* 28, ch. lxxix, *v.* 14 ; *Pūjāvaliya*, ch. xxxiv).

The term *dāgāba*, as the name for a shrine symbolising the Buddha, seems to be emotionally more satisfying than the words *cetiya* or stūpa (Sinh. *caityaya* and *stūpaya*) for it directly evokes memories of the person of the Buddha through reference to his bodily remains (*dhātu*). See further CETIYA and STŪPA.

H. R. P.

DAIBUTSU, meaning the great Buddha, is the Japanese term used to denote several colossi of the Buddha found in Japan. The Buddhas thus frequently represented are Locana or Dainichi (i.e., Vairocana) and Amida (i.e., Amitābha). Of the several colossi, the one at Nara and the other at Kamakura are the best known. The earliest of the Daibutsu is the one found in Todai-ji at Nara. The construction of this Daibutsu was commenced in 743 A.C. by Emperor Shomu, first at Shiragaki palace and then at Sonogami. But both these attempts failed. Subsequently in 745 A.C., probably on the advice of the two eminent priests called Gyogi Bosatsu and Roben, the construction work was started at the Todai-ji temple and successfully completed by 749 A.C.

Several reasons are adduced for the erection of this image. According to one tradition this was for the purpose of winning Buddha's grace and blessing to ward-off the outbreak of an epidemic of smallpox during Shomu's reign (W. M. De Visser, *Ancient Buddhism in Japan*, Leiden, 1935, p. 589). Another tradition considers this as symbolizing the successful amalgamation of Buddhism and Shintoism, for legends connected with the construction of this Daibutsu facilitated the formal identfication of Amaterasu, the sun-goddess of the Shinto pantheon with the Buddha Locana (M. Anesaki, *History of Japanese Religion*, London, 1930, p. 99). Still another view is that the Daibutsu at Nara signifies the union of Buddhism and the government as well as the emergence of Buddhism as a national religion (*Pageant of Japanese Art*, Tokyo, 1952, Vol. III, p. 19).

Though the erection of the image was completed by 749 A.C., the dedication ceremony was performed only in 752 A.C. under the patronage of Empress Koken. As the eminent priests who initiated the erection of the Daibutsu were dead by then, the task of performing the dedication ceremony fell upon the Indian Buddhist priest named Bodhisena (Baraman Sojo).

This Daibutsu, which bears ample testimony to the majestic quality of the 8th century bronze-casting and which undoubtedly is one of the grandest accomplishments in the long history of Japanese bronze-casting, represents the Vairocana Buddha in a sedent posture, with the right hand placed in *semu-in* gesture (*abhaya-mudrā*) and the left-hand in *yogan-in* gesture (*varada-mudrā*). The image which is 53 ft. in height, the largest bronze casting ever produced in Japan, and most probably the largest bronze statue in the world, is represented as being seated in cross-legged position on a lotus pedestal which is 68 ft. in diameter. The lotus pedestal comprises 56 petals, each petal being 10 ft. in height and alternately turned upwards and downwards. On the pedestal is found engraved scenes from the Padmaloka-dhātu (Renge-zo kai), the paradise of Vairocana. Engraved beneath it is a picture of Mount Sineru around which are drawn twentyfive crosswise lines within which are shown numerous Buddhas and bodhisattvas. These engravings are identified as being T'ang in style (*Japan, The Official Guide*, Japan Travel Bureau, Japan, 1955, p. 729).

A wooden-hall called the Daibutsu-den, which is supposed to be the largest wooden-building in the world, has been erected to house the image. However, this hall seems to conceal the magnificence of the proportions of the Daibutsu.

The designer of this colossus was Kuninaka-no Muri Kimimaro, a Korean from the Kudara kingdom and the most notable among its casters were Takechi Makuni, Takechi Mamaro and Kamimoto-no-Otama. They have followed the technique called *iragakuri* and accomplished the image in eight part-castings.

The Daibutsu at Nara has been severely affected on several occasions by earthquakes, fires and ravages of wars. Hence, much repairs have been done and only very little of the original remains at present.

Besides the repairs that were effected from time to time new additions, too, were made, and of these the enormous gilded wooden-halo, supposed to be a work of the Genroku-era (1688–1703 A.C.), is embellished with sixteen Buddha manifestations. On the four corners of the Daibutsu are found four statues of Nyo-i-rin Kannon (Cintāmaṇi Avalokiteśvara), Kokūzo-Bosatsu (Ākāśagarbha), Komoku-ten (Virūpākṣa) and Tamon (Kubera).

The Daibutsu at Kamakura located in the precincts of the Kotoku-in temple represents Amida Buddha. This image belongs to the Kencho era (1249–55 AC.) and shows characteristics of the middle Kamakura period. This Daibutsu, measuring 42 ft. 5 inches in height including the pedestal, is the second largest bronze statue in Japan. The idea of erecting this Daibutsu seems to have been initiated by Minamoto Yoritomo, somewhere in 1195 A.C., who was inspired by the re-dedication ceremony of the Nara Daibutsu. However, he did not survive to realise his wish, and it was Ita-no-Tsubone, a lady of his court, who raised funds for this purpose.

The same technique of casting used in the execution of the Nara Daibutsu has been followed in this case too. Though smaller than its counterpart at Nara, the Kamakura Daibutsu, by virtue of its very high artistic value, has acquired world-wide fame. The wooden *daibutsu-den* that originally housed the colossus was carried away by tidal waves twice, once in 1369 A.C. and again in 1495 A.C. Since then the image has been left to stand in the open amidst picturesque surroundings. As the image was originally meant to be housed in a *daibutsu-den* its dimensions were designed accordingly. In its present unhoused state the head of the image appears oversized and awkwardly bent forward; the crossed legs appear thinner and narrower than they ought to be. The facial features, the eyes, eyebrows, lips all appear to be a bit overdone. Yet none of these are defects, for these features were so executed purposely to suit an image that was intended to be housed. The serene and composed expression in the face, the suppleness of the bodily features, the broadly undulating curves of the drapery and the overall balance and harmony bear testimony to the artistic skill and technical perfection of the artist who remains unidentified. The monastery tradition says the caster was Ono Gorozaemen, but another tradition suggests the name of Tanji Hisatomo, a caster of the time who called himself 'the caster of the new great Buddha of Kamakura.'

Besides these two famous Daibutsu colossi, occasional references are made to a wooden Daibutsu supposed to have been erected by Hideyoshi in 1586 in Kyoto. This has been replaced by bronze images which were also subsequently destroyed by natural calamities. The present wooden Daibutsu at Kyoto dates from 1801 A.C. and shows no features of any artistic value. In passing it may be noted that before the World War II Nofuku-ji temple an Hyogo claimed a prominent Daibutsu and it was so well known that the temple itself came to be called Hyogo Daibutsu. It was a sedent image cast in bronze, and measured 37.8 feet in height. But during the war this image was melted down for the purpose of obtaining metal. Mention should also be made of a peculiar type of Daibutsu found in the Shoho-ji temple near the entrance to Gifu Park. This is made of basket-work and pasted with paper on which are written Buddhist sūtras. The whole structure is finally finished in lacquer (*Japan, The Official Guide*, op. cit. p. 476). Pl. XXXV

C. S. RANASINGHA

DAINICHI. See VAIROCANA.

ḌĀKINĪ (feminine form of *ḍāka*), female helpers, mainly symbolic, of meditating yogins in Tantric Buddhism. In classical Sanskrit, ḍākinīs were malignant female spirits attending on Kāli and feeding on human flesh and blood. As such they were hostile to men and were usually associated with cemeteries and such lonely and uncanny places which were frightening to ordinary humans. But for the meditating yogins these were the very places which provided them with the opportunity of facing these dangers and overcoming them.

One who sincerely follows the religious life for the achievement of true freedom has of necessity to overcome every kind of fear and danger. This cannot be done by sheltering oneself from such dangers and fears but by becoming fearless in facing them. Thus, the yogins purposely resorted to these places and the fears, dangers, visions etc. which they thus experienced in their meditational exercises were personified as ḍākinīs.

And in this manner "the *ḍākinis* became the genii of meditation, spiritual helpers who inspired the *sādhaka* and roused him from the illusion of worldly contentment. They were the forces that awakened the dormant qualities of mind and soul."[1]

When such visions were of a peaceful nature they were regarded as divine and when of a frightening nature as demoniacal which fact deserves comparison with the Buddhist concept of *yakkha* which has both a good and a bad sense traceable upto the *Upaniṣads*.[2] Whatever their nature was they were welcome to them because they were powerful impulses which inspired them towards Enlighten-

1. Lama Anagarika Govinda, *Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism*, London, 1959, p.192.
2. See 'Philosophical Import of Vedic Yaksa' by O.H.de A. Wijesekara, *UCR*, Vol. I. No.2, November 1943, p.24 ff.

ment. Thus, constituting as they were the inspirational forces of consciousness (*bodhicitta*) they would reveal themselves at the appropriate moment in the yogin's spiritual progress. One such well-known ḍākinī mentioned in Tantric Buddhist texts is Vajrayoginī who is "a ḍākinī of highest rank. She redeems the treasures of aeons of experience, which lie dormant in the subconscious and raises them into the realm of a higher consciousness beyond that of our intellect."[3] (For iconographical descriptions of the ḍākinīs Vajravarāhī Sarvabuddhaḍākinī, Sinhavaktrā and Vajra-ḍākinī, see Alice Getty, *The Gods of Northern Buddhism*, Japan, 1962, pp. 134, 138, 140).

As symbols these ḍākinīs would indicate a particular weakness of the yogin so that he is given the opportunity of rectifying it himself. Once the weakness is overcome that particular yogin can be said to have acquired some power or knowledge which he hitherto did not possess. In this sense ḍākinīs are regarded as bestowers of secret knowledge and power. Thus, they "play a great part in an individual's attainment of Enlightenment, for they are in fact the forces welling from within himself by which he is driven to master the hostile array of cravings, passions and delusions and transform them into the winged steeds that will carry him forward to Enlightenment."[4]

Unveiled truth as reality can be frightening to the ordinary man. Even the yogins, in their search after Truth, experience this fear but they overcome it. It is in keeping with this fact that the ḍākinīs are portrayed unclothed and as ferocious in appearance, with terrifying expressions and gruesome ornaments.

As personified representatives of psychic experiences or as female embodiments of knowledge and magic power they were given iconographical forms and were invoked ritualistically by the Tantric Buddhists for obtaining the occult and superhuman powers they possessed. For instance the devotee (*sādhaka*) is instructed to invoke them thus:

"May the bands of the Mothers, the Ḍākinīs, be (my) rear-guard;

May they save me from the fearful ambuscades of the Bardo,

And place me in the pure Paradise Realms."[5]

'O ye *Gurus* and *Devas* and ye *Dākinīs*, the faithful ones

Hearken now out of (your) great love and compassion:

Obeisance, O ye assemblage of *Gurus* and *Dākinīs*

Out of your great love, lead us along the path[6]

Ḍākinīs are supposed to dwell in various places. The Tibetan rendering of the term is *khadoma* which means 'moving in space.' It is in this sense that they are sometimes designated as fairies. The fearful ones are usually those residing in cemeteries and similar lonely places, which, however, are their normal places of residence. They are also regarded as specially associated with holy places and places of pilgrimage. They are also connected with Udyāna (*Uḍḍiyāna*), the modern Swat valley in Afghanistan, which was the home of Padmasambhava. In certain Tantric Buddhist meditations, the psychic forces resident in each of the nervous centres (*cakra*) of the human body (i.e., brain, throat and heart) are personified as ḍākinīs.

Helmut Hoffmann[7] opines that in ḍākas and ḍākinīs one may see a reflection of perfected and departed mystics "who transit mystic doctrines to their pupils who are still in this world, sometimes directly sometimes indirectly, occasionally making it possible for them, by means of special instructions to discover hidden documents, so called treasures." It was the ḍākinīs of this type that gave Padmasambhava the books on which he founded the doctrines he preached in Tibet.[8]

The psychic experiences which some of the *siddhas* (perfected ones) are said to have undergone with ḍākinīs are typical of such experiences that have to be faced by any serious-minded yogin. They are reminiscent of Siddhārtha Gautama's experiences traditionally designated as the *Māra-yuddha*. What Padmasambhava experienced while practising meditation at Sītāvana, a well-known cemetery in Magadha, may be cited as an instance: "His biography tells us that rays of light like sun-shine came from the eyes of some, others rode on buffaloes with a voice of thunder, others held knives, stared

3. Lama Anagarika Govinda, op. cit. p.172.
4. John Blofeld, *The Way of Power*, London, 1970, p.114.
5. W. Y. Evans—Wentz, *The Tibetan Book of the Dead*, Oxford University press, 1970, p.180.
6. op. cit. p. 199.
7. Helmut Hoffmann, *The Religions of Tibet*, London, ,1961, p.85.
8. Alice Getty, op. cit. p. 119.

with eyes like grains, hold piles of skulls, rode on tigers, carried human corpses, rode on back of lions, ate entrails and rode on jackals, several with five heads conjured up a sea of blood, some had innumerable hands and carried many different kinds of creatures, some of them held their own decapitated heads in their hands, others held their torn-out hearts in their hands ....."[9] Similar experiences are recorded of other prominent Tibetan *Gurus* such as Tilopa, Naropa, Marpa etc., who lived in the 10th and 11th centuries.

The appearance of God in an awe-inspiring but benevolent form is a phenomenon found also in the *Bhagavad Gītā* as recounted in the 11th chapter of that work. Here, however, God reveals Himself, in His fearful form at the request of the devotee, who makes the request through perfect devotion (*bhakti*). All the worlds stand trembling at the sight of his epiphany.

In the tradition of Tantric Buddhism the initiation of *siddhas* (perfect ones) into the sects of Tantric religious life, is said to have been through the ḍākinīs. Typical of such stories is the one recorded about Padmasambhava.[10] According to this story the ḍākinī dwelt in a sandalwood garden amidst a cemetery in a palace of human skulls. Padmasambhava found the door of the palace closed. Then a water-carrying maid-servant appeared whose water-carrying was stopped by the power of Padmasambhava's meditations. She then cut open her breast with a crystal knife thereby exposing 42 peaceful and 58 wrathful deities. Padma bowed down before her and solicited instruction. Saying that she was only a servant she requested him to go inside. On entering he beheld the ḍākinī sitting on a sun and moon throne holding a double-drum and a skull-cup surrounded by 32 serving ḍākinīs. Padma paid obeisance and made offerings to the ḍākinī and begged her for instruction. Then the 100 peaceful and wrathful deities appeared overhead and the ḍākinī pointing them out requested Padma to ask for instruction. Then Padma responded by making the statement that as much as all the Buddhas throughout the aeons have had *gurus* let him also be accepted as her disciple. Then she absorbed all the lesser ḍākinīs into her body and transformed Padma into the syllable *HŪM*, the mantric symbol of integration. Thereupon she swallowed the syllable *HŪM*, and inside her stomach Padma received the secret Avalokiteśvara initiation of the body, speech and mind.

What is important is the esoteric significance of this story as understood in the symbolic terminology of Tantric Buddhism and explained by Lama Govinda.[11] The sandalwood garden in the cemetery is the saṃsāric world, pleasant in appearance but surrounded by death and decay. The palace of human skulls in which the ḍākinī lives is the human body, the materialisation of past kamma. When Padma found the door of the palace closed it meant that he had not yet found the key to the meaning of corporeality. The water carried by the servant girl signifies life-force, *prāṇa*, the normal stream of which was interfered by Padma by means of breath-control (*prāṇāyāma*). The crystal knife signifies the sharp and penetrating analytical insight and knowledge while the servant girl's cutting open the breast signifies the revelation of the hidden inner nature of corporeality. Thus, Padma now recognises that the human body despite its impermanence, is the temple of highest forces and attainments. Only a human being can become a Buddha. His bowing down before the maiden requesting for instruction signifiying humility and the readiness to see things as they really are opened for him the hitherto closed door of the palace : the entrance to the secret powers of his own body. The sun and moon of her throne represent the psycho-cosmic solar and lunar energies while the double-drum symbolises the transcendental sound of the Dharma, the drum of immortality (*amata-dundubhi*), about which the Buddha spoke on his way to preach the first sermon (*Vin.* I, p. 8). The thirty-two serving ḍākinīs represent the thirty-two marks of physical perfection characterising the body of an Enlightened One. Thus, the ḍākinī shown here is regarded as the embodiment of the wisdom of all the Buddha's (*sarvabuddha-ḍākinī*), who is regarded as the most perfect form of a ḍākinī embodying the synthesis of all the Buddha-wisdoms. And it is in this sense that the ḍākinīs are sometimes equated with *Prajñās* or the female forms of Dhyāni Buddhas and regarded as united with the latter in the aspect of *yab-yum* or *yuga-naddha*, symbolising the perfected state of male-female non-duality.

The foregoing account shows that these Tantric teachings are recorded in an esoteric way, in the so-called symbolical language characteristic of Siddha literature and if they are taken in their literal sense it can lead to much abuse. This seems to have actually happened in later times when pseudo-yogins began to engage in various sexual

9. Hoffmann, op. cit. p.54.
10. Govinda, op. cit. pp. 193 ff.
11. op. cit. p. 195 f.

rites with actual women designating them as ḍākinīs.[12] Such psycho-sexual rites are said to be so gruesome and obscene that these so-called ḍākinīs came sometimes to be referred to as witches. And this degeneration has gone so far in modern Nepal that the term has come to mean 'prostitute.'[13] There was also a stage in Tantric Buddhism when the orthodox Buddha-Dhamma-Saṅgha triology came to be replaced by the new triology (*lama-yidam-ḍākinī* : spiritual preceptor-tutelary divinity-mystic female partner), the union of the three precious ones.

Generally speaking, the ḍākas and ḍākinīs seem to represent the way in which the Tantric Buddhists conceived of the supernatural evil and beneficent forces mentioned in early Buddhist texts as Māras, gods, brahmās etc., who are said to have communicated with the Buddha and other arhants at various crucial moments in their lives. However, they mainly represent the defilements or passions (*kilesa*) personified as *kilesa-māra* in early Buddhism.

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A.G.S.K.

DAKKHIṆĀ (Skt. *Dakṣiṇā*), a religious concept of varying significance and meaning found both in Buddhist and Brahmanic traditions. The common basic meaning of the term appears to be 'a gift'. Already in the earlier stratum of Buddhist literature the concept of *dakkhiṇā* seems to fall into two distinct categories : (i) *dakkhiṇā* is an offering of food, and perhaps of clothing too, made to *śramaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas*, i e., men of religious orders both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, as part of one's social and religious obligations [1]; (ii) *dakkhiṇā* is the benevolent force which arises out of giving (*dāna*) to persons of virtue and piety, religious[2] or even secular[3], which in turn is directed towards (*a*) spirits or *devatā*, generally of a terrestrial order, who reciprocate by making the lives of the donor in the human world happier and more prosperous (*D.* II, p. 88) and (*b*) the dead who are believed to be in a pitiful state of suffering (*petas*) in order that they may be relieved of their insatiable hunger and thirst and further be elevated to a state of more or less luxurious prosperity, relating to their clothing, residence and transport.[4]

Taking *dakkhiṇā* of the first category, the provision of food and clothing to religious men, men of virtue (*madappamādāpaṭiviratā khantisoracce niviṭṭhā* : *A.* II, p. 68, III p. 46) is included among the many meaningful and profitable things a man of means would do, making proper use of his wealth (..... *tathārūpesu samaṇabrāhmaṇesu dakkhiṇam paṭiṭṭhāpeti* : loc. cit.) This aspect of *dakkhiṇā* fulfils primarily a socio-religious obligation. Elaborating on the profitable use of wealth (*bhogānaṃ ādiyā*) by a discreet, diligent man it is said that he would provide material comforts (*sukheti piṇeti*) for himself and for dependents like his wife and children and his parents, as well as for his domestic staff. The gifts to the *śramaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas* (i.e., *dakkhiṇā*) is added to the list at this stage. It is also noted that this *dakkhiṇā* brings about comfort and happiness to the donor (*sukhavipākaṃ*) and that it is conducive to birth in the heavenly worlds (*sovaggikaṃ ..saggasaṃvattanikaṃ*). With the shift of accent towards other worldly considerations connected with *dakkhiṇā*, we also find specific reference to the virtues of the worthy recipients of the *dakkhiṇā*. To begin with, they are general virtues such as deligence and humility (*madappamādāpaṭiviratā* : loc. cit.), gentleness and forbearance (*khantisoracce niviṭṭhā* : loc. cit). Above all, these *śramaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas* pursue a religious life and do not swerve from the path of virtue (*ekam attānaṃ damenti ekaṃ attānaṃ samaaenti ekam attānaṃ parinibbāpenti* : loc. cit.).

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12. Even the Guru Padmasambhava is said to have had five special *ḍākinīs* : Hoffmann, op. cit. p. 55.

13. D.L. Snellgrove, *Buddhist Himalaya*, Oxford, 1957. p.175 note.

1 *te diṭṭheva dhamme sandiṭṭhikaṃ sippaphalam upajīvanti. Te tena ..... samaṇabrāhmaṇesu uddhaggikaṃ dakkhiṇaṃ paṭiṭṭhāpenti sovaggikaṃ sukhavipākaṃ saggasaṃvattanikaṃ.* (*D.* I, p. 51, also III, p. 60 ; *S.* I, p. 90 ; *A.* II, p. 68, III, p. 259)

2 *Bhikkhū ca sīlasampanne-vitarāge bahussute tappehi annapānena mamaṃ dakkhiṇaṃ ādisa tadāham sukhitā hessaṃ-abbakāmasamiddhini.* (*Pvu.* II, 4.7–8)

3 *Ko'ettha upāsako saddho sammāsambuddhasāvako*
Etam acchādayitvāna mamaṃ dakkhiṇam ādisa. (*Pvu.* I, 10.45) *Navāya tiṭṭhamānāya kappakāsiṃ addasayi*
Kappakāsse paṭinnamhi thāne petassa disatha. (*Pvu.* III, 1.4)

4 *Sādhū ti so tassa paṭisuṇitvā Sāriputto anukampako bhikkhūnam ālopaṃ datvā pānimattañ ca colakaṃ Thālak asseca pāniyam tassa dakkhiṇam adisi sāmanantarā anudiṭṭhe vipāko upapajjatha*
Bhojanacchādanapāniyam dakkhiṇāya idaṃ phalam. (*Pvv.* II, 1.7-9 ; *Pet.* II, 1.7–8 ; 2.6, 8)

The unmistakably Buddhist character of *dakkhiṇā* and its evaluation in terms of Buddhist criteria is seen at *A*. III, p. 336.

While discussing the six virtues of what is referred to as *chaḷaṅgasamannāgatadakkhiṇā* or 'perfect gift' it is indicated that for the enhancement of the quality of *dakkhiṇā* or the results accruing from it the recipients should be those aspiring or striving for the elimination of lust (*rāga*), hatred (*dosa*) and delusion (*moha*), which ultimately is the Buddhist goal of arahantship. The donors also, it is added, should rejoice over the act of giving at all stages from the first promptings to give, through the act of giving and finally reflecting on its accomplishment. These observations on the attitudes of the donor is resonant with the psychology of Buddhist ethics.

In the Buddhist social organization where the monk is necessarily dependent on the layman for his sustenance (not untrue of many other religious groups as well), this concept of *dakkhiṇā* is a vital element for the proper and harmonious maintenance of the monastic community. Confident of the fact that there is provision in every home for the monk's morsel [5] a monk is able to devote the whole of his life to his spiritual development. It is in the context of this that the reciprocity of the layman's obligation to provide the means of sustenance to the monk and the monk's concern to make himself worthy of such gifts is best appreciated. In a strongly-worded statement relating to this it is said in the *Dhammapada* that it is better for a monk who is lacking in virtue to devour a glowing red-hot iron ball for a meal than partake of food offerings given to him by the people (*Dhp.v.* 308). This *dakkhiṇā* of the first category described so far is essentially of the human world, made by the living to the living in order to further the interests of the living. This is sometimes referred to as a contribution to the physical well-being and strength of the monk (*balañca bhikkhūṇaṃ anuppadinnaṃ*: *Pvu.* p.1,p. 5.12). The other worldly outcome of amassing merit and consequent birth in heaven is to be considered as its derivative.

Dakkhiṇā in the second category as a mediatory force reflects a more popularly religious character. It is based on the belief, on the one hand, that gifts of food, clothing etc. made to worthy and virtuous persons produce a moral or spiritual force which operates beyond the world of human existence, and on the other, that this force could be directed at will either for the reinforcement of the fortunes of *devas* and *devatās* who are themselves the product of their own previous good karma or to alleviate the sufferings of *petas* who have fallen into a miserable state of want through their own misdeeds and neglect [6]. Both *deva* and *peta* here are states of existence to which the humans can pass after death—*sugati* or good gait and *duggati* or bad gait-elevate or degrade themselves respectively according to the karma structure of their life-time.

The belief pattern being thus, there is a stress on the virtues or the worthiness of the recipients of the offerings. In the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* (*D*. II, p. 88) we find the Buddha indicating that the good-will of the *devatās* who inhabit a particular locality may be obtained by the people of the area by making offerings of food to pious and virtuous monks (*sīlavantettha bhojetvā saññate brahmacārayo* : loc. cit.) and directing the resultant effect thereof to the *devatās* (*yā tattha devatā ḍesuṃ tāsaṃ dakkhiṇam ādise* : loc. cit.) It is also added that this would lead to reciprocal acts of blessing and favour on the part of the *devatās* (*Tā pūjitā pūjayanti mānitā mānayanti naṃ ; Tato nam anukampanti mātā puttam' va orasaṃ; Devatānukampito poso sadā bhadrāni passati* : loc. cit.).

While the motive for these acts of courtesy towards the *devatās* seems to be one of social well-being for the donor, the relationship towards *petas* seems to be one of pity, sympathy and compassion.[7] The element of fear and dread associated with *petas* in the later phases of popular religion is almost totally absent in the early stages.[8] A hungry ghost, often suffering from heat and cold for want of clothing, is the object of pity. The pattern usually is that they themselves make the requests to the living to make offerings of whatever they

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5 Cooked stands the sage's food, A little here, A little there
In one can or the next. (*Psalms of the Brethren*, p. 168.)

6 *Buddhañ ca saṅghañ ca parivisayāna rāja annena pānenapi civarena tam dakkhiṇaṃ ādisa me hitāya evam ahaṃ cirataram yiniṭṭe siyā*. (*Pvu*. ii, 8.8) *Dānam datvā ca me mātā dakkiṇam anvādissatu me tadahaṃ sukhitā hessaṃ sabbakāmasamiddhiniti*. (*Pvu*. iii, 6.9)

7 *Tasmā dajjetha petānam anukampāya punappunaṃ*.(*Pvu*. iii, 1.5) *Anukampa maṃ dhīra mahānubhāva datvā ca me ādissa yāhi kiñci mocehi maṃ duggatiyā bhaddante ti*. (*Pvu*. ii, 1.6)

8 In the commentary on the *Petavatthu* it is said that once a band of *petas* who expected their relatives in the world of the living to relieve them of their suffering by the proper administration of *dakkhiṇā* were disappointed at their failure to do so and terrified them with dreadful disturbance (*Tatha tam dānam alabhantā petā chinnāsā hutvā rattiyan rañño nivesane ativiya bhimsanakam vissaram akaṃsu* (*PvuA*. *p*. 22.)

are in want to virtuous monks and direct the *dakkhiṇā* which results from it to them.[9] It is admitted and made known to the living by the *petas* that no direct gifts of any material object is possible.[10] Hence it is clear that in this context *dakkhiṇā* is not the material gift to the monks but the effect of making the gift which is banked as it were with the monks and is transferable to the spirit world, *deva* or *peta*. A sutta in the *Petavatthu* which appears to standardise the Buddhist rituals relating to the dead states that the *petas* could draw benefits from time to time, according to need, from this fund of *dakkhiṇā* established in the monkhood or Saṅgha (*Ayaṃ ca kho dakkhiṇā dinnā saṅghamhi suppatiṭṭhitā Dīgharattaṃ hitāyassa-phānaso upakappati : Pvu.* i 4.4. and i. 5.11). This is more consoling both to the living and to the dead (*petas*) in that it is more lasting and enduring, and readily available for utilization by the under-priviledged *petas*.

A sutta in the last section of the *Majjhima Nikāya* (*M.* III, pp. 253-7 : *Dakkhiṇāvibhaṅga Sutta*, No. 142) which shows evident signs of deviation from the original spirit of Buddhism in its attitude to *dāna* or giving, attempts, according to what its title implies, to make an analysis of the Buddhist concept of *dakkhiṇā*. The major theme of the sutta with which it opens is that, according to the Buddha himself, it is more fruitful and meaningful to give gifts (*dakkhiṇā*) to the collective organization of the Saṅgha (*saṅghagatā dakkhiṇā*) than to individuals (*pāṭipuggalikā dakkhiṇā*). The sutta then enumerates seven types of the former and fourteen of the latter, with heirarchical values assigned to some of them. These evaluations are based both on the worthiness of the recipient and the attitude of mind of the donor. A new trend which one detects here in the development of the concept of *dakkhiṇā* is that the sutta speaks of the results which one is believed to inherit through giving, in mathematical proportions relative to the grade of the recipients (.... *dānaṃ datvā sataguṇā dakkhiṇā pāṭikaṅkhitabbā*) who range from an animal (*tiracchānagata*) to the fully enlightened Buddha himself. The main interest of *dakkhiṇā* that is stressed here is the benefits accruing to the donor, hundredfold, thousandfold, hundredthousandfold. The contribution of *dakkhiṇā* to the sustenance and well-being of the Saṅgha as a group living on the charity and generosity of the layman consequently comes to be reckoned with much less and the expiatory role of *dakkhiṇā* in relieving the misery of *petas* has receded to the background. The word *dakkhiṇā* here virtually stands for the personal benefits resulting from *dāna* or acts of giving.

J.D.

DAKKHIṆĀPATHA (var. Dakkhiṇapatha ; Skt. Dakṣiṇāpatha). One of the earliest Pali references to Dakkhiṇāpatha, literally meaning 'Southward Path', is in the *Suttanipāta* (*v.* 976) where it is said that Bāvarī went to the Dakkhiṇāpatha region and settled down in the territory midway between the kindgoms of Assaka and Mūlaka (Alaka). T. W. Rhys Davids (*Buddhist India*, London, 1903, p. 30) suggests that this reference to Dakkhiṇāpatha indicates only a remote settlement or a colony on the banks of upper Godāvarī. This view is, also, endorsed by Malalasekera (*DPPN.* s.v. Dakkhiṇā-patha).

Early Sanskrit works also suggest that the area referred to as Dakkhiṇāpatha was of considerable extent for, according to some sources it included the kingdoms of Chola, Pāṇḍya and Kerala (see *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*, xxxvii, *v.* 45 ; *Vāyu Purāṇa*, xlv, *v.* 124 ; *Matsya Purāṇa* cii, *v.* 46 ; *PvuA.* p. 133 also, includes the Damila (Tamil) country in Dakkhiṇāpatha). Just as these descriptions are not totally accepted or corroborated by other sources, these are also not totally rejected or contradicted. Though there is no complete uniformity in these references, the fact that Dakkhiṇāpatha was considered to be a vast area is quite obvious.

The *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī* (I, p. 265) considers Dakkhiṇāpatha and Dakkhiṇajanapada as synonyms. The *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī* (loc. cit.) further adds that it was the district to the south of the Ganges (*Gaṅgāya dakkhiṇato pākaṭajanapadaṃ*). B.C. Law (*Geography of Early Buddhism*, London, 1932, p. 60) says that according to the definitions of Madhyadeśa, as given by Vaśiṣṭha and Baudhāyana, it seems that the Dakṣiṇāpatha region lay to the south of Pāripātra, generally identified with a portion of the Vindhyas. The fact that Dakṣiṇāpatha lay to the south of Vindhya mountain is generally accepted by scholars.

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9 In the *Petavatthu*, Sānuvāsipetas, father, mother and brother, get food, clothing, houses, ponds and bathing places and chariots as a result of token gifts made to the Saṅgha by their kinsman, Sānuvāsi thera (*Pvu.* iii, 2.1–32; see also ii, 1.7–8).

10 They call upon the donors to make the required offerings to the monks and channel the results thereof (*dakkhiṇā*) for their benefit. *Hatthena hatthe te dinnaṃ na mayhaṃ upakappati Bhikkhū ca sīlasampanne vītarāge bahussute Tappehi annapānena mamaṃ dakkhiṇamādisa Tadā'haṃ sukhitā hessaṃ sabbakāma-samiddhinī ti* (*Pvu.* ii, 4.7–8)

A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith (*Vedic Index of Names and Subjects*, London, 1912, Vol. I, p. 336) suggest that Dakṣiṇāpatha and Dakṣiṇā-pada (*Ṛgveda*, X, 161, 8), which they explain as 'Southward foot' are similar expressions. Further they explain this as a place where an exile (*parāvṛj*) goes on being expelled, i.e., the south, beyond the limits of the recognised Aryan world. But the particular hymn involved is of doubtful meaning, and therefore, cannot be completely relied upon (cf. H. H. Wilson, *Ṛgveda Saṃhitā*, VI, p. 159, where the hymn is interpreted in a completely different way).

However, it is quite possible, as suggested by many scholars (*DPPN*. s.v. Dakkhiṇāpatha), that during the earliest period it meant a road which led to the south. In this connection it is interesting to note the name Dakṣiṇāṭya (Dakṣiṇā+aṭya), literally meaning 'Southward-courser', mentioned by Pāṇini (iv. 2, 98) is another synonym for Dakṣiṇāpatha. This further supports the suggestion cited above. Ultimately, the whole region, comprising numerous kingdoms, through which it passed may have come to be known as Dakṣiṇāpatha.

Sometimes the name is coupled with Avanti as Avantidakkhiṇāpatha (*Vin*. I, pp. 195, 196, II, p. 298). It is not quite clear whether this, too, is synonymous with Dakkhiṇāpatha. Translators render it into English in different ways. It is rendered either as 'Southern region of Avanti' (*SBB*. XIV, p. 263 f.) or as 'the southern country and Avanti' (*SBE*. XVII, pt. ii, p. 336 f.). The *Indriya Jātaka* (*J*. III, p. 463), too, has this coupled name, while the *Sarabhaṅga Jātaka* (*J*. V, p. 133) speaks of Avanti as a part of *Dakkhiṇāpatha*. Available information seems to support this last view (see also *SBE*, XVII, p. 146, n. 1, which says that Avanti, Dakkhiṇāpatha Pāṭeyye were considered to be the principal divisions of India). B.C. Law (op. cit. p. 60 f.) is of opinion that a portion of Avanti was included in the Dakkhiṇāpatha and further says that the kingdom of Avanti referred to in the *Mahāgovinda Sutta* (*D*. II, p. 235) is Avantidakkhiṇāpatha as distinguished from the kingdom of Avanti of Madhyadesa, the capital of which was Ujjain. See further DECCAN.

S.K.N.

DAKṢIṆĀ. See DAKKHIṆĀ.

DAḶADĀ, the Sinhalese term for Pali *Dāṭhādhātu* means the Tooth Relic (eye-tooth) of the Buddha. It is one of the most venerated objects of worship among the Buddhists world over. Historically, this form of worship appears to have been sanctioned in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* (*D*. II, p. 142 f.) where the Buddha speaks of the construction of stūpas over the bodily remains of 'worthy ones' and their veneration (see CETIYA).

The relics in Buddhism are categorised into three main classes, namely: *sārīrika* (a relic of the Buddha's body), *pāribhogika* (an object with which the Buddha in his life-time was physically associated, i.e., something used by him), and *uddesika* (a likeness which represented the Buddha, i.e., Buddha image; see CETIYA). The Tooth Relic, therefore, falls into the first category.

Buddha lived and passed away as a human-being and he was venerated, respected and adored even during his life-time. The grateful followers who accepted his leadership started deifying and spiritualizing him after his Parinibbāna. Relic worship as practised by the followers of Gotama Buddha began with the proceedings connected with his funeral, when the relics of his burnt body were collected by the Brahmin named Droṇa and distributed among eight kings in India.

These Teeth Relics (i.e., the four teeth) together with the two-collar-bones and the frontal-bone form the seven great relics of the Buddha. Out of these the most famous and the highly venerated is the Tooth Relic which is traditionally believed to have been brought to Sri Lanka in the 4th century A.C. and is presently housed in a beautiful palace in Kandy, the hill capital of the island (See DAḶADĀ MĀLIGĀVA).

The Tooth Relic which is now in Kandy, is said to have been removed from the funeral pyre of the Buddha by an arahant named Khema, a pupil of Sāriputta (*Daḷadāsirita*, ed. Vāliviṭiye Sorata, Colombo, 1961, p. 14). It was taken to Kāliṅga and handed over to King Brahmadatta who paid great homage to it. His son, Kāsirāja, is said to have illuminated the Tooth Relic chamber with the lustre of an expensive jewel. The Tooth Relic had been the object of veneration for many centuries by the Buddhists of Kāliṅga. King Guhasīva of Kāliṅga who was a heretic earlier, abandoned his heretical beliefs and started to honour the Tooth Relic. The heretics who were dissatisfied with the attitude of their ruler made a complaint to King Paṇḍu of Pāṭaliputta, that Guhasīva was paying homage to a bone of the dead man Gotama. Becoming alarmed at the news, Paṇḍu

ordered his sub-king Citrayāna to bring along Guhasīva and the Tooth Relic, which he did. When the king ordered the 60,000 heretics to burn the bone in a pit full of charcoal, it is said to have performed miracles in the presence of Paṇḍu, who later ridiculed the heretics and embraced Buddhism. He took it to his inner city and placed it in a beautiful palace especially built for this purpose. After some time he sent Guhasīva with the Relic to Kāliṅga. It was at this time that Danta, the son of the king of Ujjeni went to Kāliṅga to pay homage to the Tooth Relic, where he was appointed as its custodian (*dhāturakkhādhikāro : Dāṭhv. v.* 294) by Guhasīva after giving him his daughter Hemamālā in marriage to him. When the nephews of King Paṇḍu waged war against Guhasīva in order to get the Relic, he enjoined his daughter and the son-in-law to find refuge for themselves and the Relic in Sri Lanka, whose King Mahāsena (274–301 A.C.) had earlier given expression to his deep reverence towards it. At the death of Guhasīva in the battle, Danta and Hemamālā came to Sri Lanka in the guise of Brahmins, bringing with them the Tooth Relic. It is believed that the latter brought it, concealing it in her hair (ibid. ch. iv, *v.* 53). According to the *Dāṭhāvaṃsa* (ch. iv, *v.* 14 ff.) this Relic was sent by Guhasīva to Mahāsena for protection, but he was dead at the time of its arrival. Danta and Hemamālā who broke journey at Meghagiri-vihāra at the Mahāmegha gardens at Anuradhapura, sent a message to King Sirimeghavaṇṇa (301–328 A.C.) who received the relic with great honour and offered it with his entire kingdom (ibid. ch. v, *v.* 15 ff.). Thereafter, he placed it in a shrine, built within the precincts of his royal palace. The very first exhibition of this Relic was made to the public at the place where thera Mahinda preached his first sermon (ibid. ch. v, *v.* 59). Sirimeghavaṇṇa is believed to have declared that the Tooth Relic should be taken to Abhayagiri-vihāra (var. Uttaravehera) and an annual festival should be held in its honour (*Mhv.* xxxvii. *v.* 97).

This festival which is associated with Abhayagiri vihāra continued to be one of the most important religious festivals in Sri Lanka. Sirimeghavaṇṇa is said to have spent 900,000 gold coins (*kahāpaṇas*) for the first festival (ibid. v. 93). Fa-hsien, the Chinese pilgrim who visited Sri Lanka about a century after the arrival of the Tooth Relic has left on record a graphic description of the festival held on such an occasion (Samuel Beal, *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, Calcutta, 1957, p. 48). One could gather from this description, the strong hold which the cult of the Tooth Relic had taken on the minds of the Sinhalese Buddhists, and the enthusiasm displayed by the king for its worship (S. Paranavitana, *History of Ceylon*, Colombo, 1959, Vol. I, Pt. I, p. 379).

The cult of the Tooth Relic gained importance and the belief that its possession conferred on a prince the legitimate right to the sovereignity seems to have become established during the Polonnaruva period. Therefore, we find on several occasions, the Sinhalese princes and other foreign invaders fighting among themselves to obtain the sacred object in order to become the legitimate ruler of this country. Except for a few Sinhalese princes, the others who obtained the kingship of the island seem to have paid their honour to this particular Relic, to the best of their ability.

When Pāṇḍyas arrived in Sri Lanka during the reign of Sena I (833–853 A.C.), the Tooth Relic was removed to a place of safety. Later, when the Colas invaded the island in 1017 A.C. the bhikkhūs fled to the southern parts of Sri Lanka taking the Relic with them. Prince Kitti defeated them and succeeded to the throne under the name of Vijayabāhu I (1055–1110 A.C.). When he sent a request to the Burmese king Anawrahta asking him to send Buddhist scriptures and monks to convene a chapter and make valid ordinations in Sri Lanka, the Burmese King complied with his request, but asked in return for the Tooth Relic. Vijayabāhu did not hand over the Relic to the Burmese envoys, but instead sent a replica of it (Harvey, *History of Burma*, Longmans Green, 1925, pp. 32–33).

King Vijayabāhu I built a costly temple to house the Tooth Relic and organized a great festival to honour the Relic. After this king, the shrine was entrusted to Velaikkāra forces by Mugalan Mahāsthavira of the Uturuḷumuḷu monastery, who assigned lands and guards from each regiment to upkeep and to protect the shrine (*EZ.* II, p. 253 ff.). Inspite of their protection Vikramabāhu I (1111–1132 A.C.) forcibly took the precious stones, pearls, jewels and the images of gold, presented by the pious to the Tooth Relic.

Observing the behaviour of Vikramabāhu, the Pamsukūlika monks, together with the monks of the eight monastic institutions (Aṭṭhamūlā vihāra) removed the relics (the Tooth Relic and the Bowl Relic) to Rohaṇa, and guarded them there, moving from place to place, for purposes of security (*Mhv.* lxi, *vv.* 56–61). King Parākramabāhu I (1153–1186 A.C.) succeeded, with the help of his Commander-in-Chief Rakkha, in obtaining back the Relics from the Rohaṇa princes and it is said

that they honoured the Relics at the battle-field itself, and sent them to Polonnaruva (*Mhv.* lxxiv, *v.* 138 ff.) where they were received by the king in great pomp and ceremony. The king bore the Relics on his head and showed it to all his companions. He got a temporary pavilion erected in the city for the exhibition of the Relics and accompanied it to the capital attended by all the dignitaries of the court, religious leaders and the army to the accompaniment of music, dancing and other festivities. The Tooth Relic was placed inside a valuable jewel that was hollowed out and filled with sweet smelling powder. This was encased in a casket of precious stones which was placed in a valuable golden box (*Mhv.* lxxiv, *v.* 208 ff.). It was after the demise of this king that Māgha invaded Śri Lanka. At this juncture a bhikkhu named Vācissara took the Relic to Kotmale and hid it at a temple in Puhulpitiya which is known even today as Dāṭhākaraṇḍārāmaya.

Nissaṅkamalla (1187–1196 A.C.) is yet another king who is said to have had great faith in the Tooth Relic. He built a splendid shrine for it and made offerings including his son Vīrabāhu and his daughter Sarvāṅgasundarī. He redeemed these two children by offering a golden dāgāba as their price (Paranavitana. op. cit. Vol. I, Pt. I, pp. 573–574).

When Vijayabāhu III (1232–1236 A.C.) became the king of Sri Lanka, he got down the Tooth Relic which was concealed but at the same time, not wishing to keep the Tooth Relic in his capital, he had a shrine built on the inaccessible rock of Beligala. He made provisions for the daily ritual at the shrine and the maintenance of its servitors. He kept guards for its security equal to that of the royal palace (ibid. p. 758). His son Parākramabāhu II (1236–1270 A.C.) who was famous for his great Buddhist activities held grand festivals in honour of the Tooth Relic. It is said that ' the king ascends every morning the upper storey of the temple of the Tooth, with as much reverence as if he were going to see the living Buddha, sweeps the shrine with a broom made of human hair tied together with gold thread, makes the sixteen kinds of offerings to the sacred Relic, sprinkles scented lavendar water on every flower that had been offered and prostrates before the Relic ' (Paranavitana, op. cit. Vol. I, pt. II, p. 727). He removed the Tooth Relic from Beligala to Dambadeniya, his capital and built a shrine in the vicinity of his palace. The foreign invasions followed by the death of this king made it compulsory for the removal of the Relic, to a strongly guarded fortress at Yāpavu, from where the Pāṇḍya invaders obtained it and handed it over to their king Kulasekhara in South India. Parākramabāhu III (1287–1293 A.C.) visited Pāṇḍya court, negotiated with the Pāṇḍya king and brought back the Tooth Relic to Sri Lanka, thereby becoming the legitimate ruler of this country under the Pāṇḍyan care. Daily he held a great festival in honour of this Relic (*Mhv.* xc., *v.* 41). Thus, the Relic was once again placed at Polonnaruva for a short period (*Mhv.* xc., *v.* 55).

Parākramabāhu IV (1302–1326 A.C.) built a magnificent shrine for the Tooth Relic and also proclaimed an ordinance to regulate the ritual and public celebrations in its honour. According to the *Mahāvaṃsa* (ch. xc., *vv.* 77–79), this king wished to perpetuate in relation to the Tooth Relic the life pattern of the living Buddha (..... *tassa yaṃ dinacārittaṃ atthi taṃ dantadhātuyā itoppabhuti hotuūti*). With this end in view he ordered a manual on this subject called *Daḷadāsirita* compiled in Sinhala and held daily rituals in honour of the Relic following the instructions laid down in it.

It is very interesting to note the manner in which this particular king paid great honour to the Tooth Relic. The *Daḷadāsirita* gives a vivid description of this entire ritual. It is as follows : There were three ante-chambers in the shrine in which the Relic was kept and only those who were permitted to prepare the altar were allowed to enter the shrine through the inner-most portal. The bhikkhūs, the members of the royal families, those in charge of the crown-jewels, those in charge of the Temple of the Tooth and those well-versed in the Dhamma were allowed to enter the shrine through the second portal. The ministers were allowed to enter the outer – ante – chamber through the third portal. The general public were allowed to worship the Relic from outside. When food was brought to be offered to the Relic the attendants had to cover their mouths with a veil and it was brought to the accompaniment of music. On festive occasions, the white umbrella was held over the offerings and to the accompaniment of music. Everybody had to stand up when it was being brought. Within half an hour of the arrival of the offerings, the food had to be offered to the Relic in vessels arranged on a carpet, after offering water for rinsing the mouth. The offerings to the Relic were distributed among the temple officials and musicians. When the king visited the Relic chamber once a day to worship, he left the retinue outside, purified himself, swept the floor with his own hands, washed the hands and offered jewels, flowers and other presents,

contemplated on the greatness of the Buddha and observed the formula of the five precepts.

He offered a special service to the Tooth Relic on every poya day. The king and the ministers provided for the service on other days on rotation. A Bathing ceremony was performed at intervals for the Tooth Relic. Whenever the king occupied a new palace, he did it after it was protected by the Tooth Relic being brought therein, the *paritta* chanted and holy water sprinkled. The officials, bhikkhūs and guards of the temple wore cloaks and turbans while on duty. The Tooth Relic was taken in procession and exhibited to the public on a day when planetary conjunctions were auspicious. Seven days prior to the commencement of the procession, special offerings such as food, flowers and lamps were made to the Tooth Relic, by the king, the inmates of the harem, the ministers and the citizens. The shrine of the Relic was purified and decorated with canopies, silk cloth etc. and on the seventh day the Relic was taken out to be conducted in the well-decorated streets. The casket in which the Relic was enshrined was taken out in the presence of the head of the Uturuḷumuḷu monastery, representatives of the Gaṇavāsi and Kâlinga families and placed on a decorated chariot to which was yoked an elephant with auspicious marks. In front of the chariot walked the bhikkhus holding the string of protection tied to the chariot, chanting the *paritta*. The representatives of the Doranāvāsi family sprinkled the holy water on the streets, some of the functionaries of the temple walked on either side of the chariot holding white umbrellas and fly-whisks. Then followed the officials and musicians attached to the temple of the Tooth. They were followed by the officials and the musicians of the royal palace. They were followed by the four-fold army and the ministers. Thus, the procession circumambulated the city and went back to the shrine. Thereupon, the seals of the casket were broken in the presence of the king, the head of the Uturuḷumuḷu monastery, the two representatives of the Gaṇavāsi and Kâlinga families and the guardians of the Temple of the Tooth. Having taken out the Relic it was first shown to the bhikkhus, and then taken by the king who placed it with great honour on a higher place enabling the assembly to have a clear view of it, while yak-tail fans were waved, the white umbrellas were held and conches were blown. Strangers were allowed to have a look at the Relic from a distance after having taken great protection. Those who made offerings to the Relic were given sandalwood paste. After the exhibition the Relic was placed back in the casket in the presence of the king and secured with three seals. Bhikkhus varying in number, either seven or five, always chanted the *paritta*, in the Temple of the Tooth. King Parākramabāhu IV held this ceremony every year during the period of his reign. At this time the income of the Tooth Relic Temple was administered solely by the palace. If any funds of this temple were to be taken for the use of the palace work in an emergency, it had to be refunded with hundred percent interest within a period of six months. On the king's birthday and on the anniversary of his coronation it was the custom of the king to donate a *pamuṇu* land to the Temple of the Tooth. When the dignitaries gave presents to the king on the *kārtika* festival and the New Year festival, they were obliged to make their first present to the Tooth Relic. Those who had *pamuṇu* lands had to pay certain dues to the Tooth Relic. The holders of *divel* lands had to supply oil for lamps; others had to pay dues known as *is-ran*, *mas-ran* and *dvas-ran*. All administrative disputes connected with the Temple of the Tooth had to be settled by an official appointed by the palace and the head monk of the Uturuḷumuḷu monastery. The unsettled matters were referred to the Saṅgha for a final decision. (*Daḷadāsirita*, op. cit. pp. 53–54). This king is also said to have ordered, to pay a duty to the Tooth Relic, quarter per cent of all merchandise passing through the sea-ports.

During the reign of Parākramabāhu VI (1412–1467 A.C.), the Tooth Relic was placed in Kotte. A period of chaos followed after his reign and then Portuguese invaded this country. When under their influence Dharmapāla, the heir to the throne became a Catholic, Hiripiṭiya Divana Rāja removed the Tooth Relic to Delgamuwa. According to Harvey (op. cit. pp. 172–173), the Portugese captured the Tooth Relic in 1560 A.C. and took it to Goa where it was destroyed and burnt and the ashes were cast into a river. But it is believed that it was not the genuine Relic that they took, but a replica of the same. When in 1611 A.C. the Portugese invaded Kandy, the bhikkhus are said to have fled away with the Tooth Relic to the mountain areas. After chasing away the Portugese Vimaladharmasūriya I brought the Tooth Relic back to the palace of the Tooth Relic in Kandy. His son Vimaladharmasūriya II built a three storeyed palace for the same.

When during the reign of Kīrti Śrī Rājasiṃha 1747–1780 A.C.), bhikkhus arrived from Siam for the *upasampadā* (higher ordination) ceremony in

1753 A.C., they suggested that a place of honour should be given to the Tooth Relic during the Äsaḷa festival when honour was paid to the Hindu deities. This suggestion was welcomed by the king and thus, this national festival gradually became the Daḷadā Festival which is held annually in the month of August even at present (*See* DAḶADĀ-PERAHĂRA). Kirti Śrī Rājasiṃha built the Inner Templ of the Tooth Relic and completed a golden casket for it begun by the former kings and caused a large lustrous costly diamond to be set on the top of the casket. The caskets were made to cover the above casket.

The Tooth Relic was removed to another place of safety during the wars between Śrī Vickrama Rājasiṃha and the British. It was brought back only after the Kandyan kingdom was handed over to the British on the 2nd March 1815, and was housed in the Palace of the Tooth Relic in Kandy. When in 1818, a rebellion broke out it was removed to Matale by the bhikkhus. Once again it was placed back in the same palace by the British, and a resident was appointed as its custodian known as the Diyavaḍana Nilame (See DIYAVAḌANA NILAME). In 1853 the custody of the Tooth Relic was handed over to this official and to the two chief Theras of Asgiriya and Malwatta Chapters in Kandy.

It is but fair by the accounts known to us, historically and otherwise, to arrive at the conclusion that the Tooth Relic was considered as the National Treasure of the Buddhists from the time of its arrival in Sri Lanka. Other Buddhist countries of the world too seem to have envied Sri Lanka for possessing such a valuable treasure which gives lot of faith and encouragement to the Buddhists at large all over the world. It is mentioned that when an embassy was sent to China during the reign of Mahānāma (406–428 A.C.) they presented the Chinese Emperor with a model of the shrine of the Tooth (Paranavitana, op. cit. p. 379). According to the Chinese sources, the third Ming Emperor of China, Cheng Tsu who came to the throne in 1403 A.C. sent an admiral named Cheng Ho to Sri Lanka in order to acquire the Tooth Relic.

A noteworthy aspect of the cult of the Tooth Relic was the belief that by carrying out the necessary rituals, the gods could be induced to make rain fall. Even today, the general belief is that rain would fall when the Tooth Relic is taken out in procession. Sometimes one could arrive at the conclusion that the possession of the Tooth Relic by the king also became a necessity, because the ancient people considered that it was the duty of the king to ensure the rain-fall in due season for cultivating purposes and other use. During the reign of Parākramabāhu IV a great procession of the Tooth-Relic was held when there was no rain (Vālivitiye Sorata, op. cit. p. 53). According to the chronicles, when Parākramabāhu I was the king of Sri Lanka a great shower had fallen when the Tooth Relic was brought to the city, although it was not the rainy season (*Mhv.* lxxiv, *vv.* 228 240).

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I. K.

According to Chinese records, during the 5th century, a Chinese monk of the Southern Chi dynasty, named Fa-hsien, travelled to Khotan and brought back to Nanking one of the Tooth Relics of the Buddha which had orginally been brought there from the ancient kingdom of Udayana. During the Five Dynasties when Central China fell into a chaotic state, the Tooth Relic was taken from place to place until it reached Yen-Ching (present Peking) of the Liao dynasty in the North. The "Chronicle of Emperor Tao-tsung" in the *History of the Liao Dynasty*, Vol. XXII, contains a record relating the enshrinement of the Buddha's Tooth Relic in the Chao-hsien Pagoda in the 8th month of the 7th year of Hsien-yung (1071).

In 1900 when the allied forces of eight imperialist countries invaded Peking, the original pagoda together with the monastic buildings was destroyed. After the catastrophe, the monks of the monastery, when clearing the place, found in the basement of the pagoda a stone casket in which the Tooth-Relic was preserved. In the casket there was an aloe-wood box on which were written the words: "The Holy Tooth-Relic of Shakyamuni Buddha, written by Shan-hui on the 23rd day of the 4th month in the 7th year of Tien-hui."

In 1957 the Buddhists of China proposed to construct a new pagoda according to Buddhist tradition with the purpose of providing a permanent place for the worship of the Holy Tooth. From the summer of 1958, till the spring of 1964, the construction works of the stately new pagoda, together with its accessory buildings, were completed. The inauguration ceremony was held on June 25, 1964, with the attendance of Buddhist delegations from many Asian countries. The information furnished here is extracted from *the Buddha's Tooth-Relic Pagoda*, compiled and published by the Buddhist Association.

E–in–C

DAḶADĀ MĀLIGĀVA, the Sinhalese name of the shrine in which was kept the Tooth Relic of the Buddha conveyed to Sri Lanka by a prince and princess of Kàliṅga in the 9th year (309 A.C.) of King Kitti Sirimeghavaṇṇa of the island (*Mhv.* xxxvii, *v.* 92 ff.). The word means 'palace of the (eye) tooth (of the Buddha)'; more simply, it was described in the earliest centuries as 'house' of the Tooth Relic (*daḷadā-ge*). Today, the term 'Daḷadā Māligāva' is exclusively used for the temple in Kandy in which this relic is housed.

The first building entitled to be called a house for the relic itself was a shrine in Anuradhapura which went by the name of Dhammacakka (*Dammacakkhāvhaye gehe*) and was standing from the time of Devânampiya Tissa (3rd century B.C.), in the royal premises. Here the relic reposed until a special *Daḷadā-ge* was built in the course of the years. The remains of just such a later structure are to be seen to this day in the ancient inner city.

There were other temples erected specially for the relic in the next royal capital, Polonnaruva, from about a century or two afterwards. The remains of two of them are known in the raised terrace anciently known as Daḷadā Maḷuva (now Sacred Quadrangle), where there is the largest single concentration of ancient temples. One of them, the Aṭa-dā-ge, was the shrine put up by Vijayabāhu I (1055–1110). The other is the Hāṭa-dā-ge erected at the instance of Nissaṅka Malla (1187–96). Both these are known from archaeology (*CJSc. II*, p. 161 ff.). Parākramabāhu I (1153 86) had also got Mahinda, one of the 'closest of his followers,' to build a shrine which has been grandiloquently described (*Mhv.* lxxiii, *v.* 128 ff.).

"Now this man with the favour of the sublime Monarch who was ever a helper in all (good) enterprises, caused a *pāsāda* to be built for the honour of the sacred Tooth Relic which was pure by its suffusion with the nectar of the eighty-four thousand portions of the doctrine. The same (*pāsāda*) was embellished by a roofing and doors and windows of gold and was resplendent with numerous paintings within and without. It gleamed with canopies of various colours like a golden mountain surrounded by a net of lightning. It was resplendent with curtains which glistened in brilliancy, and with a series of couches covered with costly coverings. It was like a dwelling of the goddess of beauty, glorious as if all the grace found in each living being were concentrated in one spot. It was resplendent with its vast, charming ball of the moon, which was wonderfully beautiful, white as light, or as pearl ornaments, or as geese, or as snow, or as a cloud. Banners were fixed on it, it was fair, with gilded summit, bright, calling forth delight, beautiful."

This has not been identified. However, the lyrical sentiments here are typical of the descriptive language used for the *daḷadā* shrines of the later rulers.

The royal seats were moved in the course of the years to different parts of the island. Thus, the relic reposed in various places. In times of stress it was housed in temporary shelters which, too, were honoured by the same dignified name. Whether permanent or temporary, therefore, the temple was a *daḷadā-ge* (*māligāva*) as far as the pious Buddhist understood it.

The Daḷadā Māligāva in Kandy is the only living instance of this type of shrine and is the one temple of the name known to the average person. The hill city of Kandy was the last capital of the line of indigenous rulers and maintained this position of dignity unitil 1815, when the administration of the island passed into British hands.

The shrine in which the relic is housed stands within a large complex of buildings and is not seen direct from the high road. The group has been erected on the slope of a hill so that it is in stages which descend towards the road. The siting was also related to that of the royal palace which is aligned north. At the other end is the lake of the city constructed on the orders of the last king, and then known by the name 'Kiri Muhuda' (MilkySea). Its bed was once a valley which had belonged to Malvatta Vihāra (Pupphārāma), the important

monastery on the opposite bank. A high road runs between the southern end of the Māligāve buildings and the lake. A pretty parapet wall from the palace area borders the high roads and marks off the religious buildings. It has been described as crenellated[1] and the niches and holes which pierce its face are used for lamps during festivals. This wall is interrupted to give entrance to the premises.

The Approaches.—The first few steps lead to a bridge over a moat at the back of the parapet; the bridge or gangway passes through the Mahāvāhalkaḍa (Great Porch), a massive unroofed erection of brick and plaster; a second crenellated wall runs in line with the rear of this porch—its lines are mellower than those of the first wall, but their functions are similar. The path here turns right, towards steps and a landing from which it turns left by some steps which lead to the actual threshold of the complex. The section at the back of the second parapet wall is used for the dressing of the temple elephants during festival time and to fix the howdahs and caskets on their backs.

The Octagon.—Before the threshold is crossed, and standing high above the moat to face the road, is a picturesque abutment with the impression of a large-sized balcony. Its plinth, which is fused into the group, is heavily moulded and punctured by small window spaces. Known as the Octagon for its shape, it was the *pattirippuva* (for the royalty to watch sports in the square down below) which the last king added to the complex. A deep pillared varandah runs round it, except at its entrance from within the buildings. The upper section is a library; the lower, the office of the monk-librarian. The library is also popularly regarded as a shrine, for it contains mainly religious works as well as other objects venerated by many a devotee.

Corridor and Hall.—Past the threshold of the group is a low, deep corridor, much like an arched tunnel. The two-storeyed shrine, the temple of the Tooth, stands right across, on its separate courtyard. The oblong pillared hall which intervenes between the farther end of the corridor and the entrance to the temple proper is the *hevisi maṇḍapa* ('drumming pavilion'), functionally, the same as the *dig-ge* (long house'), that is, the section for temple musicians. At the back of it, towards the corridor are 'perpetual lamps' (the *dolosmahepān* or 'twelve-months lamps'), in high glass-faced booths, which are kept continuously lighted.

Subsidiary Shrine.—From the hall on one side is the entrance to the Octagon. At right is the *pallemāle* ('lower floor'), a subsidiary shrine built over the corridor. Ritually, this shrine has been interpreted as the understudy of the Temple of the Tooth, the services at which have been described from those conducted in this sub-temple.[2] It houses the usual objects of devotion, with an extra item or two which are chiefly incidental.

Thūpa.—On the other side is a small gilt thūpa at which devotions are paid. What it enshrines is not precisely known, but a tradition is current that the Buddha's begging-bowl relic (*pātra dhātu*) reposes within.

Wings.—The two-floored wings (aligned to the thūpa and the Octagon, respectively) which flank either side of the main shrine contain rooms put to assorted purposes. Those in line with the Octagon at the end, are used as the administration block by the chief lay executive, the Diyavaḍana Nilame (s.v.). The lower rooms on the opposing side are for stores, washing, etc.; in the upper rooms reside the monks to conduct the daily services.

Upper Hall.—The floor above the drumming hall is where the devotees have to congregate on days when the relic is brought out of the adytum. For this exposition a small square pavilion area is marked out in front of the upper entrance doorway. This section is mainly a renovation and re-arrangement, while the wing section (both upper and lower) is entirely new.

Temple of the Tooth—The Temple of the Tooth proper is two-floored and has its own individuality. Standing on its own courtyard, it is led into by its own moonstones. The other buildings or sections in front are its adjuncts which have been made to be contiguous with it; at the rear and at the two sides it stands separated by its yard, so that the surrounding arms or buildings merely enclose it.

Date.—This shrine apparently dates from the first three decades of the 18th century, when King Narendrasiṃha rebuilt it because the three-storeyed building by his father needed replacement. A plan made when the latter was still standing and the new one was being built was found among some papers in Holland. This shows the two ground plans to be unchanged.

1. J. E. Tennent, *Ceylon*, II, p. 196.
2. A. M. Hocart, *ASC Mem.* IV, p. 7. The basic material (architectural and ritual) is from this author.

Lower Floor.—The lower section of the building is enclosed by a pillared verandah ; a railing on the yard, which is used for illuminations, further marks it off. The lower floor is divided into a *dig-ge* in front with a room of smaller size (*mahā aramudala* ; 'great treasure room') towards the back. Functionally, the former is the hall of drumming. The doors of the *mahā aramudala* are generally kept closed as the gold vessels are kept here. A stairway in one corner of the *dig-ge*, towards the entrance, is the way up to the sanctuary above.

Upper Floor.—The arrangement of space on the upper floor (the verandahs excluded) practically conforms to that below. As the area is the same, the pressure of weight has been neutralized by the device of having plastered wooden walls above. This upper floor is distinctly marked out into three stages. In front is the *haňdun kūḍama* ('sandalwood shed'), next to it a narrow space (also entitled to the same description) which is the portal of the sanctuary, and the sanctuary itself—the adytum.

For the daily services those coming from below enter this first ante-chamber. Here are the huge *kiri pātra* ('milk bowls') to contain the offerings of rice, and also a copper one for the first fruits of the rice harvest. They next move on to the second, in turn, from where they hand over the offerings to the monks in the sanctuary and worship.

Generally speaking, pilgrims are not permitted into the sanctum, and when visiting monks are allowed in, they have to wear the broad yellow waist-band like the monks performing duties within. The upper lintel of the doorway of the sanctuary (*Ätul* or *Vāḍasiṭina Māligāva* : Inner Palace or Palace of the Abode) is decorated with an inverted brass lotus ; the threshold is covered with sheets of silver ; the door-frame is lavishly ornamented with precious material (ivory, gold, silver, inlaid gems etc.) in the art typical of the hill country and of the period.

Adytum.—The relic is kept secured behind a barred 'cage' and its key is held by the Diyavaḍana Nilame. On account of the political implications in the possession of the relic (now gone into desuetude) the early British administrators took this security measure.

Seven rich caskets cover the relic. The innermost cover is of glass and truncated in shape. An upturned lotus of gold functions as the actual pedestal. A gold wire issuing from it holds the relic in the middle. The relic is kept on a throne of gold.

Only three of the caskets have keys, and these are held in triple sets. One each is held by the head monk (mahānāyaka) of the administration of the Malvatta and the Asgiriya Ordinations, and the other by the Diyavaḍana Nilame. But these three custodians by themselves do not take the decision to expose the relic for worship. The concurrence of the civil authority is a *sine qua non*.

Adjuncts : On the sides of the sanctum are small rooms. The room behind is the *haḷu maṇḍape* ('robe pavilion') ; one side-room is the *kattiyana barāňda* in which the load-carrying shoulder-poles are kept. On the opposite side is the *gepalun barāňda* ('store-keeper's verandah') for keeping the musical instruments ; the extension from this leads to the exit stairway. Aligned with the *kattiyana barāňda* (on a flank of the entrance stairway) is the *kavikāra maḍuva* (pavilion for poets') where ritual hymnal is sung during festival time.

The temple was the most lavish construction of its times. In those days a staggering wealth undoubtedly went into the work of piety of which it stands as the noblest expression. The *Mahāvaṃsa* (xcvii, *v.* 38 ff.) succinctly describes it as the chronicler saw it for himself. "The Lord of men had the beautiful (temple) rebuilt, two-storeyed, splendid ; he provided it with a portal resplendent with all kinds of brilliant ornaments, made it so that with its stucco coating it resembled a mountain of silver, provided it with a graceful roof and had thirty-two Jātakas depicted in coloured painting on the two walls of the courtyard." In the after years, up to the present, the devout have contributed to add to its brilliance, and the Government has granted funds towards renovations and additions with modern amenities.

Services : The performance of the daily rites in connection with the relic is the responsibility of the Malvatta and the Asgiriya establishments who have long agreed upon their taking turns[3]. The Mahānāyaka of each of these vihāras appoints his delegates for this work ; the monks who perform the rites are seniors and elderly ones. During the period of their duties they reside in rooms in the premises of the Daḷadā Māligāva.

3. This section is almost wholly from A. M. Hocart, op. cit.

The temple doors are drawn back at dawn. The main and the subsidiary shrines are opened only during the times of service. There are three daily services, two in the forenoon and one in the evening. The first is at dawn, the next about 9 or 9.30, and the evening service about 6.30 p.m. The time is reckoned by the traditional Sinhalese hour,[4] and the services (*pūjā*) are named in line with these intervals. Drumming is the preliminary to a service.

For the dawn service, as the monk in charge appears in the distance with his retinue the drumming rises into a roll. The monks are preceded by a torch-bearer ; the *vaṭṭerurāḷa* (*vaṭṭoru*), or steward, carries the keys, which are large and wrapped up, at the level of his shoulders. The monks have their feet washed by one of the musicians and move on to the shrines. One, accompanied by the *pallemāleraāḷa* ('chief of the lower floor'), enters the subsidiary shrine ; the others go up to the shrine proper. The public are shut out from the service in the sanctuary.

The monks within the shrines adjust their robes (the right shoulder being left bare) in such a way as to tighten them round the waist by a broad band. The threshold is crossed by stepping over. Before opening the door, the monk kneels and makes his obeisance, lights the lamps and then washes his hands it being a rigid rule that he must so cleanse himself whenever he touches objects like a skin ('prayer mat'), the broom, the spittoon, etc., before he handles the offerings. Upon the table ('altar') there would be the flowers and the betel-leaves from the overnight service ; a cloth is spread to cover them. The door of the sanctuary is shut. The monks prepare the objects offered in the first part of the service (*tevāva*), namely, the three robes, fan, fly-whisk, two gold water-pouring jars (like coffee-pots), a golden finger-bowl like goblet (*kusalāna*), the camphor-burning lamp and cuspidor.

When everything has been arranged, a monk through the half open door holds out the coffee-pot jars (*keṇḍi*) into which water is poured by a servitor outside ; the water of one is for drinking and of the other for washing.

The rites proper now commence, with the ministrant keeping his hands in worship and reciting the well-known 'Buddhist creed' beginning, *Ye dhammā hetuppabhavā*, while facing the direction of the relic. (All the stanzas recited are in Pali.) He holds up the *keṇḍi*, sets it down joining hands in worship, to present it with the left hand touching it flat with his right-the traditional gesture throughout. The stanza he recites has been rendered "Lord, may it cleanse Thy soft tender buds of hands variegated with network of pattern, beautifully marked, naturally pure.".

He next takes up a stick (for cleaning the teeth)' which has been fitted into a golden handle, and moving it thrice up and down, presents it reciting words to mean : "May the Blessed One receive the toothstick and water, as if it were a toothstick of betel-vine with the waters of Anotatta lake". The stick is thrown away into the spittoon and the handle laid on the altar. Thrice again he pours water into the spittoon, when (it would seem that) the following sentiments are recited : "Like Bhadanta Ānanda let me wash the Sakyan leader (*Sakyapuṅgava*) with pure water for the weal of the world". A piece of cloth representing a towel is next taken up in the hands, which are held in worship, and moved up and down twice ; apparently the following seems to accompany the act : "Like the fleeting autumn clouds above, below, round the moon, I perform for these the wiping of the face with a clean towel," and "with a thin white cloth scented with clothes perfume, I perform on the Sage's body the wiping off of the bathing water." The three robes are offered by the act of merely reciting : "With the triple robe originating from the silken Benares, beautiful with saffron tint I clothe the Blessed Teacher."

In like manner every stage of the ensueing rites is accompanied by the recital of stanzas pregnant with meaning and descriptive of the particular action. The feet are symbolically washed by the pouring of water into the spittoon ; a seat offered for use after the feet have been so washed ; the body fanned thrice ; the fly-whisk waved ; a miniature bell tung seven times as a sound offering - after which the articles used are removed to the adjoining room.

The camphor-lamp is now lighted, sandalwood water is sprinkled with a plumeria flower (of the 'temple-tree'), and the camphor and scented water are taken inside. This is the final act of the *tevāva*. The monk kneels down and then goes to wash his hands. The steward empties the spittoon, an act permitted to him or to the monk and none else.

4. From one dawn to the next is the traditional 60 hour day of the Sinhalese.

Now the big bell is rung thrice, the drums roll a while and cease. His hands washed, the monk now receives a golden tray with the flowers left overnight, there being at this service no *malmure* (flowers due to be supplied by the appointed temple tenant). The flowers are offered with the usual stanza recited by Buddhist devotees. The door is now opened and the worshippers, who have been waiting in the first (large) ante-room, are admitted into the small chamber, to the threshold of the sanctuary. The flowers, mainly jasmine and plumeria, are in small wicker trays which are passed on to the steward, who presents them to the monk for laying on the altar. Sometimes the monk takes them direct from a devotee. Their offerings over, the worshippers pay obeisance to the unseen relic and retire. Candles, donations of money, etc., are left on the threshold. Sometimes, one would observe even an infant being brought in, as it were to solicit blessing ; very considerately, it is taken to the sanctuary floor for a brief moment ; the parents sometimes make a donation, possibly as a token of redeeming the little one.

Food Offering : During the period of the *tevāva*, a load-carrier has been busy in the pantry to fetch food to be offered as part of the service. His movements towards the shrine, as well as those of the storekeeper who carries in his hands a dish covered with a cloth, are accompanied by loud temple music, which slows down when they have entered the shrine, and ceases when the food offering is over. At this ceremony the doors are closed and the curtains drawn ; but sometimes a few worshippers are allowed to remain. Any food brought by devotees is taken into the pantry where small quantities are put into the bowls and cups for the service. A cloth is laid on the altar over the flowers and the food dishes are placed on it. The 'coffee pots' are put on the table, one being held out of the half open door for filling. The goblet is set on the altar. The 'coffee pot' is presented and water poured thrice into the goblet. A stanza is recited. The water in the goblet is emptied into the spittoon ; water (for drinking) is poured thrice again into the goblet.

Fifteen measures[5] of boiled rice are brought in by the store-keeper in four gold and silver bowls. The steward takes them in through the half open door and places them on the table. Five *maṇḍe* (flat dishes) follow ; one has four small bowls containing curries, and one has a large bowl. A coloured cloth covers every vessel. Devotees are sometimes invited to touch the food vessels, and sometimes do it as the trays are passed up, repeating the word '*sādhu*'. The food so far offered comes from the establishment. The offering of the worshippers follows ; occasionally, a devotee is allowed into the sanctum with his offering, but is not permitted to lay it on the table. The steward leaves the sanctum to the monks after the food has all been taken in. The bell is now rung and the rhythm of the drums is changed. One monk alone remains for ministrations. He uncovers the bowls and trays and attends to the accompanying devotions, standing. The first to be offered is the drinking water ; this is followed by gruel. The others, rice, curry and sweetmeats, follow, with the monk in a kneeling position reciting the stanzas of invitation.

The monk now comes outside, as if to permit the Buddha to partake of his meals undisturbed. When next he enters the sanctum, having washed his hands, he pours water into the spittoon. Emptying also the water of the goblet, he waves a small piece of cloth up and down as if to wipe the mouth. The food offering as such is now over. The cloth which covers the flowers is removed, the betel-dish placed in the centre and uncovered, and the Buddha invited to partake of a chew of betel. The dish is again covered, a second time flowers are offered, and the doors opened for the public to make their flower offerings.

Finally, the offering of fragrant smoke takes place, when the altar and walls are fumigated with the burning of the resinuous gum of the *hal* tree handed by one of the musicians. This over, the monks sweep the floor kneel down and recite the stanza generally used at the end of important rites :

Kāyena vācā cittena
Pamādena mayā kataṃ
Accayaṃ khama me bhante
Bhūripaññā Tathāgata.

(Forgive me, venerable World Sage, Blessed One, the sins I may have committed with body, word, thought, through any carelessness.)

Two stanzas of blessing, popular at the conclusion of important recitals, now follow :

Devo vassatu kālena
Sassasampattihetu ca ;
Pīto bhavatu loko ca ;
Rājā bhavatu dhammiko.

5. That is, one measure above a half-bushel.

(Let the gods who promote the welfare of crops cause rain in due season ; let the world rejoice ; may the king be righteous.)

Ākāsaṭṭhā ca bhummaṭṭhā
Devā nāgā mahiddhikā
Puññaṃ taṃ anumoditvā
Ciraṃ rakkhantu lokasāsanaṃ.

(Let the gods and nāgas of great potency who dwell in heaven and on earth share the merit of this act of virtuous conduct, and may they long preserve the faith in the world.)

The inner curtain is drawn and the monks retire backwards. The steward looks into the sanctum, locks the door, and worships. A bell is rung as signal for the doors of the subsidiary shrine to be closed. The officiating team descends to the lower floor, the monk in charge going last, carrying the keys to see that every-thing is being left in its proper order. Below, they meet the officiating monk at the other shrine, after which they go to their respective quarters until the next turn of duty.

There is no preliminary drumming at the day service and no torch-bearer. The steward carries the keys before the monks. The sanctuary is swept and the flowers are removed from the altar which is then sprinkled with water. As there is no *tevāva* rite, the offering of flowers (*malmurē*), the obligation of a temple tenant, is the first stage towards the service. The *malmurē* flowers are emptied into a round gold (or silver) tray held by the monk. A further large tray of silver with flowers is next handed in. The curtains of the doorway are not drawn in, and the sprinkling of water on the flowers can be watched by the worshipers, more of whom are present at this time. The load-carrier now appears with the food offerings, his arrival being signalled by the beating of drums. Seven bowls of rice and six trays of sweets and curries are provided by the temple at this rite ; on special occasions the number is thirty ; gruel is absent being a special breakfast dish. The water-vessels are got ready and the monk makes his obeisance, washing his hands thereafter. The food is handed in and the tooth-stick laid on the table, upon which the waiting conch-blower blows on his instrument a long while. Water is poured into the bowl, the tooth-stick offered, water emptied into the spittoon and the dishes are removed. Betal is next offered. The service closes with the offering of flowers ; the door is shut about 11.00 a.m.

Drumming for about half an hour (*hāňdā durē*) signalizes the time of the evening service ; it ceases upon the arrival of the monks and is resumed with the arrival of the load-carrier on the note of the 'auspicious drumming' (*maṅgul bera*) at the end of the *tevāva* in place of the offering of food.

The shrine is swept and the table cleared. At the *tevāva* no tooth-stick is used because the last meal for monks is taken by midday. The general procedure is as at dawn. After the tenant's flowers, comes the offering of flowers by the public. Soft drinks are offered in place of food, and sometimes there are the special 'eight kinds of drinks' (*aṣṭavidhapāna*). The store-keeper brings the special *bolapān* (water) in a metal pot and fills two small goblets. The drinks are served in the same way as food was earlier in the day. In the recitations the expression *gilānapaccayaṃ* (here designating drinks) is substituted for that meaning food. Offerings from the devotees follow those by the temple. As before, the monks leave the room while the refreshments are being 'taken,' and after other servings betel is offered ; the public then offer flowers. Three bells mark the end, the drums beat a while longer and cease.

In the main shrine only, there is a second offering of refreshments. This, it is said, is a continuation of an incident of an 18th century king, who had happened to arrive too late for the regular service and a second one had to be held for his benefit.

After the public have offered flowers and the steward and the load-carrier swept the shrine and the antechamber, respectively, the doors are closed for the burning of incense. Outside, on the upper floor, the conch is blown, the drumming resumed, incense burnt, the bell is rung thrice, and the drums roll for a brief space, marking the end of the rites. The sanctuary is opened for the monks to prostrate themselves ; they put out the lights, sprinkle sandalwood water and retire backwards. The party descends after locking the doors ; this is reported to the monks, when the watchers take charge. The keys are wrapped up in a cloth by the steward. The *ārāccī* ('sergeant') keeps the keys.

Wednesday Day Service : This service is connected with ceremonial bathing, and is known as *Nānumura-maṅgallaya*. On auspicious occasions (such as the ceremonial first bath in the traditional New Year) a preparation, known as *nānu*, is applied on the head before the bath. The mixture is prepared in the kitchen and has, for ingredients, leaves of the water-lily, flour, leaves of the hibiscus, *āmalaka* fruit (embyllic myrobalan) and slices of the lime-fruit. These are put into a bowl on a large silver tray on which there is a second bowl with sandalwood and water and the piece of sandalwood

from which a paste is prepared. The tray is covered with a cloth. It is on this day that a special officer (*haňdun kapurāḷa*) prepares the sandalwood for the entire week. The serving monks themselves bathe before they come in; they themselves clean the vessels with water. The drummers are more numerous at this service.

After the shrine has been opened by the monks a canopy is brought into the kitchen and preceded by a torch-bearer; under it goes the store-keeper, the *pallemālerāḷa* ('lower floor chief') carrying the *nānu* and the load-carrier. Their appearance is the signal for music; the drums are beaten, conch blown, and upstairs the singers accompany them with their voices raised in religious recital. In between, the ministrant monk has laid out the robes etc., as at the dawn service; in front of the altar the spittoon is placed on a small table; some camphor oil, too, is ready in a receptacle. In the pantry the *nānu* is mixed and the plumeria flowers added. The water is poured into two *keṇḍi*. The *nānu* rite which is being performed upstairs is accompanied by the sound offering of auspicious drums, the drummers circumambulating thrice and worshipping.

The ministrant monk bows in front of the altar and rubs fragrant oil on a mirror held by a lay attendant over the spittoon to face the tooth relic. Before offering the *nānu* he recites a stanza to mean: "Let me anoint with pure, frangrant oil the mightiest among men (*narāsabha*), best in the world, of smooth limbs and fair face." When the offering is being made, the stanza he repeats means: "On the Sage's golden coloured resplendent body that conveys sweetness to the eyes of the people I perform the anointing with fragrant myrobalan." The mixture is poured over the mirror to trickle into the spittoon. Water is offered and poured likewise, at first hot water and next scented water, with words meaning: "Let me anoint the Sage's head with the waters of a golden pitcher, strained clean, mixed with sweet savours." The towel for drying the head is then offered (to the accompaniment of a stanza), followed by a second towel. The monk makes obeisance, standing. The *tevāva* follows as at dawn with minor changes.

During these proceedings, two old women dressed in white who are known as *ālattiammā* have been waiting in the verandah with incense-sticks in their hands; they now come up and kneel before the sanctuary door, when the curtain in front is thrown around them. Only the monk and the lay steward are witnesses of what they do, for the women themselves keep silence over their actions. It is believed that the women hold lighted lamps which they wave in a circle, presumably as a rite against ill-luck. The doors are thrown open to the public. The rest of the service is as usual, except that the singing of religious songs continues all through the rite of offering food, it being said that singers used to sing the king to sleep after his meal.

On Sundays and during the *uposatha* days of the quarterly phases of the moon, there are special services but on a minor key. At the *pallemāle* the ritual is much simpler than at the main shrine; here, however, no women participate at any stage.

Among observances described as private, there is the offering of food to the Saṅgha during the Wednesday day-service; but it is not part of the service as such.

Sirimeghavaṇṇa decreed that a ceremonial be observed regularly for the relic (*Mhv.* loc. cit.). But the current proceedings are largely based on the rites prescribed in the *Daḷadā Sirita* by Parākramabāhu IV (1302–26) on the analogy of those for a living Buddha.

The property of the temple is scattered in various places in the country which had been under the direct rule of the kings of the final years of independence; sometimes the fact is recognized from the perpetuation of this ownership, e.g., Daḷadā-gama (Tooth Relic village). Costly vessels of gold and magnificient gifts to the relic through the centuries are stored carefully in the precincts. An inventory is maintained and periodical inspections made of them under the supervision of the Public Trustee. Accounts, including gifts etc., are kept, audited and published in the annual administration reports of this officer of the government.

OFFICEAND TENURE: The Diyavadana Nilame is voted into office for ten years by a body of electors laid down by law. He makes the subsidiary appointments. For their services they are entitled to hold some land belonging to the temple. Service dues are bound with such holdings and devolve on any purchaser; at one stage many of them were assessed in terms of money, and the tenants were thus not obliged to render personal service.

The property of the temple is scattered in various places.

Apart from the solemn occasions of the public exposition of the relic, the annual pageant held in the city of Kandy during the month of Äsaḷha or Äsaḷa is the most widely known event for which the temple is famed. Here the section of the pageant belonging to the Daḷadā Māligāva has come to take precedence from about the mid eighteenth century, on the orders of Kīrti Śrī Rājasiṃha who wanted to give a Buddhist character to the traditional *deva* festival. The temple is also the venue of minor rites such as the *alutsāl maṅgalle* (the Festival of the New Rice, i.e., of the first fruits).

Along with the Bodhi tree at Anurādhapura the temple is the most sacred shrine of Buddhists of the world. Countless numbers pay it their homage. See the complementary articles DAḶADĀ, DAḶADĀ PERAHÄRA, DIYAVAḌANA NILAME.

D. T. Devendra

DAḶADĀ PERAHÄRA. The great festive parade (Sinhala, *Perahära*) held annually in the city of Kandy (Sri Lanka) during the lunar month of Äsaḷa[1] (June-July), primarily in honour of the Sacred Tooth Relic of the Buddha (see DAḶADĀ). Hence its name *Daḷadā Perahära*. It is also called the *Äsaḷa Perahära* because it is held in the month of Äsaḷa. during which period the Sinhala people hold their traditional festivals connected with rain and harvest.

The month of Äsaḷa (Skt. *Āṣāḍha* ; Pali, *Äsaḷha*) has been a period of festivity and mirth in Sri Lanka from the earliest times (*JCBRAS*. XIV, pp. 109, 119). Äsaḷa full-moon day marks an epoch making event in the history of Buddhism, being the day on which the Buddha preached his first sermon, the *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta*. Further, it is in the month of Äsaḷa that the Buddhist laity inaugurates the 'rains retreat' or '*Vassāvāsa*' of three months duration for the bhikkhus with the religious ceremony known as '*Vas Piṅkama*' and abide by a solemn oath to provide the daily requirements of the Saṅgha during their seclusion in the rainy season[2].

History records several occasions on which kings of ancient Sri Lanka held festivals connected with the Sacred Tooth Relic since the time the sacred Tooth Relic was brought here from the kingdom of Kāliṅga at the beginning of the 4th century A.D. The *Mahāvaṃsa*, however, is unusually brief in referring to the inauguration of this festival by King Sirimeghavaṇṇa on receipt of the Relic from Kāliṅga. "The King, his heart swelling with joy, spent 900,000 (*kahāpanas*) and arranged therewith a great festival for the Tooth Relic. He decreed that it should be brought every year to the Abhayuttara-vihāra and that the same sacrificial ceremonial (*pūjāvidhiṃ* : *regular ceremonial offerings*) should be observed" (*Mhv.* xxxvii, *vv.* 92-97).

On the other hand, the Chinese itinerant monk Fa-hsien who arrived in Sri Lanka almost at the beginning of the 5th century (i.e., nearly a century after the Sacred Tooth Relic was brought here) describes most graphically the celebrations associated with the sacred Tooth Relic (S. Beal, Si-Yu-Ki, Chinese accounts of India, Calcutta, 1957 Vol. I. p. 48).

Fa-hsien's observation of the *Daḷadā* festival is most important historically as it corroborates several other ancient records on the same event both by the chroniclers as well as other eaily writers. "They always bring out the Tooth of the Buddha in the middle of the third month[3]. Ten days beforehand the king magnificently caparisons a great elephant and commissions a man of eloquence and ability to clothe himself in royal apparel, and, riding on the elephant, to sound a drum and proclaim as follows.[4] : the bodhisattva during three *asaṅkhyeya kalpas* underwent every kind of austerity, he spared himself no personal sufferings, he left his country, wife and child, more over tore out his eyes to bestow them on another, he mangled his flesh to deliver a dove (from the hawk), he sacrificed his head in alms, he gave his body to a famishing tiger, he grudged not his marrow or brain. Thus, he endured every sort of agony for the sake of all flesh. Moreover when he became perfect Buddha, he lived in the world forty-five years, preaching the law and teaching and converting men. He gave rest to the wretched, he saved the lost. Having passed through countless births, he then entered

1 Wilhelm Geiger, *The Mahāvaṃsa*, Colombo 1950, p. 20. 3

2 The "Vas" observance (seclusion during the rainy season) of the Buddhist monks begins immediately after the Äsala month.

3. It could be observed that it was in the month of Äsala that the Daladā Perahära in the time of Anuradhapura kings too, was held if we take Fa-hsien's reckoning of the year to be the Buddhist year, that begins from the month of Vesak. Hence the third month counted by Fa-hsien would fall in Äsala.

4 Before the Perahära proper is begun its approach is announced to the people by a herald on an elephant back. recalling the ancient practice of the present day *Peramunerdia* (*vide infra*).

Nirvāṇa. Since that event is 1497 years. The eyes of the world were then put out and all flesh deeply grieved. After ten days the tooth of (this same) Buddha will be brought forth and taken to the Abhayagiri Vihāra.[5] Let all ecclesiastical and lay persons within the kingdom who wish to lay up a store of merit, prepare and smooth the roads, adorn streets and highways ; let them scatter every kind of flower and offer incense in religious reverence to the relic.

This proclamation being finished, the king next caused to be placed on both sides of the procession-road representations of the 500 bodily forms which bodhisattva assumed during his successive births. For instance, his birth as Sudāna, his appearance as Sāma, his birth as the king of the elephants and as an antelope. These figures are all beautifully painted[6] in diverse colours and have a very life-like appearance. At length the tooth of the Buddha is brought forth and conducted along the principal road. As they proceed on the way, religious offerings are made to it. When they arrive in the Abhaya Vihāra they place it in the Hall of Buddha, where the clergy and laity all assemble in vast crowds and burn incense, and light lamps, and perform every kind of religious ceremony both night and day, without ceasing. After ninety complete days they again return it to the vihāra within the city."

It is also to be observed that the exposition of the *Daḷadā* in the past, on many occasions in the history of the island, relates to periods of drought. At a very early date, there is evidence of the belief that a public exposition of the *Daḷadā* would bring about rain during such times. The earlier belief that the presence of the Buddha brings rain, relieving thereby the misery of the people in drought stricken territories is attested to in the commentarial introduction to the *Ratana Sutta* (*Khuddakapāṭha Commentary*, p. 163 f.). The Sacred Tooth Relic was undoubtedly regarded as symbolic of the Buddha.

The *Mahāvaṃsa* (xxxvii, *vv.* 189–197) records of a great religious festival which convincingly proves that this belief had already gained wide acceptance, very early in the history of the island. During a period of persistent drought, in the reign of Upatissa I (cir. 460 A.D.), the king is said to have consulted the Buddhist monks as to whether there was anything which the Buddha himself had done during such times of crisis. They related to him this incident of the *Gaṅgārohaṇa Sutta* (*DhpA.* III, pp. 326–340) which is the same as referred to in the introduction to the *Ratana Sutta* (loc. cit.). Thereupon the king is said to have made a golden image of the Buddha, placed the stone alms bowl of the Master filled with water in the hollow of its hands and placed this figure on a great charriot. The very act of taking it out to the street in the company of monks who were reciting the *Ratana Sutta*, is said to have brought about a heavy down-pour of rain.

The mediaeval Sinhalese text *Daḷadāsirita*[6] categorically mentions this fact when it records a royal decree which requires the exposition of the sacred Tooth Relic during periods of drought (*Daḷadāsirita*, ed. Vāliviṭiye Sorata Nāyaka Thera, Colombo, 1950, p. 53).

During the 12th century, Parākramabāhu the great of Polonnaruva is said to have held a *Daḷadā* Festival when the sacred Tooth Relic, together with the Buddha's Bowl Relic (regarded as palladia by kings of Sri Lanka) was brought to Polonnaruva, after their capture from the contenders of Rohaṇa. This festival is said to have lasted for seven nights (*Mhv.* lxxiv, *vv.* 181–248). During the period of the Dambadeniya kingdom Parākramabāhu II (Paṇḍita Parākramabāhu I) had held several religious festivals in honour of the Daḷadā (*Mhv.* lxxxii, *vv.* 8–16; lxxxv, *vv.* 4–33, *r.*93 f.*v* 109 ff.; lxxxvii, *v.* 6) It is important to note that the Tooth Relic festival held by King Parākramabāhu II of Daṁbadeniya (*Mhv.* lxxxvii, *v.* 5 f.), to ward off the evil effects that came in the wake of a drought, agrees in detail with the religious festival held by Upatissa I on a similar occasion earlier.

The Festival of the sacred Tooth Relic was not entirely forgotten during the chaotic times when Sinhalese monarchs had to shift their capitals from one place to another for the sake of greater security. King Buvanakabāhu I (cir. 1272–1284 A.D.) of Yāpahuva (Subhagiri) held a festival in honour of the Sacred Relic before it was taken away to the Pandyan capital by the invading commander Āryacakravarti of the Paṇḍu king.

A more descriptive account of *Daḷadā Perahāra* is recorded in the *Mahāvaṃsa* during the time of King Parākramabāhu IV, of Kurunāgala (Paṇḍita

5 This tallies with the account of the chronicler that the Daladā was annually brought in procession from the Tooth Relic temple to the Abhayagiri Vihāra (*Mhv. ch.* 37, *v.* 97).

6 These were the Jātaka tales illustrated for the edification of the laity who throng the city to witness the great festival. Fa-hsien's remark also gives a clue to the high standard the ancient Sinhalese have attained in the art of painting, although documentary evidence is scarce today.

Parākramabāhu II, cir. 1303–1333 A.D.) — "A festival glorious with flowers and perfumes and with lamps and incense, provided with all foods, soft and solid, and with all that are drinks and sips, beautified by the reverberating sound of the five musical instruments, fair through the dances and songs performed by the dancing girls and actors, giving delight to the world" (*Mhv.* xc, *vv.* 66–79). It is the same event that the king had decreed to be recorded in the treatise *Daḷadāsirita*.

The following kings of the Kotte period of Sri Lanka's history are mentioned in the *Mahāvaṃsa* as having venerated the Tooth Relic. King Buvanekabāhu V, (cir. 1372–1408 A.D., *Mhv.* xci, *vv.* 9–12) and Parākramabāhu VI (1412–1467; *Mhv.* xci, *vv.* 17–21), until the Sacred Relic was moved to its present resting place in Kandy during the reign of King Vimaladharmasūriya I (1592–1604; *Mhv.* xciv, *v.* 11 f.).

Although not mentioned in the chronicles, during the reign of King Rājasiṃha I of Sītāvaka, also, the *Daḷadā Perahära* was held in the province of Sabaragamuva, when the Sacred Tooth Relic was enshrined in the Delgamu Vihāra (near Ratnapura). The divinity that was primarily associated with the *Perahära* festival of Rājasiṃha's time was Mahāsaman whose fare is still found in Ratnapura. The route of the annual *Perahära* was between the Delgamu Vihāra and the Mahāsaman Devālaya (Ven. Kiriälle Gñāṇavimala Thera, *The Ancient Documents of Saparagamu* in Sinhala, Colombo, 1942, p. 45 f.).

King Rājasiṃha I had appointed various dignitaries to be in charge of the religious functions of the sacred festival and the two shrines, viz. the shrine of the sacred Tooth Relic and the Mahā Saman Devālaya (ibid. p. 47). What is most striking in these references to the *Daḷadā Perahära* held during the time of King Sītāvaka Rājasiṃha is that the very pattern of the *Perahära* as found today, was prevailing even at that time of the kingdom of Sītāvaka (cir. 16th century A.D.), although it is referred to by some that the pattern of today's *Perahära* is a suruival of the *Daḷadā Perahära* initiated by the Nayakkar king, Kīrthi Śrī Rājasiṃha, of Kandy. The two chief divisions *Kuṁbal* and *Randoli* of the present *Daḷadā Perahära* were apparently found even during the time of Sītāvaka Rājasiṃha which factor indicates that these important components of the *Daḷadā Perahära* have a deep rooted history although its origin is shrouded in obscurity.

It is also noteworthy that King Rājasiṃha I of Sītāvaka who has been portrayed as a tyrant and a ruthless persecutor of Buddhism in several medieval writings was, according to some available Sabaragamuva edicts and royal grants, a monarch who had not failed to do his duty by the religion of the Buddha. In his benefactions to the cause of Buddhism, he was almost on a par with the other monarchs of his time, although in some parochial writings, this warrior king has seemingly been depicted calumniously. This may be the result of the severe treatment meted out by him to the bhikkhus who plotted to overthrow him (loc. cit.).

The brother and successor to King Vimaladharmasūriya I, King Senarat had held a great festival in honour of the Seacred Tooth Relic (*Mhv.* xcv., *v.* 2 f.). The *Mahāvaṃsa* does not record any Tooth Relic festival during the time of King Rājasiṃha II of Kandy, but Robert Knox, the British captive in Kandy during the time, writes about the annual festival held in Kandy during the month of Äsaḷa, i.e., June-July (Robert Knox, *An Historical Relation of Ceylon*, ed. S. D. Saparamadu, Tisara Press, Ceylon, 1966, p. 148 ff.). Although in Knox's account no mention is made of the Sacred Tooth Relic in association with the festival held, it is unlikely that the *Daḷadā* was dissociated from the Äsaḷa festival during the reign of Rājasiṃha II. It is also probable that the Relic was taken away to a place of greater security owing to constant enemy attacks on Rājasiṃha's capital and at the time of the festival to which Knox refers, it was still kept hidden away and was not thought discreet to be taken out for public exposition or parade.

His successors, Vimaladharmasūriya II (1687–1707) and Vīraparākrama Narendrasiṃha (1707–1739), are reported to have been regular in their honouring of the Tooth Relic (*Mhv.* xcvii, *v.* 4 f., *dāṭhāpūjā*; *v.* 25 *dantadhātumahā*).[7]

According to the chronicles, the Nayakkar kings of Kandy also held such festivals: Śrī Vijaya Rājasiṃha (1739–1747; *Mhv.* xcviii, *vv.* 38–57). Kīrti Śrī Rājasiṃha (1747–1782; *Mhv.* xcix, *vv.* 42–65 and 86) and Rājādhi Rājasiṃha (1780–1798; *Mhv.* ci., *v.* 14 f.). It is interesting to note that the chronicler makes special mention of the fact that Kīrti Śrī Rājasiṃha ordered that precedence be given to the honouring of the Buddha, i.e., the

7 Cf. Nātheśvara shrine built by Vīraparākrama Narendrasiṃha: *Mhv.* ch. 97, v. 46, and Robert Knox, op. cit. p.150

Tooth Relic in the celebration of the "Äsaḷa festival "*Anuvaccharam pavattentam āsaḷhi-chana-ussavam buddhapūjam purakkhatvā pavattetum vicintiya*" (*Mhv.* xcix, *v.* 53 ff.).[8]

The *Daḷadā Perahāra* is reckoned today as the grand national festival. This position is the result of historical circumstances of over fifteen centuries. Judging by the character and content of the festival, it would not be incorrect to say that it is replete with both religious and social traditions. It exhibits today a great deal more than the religious grandeur and religious simplicity of the festival witnessed by Fa-hsien, almost at the time of its institution in Sri Lanka.

The historical records of Sri Lanka clearly indicate the survival of pre-Buddhist beliefs and practices and their accomodation in the lives of the people even after their conversion to Buddhism. Patronized by the reigning monarchs these pre-Buddhist beleifs etc. have given rise to rites, ceremonies, and festivals which have carried with them a certain amount of socio-political significance. Religious ceremonies with highly-rated social consequences (*maṅgalasammata*) appear to have been initiated by kings, themselves. The *Mahāvaṃsa* (xcix, *v.* 42 f.) refers to such events connected with the honouring of gods like Nātha and Uppalavaṇṇa (Upulvan) during the reign of Kīrti Śrī Rājasiṃha. We also observe that they acquire a political significance when these events with religious and cultural associations are made to preface, as it were, events like military tournaments (ibid. *vv.* 42–50). This combination of a festival of the gods and military tattoo, perhaps, indicates the high watermark of the "Äsaḷa" festival. It is at this point that King Kīrti Śrī Rājasiṃha decided to use this entire pageant in the service of the Buddha (*Buddhapūjaṃ purakkhatvā* etc.), i.e., as accompaniments to a festival of the Tooth Relic.

Thus, in a close analytical study of the *Daḷadā Perahāra*, one discovers within it, religious rites of almost magical character belonging to the sphere of gods, reflections of social and political institutions, diverse grades of cultural attainments as well as different shades of religious aspirations.

The *Daḷadā Perahāra* is inaugurated under the astrological auspices which provide the times for the various rites and rituals connected with it.

The ritual proper begins with the planting of the *kapa* or pole. At an appointed, auspicious moment announced by the chief astrologer of the Daḷadā Māligāva (q.v.), the temple of the Sacred Tooth Relic in Kandy, which normally falls a few days before the new moon of the Äsaḷa month, the representatives of the four *devālayas* (Nātha, Viṣṇu, Kataragama and Pattini) select a sapling of a tree that sheds milky sap, which often happens to be a 'jak' sapling (*Artocarpus integrifolia*),[9] which has not yet borne fruit. The ground around it is cleared, before it is bathed with scented water, smeared with the specially prepared sandal paste and fumigated with burning resin. Flowers, betel and a lighted lamp are kept at the foot of the sapling and in the belief that a deity might be residing in it an appeal is made to him to leave it. The sapling is afterwards felled and the trunk cut into four parts which are distributed among the four *devālayas*, the Tooth Relic temple being beyond these requirements. Nātha *devālaya* gets the first and Viṣṇu, Kataragama and Pattini *deaālayas*, got the second, third and the fourth parts respectively, which order is followed in the arrangement of the *Perahāra* when it parades the streets. Each piece called *kap* is carried in procession to the accompaniment of drumming and music and at the dawn of the new moon day of Äsaḷa, it is planted in a special corner of the *devālaya* premises (formerly outside in the open-air). A white canopy (*uduviyana*) is erected over the *kapa* which is wrapped up in fresh linen and the place decorated with flowers etc.[10]

The *Perahāra* is formally begun at this point of the erecting of *kapa*. For five days from the planting of *kapa* (Sinhala, *kapsituvima*), the *kapurāḷa* (officiating priest of the *devālaya* who is a layman and is not a Buddhist monk) of each *devālaya* circumambulates every evening the *kapa*, having taken the sacred insignia of the gods (*devāyudha*, lit. weapons of the gods: *Mhv.* xcix, *v.* 45), to the accompaniment of drumming and music, flag and fly-whisk bearers and spearmen.

8 Although no reference is made of any Daḷadā festival during the reign of the last Nāyakkar monarch, Śrī Vikrama Rajasiṃha, in the chronicle *Mahāvaṃsa*, a newly discovered document refers to several benefactions in the form of Daḷadā festivals instituted by the last king of the Sinhalese (Nandasena Mudiyanse, A History of the Tooth Relic and glimpses into the Kandyan British relations in early 19th century, *The Buddhist*, Y.M.B.A. Colombo, Vol. XLIII, Nos. 2-5, for 1972, pp. 124–131).

9 Some believe only a jak sapling is used for the purpose. But it is found that any tree bearing milky sap could be used for the purpose.

10 Robert Knox, op. cit. p. 149, where he mentions "a painted stick, about which strings of flowers are hanged and so it is wrapped in branched silk, some part covered, and some not; before which the people bow down and worship." It would be interesting to trace the origin of the world "kap" in "*kap-ruk*"—the wish-yielding angelic tree.

This is in actuality a *perahāra* in miniature which is confined to the courtyard of the four *devālayas*, hence called *Devāla Perahāra*.

On the fifth day it issues into the streets, but still on a moderate scale. A caparisoned elephant carrying a gilded howdah (*ranhilige*) on its back in which is placed the insignia of the deity (*āyudha*), is conducted in procession accomapnied by other caparisoned elephants, drummers, dancers and the Basnāyaka Nilame (chieftain) of the *devālaya*. They assemble in front of the Maligāva (the Tooth Relic Temple). The four *Devāla Perahāras* thus assembled wait until the appointed auspicious hour when the Maligāva tusker, gorgeously decked, carrying a gilded howdah in which is placed the casket carrying the Sacred Tooth Relic comes out with all pomp and glamour to give a lead to the four *Devāla Perahāras*. This is called *Kuṁbal Perahāra*.[11]

Five days after the parading of the *Kuṁbal Perahāra*, the *Randoli Perahāra* begins. It is the most elegant and glamorous version of the *Daḷadā Perahāra*, the matrix of all *perahāras* of Sri Lanka, today. This is actually an expanded version of the *Kuṁbal Perahāra* to which are added the *randoli* (golden palanquins) of the *devālayas*. *Randoli* contains the ornaments of the deities, the sword and pitcher of each *devālaya*. With the introduction of the golden palanquin, the *Perahāra* is transformed into a great pageant whose splendour grows in intensity with each succeeding day.

The main attractions of this great pageant are the caparisoned elephants carrying bejewelled howdahs and the gleaming dancers, drummers, bearers of '*vilakku*' (lighted torches), bearers of flags and banners, *kapurāḷas*, and the Basnāyaka Nilames, headed by the Diyavaḍana Nilame (the highest official of the Tooth Relic Temple).

First come the whip-crackers (*kasakārayas*) making sounds like gun-shots, as if to give an allusion to the train of Indra, the rain god who is heralded by the noice of thunder, and flashes of lightning (the banners). The whip-crackers are followed by the bearers of banners and flags on foot. Behind them, mounted on an elephant, rides a venerable figure, the *Peramuṇerāḷa* (harbinger), who holds in his outstretched hands a palm-leaf book wrapped in cloth (*Lekammiṭi*) which contains the authority and the directions to traverse the streets.[12] Drummers, dancers and musicians follow him. Next comes the Gajanāyaka Nilame (the keeper of royal elephants), mounted on an elephant and carrying a silver goad (*aṅkusa*), the symbol of his office. Drummers and dancers and musicians again. At the next stage walks the Kāriyakaravanarāḷa, who is preceded by numerous drummers and dancers and flanked by a short line of dancers. Behind him comes the tall tusker of the Māligāva, richly caprisoned, truly a majestic beast. It alone walks on a cloth spread on its path (*pāvaḍa*), as it carries in its howdah the relics of the Buddha. For the same reason a canopy (*viyana*) is held over the howdah and a minor officer mounted on an elephant throws jasmine blossoms upon it while others fan it with *cāmara* (fly-whisks made out of white yak tail). Next follows the train of the Diyavaḍana Nilame (the chief lay custodian of the Sacred Tooth Relic), consisting of drummers, dancers and musicians. The aristocratic air of a mediaeval baron is well depicted in the figure of this chief Nilame in his regal attire.

At the next stage walks the lay priest (*kapurāḷa*) of a *devālaya* who is preceded by musicians and drummers and flanked by short lines of dancers and followed by the richly decked elephants attached to his fane, first the *Nātha devālaya*, and then *Viṣṇu*, *Kataragama* and *Pattini*. The gilded howdah on the elephant's back contains the insignia (*āyudha*) of the deity. An attendant animal is on each side, next is a crowd of drummers and musicians and a long line of dancers forming an avenue for the Basnayāka Nilame, the leading lay officer of the *devālaya*.

"Diyavaḍana Nilame and all other cheifs (Basnāyaka Nilames) are dressed in unimaginable mediaeval costumes. Adorning their persons are jewelled daggers, sheaths, weighted necklaces, and enormous rings on fingers. A rich four-cornered

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11 In the former days a chief representative of the Kuṁbal(potters') caste had to go in front of the Perahāra, wearing a white cloth and covering his head with a white turban, carrying in his hands two nets, accompanied by an acolyte who carries a pingo laden with pots, hence the name Kumbal Perahara. (Kirialle Gnanavimala Thera, op. cit. p. 45f)

12 See note 4. For a different interpretation of the role of the Peramunerala and the contents of his lekammitiya, see the *Kandy Perahara* by Sir Richard Aluvihare, 1952, p. 11.

"The Peramunerāla—This official rides on the first elephant. In olden times he carried the mandate from the King giving permission to hold the Perahāra. The mandate has, in the present day, been replaced by an ola manuscript called the Lekam Mitiya, which is a register of the Māligava lands as well as the tenants and the services due by them (Fa-hsien also refers to an official who proclaimed the Perahāra)."

Also H. D. Evers in his *Monks, Priests and Peasant*, E. J. Brill-Leiden, 1972, p. 1: "The Peramunerala (temple official), riding on an elephant and holding the register of temple lands (lekammiṭiya)"—E-in-C.

hat of a pin-cushion shape topped by a tiny golden 'tree' is worn on the head."[13]

Last of all are borne the palanquins of each deity. By their side walk the only women, as it was their right in the capacity of servants of the goddess *Pattini*, (reminiscent of *devadāsis* of Indian temples). Pots with water taken in at the end of the previous year's rites are the only contents of the palanquins; devotees place offerings of money, also in them. "On the final night, the Perahāra traverses the streets till dawn. This is the fifth day of the *Randoli*, which usually coincides with the full-moon of Äsala. Once the usual grand parade through the streets is over, they all reassemble and form into a procession towards the Asgiri Vihāra, where the casket containing the Sacred Tooth Relic is placed in the *Ādāhanamaḷuva Geḍige* temple of the Asgiriya chapter."[14] Before dawn the officers of the four *devālayas* bearing the insignia and the *Randoli* ride out to the Gatambe ferry of the Mahavāli river where they take boat and wait in the middle of the river for dawn to appear. As soon as it does, the *kapurālas*, drawing a circle in the water with their golden swords, empty the old water collected in a similar ceremony in the previous year and refill the pots from the cleaving. The *kap* logs too are floated down. The water vessels and the swords are kept back in the *Randoli* before they proceed towards the city. On their way back they stop at the *Gaṇeṣa Kovil* (the shrine dedicated to god *Gaṇeṣa*, the brother of god Kataragama), at the western entrance the to the city, where the assembled crowds receive the blessings of the God.

The grand pageant is formally concluded with the Day *Perahāra* which commences from the *Ādāhanamaḷuva Geḍige* temple where the Māligāva section of the *Perahāra* awaits the four *Devāla Perahāras* that have gone to the river for the *Diyakāpuma* (water cutting) ceremony. From *Ādāhanamaḷuva* the fully arranged *Perahāra* then returns to the Māligāva, where at the prescribed auspicious moment, the sacred Relic Casket is installed in the sanctum of the temple. The four *Devāla Perahāras* which have joined the *Māligāwa Perahāra* in forming the Day *Perahāra*, now return to their respective shrines. However, dancing, singing and drumming continue within the *Viṣṇu devālaya* for seven days afterwards. They sing devotional songs beseeching the benevolance of the gods for any lapses which may have unwittingly occurred in the performance of the long ceremony. This particular rite is called the *Valiyaknāfuma*, which is an adaptation of the ancient *Kohombakankāriya* ceremony.[15]

Further Reading : Aluvihare, Sir Richard, *The Kandy Perahara*, 1952. Seneviratna, H. L., 'The Äsala Perahāra in Kandy', *The Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies*, July-December, 1963, Vol. 6, No. 2.

A.D.T.E.P.

DALAI LAMA. The official designation of the spiritual and temporal head of Tibet. The institution of Dalai Lama which really came into existence in the latter part of the seventeenth century lasted till 1959 when the present Dalai Lama, fourteenth in the series, was forced into exile by the Chinese invasion of Tibet.

The term *dalai* or *talai* meaning ocean which precedes the Tibetan word *lama* (Buddhist priest) is of Mongolian origin and its equivalent in Tibetan is *gya-tso*. In Mongolian this term is used as a title, signifying metaphorically the depth of learning. The Mongolian ruler Altan Khan, grandson of Khubilai Khan, is said to be the person who first conferred this title on So-nam Gya-tso (1543–88), the high priest of the Ge-lug-pa (q.v.) sect. It appears that since the first conferment of the title the followers of the Ge-lug-pa sect have attached much significance to it as a honorific title, and that all those who attained the eminent position of being the high priest of the Ge-lug-pa sect and who invariably became the Dalai Lama adopted the term *gya-tso* (equivalent of Mongolian *dalai*) as a sort of surname. Thus, the present Dalai Lama is called Tenzin Gya-tso.

The history of this unique institution of Dalai Lama is closely knit with the history of the Ge-lug-pa founded by Tsong-kha-pa (1358–1419). Ge-dun-Trup-pa who succeeded Tsong-kha-pa hap-

13 D. T. Devendra, "The Perahāra," *Ceylon Today*, July, 1963, pp. 9–10.

14 It is believed that this practice is a continuation of an old tradition when the custodians of the Sacred Tooth Relic places the casket enshrining the Sacred Relics, at the *Geḍige* Vihara of the *Ādāhanamaḷuva* temple and removes the golden sword of the monarch for the water-cutting ceremony. The Relic Casket is kept as security for the golden sword until it is returned.

15 C. E. Godakumbara, "Sinhalese Festivals," *JRASCB*, Vol. XIV, for 1970, p. 121, note 106; Id. *Kohombakankāriya*, Colombo, 1963, p. xviii.

penod to be a virtuous and energetic Lama, regarded by his followers to be a saint. Some even thought him to be an incarnation of Avalokiteśvara (Tib.Chen-re-zi), the patron deity of Tibet. When he died, his followers who were influenced by the belief that Ge-dun Trup-pa will once again reappear to serve the Order, sent emissaries to different places frequented by him when he was alive, to see whether they could discover his reincarnation, in the form of a male child, born seven weeks after his death.[1] Finally, with the aid of oracles, they found a child who, it is said, succeeded even in recognising certain articles used by Ge-dun Trup-pa. With his installation as the high priest of the sect the theory of reincarnation got established, and this became the accepted method of finding successors to the headship of Ge-lug-pa sect.[2]

So-nam Gya-tso (1569–1588), the third in the series of successors, who followed Ge-dun Gya-tso (1475–1542) later happened to convert Altan Khan, and thereby became his spiritual teacher. It is said that when these two met for the first time, So-nam Gya-tso was able to make a strong impression on Altan Khan by tracing Altan Khan's and his own previous births to Khubilai Khan and Dro-gon Phags-pa respectively.[3] At this meeting Altan Khan is said to have conferred the title Dalai on So-nam Gya-tso. This high priest was succeeded by Yon-tan Gya-tso (1589–1616) who in turn was succeeded by Ngag-wang Lo-bzang Gya-tso (1617–82) due to whose effort and ingeniousness the institution of Dalai Lama came to be established and acquired not only the spritual power but also the temporal overlordship over whole of Tibet.

He induced Gusri Khan (1582–1654) to overthrow the secular ruler of Tibet and install a governor who was favourable to him. This move enabled him to suppress the Sas-kya sect (Red-cap sect) and establish the authority of the Ge-lug-pa sect, thus establishing himself as the undisputed spiritual authority of Tibet. Later, when the Mongolian power waned he gradually took into his charge the administration of temporal affairs. Seeing that the Manchu Emperor Shun-chin of China was the most powerful ruler of the time Ngag-wang Lo-bzang Gya-tso won him over, and consequently the Chinese Emperor accepted him as his spiritual teachor and the temporal ruler of Tibet as well. Thence onwards Ngag-wang Lo-bzang Gya-tso did everything possible to strengthen his newly acquired power. Expanding the theory of incarnation he proclaimed himself as the incarnation of Tsong-kha-pa who in turn was said to be the incarnation of King Srong-btsan Gam-po. This king was declared to be the incarnation of Avalokiteśvara. Thus, by gradual extension of the theory of incarnation he claimed to be the incarnation of Avalokiteśvara.[4]

This made his position as the spiritual leader quite firm and unassailable. Those who refused to accept his authority were severely dealt with. He appointed Sangye Gyo-tso as the Regent, who with his efficient administration was able to establish Ngag-wang Lo-bzang Gya-tso's temporal authority. He laid much emphasis on the title Dalai Lama and extended as far back as Tsong kha-pa, the founder and the first high priest of the Ge-lug-pa sect. He being the fifth in succession was proclaimed as the Fifth Dalai Lama.

After establishing his position as the spiritual and temporal overlord of the whole of Tibet he changed his residence to the ancient palace of King Srong-btsan Gam-po which stood on the hill called Marpoi-ri (Red Hill), which he renamed Potala.[5] He conferred on the chief priest of Ta-shi Lhun-po the title Panchen Lama[6] and proclaimed him to be the incarnation of Amitābha (Tib. O-pa-me). The successors of Ngag-wang Lo-bzang Gya-tso invariably were heirs to the title of Dalai[7] and to the spiritual and temporal overlordship of Tibet.

S.K.N.

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1. The Tibetans believe that after death the spirit of the dead person remains in an intermediate state (*antarābhava*) for forty-nine days before taking another birth.

2. The procedure adopted in discovering a successor is rather elaborate and perhaps finds no parallel elsewhere in the world. Sometimes the aged Dalai Lama may give clues as to where he will be born. Consultation of Oracles is a must. Often the selected incarnation is made to identify articles used by the previous Dalai Lama. Aid of physiognomy, too, is often sought.

3. Tibetan tradition considers this meeting as a pre-destined event. It is said that Phags-pa, the head of the Sas-kya sect and spiritual guide of Khubilai Khan, predicted that in a later birth he would appear under the name Gya-tso (Mongolian, Dalai) while the Emperor Khubilai Khan himself would be born as Altan Khan. When Altan Khan was told by an astrologer that he had been Khubilai Khan in a previous birth he desired to find his spiritual teacher and sent emissaries to Tibet. It may be that So-nam Gya-tso, for his own personal benefit posed as the incarnation of Phags-pa.

4. Nga-wang Lo-bzang Gya-tso is even said to have discovered a 'book of revelation' in which this line of incarnation had been prognosticated by King Srong-bstan Gampo himself.

5. Potala is considered to be the abode of Avalokitesvara himself.

6. Panchen Lama, also called Tashi Lama as he is the head of the Tashi Lhun po monastery, ranks only second to Dalai Lama. The procedure adopted in selecting a Panchen Lama is very much similar to the procedure of selection of a Dalai Lama.

7. Though this is the most common and widely known epithet, the Tibetans themselves usually refer to the Dalai Lama as Kyam gon-rim-po, che Gye-wa-rin-po-che, Buk, Ku-dun and so forth.

DAMBADENIYA. Today, it is a small township in the Kurunegala district in Sri Lanka. However, Dambadeniya (Pāli : Jambudoni) was even more than a seat of royalty let alone a township. It marks the beginning of a new royal house of Sinhalese kings as distinct from the early Maurya and Lambakarṇa (Lamaṇi) dynasties of Anuradhapura. What is pertinent to the present study is the concerted effort made by the rulers of this mediaeval Sinhala kingdom with the guidance of noble Buddhist hierarchs, for the sustenance of the religion of the Buddha (*Buddhasāsana*) by furthering and promoting its cause.

Historical Background

When the whole of Rajaraṭa (domain of early Sinhala royalty) was under foreign suzerainty in the beginning of the 13th century, Dambadeniya was one of the rallying points of Sinhalese war-lords. It was the period during which the ruthless foreign invader, Māgha (of Kāliṅga origin), was ruling the country having captured the metropolis, Polonnaruva. Māgha's rule was fateful to both the Sinhala nation and the *Buddhasāsana*. The bhikkhu community that was the worst affected either left the Order or migrated to other Buddhist lands where conditions were not unfavourable.

It was during such a catastrophic time that there appeared the hero, Vijayabāhu III who came forward as the leader of a movement of Sinhalese resistance against the foreign yoke and also played the part of the champion of the Buddha's religion. He established himself at Dambadeniya and ruled there upto 1236 A. C.

Although Vijayabāhu could not achieve his aim of fully ridding the country of the foreigner Māgha, he was successful in carving out a separate kingdom for himself in Māyāraṭa, where at his capital city, Dambadeniya, he proclaimed himself the crowned ruler.

However, after his death (in 1236 A.C.), his son Parākramabāhu II, the most able of his successors, continued the struggle begun by his father and was successful in achieving the aim of becoming the sole monarch of Sri Lanka by defeating Māgha and driving away the foreigners out of Polonnaruva. This feat he achieved around 1255 A.C.

According to Senerat Paranavitana, the places at which Vijayabāhu III founded new religious edifices or repaired old ones give an indication of the territory over which he exercised effective power. These in addition to Dambadeniya and Beligala are Wattala, Kālaniya, Attanagalla, and Toṭagamuva (near Hikkaduva). Parākramabāhu II was succeeded by his son Vijayabāhu IV (Boosat Vijayabāhu). Although the country was ridden of Māgha's rule, Parākramabāhu II or any of his successors of the Dambadeniya dynasty could not resuscitate the glory of the ancient seats of royalty at Rajaraṭa. Thus, Anuradhapura and Polonnaruva, the centres of classical Sinhalese culture, were abandoned on account of political, economic and military reasons.

The desperate but gallant struggle by the Buddhist leaders of the period, both the laity and the clergy as well, to maintain the status-quo of the Buddhist religion is a matter that deserves recognition.

The establishment of the kingdom of Dambadeniya in the 13th century also marks the turning point in the drift to the South and South-eastern region of the Island of the Sinhalese kingdom which resulted in the final collapse of the ancient seats of royalty and attrition of ancient centres of Buddhist culture at Anuradhapura and Polonnaruva. With the decay and gradual disappearance of a self-oriented culture, an avenue was also created for foreign inroads in regard to religio-cultural activities. Although Dambadeniya as a seat of royalty was abandoned around 1287 when King Parākramabāhu III, a scion of the Dambadeniya royal house, made a futile attempt to install his kingdom at the old city of Polonnaruva, the family founded by the first king of Dambadeniya continued for many more years at other centers like, Kurunegala, Yāpahuva, Gampola, and Dedigama, until the seat of Sinhalese royalty was established finally at Kandy after a short stay at Kotte, thus completing the drift to the South.

Buddhism during the Dambadeniya period

The founder of the Dambadeniya kingdom was fortunate enough to obtain the sacred Tooth Relic and the sacred Alms- bowl Relic of the Buddha which had by this time been recognised as the palladia of Sinhalese kings. When the custodians of these two sacred relics apprised Vijayabāhu of Dambadeniya of the fact that these two sacred objects were being concealed at Kotmale in the Hill country to safeguard them from Māgha, Vijayabāhu promptly brought them down to his kingdom and enshrined them in a specially built three-storied temple at Beligala. It was the possession of these two sacred objects that gave religious and legal sanction to Vijayabāhu III and his successors at Dambadeniya to be rulers of the island.

The Saṅgha

The theras who had left the ancient seats of Buddhist learning and worship at Rajaraṭa now rallied round the Dambadeniya kings. Vijayabāhu III was much assisted by these religeuxes in putting the Buddhist monastic organization in order. Several convocations have been held by the elders at the newly built monastery Vijayasundarārāma at Dambadeniya to draw up a code of regulations for the Order (Saṅgha) which by this time had deteriorated much owing to neglect and the admission of undesirables into it. Vijayabāhu III himself is credited to have summoned two such synods. After these convocations (saṅgīti), the king is supposed to have promulgated royal rescripts referred to as *katikāvata*[1] in Sinhalese. Unfortunately, those royal edicts of Vijayabāhu III are not extant today. Among those divines who realised the needs of the Sāsana and assisted the Dambadeniya royalty in bringing matters to order were such famous dignitaries like Saṅgharakṣita Mahāsāmi and Medhaṃkara Mahāthera of the *Grāmavāsi* sect, who were the pupils of the great scholar monk Sāriputta who flourished during the time of Parākramabāhu the great and Medhaṃkara Mahāthera of Dimbulāgala of the *Vanavāsi* sect who resided at Dimbulāgala. This Medhaṃkara was the pupil of Buddhavaṃsa Vanaratana[2]

The elder Medhaṁkara Mahāthera of Dimbulāgala of the *Āraṇyaka* or *Vanavāsi* sect, the great thera who helped King Vijayabāhu III in setting matters of the religion in order, was also responsible in convening a great synod of both the *Āraṇyaka* and the *Grāmavāsi* during the reign of Parākramabāhu II. Parākramabahu II realised that despite the efforts of his father (King Vijayabāhu III), things were not all too satisfactory as undesirables had gained admission to the Order[3]. At this convocation many bhikkhus whose conduct had been found blameworthy were expelled from the Order. A formal act of the Order, embodying rules for the conduct of the Saṅgha was promulgated by this convocation which came to be known as the *Dambadeni-katikāvata* which is still extant. An analysis of this document reveals that the great theras of the day expected of the Saṅgha to ensure that the life of an eremite should be not only decorous and moral but also be aimed at acquiring spiritual and intellectual attainments.

According to the literary records of the period, at the head of all the bhikkhus in the island at that time was the hierarch who is referred to as *Mahāsāmi* (Pali, *Mahāsāmi* ; Sinhala, *Māhimi*) or *Nāyaka*[4]. Under him were two dignitaries with the title *Mahāsthavira* (Sinhala, *Mahātera*) who were respectively the heads of the two sects, *Grāmavāsi* (village-dwelling) and *Vanavāsi* or *Āraṇyaka* (forest-dwelling). The person to be appointed to each of these offices had to be one who was agreeable to the *Mahāsāmi*, not less than twenty years standing in the Order as a fully ordained or *upasampanna* monk, and with good reputation for religious and intellectual attainments. Whenever the office of the *Mahāsāmi* (or *Nāyaka*) became vacant one of the two *Mahātheras* had to be selected for that high office.[5]

Another important Buddhist institution of the period is the division of the bhikkhu community among the eight *Āyatana* or *Mūla* (hence *Mūlāyatana* also) which were the ancient religious foundations dating from the Anuradhapura period.[6] It could be presumed that a *Mūlāyatana* was the primary centre of learning and residence (for monks) and as such a monastic complex of the bhikkhu community belonging to the two sects *Āraṇyaka* and *Grāmavāsi*. It is also said that these *Mūlāyatana* possessed rich endowments; hence the hierarchs who were the heads of these eight *Āyatana* (*Mūla*) had wielded great authority and were second in importance to the *Mahātheras* only. There were also another type of religious institution referred to as *Pariveṇa* which also possessed considerable endowments. These could be monastic establishments of a lesser rank, below the monastery complex (*Mūlāyatana*). Some of these *Pariveṇa* were the residence of famous scholar monks.[7]

It could be presumed that on account of the above factor the word *Pariveṇa* gradually acquired the meaning of 'a seat of learning'. These institutions quite often acquired the names of their founders, and the bhikkhu who had received the

1. See *Katikāvatasaṅgarāva*, ed. D. B. Jayatillake, Kalaniya, second edition, 1955, p. 6f; A. V. Suraveera, *Siṃhala Katikāvat hā Bhikṣu Sanvidhāna*, (Sinhala), Colombo, 1971, p. 124; *Nikāyasaṅgrahaya*, English translation - C. M. Fernando, Colombo, 1908, pp. 22f.
2. A. V. Suraveera, op. cit. p.125
3. *Nikāya saṅgrahaya*, ed. D. P. R. Samaranayake, Colombo, 1966, pp. 80-81 ; *Siṃhala Katikāvat hā Bhikṣu Sanvidhāna* op. cit. p. 125f.
4. *University History of Ceylon*, Vol. II, pt. 2, p. 747.
5. ibid. p. 477.
6. ibid. p. 748, 6.
7. ibid. p 749.

benefice was called after the institution[8], e.g., Parākramabāhu Mahāsthavira, etc.

It is to the credit of the Dambadeniya rulers that the lost prestige of the Sinhalese bhikkhus (*Sīhalagaṇa*) subsequent to the draconian rule of Māgha was restored. The fame of the Sinhalese bhikkhus and the Theravāda Buddhist institutions of Sri Lanka again reached far off shores. Several Sinhala monks led religious missions to Thailand, Burma and other South East Asian lands for the establishment of higher ordination during this period, at the request of the monarchs of these lands. The Sinhala Saṅgha (*Sīhalagaṇa*) became a very respected order in Thailand and Burma from this period up to several centuries afterwards. The Pali work *Sāsanavaṃsa* is a true index to this great respect the Sinhala bhikkhu community had enjoyed from the mediaeval times up till late, in the South East Asian region. It has been specifically thought discreet by the authors of this eighteenth century work that the translation of it from original Burmese to Pali, could benefit much the Sinhala bhikkhu community who frequents their lands. Vihāras (monasterics), were also dedicated to the Sinhala bhikkhus who had gone to their shores for missionary activities[9].

Fame of Sri Lanka as the seat of Theravāda Buddhism had also reached other far-off lands including the Chinese empire under Kubilai Khan. In 1282 Kubilai, the great Mongol emperor sent an envoy to Sri Lanka with offerings, asking the Sinhala king for the two sacred objects, the Tooth Relic and the Alms Bowl Relic. Fortunately for the Buddhists of Sri Lanka, at the time the Chinese envoys arrived the palladia of the Sinhala royalty had been removod to the Pandyan court in South India. They were subsequently brought back to the island and enshrined within a shrine at Polonnaruva by Parākramabāhu III who made a futile attempt to install his kingdom at Polonnaruva (cir.1287 A. C.).

It is also believed that the invasion of the Malaysian Jāvaka king 'Candrabhānu' was owing to the fame Sri Lanka had attained on account of her possession of Buddha relics. According to the Pāli work *Jinakālamāli*[10] (ed. Polvatte Buddhadatta Mahathera, Lanka Bauddha Mandalaya Publication, Colombo, 1956), it was during this period that the famous Buddha image, still known as *Sīhalapaṭimā* (In Thai language : *Sihinga Buddha*) was sent to Thailand from Sri Lanka.[11] Relics and images from Sri Lanka were regarded with great veneration. A visit to the island and being admitted to the Order in Sri Lanka was a mark of distinction for a Cambodian or Siamese bhikkhu of the period.[12]

Buddhist Literature of the Period

The establishment of Buddhist cultural institutions and the restoration of ancient seats of learning and worship were accompanied with an equally considerable revival of Buddhist literature and art. Under the direction of the afore-mentioned eight *Mūlāyatana*, Buddhist literature of the period was revived and several great scholars devoted themselves to writing of many treatises and texts on Buddhist and liturgical matters in Sinhala, Pali, and in Sanskrit as well.

Some of their works are *Dambadeni Katikāvata*, the *Pali Thūpavaṃsa*, *Vinayavinicchayaṭīkā*, *Sīmālaṅkārasaṅgaha*, *Cūḷavaṃsa* (the continuation of the *Mahāvaṃsa*), which was composed during the reign of Parākramabāhu II, the elegant Pali prose *Hatthavanagalla Vihāra Vaṃsa*, *Rasavāhinī*, *Samantakūṭavaṇṇanā*, *Pūjāvaliya*, and the *Saddharmaratnāvaliya* which is a Sinhala rendering of the Pali *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā*. King Parākramabāhu II himself is credited with several books like the great poem of epic distinction, viz., the *Kavsiḷumiṇa*, based on the *Kusa Jātaka* tale; two *Sanne* or explanatory works in Sinalese on Pali *Vinayavinicchaya* and *Visuddhimagga*, that is *Vanavinisa Sanne* and *Visuddhimagga Sanne*, too, are some of the innumerable literary works of value of this period. The revival of learning witnessed during the time of Parākramabāhu II was largely due to the fact that he besides being a patron of learning, was himself an erudite scholar.

Buddhist Art and Architecture of the Period

In the sphere of Buddhist art it could be said that the Dambadeniya period witnessed the early signs of breaking away from the classical Sinhala art traditions. The devastation of early Sinhalese seats of administration and political authority also witnessed the disintegration of the traditional schools of Sinhala master artists. They either perished during the period of hardship and internal

8. loc. cit., see also, Colophon of the *Sūriya Sataka Sanne*.
9. *Sāsanavaṃsa*, ed. M. Bode, PTS. London, 1897.
10. *Jinakālamāli*, ed. Polwatte Buddhadatta Mahathera, Lanka Bauddha Mandalaya Publication, Colombo, 1956.
11. A. B. Griswold, *Towards A History of Sukhodaya Art*, Bangkok, 1967, fig. 62.
12. *University History of Ceylon*, Vol. I, pt. 2, p. 753.

feuds that preceded the rise of Dambadeniya Kingdom, or sought asylum elsewhere outside Sri Lanka. Those few craftsman who escaped the fateful hour of Māgha's draconian rule had ultimately rallied round the Dambadeniya rulers and their successors. It was they who kept the classical traditions in art alive, despite the unavoidable admixture of extraneous influences. Notwithstanding these deteriorating effects, such pieces of art as the Sinhala Buddha image, the Sinhala thūpa were still considered in the Buddhist lands as the ideal works. The great craving to possess Buddha images sculpted by Sinhalese artists is exemplified by the *Sihinga Buddha* of Thailand. Yet another Buddha image from Sri Lanka probably belonging to the period under review is still the palladium of Laotian royalty. Both in Burma and Thailand, the Sinhalese thūpa design has become the ideal type during the medieval period.

The influx of foreign elements into the political field had also its repercussions in the field of art. The Pandya and other South Indian influences had crept into sculpture, painting and architecture. The traditional symbolic motifs of ancient Sinhala Buddhist art such as the Moonstone (*Sañdakaḍapahaṇa*), *Nāgarāja* guard stone, the *Makara* wingstone, had seemingly been forgotten or rather allowed to be replaced with new motifs owing probably to South Indian influence.

The marked difference in the moonstone motifs of the Dambadeniya period onwards, from the early types, is a clear indication of the artists sympathy towards foreign types and designs. Apart from dropping the entire friezes in the moonstone sculpture of early periods, the very shape of it, being a semi-circle has been replaced with a full circle or at times with three concentric circles in a sculptured ensemble.

The *Makara* wingstone of much symbolic meaning produced by the ancient Sinhala artists had given way to another type of sculptured balustrade referred to as *gajasiṃha*, a chimerical beast, a creation in art of south Indian origin, which had however preserved rudiments of the early *Makara* wingstone types in the long proboscis of the elephantine beast, ending in a volute. Nevertheless this combination of the lion-elephant has completely deviated from the original *Makara* symbolism which was meant to convey the idea of divine waters. This new type of the wingstone is found at almost every place where religious architecture of the Dambadeniya and subsequent periods exists e.g., Devundara, Yāpahuva, Beligala, Kalaniya, Kurunegala (various sites), Totagamuva and at several Kandyan sites.

Although the seated Buddha image was carved in the traditional *samādhi* pose which is quite common to the Sinhala artist, and the standing image in the typical *Avukana*(s.v.)stance with slight variation in the hand gestures, it was during this period that innovations have been introduced. The Buddha's robe(*cīvara*)with tiny schematic crispy lines instead of the parallel grove or ridge design in early types, the dilated eyes as against the half-closed serene look of the great sage, and the additional fiery *ketumālā* on an emphatic cranial protuberance (*uṣṇīṣa*), are all features that had differentiated the Buddha statuary of Dambadeniya period, from early types. It could be presumed that these features have been added through the combined infuences of the Burmo-Siamese and South Indian types.

Some of these features that are found in the Buddha statuary of certain sites of the Polonnaruva period that are pre-Dambadeniya in date, could be due to the restorations and renovations effected during and after the period under review.

In the temple paintings of the Dambadeniya and post-Dambadeniya period the above mentioned characteristics are seen in the portrayal of the Buddha figure in addition to many other features that mark a gradual degeneration of classical Sinhala painters' art. The paintings hardly show a depth or a third dimension and often the rythmic balance in the proportionate delineation of figures that have been the hall-mark of early Sinhalese paintings has never been achieved or considered necessary. Thus, aesthetically also the Buddhist temple murals of the Dambadeniya and post-Dambadeniya periods show the beginnings of deterioration owing to too much dependence on the South Indian genre [13].

Buddhist Architecture : Temple architecture, has also undergone considerable change owing probably to foreign influence as well as to the change of terrain from the dry-zone to the wet-zone. The ample availability of wood in the thick jungles of the monsoon-swept western hinterland of Sri Lanka made the temple builders depend more on wooden architecture than on stone, brick and such material as in the previous times. However, brick and stone were not entirely forgotten. The geographical conditions also have influenced temple architecture

13. See D. B. Dhanapala, *The Story of Sinhalese Paintings*, Colombo, 1957, for a comparative analysis of the periods.

in more than one aspect. The steep slope of the roof at the top, breaking into an obtuse angle half-way at the lower part, which is typical of many Kandyan shrines must have been necessitated with the drift of the capital towards south and south-west of Sri Lanka where the builders would have given much thought to the onthrust of heavy monsoon rains. The south Indian '*Sikara*' type, slightly camouflaged with a stūpa dome ending in a finial had also been introduced as a roof type during this period as seen in the roof of the *Geḍige* type shrines built out of ashlar which date from the Dambadeniya period, e.g., The *Galge* at Devundara, Gaḍalādeniya shrine, Nātha Dēvālē at Kandy. Although much of the Dambadeniya period edifices have been lost beyond recognition, probably on account of the material used for construction, the few available specimens of the period that immediately followed the Dambadeniya Kingdom could give a glimpse of the temple architecture of the period.

Another type of shrine that was fashioned out according to the needs of the climes was the edifice on a pillared platform or *ṭāmpiṭa vihāra* (temple on pillars). Although the early origins of this type could be traced back to the Anuradhapura period, e.g., the Lovāmahāpāya and such edifices built on an infrastructure of pillars the type became a common model during the period under review. The innumerable *ṭāmpiṭa piḷimage* shrines (Buddha-image house on pillars) of this period could be explained as a product of an architectural necessity that has arisen more owing to geographical factors and partly due to foreign influences than as a survival of the past.

The construction of the stūpa also shows similar noteworthy changes. The colossal *dāgābas* of old capitals were never attempted. Instead, preference was given to the smaller type edifice, which was again sheltered by a roofed super-structure. This architectural type nevertheless recalls the ancient *Vaṭadāge* types, which are also stūpas built within a roofed enclosure (See CETIYAGHARA). But unlike in the classical types, here it was the *dāgāba* (*stūpa*) that was the chief item in the architectural ensemble, and the house or structure that held a roof above it was only meant to serve a secondary function of protecting the *dāgāba* from the elements. Probably the kings of the Dambadeniya period had given a start to this type of *dāgāba* construction at sites like Attanagalla, Dambadeniya,[14] Devundara (and other South Sri Lanka sites), to be followed at such other sites of the Dambadeniya Kingdom as Gaḍalādeniya, Hindagala, Dambulla, etc. In these instances the roof above the *dāgāba* has to serve more a utility function and it is to be viewed less as an achitectural innovation exhibiting the technical expertise and the aesthetic sense of its builders as in the famous *Vaṭadāge* shrines of ancient Sri Lanka.

Buddhist Ritual and Popular Cults of the Period

The period of the rise of Dambadeniya Kingdom also saw new trends in Buddhist religious cults and popular beliefs. Up to the end of the Polonnaruva period, Theravāda Buddhism in Sri Lanka, despite the vehement opposition of its dignitaries, has seemingly absorbed Mahāyāna forms of cult worship into its fold.

It saw the appearance of Buddhist cults in the form of Maitreya, Nātha, Avalokiteśvara, Tārā, Jambhala, Kuvera etc. But the events that took place immediately prior to the founding of Dambadeniya had proved fatal to the gradual evolution of the Buddhist religious structure in Sri Lanka. The devastating activities of the invaders and usurpers had necessarily obstructed the earlier free flow of traditions. It was in such an atmosphere that the path was paved for a new Theravāda, especially in regard to popular cults and beliefs. The village-divinities (*grāmadevatās*) of old were also absorbed into the Buddhist pantheon. Upulvan, Saman, Boksal, Vibhīṣaṇa, Pattini, and lesser divinities like Ayyanāyaka, Sūniyam, Kaḍavara, Gale Deyyo, emerged on an equal footing with the bodhisattvas of the earlier reckoning like Maitreya, Nātha and Tārā. The most noteworthy Buddhist theistic trend of the period is the revival of the cult of Upulvan, the patron god of the Sinhalese and many other god cults. Gods and goddesses of the Hindu pantheon especially Viṣṇu, Gaṇa, Kārtika and Kāli (and several aspects of the mother goddess including Pattini) have gradually found their way into popular worship and finally submerged the early Buddhist gods of Sri Lanka. But in the early part of the Dambadeniya civilization some of these Buddhist gods still held a place in the popular religious observances of the people. The kings, however, have shown special patronage to the God Upulvan and several shrines of this puissant deity were caused to be built within the Dambadeniya Kingdom (e.g., Māyādunraṭa, Lankātilaka near Kandy, Alutnuvara near Kegalle, Aggabodhi Vihāra near Vāligama, etc.).

14. *Mem. of the Archaeological Survey of Ceylon*, Vol. IV, ed. A. M. Hocart, London, 1931, pl. 41, 42.

Emphasis was also laid on such religious festivals like the *Daḷadā*, Äsaḷa etc. Elaborate ritual was attached to the worship of the sacred Tooth Relic (*Daḷadā*) and it is not incorrect to say that the *Daḷadā Perahāra* has acquired once again the glamour that it later enjoyed under the kings of Kandy, from the time of Dambadeniya rulers (s.v. DAḶADĀ PERAHĀRA).

The rise of the cult of devas like Uppalavaṇṇa who were considered the guardians or protectors of the Buddhist religion as well as of the people, could also have gained currency during this period. Although the pantheon consisted of purely Buddhist divinities at the beginning, the South-Indian influence had paved the way for the predominance of the god Viṣṇu (who later, more or less, displaced Uppalavaṇṇa as the guardian of the *Sāsana*) and the god Kārtika among the Buddhists.

A.D.T.E.P.

DAMBULLA (var. Dambulu-vihāraya), the ancient Jambukola-lena or Jambukola-vihāra, is one of the largest and most celebrated Buddhist cave-temples of Sri Lanka. It is a veritable gallery of Buddhist art, containing a vast array of Buddhist statuary of the Buddha and Buddhist divinities, as well as valuable samples of Buddhist painting. Dating almost from the early centuries of Buddhism in Sri Lanka it also provides an index to the study of phases of Buddhism in the island. Situated in the central province, twenty-six miles north of modern Matale, along the Kandy-Anuradhapura road, the vihāra is reputed to have been founded by King Vaṭṭāgāmaṇī Abhaya (89–77 B.C.), on his return to the throne after a period of hiding, converting the cave in which he was hiding into a beautiful temple. Numerous pre-Christian inscriptions have been discovered at the Dambulla-vihāra.

The rock which is converted into a temple is about five hundred feet in height and about two thousand feet in length. There are five caves altogether, each one separated from the other by a rock wall left out from the original rock. The unimpressive front view with no attempt at external decoration, and the coarse, modern roofing running under the edge of the overhanging rock form a poor introduction to the impressive interior.

The lower mass of the rock forms the ascent to the temple. One has to begin by climbing the sloping rock where the gradient has not necessitated the cutting of steps, and then ascend a flight of steps cut on the steeper rock, before reaching the entrance to the temple.

Two of the five caves at Dambulla are superior to the rest in their importance, fame, magnitude and workmanship. One of them called the *Maha-deyyo-devāle* or the Deva-rāja-vihāra, meaning, the temple of the great god, has apparently received that name on account of the wooden image of god Viṣṇu which is inside this chamber. Paranavitana is of opinion that this originally represented Upulvan and that together with the other wooden statue of Saman which stands besides it, they both go back to the reign of Niśśaṅka Malla of the twelfth century (S. Paranavitana, *The God of Adam's Peak*, Switzerland, 1958, p. 45 f.). It is believed that this monarch embellished the main caves with images (*Vihāraṃ Jambukolāvhaṃ kārayitvā tahiṃ sudhī patiṭṭhāpayi sovaṇṇe satthubimbe tisattatiṃ : Mhv.* LXXX, *v.* 23). This statue of the god, i.e., Viṣṇu, is supposed to have possessed peculiar sanctity, and in its presence most serious oaths were sworn and cases of importance decided without any other trial. Close to this wooden statue of Viṣṇu is a gigantic recumbent figure of the Buddha, which with the pillow and couch on which it rests, is cut out of the solid rock and measures forty-seven feet in length. This, together with the standing figure of Ānanda by the side, reminds one of the similar group of the Gal Vihāra at Polonnaruva. There are numerous other statues of a smaller size.

The next cave which is called the Mahā-vihāra, meaning, the great temple is the finest and the largest of the five caves. It measures 160 feet by 50 and its height at the highest point is 23 feet, the roof sloping down towards the back of the cave where it is only four feet high. Inside this chamber are 53 statues, most of them exceeding life-size. To the left of the entrance, inside the cave is a well-proportioned *dāgäba* (*stūpa*), sorrounded by sedent Buddha statues some of which have a canopy formed by a hooded cobra. To the left, beyond the *dāgäba* is a large statue of King Vaṭṭagāmaṇī Abhaya to whom the construction of the shrine is attributed. There is also in this chamber a wooden statue of King Niśśaṅka Malla (1187–96 A.C.) to whom the shrine owes much of its glory. Inscriptional and literary evidence (e.g., *EZ*. I, p. 121 ff. ; II, p. 111 f., p. 140, etc. ; *Mhv.* LXXX, *v.* 22 *f.* ; *Rājaratnākaraya*, ed. P. N. Tissera, Colombo, 1929, p. 33 ; *Rājāvaliya*, ed. Rev. W. Pemananda, Colombo, 1959, p. 68), bears testimony to his having gilded the statues of the Dambulla rock temple after which it became popularly known as *Svarṇagiri-guhā*, the golden rock-cave. Prior to him, King Vijayabāhu I

(1055–1110 A.C.) is also said to have restored this shrine and granted villages to it (*Mhv.* LX, *v.* 61 ff.).

In the eighteenth century, in the reign of Kīrti Śri Rājasiṃha, the images of the Buddha and the gods were painted and the walls and roofs of caves covered with frescoes which include scenes depicting the life of the Buddha and some historical events of ancient Sri Lanka. Among these are paintings showing the landing of Vijaya, the first king of Sri Lanka, the duel between King Elāra and Prince Duṭṭhagāmaṇī, the planting of the Bodhi-tree at Anuradhapura, and the depositing of relics in the Mahāthūpa.

Of the other three chambers, which are not as interesting and imposing as the two described above, one is known as the *Mahā Aluth vihāra*, meaning the new great temple. It is 78 feet in length and from 30 to 60 feet in breadth. There are 54 statues in this chamber including a large reclining figure of the Buddha, made of brick and about 30 feet long, a wooden statue of King Niśśaṅka Malla, and a large statue of the sedent Buddha in the centre of the chamber, under a stone canopy.

The fourth chamber which is known as the *Paspiḷima-vihāra* is of smaller dimensions, being about 40 feet in length and 30 feet in breadth. It contains several statues of the Buddha and a small *dāgaba* with a copper top.

The fifth chamber which is very much of the same dimensions is quite modern, having been built by a Kandyan chief in the early part of the nineteenth century. It contains a large statue of the Buddha, about 35 feet long, and several other smaller statues.

Further Reading :

Burrows, S.M., *Buried Cities of Ceylon* Colombo, 1899; Forbes, J , *Eleven Years in Ceylon*, London, 1840, Vol. I.; Tennent, J. E., *Ceylon*, London, 1860 ; JASB. Vol XVI, Pt. I ; JCBRAS. New Series, Vol. VI, Special Number.

H R.P.

DĀNA, derived from the root *dā*—to give, means : " bestowing " or " giving ". In Buddhism *dāna* has an important ethical significance. There is another word used in Pali literature to connote the same ethical meaning, namely, *cāga*, which is mostly rendered into English as giving up or liberality, that is, ability to part with something one owns and values to benefit another. But *dāna* seems to be the more popular and commonly used one. Commentator Buddhaghosa defines this term in the *Visuddhimagga* (*Vism.* p. 60) as : " *Dāna* is giving away or distribution " (*dānam vuccati avakhaṇḍanaṃ*).

Buddhism has the highest regard and respect for all life, and all its ethical behaviour is founded on this basic humanitarian attitude. Since life is regarded as the most precious thing for every being (*S.V*, pp. 352-5), it is put forward as the fundamental duty of every man to refrain from causing any harm or damage to another's life, and also to behave in such a way, that one's behaviour results in the highest good and happiness of as many beings as possible. The *Sāmaññaphala Sutta*, (*D.* I, p. 63) discussing the ethical life of an individual, says that the first step in the ethical life of a follower of the Buddha should be to avoid causing injury to life, to put aside cudgels and weapons that are used in causing injury to life, to shrink at the thought of causing injury to life, be compassionate to all beings and behave in such a way as to bring about the welfare of all beings (*pāṇātipātam pahāya pāṇātipātā paṭivirato hoti nihitadaṇḍo nihitasattho lajjī dayāpanno sabbapāṇabhūtahitānukampī viharati* : loc. cit.). If we examine this ethical injunction referred to here, we see in it two aspects, namely, a negative aspect (*vāritta*) and a positive aspect (*cāritta*). The negative aspect is to refrain from causing injury to life, to keep aside cudgels and weapons that are used in causing injury to life. The positive aspect is to work sympathetically to bring about the welfare of all beings. It is this friendly attitude of a person (*mettā*) that causes in him sympathy (*karuṇā*) to those who are less fortunate and suffering. *Dāna* or giving away of things by one to another of one's own accord constitutes the first move in this sympathetic course of action.

The second step in the ethical behaviour of a Buddhist disciple is to refrain from taking what is not voluntarily given by another (*adinnādānā veramaṇi sikkhāpadaṃ samādiyāmi*). If one has the highest respect and regard for the lives of other beings, one should not deprive them of the things that contribute to make their lives healthy, comfortable and happy. If one takes away something that is not voluntarily given away by its owner, it causes not only pain of mind to its owner, but also lot of hardship and embarrassment, sometimes making life painful and miserable. Thus, it is incumbent on a sympathetic man to refrain from taking anything away from its owner, unless the owner of a thing, if he can afford to do without it, if he is ready to make a personal sacrifice of it to help the other, volunteers to give it away. A man

who feels for the lives of others cannot rest satisfied merely by refraining from theft or stealing. Having refrained himself from all types of thefts, whether big or small, he should give away whatever he can afford to other beings as occasions demand to make the lives of others more comfortable and happy. While behaving sympathetically in this manner, he should try to refrain others, too, from stealing, and encourage them, too, to be generous in their own way. He should also praise and encourage those other men who are already engaging themselves in magnanimous activities.

Dāna or generosity is considered so important in the ethical life of an individual that it occupies the first place in several ethical categories in Buddhism. It is the first of the three ways of acquiring merit (*dānamayapuñña*), the other two being practice of virtue (*sīlamayapuñña*) and mental cultivation or meditation (*bhāvanāmayapuñña : D.* III, p. 218). It is the first of the ten perfections (*pāramitā*, q.v.) of a Buddha-aspirant (*J.* I, p. 73). For a long period in saṃsāra, the Buddha-aspirant is said to have engaged himself in all types of generous activities. Some Jātaka stories describe how he, once born as King Vessantara, practised this virtue to a very advanced degree such as voluntarily giving away his wife and children to a beggar (*J.* No. 547) and how he once, born as a hare, voluntarily came forward to offer his own flesh to save a fatigued traveller from imminent death (*J.* No. 316). *Dāna* is also mentioned as the first of the ten meritorious actions. In the graduated teaching method in Buddhism (*ānupubbikathā*), talks on generosity (*dānakathā*) is the first step (*D.* I, p. 110; II, p. 41). Ordinary people who come to the Buddha for the first time are admonished about the importance of the virtue of engaging in all sorts of generous activities. In this respect generosity is described as a two-faceted thing, namely, giving of material things (*āmisadāna*) and giving of advice and spiritual guidance (*dhammadāna : It.* p. 98), and of the two the latter is extolled as the more valuable thing (*sabbadānam dhammadānam jināti*).

Though the idea of generosity is directly linked and dependent on the concept of friendship and sympathy, it also emphasises the benefits that accrue, both here and in the hereafter, to the donor as well. In many places where generosity is discussed in Pali literature, this two-fold benefit to the recipient as well as to the donor is equally emphasised. In a passage in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*A.* III, p. 41), five benefits that accrue to a donor of gifts are enumerated. They are: A donor becomes acceptable to many people, peace-loving good people like to associate him, a good reputation spreads about him, he can feel happy that he is doing his duty as a layman and after death he would be reborn in a good state, in heaven. A person who gives another a gift of food thereby gives the recipient long life, complexion, happiness, strength, and promptitude and having given these five things, the donor, too, becomes endowed with the same things in future lives (*A.* III, p. 42).

Dāna is encouraged in Buddhism with two aims in view. When it is practised gradually, a stage would come wherein one would not have any craving for possession and would be in a position to give away or renounce anything with compassion to the recipient. Such a person would completely put an end to suffering in saṃsāra by becoming an arahant. On the other hand, even if it is not practised to such heights, the tendency of one to give away or sacrifice something for the benefit or welfare of others in the society, is a positive contribution to maintain healthy relations in that society. Happiness and progress in a society depend on the attitude of its members towards one another. A society in which members are miserly, jealous of one another, lacking in mutual co-operation, and not sympathetic towards one another, cannot in any way be called a healthy society. To build up a healthy society, therefore, generosity, and mutual co-operation have greatly to be encouraged.

If an individual covets too much, if he is concerned only with his own welfare, if he is not ready to part with some of his things for the good of others when a need for it arises, such an individual earns the hatred of the society, and a hostile attitude develops towards him in the society (*Sn. vv.* 98, 102, 124).

To lead a happy life one needs the friendship and co-operation of the society and without these, however much wealth one may possess, one cannot be happy in life, in the Buddhist sense of the word. To win friendship and devotion, one has to be a friend of the society ready to render help in some way or other to any one when a need for it arises, ready to share one's meal with another or to sacrifice it to feed a hungry man, going out of one's way to help a man out of a difficulty, advising others to avoid evil and pursue good alone, teaching methods of understanding good and evil, making known the way to a successful and happy life etc. All these activities could be accomodated in the word *dāna* in a very broad Buddhist sense.

Eight reasons that motivated men in India during the time of the Buddha to give in chartiy to

recluses and Brahamins are mentioned in two suttas of the *Dīgha Nikāya* and the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*D.* III, pp. 258–59 ; *A.* IV, p. 239). An ordinary man sees a Brahmin or a Khattiya or a Vaisya wealthy man living in comfort, luxury and affluence, and he too, expecting such fortunes in the next life gives alms to recluses and Brahmins. Again another man hears about the happiness of the Cātummahārājika gods, and wishing for such prosperity in the next life gives abundant alms to recluses and Brahmins. Another man hears of the happiness of the gods of the heaven of thirty three (*Tāvatiṃsa*) and wishing for such happiness and comforts gives abundant alms to recluses and Brahmins. Similarly, another man hears of the happiness of the gods of the Yāma heaven, another that of the Tusita heaven, another that of the Nimmānarati heaven, another that of the heaven of Paranimmitavasavatti gods, and another that of the Brahmakāyika gods and wishing for such prosperity in the life to come, gives abundant gifts to recluses and Brahmins. Having described these eight reasons the Buddha says that the wish of these donors become fulfilled accordingly only if those people lead virtuous lives in addition to giving those lavish gifts.

Further eight ways of giving prevalent at the time are described in another passage in the *Dīgha Nikāya* (*D.* III, p. 258 ; *A.* IV, p. 236), namely, some give spontaneously (*āsajja*), some give through fear (*bhaya*), some give because they had received things from those to whom they are giving now (*adāsi meti dānam deti*), some give expecting a better return in future from the recipients (*dassati meti dānam deti*), some give because they consider it a good thing to give, some give thinking : 'I am cooking, They do not. So it behoves of me to give something to them'. Some give just to get a good reputatuon, and some give for psychological satisfaction.

In another passage in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*A.* III, p. 41), five appropriate gifts (*kāladāna*) are mentioned, namely, gift of food given to a guest, a departing person, ailing person, gift made to a deserving person during a famine, and a gift made from the grains of the new harvest.

Generosity is always linked in Buddhism with virtue. Giving in charity itself is an act whereby one gets rid of selfishness—urge within one's self to possess many things—which makes one unacceptable and resentful to many. Giving in charity thus helps one to overcome selfishness and make one acceptable to many people. Thus, it is said : One who gives makes many friends' (*dadaṃ mittāni ganthati : Sn. v.* 187). To derive the best out of a gift, one should give without miserliness, i.e., without reluctance to part with the thing given away. Miserliness is described as a stain in a giver (*maccheraṃ dadato malaṃ : Dhp. v.* 241). In another passage in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (*S.* I, p. 18) it is said : "One does not give things away on account of miserliness and heedlessness. One who desires merit has to give discreetly. So let one overcome miserliness and be free from the stain of miserliness in giving gifts, for, one must have merit as a good foundation for the next life." Another passage in the same collection (loc. cit.) says : "Some people who are up to many vices give in charity having caused a lot of misery to others. That charity given after causing a lot of hardship and bewilderment to others is not worth even a fraction of a little gift made in a humble innocent way." In the same text it is further said : "A little gift given by an innocent man who looks after wife and children well and leads a virtuous life, is worth many times the grand sacrifice made by a corrupt man who is a source of irritation to many others." In a sutta in the *Majjhima Nikāya* (*M.* III, pp. 255–6), discussing the worth and purity of a gift, the Buddha says : "A gift may be clean and pure from the side of the donor, but not so from the side of the recipient. This happens when the donor is virtuous, but the recipient is corrupt and given to vices. Again, a gift may be clean and pure from the side of the recipient, but not so from the side of the donor. It happens when the recipient is virtuous and the donor not so. Again, a gift may be unclean and impure from the side of the donor as well as from the side of the recipient. It happens when both the donor and recipient are corrupt and given to vices. Lastly, a gift may be clean and pure from the side of the donor as well as the recipient. It happens when both of them are virtuous and pure." Having described these four types of gifts, the Buddha extols the last type as the best gift.

Though at the outset generosity is extolled as a good thing in itself, as a thing done through friendship and sympathy, with fellow feeling, in many places in Pali literature we see a slightly different trend developing. In these instances generosity is extolled not so much as a thing that benefits the recipient, but as a thing that wins for the donor multiple returns in the future. In this respect the Order of monks (*Saṅgha*) is considered the unique field of merit (*puññakkhettaṃ anuttaraṃ : D.* III, pp. 5, 227). One sows paddy in a field to get a harvest, sometimes fifty or sixty fold of what one sowed. Likewise when one gives alms to the Saṅgha, the donor is sure to get a manifold return

in future lives. It is something in the nature of property insurance for future benefit. It may be because of this fact that the donors of gifts sometimes beg of the monks to accept their offerings through compassion to them (*anukampaṃ upādāya paṭiggaṇhātumuttama : The Wheel*, BPS, Kandy, Sri Lanka, No. 54, p. 12). This development is well depicted in the *Dakkhiṇāvibhaṅga Sutta* (*M.* III, pp. 254–5). There it is stated that when one gives food to animals, it yields to the donor a hundred fold return in future lives ; a gift of food to an ordinary evil minded person results in a thousand fold return ; a gift of food to an ordinary good man results in a hundred thousand fold return to the donor ; a gift of food to a religious man outside the Buddhist fold results in a million fold return to the donor ; likewise the benefits that accrue to the donor increases and multiplies many fold in the above way in the case of one who is on the path to the attainment of the fruit of stream entry (*sotāpattiphalasacchikiriyāya paṭipanna*) ; a stream entrant (*sotāpanna*) ; one who is on the path to the realisation of the fruit of once returner (*sakadāgāmiphalasacchikiriyāya paṭipanna*) a once returner (*sakadāgāmi*) ; one who is on the path to the realisation of the fruit of non-returning (*anāgāmiphalasacchikiriyāya paṭipanna*) ; a non-returner (*anāgāmi*) ; one who is on the path to the realisation of the fruit of arahanthood (*arahatta-phala-sacchikiriyāya paṭipanna*) ; an arahant ; a Paccekabuddha ; and a Fully enlightened one. Having described these fourteen types of individual offerings of gifts, the sutta continues to describe gifts made to the community of monks. Therein, it is said that a gift made to the Bhikkhu Saṅgha far exceeds the worth of gift made to any one of the above mentioned individual recipients. Seven categories of Bhikkhu Saṅgha are mentioned in this sutta in order of importance ; (1) The community of bhikkhus and bhikkhuṅīs headed by the Buddha, (2) The community of bhikkhus and bhikkhuṇīs without the Buddha, after his demise ; (3) The community of bhikkhus ; (4) The community of bhikkhuṇīs (5) The community consisting of a specific number of bhikkhus and bhikkhuṇīs ; (6) The community consisting of a specific number of bhikkhus and ; (7) The community consisting of a specific number of bhikkhuṇīs.

As a result of the trend that developed in *dāna* subsequently as indicated in the *Dakkhiṇāvibhaṅga Sutta*, *dāna* has come to mean mainly alms food given to the community of monks by the laity, not so much as a thing to help the bhikkhus sustain themselves but as a thing to help donors to acquire an abundance of merit that would ensure them prosperity and abundance in future lives. Thus, in many countries where Buddhists live, they are in the habit of giving alms food to the bhikkhus often. The monks are seen also going from door to door, even today, collecting alms food at meal time, which was the common practice for a long time since the inception of the Order of monks. But the current practice is to cook meals in the homes of the laity and take it to the temples. In many village and town temples the pratice of arranging alms food by a ticket system is often followed (*salākadāna*). Each family undertakes to supply alms food to the resident bhikkhus in the temple once a month on a fixed day. Apart from this type of alms giving, the practice of inviting a specific number of bhikkhus to the homes of the laity, once a month, once in three months or once a year is done by many Buddhists. On such occasions a minimum of five monks are invited, because it is customarily believed that to have the alms dedicated in the name of the whole congregation of bhikkhus headed by the Buddha himself, at least five monks have to be present. This type of alms-giving is normally done to remember dead relatives, or as an auspicious act before an important event such as a marriage or birth of a child. It is believed that when such alms givings are held the merit accrued could be transferred to the dead relatives, so that they could be freed in case they are born in bad states (*duggati*). See ANUMODANĀ, DAKKHIṆĀ.

W.G.W.

DĀNA PĀRAMITĀ. See PĀRAMITĀ.

DAṆḌAKAMMA. Act of punishment. The term *daṇḍa*, in its general use in Pali texts, refers to penalty or punishment meted out to one who is guilty of a crime (*aparādha*) or offence (*vajja*) in terms of common law or penal code (*So kuddho rājadaṇḍena tasmim pakkamate bhusaṃ :* The king who is enraged will punish him severely : *S.* I, p. 69 ; *Yamassa rañño dassenti iminā devo daṇḍam paneti ti :* They present him to King Yama, recommending that he should be punished by the king : *A.* I, p. 138). Similar use of the word in Sanskrit too is attested. The word is also used in its basic meaning of stick, rod or pole used as a weapon of offence for attack and assault : e.g., *sabbe tasanti daṇḍassa :* all dread assault or attack. It is in this sense that it is said of the Cakkavatti or Universal Monarch that he conquers territories (*dhammena abhivijiya : D.* III, p. 59) without

daṇḍa (*adaṇḍena* — without assault) and without *sattha* (*asatthe na*— without weapons). Nevertheless, this appears to have been misunderstood at times. For we discover in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (*See* ERE. Vol. 4, p. 261) the following said of the Cakkavatti king : '..... a righteous king who rules in righteousness, without punishment and without a sword (*adaṇḍena asatthena*).' It must be pointed out that the reference there is to the non-use of violence in political conquest (*abhivijiya*). There is no concept of an absence of punishment. It must also be noted that one who abstains from destruction of life, in compliance with the first of the Buddhist moral precepts (*pāṇātipātā veramaṇī*), is described as 'having laid aside the rod (*nihitadaṇḍa*) and weapons (*nihitasattha : D.* I, p. 63).'

Punishments (*daṇḍa* or *daṇḍakamma*) provided for by law which included forms like branding and whipping seems to have often left long enduring visible traces, thus adding to the stigma which the offenders had to suffer even after paying the heavy penalties. Undoubtedly it is this aspect of punishment and the consequent stigmatisation which is highlighted in the noisy protests of the public, recorded in the *Vinaya*, at the admission of such persons into the Buddhist Order as bhikkhus (*Manussā ujjhāyanti khīyanti vipācenti katham hi nāma samaṇā sakyaputtiyā kasāhatam kataḍaṇḍakammam pabbājessaanti ti :* How could monks who are followers of the son of the Sakyas admit into their Order a person who has been punished with whipping under the law of the land : *Vin.* I, p. 75 f.). In the lay society of the Buddhists, it is the law of the land which inflicts punishment for impropriety of behaviour or breach of ethical codes which come within its purview. The Buddhists do not set up for themselves any legal machinery for regulating through their religion the ethics of the laymen.

It is in the monastic community of the Saṅgha that we discover an elaborately worked out system of legislation regulating the conduct of its members. Consequently, it is there that punishment and deterrent action are worked out in great detail. The Buddha himself appears to have sanctioned the imposition of punishment (*daṇḍakammam kātuṃ*) on miscreant young monks whose behaviour was detrimental to the interests of the *sāsana* (*Vin.* I, p. 84). On another occasion both monks and nuns appear to be threatened with punishment for their frivolous and improper behaviour (*Vin.* II, p. 2*a*2). These punishments assume different forms such as curtailing the freedom of movement (*ḍvaraṇaṃ kātuṃ : Vin.* I, p. 84) and withdrawal of privileges (*Vin.* II, p. 262).

After the institution of the monastic Order, as the years passed by and the membership increased, we are told that there appeared the need to lay down rules for the regulation of the life of monks and nuns, both with regard to the manner in which they conducted themselves as well as for the proper execution of ecclesiastical affairs. These regulations were not always respected and adhered to by all members alike and in their breach more specific and legalised forms of punishment had to be instituted.

In the regulation of Buddhist monastic discipline two areas are clearly discernible. The earlier of these two, the *Pāṭimokkha*, attempts to check by means of specific regulations the behaviour of monks and nuns in term of word and deed. The mental discipline of the disciple was sought and achieved through the Dhamma. It is the identity of these men and women who renounce their household life as a specific group, distinct from the laymen, pursuing more earnestly their selected career which seems to justify the formulation and continuance of a special code of discipline.

The regulations being graded (into five and sometimes into seven groups) according to their significance and the gravity of the implied offences the penalties recommended for their breach also vary in severity, from a total expulsion from the Order to a formal apology. Punitive action of expulsion recommended for the breach of the four (eight, in the case of nuns) regulations of the first group of *Pārājikā* spell total condemnation. Their observance being the basic moral requirement for membership in the monastic community, no room is left in their violation even for consideration of rehabilitation. This relentless punishment emphasises, as it were, the exemplary life that the monk was necessarily expected to lead in contrast to the layman, perhaps also due to his total dependence for his living on the esteem and the consequent generosity of the latter. (Note the use of attributes like *āhuneyya*, *pāhuneyya* and *dakkhiṇeyya* which mean 'worthy of honour' in describing the Buddhist monk). For all other offences included in the *Pāṭimokkha*, below this category, redress is possible (*A.* I, p. 231 and *Vin.* I, p. 103) and efficient and effective methods of rehabilitation are prescribed (See PĀṬIMOKKHA).

On the other hand, the discipline of the *Khandhakas* concerns itself with the welfare and well-being of the monastic community and towards

the achievement of this end legislates for the proper execution of ecclesiastical affairs and for the regulation of the relations of the monks with the lay society. Penalties and punishments are prescribed for the neglect or violation of these observances. Their punitive character being implied in the very names by which they are known; these are referred to in the *Vinaya* merely as *kammas* or acts without the word *daṇḍa* or punishment. An important set of five (or seven as a result of a further internal sub-division) such acts is found in the *Cullavagga* of the *Khandhakas* (*Vin.* II, pp. 1–28). They are: (1) Act of Censure (*Tajjaniyakamma*), (2) Act of Guidance, i.e., being put under compulsory tutelage (*Nissayakamma*); (3) Act of Banishment (*Pabbājaniya kamma*); (4) Act of Reconciliation, i.e., when monks have strained their relations with laymen (*Paṭisāraṇiyakamma*); (5) Act of Suspension (*Ukkhepaṇiyakamma*) for (*a*) not seeing an offence, (6) Act of Suspension for (*b*) not making amends for an offence, (7) Act of Suspension for (*c*) not giving up a wrong view. (For details of these different Acts of punishment, see under the Pali terms).

The Buddha expected his disciples to implement the law thus laid down without fear or favour. The Venerables Sāriputta and Moggallāna whom the Buddha called upon to carry out the Act of Banishment on the followers of Assaji and Punabbasu, the miscreant monks of Kiṭāgiri, reported to the Buddha that they were fierce and rough and hence they appeared somewhat diffident on that account. The Buddha's promt reply was: "Well then, Sāriputta and Moggallāna, go together with many monks." (*The Book of the Discipline*, Vol. V, p. 17 f.). It is to be further observed that resistance and challenge on the part of those subjected to punishment in the Buddhist monastic Order does not lead to a withdrawal of the act of punishment or a reduction of the severity of the penalty. It is on the other hand, submission and good behaviour (*sammā vattāmi lomaṃ pātemi netthāraṃ vattāmi : Vin.* II, p. 15) which justifies revoking an act of punishment. The Buddha insisted that the Act of Banishment imposed on the Assaji-Punabbasuka monks of Kiṭāgiri be not revoked because of their unruly behaviour (*DPPN.* I, p. 226 arrives at a different conclusion which must obviously be attributed to an incorrect reading of the text.).

On the other hand, the Act of Reconciliation shows that the monks as a group were not to be, *ipso facto*, exclusively privileged. The Buddha's remarks to thera Sudhamma on whom this act was to be carried out reveals this. "How can you foolish man, jeer at the householder Citta, who has faith and is believing, who is a benefactor, a worker, a supporter of the Order, with a low thing, and scoff at him with a low thing." (ibid. p. 25).

The disciplinary machinery of the Buddhist monastic Order reveals yet another interesting feature in relation to teacher and pupil. When major injunctions of the *Pāṭimokkha* like *Saṅghādisesa* are violated, even though the offender is discovered to be his own teacher, a pupil is called upon to be firm and diligent in the enforcement of discipline through the collective organization of the Saṅgha (*Vin.* I, p. 49).

The scales were thus held evenly between the monk and layman, the teacher and pupil, the old and young, the only consideration being the validity of the law. It has been fittingly remarked about the disciplinary machinery of the Buddhist Saṅgha that it is unique in its impersonal and self-operating character (*M.* III, p. 10).

J. D.

DANTADHĀTU. See DALADĀ

DARŚANA, a Sanskrit term which comes from the root *dṛś* to see, primarily means the occular perception, i.e., sight or vision. But in course of time, as it appears in the literatures of India, it extended its meaning to cover an intellectual or intuitional understanding as well as a philosophical theory or a system. In later Sanskrit literature, it connoted the meaning of philosophy and system in the sense they are used in the West. Yet on the whole, the application of the Sanskrit as well as its Pali equivalent seems to show that there are perhaps three modes of behaviour recorded in literature. They are as follows : 1. sight or vision, 2. intellectual or intuitive grasp of reality and 3. philosophical system.

The physical sense of sight is implied in phrases like 'for the sake of seeing the Buddha, (*Bhagavantaṃ dassanāya : D.* III p. 36) and the sight of the sramaṇas is a blessing' (*samanānañ ca dassanaṃ.... maṅgalamuttamaṃ: Sn. v.* 266). There is no doubt that this is the original meaning of the term since it comes directly from the root *dṛś* meaning to see. It is an extension of that sense to use it to convey the intellectual or intuitional grasp of something. This application is found in contexts like the following : 'There are, monks, defilements which are to be eradicated through intellectual or intuitional grasp'

(*Atthi bhikkhave dassanā pahātabbā : M.* I, p. 7), and 'the understanding of the noble Truths' (*Ariyasaccāna dassanaṃ : Sn. v.* 267).

This extension of meaning can further be exemplified from the following contexts too. This is found in places like 'without falling into a dogma but being virtuous and endowed with a correct view of life' (*Diṭṭhiñ ca anupagamma sīlavā dassanena sampanno : Sn. v.* 152). This sense is also found in the *Ratana Sutta* where it is said that 'with the attainment of insight or correct view of life the following three factors are exterminated' (*Sahāvassa dassanasampadāya tayassu dhammā jahitā bhavanti : Sn. v.* 231 ; cf. *Paramatthajotikā*, I, p. 188).

These two senses in which the word is used could be taken as the two basic modes of behaviour of the term *darśana* both in its extension and evolution of meaning. The development of the meaning underlying both these modes is fairly obvious in the field of epistemology of Indian philosophy.

There was a school of materiarialism in ancient India which subscribed to the view that sense perception is the only source of knowledge. The epistemological basis of this theory led them to deny some of the then prevalent Indian beliefs such as those which upheld the existence of a life after death and of beings of spontaneous origin, and the effect of good or evil deeds. Pāyāsi (*D.* II, p. 316 ff.) seems to have based his arguments on this epistemology which implicitly claims that whatever exists is verifiable by the senses. This is expressed by the popular phrase 'I know and I see'. The converse of this proposition was taken to imply that 'I do not know this, I do not see this and therefore it does not exist'. This shows that this class of thinkers relied for knowledge only on the evidence of the senses. Kumāra Kassapa argues against this theory as advocated by Pāyāsi. Yet it is interesting to note that in contrast to this school of materialism there were other schools of thought in India such as Jainism and Buddhism which admitted perception, both sensory and extrasensory, as a means of knowledge in addition to other means. According to the *Brahmajāla Sutta* (*D.* I, pp. 34–35), however, there seems to have been six other types of materialist thinkers who appear to have developed extrasensory perception through meditation and thereby granted the possibility of progressively subtler souls which they nevertheless maintained did not survive bodily death. The description of the souls as posited by the last four schools of these materialists is similar to that of the four *arūpajhānas* in the Pali texts. Therefore, it is reasonable to think the expression *jānāmi passāmi* covers both sensory and extrasensory fields.

When we look at the history of philosophy in the West, particularly after the period of Hegel, we find at a certain point in the history of Western thought a reaction rising against system-building and metaphysics. At times the term philosophy was identified with these activities and thus it tended to become a pejorative term of reference. The whole development of modern philosophy after Hegel is considered a reaction against system-building and metaphysics.

Buddhism, as it is revealed to us from the earliest stratum of the canon, had a tendency against system-building and metaphysics and having a philosophy for its own sake. In fact, the fundamental teachings like the concept of Nirvāṇa, causality and non-substantiality are the results of the reaction. For Buddhism was a view, more correctly a working hypothesis, presented for experimenting (*ehipassika, paccattaṃ veditabba*). It is explicitly said in the *Kalahavivāda Sutta* that the person obsessed with doubts and is held in suspense has to train himself in the path for the attainment of knowledge (*ñāṇapatha*) in order to get rid of those disturbing elements. The Buddha has expounded his teachings only after knowing them (*Sn. v.* 868).

It is theoretically held in philosophical circles for instance, that a person who argues and subscribes to idealism on logical ground can behave like a realist in his private life, in complete contradiction to his personal opinions. But within the Buddhist tradition this position is not ethically tenable. A characteristic of truth according to Buddhism is that there must not only be consistency within the statements themselves but also that there must be behaviourial consistency. This position implies that the propounder of a statement, has to act or at least try to act accordingly (*yathāvādī tathākārī*). This is quite in keeping with the Indian tradition.

In Buddhism it is upheld to such an extent that there was even no need for such a person who had already attained the release to establish or prove his attainment on logical grounds, after his realization. And as such he does not enter into disputes (*Sn. v.* 877). So it is obvious that the term *darśana* (Pāli. *dassana*) does not convey the sense of theoretical system divorced from practical application, in the Buddhist contexts. So this word both in Sanskrit and Pali forms, has been used invariably in the sense of correct view or correct insight, i.e., a view

which conforms to reality (*yathābhūta*). This becomes very clear even from the Buddha's very first discourse to the world, where he is reported to have claimed that both knowledge and correct view of reality had dawned upon him (cf. *ñāṇañ ca pana me dassanam udapādi* .... *Vin.* I, p. 11 : *S.* V. p. 423).

But as is shown by Betty Heimann (*Indian and Western Philosophy*, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1937, p. 28) more popular is the use of *darśana* in the sense of system. This is the last and the third mode of behaviour of the term mentioned in the article. So it has been employed for instance by Haribhadra, a Śvetāmbara Jain who lived in the latter half of the ninth century in his treatise called *Ṣaddarśanasamuccaya*, and also by Sāyana Mādhava, a Vedantist who lived in the latter part of the fourteenth century, in his treatise named *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha* (cf. *M.* I, p.285; *A.* III, p.114) These are two of the systematic anthologies which present the current philosophical and religious thought in succinct form. This use of the term has been continued to the present day. Incidentally, the technical term for philosophy in modern Sinhala is *darśanaya* which has been adopted from its Sanskrit original.

In Buddhist literature the term *dṛṣṭi* (Pali, *diṭṭhi*) which is also derived from the same root *dṛś* when it stands unqualified is used sometimes to connote a wrong view or a dogma. In Buddhist Sanskrit, the term *darśana* has been used in the general sense of view (*Mhvu.* p. 212, *v.* 5). The term *dṛṣṭi* also has been employed sometimes to convey the same sense (op. cit. p. 212, *v.* 7). But it is noteworthy that all these instances refer to the wrong views from the Buddhist standpoint. When it has to be shown emphatically to be a wrong view, the adjective (*mithyā*) has been added (op. cit. p. 214, *v.* 15). When it is preceded by the adjective *samyak* (Pāli, *sammā*) it always refers to correct view. The general attitude of Buddhism towards *dṛṣṭi* is one of condemnation. In some of the discussions in early Pāli Buddhist literature on *diṭṭhi*, it has been branded as *upādāna* (grasping), *anusaya* (inclination), *āsava* (intoxicant), *kantāra* (wilderness), *gaṇṭhi* (web), *gahana* (thicket) and *jāla* (net). The above references to *diṭṭhi* show that it is looked upon as leading to prolongation of the saṃsāric process, and therefore, as having the characteristic of producing tangles. This stigmatization of *diṭṭhi* equally shows that according to Buddhism it is a tendency to be dispensed at any cost. Emphasizing this attitude of Buddhism Nāgārjuna maintains that it is for the purpose of elimination of all views and theories that the Buddha preached his *saddharma* (MK. *xxvii*,, 30 ; *sarvadṛṣṭiprahāṇāya yaḥ saddharmam adeśayat Anukampām upādāya Taṃ namasyāmi Gautamaṃ*). But the concept of *darśana* in the sense of correct view of reality or of life in contrast to *dṛṣṭi* is highly encouraged. It is in this sense that *sammā-diṭṭhi* has been listed as the first factor in the Eightfold Path (see DIṬṬHI).

Even the Sanskrit term used for perception is *pratyakṣa* (cf. Pali, *paccakkha, sacchikiriyā*), literally meaning 'that which comes within the purview of the eye'. The term has been extended to cover the other perceptual senses as well. This usage, that is the extension of the visual perception to cover the senses, is not restricted to ancient epistemology. This is equally found in the field of modern psychology. Therefore, even the present day psychologists treat sight as one of the two higher senses, the other being hearing. Owing to the preeminence of vision as a spatial sense most of their discussions of perception focus on the visual process. Even the English term 'to see and perceive' are equally loaded with epistemological and psychological senses (e.g., "Did you see the point ?"). Thus, the verbal forms from the root *dṛś* are used in the sense of perception (*ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ : Bṛhadāraṇayaka-Upaniṣad*, 11.4.5). One of the few verbal forms used in early *Upaniṣads* to denote the ways of knowing is *paśyati* (*yatra nāmyat paśyati.... Chāndogya-Upaniṣad*, 7.24.1 ; *Yatra.... tad itara itaram paśyati.... Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*, 2.4.14), from the root *paś* also in the sense of to see. When the verbal forms from the root *dṛś* are used without mention of other forms of sensing it seems to refer not just to visual sensing but to perception in general. Thus, *dṛṣṭi* (*Chāndogya-Upaṇad* 3.13.18) is used to denote perception in general (K. N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. London, 1963, p. 58). The fact that forms derived from the roots *dṛś*. and *paś*, are used predominantly to refer to perception is undoubtedly due to the simple reason that perhaps the largest number of our perceptions are visual perceptions so that the words for visual perception are generally extended to denote perception in general.

S. W.

DASA-AKUSALA-KAMMAPATHA. See DASA-KAMMAPATHA.

DASABALA (Skt. *Daśabala*), one who is endowed with ten super-normal powers. This is an epithet like the terms Jina or Tathāgata, which is used for

the Buddha. These powers consist of ten intellectual and spiritual attainments or forms of knowledge by virtue of which he claims leadership over others and speaks fearlessly in any kind of assembly. Here "knowledge is considered as power (*bala*) because in itself it is unshakable and props up and lends support to the one who possesses it." (*ñāṇaṃ hi akampiyaṭṭhena upatthambhanaṭṭhena ca balaṃ ti vuttaṃ : MA.* II, p. 26 ; *AA.* V, p. 11).[1]

There are two places in the Nikāyas which enumerate and define these powers (i.e., *M.* I, pp. 69–71 ; *A.* V, pp. 33–36). In the *Majjhima Nikāya* account[2] occurring in the *Mahāsīhanāda Sutta*, the Buddha himself enumerates them in reply to an accusation made by Sunakkhatta, an ex-monk, who was making the following statement in public : "The recluse Gotama does not possess any super-normal achievements, let alone distinctive knowledge and vision that is noble ; he preaches a doctrine which is constructed by reasoning and based on investigation and is evident to him alone" (*Natthi samaṇassa Gotamassa uttariṃ manussadhammā alamariyañāṇadassanaviseso takkapariyāhataṃ samaṇo Gotamo dhammaṃ deseti vīmaṃsānucaritaṃ sayampaṭibhānaṃ : M.* I, p. 68). The Buddha challenges this statement and claims different kinds of powers and knowledges among which this group of ten powers also occur. They are thus meant to meet the challenge of Sunakkhatta just mentioned. However, as the commentary observes (*MA.* II, p. 26) these ten are only an aspect of a Tathāgata's intellectual powers (*ñāṇa-bala*) which include many other aspects such as the knowledge pertaining to the four grounds of self-confidence (*catu-vesārajja-ñāṇa*). They are designated as *Tathāgata-bala* because they are found only in Tathāgatas, constituting one of their unique characteristics (*MA.* II, p. 25 ; *AA.* V, p. 10).

The refrain that runs after the definition of each of these powers records that they become powers of a Tathāgata in a triple sense. First, they qualify him for leadership (*āsabhaṃ ṭhānaṃ*) in any kind of gathering ; secondly, they enable him to make bold utterances in them without any fear or excitement (*vigatalomahaṃso visārado : MA.* II, p. 27 ; *AA.* V, p. 12), and thirdly as a result of this ability he sets rolling the excellent wheel of the law (*brahmacakka*) by preaching his doctrine. This is compared to the fearless (*abhīta*) roar of the lion (*sīhanāda*), who, as the king of the beasts, roars triumphantly in the jungle. It is evident that these powers are intended to show the Buddha's greatness as a teacher (*satthā*), who has to be a dauntless public speaker and debator, if he were to succeed in his mission as a moral and spiritual leader of mankind.

The definition of the first *bala* runs as follows: "The Tathāgata knows, as it really is, the causal occasion (of a thing) as such and what is not causal occasion as such" (*Tathāgato ṭhānañca ṭhānato aṭṭhānañca aṭṭhānato yathābhutaṃ pajānāti : M.*I. p. 69).. This shows that this first *bala* is the ability to see through a intricate problem realistically and to arrive at the correct judgement. As the commentary explains (*MA.* II, p. 28 ; *AA.* V, p.12 f.) it is the ability to see the possibility (*ṭhāna*) and the impossibility (*aṭṭhāna*) of events and things by analysing them in terms of causal relationships (*hetupaccaya*). Or he knows the cause and non-cause of situations (*kāraṇākāraṇaṃ eva jānāti : AA.* V, p. 16). Stated otherwise he has the correct knowledge about the application of the theory of cause and effect to problems. It is the knowledge of truth and error (*ṭhānaṭṭhānañāṇa*) in any given context. It is of interest to note an important subdivision of the *bala* made in the commentary (ibid. pp. 12, 27), where this knowldge is said to be of two kinds as *paṭivedha* and *desanā*. The former implies the Tathāgata's general wisdom of full insight into phenomena—and the latter his greatness as a preacher bringing welfare to others. The former is aptly described as fostered by insight (*paññā-pabhāvita*) and the latter by compassion (*karuṇā-pabhāvita*). As summing up the greatness of a Tathāgata these two concepts (i.e., *paññā* and *karuṇā*) later became two major themes in the Mahāyāna.

The definition of the second *bala* runs as follows: "The Tathāgata understands, according to reality, and with reason and cause the results of past, present and future acquisition of kamma" (*Tathāgato atītānāgata-paccuppannānaṃ kammasamādānānaṃ ṭhānaso hetuso vipākaṃ yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti : M.* I, p. 70). He knows the different varieties of kamma and their consequences (*kammantaraṃ vipākantaraṃ jānāti : MA.* II, p. 31 ; *AA.* V, p. 16). This refers to his perfect comprehension of the theory of kamma, namely, how wholesome and unwholesome volitional activities bring about results accordingly. This *bala* enables him to understand the nature of life comprehensively and also to see

1 The term *bala* in this sense is invariably used compounded with the term Tathāgata to read as *Tathāgatabala*.

2 In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* the Buddha introduces the list by way of explaining how the Buddha's voice becomes a lion-roar (*sīha-nāda*) in assemblies.

how and why human suffering exists. It is specially helpful in his activities as a Teacher as it enables him to understand the needs of each disciple individually according to his or her karmic make-up. It is with the help of this *bala* that he applies the theory of cause and effect to the ethical field and shows how it operates therein.

According to the third *bala* "the Tathāgata knows, as it really is, how beings are led to all forms of existence." (*Tathāgato sabbatthagāminiṃ paṭipadaṃ yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti : M.* I, p. 70). This could be explained as proceeding from the second *bala*, for this means that the Tathāgata knows how beings are led to different forms of existence as happy or unhappy according to their kamma. In this sense he knows the range of kamma, as it were (*kammaparicchedaṃ jānāti : AA.* V, p. 16 ; *MA.* II, p. 31). Like the preceeding *bala*, this too enables him to understand characters, situations, problems etc. realistically.

The fourth *bala* is that "he understands realistically the world with its many different elements (*Tathāgato anekadhātunānādhātulokaṃ yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti : M.* I, p. 70). The commentary (*MA.* II, p. 29; *AA.* V, p. 14) explains the term *anekadhātu* as 'the element of eye' etc. (*cakkhu -dhātu-ādini*) referring thereby to the elements involved in sense-perception as eye, ear etc. These comprise the six sense-organs, their objects and the corresponding six sense consciousnesses thus constituting the group known as the 18 forms of *dhātu* (*aṭṭhārasa dhātuyo*). The commentary also gives an alternative explanation as sensuous world etc. (*kāmadhātu-ādihi vā*) according to which *anekadhātu* could mean the three world elements known as the sensuous world (*kāma-dhātu*), fine-material world (*rūpa-dhātu*) and the immaterial world (*arūpa-dhātu*). Thus, this *bala* also covers a very extensive and important field of knowledge including psychology, physiology, epistemology and physics as all these aspects are covered by the eighteen elements meant here. Under the alternative explanation of three *dhātus* just enumerated comes the knowledge about the entire universe with all its divisions and subdivisions, in all their cosmological details. It also includes the knowledge of the eight attainments (*samāpatti*, q.v.) as they are connected with these planes of existence. The term *nānā-dhātu* (all kinds of elements) is explained as "the multiplicity of elements resulting from their own (these elements) varieties of manifestation (*tesaṃ yeva vilakkhaṇattā nānappakāra dhātu*). This account thus clarifies that the Tathāgata's knowledge with regard to the world and the individual is quite comprehensive as no aspect is left out. Both the subjective and the objective (psycho-physical) aspects of life are known to him completely in their true perspective. He also knows the reasons for the diverse manifestations of elements (*dhātunānattakāraṇaṃ eva jānāti : AA.* V, p. 16). Thus, all the physical sciences and epistemology could be included under this category of knowledge.

According to the fifth *bala* he knows, as they really are, the different inclinations of people (*Tathāgato sattānaṃ nānādhimuttikataṃ yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti : M.* I, p. 70). As the commentary explains (*AA.* V, p. 14) this means that he knows that men are of different dispositions (*adhimuttikatā*), such as lowly (*hīna*) etc. This type of accurate understanding of facts and men becomes a power when dealing with people, specially to a social reformer like the Tathāgata. Disciples cannot be properly guided unless he knows their individual characters, for each individual has to be instructed according to his or her nature. Thus, he knows their 'dispositions and temperaments' (*ajjhāsayādhimuttiṃ eva pajānāti : AA.* V, p. 16).

The sixth *bala* is the ability to know the spiritual potential of others, in all its diverse aspects. "The Tathāgata comprehends, as it really is, the efficiency of the spiritual faculties of other beings, of other persons" (*Tathāgato parasattānaṃ parapuggalānaṃ indriyaparopariyattaṃ yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti : M.* I p. 70). The faculties (*indriya*) meant here are those basic requirements for the attainment of the desired goal of Nirvāṇa. They are five in number and are confidence (*saddhā*), energy (*viriya*), mindfulness (*sati*), concentration (*samādhi*) and wisdom (*paññā*). The Tathāgata knows whether these are keen (*tikkha*) or dull (*mudu*), efficient or otherwise (*parabhāvañca aparabhāvañca*) etc. in others as well as their growth and decline (*vuddhiñ ca hāniñ ca : AA.* V, pp. 15, 16). This means that he comprehends every type of inclination and disposition (*āsayaṃ jānāti, anusayaṃ jānāti : AA.* V, p. 15 ; *MA.* II, p. 30) of beings. This unique power of understanding completely the emotional and intellectual make-up of others helps him to instruct his followers according to the needs of the occasion and of the individual. It also helps him to bring recalcitrant individuals under control and guide them properly. It is his efficiency as a Teacher (*satthā*) that is brought to the fore here.

The seventh *bala* deals with certain mental exercises and stages of deliverance. It is the knowledge of how the four mental absorptions, eight deliverances, three concentrations and the

nine attainments take place and how they become defiled or purified. The definition runs as follows: "The Tathāgata comprehends as it really is, the defilement, purity and the ascendance from the one to another regarding the absorptions, deliverances, concentrations and attainments" (*Tathāgatojhāna-vimokkha-samādhisamāpattīnaṃ saṅkilesaṃ vodānaṃ vuṭṭhānaṃ yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti: M.* I, p. 70). This means that the Tathāgata has a comprehensive understanding of the different mental exercises that lead to final deliverance. This becomes a power (*bala*) in his activities as a Teacher in leading his disciples along the path of deliverance.

The eighth *bala* is the knowledge that enables him to remember his former births. "He remembers many former rebirths as one birth, two births etc." (*Tāthagato anekavihitaṃ pubbenivāsaṃ anussarati ekaṃ 'pi jātim dve'pi jātiyo* etc.: loc. cit.). It is the knowledge of the continuity of the group of five aggregates (*khandha-santati*). This knowledge helps him to substantiate the theory of kamma and rebirth, which is one of his main doctrines.

The ninth *bala* is given as the 'divine eye' which enables him to see how beings pass from one existence to another in saṃsāra. This is more or less an application of the preceding *bala* to others: "He perceives with his divine eye, purified and surpassing that of men, how beings, both mean and noble, lovely and ugly, vanish and re-appear according to their kamma either in happy or unhappy forms of existence" (*Tathāgato dibbena cakkhunā visuddhena atikkantamānusakena satte passati cavamāne uppajjamāne, hīne paṇīte, suvaṇṇe dubbaṇṇe sugate duggate yathākammūpage satte pajānāti:* loc. cit.). This knowledge, which is technically designated as *cutūpapatti-ñāṇa* (knowledge about death and rebirth), as directly proving the theory of kamma and rebirth, was indispensable in explaining with proof this important doctrine of Buddhism.

The tenth *bala* is the knowledge concerning the destruction of intoxicants (*āsava*) and is defined in the following terms ". . abides, after realising by himself and in this very existence, the cankerless emancipation of mind and wisdom through the destruction of cankers" (*Tathāgato āsavānaṃ khayā anāsavaṃ cetovimuttiṃ paññāvimuttiṃ diṭṭheva dhamme sayaṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā upasampajja viharati:* ibid. p. 71). This amounts to the extinction of all *āsavas* (cankers, or intoxicants) which is identical with the perfection of the religious life as understood in Buddhism. It is the culmination of the Buddhist path of freedom.

The last three *balas* are the well-known threefold knowedge of a Tathāgata (also of arahants) in which context they are the hall-mark of final deliverance (*tisso vijjā anuppattā kataṃ buddhassa sāsanaṃ: Thag. vv.* 220, 286, 515 etc.) usually referred to as *tisso vijjā*.

The detailed accounts of some of these *balas* given in the commentaries reveal a tendency for tedious eleboration (e.g., *AA.* V. p. 15 ff.; *MA* II, p. 30 ff.). In the course of these details, the commentator refers to a view that (*AA.* V, p. 16) maintains that there is no separate *ñāṇa* called *dasabala-ñāṇa* but that it is an aspect (*pabheda*) of omniscience (*sabbaññuta-ñāṇa*). The commentator refutes this view maintaining that the two are different from each other and explains *dasabala-ñāṇa* as that it is conscious of its diverse functions *dasabalañāṇaṃ hi sakasakakiccaṃ eva jānāti*) while *sabbaññuta-ñāṇa* includes such knowledge and many others (*tato avasesampi*). The specific purpose of these ten *ñāṇas* is that they help the Tathāgata to find out those who can be delivered and to lead them gradually along the path of freedom (*AA.* V, pp. 17-18).

In Buddhist Sanskrit literature, too, the Buddha-epithet *daśabala* is of frequent occurrence. The *Dharmasaṅgraha* (section 76) gives the same list as the Pali one with some variations in the numerical order, while the *Mahāvastu* list (Calcutta Sanskrit College Series, I, pp. 188-89; Senart's edition pp. 159-60) has a few variations in the definitions, these differences being confined mainly to vocabulary. For instance, the sixth *bala* of the Pali list is, defined here as *parapuruṣacaritakuśalāni vetti* (he knows the merits of the characters of other men) while the ninth *bala* is defined as *pariśuddha-divyanayanā bhavanti* (he possesses purified divine vision). Its description of the last *bala* is *sarvakleśavināśaṃ prāpnoti* (he attains to the destruction of all defilements). This shows that the idea about the ten *balas* is shared by both Pali and Sanskrit literary traditions.

As a summing up it would be profitable to make a few observations about these powers of the Tathāgata. In the first place these are not physical, moral or spiritual. They are not even worldly like, for instance, those of a political dictator who seeks to keep his subjects under his sway by disallowing them to assert themselves. They are different even from ordinary forms of political power that seeks to keep groups of men in allegiance to a particular ideology. In contrast, they are utilized to guide his followers through to the

perfect freedom of Nirvāṇa. They have come to him through a process of personal perfection of the ordinary intellectual powers of men. The power-relation between him and his disciples is of the teacher-pupil type. These powers make the Tathāgata unique in the world as a moral and spiritual leader. The driving force behind the exercise of these powers is unbounded compassion (*mahākaruṇā*)

DAŚABALA. See DASABALA.

DAŚABHŪMI. See BHŪMI.

DAŚABHŪMIKA SŪTRA also called the *Dasabhūmika*, the *Daśabhūmaka* or the *Daśabhūmīśvara*, is an important Mahāyāna text containing a very systematic treatment of the doctrine of the ten bodhisattva-bhūmi, i.e., the ten stages a bodhisattva has to pass through before finally attaining enlightenment. Though regarded as a section of the *Avataṃsaka*, it is found also as an independent work. This text is regarded as one of the nine most sacred books (*navadharma*) in Nepal.

The text, consisting of eleven chapters, is in a mixture of Sanskrit prose and verse. However, the main treatise is in prose. Except the few verses that occur in the conversation between Vajragarbha and Vimuktīcandra the rest of the verses contain the gist of the prose portion.

The exact date and the author of the text are not known. The Mahāyānists, however, regard this as being preached by the Buddha. The fact that it was first translated into Chinese in 297 A.C. by Dharmarakṣa shows that it, at least, belongs to the middle of the third century (*Taishō*, No. 285 ; *Nanjio*, No. 110). Har Dayal (The *Bodhisattva Doctrine*, London, 1932, p. 272) seems to suggest that it is later than the *Mahāvastu* and the *Prajñā-pāramitā-śata-śāhasrikā* and earlier than the *Bodhisattva-bhūmi*.

The work begins with a śloka requesting those who desire to attain Enlightenment to listen to the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra*.

The sūtra proper opens with the phrase, 'Thus I have heard' (*evaṃ mayā śrutaṃ*) which is typical of almost all sūtras. It is said that the Buddha, in the second week after Enlightenment was sojourning in the abode of Vaśavarti, the king of gods, together with a host of bodhisattvas headed by Vajragarbha. At that time, the bodhisattva Vajragarbha, by the power of the Buddha, entered into a trance called *Mahāyāna-prabhāsa*. No sooner than this was accomplished, innumerable Buddhas from many world systems appeared. They, all known by the name Vajragarbha, gave reasons for their appearance and wished that the doctrine capable of gaining entrance into the light of doctrine (*dharmāloka-mukha*) may dawn upon Vajragarbha.

These Buddhas, by supernatural power, touched Vajragarbha's head with their right hands. Then Vajragarbha rose up from the trance and addressed the bodhisattvas gathered there and praised the bodhisattva vows (*praṇidhāna*) which enable an aspirant of Enlightenment to comprehend the fields of knowledge (*jñāna-bhūmi*) of the Buddhas of the past, present and future, and to grasp the doctrine of the ten bodhisattva stages (*bhūmi*). After enumerating the names of the ten stages, he remained silent. Their curiosity roused, the bodhisattvas begin to inquire into details regarding the ten stages. But Vajragarbha dissuades them pointing out to them the incomprehensibility of the doctrine of *Bodhisattva-bhūmi*. But ultimately, induced by the Buddha, he preached to them the doctrine of the ten stages (*daśa-bhūmi*) and hence the name of the text.

According to the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* a bodhisattva, immediately after the production of the thought of Enlightenment, rises above the sphere of ordinary beings and steps into the fixed way of a bodhisattva (*bodhisattva-niyāma*) and also enters into the first bodhisattva stage (*bhūmi*) called *pramuditā*. While a bodhisattva is in this stage, he is exceedingly happy, reflecting on the Buddha's teaching and on the bodhisattva discipline. He feels extremely glad as he realises that he has entered into the bodhisattva discipline and that he is the refuge of all beings. He is freed from the five fears that beset ordinary human beings. He becomes endowed with purifying qualities such as faith (*śraddhā*), devotion (*prasāda*), zealous application (*adhimukhi*) etc. He undertakes the ten great vows (*praṇidhāna*). He effects the ten vows by ten fundamental terms (*niṣṭha-pada*). He earnestly desires that the ten vows he has undertaken may endure and extend throughout the universe and pervade throughout the space also. He realises thoroughly the depth and the profundity of the Buddha's teachings. He clearly sees that beings are immersed in ignorance and that they are under the sway of passion, craving and

delusion. He reflects on the origin and cessation of the mass of suffering. Filled with pity for the ordinary masses, he resolves to liberate them. He practises generosity by giving away all his wealth and possessions, his wife, children and even his own limbs. For the sake of the masses he even pursues worldly matters and thus acquires learning, experience and fortitude. He worships the Buddhas and follows their teachings. By the power of his ten vows he is able to see and serve many Buddhas. He dedicates all his roots of merit for the purpose of Enlightenment. In this stage he specially practises the perfection of generosity (*dāna-pāramitā*) without neglecting other perfections. He learns from faithful friends and other bodhisattvas, good qualities and virtues suitable for an aspirant of Enlightenment. He pays special attention to the first of the four modes of generous treatment (*saṅgraha-vastu*), namely generosity. He follows the Buddha's teaching with the view of becoming the highest among men. He sees thousands of Buddhas and finds out their resolutions. He enters into innumerable trances and performs numerous miracles.

When a bolhisattva has well accomplished the first stage, he desires to enter the second stage. To him who so desires arise the ten mental dispositions and with the rising of these he enters the second stage called *vimalā*. Before preaching to others he himself puts into effect the ten mental dispositions in order to establish his own self in the path of virtue. He makes others also to practise virtues. He specially cultivates the perfection of virtue (*śīla-pāramitā*) without neglecting the others, and also, practises the second mode of generous treatment, namely, pleasant speech (*priya-vāda*).

With the ten mental dispositions purified in the second stage, he enters the third stage called *prabhākarī*. He attains perfection in the ten forms of mental application (*cittāsayamanasikāra*). Thus, his thoughts are pure (*śuddha*), constant (*sthira*) not-worldly (*nirvida*), dispassionate (*virāga*), stable, (*avinivarta*), firm (*dṛḍha*), cleansed (*uttapta*), ambitious (*atṛpta*), noble (*udāra*) and magnanimous (*mahātmya*).

In this stage he sees all things in their true perspective and realises that all component things are transient. He becomes aware that his own body is exposed to suffering; that it is constantly burning with attachment (*rāga*), hatred (*dveṣa*) and delusion (*moha*). Therefore, he distracts his mind from component things. He practises the ten mental states with regard to beings and puts forth effort to alleviate the suffering of others. He earnestly searches for a means to accomplish this task. He understands that the only means of gaining their release depends on the non-obstructing knowledge of release (*anāvaraṇa-vimokṣa-jñāna*). In order to acquire this knowledge he studies scriptures, abandons all wealth, attains the four *dhyānas*, the four *samāpattis*, the four *brahmavihāras* and also the five *abhijjhā*. He acquires supernatural power (*ṛddhi*). He gets rid of his attachment to sense-pleasures, to birth, to metaphysical speculation and also to ignorance. He becomes gradually cut-off from worldly affairs; of the four modes of generous treatment he practises the third, i.e., promoting the well-being of others (*artha-kriyā*) and performs the perfection of forbearance (*kṣānti-pāramitā*).

In the fourth stage, called *arciṣmatī*, he gains the ten ways of entering the light of the doctrine (*dharmāloka*). Further, he acquires the ten virtues that mature his knowledge. He practises the thirty-seven factors conducive to enlightenment (*bodhipākṣya-dharmā*). He abandons all wrong notions pertaining to a soul. He specially cultivates the perfection of energy (*vīrya-pāramitā*) and also the fourth *saṅgraha-vastu*, namely, equality (*samānārthatā*).

After fulfilling the requirements of the fourth stage, he enters the fifth stage called *sudurjayā*. In this stage he acquires the ten mental dispositions of equanimity. He comprehends the Four Noble Truths. He understands that the relative knowledge (*saṃvṛti-jñāna*) and absolute knowledge (*paramārtha-jñāna*) are two aspects of the same truth. He becomes endowed with great compassion and begins to wonder why ordinary beings do not develop an aversion with regard to aggregates etc. Realising the cause of their attachment to the cycle of existence, he strives to bring about their release. In this stage he especially cultivates the perfection of meditation (*dhyāna-pāramitā*) and practises all four modes of generous treatment. He gains a knowledge of various arts and sciences. He also obtains numerous spells (*dhāraṇī*) for his own protection. He begins to preach the doctrine.

When he enters the sixth stage, he understands the ten aspects of sameness of all things. He begins to view all things as signless, uncharacterized, not produced and not originated. Further, he sees them as diverse, pure from the beginning, indescribable (*niṣprapañca*), without activity or abstention from it (*anābyūhānirvyūha*); as a dream, an optical illusion, an echo, the disc of the moon

seen in water; and as being free from the duality of existence and non-existence. By viewing things in this manner he acquires the *kṣānti* called *anulomikī*. He further develops his compassion and also comprehends the doctrine of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*). He practises the factors of Enlightenment (*bodhyaṅga*). He experiences many *samādhis*. His thoughts are firm and pure and he is firmly resolved to attain Enlightenment. He especially cultivates the perfection of wisdom (*jñāna-pāramitā*) without neglecting the others.

After entering the seventh stage called *dūraṅgamā*, he acquires ten forms of knowledge with regard to the choice of expedients. He understands that all the Buddhas are not radically different from him. Yet he pays homage to them. He is always engaged in contemplating on the absolute. In this stage he is said to practise all the ten perfections, for, a bodhisattva has to complete the practical aspect of the bodhisattva-discipline in this stage and begin the acquisition of intuitive knowledge. He conquers all defilements. His thoughts, words and deeds are extremely pure. All activities pertaining to worldly matters are accomplished without effort. He attains many *samādhis*. In this stage he surpasses all the activities of Pratyekabuddhas and disciples by the greatness of his knowledge.

A bodhisattva who is in this stage attains cessation only whenever he desires and again reverts from that condition for, though he attains cessation he has not realised Nirvāṇa. He places himself on the level of ordinary beings for the purpose of bringing about their liberation. He utilises all his roots of merit for the purpose of emancipation of others. Of the ten perfections he specially practises the perfection of means (*upāyakauśalya*).

Then he enters the eighth stage called *acalā*. In this he attains the particular *kṣānti* called *anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti*. His conscious striving to attain supreme Enlightenment gives way to a state of spontaneous activity. The Buddhas initiate him in Buddha knowledge and urge him to attain supernatural power of the doctrine. They, also, remind him of his vows and persuade him to attain Enlightenment for the benefit of all. He begins to inquire with regard to all details of the universe. Its evolution, involution and the number of atoms it contains, etc. He understands that the universe exists due to action and when action ceases the universe, too, will cease to exist.

He attains different forms in accordance with the birth of those beings to whom he preaches. He attains the ten powers (*vaśitā*) and spells (*dhāraṇī*) and strengthens his resolution to attain Enlightenment. This stage is called the stage of knowledge (*jñāna-bhūmi*), or the stage of non-reverting (*avivartya-bhūmi*) for, he does not revert from the knowledge he has attained. It is also referred to by numerous other names such as birth (*janma*) and perfection (*pariniṣṭhita*). Of the ten perfections he specially practises the perfection of vows (*praṇidhāna-pāramitā*).

Entering the ninth stage known as *sādhumatī* the bodhisattva understands the nature of everything mundane and supermundane, conceivable and inconceivable, of actions and their results. He also understands the causes for differences in births, mental states etc. Knowing all this he preaches regarding the true nature of all things. He acquires the four kinds of analytical insight (*pratisaṃvid*). From the Buddhas he receives numerous doctrines and also attains bodhisattva-liberations (*bodhisattva-vimokṣa*). He enters into many *samādhis* and cultivates the perfection of strength (*bala-pāramitā*).

After completing the requirements of the ninth stage, he enters into the final stage called *dharma-meghā*. This stage is also referred to as *abhiṣeka*, for it is in this stage that the bodhisattva receives his consecration as a fully Enlightened-one. Amongst numerous other *samādhis* he attains the great *bodhisattva-samādhi* called *Sarvajña-jñāna-viśeṣa-abhiṣekavān*. With the realisation of this *samādhi* there appears a miraculous lotus embedded with jewels. The bodhisattva assuming a suitable form shows himself seated on that lotus. There appear numerous other lotuses sorrounding this particular lotus. On them are seated many other bodhisattvas. From all parts of the body of the bodhisattva, seated on that miraculous lotus, issue forth a great number of rays which spread into different spheres of existence and destroy all suffering therein. These rays pervade the assemblies of the Buddhas, who thereby come to know that it is the time of consecration of a bodhisattva. A countless number of rays called *sarvajñatā-abhijñāvatī* emit from the *ūrṇās* of those Buddhas. All these rays finally settle down on the head of the bodhisattva who is in the final stage of the bodhisattva discipline. With this he comes to be known as being consecrated by the consecration of full Enlightenment and consecrated by the great knowledge of consecration (*mahājñāna-abhiṣeka*). Being thus consecrated he becomes well established in the tenth stage.

Then he understands everything about the mundane and supermundane things; he grasps all the subtle, penetrating knowledge of the Buddhas. He attains numerous bodhisattva-liberations. He acquires from the Buddhas the repository of the teachings of the past, present and future. He performs many miracles and assumes numerous bodies and specially cultivates the perfection of knowledge (*jñāna-pāramitā*).

The last chapter, i.e., the eleventh chapter, called the *Parindanā-parivarta* serves as the colophon to the text. Besides mentioning the place and time of preaching as well as the name of the preacher this chapter contains numerous similies employed to praise the special characteristics of the ten stages and the various attainments acquired in these stages. It also records the marvellous events, such as the trembling and roaring of the earth, that took place at the conclusion of the sermon.

This is the gist of the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* which is the result of an attempt to systematise the various teachings on *bhūmis*. It seems that before the time of the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* the number of *bhūmis* varied from seven to ten. The *Daśobhūmika Sūtra* itself suggests that the scheme of seven stages was the original one. Even according to the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* a bodhisattva is said to practise all the perfections in the seventh stage. It is further said that a bodhisattva, if he desires, can pass away into Nirvāṇa at that stage. The other three *bhūmis*, in which conscious striving gives way to spontaneous activity, were added to the original scheme of seven. It was the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* that finally fixed the number of *bhūmis* as ten.

J. Rahder (*Daśabhūmika Sūtra*, Paris 1926, preface) attempts to show that the system of the *Mahāvastu* and the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* are closely related. This view is not endorsed by Har Dayal (op. cit. p. 271). The latter points out that the only connections between the two systems are that sections dealing with the first *bhūmi* mentions a few similar virtues and that the name of one of the *bhūmis* in both texts is somewhat similar (i.e., the *durjayā* the seventh *bhūmi* in the *Mahāvastu* and *sudurjáyā* the fifth *bhumi* in the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra*). While the *Mahāvastu* speaks of retrogression of a bodhisattva on failing to fulfil his undertakings the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* does not even hint at such a possibility.

The *Bodhisattva-bhūmi* which is probably later than the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* is slightly influenced by the latter work. Though the author of the *Bodhisattva-bhūmi* attempts to show that his scheme of thirteen *vihāras* is the same as the ten *bhūmis* of the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* really there is not much similarity. The bases on which the two texts have been developed are completely different. The *Bodhisattva-bhūmi* is based on *nirnimitta-bhāvanā* whereas the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* is based on ten perfections. The former does not attach much importance to perfection. The allocation of the four modes of generous treatment (*saṅgraha vastu*) also points to the fact that the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra*, in which the four *saṅgraha-vastus* are allocated to the first four stages, is more systematic than the *Bodhisattva-bhūmi* in which all four are put in the first *vihāra*, i.e., *pramudita-vihāra*.

Though the *Dasabhūmika Sūtra* presents a more methodical and a coherent scheme than any other text dealing with the same subject, it is evident from the text itself that the author has not been able to blend perfectly the different prevalent teachings on the subject. One such discrepancy has been already referred to in the article, i.e., with regard to the description of the seventh stage where the author says that a bodhisattva practises all *pāramitās* in that stage and yet goes on to allocate different *pāramitās* to the remaining three stages. Another discrepancy is with regard to the details given about the third stage. Really the *kṣānti-pāramitā* (the perfection of forbearance) is connected with this stage. But the attributes and qualifications cited belong to the *dhyāna-pāramitā*, perfection of meditation. On this point Har Dayal (op. cit. p. 287) says, "It seems probable that the original scheme of division was based on the three *śikṣās* (branches of instruction) of *śīla*, *citta* and *prajñā*. The *Bodhisattva-bhūmi* has partially observed it, though the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* ignores it. But this third *bhūmi* appears to deal with *citta* or *samādhi*, and not with *kṣānti* which is tacked on at the end. The old scheme was recast and expanded in order to secure the symmetrical parallelism of the ten perfections and the ten stages."

Another inconsistency is seen in the account of the tenth stage. The author of the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* at the outset of his account of this stage says that the bodhisattva is annointed as a fully Enlightened one in this stage. He calls this stage the stage of consecration (*abhiṣeka*). Yet, as the account goes on he refers to the vast difference between a bodhisattva in the tenth stage and a Tathāgata. Although the bodhisattva in this stage is referred to as the 'Fully Enlightened One' (*Samyaksambuddha*) he has yet to practise perfections and acquire numerous virtues. This discrepancy also may be a result of his attempt to

blend different views prevalent at the time. In fact a bodhisattva has to pass the tenth stage and then attain Buddhahood. This is also the view promulgated in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* which refers to the stage in which a bodhisattva becomes a Tathāgata as *Tathāgata-bhūmi* (*Lank.* p. 227). But the *Śatasāhaśrikā-prajñā-pāramitā* (*BI.* 1910, p. 458) says that a bodhisattva in the tenth stage can be called a Tathāgata. It may be that the author of the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* attempted to blend these two ideas, though there is no complete harmony in his blending (N. Dutt, *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and Its Relation To Hīnayāna*, London, 1930, p. 238ff.).

The *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* has been translated several times into Chinese (*Taishō*, 285, 286, 287 ; *Nanjio*, 110, 105). It is also found incorporated in the Korean Tripiṭaka. (See *JRAS.* 1907, p. 663 ff.).

S. K. N.

DASAKAMMAPATHA. The ten different ways in which volitional activity or karma finds expression. Since karma in Buddhism is viewed from both angles of being efficient and inefficient (*kusala* and *akusala*) pure and impure (*suci* and *asuci*), good and bad (*sādhu* and *asādhu*), one meets with different sets of *kammapathas* named severally as *dasa-kusala-kammapatha* and *dasa-akusala-kammapatha* in Buddhist texts (*D.* III, pp. 71, 269 ; *S.* II. p. 166 ff. : *A.* V, pp. 54, 57, 266, 268).

The concept of efficiency in Buddhism, here as well as elsewhere, is related to the goal of transcending the painful process of saṃsāric existence. The cause of this saṃsāric continuance is given as basically being greed (*lobha*), hatred (*dosa*) and delusion (*moha*). In the attainment of Nirvāṇa, one is completely freed of these : hence Nirvāṇa, is described as end-of-greed (*rāgakkhaya*), end-of-hatred (*dosakkhaya*) and end-of-delusion (*mohakkhaya*). These three are the roots of *akusala* (*akusala-mūla*), or bases of inefficient volitional activity.

Whatever activity is divorced of such motivation, they come to be termed *kusala* or efficient. Thus, it is said that as the world reaches a stage of physical deterioration and moral decline the ten efficient ways of activity (*dasa-kusala-kammapatha*) disappear and the ten inefficient ways of activity (*dasa-akusala-kammapatha*) begin to manifest, themselves. Evidently, the well-being of the world is reciprocally dependent on the efficient ways of activity of man. On the otherhand, the ability to reject the ten inefficient ways of activity (*imesu kho bhikkhave dasasu dhammesu bhikkhu sammā nibbindamāno : A.* V, p. 54) helps a bhikkhu to attain his religious goal of making an end of suffering in this very life, *diṭṭheva dhamme dukkhassantakaro hoti :* loc. cit.). Its positive aspect of pursuing efficient activity (*dasasu āvuso dhammesu bhikkhu sammā subhāvitacitto :* ibid. p. 57) is equally commended.

In terms of the media through which these tenfold volitional activity find expression they are divided into three as physical, verbal and mental (*kāyakamma, vacīkamma* and *manokamma* respectively). Depending on the correctness and propriety of the diverse expressions of activity they bring purity (*soceyya*) or impurity (*asoceyya*), to each of the three respective areas of thought word and deed (*manasā asoceyyaṃ, vācāya asoceyyaṃ* and *kāyena asoceyyaṃ ; A.* V, p. 264 ff.). It is also to be observed that on account of the debased nature and incorrectness of such activity a more degenerate state of existence is to be expected in the life after (*imesaṃ pana Ounda dasannaṃ akusalānaṃ kammapathānaṃ samannāgamanahetu nirayo paññāyati tiracchānayoni paññāyati pettivisayo paññāyati yā vā pan'aññā pi kāci duggatiyo :* ibid. p. 266).

A study of the *kammapathas* as they are listed under *kusala* and *akusala* leads one to the conclusion that they are viewed as being more active and positive on their *akusala* or evil side. The positively stated are the ten *akusala-kammas* (*pāṇātipāti hoti* etc. op. cit. p. 264 ff.) and abstaining from them constitute the ten *kusala* or efficient kammas (*pāṇātipātā paṭivirato* etc. loc. cit.). Thus, taking the ten *akusala kammas* for purposes of classification we find 3 items under physical, 4 under verbal and 3 under mental kammas. Their distribution is as follows :

kāyakamma

1. *pāṇātipāta* : destruction of life
2. *adinnādāna* : stealing ;
3. *kāmesu micchācāra* : sexual misconduct;

1. Samsāra is an unsatisfactory state of affairs out of which any sensible man would choose to step out (*Kuḍā sunāmo imassa dukkhassa nissaraṇaṃ paññayissati jarāmaraṇas-sāti : S.* II, p. 10). See also *Anamataggāyaṃ bhikkhavesaṃsāro pubbākoṭi na paññāyati avijjā nīvaraṇānaṃ sattānaṃtaṇhā saṃyojanānaṃ sandhāvataṃ saṃsaraṇaṃ. Evaṃ digha rattaṃ vo bhikkhave dukkaṃ pacanu-bhūtaṃ vyasanaṃ pacanu-bhūtaṃ kaṭasi vaḍḍhitā:* Ibid. p. 178).

vacīkamma

4. *musāvāda* : lying ;
5. *pisuṇāvāca* : slander ;
6. *pharusāvāca* : harsh speech ;
7. *samphappalāpa* : frivolous talk ;

manokamma

8. *abhijjhā* : covetousness ;
9. *vyāpāda* : ill-will ;
10. *micchādiṭṭhi* : wrong-views.

The ten efficient or inoffensive forms of activity (i.e., *kusala-kamma*) consist of abstaining from the above ten *akusalakammas*.

Of these three groups of *kammapatha*, the more manifest are the physical (*kāyakamma*) and the verbal (*vacīkamma*), hence are also the more easily legislated against, in their *akusala* form. This, in fact, is what forms the theme of *sīla* in Buddhism, namely, providing for the abstinence from wrong patterns of conduct. This common feature of the *kāyakamma* and the *vacīkamma* has enabled these two groups to be brought under one category resulting in a set of seven referred to as the *sattakammapatha* or seven ways of volitional activity (*S.* II, p. 167).

J. D.

DASAKUSALAKAMMAPATHA. See DASAKAMMAPATHA.

DASAKUŚALAKARMAPATHA. See DASAKAMMAPATHA.

DASAPĀRAMĪ. See PĀRAMITĀ.

DASASAṂYOJANA. See SAMYOJANA.

DASA-SIKKHĀPADA, a set of ten precepts intended to be the course of training for novices [*sāmaṇera* (*Vin.* I, p. 83)]. It appears to be a development of the *uposatha-sīla* consisting of a set of eight precepts to be observed by laymen and laywomen (*upāsaka upāsikā*) on *uposatha* (Sinh. *poya*) days (See ATTHAṄGUPOSATHA), with the seventh precept split into two and a new one added as the tenth.

The necessity for *dasa-sikkhāpada* arose, according to the Vinaya, with the institution of the community of *sāmaṇeras*, as a disciplinary medium for their increasing numbers. Formerly, a thera was allowed to have only one *sāmaṇera* under him. When more and more sought entry into the Order as *sāmaṇeras*, a thera was allowed to have more *sāmaṇeras* under him ; and the question arose as to how these *sāmaṇeras* were to be trained. When the matter was put to the Buddha for a solution, he prescribed the *dasa-sikkhāpadas* to be their course of training (*Vin.* I, p. 83).

The ten precepts are all negative by nature, i.e. all are abstainnings (*veramaṇī*) from some misdeed. They are abstinence 1. from taking life, from killing living beings (*pāṇātipātā-veramaṇī*), 2. from taking what is not given, from theft (*adinnādānā-v°*), 3. from sex relations i.e., observance of celibacy (q.v.; *abrahmacariyā-v°*), 4. from telling lies, from falsehood (*musāvādā-v°*), 5. from any state of indolence arising from the use of intoxicants, from taking liquor (*surāmerayamajjapamādaṭṭhānā-v°*), 6. from eating at the wrong hour, i.e., after mid-day (*vikālabhojanā-v°*), 7. from worldly amusements such as dances, songs, instrumental music and variety shows, (*naccagītavāditavisūkadassana-v°*), 8. from using unguents and ornaments (*mālāgandhavilepanadhāraṇamaṇḍanavibhūsanaṭṭhānā-v°*), 9. from sleeping on a high and luxurious bed (*uccāsayanamahāsayanā-v°*) and 10. from accepting gold and silver (*jātarūparajatapaṭiggahanā-v°* : *Vin.* I, p. 83 ; *Khp.* p. 1).

Numbers 1, 2, 4, and 5 are also common to laymen (*upāsaka*) as precepts for regular observance in their daily life (*niccasīla*). These four, plus abstaining from wrong indulgence in sense-pleasures (*kāmesumicchācārā-veramaṇī*), in place of celibacy of the *dasasikkhāpada*, constitute what is called the set of five precepts meant for the laymen (*pañca-sīla*). Numbers 7 and 8 of the *dasasikkhāpada* are to be found combined as one precept in *uposatha-sīla* meant for the laymen. Thus, the first nine precepts of *dasasikkāpada* meant for the novices (i.e., *sāmaṇera* and *sāmaṇerī*) are also common to laymen as *uposatha-sīla*. Only the tenth precept, i.e., abstaining from accepting gold and silver, is pecular to the life of the cloister.

The first five of the ten precepts are described as abstaining from practices which are wrong in themselves (*pakativajjā-veramaṇī*) because these practices have unwholesome thoughts as their basis : the rest are called abstainings from practices which are wrong because they are contrary to the injunctions laid down for the regulation of the religious life (*paññattivajja-Khp-A* p. 24.).

UPALI KARUNARATNA.

DAŚAŚIKSĀPADA. See **DASASIKKHĀPADA.**

DASAVATTHU, the ten disputed points of Buddhist monastic discipline maintained as lawful by the Vajjian monks of Vesāli, but rejected as unlawful at the second Buddhist Council convened at Vesāli for the express purpose of considering these points and taking a decision on them. All these practices, except the practice called *āciṇṇa*, have been traced back to the Vinaya texts and found to be prohibited as being contrary to certain rules of discipline and amounting to either a *nissaggiya-pācittiya*, a *pācittiya* or a *dukkaṭa* offence. The ruling, given in connection with the practice called 'custom' (*āciṇṇa*) is that it is sometimes permissible and sometimes not, as the case may be. It is, interesting to note that all these points are of very insignificant nature, as they amount to the transgression of very minor rules in the *Vinaya*. An exception may be made of the two practices called 'residence' (*āvāsa*) and 'consent' (*anumati*) which are likely to lead to a rift in the Saṅgha. It is also interestng to note that five of the ten points pertain to eating and drinking. However, the point relating to the acceptance of money (i.e., in the form of gold and silver : *jātarūpa* and *rajata*) stands in a class by itself because it is given as the provocation which triggered off the summoning of the Council (*Vin.* II, p. 294 ff.). The incorrectness of this practice has also been pointed out and discussed in great detail even before the summoning of the council by the elder Yasa Kākaṇḍaputta, the monk who challenged this practice indulged in by the Vajjian monks of Vesāli. This, according to the *Vinaya* account (loc. cit.), was at a time when several malpractices by Buddhist monks were being witnessed in Vesāli.

There are seven accounts that deal with these ten points ; they are the (1) Theravāda Pali tradition preserved in (*a*) *Vinaya, Cullavagga*, ch. xii ; (*b*) *Dīpavaṃsa*, ch. iv and v ; (*c*) *Mahāvaṃsa*, ch. iv ; (*d*) *Samantapāsādikā, VinA.* VI, pp. 1298–99 ; (*e*) *Mahāvaṃsaṭikā*, pp. 156–7 ; and (*f*) the Chinese translation of the *Samantapāsādikā* (*Taishō*, No. 1462, Vol. 24, p. 677) ; the Chinese translations of the following *Vinayas :* (2) *Sarvāstivāda* (*Taishō*, No. 1435, Vol. 23, p. 450 ff.) ; (3) *Mahīśāsaka* (*Taishō*, No. 1421, Vol. 22, p. 192) ; (4) *Dharmaguptaka* (*Taishō*, No. 1428, Vol. 22, p. 968) ; (5) the *Vinayakṣūdrakavastu*, another *Sarvāstivāda Vinaya* (*Taisho*, No. 1451, Vol. 24, p. 411) ; (6) the *Vinaya-mātṛkā śāstra, P'i-ni-mu-lun* or *P'i-ni-mu-ching* (*Taishō*, No. 1463, Vol. 24, p. 819) and (7) the Tibetan *Vinaya* (*Dulva*, Vol. 11) ; an English translation of which is given by W. W. Rockhill in his *The Life of the Buddha*, London, 1884, p. 171 ff.

It is significant that the *Mahāsaṅghika Vinaya* does not mention these ten points. It is said that the Vajjian monks who held these ten points as lawful did not accept the ruling given at the Council, broke away from those who favoured the decision of the Council and established a separate school. This school is known as the Mahāsaṅghika The *Mahāsaṅghika Vinaya* also gives some causes that led to the summoning of a Council, which, according to them, is the first Council : but these causes, with the sole exception of one, are entirely different from the ten points given in the other traditions. One of the causes given in the *Mahāsaṅghika Vinaya* (*Taishō*, No. 1425, Vol. 22), however, pertains to gold and silver. It is said that. if a monk has no way of obtaining a bowl, robes and medicine, he may have gold and silver, so that he may be able to buy them. This, in a way, corresponds to the tenth point, *jātarūparajata*, given in the other traditions. The omission of the ten points in the *Mahāsaṅghika Vinaya* is quite natural because, according to all other traditions, the *Mahāsaṅghikas* were the miscreants condemned at the Council.

All accounts speak of the ten practices, but they do not agree as to what these ten were ; and it is clear that different schools understood them differently. Evidently, the writers had to guess the meaning. The order, too, in which the ten points are given in different lists is not the same. The list was preserved by means of ten mnemonic words, and the Pali list consists of (1) *siṅgiloṇa*. (2) *dvaṅgula*, 3) *gāmantara*, 4) *āvāsa* (5) *anumati* 6) *āciṇṇa*, (7) *amathita*, (8) *jalogi*, (9) *adasaka-nisīdana* and 10) *jātarūparajata*. At the end of those ten words is found another word *kappa* meaning : 'permissible' or 'lawful.' So the question is : " Are these ten practices lawful and permissible " The difference of opinion comes in the interpretation of these ten practices.

1. *Siṅgiloṇa*, salt (*loṇa*) in a horn (*siṅga*). First point of dispute according to the Theravāda *Vinaya*, the fourth according to a Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* text called *Vinayakṣūdrakavastu* means carrying salt in a horn with a view to adding it to unsalted food if and when such food is served. The Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, (first point) and the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya* (seventh point) are in agreement in interpreting it. According to them, it is keeping salt aside. ' The interpretation is not very clear. The Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya* (first point) which agrees with the Theravāda

interpretation adds ginger and says that it means carrying salt and ginger.' The *Vinayamātṛkā Sāstra* (seventh point) understood it as 'using salt which was accepted the previous day,' while the *Dulva* (fourth point) took it to mean 'keeping salt as long as one lived.'

All these accounts refer to salt ; the difference lies in the manner of using it.

The *Cullavagga* says that this practice was declared unlawful in terms of a *Suttavibhaṅga* rule laid down at Sāvatthi (*Sāvatthiyā sutta-vibhaṅge*, i.e., *Pācittiya* No. 38). It amounts to an offence of expiation (*pācittiya*) for eating what has been stored (*sannidhikāraka bhojane*). All the other *Vinayas*, too, are in agreement in declaring this practice to be an offence of expiation..

Rockhill, who translated the *Dulva* paragraph dealing with this practice, says in a footnote : In *Dulva*, X, 296, the Buddha allows salt to be kept in certain cases. It must be kept in a box with a cover. The *Pācittiya* No. 67 of the Tibetan *Prātimokṣa Sūtra* makes mention of a bhikkhu who hides another's alms-bowl or salt-horn etc ...." (W. W. Rockhill, op. cit. p. 172 n). But the *Dulva* paragraph that deals with this practice clearly says that it was declared unlawful at Rājagaha on account of an act of Śāriputra and it was pronounced a Pācittiya (Rockhill, op. cit. p. 174).

2. *Dvaṅgula*, two-fingers, has been interpreted in three ways. According to the Theravāda interpretation, this practice (second point) means 'eating a meal at the wrong time, i.e., when the shadow of the sun showed two fingers' breadth after noon.' The Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* (second point) and the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya* (first point) agree in interpreting it as 'the amount of food that can be taken in two fingers is allowed, after mid-day meal'. According to the *Vinayakṣūdrakavastu* (sixth point), the *Vinayamatṛkā Śāstra* (first point), the Mahīsāsaka Vinaya (second point) and the *Dulva* (sixth point) the practice is 'picking up food with two fingers, after mid-day meal'.

All are in agreement in interpreting one aspect of the practice, i.e., eating after noon; they differed as to how monks should eat after the mid-day meal.

This is found prohibited in the *Suttavibhaṅga* as amounting to an offence of expiation (*pācittiya*, No. 37), for eating at the wrong time (*vikāla-bhojana Vin.* II, p. 306). Other accounts, too, are in agreement with the Pali tradtion in declaring it to be an offence of expiation (Rockhill, op. cit. p. 175).

3. *Gāmantara* 'among the villages', or 'in another village' , has been interpreted by the Theravādins (third point) as 'having eaten and being satisfied, a monk may go to the village and eat there a second meal that is not left over', 'That a monk, having had one meal in one village, may take another meal in a near village' is the interpretation given by the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* (third point) and the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya* (second point). The *Vinayamātṛkā Śāstra* (second point) and the Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya* (fourth point) interpret it as 'having a second meal in another village, after having had the proper meal in one village' ; whereas the *Vinayakṣūdrakavastu* (fifth point) has 'in another town or on way to another town' in place of 'in another village'. According to *Dulva*, (fifth point) it is 'eating food during journeys when they (the monks) are a *yojana* or half a *yojana* away from their residence'.

All these accounts interpret this practice as having a second meal, after having had the proper mid-day meal. They differ with regard to the place where they can take the meal.

This practice is found prohibited in the *Suttavibhaṅga* as amounting to an offence of expiation (*Pācittiya*, No. 35 ; *Vin.* II, p. 306 ; Rockhill, op. cit. p. 175).

4. *Avāsa*, residence, according to the Theravāda *Vinaya* (fourth point) and the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* (fifth point) is that 'several residences belonging to one parish (boundary - *sīmā*) may carry out separate formal acts (*uposatha-kamma*)'. The Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya* (third point) explains it as 'holding formal acts, *saṅghakamma*, separately inside the residence'. This point is not found in the other four accounts, i.e., the Mahīśāsāka, the *Vinayamātṛkā śāstra*, the *Vinayakṣūdrakavastu* and the *Dulva*.

This practice is found prohibited in the *Uposathasaṃyutta* as amounting to an offence of wrong-doing (*dukkaṭa*) for going beyond Vinaya-rules (*Vin.* II, p. 306). The *Uposathasaṃyutta* has been identified as the 8.3 of chapter ii of the *Mahāvagga* (*Vin.* I, p. 107).

5. *Anumati*, 'consent, sanction, approval, according to the Theravāda tradition (fifth point), means that an incomplete Order of monks may without prior sanction of the absentee monks, carry out, in their absence, a formal act (*uposatha-kamma*), with the intention of securing their sanction afterwards. The Sarvāstivāda (sixth point) and the Dharmaguptaka (fourth point)

traditions agree in explaining it as performing a wrong act first and then asking the Saṅgha for its recognition. In the Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya* (ninth point) we find the phrase 'separate act' in place of 'wrong act' of the Sarvāstivāda and Dharmaguptaka account. The *Vinayamātṛkā Śāstra*, the *Vinayakṣūdrakavastu* and the *Dulva* do not mention this point in their respective accounts.

The *Cullavagga* (*Vin.* II, p. 306) says that this practice was prohibited by the Buddha in Campā and refers the reader to *Campeyyavinayavatthu* which is identified as *Campeyya-khandhaka* of the *Māhavagga*, (ch. ix, 3.5 ; *Vin.* I, p. 318). It amounts to an offenc of wrong-doing (*dukkaṭa*).

6. *Āciṇṇa*, 'customary practice, habitually indulged in', according to the Theravādins (sixth point) is that 'monks may follow the practices of his teacher, right or wrong, merely because his teacher has practised it'. The *Vinayamātṛkā Śāstra* (sixth point) has 'former monks' in place of 'his teacher' of the Theravāda account, and that is the only difference between the two interpretations. We find a quite extraordinary explanation in the Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya* (eighth point). It says that this practice means 'following the same acts that the monk used to do when he was a layman'. The Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya* explains it as 'performing an act in accordance with the usual way'.—This point does not occur in the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, *Vinayakṣūdrakavastu* and the *Dulva*.

The ruling given in the Council is that this practice is sometimes allowed, and sometimes not, as the case may be.

7. *Amathita*.. 'not churned', according to the Theravāda (seventh point) and the *Dulva* (eighth point)is that 'having eaten and being satisfied, the monks may drink a kind of milk product which has passed the stage of milk but has not turned curd, i.e., half-milk-half-curd'. It is according to the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* (fourth point), taking a mixture of unboiled milk, curd and butter, ; according to *Vinayakṣūdrakavastu*(eighth point), taking milk and curd mixed with water, according to the Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya* (fifth point) and the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya* (sixth point), taking a mixture of ghee, sugar molasses, curd, butter and honey and, according to the *Vinayamātṛkā Śāstra* (sixth point), drinking a mixture of butter, curd and honey. All accounts agree that it is the taking of this mixture, after finishing the mid-day meal, that is disputed.

This practice has been prohibited in the *Suttavibhaṅga* as being an offence of expiation (*Pācittiya* No. 35 ; Rockhill, op. cit. p. 175).

8. *Jalogi*, a kind of liquor, in the Theravāda (eighth point) and the Mahīśāśaka (sixth point) traditions, means 'drinking liquor that is not fully fermented'. It means, according to the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* (seventh point), 'taking liquor because living conditions are poor'; according to the *Vinayakṣūdrakavastu* (seventh point) 'taking liquor mixed with water as a medicine to cure diseases'; according to the Dharmaguptaka (eighth point) and the *Vinayamātṛkā śāstra* (eighth point), 'taking liquor called *jalogi*'. The *Dulva* (seventh point) gives an entirely different explanation, i.e., fermented liquor may be sucked as a leech (*jalūka*) would do. The *Cullavagga* (*Vin.* II, p. 307) says that this practice is prohibited in the *Suttavibhaṅga* as an offence of expiation (*Pācittiya*, No. 51) for drinking liquor (Rockhill, op. cit. p. 175).

9. *Adasaka-nisīdana*, seat (*nisīdana*) with no border (*a-dasaka*), according to Theravāda tradition (ninth point) is sitting upon a rug or piece of cloth which has no border ; according to the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* (ninth point) and the *Vinayakṣūdrakavastu* (ninth point), is making a new seat rug without adding to its border a piece of one span's length from the old rug ; according to *Dulva* (ninth point), using a mat without patching it around the edge the width of a span of the Sugata, i.e., the Buddha ; according to the Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya* (seventh point), sitting upon a mat of any size ; and according to the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya* (ninth point) and the *Vinayamātṛkā śāstra* (ninth point), keeping a cushion without cutting its edge nicely.

This practice is prohibited in the *Suttavibhaṅga* as an offence of expiation (*Pācittiya*, No. 89 ; Rockhill op. cit. p. 175).

10. *Jātarūparajata*, gold and silver, means accepting gold and silver in all the *Vinayas*. While the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, *Vinayakṣūdraka-vastu* and *Dulva* have 'other treasures' in addition to 'gold and silver', the Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya* has 'coins'. The other three *Vinayas* mention only gold and silver. It is the tenth point in all lists.

"This is a *Nissaggiya-pācittiya* offence according to *Vinaya*, *Dirghāgama*, *Madhyamāgama*, *Kaṭhina* section of the *Prātimokṣa Sūtra* and the *Ekottarāgama*" (Rockhill, op.cit.p.175). "It is prohibited in the *Suttavibhaṅga*" and has been identified with the *Nissa ivapācittiva* No. 18 (*Vin.* II. p 307)

Some lists, while omitting some of these practices, give in their place certain other practices which cannot be identified with any of the ten practices explained above. The Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, for example, does not give the sixth point, *Aciṇṇa*, but, instead, gives a practice which is not found in the above ten. It is the eighth point in their list, and it says that certain offences such as killing, stealing, wrong sexual behaviour and lying etc. are considered impure whether one commits them or not. So is the third point in the Mahīśāsaka list, i.e., eating once more, or having a second meal; it seems to be a repetition or a modification of the *dvaṅgula* and *gāmantara* practices. This list does not give the practice called *āvāsa*. The *Vinayakṣūdrakavastu*, in which the practices called *āvāsa*, *anumati* and *āciṇṇa* are not found, gives three points which do not correspond to any of the above ten points. They are (1) performing three kinds of *Saṅghakarma*, namely, *saṅghakarma* which is neither in keeping with the dharma nor performed in harmony, and a *saṅghakarma* which is in keeping with the dharma but not performed in harmony ; (2) performing the same three types of *saṅghakarma*, if they are approved of by the laymen, and (3) digging earth or having it dug by others. These are the first three points of their list. The third point, digging earth, is also found in the *Dulva*. The *Vinayamātṛkā Śāstra* does not give the two practices, *āvāsa* and *anumati* but we find in it two practices, the third and the fourth in the list not given in the list of ten explained above ; they are (1) following the deeds of the beings of this world, and (2) praising the good deeds of all beings. The *Dulva* gives three practices in place of *āvāsa*, *anumati* and *āciṇṇa*. They are (1) the exclamation *alala*. (2) indulgence in enjoyment and (3) digging earth or having it dug by others : the first three practices in the list.

What is meant by the phrase, 'exclamation *alala*', is not quite clear. The following is the translation given by Rockhill : "The bhikkhus of Vaisāli practised as lawful the exclamation *alala* : (those who) did not agree were heterodox ; (those who were)assembled (elsewhere than at Vaisali were heterodox; those who did agree were orthodox." Rockhill himself admits, in the footnote, that this phrase is exceedingly difficult (Rockhill, op. cit. p. 171).

According to the *Dulva*, the first and the second points were declared unlawful in the town of Campā on account of the acts of the group of six monks ; it amounts to a *dukkaṭa* offence. The third point was declared unlawful at Śrāvasti in consequence of the acts of the group of six monks and was pronounced an offence of expiation. It is the *Pācittiya* No. 73 of the *Bhikṣuprātimokṣa* and No. 56 of the *Bhikṣuṇiprātimokṣa* (Rockhill, op. cit. p. 174).

There are two lists, that of the Theravāda and Dharmaguptaka where all the ten practices are identical, but even there we find the difference of order in which the ten points are listed, and also the difference of interpretation.

UPALI KARUNARATNA.

DASSANA (Skt. *darśana*), 'seeing', 'sight', in its literal, physical meanings which is preserved in the applied and developed meaning in the theory of perception as insight, understanding, comprehension and intuition. It is mostly used in combination with knowledge (*ñāṇa*). This 'knowing and seeing' (*ñāṇa-dassana*) or the insight arising from knowledge is the perfect realisation of the true nature (*yathā-bhūta*) of phenomena and events to be impermanent (*anicca*), the realisation that misunderstanding (*avijjā*) in this respect can only lead to conflict (*dukkha*), the realisation that such conflict is created by the imperfect understanding of the total insubstantiality (*anatta*) of all phenomena, which is due to a desire for substantiality, stability, permanence, personality, individuality, essence in existence, all of which oppose the impermanence and instability which is characteristic of *bhava* or existence.

This insight (*dassana*), therefore, is an awakening (*bodhi or bodha*) to the truth, a release (*vimutti : S.* I, p. 139) from bondage, a purification (*visuddhi : M.* I, p. 147) from all that is wrong

See further DARŚANA

H.G.A.v. ZEYST

DAṬHĀ DHĀTU See DAḶADĀ.

DĀYAKA, a donor, benefactor or a munificent person. In its general application this term connotes a giver of something to another. A good king is always described as a *dāyaka* (a liberal and munificent person : *D.* I, p. 137). But we see this term mostly used in a religious connotation in Buddhist literature. *Dāna* or liberality is an important item in the religious life of Buddhists and it is of vital doctrinal importance, too, as it is directly connected to the doctrine of kamma; and those who are liberal to others are called *dāyakas* in a religious sense in Buddhism.

Buddhism teaches that a practising Buddhist should be very sympathetic towards all beings, human or otherwise (*sabbapāṇabhūta-hitānukampī* : *D*. I, pp. 4, 63, 171) and he should endeavour always to help those in need of help, in whatever possible manner. In helping others, one is not only doing something to eliminate the suffering of those who receive one's help, but also one is doing something that will result in one's own welfare, because each act of munificence is supposed to have in it the potentiality of retributing to the donor on a grander scale in the future (*dinnaṃ sukhaphalaṃ hoti*). But the power of retribution varies according to the virtues of the recipient In the *Dakkhiṇāvibhaṅga Sutta* (*M*. III, p. 254f.) the Buddha enumerates fourteen groups on whom a munificent man (*dāyaka*) could show his munificence. They are (1) The Buddha, (2) a Paccekabuddha, (3) an arahant, (4) a person on the path to the attainment of arahantship, (5) a non-returner (*anāgāmin*), (6) a person on the path to the attainment of the state of a non-returner, (7) a once-returner, (8) a person on the path to the attainment of the state of a once-returner, (9) a stream-entrant, (10) a person on the path to the attainment of stream-entry, (11) a virtuous person outside the Buddhist-fold, (12) a disciplined layman, (13) an undisciplined layman and (14) an animal. The Buddha says in the same sutta that munificence shown on an animal will result in a hundredfold return to the donor, on an ordinary undisciplined layman a thousandfold, on an ordinary disciplined layman a hundred thousandfold and likewise the retributive power to the donor increases depending on the virtues of the recipient. So the entire world is a field where the donor may sow his seeds of munificnece, but the best field (*anuttaraṃ puññakkhettaṃ* : *M*. I, p. 447) where he can sow his seeds of munificence so that he may collect the richest harvest, is the Order of monks, At the same time there should be three conditions present in the donor for him to derive the full benefit of his gift, namely he should feel happy before giving, while giving and after giving (*A*. III, p. 336).

Discussing the benefits a donor gets by being munificent the Buddha says that such a person will be liked by many people, good people will like to associate with him, a good reputation will spread about him, he will be recognised as a noble man in any assembly and after death he will be reborn in heaven (*A*. III, p. 39).

Out of material gifts given by a donor, the gift of food is supposed to be the best, and a giver of food gives others longevity (*āyu*), complexion (*vaṇṇa*), happiness (*sukha*) and vitality (*bala*) ; and having given these four things to others he himself becomes entitled to the same things in the future (*A*. II, p. 63).

The Buddhist Order of monks, like many other religious organisations, depended entirely on the generosity of the general public for its sustenance, and hence the lay supporter or, the *dāyaka*, occupies an important place in the Buddhist organisation. It was considered the foremost duty of the monks to learn the Dhamma and practise it thoroughly and sincerely and cater to the spiritual needs of the layman. It is considered a severe breach of trust for a monk to deceive a believing *dāyaka* and enjoy his munificence while being not virtuous (*Dhp*. *v*. 308 ; *Dhp A*. III, p. 481). On the other hand, it is the duty of a good *dāyaka* to inquire into the needs of the monks and supply them with those needs with due respect (*A*. IV, p. 244).

From the very inception of the Buddhist movement very influential persons came forward to support the Buddhist Order of monks, some of them being Bimbisāra (*Sn*. *v*. 405 ff.), Anāthapiṇḍika (*J*. I, p. 92) Jīvaka (*DA*. I, p. 133), Visākhā (*A*. IV, p. 348), Bandula Mallikā (*VvuA*. p. 165) and Kosala Mallikā (*DhpA*. III f). Of them Anāthapiṇḍika was acclaimed as the chief benefactor and Visākhā as the chief benefactress (*A*. I, p. 26) by the Buddha himself.

The Buddha, as well as his disciples, heeded the views of the donors very much. In the Vinaya the Buddha included the custom of congregating on the *uposatha* days to recite the *pāṭimokkha* on a suggestion made by Bimbisāra (*Vin*. I, pp. 101–2).

With the establishment of monasteries, the connotation of the word *dāyaka* slightly changed. At the outset anybody who supported the order of monks in general earned the title of *dāyaka*, but with the establishment of monasteries in villages and towns, and when the monks started resident life, people in a particular locality began to support the monastery in that locality, and the resident monks became accustomed to call those people their own *dāyakas*, namely, the people who thought themselves to be under a moral obligation to support that monastery. This became more or less the custom of almost all monasteries in Sri Lanka. The *dāyakas* supporting a particular monastery organise and perform all the activities connected with that monastery, and in many instances they form into an organisation called the *dāyaka-sabhā* with the incumbent monk as its patron. See also DAKKHIṆĀ

W.G.W.

DEAD. THE DISPOSAL OF THE—Buddhism does not attach any special significance to death, and hence, the disposal of the dead, too, does not receive any special consideration. Nevertheless, by way of acceding to popular sentiments which were essential to the sustenance of social life, Buddhism had to assimilate the prevalent customs and rites concerning the dead and their disposal. However, there is not much textual reference to funeral rites. The evidence found in the Nikāyas and the Jātakas shows that cremation and burial were both common as modes of disposal of the dead. In the *Therigāthā* one witnesses a very touching scene of three members of the same family being burnt away in a single pyre (*mātā pitā ca bhātā ca dayhanti ekacitakayaṃ : Thig. v.* 219). The *Raṭṭhapāla Theragāthā* describes cremation as a simple style of disposal of the dead when it says that " wrapped up in a single length of cloth the dead body is taken away to be burnt on a pyre' (*Vatthena naṃ pārutaṃ niharitvā citaṃ samodhāya tato dahanti : Thag. v.* 779). Sometimes dead bodies were disposed of by casting them in the cemeteries to be devoured by birds and beasts of prey (*J.* I, pp. 175, 372, 373). As suggested by the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*, the cremation of kings and great personages appears to have been performed with great ceremony. Though it was customary to have the body disposed of on the day of death itself, exceptions may have been made with regard the disposal of bodies of very important members of society. The cremation of the Buddha's body is very graphically described in the *Mahā parinibbāna Sutta* (*D.* II, p. 160 f.). This, however is a very exceptional instance, and hence, cannot be considered as reflecting the general practice prevaling at the time. From this account it is seen that the Buddha's body was wrapped up several times in new cloth and cotton wool and placed in a special casket filled with oil. This was carried to the place of cremation in procession, accompanied by dance, song and music. Those who desired to show their last respects to the Buddha circumambulated the pyre thrice, clockwise, i.e., with their right shoulder nearer to the pyre (*pradakṣiṇā*)[1]. After the body was completely burnt, it was customary to put out the fire by sprinkling water over it[2]. The *Sāma Jātaka* (*J.* VI, p. 84) makes a brief reference to a casual disposal of the dead. From this Jātaka it is seen that offering of flowers to the corpse, sprinkling it with water, and then circumambulating it thrice seem to have been customary gestures of showing respect to the dead (*J.* I, pp. 255, 287, II, pp. 155). There is nothing particularly Buddhistic in these modes of disposal of the dead and rites connected therewith. What is obvious is that Buddhism merely accomodated and assimilated the prevalent practices which were socially and religiously not obnoxious and offensive.

It is really in post-funeral rites and ceremonies[3] that one could notice distinct Buddhist influence. Even when formulating these rites and ceremonies Buddhism did not completely deviate from traditions and customs, but instead adopted them after effecting necessary modification. The assimilation of these rites was facilitated by the Buddhist teaching on karma and rebirth. Buddhism, while rejecting the belief in a permanent soul accepts the belief in re-birth. Except arahants, i.e., those who have terminated their saṃsāric process of birth and death, the others are regarded as subject to rebirth in one of the five life-courses (*pañca-gati : M* I, p. 73). Rebirth in any of these is determined by one's own karma. Subsequently, it was taught that even wholesome karma did not guarantee birth in a happy state (*sugati*, q.v.) and it is the death-consciousness (*cuti-citta*, q.v.) that played the deciding role in fixing the state of rebirth. These beliefs, along with the later-developed ideas of intermediate existence (*antarābhava*, q.v.) and tranference of merit (*anumodanā*, q.v.) paved the way for numerous pre-Buddhistic rites connected with the dead to be grafted onto popular Buddhism with necessary modifications. One such major modification is seen in the introduction of Buddhist monks in place of Brahmanic priests to officiate at these rites. Consequently, all these rites connected with the dead grew around the Saṅgha.

Buddhism adopted these rites to serve a variety of purposes. Unlike pre-Buddhistic religions Buddhism did not consider the dead with awe and reverence, and did not beleive that the dead could harm the living. Thus, primarily, it was the sense

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1 In the cremation rites of the present day in Sri Lanka one notices of times that the spirit of *pradakṣiṇā* by which it was intended to honour the dead has evoporated leaving in its place a mechnical ritual of taking the coffin containing the dead body thrice round the pyre.

2 This too, has given rise in Sri Lanka to an observance of religiomagical significance. Water sanctified by Buddhist monks through the chanting of *parittas* (Sinh. *pirit*) is used to quench the fire of the pyre on the morning of the following day. This is based on the belief that human bones and ash from a pyre, unless its magical potency is nullified in this manner could be used in the performance of black magic.

3 The term *peta-kicca* (*J.* II, p. 5) refers to such rites.

of filial piety, coupled with a sense of gratitude that motivated the rites performed for the sake of the dead (*Petānaṃ dakkhiṇaṃ dajjā pubbe kataṃ anussaraṃ : Pvu.* p. 4). This is indicated in the *Siṅgālovāda Sutta* (D. III, p. 189) wherein it is said that making of offerings to the dead is an incumbent duty of a child (cf. *A.* III, p. 43). The other purpose is more utilitarian in nature. Though Buddhism encourages one to consider death as a natural event, and hence, advocates the adoption of a detached attitude towards the dead, such teachings were neither appealing to the masses nor capable of helping them to drown the grief of the members of the bereaved family. Performance of funeral rites that were considered as being beneficial to the departed ones provided not only a means of showing gratitude for the good done by them when alive, but also proved an effective source of solace for the living. As these rites grew centered on the Saṅgha, they contributed in a fair measure to the upkeep of the Saṅgha institution and hence, the performance of such rites were encouraged (*balañca bhikkhūnaṃ anuppadinnaṃ : Pvu.* loc. cit.).

According to Buddhism only those who are born in the realm of *petas*[4] are capable of receiveing the benefits of these rites. Yet as the state of re-birth is neither predestined nor known to the living, the performance of these rites became obligatory at the death of any member of the family. Popularity of such rites is evident from the importance attached to the *Tirokuḍḍa Sutta* which occurs both in the *Petavatthu* and the *Khuddakapāṭha*. This sutta emphasises the reciprocal nature of the effects of these rites. On the one hand, the rites are supposed to provide the dead with their day-to-day requirements in the new degenerate existence of *pretas* into which they have fallen. It is believed that whatever item is offered to a virtuous person, usually the members of the Saṅgha, on behalf of the dead, the corresponding item became available to him in the world of the dead[5]. On the other, the sutta emphasises, that the dead thus provided with food, clothing etc, which are otherwise not available to them, show their gratitude by blessing the surviving relatives (*Ciraṃ jīvantu no ñāti yesaṃ hetu labhāmase : Pvu.* loc. cit.).

The main funeral rite of the Buddhist in Sri Lanka is the *pāṃsukūla*[6] ceremony which in all probability had its origin in this country. It seems to be based on the ideas embodied in the *Tirokuḍḍa Sutta*. The *pāṃsukūla* rite performed by monks prior to the disposal of the dead is a must for all Buddhists alike, rich or poor, laity or clergy. At the beginning of the rite, performed either at the home of the deceased or at the place of disposal, the monk administers the five precepts to those who are gathered at the funeral. This is customarily followed by a sermon on impermanence of life and inevitability of death and also by eulogistic speeches about the dead person, undoubtedly intended to console the members of the bereaved family. It is only after this that the rite-proper takes place. A length of white cloth which is neatly folded is laid on the coffin[7] and one of the monks makes those gathered offer it as a gift to the Saṅgha on behalf of the dead, by repeating thrice collectively the phrase *imaṃ matakavattaṃ bhikkhusaṅghassa dema* (we give this corpse-clothing to the Saṅgha). After this the monks chant the stanza,

aniccā vata saṅkhārā uppāda-vaya-dhammino
uppajjitvā nirujjhantī, tesaṃ vūpasamo sukho

(*D.* II, p. 157)

(Impermanent indeed are compounded things, whose nature is to arise and pass away. Having arisen they are destroyed. Their being stilled is pleasant).

A close relative, usually a son of the deceased is asked to pour water out of a vessel into a cup till it overflows[8]. While this is being done the monks recite the following stanza from the *Tirokuḍḍa Sutta* which sums up the intention of this rite, namely, the transference of the merit gathered through this funeral rite for the benefit of the dead.

unname udakaṃ vaṭṭaṃ yathā ninnaṃ pavattati
evameva ito dinnaṃ petānaṃ upakappati
yathā vārivahā pūrā paripūrenti sāgaraṃ
evameva ito dinnaṃ petānaṃ upakappati

(*Pvu.* I, 5.7.)

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4 Cf. Vedic *pitaraḥ* and Brahamanic *preta ;* Pali term *peta* connotes the dead, the departed ones.

5 According to Buddhist texts this provision of items of food and clothing to those in the world of the dead, to the living, takes place through the efficacy of the merit generated by making offerings to the Saṅgha.

6 *Paṃsukūla* means rags from a dust heap: at the commencement of the order the monks made robes out of pieces of rags gathered from dust-heaps, charnel grounds etc. (*VinA. V.* p. 1119). See DHUTAṄGA.

7 This, perhaps, is a device evolved to make this cloth fall within the category of *paṃsukūla*.

8 This act is purely symbolic, of the intention of the *paṃsukūla* rite. It is believed that the merit generated by the offering of the cloth to the Saṅgha becomes effective in providing the *petas*, who are usually naked, with a suitable dress.

(Just as water showered on the hill flows down to reach the lower region, similarly whatever is given here will accrue to the dead. As rivers when full bear water to fill the sea, similarly whatever is given here will accrue to the dead). See also COMMEMORATION OF THE DEAD, DAKKHIṆĀ.

S.K.N.

DEATH (*maraṇa, cuti*). Viewing life in the total context of saṃsāra, Buddhism looks upon death as the termination of a single phase of life therein. It is regarded as marking the passage from one such phase to another, or in the standard description of the saṃsāric process of life, the concept of death (*miyati*) is followed by that of passing away (*cavati*) leading to birth in another life (*uppajjati ca : S.* 11, p. 10).

It may be simple enough to explain the phenomenon of death biologically as the cessation of the vital functions of an organism (*ekabhavapariyāpannassa jīvitindriyassa upacchedo : Vism.* p 229). But the problem of death as an existential question has been given deep consideration in Buddhism, especially in later Abhidhamma, and is related to the other philosophical questions such as existence (q.v.) kamma (q.v.) *anatta* (q.v.) rebirth (q.v.), dependent origination (q.v.), etc.

The term mostly used in the Nikāyas to denote death is *maraṇa* (from *mṛ* to die) whereas in the Abhidhamma and in commentarial literature the term *cuti* (from *cyu* to fall away) is used more frequently. The latter term as well as the concept assumes more ethical and psychological significance than in the Nikāyas.

The term *maraṇa* as used in the Nikāyas denotes the ending of this existence or physical death, i.e. the dissolution of the combination of the five aggregates (*khandha*, q.v.) in the form of the individual. The customary stock definition of *maraṇa* in the Piṭakas uses eight synonyms, each expressive of a particular aspect of death (*D.* 11, p. 305 ; *M.* I. p. 49 ; *I.* 11, pp. 2-3 ; *DA.* 111, pp. 7 8-9; *MA.* 1. pp. 216-1-7): it is the passing away (*cuti*), falling away (*cavanatā*), breaking up (*bheda*), disappearance (*antaradhānu*), dying in death (*maccu-maraṇa*) fulfilment of time (*kālakiriyā*), dissolution of the aggregates (*khandhānam bheda*) and laying down the body (*kalebarassa nikkhepa*) of living beings from their respective planes of existence (*sattanikāya*). Among these terms those like *cuti cavanatā, bheda* and *antaradhāna* are self-explanatory. The term *maccu-maraṇa* is used exclusively to denote the physical death at the end of the life span of an ordinary human being (*maccumaraṇaṃhi maccusaṅkhātaṃ maraṇaṃ*:*MA.* 1, p. 216) as distinguished from three other forms of death which are (i) the final death of a Buddha or of an arhant which is not followed by rebirth and which is accordingly described as 'dying by extirpation of saṃsāra (*samucchedo-maraṇa* : *Vism.* p. 229), (ii) death conceived in the phenomenon of the momentary dissolution of formations called the *khaṇika-maraṇa* (*saṅkhārānaṃ khaṇabhaṅgasaṅkhātaṃ khaṇika-maraṇaṃ* : loc. cit.), (iii) the concept of death understood in common parlance (*sammuti-maraṇa* : loc. cit.) in expressions such as 'dead tree' 'dead metal' etc. (loc. cit.) The term *kālakiriyā* signifies the fulfilment of the life-span belonging to a particular form of existence, e.g., one hundred years in the case of human beings, according to Buddhaghosa (loc. cit.). *Khandhānaṃ-bheda*, dissolution of the aggregates, is a frequent definition of death as shown in this essay. The term *kalebarassa nikkhepa*, laying down of the body, is self-explanatory.

According to Buddhism, life or existence is a single and unbroken process of becoming (*bhava*) which does not terminate at physical death, although it appears to be so. The so-called individual (*puggala*) is only a group of aggregates (*khandha*) which is subject to change (*vaya*), decay (*jarā*) and dissolution (*bhaṅga* or *bheda*). There is nothing real or permanent in this assemblage, either collectively or individually. There is no permanent soul or ego transmigrating from one life to another. The aggregates have come together through mutual causation and dependence (*hetu-paccaya-vasena*) and this causal process of actuality, of growth and springing up incessantly, of change, decay and dissolution has ignorance (*avijjā*) as its root cause. The I-concept (*asmimāna*) is only an illusion. It is only an actual process but not an 'I' in itself as a metaphysical entity but an empirical concept. The so-called individual is a process of becoming undergoing change and transformation at every moment. It is a process of action operating under causality. There is no agent or experiencer as such. All terms designating an entity such as *puggala*, *satta*, *attā* etc., are just names, not corresponding to anything substantial but more conventional modes of expression (*vohāra-vacana*). In the ultimate sense (*paramatttha vasena*) empirical concepts imply only ever-changing physical and mental phenomena (*nāma* and *rūpa*) coming to life and dying at every point instant.

All the physical and psychical phenomena of existence have been summed up in Buddhism as the five groups of clinging (*pañca-upādānak-khanda*) or as mind and matter (*nāma* and *rūpa*) or as a combination of consciousness (*citta*) along with mental factors (*cetasika*) and corporeality (*rūpa*). The significant fact about this process of becoming in relation to the phenomenon of ordinary death is that the process will go on co-tinuously despite physical death. As mentioned above the so-called individual is a mere synthesis of ever-changing mental and physical phenomena designated in Buddhism as groups (*khandha*) of clinging (*upādāna*) which are corporeality (*rūpa*), feeling (*vedanā*), perception (*saññā*), mental formations (*saṅkhāra*) and consciousness (*viññāṇa*). It is the combined operation of these five groups that appears to us as a living being.

It is seen that in the five-fold analysis given above the last four are psychical (*nāma*) and the first physical (*rūpa*). The organic functioning of the individual takes place only when both aspects are present simultaneously and continue to function in mutal dependency (*aññamaññ-paccaya*). This ever-changing combination of aggregates, conventionally designnated as being (*satta*) functions (i. e., is alive) only when vitality (*āyu*), heat (*usmā*). and consciousness (*viññāṇa*) are present. This is compared to the conch-shell which provides sound only when a man attempts to blow it and air too is present (*D.* II. p. 388). Buddhaghosa gives a detailed exposition of the origin (*samuṭṭhāna*) of this mentality-materiality com.plex (*nāma-rūpa*), the so-called individual, in the xviiith chapter of the *Visuddhimagga* where, after dealing with the Buddhist analysis of existence into element (*dhātu*), bases (*āyatana*) aggregates (*khandha*) etc. he concludes that over and above this *nāma rūpa* there is nothing else as a being, a person, a deity or a Brahma. Comparing this constitution of being to a chariot, in the same way as therī-Vajirā does (quoted by thera Nāgasena in the *Milindapañha*, p. 28) which is so designated only when the various parts are put together, he stresses the point with a number of other illustrations. If one were to hold the view that there is a permanent entity as a individual he has to believe either that it is annihilated at death (*ucchedavāda*) or that it is eternal and survives death (*sassatavāda*). Buddhism rejects both these views, for it holds existence to be a process of becoming and whatever that has become (*bhūta*) undergoes continuous change and dissoultion, visible to the ordinary eye as birth, decay and death, followed again by birth. Like a puppet marionette which acts through the combination of strings and wood this combination of *nāma* and *rūpa* is void (*suñña*) and soulless (*nijjīva*). Its activity is solely due to the combination of the two together. Owing to the conditionality of all phenomena, both physical and psychical, the psycho-physical combination called the individual goes on, irrespective of physical death, in a cotinuous series.

If physical death is thus only a monemtary interruption in this continuity of the groups of existence (*khandha-santāna : Vism.* p. 414), which has no permanent soul, how do these constituents appear as a being ? They appear so because they (*nāma*) and (*rūpa*) are inter-dependent. Just as two sheaves of reeds (*nalakalāpa*) are propped up with mutual support (*aññamaññaṃ nissāya*) and when one falls the other too falls, even so in this five constituent becoming (*pañcavokārabhava*), *nāma* and *rūpa* occur as interdependent states each component giving support to the other and when one of them falls, owing to death, the others fall too (*maraṇavasena ekasmiṃ patamāne itarampi patati : Vism.*p. 595)[1]. Here the two are, however, not mixed together. But just like a drum which produces sound when beaten with a stick, *nāma* occurs with *rūpa* as the physical basis (loc. cit.). Neither has the efficient power (*nitteja*) to occur on its own.

Thus, all the genera of existence, conventionally called man, being, animal etc.,whether considered according to the doctrine of the *khandhas* or according to the *Paṭiccasamuppāda* (q.v.), their conditional and dependent nature coupled with the fact of their being an uninterrupted flux, has to be accepted. And as anything conditionally composed has to be decomposed, it inevitably follows that all formations (*saṅkhāra*) are subject to change (*vaya*), decay *jarā*) and dissolution (*bhaṅga*). Coming into being they pass away (*uppāda-vaya*) and then cease to function (*niru-jjhanti*). Hence birth, old age and death (*jāti-jarā-maraṇa*) characterise the lives of all beings. Therefore, it is a confusion (*vimūḷha*) to treat death as an individual's death (*satto marati*) or his trans-migration to another physical form (*sattasa dehāntara saṅkamaṇa : Vism.* p. 544).

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1 At *S.* II, p. 114, this simile of the two sheaves of reeds is applied to the formula of conditioned genesis (*paṭiccasamupp pāda*) and accordingly *nāma* and *rūpa* are combined as a single item against *viññāṇa* or consciousness(i.e., *nāma-rūpa paccayo viññāṇa, etc.*)

The aggregates of clinging (*upādāna-khandha*) have birth (*jāti*) as their initial suffering (*ādi-dukkha*), ageing (*jarā*) as their medial suffering (*majjhe-dukkha*) and death (*maraṇa*) as their final suffering (*pariyosāna-dukkha* : ibid. p. 505). Or else the act of being born is birth (*jananam jāti*), the act of growing old is ageing (*jīraṇam jarā*) and thereby they die, and hence it is death (*maranti etenā'ti maraṇaṃ* : ibid. p. 527), or what grows old is characterised by its disappearance (*vayovuḍḍhatthaṅgama* : ibid. p. 619). These three basic characteristics of birth, ageing and death (*jāti jarā,maraṇa*) are always found in existence (*saṃsāra*)

This ordinary death, which inevitably follows birth (*maraṇantaṃ hi jīvitaṃ : Dhp. v.* 148), in any form of existence (*gati, nikāya*) is of two kinds, timely death (*kāla-maraṇa*) and untimely death (*akāla-maraṇa*). Timely death comes about with the exhaustion of favourable karmic forces (*puññakkhaya*) or with the exhaustion of life-span (*ayukkhaya*) or of both. Untimely death comes through kamma that interrupts the life-producing kamma (*kammupacchedaka-kamma.*) Death through the exhaustion of merit means the death that comes owing to the results of rebirth-producing kamma (*paṭisandhi-janaka-kamma*) finishing its ripening (*vipakkha-vipākattā*) although the conditions for prolonging the continuity of a life-span (*āyusantāna-janaka-paccayasampatti*) may be still present. Death through exaustion of the life-span implies the kind of death that comes about owing to the exhaustion of the normal life-span of a particular period of time which, Buddhaghosa says, is one hundred years at present. The duration depends either on the destiny of beings (i.e., *gati*, such as gods) or on the time (*kāla*. i.e., at the beginning of a *kappa*), or on the kind of nutriment (*āhāra* : i.e., as the inhabitants of places like Uttarakuru have). Hence, timely death can come through either of these or of both occurring concurrently. Untimely death is of two kinds. The death that comes about owing to the interruption of the continuity of life by kamma capable of causing beings to fall from their places (*cavanasamatthena kammanā upacchinna santānam*)at that very moment as in the case of Dūsi Māra or Kalābu-rāja. The second kind of untimely death is the death of those whose continuity of life is interrupted by assaults with weapons, etc, due to previous (*purima*) kamma (*Vism.* p. 229). Thus, generally speaking death is the interruption of the life-faculty included within a single becoming (*ekabhavapariyāpannassa jīvitindriyassa upacchedo* : loc. cit.).

In the *Milindapañha* (pp. 303-9), Nāgasena explains, by means of a number of similes, various ways in which untimely death could take place. First, he enumerates seven kinds of persons who die out of time (*akāle maranti*), even when a portion of their life-span (*āyu*) is still remaining. These are the starving man who can get no food, the thirsty man who can get no water, the person bitten by a snake in need of a cure, he who has taken poison unable to procure an antidote, the one fallen into fire, the person who is drowned and the one attacked by weapons. In order to include further possibilities of untimely death he enumerates further seven ways in which such death could occur, almost all of which are due to various illnesses brought about by external causes.

The continuity of becoming brought about by kamma (*kamma-bhava*), which is the karmically active side of existence, resulting in the birth of the *khandhas* (*uppatti-bhava*) the karmically passive side of existence or birth (*jāti*), matures in the form of ageing (*jarā*) and dissolves at the end of the life-span in the form of death (*maraṇa*) to be immediately followed by birth. This process is repeated incessantly until the attainment of arahantship when the *khandhas* disappear completely (*khandhaparinibbāna*).

In explaining the difference between the one who has attained the total cessation of sense-functioning (*nirodha-samāpatti*) and the one who is dead, the *Majjhima Nikāya* (I, p. 296) says that when three things, i.e., vitality or life (*āyu*), heat (*usmā*) and consciousness (*viññāṇa*) are abandoned, this body lies cast away like a useless log of wood, whereas in *nirodha-samāpatti* vitality and heat remain with purified sense-functioning. So, also at *S.* III, p. 413 it is said that when these three things leave the body it lies abandoned, and senseless, being mere food for others. A verse with the same theme occurs in the *Dhammapada* (*v.* 41).

The functioning of consciousness at the time of physical death is part of the fourteen modes in which consciousness occurs (*Vism* p. 457). This death-consciousness which is called *cuti-citta* (q.v.) is the last of these fourteen functions and naturally has rebirth-consciousnes (*paṭisandhi-viññāṇa*) as the first. *Cuti-citta* is the last in the life-continuum (see BHAVAṄGA) in a particular life and is called *cuti*, because of falling from that particular becoming *ekaskasmin hi bhave yaṃ sabbapaco himam bhavaṅgacittaṃ tam tato bhavato cavanattā cuti' ti vuccati* : ibid. p. 460). Except in the case of the arahants, this *cuti-citta* or the last

bhavaṅga of life is immediately followed by rebirth-linking consciousness (*paṭisandhi-viññāṇa*), which is followed by the *bhavaṅga* of the new life. Hence this whole existence is a series of consciousness (*citta-santāna*) which continues in spite of physical death (loc. cit.).

At the moment of death the consciousness of a person (*cuti-citta*) is hinged on to one of three things called *kamma, kamma-nimitta* or *gati-nimitta* (*Vism.* p. 554). The rebirth-consciousness, which immediately follows the *cuti-citta* could occur taking one of these three as its object. Here kamma means the stored-up kamma of the past that has got an opportunity to ripen. At the moment of death the memory of these actions may occur in the form of a last thought, thereby conditioning its subsequent birth. Or else a material object that was a condition or the performance of the kamma at the time of its accumulation might appear and be the object of one's last conscious thought. This is called *kamma-nimitta*. Or else some visible data indicating a future destiny might be the object of one's dying consciousness and thereby condition the rebirth-consciousness. This is the *gati-nimitta*.

Whatever be its kind, the rebirth-consciousness is the result of the death-consciousness. The character of the former is determined by that of the latter, and hence the moral character of a person is determined by the nature of his rebirth-consciousness, which in turn is conditioned by its mental object (*ārammaṇa*) at the moment of death. There is no interval (*anantara*) between these two kinds of *bhavaṅga*. Although in relation to each life-span the *cuti-citta* and the consciousness that follows the *paṭisandhi-citta* could be called the last and the first *bhavaṅga*, respectively, of that particular existence, in relation to the continuity of the life-continuum (*bhavaṅga-sota*) there is no break or a beginning as such. When the *paṭisandhi-citta* starts functioning as *bhavaṅga* in the new life, it does so subject to the laws of psychical causation (*cittaniyāma*) in the new mentality-materiality combination (*nāma-rūpa*); and so the process continues. And also there is no consciousness that 'fares and continues' (*samdhāvati saṃsarati*) as an entity without change of identity (*tadeva idam.... anaññaṃ*) as an agent or an experiencer (*vado vedeyyo : M.* I, p. 258) as held by Sāti (*M.* I. p. 256 ff.). It is the continuity of becoming (*bhavasota : S.* I, p. 15) or of consciousness (*viññāṇa-sota : D.* III, p. 105). It implies constant change, a flux extending to both worlds leaving no interval between death and rebirth (*D.* III, p. 105). The end equals the beginning. Death and birth follow each other. If death be the backward view of life, birth is its forward view. They are two aspects of the same phenomenon. Consciousness as saṃsāric or transmigrating (*saṃvattanika : M.* II, p. 262 f.) is the surviving factor which continues its play of grasping, irrespective of physical death, and continues to re-enter 'womb after womb' (*gabbhā gabbhaṃ : Sn. v.* 278) incessantly resulting in saṃsāra. The body is abandoned at death but not ignorance and craving and, therefore, (*taṇhā 'vijjānam appahīnattā*) the consciousness of the dying man is pushed by craving and flung forward by formations (*taṇhāya namiyamānaṃ saṅkhārehi khippamānaṃ : Vism.* p. 554), when physically, the new being abandons the old form 'like a man who crosses a river by hanging on to a rope tied to a tree on the other bank' says Buddhaghoṣa (loc. cit.).

The driving force behind this flux is kamma, rooted in ignorance and there is no external agency experiencing this process. Mere suffering (*dukkha*) exists, no sufferer (*dukkhita*); mere deed (*kiriya*), no doer (*kāraka*); Nibbāna but no entrant (*nibbuta*). the path (*magga*) but no traveller (*gamaka : Vism* p. 513). And hence when beings die it is a part of the process of life and there is no agent within or without.

The momentary dissolution of formations called 'momentary death' or *khaṇika-maraṇa* (*saṅkhārānam khaṇabhaṅga-saṅkhātaṃ khaṇikamaraṇaṃ : Vism.* p. 229), is given much significance in post-canonical literature. As everything is subject to change (*vayadhammā saṅkhārā*), in the ultimate sense (*paramatthena*) the life-moment of living beings is extremely short as it lasts only for the occurrence of a single conscious moment, for no formation remains the same for two consecutive moments. Buddhaghoṣa compares this phenomenon to the chariot-wheel which, when at rest, rests only on one point. When that conscious moment (*cittakkhaṇa*) is gone the being, too, is said to have ceased (*niruddha*). Life and everything that pertains to it join in this one conscious moment that flicks by; and when this consciousness dissolves, the world is dead (*cittabhaṅgā mato loko :* ibid. p. 238). In this sense death or *maraṇa* is the continuously repeated dissloution and vanishing of each momentary psycho-physical combination and thus it takes place every split-second (*khaṇa*) and is in a way a remarkable phenomenon, which is hardly noticed.

The consciousness at the time of death is characterised by the same attachment, passions and desires as at other times. And as the preceding consciousness-moment has the power of producing a succeeding one, the continuity is maintained despite

death. This consciousness is never located as such in any physical organism. It only functions, under the laws of psychic causation (See CUTI-CITTA) through that physical body, after the dissolution of which (i.e., at death) it starts to function through the medium of another in the succeeding birth. Consciousness continues to operate, kamma being its driving force. In reality, what obtains at death is only an appearance of a breach in this unbroken continuity. Consciousness, obscured by ignorance, goes on accumulating many kinds of life affirming activities in this unbroken series until, with the destruction of ignorance and craving, arahantship is attained. The only way to defeat death is to destroy the karmic defilements (*āsava*) and attain Nibbāna.

When the series of changes culminates in the crisis called death the individual dies 'sans every thing' but his rebirth-producing kamma. And from an empirical point of view we see how death is as necessary as birth for this world to continue. A world of immortals would be static and hence inconceivable.

Buddhism, viewing the whole of existence as a mass of conflict, recommends its destruction by being ever heedful (*appamādena sampādetha*).

Brief time have sons of men on earth to live
Let the good man herein much trouble take
Acting as were his turban all ablaze
There is no man to whom death cometh not.
(*The Book of the Kindred Sayings*, I, p. 136)

Appamāyu manussānaṃ
Hileyya naṃ suporiso
Careyyādittasīsova
Natthi maccussa nāgamo. (*S.* I, p. 108)

We have no time 'to stand and stare' because death, with all its attendant evils, is threatening us always (*Thag. v.* 450). It is the sword of Democles. It is the 'leveller' and 'like chimney-sweepers....' all, paupers and kings must 'come to dust'. Death is an executioner (*vadhaka : S.* III, p. 143).

In this connection a word may be added about the Buddhist concept of Māra. Originally and fundamentally, this term signifies the personification of death (cp. *maccu-māra*). This concept has developed so exuberantly that all the evils of existence began to be understood by this term. (For Death as one of the three divine messengers, who remind men of what befalls them. see DEVADŪTA. See also *A.* I, p. 138f.).

The *Petavatthu* (p. 11) epitomises a truly philosophical view of Death when it says in regard to the death of a person :

"Uninvited he came,
Unbidden he went.
As he came so he went.
What cause then for lament ?"

Anabbhito tato āga—ananuññāto ito gato
Yathā 'gato tathā gato—tattha kā paridevanā ?

A. G. S. K.

DEATH-CONSCIOUSNESS. See CUTI-CITTA.

DEATHLESSNESS (Pali, *amata*), an attribute of Nibbāna, is often used as a synonym for Nibbāna (*Sn. v.* 225 ; *M.* I, p. 167 ; *Vin.* I, p. 9). The path to deathlessness (*amatapada*, i.e., Nibbāna) is contrasted with the way to death (*maccuno pada*, i.e., saṃsāra, *Dhp. v.* 21). The Dhamma is described as the door to deathlessness (*amatassa dvāra : M.* I, p. 168, 353). The Buddha is called the giver of deathlessness (*amatassa-dātā* : ibid. p. 111). Commentarial literature consistently defines *amata* (deathlessness) as a name for Nibbāna (*MA.* III, p. 218 ; *SnA.* II, p. 572).

From time immemorial men have been greatly purturbed with the fear of death (q.v.). Hence the simplest of early prayers included a desire for longevity, as for instance when the Vedic Aryans expressed a wish to live for a hundred Autumns (*Paśyema śaradaḥ śatam jīvema śaradaḥ śataṃ : Rv.* 7, 66. 16), perhaps on the assumption that they could thereby brush off their minds the pain of the sting of death. Direct reference to freedom from decay and freedom from death are also not unknown in the Vedic literature (*ajarāsaste sakhye eyāma : Rv.* 7.54.2). To them it was a wish to attain to these states here and now, in this very life. On the other hand, philosophers and religious teachers have attempted to allay this fear with a different appeal. Theists tried to appease this fear by explaining that death opens the gate to immortality of the soul, while annihilationists argued that death brings about the final extinction of personal soul. Buddhism which teaches the causal origin of things rejected both these views and approached the problem from a different angle.

Buddhism explicitly states that existence (saṃsāra) is unsatisfactory (*dukkha*). The more manifest signs of this unsatisfactoriness are birth (*jāti*), decay (*jarā*), disease (*vyādhi*) and death

(*maraṇa*). Of these, too, death, being a voilent break in the continuity of life, is the most striking aspect of *dukkha*. As Buddhism accepts rebirth, all these forms of evil, including death are regarded as recurring events. Buddhism affirms that whatever is born is bound to die (*D.* II, p. 246 *S.* I, p. 132). Thus, death is a corollary of birth and *vice versa*. The sole aim of Buddhism is to put an end to this endless chain of succession of birth and death. Gotama's noble quest (*ariya-pariyesana*) was for this purpose (*M.* I, p. 163 ff.). This is thought possible, according to Buddhism, only by putting an end to saṃsāric existence by attaining Nibbāna. Thus, cessation of saṃsāra is regarded as being synonymous with the realization of Nibbāna, and in this sense Nibbāna is described as the cessation of *dukkha* (*anto dukkhassa : Ud.* 80), cessation of becoming (*bhavanirodha : S.* II, p. 117) and cessation of birth and death (*jātimaraṇassa pāragā : Sn. v.* 32).

Though cessation of saṃsāra, or more positively the realization of Nibbāna, is called the ending of birth and death, it is not identical with the attainment of immortality taught by theistic religions. This attainment of immortality presupposes the existence of a soul which survives death and then becomes immortal. Buddhism rejects completely the belief in a permanent soul, and as such the belief in the immortality of the soul is quite incompatible with Buddhism. So is the view of the annihilationists for, once again Buddhism rejects the idea of a permanent entity that gets annihilated at death.

It should, however, be borne in mind that the description of Nibbāna as deathlessness (or as unborn = *ajāta*, undecaying = *ajara*, and as free from decease = *aroga*) is an attempt to describe a supramundane, transcendental experience in terms of empirical existence. In such an attempt Nibbāna unavoidably gets posited with characteristics, attributes and limitations pertaining to the empirical sphere. Thus, it should be clearly understood that these are not characteristics of Nibbāna in the same sense as their opposites are attributes of saṃsāra. It is because Nibbāna is regarded as the antithesis of saṃsāra that such characteristics as deathlessness come to be attributed to it.

A perusal of early Buddhist literature shows that the realization of arahantship is co-terminus with the realization of Nibbāna, and it is explicitly pointed out in texts that arahantship is attainable in this life itself. The main ecstacy of the arahant on reaching his goal is that rebirth is ended (*khīṇā jātī*) and that the saṃsāric process has been terminated (*natthi' dāni punabbhavo*). All other attributes like 'no-decay' (*ajara*) and 'no-disease' (*avyādhi*) and no-death (*amata*) are derivative of the act of not being born again hereafter (*nāparaṃ itthattāya*) and therefore, very correctly, do not apply to the present life. However, in describing the attainment of Nibbāna, it is said of the arahant that he has reached a state which not only knows of no more rebirth but also of its associated qualities like decay, disease and death.

If deathlessness is neither immortality nor annihilation then what is it? As stated earlier, deathlessness being a trancendental experience is inexplicable in empirical terms. This inexplicability is very tersely expressed by the Buddha in his reply to Upasiva regarding the state of one who has attained the goal (i.e., Nibbāna). "Know, Upasiva, of him who has reached the goal of terminating the saṃsāric process (*atthaṃ gatassa*) there is no measuring (*na pamāṇamatthi*) whereby they would say, his measure is so. When all conditions are removed, then all means of description are also removed (*Sn. v.* 1076).

S.K.N.

DEBATE, coming from the Old French *debate* meaning 'to strike down,' the term debate designates a formal argument following a definite procedure wherein the subject to be argued is stated as a positive resolution or proposition. The affirmative side, on whom rests the burden of proof, supports the proposition with constructive arguments while the negative side refutes it with rebuttals. The two sides thus set forth the pros and cons of the subject. While this is the most important characteristic of a debate, important also are the evidence and sound reasoning with which each side attempts to prove its case. Minor contentions are used to support the major one.

Another important feature of a debate is the audience upon which often depends the choice of evidence and the method of presenting it. The debator's main purpose is to win the audience to his side by means of his dialectical skill. In this respect the importance of a rebuttal in a debate cannot be over-emphasised, for a debate is very often won by a rebuttal, which should be effective enough to demolish the arguments of the opponent.

Being a discussion of the two sides of a disputed question, the purpose of a debate is to determine

which side can best be supported by acts and logical reasoning. Thus it has to be conducted according to set rules before an audience thereby making oratory and eloquence play an important place (*The American Educator Encyclopaedia*, Illinois, 1965, Vol. IV, pp. 29–30).

The debate in Buddhist India seems to have had its origins in the Vedic *brahmodyas* (*brahma tudaya* : from the root *tud*), which were religious dialogues in the form of question and answer, technically called *vākovākya* (speech and reply). When sacrificial sessions had become the all-important institution in the Indian society during the period of the *Brāhmaṇas*, these *brahmodyas* had become a minor diversion within it. When we come to the period of the *Upaniṣads* they seem to have assumed the character of public debates with more improved standards of reasoning and argument. Their importance and popularity at the time could be gauged from the fact that the Brahmins were used to go to the courts of kings to hold such debates as instanced by Yājñavalkya's visit to King Janaka of Videha and Bālakī's visit to Ajātaśatru of Magadha. (K. N, Jayatillake, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*. London, 1963, pp. 43 5).

Several Pali terms are used to designate a debate : *viggaha, vivāda, vāda* and *viggāhika-kathā*. All these terms are used in the sense of a verbal dispute wherin one party tries to defeat the other by means of argument. *Kathojja* (*kathā tudya*) is a term used in the *Suttanipāta* (*vv.* 825, 828).

This institution of debate became still more important in Buddhist India which provided the necessary religious and philosophical atmosphere for its development. Brahmins, wandering ascetics (*paribbājakā*) and recluses (*samaṇa*), and other members of various sects (*nānā-titthiyā*), were visiting from place to place and holding debates. The *Suttanipāta*, one of the earliest texts of the Pali Canon, contains much information about such debates and also the Buddha's attitude to them. Thus, the *Dhammika Sutta* refers (*Sn. vv.* 381, 382, 390) to various non-Buddhist sectarians (*titthiyas*) describing them as habitual debaters (*vādasilā*) and classifying them as Ājivakas and Niganṭhas. There were Brahmans and others (*aññe vādino*) as well who, too, similarly were habitual debaters. The commentary (*SnA.* I, p. 372) explains the term *vādasilā* here as "desirous of engaging in debate they move about saying 'we are of the correct path, the others are of the wrong path' and thus making verbal thrusts at the world." (*mayaṃ sammā-paṭipannā, aññe micchāpaṭipannā'ti evaṃ vādakaraṇasilā lokaṃ mukhasattihi vitudantā viharanti*). It is important to note that this commentarial passage explains in general the way in which the debaters conducted themselves. They would construct (*pakappati*) theories and would try to defend them against their opponents by logical argument (*takka*). Some of those habitually debating Brahmins of Buddhist India mentioned by the commentator as elderly (*vuddha*) are Caṅkī, Tārukkha, Pokkharasātī, and Jāṇussoni while Assalāyana, Vāseṭṭha, Ambaṭṭha and Uttaramāṇava are given as others. When the *Udāna* (pp. 66–7) mentions this kind of debaters at Savatthi, it refers to them as "a large number of samaṇas, Brahmins and wandering ascetics of various heretical sects, holding a variety of views, doubters of many points, having many diverse aspirations and recourse to that which relates to various heresies" (*sambahulā nānātitthiyā samaṇa-brāhmaṇā paribbājakā .... nānādiṭṭhikā nānākhantikā nānārucikā nānādiṭṭhinissayanissitā*). This is generally the picture of these debaters we get in the Pali Nikāyas. And they, when in action, are said to be "quarreling and disputing, debating and making verbal thrusts at each other" (*bhaṇḍanajātā, kalahajātā vivādāpannā aññamaññaṃ mukha-sattīhi vitudantā viharanti*).

A graphic description of a gathering of such debaters is found in the *Pasūra Sutta* (*Sn. vv.* 824–34) in words attributed to the Buddha himself. Debates originate when each party tries to maintain its own view as correct, branding the other view as false. Desirous of debates (*vādakāmā*) they meet in assemblies and brand each other as fools. Thus, they engage in verbal duels, wishing for praise but fearing to lose. When defeated they become downcast and although they look for the faults of the opponents' party they become agitated when they themselves get the blame. When the question-testers (*pañha-vīmaṃsakā*) say that a particular debater's talk is worthless he grieves and laments saying ' they have defeated me'. Seeing these frayed tempers resulting from victory and defeat one should avoid these debates : praise gained through victory in these disputes is of no value. Instead of leading to purity it only fattens one's ego. A stanza from the *Suttanipāta* may be quoted here as giving a succinct description of such a debate :

> For each declares his view as consummate,
> Declares the other's view as lacking worth :
> And thus indeed they argue and dispute
> Each saying his opinion is the truth.
>
> *Sakaṃ hi dhammaṃ paripuṇṇāmāhu :*
> *Aññassa dhammaṃ pana hīnamāhu*
> *Evampi viggayha vivādayanti*
> *Sakaṃ sakaṃ saṃmutiṃ āhu saccaṃ* (*Sn. v.* 904)

The *Kalahavivāda Sutta* (*Sn. v.* 862 ff.) also refers to disputes and contentions (*kalahavivāda*) but not in the sense of debates. It is a general reference giving a psycho-ethical origin of debaters in a causal sequence: disputes arise from attachment (to things or ideas) which in turn is the result of greed and so on. The theme of the discourse is that as one thought leads to another in an endless sequence the true solution lies in the complete deconceptualisation of the mind so that all thoughts cease to assail the individual. Thus, the *sutta* concludes:

"Knowing, released, the rapt seeks no dispute
Seeks not about becoming this or that."
Ñatvā vimutto na vivādameti
Bhavābhavāya na sameti dhīro (*Sn. v.* 877).

In the *Cūlaviyūha Sutta* (*Sn. vv.* 878–94), too, getting hold of a particular view as true and brandishing those of other views as fools is the general description given about the disputing debaters.

'The experts, each confined by his own view,
In arguing on divers points, declare:
'Whoso holds thus, hath found and known the thing;
Whoso revileth this, he is not whole.'

Sakaṃ sakaṃ diṭṭhiparibbasānā
Viggayha nānā kusalā vadanti
Yo evaṃ jānāti sa vedi dhammaṃ
Idaṃ paṭikkosaṃ akevalī so (*Sn. v.* 878).

Now the question is put to the Buddha that if everyone brands every other as a fool, who could be speaking the truth or are all of them equally experts? The Buddha comments that if dissent makes one a fool then all are fools because each has a view of his own. And on the other hand if each view is correct then there cannot be a single fool. Therefore, what the Buddha has to say is that what these fools say of themselves is not true, because each person calls his own view the truth, while the Truth is always single. But these debaters who profess many 'truths' do so by fabricating logical arguments on views and thereby positing a duality between truth and falsehood (*takkaṃ ca diṭṭhīsu pakappayitvā, saccaṃ musā,ti dvayadhammamāhu: Sn. v.* 886). From this it follows that the person who is free from every theory stirs up no trouble in the world (*hitvāna sabbāni vinicchayāni na medhagaṃ kurute jantu loke: Sn. v.* 894). Therefore, having passed beyond disputes, he sees no other view as best (*tasmā vivādāni upātivatto, na hi seṭṭhato passati dhammamaññaṃ: Sn. v.* 907).

This same theme is found in the *Mahaviyūha Sutta* that follows (*Sn. v.* 895 ff.).

A somewhat similar account of the origin of debate is found in a passage which recurs in several places of the Canon (*D.* III, p. 246; *A.* III, p. 334; *Vbh.* p. 380). Here are given six roots of contention (*vivādamūlāni*) which are anger (*kodha*), selfishness (*makkha*), envy (*issā*), fraudulance (*sāṭheyya*) and evil intention (*pāpicchatā*). The bhikkhu who is not free from these evils lives disrespectful of the Buddha, Dhamma and the Saṅgha and instead of fulfilling the duties of a monk, he would bring about disputes among the brotherhood (*so saṅghe vivādaṃ janeti*), for the detriment of all concerned. The Buddha advises the bhikkhus to see that such contentions are nipped in the bud. These are the disputes referred to elsewhere in the *Pasūra Sutta* in the line *ete vivādā samaṇesu jātā* (these disputes have arisen among the *samaṇas Sn. v.* 828). Mention also may be made here of the two *Vivāda Suttas* of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (V. p. 78), each enumerating ten theses and anti-theses which were the subjects of debate during the Buddha's time (See also *Vin.* II, p. 88).

The foregoing discussion shows that attachment to one's own views (*diṭṭhi*) is the fundamental cause of debates. In this context the term (*diṭṭhi*) has to be explained under the Buddhist concept of *diṭṭhi-anusaya* or "inclination to view-holding". Edwin A. Burtt ("My Path to Philosophy", *Philosophy East and West*, Oct. 1972, p. 432) regards this kind of bias as "presupposition" describing it as "a hidden or tacit premise underlying any statement or question or piece of reasoning". Hence when a new concept or idea is presented its champion may be basing his arguments on certain presuppositions while its opponent sees certain other presuppositions implied in the thesis but not clear to the proposer of the thesis. Burtt's description of the origin of debates in this manner may be quoted here: "The champions of a new philosophy, blithely confident of its central dogma, are at first unaware of difficulties in it and of what, in the presence of these difficulties, they really, mean to assert. Its opponents, stubbornly confident of some traditional set of presuppositions which that dogma calls in question, are likewise unclear as to what they really object to and why" (ibid. p. 438). Burtt continues "……each participant in the discussion has his own confident solution, which he is eager to make persuasive and to defend against attack. He is unaware of the presuppositions reflected in that proposed solution and, therefore, is not clearly aware of their virtues

or their defects. While he is in this state, his thinking is confined to the narrow argumentative setting determined by his professed answer in its rivalry with an answer professed by other philosophers. Only when he becomes conscious of his presuppositions, realising that a different set is possible and might be more adequate, can he pass from that cramped setting to the larger arena, which is really involved in the controversy" ibid. p. 439).

A glimpse of what took place in the debating assemblies of some of these recluses and brahmins who included both Buddhists and non-Buddhists, could be had from a stereotyped passage found in several places in the Nikāyas (*D*. I, p. 8 ; *M*. II, p. 243 ; *S*. V, p. 419). The debate is here called 'the quarrelsome discussion' (*viggāhika-kathā*) and the main purpose of the passage is to give a brief account of the language and the reasoning used in debate while at the same time showing the futility of addiction to debate in this manner. The debate begins when one person says that his opponent does not know a particular teaching, while he knows it (*na tvaṃ imaṃ dhammavinayaṃ ājānāsi : ahaṃ ... jānāmi*) Thus ,the argument goes on : "How could you know about it. You have fallen on wrong views while I have come by right views ; the text is on my side while you have no text on your side : you stated late what should be stated earlier while stating early what should be stated later : what you have thought out so long is all upset (reversed). Your view is taken up and now you are censured : set to work to clear your views : disentangle yourself if you can." The genuine monk is advised to refrain from this kind of wrangling and, on the other hand, make the required effort to put an end to suffering.

Apart from the ethics involved in this passage, it also implies that there was a conception of valid and invalid reasoning at the time. When the opponent is finally defeated he was supposed to be 'censured' (*niggahita*).

A glimpse at the concept of valid and invalid reasoning as understood in Buddhist India could also be had from the account of Hatthaka, the Sakyan monk, as recounted in two places in the Pali texts (*Vin*. IV, pp. 1-2 ; *DhpA*. III, p. 390). He loved holding debates with the heretics and when he lost (*vādakkhitta*) he "having denied acknowledged, having acknowledged denied, he shelved the question by (asking) another, he told a common lie, having made a rendezvous, he deceived them" (*Book of the Discipline*, II, p. 164). This account shows that Hatthaka represents the type of debater who refused to accept defeat even when defeated. Instead he would argue further leading to one contradiction after another. When this confused him he would give an inappropriate answer or would utter a lie in order to cover up the issue. As a last resort he would ask his opponents to meet him somewhere and then go there before the appointed time and say that his opponents had avoided him fearing defeat. He seems to be a zealous but rather poor casuist (*vitaṇḍavādin*).

In contrast to Hatthaka there were debaters like Pasūra and Saccaka who seem to have had their own theories in defence of which they debated with their opponents. The account of Pasūra as given in the *Suttanipāta Commentary* (*SnA*. II, p. 538 ff.) shows that he had the courage of his convictions and was eager to learn from his opponents if he were proved wrong. When Sāriputta accepted his challenge for a debate and defeated him, he wanted to be his follower as he regarded him as a great debater (*mahāvādī*) from whom he wanted to learn the science of debate (*vīdasattha*).

Saccaka was by far the most renowned debater mentioned in Buddhist literature. Even the Buddhist writers, who were his opponents, have described him as "one who excelled in debate, a learned controversialist, who was held in high esteem by the common people" (*bhassappavādako paṇḍitavādo sādhusammato bahujanassa : M*. I, pp. 227, 237). He hailed from a family of debaters and is said to have confounded the six famous teachers (i.e., Pūraṇakassapa etc.) in debate (*M*. I, p. 250). Although he was defeated by the Buddha, the magniloquent language in which he used to boast of his dialectical skill may be quoted here as it would help us to imagine the picture of a serious kind of debating assembly at the time : "I do not see that recluse or brahman, the head of a company, the head of a group, the teacher of a group, even if he is claiming to be perfected one, a fully self-awakened one, who, when taken in hand by me, speech by speech, would not tremble, would not shake, would not shake violently and from whose armpits sweat would not pour. Even if I were to take in hand, speech by speech, an insensate post, even that, when taken in hand by me, speech by speech, would tremble, would shake, would shake violently—let alone a human being" (*Middle Length Sayings*, I, p. 280).

On the ethical side the futility of mere eristic is always admitted in Buddhism. Thus, at *S.* V, p. 419, the Buddha instructs the bhikkhus to refrain from such disputation because they are not profitable, not pertaining to the rudiments of holy life, they conduce not to revulsion, to dispassion, to cessation, to tranquillity, to full knowledge, to perfect Enlightenment, to Nibbāna. More important was to discuss suffering involved in life and the ways of overcoming it. Thus, when a debate has arisen the sage does not enter it (*vādaṃ ca jātaṃ muni no upeti : Sn. v.* 780). Seeing the evils of this kind of debate one should shun them (*etam pi disvā virame kathojjaṃ :* ibid. *v.* 828).

Victory and defeat in a debate very often depended on the whims of the audience (*parisā : pariṣad*), for the prejudices and the beliefs of the audience played a large part in the decisions made. When two parties were engaged in a contentious debate, logic and argument could bring victory to one party, whether their thesis is true or not. The aim was victory, not truth.

A passage in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (II, pp. 138–9), attributed to the Buddha himself, classifies all disputants (*vādī*) into four groups showing the various weaknesses as well as the qualifications of those who took part in these debates. Thus, some are at a loss when questioned about the meaning (*atthato*) of something but not in the letter (*vyañjanato*), while some are at a loss as regards the letter but not the meaning. The third type are the weakest as they are at a loss in both cases while the fourth category comprises the best as they are proficient in both aspects. The passage concludes by saying that those who are endowed with the four branches of logical analysis (*catu-paṭisambhidā*) of necessity belong to the fourth category. This classification of disputants assumes importance as it gives the concept of the true debator from the standpoint of early Buddhism. A debater is truly qualified if he has mastered the four branches of logical analysis (*catu-paṭisambhidā*) as taught in Buddhist philosophy. These four are : (i) analysis of meaning (*attha-paṭisambhidā*) (ii) of reasons or causal relations (*dhamma-p°*) (iii) etymological interpretation (*nirutti-p°*) and (iv) of intellect (*paṭibhāna-p°*). The person who has these qualifications cannot be defeated in debate, because he is never at a loss with regard the letter (*vyañjana*) or the meaning (*attha*) of any statement made. Now, this special ability as mentioned here, comes under the third *paṭisambhidā*, that of *nirutti*, which deals with the grammatical and syntactical analyses. Such analyses should include both the semantic (*attha*) and the morphological (*vyañjana*) aspects as is intended in this particular passage. Or we may include the first *paṭisambhidā*, that of meanings (*attha*) also here, thereby explaining *atthato* and *vyañjanato* as based on the first and the third *paṭisambhidā* respectively. Whatever be the way in which we take it, this passage further emphasises the futility of mere eristic and the supremacy of the methods of valid reasoning (*sutakkita*).

Mention was made earlier that it was the argumentative ability rather than the merits of the thesis that brought victory to a particular party in a public debate. This fact is further substantiated by a conversation the Buddha had with Ajita, the wandering ascetic, as recorded in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (V. p. 229 ff.). Accordingly, a certain person :

> (i) suppresses an illegitimate theory (*adhammikaṃ vādaṃ*) with an unrighteous theory (*adhammikena vādena*). This pleases an unrighteous audience (*adhammikaṃ parisaṃ rañjeti*), which, with a loud uproar, acclaims him learned (*uccāsaddā mahāsaddā hoti paṇḍito vata bho paṇḍito vata bho'ti*).
>
> (ii) suppresses a legitimate theory with an illegitimate theory. This pleases an unrighteous audience, which acclaims him learned in the same manner.
>
> (iii) suppresses a partly legitimate and partly illegitimate theory (*dhammikaṃ ca vādaṃ adhammikaṃ ca vādaṃ*) with an illegitimate theory. This pleases an unrighteous audience which similarly acclaims him learned.
>
> (iv) suppresses an illegitimate theory with a legitimate theory. This pleases a righteous audience, which, with a loud uproar, acclaims him learned.

The following observations about this passage may be quoted here : " When victory depended on the decisions of a fickle audience, it would be natural that the reasoning would have been largely directed at winning it over by any dialectical device at the command of the debater rather than be aimed at unravelling the nature of truth. But with critical audiences and a growing knowledge of the nature of sophisms (*chala, jāti, ahetu, vākyadoṣa* etc.), perhaps among this very class of people who cultivated this art, a time would have come when it was possible to distinguish good reasoning from fallacious reasoning. This time seems to be coeval with the composition of some of the suttas since the *Sandaka Sutta*

recognises a difference between what is well-reasoned (*sutakkita*) and ill-reasoned (*dutakkita : M.* I, p. 520)." (K. N. Jayatilleke, op. cit. p. 225)

Another important aspect of these debates was the different subjects or topics debated in them. Important in this respect is the passage in the *Dīgha* (p. 67) wherein all the theories that were debated are enumerated. These consist of the ten unexplained questions (*avyākata*, q.v.) so well-known to the students of Buddhist philosophy. The keenness with which the contending *samaṇas*, brahmins and wandering ascetics debated these topics could be understood from the description of them given in the text which runs as " these quarrelsome, pugnacious, cavilling monks wounded one another with sharp words (lit. mouth-javelins) declaring 'such is the truth, such is not the truth : the truth is not such, such is the truth'"(tr. D.M. Strong). The Buddha criticises these heretical wandering ascetics (*aññatitthiyā paribbājakā*) as " blind, eyeless, not knowing what is right and wrong, true and false and therefore becoming contentious " (*andhā, acakkhukā attham na jānāti, dhammaṃ na jānāti, adhammaṃ na jānāti .... bhaṇḍajātā*). The Buddha compares them to the blind men who described the elephant by describing a particular part of the elephant's body they felt. Perceiving only one aspect of a case (*ekaṅgadassino*), they disagree and quarrel with one another, " deeply attached to their respective theories which they cherish " (*nānādiṭṭhi-nissaya-nissitā : Ud.* p. 67).

In a subsequent passage (ibid. p. 69) dealing with these debaters the debated topics are given a little differently from the usual ten *avyākata* problems referred to earlier. In this list there are sixteen theories which may be classified into four groups according to the topics discussed : i. Four topics dealing with the duration of the soul and the world. ii. Four dealing with the cause of the soul and the world. iii. Four dealing with the duration of the experiences of pleasure and pain as well as of the soul and the world. iv. Four dealing with the cause of the experiences of pleasure and pain, the soul and the world.

As these debating topics are given in the texts in a stereotyped pattern we may state that the topics generally debated were those relating to the origin and duration of the world and the soul, extent and cause of the universe, the existence of the Tathāgata after death, identity of the body and the soul etc. In other words these debates revolved around the main philosophical concepts such as Time, Space, Immortality, Infinity, Soul, etc.

Those pure reasoners (*suddha-takkikā*), who engaged in debate merely for the sake of victory through argument irrespective of the truth or falsity of a thesis were sometimes designated as *lokāyatikas* (from *lokāyata*) in the Pali texts. And the term *lokāyata* is explained as the science of casuistry (*vitaṇḍavādasattha : DA.* I, p. 247). Thus, the *lokāyatikas* or the *vitaṇḍavādins* were those debaters who were primarily interested in displaying their dialectical skill and defeating their opponents, regardless of the nature of the arguments used. These included the class of debaters described in the stock-phrase in the Nikāyas as " learned, subtle, hairsplitters who have mastered the doctrines of others and who go about shattering with their intelligence the theories put forward " (*paṇḍitā, nipunā, vālavedhirūpā, kataparappavādā vobhindantā paññāgatena diṭṭhigatāni : D.* I, p. 26). They may be compared with the Sophists of ancient Greece who " were in the first place teachers of argument and rhetoric and regarded disputation of this kind *as an end in itself*. They argued in order to show their pupils how arguing should be done ; they talked for victory " (*ERE.* IV, p. 101).

Defeat in a public debate was expressed by the Pali term *niggahita* (Skt. *nigrahita*), which, accordingly, became a key term in the debate and was used when there arose an 'occasion for censure' (*nigrahasthāna*). In this regard it would suffice here to quote the following words : " There is no direct mention of individual *nigrahasthānas* in the Pali Nikāyas but a few indirect references are made to them. Where the Buddha engages Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta in debate on questions 'relating to the prior end' (*pubbantaṃ ārabbha : M.* II, p. 31) and Saccaka to have engaged the famous six teachers in debate (*M.* I, p. 251) when their opponents are said to have 'shifted the topic of conversation' (*bahiddhā kathaṃ apanesi*) which is an indirect way of saying that they were defeated as is implied by the context, since this is identical with the *nigrahasthāna* (of *arthāntaraṃ*) or 'shifting the topic' (*Nyāya Sūtra*, 5.2.1). In the account of the Buddha's debate with Ambaṭṭha on the problem of caste, there are again a few indirect references to *nigrahasthānas*. Here it is said that when the Buddha questions someone up to a third time (*yāva tatiyakaṃ : D.* I, p. 95) according to the rules, and the latter fails to answer then 'his head would split into seven pieces'. This is a picturesque way of saying that his opponent would suffer ignominious defeat in such circumstances, for as we can see from the definition of *nigrahasthānas* in the *Caraka Saṃhitā* when a question was asked in debate three times and

the opponent failed to answer, then it was an occasion for *nigraha* or defeat. Now this *sutta* (*D.* I, p. 94) enumerates the occasions on which the opponent would incur this defeat and mentions them as (a) *na vyākarissati* (does not explain clearly), (b) *aññena vā aññaṃ paṭicarissati* (shifts the proposition, i.e., covers up one thing with another), (c) *tuṇhī vā bhavissati* (remains silent or does not answer and (d) *pakkamissati* (goes away or postpones)". (K.N. Jayatillake, op. cit. pp. 237–8).

In a passage in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*A.* V, p. 230) the wandering ascetic Ajita tells the Buddha that a friend of his called Paṇḍita has thought out about five hundred thought-situations (*pañcamattāni cittaṭṭhānasatāni*) wherein other religious teachers (*aññatitthiyā*), when censured (*upāraddha*) would realise that they are censured. As the context is that of the debate the reference seems to be to various possible *nigrahasthānas* as understood at the time.

Something has to be said about the subject of debating as it was treated in the later schools of Buddhism. We should know that the Buddha treated his teaching as a plan of action and not as a mere subject for logical argument and debating. When teaching others his method was rationalistic persuasion in the form of dialogues. In such a system there was little scope for the development of a system of debating as a separate subject. A change in this attitude is seen round about 500 A.C. during the golden age of Indian civilisation that was ushered in under the Guptas, when the brothers Asaṅga and Vasubandhu gave logic an important place in Buddhist philosophy. The condemnation of logic and debating that characterised the preceding period was forsaken and the Buddhists began to attach very great importance to the subject. The brahmanical logic which had formulated all the essential features of public debating was reconciled with Buddhism thereby creating a system of Buddhist logic in which public debating was formally recognised as an important feature of Buddhist activity.

All the important Mahāyāna teachers like Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Dharmakīrti etc. were great public debaters who are recorded to have engaged in such debates with the opponents of Buddhism successfully. Āryadeva (4th century), the eminent disciple of Nāgārjuna, is said to have visited all the important Buddhist centres in India during his time (Kosala, Śrugna, Prayāga, Coḷa, Vaiśālī etc.) in all of which he won fame by defeating the Tīrthakas and preaching the Buddha's doctrine (S. C. Vidyabhusana, *History of the Medieval School of Indian Logic*, Calcutta, 1909, p. 71). Maitreyanātha (5th century), in his *Saptadaśabhūmi Śāstra* or *Yogācāra-bhūmi Śāstra* discusses all the aspects of public debating in great detail (ibid.p. 74). Vasubandhu and Diṇnāga, teacher and pupil, both wrote and discussed logic and debating in their works. Diṇnāga is said to have defeated a large number of controversialists at the Nālandā University thereby earning the epithet "Master Debator" (*tarka-puṅgava* : ibid. p. 80). His debate here with the brahmin Sudurjaya won him great fame. "Such disputations were an outstanding feature of public life in ancient India. They often were arranged with great pomp in the presence of the king, of his court and a grat attendance of monks and laymen. The existence and prosperity of the monastery were at stake. The authorised winner received the support of the king and of his government for his community, converts were made and new monasteries were founded . . .

"Diṇnāga by the celebrity he won in disputations has been one of the most powerful propagators of Buddhism. He is credited with having achieved the "conquest of the world" (*dig-vijaya*). Just as a universal monarch brings under his sway all India, so is the successful winner of disputations, the propagator of his creed over the whole of the continent of India. Ceshmere seems to have been the only part of India where he has not been, but he was visited by representatives of that country who later on founded schools there". (Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, The Hague, 1958, I, p. 34).

The debates of Dharmakīrti (7th century), the illustrious follower of Diṇnāga, with Kaṇāda Gupta and Kumārila, were also important events in the history of debating among the Buddhists. These are said to have lasted for months, Dharmakīrti withstanding his opponents all throughout. When Kumārila entered into a debate with him along with 500 brahmins the condition was that the loser should embrace the winner's faith. Accordingly when Kumārila lost he is said to have become a Buddhist (Vidyabhusana, op cit. p. 104).

In this development of the technique of debating among the late schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the Buddhists owed much to the Nyāya school, which is founded on the aphorisms of Gotama. The major part of Gotama's treatise describes the different methods of carrying on a public debate. "The *bona fide* (*vāda*) and *mala fide* (*chala*) argument are described, the cavilling (*vitaṇḍa*), the futile answers (*jāti*), logical fallacies (*hetvābhāsa*) and finally all the

cases are mentioned where the debater must be pronounced by the umpire to have lost the contest (*nigrahasthāna*)". (Stcherbatsky, op. cit. p. 27).

In keeping with the general condemnation of debating in early Buddhism, anything like a manual on the art of the debate belonging to that period has not come down to us. However, when we come to the time of the *Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa* (3rd century B. C.) it seems that the practice of debating for religious purposes had been generally accepted by the Theravādins. For not only does this work employ several technical terms of debating such as *upanaya* (application of reason), *paṭiññā* (proposition) and *niggaha* (defeat) (Vidyabhusana, op. cit. p. 4) but as Stcherbatsky observes "The opening debate of the *Kathāvatthu* on the reality of the soul is conducted with so high a degree of artificiality and every kind of dialectical device that it suggests the probable existence of special manuals in which the art of debate was taught". (Stcherbatsky, op. cit. p. 28).

The popularity of debating among the Theravādins of the later times becomes still clearer to us when we come to the time of the *Milindapañha* (circa Ist century A. C.). This text refers to King Milinda as "a debater hard to equal, hard to over come and regarded as the leader of many common sectarians" (*vādī durāsado duppasāho puthutitthakarānaṃ aggaṃ akkhāyati : Miln.* p. 4). A passage that is of greater interest to us in this regard is the one wherein (pp. 28-9) Nāgasena differentiates between the ways of debating resorted to by the learned (*paṇḍita-vāda*) and by the kings (*rājavāda*). Nāgasena agrees to enter into a discussion with Milinda only if he conducts the discussion not like a king but like a learned man. When the learned discuss things, Nāgasena explains, they "ravel and unravel, explain, refute, re-adjust (redress), make specific points for and against and never become angry in the process: but when kings converse they approve of one thing and order punishment for whoever disagrees with it". We may note here that kings who abused their regal power in order to gain victory over a debate were not unknown in ancient India.

Stcherbatsky (op. cit. p. 28) informs us that the oldest Buddhist compositions on the art of debate are two tracts by Nāgārjuna survived in Tibetan translations. These are *Vigrahavyāvartini* (Repudiation of Contests) and *Vaidalya Sūtra*[1] (Dialectical splitting). "Both contain the exposition and the vindication of that unique method of conducting a debate which consists in proving nothing positive, but in applying the test of relativity to every positive thesis of the opponent and thus destroying it dialectically" (loc. cit.). It appears that it was Nāgārjuna who introduced the Buddhist writers to the habit of treating dialectics in special separate manuals. From that time we see that every author of some renown composes his own manual of dialectics containing instructions for carrying on public disputations (ibid. p. 29). Asaṅga also is said to have formulated a body of rules on the debating art very much on the lines of the Nyāya aphorisms. "*Vādavidhi*" (The Art of Debating) is a work composed by Vasubandhu and is available only in an incomplete Chinese translation (ibid. pp. 29—30).

The great importance given by the Mahāyāna Buddhist scholars to public debating was not quite in keeping with the Buddha's own attitude to it as was shown in the earlier part of this essay. Buddha was a teacher who maintained that the final Truth he discovered cannot be grasped by logic (*atakkāvacara*) but has to be individually realised by the wise (*paccattaṃ veditabbo viññūhi*). Therefore, one cannot realise this Truth merely by debating about it. However, when discussion was necessary for unravelling the Truth it had to be based on valid reasoning (*sutakkita*) and not on invalid reasoning (*dutakkita*). Defending the teaching of the Buddha against its adversaries by logical argument and also giving various interpretations to it, which these late Buddhist scholars did, was one thing, while the practical realisation of the final Truth was another thing. In this respect these Mahāyāna scholars seem to have somewhat followed the instructions laid down in the *Nyāya-Sūtra* that even fallacious forms of reasoning should be resorted to in dealing with the opponents "for safeguarding the interests of Truth, just as fences of thorny boughs are used to protect the growth of seeds".[2]

A general idea of the technique of debate in ancient India could be had from Maitreyanātha's (circa 400 A. C.) *Saptadaśabhūmi Śāstra* which contains a treatise on the art of debate consisting of seven chapters dealing with (i) Subjects of debate: debating should be about a useful subject:

1 The existence of this *Vaidalya Sūtra* reminds us of the Pali *Vedal* (*M.* I, p. 133; *A.* II, pp. 103, 178; *Vin.* III, p. 8) as a division of the Pali scriptures as showing that the origin of dialectical argument may go back to the Pali canon itself: *Vaidalya : Vedalla* 'splitting.'

2 As quoted by K. N. Jayatilleke, op. cit. p. 218.

useless subjects should not be debated ; (ii) Debates should not be entered upon in any and every place : they should be carried on in the presence of scholars, in the palace of a king, the office of a minister or in an assembly (*pariṣad*) ; (iii) The thesis (*sādhya*) should be of two kinds as (a) that concerning one's self (*ātmasambandha*) and (b) that concerning the opponent (*para-sambandha*) ; the proof should be of eight kinds as (a) proposition (*siddhānta*) (b) reason (*hetu*) (c) example (*udāharaṇa*) (d) affirmative example (*sādharmya*) (e) negative example (*vaidharmya*) (f) perception (*pratyakṣa*) (g) inference (*anumāna*) and (h) scripture (*āgama*); (iv) Qualificatie s of a debater : he must be versed in each other's scriptures : should not use bad language ; should remain fearless and speak continuously without a break ; he must be intelligible to the entire audience ; he must speak aloud or low as befitting the occasion so that he becomes pleasing to the audience ; (v) Points of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*) : a debater is defeated if he first opposes an assertion and afterwards speaks in agreement with it or if he, being unable to defend the chosen subject introduces a new subject or if he talks irrelevently ; (vi) Attending a place of debate : a person in proceeding to a place of debate, should consider beforehand whether it will be useful to him and whether the debate is about a useful subject or not etc ; (vii) Confidence of a debater : a debater should appear to the audience in such a way that he is going to win ; he should be understood by all.[3]

A. G. S. K.

DECAY (*jarā* or *jaratā*) is a characteristic of all things that are conditioned (*saṅkhata*). This characteristic is universal and unavoidable and has birth (*jāti* or *uppāda*) as its precedent condition (*jāti paccayā jarā*). See CONDITIONALITY and PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA.

Decay is spoken of as an inherent peril (*ādīnava*) of matter (*rūpa*), specially of the physical body of living beings (*M*. I, p. 88). The physical form has four phases, viz., i. growth (*upacaya*), ii. continuity (*santatā*) iii. decay (*jaratā*) and iv. change (*aniccatā*). In this categorization decay simply means the development and consequent maturing of the *khandhas* or bodily aggregates (*khandhapūranabhāva* or *khandhaparipāka : Vism*. p. 502) and their inevitable wear and tear (*khaṇḍiccādisammata* : loc. cit.) as one advances in years. This process of decay or *jarā* leads directly to death (*maraṇūpanayanarasā* : loc. cit.). This particular phase is pinpointed because it is in old age that various signs of decay, such as grey hair, broken teeth, wrinkled skin become manifest and hence, it is also called obvious decay (*pākaṭajarā : Vism*, p. 449). Stock descriptions of decay of physcial body are found at *M*. I, p. 49 ; *S*. II, p. 2 ; cf. also *M*. I, p. 88 ; *A*. I, p. 138 ; *Vism*. p. 502.

Moral edification seems to have been a reason for pinpointing this characteristic. Thus, decay is said to be an antidote against pride of youth (*A*. III, p. 71 f.). Along with sickness (*vyādhi*) and death (*maraṇa*) it is also referred to as a divine messenger (*devadūta*) to remind the human beings about the ills of life (*A*. I, p. 138).

Generally, decay is said to set in with the passage of time. Though decay becomes manifest (*pākaṭa*) with the lapse of time the actual process of decay starts from the very birth (*jāti* or *uppāda*) and operates in a hidden (*paṭicchanna : Vism*. p. 449) manner. While life is yet young, the normal tendency is more towards growth. Yet, simultaneously with growth the process of decay, too, begins to operate and continues incessantly. This decay without intermission is called *avīci-jarā*.

Just as the physical aspect of organism (*rūpa*), the psychical aspect (*nāma*), too, is subject to decay. According to Buddhism all the five aggregates (*pañcakkhandha*) undergo decay (*KhpA*. I, p. 78). Physical decay is accompainied by decay of sense faculties (*indriya paripāka*). Unlike the decay that sets in the body of a being the decay that takes place in his psychical nature is not quite apparent. Nevertheless in the psychical nature, too, decay operates in a hidden manner and continues incessantly. See JARĀ.

S. K. N.

DECCAN, designates the historic land of peninsular India. The name 'Deccan' is a corruption of the Sanskrit word *Dakṣiṇa* (Pali, *Dakkhiṇa*) which means the south or the right as distinct from the left. The name is familiar to Indian literature and to inscriptions and is also found in *The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea*, written by a Greek mariner of the first century A.C. Fa-hsien in the fifth century A.C. refers to it as 'Ta-thsin'. The most popular designation of the region used in Sanskrit literature is Dakṣiṇāpatha. In the Pali Canon the earliest

3 As quoted in translation by S. C. Vidyabhusana in his *A History of Indian Logic*, Calcutta, 1921 pp. 263-4.

reference to Deccan (*dakkhiṇaṃ janapadaṃ*) is found in the *Ambaṭṭha Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* (*D.* I, p. 96). *Dakkhiṇaṃ janapadaṃ* is explained by Buddhaghosa as the region to the south of the Ganges (*dakkhiṇāpatho ti pākaṭaṃ Gaṅgāya dakkhiṇato pākaṭajanapadaṃ, DA.* I, p. 265). The *PED.* explains *dakkhiṇaṃ janapadaṃ* as the southern country, the 'Dekkan'. In Pali texts, it is also referred to as *dakkhiṇāpatha*. The Sanskrit form *'dakṣiṇa diś'* is explained as the south, Deccan, and *Dakṣiṇādhipati* as 'Lord of Deccan' (*SED.* s.v.). The other variants of the name are Dakṣiṇātya and Dakṣiṇāśa. The area that comes under Deccan stretches from the Vindhyan range and the expanse of hills and plateaux that connects it with Mahendragiri and forms the watershed between the Mahānadī, and the Godāvarī in the north, to the Kṛṣṇā and Tuṅgabhadrā in the south, and from the Arabian sea in the west to the Bay of Bengal in the east. The territory included within it embraces the Marāṭha and Kanarese speaking districts of the Bombay Presidency, the state of Hyderabad with the southern part of Berār, some adjoining tracts of the Central provinces and portion of Orissa and the Madras Presidency lying between Mahendragiri and Kṛṣṇā. The division of India between the North and the South has been a geographical datum recognised in the country since immemorial antiquity (S. Dutt, *Buddhist Monks and Monasteries of India*, London, 1962, p. 96). It is mentioned in the *Mahābhārata* as marking off Dakṣiṇāpatha, the Southern region of India from the North. Rājaśekhara in his *Kāvyamīmāṃsā* mentions that to the South of Mahismatī is Deccan (*Mahismatyā parataḥ dakṣiṇāpathaḥ*). Cunningham, relying on Chinese testimony, enumerates the five divisions of ancient India. According to that description Dakkhiṇāpatha includes the whole of the peninsula from Naski on the west and Ganjam on the east to the Cape Comorin on the South including the modern districts of Berār and Telingana, Mahārāṣṭra and Konkan with the separate states of Hyderabad, and Mysore and Travancore or very nearly the whole of the peninsula to the south of the Narmadā and Mahānadī rivers (Cunningham, *Ancient Geography of India*, London, 1861, p. 12).

From early times the name Dakṣiṇāpatha has been used in different senses. In its broadest application it comprises the whole of India between the southern sea and the Vindhyas (*dakṣiṇasya samudrasya tathā Vindhyasya cāntare*). This definition is known to the *Bhāratanāṭya Śāstra* (XIV, 39) and to the *Bhuvanakoṣa* of the *Purāṇas*. In the old Pali literature the name Dakkhiṇāpatha would seem to indicate only a remote settlement. The earlier authors of the Buddhist legends belonged to a north-eastern corner of India and their geographical knowledge hardly extended beyond the bounds of Northern India and Majjhimadesa. The great peninsular India of the south was very vaguely known and referred to by the ancient name Dakkhiṇāpatha (way south) a sort of *terra incognita*. According to the *Suttanipāta*, brāhman Bāvarī had his hermitage on the bank of the upper Godāvarī in Dakkhiṇāpatha, midway between the kingdoms of Assaka and Aḷaka (*Sn. v.* 976 ; *SnA.* II, p. 581). In the *Vinaya* (*Vin.* I. pp. 195–196 ; II, p. 298), Dakkhiṇāpatha is coupled with Avanti as Avanti-Dakkhiṇāpatha and seems to refer to the same limited district. Bhandarkar points out that ancient Avanti was divided into two parts. The northern part had its capital at Ujjayinī and the southern part called the Avanti–Dakkhiṇāpatha had its capital at Mahismatī. According to the *Mahāgovinda Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* Mahissatī was the capital of Avanti with Vessabhu as its king (Bhandarkar, *Carmichael Lectures*, 1918, p. 54). The Pali Jātakas also stretch the northern limit of the Dakkhiṇāpatha to Avanti close to western Vindhyas. On the other hand, the southern limit of the Dakkhiṇāpatha has also been extended so as to go beyond Tuṅgabhadrā river which is the southern limit of Deccan. The *Petavatthu Commentary* includes Damiḷavisaya or 'Tamil Country' in the far south within Dakkhiṇāpatha (*PvA.* p. 133). Assaka (Aśmaka) and Mūlaka as well as the Andhakā or the Andhras occupying the northern and eastern districts of the Hyderabad state with certain adjacent areas in the Madras Presidency are also included within Deccan. The *Mahāgovinda Sutta* mentions Kāliṅga and describes Jambudīpa as having the shape of a bullock-cart with its face towards the south and accordingly extending on the north (*uttarena āyataṃ, dakkhiṇena sakaṭamukhaṃ : D.* II, p. 235). Thus, it appears that the shape of Dakkiṇāpatha had been conceived as the face of a bullock-cart. In the *Jambudīvapaṇṇatti*, Deccan is represented as having a shape of a halfmoon (*addhacanda-saṃṭhāna saṃṭhie : Jambudīvapaṇṇatti*, IV.I.10 ; IV.35 ; quoted by Chaudhury, *Buddhist Centres in Ancient India*, Culcutta, 1969. p. 4).

The region to the south of the Godāvarī watered by the Kṛṣṇā (Kaṇṇapeṇṇa) and the land of the Tamils (Damiḷaraṭṭha) are not mentioned in the earlier part of the Pali canon and occur for the first time in the jātaka stories and in the commentaries. The *Assaka Jātaka* mentions the city of Potali as the capital of Assaka (Aśmaka). The *Cuḷla-Kāliṅga*

Jātaka refers to victories won by the Assakas over the Kāliṅgas.

In the first century A.C. the *Periplus* uses the term Dachinabades, i.e., the Dakkhiṇāpatha, to signify the region beyond 'Barygaza', i.e., modern Broch on the Narmadā. From this area 'Damirica', i.e., the Tamil country, seems, however, to be excluded. Beyond Barygaza the adjoining coast extends in a straight line from north to south and so this region is called Dachinabades.

It is not possible to define precisely, with the facts available, the limits of Dakkhiṇāpatha–the ancient Deccan or its most important *janapadas* as understood by various writers. The boundaries of the territories varied from age to age and at times the same or similar names were applied to localities distinct from one another.

Buddhism held a place of considerable importance in Dakkhiṇ patha. Andhra and other *janapadas* to the south of the Vindhyan range were flourishing centres of Buddhism for several centuries (B. N. Chaudhury, op. cit. p. 226). What remains today are archaeological finds of Buddhist interest; and other evidences of contemporaneity are too scanty to determine how and when Buddhism was introduced to regions south of Majjhimadesa. In the time of the Buddha there were very few monks in the border districts (*paccantimesu janapadesu*), and the areas that came under Deccan formed one of the border districts south of the Middle-country (*Vin.* I, p. 196). In Avanti-Dakkhiṇāpatha which was in proximity to Majjhimadesa than any other part of Deccan, Elder Mahākaccāna had to wait for three years to convene the required number of ten monks to ordain venerable Soṇa Kuṭikaṇṇa. On representations made by Soṇa Kuṭikaṇṇa, on behalf of his preceptor, to the Buddha, the latter relaxed certain rules of monastic administration for the convenience of monks residing in all border districts (ibid. pp. 194–98). The early texts in the Pali canon do not record any visits of the Buddha to Deccan; but there is evidence to establish that Buddhism was introduced and gained popularity in Dakkhiṇāpatha at a very early date, prior to the Christian era. The *Suttanipāta* records the story of the mission of the ascetic Bāvarī's disciples from the region of the Godāvarī to the Buddha who was staying then at Rājagaha (*Sn. vv.* 977–1013). This establishes the fact that the fame of the Buddha as a great teacher, had, by then, spread among the people of Dakkhiṇāpatha. The *Saṃyutta Nikāya* mentions that Puṇṇa, a great lay disciple of the Buddha, who was a native of Sunāparanta *janapada* in the north-western corner of Dakkhiṇāpatha, once went on business to Sāvatthī and received ordination from the Buddha who was then residing at Jetavana. The *Sāratthappakāsinī* adds that he, on his return, propagated the religion and invited the Buddha for the opening ceremony of Maṅkulakārāma. The Buddha accepted the invitation and visited that country with five hundred monks and spent a week in that city preaching the doctrine to the people and eighty-four thousand people gained insight into the doctrine. On his way back, the Buddha stopped at Narmadā, preached the doctrine to the *nāga* king there and established his foot print on the bank of the river Narmadā as an object of worship to the *nāga* king (*Nammadā-nadītīre pada-cetiyaṃ dassesi: SA.* II, pp. 374–79). Many later Buddhist works record visits of the Buddha to Dakkhiṇāpatha. The *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā* mentions one of the previous births of the Buddha at Amarāvatī (*DhpA.* I, p. 68). The *Vimānavatthu Aṭṭhakathā* cites the story of an Assaka king ordained by elder Mahākaccāna (*VvuA.* pp. 259–67). Hsüan Tsang mentions a large number of places in the Dakkhiṇāpathaka associated with the memory of the Buddha's preachings. According to a Tibetan tradition, Sākyamuni preached Kālacakra system in Dhānyakaṭa, i. e., Amarāvatī (Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, London, 1954, Vol. III, p. 386). According to the biography of Padmasambhava written by his disciple, the Buddha was born as Padmasambhava in Dhānyakaṭa. In the Vajrayāna works it is mentioned that the Buddha turned the third wheel of Law at Dhānyakaṭa sixteen years after his Enlightenment (*History of Buddhism*) by Hbrugpdma-dkarp pp. 14B—15A referred to by Sanskritayana in his introduction to the *Vigraha Vyavartanī*, Chaudhury, op. cit. p. 226) The facts mentioned in these secondary sources carry only a very small weight as they are of very late origin.

The chronicles of Sri Lanka, the *Dīpavaṃsa* and the *Mahāvaṃsa* as well as the *Samantapāsādikā* record the mission sent during the time of Emperor Asoka to some parts of the ancient Dakkhiṇāpatha. Four of these countries, viz., Mahisamaṇḍala (Mysore), Vanavāsī (North Kanara), Aparāntaka (western border province of Asokan empire) and Mahāraṭṭha (Mahārāṣṭra) are located in the Dakkhiṇāpatha. Archaeology has confirmed the historicity of the Buddhist missions sent to various countries by emperor Asoka. According to the above sources the elder Mahādeva went to the principality of Mahiṃsaka (Mahisamaṇḍala, i. e.,

modern Mysore) and preached the discourse on the "Divine Messengers", i. e., the *Devadūta Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* (*Mhv.* xii, *v.* 29 ff.). Elder Rakkhita went to Vanavāsī (i.e., North Kanara) and converted the inhabitants of Vanavāsī with a discourse on the *Anamatagga pariyāya* (loc. cit.). It is said that five hundred *vihāras* were founded in that country. Elder Yona Dhammarakkhita went to Aparāntaka, and preached the *Aggikkhandhopama Sutta* (loc. cit.). Elder Mahā Dhammarakkhita went and converted the people of Mahāraṭṭha (Mahārāṣṭra, with a discourse on the *Mahānārada-Kassapa Jātaka* (loc. cit.). From these facts it is clear that Buddhism was officially introduced to some parts of Dakkhiṇāpatha after the third Buddhist council. But there is no trace of these missionaries and no subsequent record of their achievements save in respect of the mission sent to Tambapaṇṇi (Sri Lanka). Even if the legendary reports of the resounding success of the missions as given in the Chronicles is not relied upon, yet what is strongly plausible is that the propagation of Buddhism in the reign of Emperor Asoka in those areas south of the Vindhyan-range which later fell within the Sātavāhana empire, prepared the ground for the rise of Buddhism in the following years. The cave monasteries which had started in the second century B.C. became a distinguishing characteristic of monastic life in Dakkhiṇāpatha, and the archeological finds and inscriptions of the Deccan plateaux also help to surmise the date of the introduction of Buddhism and its history. According to the *Mahāvaṃsa* (ch. xxix, *v.* 38 ff.), among the reputed monks who took part in the ceremony at the laying of the foundation of the Mahāthūpa at Anuradhapura in the reign of King Duṭṭhagāmiṇī Abhaya, i.e., second century B.C., two *mahātheras*, namely, Candagutta from the country of Vanavāsa and Mahādeva from Pallavabhogga in South India had participated. The views attributed to Andhakas, apparently referring to a Buddhist group of the Andhra country, a sub-sect of the Mahāsaṅghika school, are referred to in the *Kathāvatthu* (*Kvu.* pp. 155, 159-62, 204–206, etc.), a book compiled during the third Buddhist council. Therefore, there is reason to believe that Buddhism, as upheld by the Mahāsaṅghika school, entered Dakkhiṇāpatha not much later than the second Buddhist council. Subsequently, offshoots of Mahāsaṅghikas–the Siddhatthikas, the Bahussutiyas, the Rājagirikas the Pūrva-and Aparaśailas and the Āryasaṅgha made their strongholds in the Andhra country (Chaudhury, op. cit. p. 228). The only subsect of the Theravāda school which developed in the Dakkhiṇāpatha was the Mahiṃsāsaka (*Dpv.* v, *v.* 45).

The routes of communication in ancient India mentioned in the Buddhist texts explain how Buddhism was introduced to distant countries. One such trade route was in the Dakkhiṇāpatha which extended from Sāvatthī to Paṭiṭṭhāna (modern Paithan). Bāvarī's disciples travelled along this route and their itinerary was from Mūlaka (an unidentified township on the bank of Godāvarī, to Paṭiṭṭhāna (Paithan), then to Mahissatī (Mahismatī is an ancient town now represented by the village Mahasar in the Madhya-pradesh and one time capital of Avanti) and to other important cities in Majjhimadesa and in north India (Dutt, *Buddhist Monks and Monasteries of India*, London, 1962, p. 122). From the upper reaches of the river Godāvarī, the route dipped downwards gradually across the river Kṛṣṇā and extended far south to Kāñchi (Conjeevaram in Madras) and Madurai (in Madras). Thus, early in the Christian era there developed a network of roads linking all important cities of peninsular India with those of north India (loc. cit). When the extensive midland empire of the Sātavāhanas was expanding, these communication facilities allowed men and women to visit *stūpas* and monasteries in different parts of India and make their offerings to them. The Maurya dynasty, which gave an impetus to the spread of Buddhism in a greater part of India came to an end in 184 B. C. The wreckage of its northern empire was divided among three ruling powers–the Suṅgas in the east ruling from Pāṭaliputra, the Yavanas in the north, and the Sātavāhanas in the west and south with their old capital Amarāvatī shifted north to Pratiṣṭhāna ; and Ujjeni which occupied the position of a "pass" between these kingdoms fell into the hands of the Sātavāhanas. The Suṅga dynasty was hostile to Buddhism and consequently Buddhism lost its hold on Majjhimadesa as its stronghold and bitter enmity sprang up between Suṅga king Puṣyamitra and the Buddhist monks. Puṣyamitra had destroyed several monasteries in his Kingdom and offered a reward of one hundred *dīnāras* for the head of every Buddhist. Under these circumstances Buddhist culture of the north and east migrated south of Vindhyas into the empire of Sātavāhanas who were not hostile to Buddhism. The route of travel and communication that existed in north and east India was extended to the new Sātavāhana capital and this route was followed by migratory parties of Buddhist monks from Magadha to build up their new stronghold in the Sātavāhana empire. The nucleus of the Sātavāhana empire

had formed even before the final break-up of the Maurya empire and it lasted in unbroken continuity for more than three centuries (78 B. C.–218 A. D.). It extended from sea to sea and the people within the empire enjoyed twin blessings of prosperity and peace. The political stability of the empire achieved a cultural unity and brought within a single cultural as well as political bond diverse tribes on both sides of the Vindhyas. The peace of the Sātavāhanas guaranteed progress and consolidation of Buddhist culture in the empire. Thus, the Sātavāhana empire in the Deccan was heir to the Maurya empire of the north.

What is significant in the spread of Buddhism in the Sātavāhana empire is that none of the kings was a professed Buddhist. They belonged to different branches of Brahmanical faith, but some of them were active patrons of Buddhism. Nāgārjuna, the famous Buddhist philospher, was born in South India (in the Vidarbha country in Mahārāṣṭra, according to Bu-ston). He zealously propagated Buddhism and was instrumental in getting royal patronage for Buddhism. The Chinese pilgrim, I-tsing, mentions that *Suhṛl-lekhā* (Letter to a Friend) of Nāgārjuna was widely read and memorised in India. According to Chinese records, Sātavāhana was the friend to whom Nāgārjuna addressed his *Suhrl-lekhā*. Gautamīputra Yajñaśrī who reigned during the period 166–196 A. C. was a contemporary of Nāgārjuna. A legend related by Bāṇa in his *Harṣacarita* also mentions Sātavāhana as the friend of Nāgārjuna (*Harṣacarita*, E. B. Cowell and F. W. Thomas, London, 1897, p. 252). The region between the lower reaches of the Godāvarī and Kṛṣṇā rivers, now comprised in the Andhrapradesh, was the heart-land of the Sātavāhana empire. Buddhist monasteries of the cave-type thrived in this region and it is rich in sites which have yielded Buddhist finds of different descriptions to archaelolgists–Amarāvatī, Bhattiprolu, Nāgārjunakoṇḍa, Goli, Ghaṇṭasālā, Jaggayyapeṭa, Godivāda, Pedda Gañjam, Sālihuṇḍam, Sankaram Hill, Guṇṭupalli, and Kapavaram are some of the important Buddhist sites.

According to some scholars Mahāyāna Buddhism originated in the Andhra country. A passage in the *Aṣṭasāhaśrikā-prajñāpāramitā* states that Mahāyāna Buddhism will originate in the Dakṣiṇāpatha, pass into the eastern countries and will prosper in the north (Chaudhury, op. cit. pp. 228–29). During the days of Sātavāhana rule, the Buddhist Saṅgha in the Andhra country rose to the summit of its glory. Gigantic monasteries and stūpas ornamented with exquisite craftsmanship of architectural and sculptural grandeur were constructed throughout the country with the liberal munificence of the royal members and other donors. Māthariputra Śrī Vīrapuruṣadatta, the second emperor of the Sātavāhana dynasty, though himself not a Buddhist, patronised the Buddhist Saṅgha. According to the archaeological finds, there is evidence of royal ladies having constructed monastic buildings. Their names appear in the list of donors engraved in *āyaka* pillars. All these ladies gave these pious gifts "for the attainment of happiness in both the worlds and for the bliss of *nirvāṇa*" (Chaudhury, op. cit. p. 230). There were rich and pious donors among whom *upāsikā* Bodhiśrī surpassed all others in her munificence and benefactions to the Buddhist Saṅgha. She erected and dedicated at Śrīparvata on the east side of Vijaya purī a *caitya*-hall and *caitya*-shrine with all the necessaries to acquire merit for members and rolatives of both the families to which she belonged. She erected several other shrines, *maṇḍapa*-pillars and cells etc. for the use of the Saṅgha. This reveals a period of prosperity for Buddhism in the Deccan peninsula during the reign of Sātavāhanas.

After the fall of the Andhras there was no royal patronage for Buddhism. Vaiṣṇavism and Brahmanism revived, marking again a gloomy period for Buddhism. But epigraphic finds and literary evidence show that Buddhism continued in South India as a living religion and did not die out even in the twelfth century A. C. During this period (2nd-5th century A. C.) there lived in South India the great Mahāyāna philosophers and commentators like Āryadeva, Buddhapālita, Diṅnāga and Bhāvaviveka (B. N. Chaudhury, *Buddhist Centres in Ancient India*, Calcutta, 1969, p. 234). Buddhadatta, the Pali commentator (5th century A. C.) gives an account of the flourishing condition of Buddhism in Kāveripaṭṭana and Uragapura. He started and completed the *Vinaya-vinicchaya* during the reign of Accyutavikrama of the Kalamba clan (*Vinvch. v.* 3179). In the *Abhidhammāvatāra*, Buddhadatta mentions that there was a great monastery built in Kāveripaṭṭana by Kaṇḍadāsa, in which he lived for some time while he composed this work. Buddhadatta also lived in the monastery of Bhūtamaṅgala at Uragapura (ibid. *v.* 3170).

When Hsüan Tsang visited India, Buddhism was in a decadent condition. In places like Dhānyakaṭaka, Malakuṭa, Andhra and Choḷa kingdom there were *deva* temples with thousands of followers, while the Buddhist establishments were very few

and mostly in a ruinous condition. In a few centres like Kāñcipura and Koṅkanapura Buddhism was flourising. The region of Śrī-parvata remained as a great centre of Tantric Buddhism for a long period. According to Tibetan historian Bu-ston, the king Srong-Tsan-Gam-po is believed to have brought the self-originated eleven-faced statue of Avalokiteśvara from South India in the 7th century A. C. (Chaudhury, op. cit. p. 235).

The *Mahāvaṃsa* mentions that some of the Vaitulyaka monks of Śrī Laṇkā who were exiled by king Goṭhābhaya (309–332 A.C.) found shelter at Kāveripaṭṭana in the Coḷa country in South India. They became intimately connected with Saṅghamitra who later became the champion of Mahāyanism in Sri Lanka. It was about this period that the activities of the Yogācāra school of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu became powerful in India and Saṅghamitra may have been influenced by that philosophy. The *Dāṭhāvaṃsa* records that the Tooth Relic of the Buddha was sent from India to Sri Lanka for protection. It was brought to Sri Laṅka from Dantapura in Kāliṅga in the time of King Sirirmeghavaṇṇa of Sri Lanka during the 4th century A.C. (*Mhv.* xxxvii, 92 ; *Daṭh.* v.p. 340). During the reign of Sena I (831–851, A.C.) a member of the Vajraparvata sect of Buddhism in India came to Sri Lanka and spread the Vājiriyavāda or Vajrayāna in the island. The *Nikāyasaṅgraha* mentions that the king accepted the secret teachings of the Vājiriyavāda.

Buddhist monks from South India had come to Sri Lanka either to write Pali commentaries or to learn the Dhamma and propagate the religion. In the 5th century A.C. commentator Buddhadatta came to Sri Lanka and while residing in Anuradhapura wrote the *Uttara-Vinicchaya* (H. Dhammaratana, *Buddhism in South India*, the Wheel No. 124/125, BPS., Kandy, Sri Lanka, p. 40). In the 7th century A.C. Vajrabodhi, a Mahāyānist adhering to the Vajrayāna faction visited the island and residing at Abayagiri for six months attempted to spread Mahāyānism in Sri Lanka. He returned to Pāṇḍya, his native country, and went to China with Amoghavajra, his pupil, and did his missionary work (ibid. p. 42). Commentator Dhammapāla was a native of South India and lived for some time either in the city of Tanjore of the Coḷa country or in the town of Tanjāvur in the Pandyan country. He came to Sri Lanka in the 8th century and while residing at the Mahāvihāra composed the *Paramattadīpanī*, a commentary on some of the texts in the *Khuddakanikāya*. He also wrote *Paramatthamañjusā*, a sub-commentary on the *Visuddhimagga* (Dhammaratana, op. cit. pp. 40–41). In the 12th century A. C. Dīpaṅkara Buddhappiya, a monk from the Coḷa country visited Sri Lanaka and studied Buddhist scriptures under venerable Ānanda Vanaratana. He is the author of *Pajjamadhu* and a Pali grammar named *Rūpasiddhi* (ibid. p. 43).

The *Mahāvaṃsa* mentions that King Parākramabāhu II of Dambadeṇiya, in the 13th century, got down Buddhist monks versed in the Tripiṭaka from Coḷa country to revive Buddhism in Sri Lanka (*Mhv.* lxxxiv, *vv.* 9–10). Venerable Dhammakitti was the chief among those monks and he wrote the continuation of the *Mahāvaṃsa* from the time of King Sirimeghavaṇṇa up to his time. The king got down scriptures also from Jambudīpa (perhaps from the Coḷa country). From the history of Sri Lanka we get further information about the state of Buddhism in South India in the 14th and 15th centuries. Early in the 14th century, King Parākramabāhu IV got down a learned monk to help in the translation of the *Jātaka* book to Sinhala (*Mhv.* ch. xc, *vv.* 80–86). In the 15th century, Senādhilaṅkāra, a minister of king Buvanekabāhu IV of Gampola caused a Buddhist monastery to be built at Kāñcipura. From these facts it is clear that there had been constant contact between Buddhist monks of Sri Lanka and South India which was helpful for the preservation of Buddhism when there was a threat in the homeland. Inscriptional evidence also shows that Buddhism was popular as a religion in the Dakkhiṇāpatha in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The Shikarpur inscription of 1065 A.C. records the construction of the Jayantipura Buddha vihāra in Beligave (var. Belgave) in Mysore by a minister named Daṇḍanāyaka Rūpabhattaya. The donor made gifts of land for the Buddhist monastery as well as for the worship of Tārā-bhagavat, Lokeśvara and Buddhadeva with their attendant gods.

The Bolur inscription of Jayasiṃha III (1021 A.C.) records the ritual observances enjoined by several religions including Buddhism. Another inscription records the intermingling condition of different religious orders including Buddhist (*EI.* Vol. VII, p. 105). A Jaina work named *Acāra-sāra* (1154 A.C.) contains numerous references to Buddhism and followers of the Buddha. Even in the 12th century Buddhism was in existence in some parts of South India. The Amarāvatī pillar inscription records that Siṃhavarmman, the Pallava king (1100 A.C.) came to Dhānyaghaṭa (i.e., Amarāvatī) and presented an image of the Buddha to the stūpa ornamented with jewels, gold and silver (*South Indian Inscriptions*, Vol. I, p. 25 ff.). Another inscription mentions that King Kota II

and his queens had a regard for Buddhism and granted villages in two different districts, and also sheep, out of whose milk ghee was to be prepared for burning perpetual lamps in the temple of the Buddha (*EI.* Vol. VI, p. 146). Another pillar inscription of 1234 A.C. records gifts of land to the Buddha by Bayyamambā, one of the queens of Keta II.

The ruins of a Buddhist stūpa have been discovered near the Simhācalam Temple, a few miles away from Visagapattam. It was erected by Langula Gajapati (1237–1282 A.C.) of Orissa. The Tipur inscription of 1533 A.C. mentions the famous Buddhist town called Kalāvati to the south east of the Telegu country. The Kumbakonam inscription of 1580 A.C. mentions the temple of the Buddha at Tiruvilandurai in Tanjore. There was royal patronage for Buddhism in this country and king Sevvappa Nāyaka (16th century A.C.) granted lands for the repairs of the Buddhist temple (*Epigraphica Carnatica*, Vol. XII, Introduction, p. 12).

Buddhist ruins that have been abundantly found in various parts of the Dakkhiṇāpatha also reveal how Buddhism gradually lost its glory. There has been religious rivalries in the past and the result was wanton damage to Buddhist monasteries. The revival of Brāhmanism, Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism at several stages of cultural history points to the gradual fall of Buddhism in South India. Some of the ancient Buddhist shrines and monasteries have later been converted to centres of Vaiṣṇavite and Saivite Cults (*Journal of Andhra Historical Research Society*, Vol. III, p. 86). The process of converting Buddhist sites to other religious centres took various forms. The Hoysala inscription (1220. A.C.) mentions the Buddha as the ninth incarnation of Viṣṇu and King Narasiṃha is praised as the Buddha due to the force of his own yoga (Chaudhury, op. cit. pp. 235–37). In the Hoysala sculpture of the 13th and 14th centuries the Buddha image is found in the place of Kṛṣṇa (*Annual Report of Mysore Archaeological Survey*, 1929, p. 11). An inscription dated 1380 A.C. on a copper plate in the Śṛṅgeri Maṭha in the reign of the Vijayanagara King Harihara II, mentions the existence of Buddhists who were harrassed by Bhāratatīrātha, a great ascetic of the Advaita school (op. cit 1933 p. 219). The Śravaṇa Belgola inscription of 1398 A.C. of a Jaina devotee contains abuses to the Buddhists and testifies to the great success of Abhinava Paṇḍitadeva, the disciple of Simhācārya over the Buddhist dialecticians. According to Charles Eliot "the monastic institutions of India seem due to Buddhism Śaṃkara perceived the advantage of the cenobitic life for organising religion and founded a number of maṭhs or colleges' (Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, London, 1921, Vol. II, p. 175). They did not stop at this. They also draped the Buddhist shrines in Hindu garb. One of the centres founded by Śaṃkara was Jagannāthapuri in Orissa. According to Swāmi Vivekānanda "the temple of Jagannātha is an old Buddhist temple. We took this and others over and re-Hinduised them. We shall have to do many things like that yet" (*Complete works*, Vol. III, p. 264, as quoted by Joshi, *Aspects of Buddhism in Indian History*. The Wheel Nos. 195/196, *BPS.*, Kandy, Śrī Laṅkā, p. 38).

The geographical distribution of Buddhism over India varied from age to age. From the first organisation of Saṅgha in the 5th century B.C. to its end in the 12th century (or a few centuries later), its influence over the society in smaller or wider areas, was by the very nature of the Saṅgha's functioning, constantly sustained. Monks slowly broadened a cult into a popular culture, a course of doctrine into a way of life for the people. The response on the people's part can be measured by the industry of monastery building (Dutt, op. cit. p. 27). The best relics of these monasteries can still be seen in the Deccan plateau and along the western and eastern Ghats. The Deccan plateau is hilly on its edges and the topography of the caves was mainly determined by the orography. The caves (*guhā* monasteries) of Karlē, Ellorā, Ajaṇṭā and Bājh, in their everlasting inset in the rocks attract visitors as treasure-houses of the best and finest specimens of ancient Indian art and culture. Historical information about the state of Buddhism in different regions or localities happens to be so scattered and discontinuous that a whole or integrated picture of any given period of Buddhist history hardly evolves. A monk settlement, once established, would continue to exist for many a century unless deserted by monks at times of religions persecution, decayed due to dilapidation or demolished by foreign invaders as had happened in the Deccan.

M.K.

DECISION. See CHOICE, FREE-WILL.

DECLINE. The concept of decline is viewed in Buddhism both from the social and worldly angle as well as from the religious and transcendental. In Buddhism, these two constitute no strict dichotomy as worldly culture and progress is integrated to the religious so as to contribute towards the furtherance of the latter. In both these planes,

worldly and transcendental growth and development is indicated by the word *vuddhi* (Skt. *vṛddhi*)[1] and as its opposite, implying decline and decay words like *hāni* and *parihāni* (from the root *hā*, *hāyati* and *hīyati* to decline, decay and perish)[2] are used.

With a keenly developed awareness of the need for socio-religious development of man, the Buddhist texts are full of instructions for the arrest of such decline. A total absence of such decline converges on the attainment of the goal of Nirvāṇa (*Abhabbo parihānāya nibbānasseva santike* : Not liable to decline, he is in the vicinity of Nibbāna : *Dhp. v.* 32). The *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* (*D.* II, p. 75 ff.) more or less opens with a full discussion on the conditions, seven in number (*satta aparihanīya dhamma*), which prevent the decline of the socio-political organization of the Vajjis. If these norms which are claimed to have been taught by the Buddha himself are adhered to, then no decline among them is to be feared. Success would be the natural outcome (*vuddhi yeva pāṭikaṅkhā no parihāni*). Proceeding from there the Buddha teaches the monks forty-one conditions, in six different sets, which assure the successful development of their monastic life. These include considerations which contribute to the perfection of the spiritual life of the monk as well as to the stability of the corporate life of the Saṅgha to which he belongs as a member. The *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*A.* II. p. 39 f.). in a section named *Aparihāna Sutta*, has a set of four conditions which essentially safeguard the spiritual life of the monk. This looks more or less like a resume, at least in part, of the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* (*D.* I, p. 47 ff.).

Social stability and wholesomeness of individual character being a mainstay of the religious development in Buddhism, it is not suprising to find the *Siṅgālovāda Sutta* (*D.* III, p. 181 ff.), making a detailed analysis of the conditions that lead to both social and religious decline (*cuddasa pāpakāpagato .... ubhalokavijayāya paṭipanno hoti tassa ayañceva loko āraddho hoti paro ca loko :* loc. cit.). Heading the list we have the four *kammakilesa* or evil ways of word and deed which are socially corroding and religiously damaging. They are destruction of life (*pāṇātipāta*), theft (*adinnādāna*), unchastity (*kāmesu micchācāra*) and dishonesty (*musāvāda*).

Under the four *agati* (i.e., motivation for improper, incorrect modes of behaviour) the sutta gives desire or partiality, dislike or resentment, fear and confusion, acting under which a man would be precipitated into social decline (*Nihīyati tassa yaso kālapakkhe'va candimā :* ibid. p. 182). Finally, we have six conditions like addiction to liquor, gambling and lethargy which lead to economic ruin (*cha bhogānam apāyamukhāni* : loc. cit.) discussed in great detail.

Socio-religious decline, with particular reference to the breakdown of moral values in society, is meticulously examined in the *Parābhava Sutta* (*Sn.* p. 18, *vv.* 91–115) which opens with a question put to the Buddha, on this wise :

> " About the declining man we question thee' Gotama. We have come to ask the Blessed One : What is the cause of his downfall ? "

The Buddha's reply, very succinctly put, is as follows : " He who respects the religious norms prospers. He who despises them declines (*Dhammakāmo bhavaṃ hoti dhammadessī parābhavo*: loc. cit.). Elaborating further, he says :

> " The man who is addicted to women (given to a life of debauchery), is a drunkard, a gambler, and a squanderer of his earnings—this is the cause of his downfall. "

Buddhism thus plans to arrest both social and religious decline by a careful analysis of the causes leading to such decline and adopts in this process uncompromising standards which are ultimately Nibbāna-oriented.

J.D.

DEDICATION is the act of setting apart of anything for a special object. In the religious sense dedication or consecration may be defined as the solemn setting apart of persons or things for some particular religious work or use. The essence of any such rite

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1 *Evaṃ hi tumhe pi imasmiṃ dhammavinaye vuddhiṃ virūḷhiṃ vepullaṃ āpajjissatha :* In this manner you too would progress, develop and reach maturity in the pratice of this monastic life (*M.* I, p. 124).

Ye kec'ime bījagāmabhūtagāmā vuddhiṃ virūḷhiṃ vepullaṃ pajjanti : These seeds, trees and plants that grow up, reach maturity and increase in size (*M.* I 230)

2 *Evaṃ h'etaṃ Bhaddāli hoti satthari hāyamanesu saddhammeantaradhāyamāne :* It is indeed so, Bhaddāli at a time when beings are on the decline and the true doctrine has begun to fade away (*M. I.* p. 415).

Santi sattā apparajakkhajātikā assavanatā dhammassa parihāyanti ; There are beings whose visions is less blurred, who are likely to decline in the event of not being able to listen to the doctrine (*M.* I, p. 168).

Asītiko vā navutiko vā vassasatiko vā jātiyā atha taṃhā paññāvevyattiyāparihāyati ti : As a man reaches eighty, ninety or hundred years of age (one would argue) he is likely to decline in the brilliance of his wisdom (*M.* I, p. 82).

or ceremony is to be found in the performance, whenever possible, of some act which is typical or symbolic, of that for which the setting apart or consecration takes place. This act, either from the very beginning or in process of time is naturally accompanied by some announcement in the assembly of what is being done or intended. It appears that no such accompaniments are really essential to the dedication itself, though they tend to increase the dignity of the occasion.

In Buddhism, dedication implying complete transfer of proprietary rights over an immovable property from an owner to the Order of Monks (Saṅgha) with the Buddha at its head has been first recorded in the *Mahāvagga*, (*Vin.* I, p. 39) relating to the occasion when King Seniya Bimbisāra of Magadha dedicated his pleasure park Veluvaṇa (Bamboo Grove) to the Buddha. This was the first offer of its kind made to the Buddha on his first visit to Magadha, immediately after attaining Full Enlightenment. The king foresaw the necessity of such a place for the Buddha and the Order of Monks. The ceremony of dedication on that occasion was simple. The king having taken a ceremonial water vessel made of gold, dedicated his pleasure park to the Buddha saying "May I, lord, give this pleasure park Veluvaṇa (Bamboo Grove) to the Order of Monks with the Awakened One at its head." The Lord accepted the park (*Vin.* I, p. 39). With this simple ceremony ownership was transferred from the king and was vested in the Order of Monks—a perpetuating corporate body, and the Buddha was the recipient of the donation on behalf of the Saṅgha. There is mention of another park being dedicated to the Order of Monks. This was by Ambapālī. When the Buddha visited Vesālī she invited the Buddha and the Order of Monks for a meal and after the meal was over, Ambapālī said, "I, lord, would give this Ambapālī Grove to the Order of Monks with the Awakened One at its head" (*D.* II, p. 98). The Buddha accepted the park and stayed there for some time. From this account it appears that a mere announcement of the dedication of the park was sufficient to complete the act of transferring proprietary rights and the custom of pouring water ceremonially was not followed. Jīvaka the royal physician also dedicated his Mango Grove to the Buddha and the Order of Monks (*DA.* I, p. 133)

There is little evidence of regular rites or ceremonies being in use when parks and monasteries were set apart for the use of the Buddha and the Order of Monks. Such places—parks, monasteries and caves (*leṇas*)—dedicated for the use of the Saṅgha gradually became numerous as the life of the Buddhist monk changed from that of a wandering ascetic to that of a monk in a settled religious community. Later, rites and ceremonies grew up in connection with the act of dedication—the transference of the ownership on the part of the founder–donor and the acceptance of the thing by the Buddha or by some other monk on behalf of the Order of Monks formed the essential feature of such ceremonies. When a thing is dedicated in this manner it almost created a 'trust' in that the donee accepts the thing donated for himself as well as on behalf of the other monks and all of them have a usufructuary right in the thing dedicated.

In the *Cullavagga* (*Vin.* II, p. 147) we see a further structuring of the formal act of gifting monasteries for the use of Buddhist monks. The Banker of Rājagaha (*Rājagahako seṭṭhi*), in his religious piety and dedication had sixty monastic residences built and wished to know from the Buddha how he should formally gift them to the Saṅgha. Here, the Buddha announced that the gift should be to all monks of the *four quarters* irrespective of their presence or absence on the occassion of making the offering(*āgatānāgatassa cāturddisassa saṅghassa*). *The Jātaka Nidāna* (*J.* I, p. 93), taking up this theme of gifting to the 'monks of the four quarters' elaborately describes the offering of Jetavana to the Buddha by the Banker Anāthapiṇḍika. According to this account when the Buddha entered the Jetavana monastery Anāthapiṇḍika asked the Buddha as to what procedure the latter should follow. Then the Buddha advised Anāthapiṇḍika to dedicate the monastery to the Order of Monks both present and not present there (*tena hi gahapati imaṃ vihāraṃ āgatānāgatassa bhikkhusaṅghassa dehīti*: *J.* I, p. 93). Then Anāthapiṇḍika took a ceremonial vessel made of gold, poured water on the Buddha's hands and announced, "I dedicate this Jetavana monastery to the Order of Monks, with the Buddha at its head, the Saṅgha of the four quarters, both physically present here and not" and donated the monastery. This festival connected with the dedication is said to have lasted nine months. In this ceremony not only Anāthapiṇḍika himself, but his whole family took part. His son with five-hundred other youths, his wife with five-hundred other noble women and his two daughters with five-hundred other maidens participated in the ceremony. Anāthapiṇḍika was attended by five-hundred other bankers. The festival that was held in connection with the dedication of Pubbārama by Visākhā lasted three months (*J.* I, p. 93).

During the time of Emperor Asoka, the dedication of monasteries and the festivals of dedication took an elaborate form. Thus, we find in post-canonical literature that Emperor Asoka honoured each one of the units of the Dhamma with a monastery. At the completion of the construction of 84,000 monasteries the king held the festival of dedication. On this occasion he commanded his subjects, both within and without the city, to make preparations for the festival of dedication of the monasteries by taking upon themselves the eightfold moral percepts. (*Vin A*. I, p. 49).

From dedicatory inscriptions, it appears that the formal announcement as found in the *Cullavagga* (*Vin*. II, p. 147) has set the standard phrase for subsequent occasions of dedication. Such a phrase states that the thing dedicated is for the use of the Order of Monks with the Buddha at its head : that it is for the use of the Order of Monks of the four quatrers, both present and not present on the occasion. From this it is clear that the phraseology has gradually been developed to include the entire Order of Monks without any restriction whatever of time and place. The dedicatory inscriptions at the caves (*leṇas*) dedicated for the use of the Saṅgha, invariably had followed this standard phrase (see Paranavitana, *ASCI*, Vol. I, p. cxix).

The *Samantapāsādikā* mentions the consecration of the Mahābodhi by Emperor Asoka who went there to remove its southern branch. At this moment the Mahābodhi performed a miracle and the Emperor with joy and fervour arisen within him as he beheld the miracle, said to the Order of Monks " Sirs, so am I pleased on beholding this miracle that I offer to the Mahābodhi the entire Kingdom of Jambudīpa " and consecrated and dedicated thrice, by offering the sovereignty of all Jambudīpa and sent a message through Ariṭṭha enjoining his friend King Devānampiyatissa in Sri Lanka to show like honour to the young Bodhi sapling. On the arrival of the Bodhi sapling in Sri Lanka, King Devānampiyatissa placed the Great Bodhi on the sea-shore and for three days honoured it with the sovereignty of the whole island of Tambapaṇṇi. What is meant by honouring the Bodhi with the sovereignty of the kingdom is elucidated from the account that King Devānampiyatissa entrusted duties of state to the sixteen families of noble birth who came in attendance upon the Bodhi. They took upon themselves the duties of state and the king stationed himself as the gate-keeper. Thus, it means a temporary transfer of power of government to the object consecrated (*Mhv*. xix, *vv*. 31–32, 58–59). There is also a symbolic offering of the sovereignty as when King Devānampiyatissa consecrated the eight Bodhi saplings by offering his white parasol of state to the young Bodhi trees and consecrated them (*rājā taruṇabodhi-rukkhe setacchattena pūjetvā abhisekaṃ adāsi*). When the Mahābhodhi was being brought to Sri Lanka by sea, the *nāgas* are said to have taken the Mahābodhi to their abode and fot seven days honoured it by dedicating the sovereignty of their kingdom (*Mhv*. xix, *vv*. 19–21).

King Duṭṭhagāmaṇi built several monasteries and cetiyas and dedicated them to the Order of Monks by pouring water of dedication (*dakkhiṇodakaṃ pāṭetvā : Mhv*. xxvi, *vv*. 15–18, xxvii, *v*. 46 etc.). From literary evidence it is seen that Buddhist public worhsip in Sri Lanka and in India during the early centuries centered on the relic thūpas and the Mahābodhi and its saplings. Kings vied with one another in the lavishness of the ceremonial with which these relics were first enshrined and in the magnanimity with which they dedicated themselves and what belonged to them for the cause of these sacred objects and religious institutions. Such accounts are numerous in the *Mahāvaṃsa*.

M.K.

DEDUCTION. See LOGIC.

DEFILEMENTS. The word defilements is used in Buddhist contexts to refer primarily to those factors which bring about degeneracy of the human mind and thereby make more and more remote the prospects of release from the bonds of saṃsāra. The equivalent Pali word used in these contexts is *āsava* (q.v.). Derived from *sru*—to flow, its basic meaning is 'those that flow in,' i.e., psycho-ethically damaging thoughts that find their way into the mind. This, according to the Buddhist texts, is generated by the unguarded response and reaction to sense-stimuli (*cf. cakkhundriyaṃ asaṃvutaṃ viharantaṃ abhijjhā domanassā pāpakā akusalā dhammā anvāssaveyyuṃ : M*. I, p. 346). These thoughts spring from the conflicting reactions of attraction and repulsion in relation to things of the world. These may be viewed differently as strong desires to possess such things of the world as one deems pleasant, and their converse, the desire to reject their opposites and the consequent states of mental restlessness, the totality of which is often termed *abhijjhādomanassā*. It is under this name that those inflowing defiling thoughts are referred to. They are also *akusala* or unwholesome, in that they contradict or negate the wholesome aspects which constitute the aspirations of the religious life.

In the attainment of the religious goal of arahantship these defilements are completely got rid of, for an arahant is referred to as one who has eradicated them: *khīṇāsava* (See also *M*. III, p. 20 : *anupādāya āsavehi cittāni vimucciṃsūti*). This achievement is described as being the result of the maturing of wisdom at the stage of reaching arahantship (*paññāya c'assa disvā āsavā parikkhīṇā honti : M*. I, p. 160). This eliminates what is within and arrests a further inflow from without of causes of decay and degeneration. The *PED*. puts this very succintly where it says : "Freedom from the '*Āsavas*' constitutes Arahantship, and the fight for the extinction of these *āsavas* forms one of the main duties of man (s.v. ĀSAVA)."

These primary defilements or *āsava* are viewed as coming under three major categories : 1. Those that are generated through attachment to sense pleasures (*kāmāsava*), 2. Those that are the result of the desire to continue in the saṃsāric process (*bhavāsava*), and 3. Those that are the manifestation of the ignorance with regard to the true nature of existence (*avijjāsava*). Final emancipation is described as the liberation of the mind of these three *āsavas* (*M*. I, p. 23). A fourth category designated as adherence to the dogmatic view of a lasting and enduring self (*diṭṭhāsava*) is sometimes found added to the above (See *D*. II, pp. 81, 84, etc. see further *Ps*. I, p. 94 where *diṭṭhāsava* is listed as the first of the *āsavas* to be got rid of at the initial stage of *sotāpatti*). The *Visuddhimagga* (p. 683) takes all these four together (*Kāmarāgabhavarāga-micchādiṭṭhi-avijjānaṃ*) and says that they are called *āsava* because they generate or out of them flows suffering which is characteristic of the saṃsāric process : *saṃsāradukkhassavāsavanato*.

Another term used in the Buddhist texts to denote agents of defilement is *kilesa* or *upakkilesa*. The verbal form of this (*kilissati*) has the basic meaning of 'being tainted.' This stands in opposition to the verb *sujjhati* (or *visujjhati*) which means 'becomes pure'. Thus *kilesa* is the characteristic of saṃsāra while *suddhi* or *visuddhi* stands for release in *Nirvāṇa* (*esa maggo visuddhiyā : Dhp. v*. 277 f.). *Kilesas* too, as do the *āsavas*, assail the mind, corroding and contaminating it. Therefore, a wise man purges himself of those *kilesas* which defile his mind (*pariyodāpeyya attānam cittakilesehi paṇḍito :S. V*. p. 24 ; *A*. V, p. 232 ; *Dhp v*. 88). Speaking of the perfectibility of the human mind or its ultimate total liberation, the Buddhist texts say that at the saṃsāric level, the mind is the victim of invading defilements which assail it from without (*Pabhassaraṃ idaṃ bhikkhave cittaṃ tañ ca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭhaṃ* (*A*. I, p. 10).

A saṃsāric being thus appears to be in the grip of these *kilesas* from birth to death, to a greater or lesser degree. According to the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, the opposites of all the eight items of the *aṭṭhaṅgika-magga*, which is the way to Nibbāna (e.g., *micchā-diṭṭhi* against *sammādiṭṭhi* and *micchājīva* against *sammājīva*) seem to generate *kilesas* of their own (referred to as *tadanuvattakakilesa : Ps*. I, p. 69 ff.). The first effective onslaught on these begins with the attainment of the state of *sotāpatti* at which the acquisition of *sammādiṭṭhi* helps in the elimination of *kilesas* connected with *micchādiṭṭhi* (loc. cit.). Through a graduated process of elimination a whole host of *kilesas* are got rid of through the states of *sakadāgāmi* and *anāgāmi*. Finally, through *sammā samādhi* of the *arahattamagga*, *kilesas* associated with the five *uddhambhāgiya saṃyojanas* or fetters that are linked with the higher levels of saṃsāric involvement are totally eliminated.

It seems logical to reckon with *lobha*, *dosa*, *moha* (greed, hatred and delusion) also in the category of defilements, for they are introduced in Buddhist texts as the fountain head of all evil qualities that mar human character (*akusala-mūlāni : M*. I, p. 47) and lead man down to decline and degradation (*apāya, vinipāta, niraya*), here and hereafter.

In addition to the defilements discussed so far (*āsava, kilesa* and *akusala*) which may be referred to as being religio-ethical in that they are primarily linked with the problem of *dukkha*, saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa, we also discover Buddhist texts taking note of a whole host of human weaknesses which defile character and impair social and economic well-being. These come more within the socio-ethical sphere and are grouped under the general term *mala*. However, the term *mala* is also used to refer to what thwarts the path to Nirvāṇa. It is in this sense that the *Malavagga* of the *Dhammapada*, a special section of the text devoted to the study of defilements or taints, refers to *avijjā* or ignorance as the greatest taint or worst *mala* ; *avijjā paramaṃ malaṃ* (*Dhp. v*. 243). It also says that he who has purged himself of *mala* or taint does not come to be born again : *niddhantamalo anaṅgaṇo na puna jāti-jaraṃ upehisi* (ibid. *v*. 238).

It is interesting to take note of the diversity of nature of the defilements which belong more to the social sphere than to the religious. Mention is made, for instance, of blemishes in the moral character, as damaging the reputation of woman (*malitthiyā*

duccaritaṃ : Dhp. v. 242). The failure of a watchman to keep vigil (*pamādo rakkhato malaṃ :* loc. cit) is referred to as a defilement which would spell disaster to him. Among other weaknesses which are stigmatised and are looked down upon as stains (*mala*) on character are lack of initiative and enterprise which would be productive of economic well-being among those who live the household life (*anuṭṭhānamalā gharā :* loc cit.) and sluggishness and apathy which would mar one's personal reputation (*malaṃ vaṇṇassa kosajjam :* loc. cit.).

J. D.

DEIFICATION, The process of elevating a human being to the status of a deity (See DEVA and DEVATĀ) or divinity (See DIVINE AND DIVINITY), or investing an inanimate object or abstract idea with divine qualities and attributes. What then are the characteristics of a deity or divinity? It is primarily the power and potency (*iddhi*) with which persons or things come to be endowed by means of which they are capable of doing many things which are above and beyond the capacity of man. The object of this article is to give a general and brief account of deification of abstract ideas, objects of natural phenomena etc. as reflected in Buddhism. Textual evidence shows that early Theravāda Buddhism accepted some of the important gods of the Vedic pantheon and, also, a few others who may be regarded as gods of the common folk. This is evident from the lists of gods found in the *Āṭānāṭiya Sutta* (*D.* III, p. 194ff) and in the *Mahāsamaya Sutta* (*D.* II, p. 253ff). In the *Mahāsamaya Sutta* sixty kinds of gods are enumerated among whom are a number of Vedic gods and also a host of non-Vedic gods. Belief in the gods of Tusita heaven, of the heaven of the thirty-three gods (*tāvatiṃsa-devaloka*), which is also regarded as the heaven of the thirty-three gods of Vedic pantheon, and numerous other divine spheres is admitted (see *M.* I, p. 289).

There is hardly any evidence to show fresh deification of abstract ideas etc. in the period of early Theravāda Buddhism. What is evident is the remodelling of early gods to suit Buddhist ethics. The Vedic gods who were adopted by Buddhism were made to appear in Buddhist garb, thus making them subject to the law of saṃsāra (*A.* I. p. 144). They are made subordinate to the Buddha and also to his eminent desciples. They are humanised and made to possess human weaknesses (*A.* I, p. 144 ; *S.* I. p. 219). This remodelling, to some extent, made the Vedic gods appear as new gods in Buddhism. The case of Sakka is a striking example of this remodelling. Sakka is undoubtedly a development of Indra with more emphasis on the moral and ethical side of his character which are not quite prominent in his character as represented in the *Ṛgveda*.[1] It appears that, sometimes, epithets and attributes of important gods are personified, resulting in the emergence of new deities. For example, consider the case of Vajirapāṇi. Vajirapāṇi is an epithet of Sakka and also of Indra, but later made into a separate god. However, such instances are extremely rare.

After the demise of the Buddha, the process of deification takes a new direction and dimension. There were attempts, during the time of the Buddha himself, to make Buddha a super-human being. With the death of the Buddha these attempts gained more importance and also received more impetus (see further BUDDHOLOGY). These attempts being intensified, later led to the deification of the Buddha himself. In Mahāyāna Buddhism the character of the Buddha lost most of its human qualities and assumed the features of a saviour. Besides deifying the Buddha, numerous epithets, characteristic features and virtues of the Buddha were personified as Buddhas and bodhisattvas, who in form are more like gods than human Buddhas and bodhisattvas. In the Mahāyāna, the Buddha himself is no more than a humanised aspect of a divine concept. Avalokiteśvara, Samantabhadra, Mañjuśrī are all closer to gods than to human bodhisattvas. The Buddha Amita, another important creation of the Mahāyānists, gradually assumed all the characteristics of a full-fledged, all-powerful saviour-god. Even the Ādi-Buddha (*EB.* I, p. 213 ff.), a concept that rose as a result of an attempt to express the oneness of saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa, is very much like the supreme god-creator in form. All the Buddhas who were later grouped together as Dhyānibuddhas (q. v.), too, bear closer resemblance to gods than to human Buddhas. Though these numerous creations of the Mahāyānists have all the essential features of deities, they are not considered to be deities in the precise sense of the word. Inspite of the fact that Mahāyāna Buddhism admits a larger number of gods than the Hinayāna, cases of deification that could be attributed to Mahāyānism are not numerous.

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1 But compare *Dialogues of the Buddha* (II, pp. 297 f.) in which Rhys Davids suggests that Sakka and Indra are independent conceptions' Malalasekara, too, agrees with this view (*DPPN.* II, p. 965). But C. Godage in his unpublished dissertation, entitled the Place of Indra in Early Buddhism submitted for the M.A. degree of the University of Ceylon)(1944) puts forward a considerable amount of evidence which suggests that the concept of Sakka is a development of Indra concept.

The goddess Tāra presents one example of deification of an abstract idea in Mahāyāna. She presents the deified form of the abstract idea of "crossing over" the ocean of saṃsāra. This goddess gradually became one of the most important goddesses of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Not only abstract ideas, but even Mahāyāna texts were deified. One such case is the deification of the important Mahāyāna text, called *Prajñāpāramitā*, under the same name.

Yet another striking example in this connection is the deification of the earth into a goddess whose origin is inseparably connected with the earth-touching gesture of the Buddha. Most probably, the earliest reference to the earth-touching gesture (*bhūmisparśamudrā q. v.*) of the Buddha Sākyamuni is found in the *Mahāvastu* (II, p. 282). There it is said that the bodhisattva, when challenged by the Evil One (Māra), summons the earth to bear witness for the great sacrifices he had made. When the bodhisattva stroked the earth thrice, the earth is said to have roared and echoed deeply, just as when a big bowl of brass is struck with a slab of rock in a mountain cavern. In the *Jātaka Nidānakathā*, the incident is slightly more developed. There it is said that the great earth roared, saying as it were, "I am witness to thee of that" (see Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Birth Stories*, Broadway tr., pp. 195-6). A further development is seen in the *Lalitavistara* (p. 232 f.). There it is said that the earth as soon as touched by the bodhisattva trembled in six different ways. At that moment the great earth goddess called Sthāvarā (*Sthāvarā-nāmā-mahā-pṛthivīdevatā*), surrounded by thousands of other earth goddesses, showed half of her body, by splitting the earth, and began to praise the bodhisattva. After that she threatened the Māra and his host and displayed her various powers and disappeared again. The concept of the Vedic earth goddess may have influenced the Mahāyāna Buddhist writers. Yet this, as it is obvious from the different stages of development, is a deification that could be attributed to Mahāyāna Buddhism.

With the development of Vajrayāna, deification became a common feature. Deification of concepts, objects of natural phenomena, manufactured objects etc. were carried out with a view to popularise the Vajrayāna teachings.

However, in the early period of the development of Vajrayāna, deification was regarded as a result of an eleborate psychic process. Accounts in early Tāntric texts, also show that deification is inseparably connected with the *śūnya* concept. Thus, the *Advayavajrasaṅgraha* (p. 50) says, all deities are manifestations of *śūnya*, and therefore, are by nature non-existent. In another place in the same text (p. 51) it is said that, from the right perception of *śūnya* proceeds the germ syllable; from the germ syllable proceeds the conception of an icon and from the icon its external manifestation. Therefore, the whole process is one of dependent origination.

The disciple (*adhikārin*) who seeks to visualise a deity is called bodhisattva or *jīvātman* (individual soul); his mind is referred to as the *bodhicitta* (thought of enlightenment); the universal soul is referred to as *śūnya*. The desire (*bhāvanā*) of the disciple which is of the nature of a psychic process is said to react upon *śūnya* and gives rise to different manifestations in forms of deities. The nature of the reaction is illimitable and, therefore, manifestations are also of illimitable variety, for, it differs according to the object for which the disciple sits in meditation.

The mass scale deification found in Tantrism is due to reasons which are circumstantial and otherwise. It was pointed out that one of its objects was to popularize Vajrayāna teachings. Another object seems to have been to create new gods who were made to appear superior to Hindu gods. Harihariharivāhanodbhava, a form of Avalokiteśvara, is the result of this hostility to Hindu gods. Harihariharivāhanobdhava is represented as having Viṣṇu as his mount (*vāhana*). Trailokavijaya, another popular tantric god, is represented as trampling Śiva and Gauri. Another such deity is Vighnāntaka, a god created for the sole purpose of defeating Gaṇeśa who is also referred to as Vighna. For this same purpose, another goddess was created by the rich imagination of the Tantrists. She is Aparājitā who is represented as trampling upon Gaṇeśa, and one of her epithets (*Gaṇapatisamakrāntā* (one who tramples Gaṇapati) reveals how she gained a place in this Vajrayāna pantheon.

Tantrists seems to have revelled in deifying whatever attracted their attention. Thus, they deified the vowels and consonants and represented them in the form of a god and a goddess called Āli and Kāli, respectively. They grouped together the seed-letters (*bīja*) of Mañjuśrī (*a*), Sūryaprabha (*ra*), Candraprabha (*pa*), Keśinī (*ca*) and Upakeśinī (*na*) and evolved a new god under the name Arapacana. In appearance most of these gods and goddesses resembled each other, except for some minor differences.

To widen the pantheon they brought about numerous forms of the same god with only minor

differences among those forms. Thus, there are a number of forms of Hevajra, Nairātmā, Kurukullā and Kṛṣṇayamāri. Very often it is due to the difference in colour or number of arms and faces that these forms are separately deified.

Various meditations explained in the *sādhanas* left much room for imagination on the part of the worshippers. Being given an impetus by these, the imagination of the Tantrist devotees ran riot. They went on deifying all imaginable things. Thus, they even deified Tantric texts. Deification of religious texts is not new to Buddhism for, it was shown that the *Prajñāpāramitā* texts were deified during the period of Mahāyāna Buddhism. The Tantrists, probably following this example, deified the *Nāmasaṅgīti* literature under the same name. Not content with this, they deified the text called *Mahāmāyūrī* and, also, twelve dhāraṇīs, each under the particular name. These gods and goddesses, too, were, given colours, ornaments, weapons and even different *mudrās*.

The Tantrists added ten gods o th ir panth by creating gods of direction. They also, created six goddesses of direction. If the names Puṣpā, Dhūpā, Dīpā and Gandhā are added to the list of six goddesses of direction they will appear as the counterparts of gods of direction. The five protectresses (*pañca-rakṣā-devatā*) are, most probably the result of the deification of a set of magic formulae. There are a number of groups of gods and goddesses such as the eight *Uṣṇīṣā*-gods and the eight Gaurī goddesses whose origins are not clear. They may be products of the imagination of the Tantrists, their shape and appearence being based on other popular gods and goddesses.

Even the musical instruments such as flute (*vaṃśa*), lute (*vīnā*), kettle-drum (*mukunda*), tambourine (*muraja*) were deified under the same names and given the shape of goddesses. Two forms of dancing *lāsya* and *nṛtya* and also song (*gīta*) and garland (*mālā* or *mālyā*) are deified and represented as four goddesses under the names Lāsyā, Nṛtyā, Gitā and Mālā or Mālyā.

Luminous bodies such as the sun, the moon, the stars and even lightning were deified under new names, Sūryahastā, Dīpā, Ratnolkā and Taḍitkarā. They are represented as four different goddesses each holding the disc of the sun, a torch, a jewel and lightining.

The pantheon was increased by the addition of four animal-faced goddesses called Hayāsyā, Śukrāsyā, Śrāsyā, Śvānāsyā and Siṃhāsyā whose origins are not clear. They are, most probably, fanciful creations of the Vajrayānists who seem to have attempted to add to the pantheon new gods with unusual forms.

The Vajrayānists were yet not satisfied with the large number of new gods added to their pantheon. Their urge for deification compelled them to search for other concepts, objects etc. that could be deified. They were attracted by the ten *pāramitās* (perfection) which they increase to twelve by adding *Ratnapāramitā* and *Vajrakarmapāramitā*. These were conceived as twelve goddesses with different forms, colours, symbols etc. Mahāyāna Buddhism speaks of ten special powers, referred to as *vasitā*, of a spiritually advanced bodhisattva. The Vajrayānists added *tathatā-vasitā* and *buddhabodhiprabhāvasitā* to these ten and deified all the twelve *vasitās* into goddesses.

The Vajrayanists accepted twelve stages to Buddhahood (*bodhisattva-bhūmi*) which were also deified by them and given the forms of goddesses In this manner all things that attracted their attention were deified and includled in their pantheon which strongly appealed to the masses. Effect of this mass scale deification was strongly felt in Tibet where Tantric Buddhism gained ground. They did not remain content with the Vajrayāna pantheon. They created new gods who were regarded as Dharmapālas or defenders of Buddhsim. They went a step further than the Indian Tantrists and deified even historical personages such as Nāgārjuna, Padmasambhava, Tson-k'a-pa and Mila-ras-pa. Even imposing mountains such as Kanchinjunga were deified. The deified form of this particular mountain was known under the same name and was represented after the style of the god of wealth. Even dead heroes seem to have been raised to the rank of gods (see L. A. Waddell, *Lamaism* Cambridge, 1939).

Adoration of the female principle, introduced into Buddhism with the deification of the concept of 'crossing over', in the form of Tārā, paved the way for numerous other goddesses to appear. This was given further incentive by the introduction of the concept of Śakti. The idea of Śakti is quite old and could be traced to the *Rgveda*. The belief in the idea of Śakti made it quite necessary that each god should have a female partner and this

2 The gods of direction were commonly found in Purānic and Hindu Tantric literature. The Buddhist gods of direction are, very probably, imitations of these Purānic and Hindu gods.

caused the number of goddesses in the pantheon to be increased. A popular belief in Tibet that a god, was more disposed to listen to and grant their requests when worshipped in the company of his Śakti, too, seems to have favoured this development. The Śakti is normally modelled on the god to whom the Śakti is assigned. Thus, Buddhaḍākinī, śakti of Mahāmāyā, a form of Hevajra, has the same appearance and symbols of Mahāmāyā By evolving, in this manner, female deities out of male deities Tantrists added numerous new goddesses to their already thickly populated panthoon[3] (See also DEVA and ŚAKTI.

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DELIGHT, state of great pleasure, and satisfaction. According to Buddhism this could be of two kinds as sensual (*sāmisa*) and super-sensual (*nirāmisa*, i.e., non-sensual). Enjoyment of pleasures by the worldlings by way of gratifying the needs of their sense-organs is the sensual variety, which can be further distinguished into two types as the ordinary type of sensual delight that prolongs saṃsāric sojourning and the morally harmless though sensual variety as that experienced by witnessing a beatuiful scenery etc. Any kind of (aesthetic) delight (*sukha*) unsullied by sensual defilement and is free from unskilled state of mind (*sukhaṃ aññatra eva kāmehi aññatra eva akusalehi dhammehi : M*. I, p. 247), comes within this category.

Far superior to both these is the super-sensual or transcendental kind of delight experienced by those who have conquered the ego and become enlightened and released.

Buddhism regards all forms of sensual delight tainted with greed or *rāga* etc., (*kāma:* as leading of misery as they strengthen the bonds of saṃsāra. A succint statement of its attitude to the problem of wordly delight is found in the *Majhima* (*M*. I, p. 65) and the *Saṃyutta Nikāyas* (*S*. II p. 170). The *Majhima Nikāya* passage says that there are five forms of sensual delight to be experienced by eye, ear, nose, tongue and body as sight, sound, smell, taste and touch respectively. These varieties of sensual delight (*pañca kāmaguṇā*) are described as agreeable (*iṭṭha*), pleasant (*kanta*), pleasing (*manāpa*), attractive (*piyarūpa*) and alluring (*rajaniya*). Diverse forms of pleasure and satisfaction (*sukhaṃ somanassaṃ*) obtained through any of the five channels aforementioned are what is meant by sensual delight in the present context. As feelings (*vedanā*) they are a part of man's perceptual process and through craving (*taṇhā*) which invariably follows they become a fetter that binds beings to saṃsāra. For this same reason the world is described as being ensnared or enslaved by *nandī* or delight in things. (*nandī- saṃyojana : Sn. v.* 1109).

The significant point in the explanation found in the text is that all these forms of delight are inevitably followed by unpleasant consequences (*ādīnava*) because they lead to repeated births and hence to all forms of suffering involved in life (described at *M*. I, p. 85 f.). Therefore one should renounce such danger-infested temporary delights and work out one's escape (*nissaraṇa*) from them into the state of unfailing delight known as Nibbāna. This has to be achieved by realising the true nature of sensual delights as they really are. It is this saving knowledge that leads to true delight referred to as *pītisukha* (*M*. I, p. 91) and described as " transcending all forms of lustful delight and related unskilled mental states " (*aññatra eva kāmehi aññatra akusalehi dhammehi :* loc. cit.).

The general difference in attitude towards the world between a released saint and worldling, as explained earlier is displayed particularly in regard to the experience of aesthetic delight. Saints are capable of 'enjoying' without the least tinge of selfish attachment (*Vītarāgā ramissanti na te kāma gavesino : Dhp. v.* 99). Their finding delight in the

3 Buddhist Tantrists attempted to arrange their pantheon according to some pattern by regarding these numerous gods as emanations of the five Dhyānibuddhas. But they seem to have failed in their attempt, for, certain gods who are cited as emanations of a particular Dhyānibuddha in one text, are cited in another text as emanations of a different Dhyānibuddha.

emancipation they have achieved (*vimutti-rasa : A.* I, p. 36) is, in general, the 'delight' *par excellence* in this super-sensual sense. Just as the ocean has but one taste, the taste of salt, the Buddha's doctrine and discipline also has but one flavour, the flavour of emancipation (*vimutti-rasa : A.* IV, p. 203), seeing which the bhikkhu delights himself (*abhiramati*) therein. Accordingly, Nibbāna is called the highest bliss (*parama-sukha : Dhp. v.* 204).

Coming to the worldly level, it is well-known that the Buddha and some of the arahants did considerably appreciate beauty of nature. While the Buddha's great liking for the open-air life in parks and forests also reveals this fact, the *Theragāthā* are a testimony to the manner in which the early arahants found delight in this kind of scenic beauty.

A more transcendent kind of delight is experienced by the disciples in the comprehension of Truth. (*ramma dhammaṃ vipassato : Thag. v.* 1071). It is not the mere contemplation on a philosophical truth, but the gradual understanding resulting from meditation and mental development. For the person who has undertaken to tread the path of release taught in Buddhism every step would bring this type of delight. As a philosophy that leads to freedom from all suffering the Buddha's teaching is a source of great delight to its followers. Thus, in a sutta in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*A.* IV. p. 200 ff.) the Buddha indicates eight wonderous marvels or unique qualities (*acchariya abbhuta dhamma*) in the religious training (*dhamma-vinaya*) taught by him owing to which bhikkhus find unceasing delight (*abhiramati*) as they pursue the religious life therein.

It is the same idea that is expressed in the *Dhammapada* (*v.* 79) which says that the wise man ever delights in the doctrine made known by the worthy ones (*ariyappavedite dhamme sadā ramati paṇḍito*). Once the Truth begins to dawn on him "the pure man finds delight in the Buddha's teaching (*sāsane ramati suci : Vin.* I, p. 197). Even the mere contemplation of these ultimate Truths is delightful, for their beauty, unlike the physical beauty of worldly phenomena, never decays. "The Doctrine of the virtuous never ages" (*sataṃ ca dhammo na jaraṃ upeti : Dhp. v.* 151).

Delight in solitude is very often found favourably mentioned in Buddhist literature. Solitude as a characteristic of the detached and secluded life has a philosophical basis in that sense and was often engaged in by the Buddha and his disciples. Once when the Buddha was finding delight in such solitude, a brahmin wanted to know as to why he was staying all alone in a forest. The Buddha replied that as he was free from all lust and grief (*nibbanatho visallo*) he was finding delight in solitude (*eko rame*) having given up all discontent (*aratiṃ vippahāya*). The brahmin congratulated the Buddha for his attitude (*S.* I, p. 180).

This kind of solitude also includes the Buddhist concepts of renunciation (*nekkhamma*), peace (*upasama*) etc. (*Sn. vv*, 41, 59, 270, 642, 956). So long as one does not allow these sources of delight to ensnare him and hold him in bondage he is free to rise above the gross and coarse pleasures of day-to-day experience and ascend to the higher planes of aesthetic experience.

Viewed from a different angle it is the purified mind that can find true delight. The mind of the saint that has achieved perfect purity (*parama-visuddhi*) experiences perfect delight. Moral behaviour leading to the abandonment of all defilements leads the mind to a state of true delight. Accordingly, it is stated (*D.* I, p. 196) that by following the saving doctrine preached by the Buddha one's evil dispositions (*saṃkilesika-dhamma*) would disappear and the purificatory tendencies (*vodāniyā dhammā*) would increase leading ultimately to the perfection of wisdom (*paññā-paripūri*) in which condition one experiences true delight (*pāmujja, pīti*).

This is truly epitomised in the words of Thera Mahākassapa whose expression of ecstacy runs as follows :

Na pañcaṅgikena turiyena rati me hoti tādisi
Yathā ekaggacittassa sammā dhammam vipassato

(*Thag. V.* 1071)

For that which brings me exquisite delight
Is not the strains of string and pipe and drum,
But when, with intellect well poised, intent, I gain
the perfect vision of the Norm

(*Psalms of the Brethren v.* 1071)

A. G. S. K.

DELIVERANCE is derived from the Latin *liberare* meaning to set free. This term is often used to render into English such Pali words as *mutti*,

vimutti, *mokkha* and *vimokkha* all derived from the root *muc* which also means to set free. The prefix *vi* in Pali, parallel of Latin *de*, adds the sense of from, away from. When used as the English rendering of the above mentioned Pali words the term deliverance acquires the religious connotation, i. e. deliverance from the vortex of life and death. At times terms such as emancipation, freedom, liberation, release and salvation are also used in place of deliverance.

Deliverance, in the sense of salvation, is the common aspiration of all religions, though the content of the conception differs from one another. In the history of Indian religious thought incipient traces of the idea of deliverance is found in the Varuṇa cult of the *Ṛgveda*. Varuṇa is the ethical god of the *Ṛgveda* who binds sinners with his fetters. The *Ṛgveda* contains many hymns echoing the humble requests of the penitent supplicants pleading with Varuṇa to release them from his bonds. Yet, the deliverance from Varuṇa's bonds was not the final aspiration of the Ṛgvedic Aryans, but the continuity of life hereafter.

The Ṛgvedic Aryans did not regard death as the end of beings. Though they had no clear idea about deliverance their aspiration was to reach the kingdom of Yama where, according to them, the departed one's attained "immortality" (*amṛtatavm*) or longevity. Subsequent to the development of ethical and moral ideas this aspiration became correlated to the concept of morality. This gave rise to the belief that the virtuous ones gained deliverance by reaching heaven while the evil doers were cast into a dark abyss (*Ṛgveda*. v, 132. 4;- ix, 73. 8 ; x, 152. 4).

With the development of eschatological ideas this simple aspiration got crystallised into a clear concept, and by the time of the *Brāhmaṇas* it came to be accepted that the future life of every being is moulded by his actions in the present life (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, vi, 2, 2, 27). The *Brahmaṇas* described the virtuous ones as those who performed sacrifices, and consequently sacrifice became the sole means of attaining heaven or a happy birth which appear to be the goal aspired by all.

It is during the early Upaniṣadic period that the idea of deliverance acquired the meaning it connotes in Jainism, Buddhism etc. The *Upaniṣads* viewed samsâric existence as a loathsome state that had to be got rid of. Therefore, the sole aim of the Upaniṣadic teachings was directed at the attainment of deliverance from this samsâric existance While rejecting the Brāhmaṇic teachings concerning deliverance the *Upaniṣads* put forward a different view emphasising the acquisition of intuitive knowledge which they considered as efficacious in bringing about deliverance through the union of *ātman* and *brahman*.

The view that sarpsāric existence is futile and loathsome was common to all religions prevalent in India during the sixth century and as such their common aspiration was to attain deliverance from this unsatisfactory existence. Unlike in the Brāhmaṇic period the ideal was not to secure a comfortable rebirth but to escape from the vortex of life and death.

Though this aspiration of attaining deliverance was common to all religions, they differed with regard to the means adopted to fulfil this aspiration. As already pointed out the Vedic tradition put forward a number of means which it considered capable of bringing about one's deliverance. Besides relying on the efficacy of the sacrifice it also considered deliverance as possible by (*a*) one's metaphysical beliefs, (*b*) reliance on scriptures and (*c*) knowledge. Of the non-Vedic religious groups some pinned their faith on self-mortification (*attakilamathānuyoga*) while others relied on complete indulgence in the enjoyment of sensual pleasures (*kāmasukhallikānuyoga*).

Buddhism rejected all these means. In his first discourse itself the Buddha denounced the two extreme paths, viz., *attakilamathānuyoga* and *kāmasukhallikānuyoga* (*Vin*. I, p. 10). Similarly he condemned elaborate sacrifices as a waste of wealth and life (*D*. I, p. 139 ff.). He did not accept the view that deliverance could be attained by speculative beliefs (*diṭṭhi*), through reliance on scriptures (*suti*) or knowledge as understood by the Vedic tradition (*ñāṇa* : *Sn*. *v*. 839 ; cf. *v*. 1078). The Buddha adopting a more realistic approach to the problem of saṃsāric existence and emphasising introspection as opposed to mere vows and ceremonies (*sīlabbata*), evolved a new path to deliverance.

Dealing with this problem in his first discourse, the Buddha declared that saṃsāric existence is full of *dukkha* (unsatisfactoriness). He pointed out that all conditioned things are impermanent (*anicca*), subject to "suffering" (*dukkha*) and without a permanent entity (*anatta* : *S*. V, p. 420 f.). He even went so far as to declare that there was no true escape from *dukkha* or unsatisfactoriness of life unless one went beyond the world, hastening at the same time to equate the term world here

with the phenomenon of existence of each individual (*S.* I, p. 62). The Buddha's noble quest (*ariyapariyesana*) was to find a means to put an end to this "suffering" (*dukkhakkhaya*), which according to him is true deliverance (*vimutti*). All his teaching is meant to show the path to deliverance (*vimuttimagga*). After being successful in his noble quest the Buddha declared that "Formerly as well as now, monks, I make known only suffering (*dukkha*) and cessation of suffering (*dukkha nirodha : M.* I, p. 140). He declared also, that his doctrine and discipline has only one taste and that is the taste of deliverance (*vimuttirasa Vin.* II, p. 239; *Ud.* p. 56). As such the conception of deliverance could be regarded as the *raison d' etre* of Buddhism.

An earnest aspiration for deliverance arises only when one realises that one is in bondage, or in other words that one is bound by numerous fetters (*saṃyojana, bandhana*) to this vortex of life and death which begets 'suffering'. This realisation is possible only if one is able to view things as they are (*yathābhūtaṃ*). But, due to ignorance one is unable to see the true nature of existence (*S.* II, p. 4; IV, p. 256; V, p. 429). One's viewpoint is normally coloured by greed, desire or lust (*rāga, lobha, chanda*), hatred (*dosa*), and delusion (*moha*). Therefore, one fails to see existence as suffering and, also, that one is in bondage. There are ten fetters that bind beings to saṃsāric existence. They are i. belief in a personal entity (*sakkāya-diṭṭhi*), ii. sceptical doubt (*vicikicchā*), iii. clinging to mere vows and ceremonies (*sīlabbataparāmāsa*), iv. sensuous craving (*kāma-rāga*), v. ill-will (*vyāpāda*), vi. craving for material existence (*rūparāga*), vii. craving for immaterial existence (*arūpa-rāga*), viii. conceit (*māna*), ix. vanity (*uddhacca*), x. ignorance (*avijjā*). The first five of these are called lower fetters (*orambhāgiyasaṃyojana*) as they tie beings to the sensuous world (*kāma-loka*). The latter five are called the higher fetters (*uddhambhāgiya-s°*) as they bind beings to the higher world (*D.* I, p. 156 ; *M.* I, p. 432 ; *A.* I, p. 232 f. ; II, p. 5; V, p. 17). Due to one's perverted views one gets more and more bound with these fetters and get accustomed to either of the two views, viz., view of becoming (*bhavadiṭṭhi*) or view of non-becoming (*vibhava-diṭṭhi : M.* I, p. 65 ; cf. *M.* I, p. 486 ; *Ud.* p. 33 ; *It.* pp. 43–44).

To see the truth one has to destroy ignorance (*avijjā*) and develop intuitive knowledge (*paññā*). This is possible only through the Middle Path (*Majjhimā paṭipadā*) also called the Noble Eightfold Path (*Ariya-aṭṭhaṅgikamagga*). This Path helps to perfect one's ethical conduct (*sīla*), mental concentration (*samādhi*) and intuitive knowledge (*paññā*) which enables one to understand the nature of reality as pertaining to man and his place in the universe. With the perfection of intuitive knowledge one is able to verify the Four Noble Truths, viz., existence of *dukkha*, arising of *dukkha*, cessation of *dukkha* and the way leading to the cessation of *dukkha* and, "As he thus knows and sees, his mind is delivered (*vimuccati*) of the inflowing impulses of sensuous gratification (*kāmāsava*), of becoming (*bhavāsava*) and of ignorance (*avijjāsava*). On deliverance the knowledge arises : there is deliverance (*vimuttasmiṃ vimuttaṃ iti ñāṇaṃ hoti*) and he comprehends that destroyed is birth, brought to a close is the holy-life, done is what was to be done, there is no more being such and so" (*M.* I, p. 139).

This knowledge leading to deliverance is gained as the culmination of a gradual process of discipline (*M.* I, pp. 479, 480).[1] The texts suggest that every one did not gain deliverance in the same manner (*S.* I, p. 181). Some were delivered in two ways (*ubhatobhāgavimutta*), i.e., deliverance of mind (*cetovimutti*) and deliverance through knowledge (*paññāvimutti*). It his hinted that this is due to the difference in their faculties (*indriyavemattatā : M.* I, p. 437).

Irrespective of the manner in which it is reached, deliverance is attained with the cessation of suffering (*dukkhakkhaya*), or in other words with the complete severing of the bonds that tie one to this saṃsāric existence (*S. IV.*, p. 251 ; if *D.* I, p. 73 ; *M.* I., p. 276). Of the numerous bonds the most palpable is the bond af craving *taṇhāsaṃyojana* or *rāga* : *It.* p. 8). That is why detachment (*virāga*) is said to be the means of attaining deliverance (*S. II*, pp. 30, 95).

So the Buddha has said, "O bhikkhus, whatever may be things conditioned or unconditioned, among them detachment (*virāga*) is the highest. That is to say, freedom from conceit, quenching of thirst, the uprooting of attachment, the cutting off of continuity, the destruction of craving (*taṇhakkhaya*), detachment (*virāga*), cessation, Nibbāna." *A.* II, p. 34). Nibbāna (Skt. *Nirvāṇa*) is the common appellation connoting this deliverance which in other words is the cessation of continuity and becoming (*bhavanirodha : S.* II, p. 117). The realization of Nibbāna is the sole aspiration of the

1 Regarding the emergence of a different view relating to this, see *Kathāvatthu* (*Kvu.* I, p. 212 ff.). See also A. K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism*, India, 1970, pp. 295–296.)

Buddhist and it has to be realized personally by the wise. The Buddha merely showed the way by teaching only whatever is conducive to the full realization of Nibbāna (*M.* I, p. 431 ; cf. *S.* III, p. 189).

Nibbāna is not a state to be realized after death. The attainment of arahantship which one does while yet alive is the same as the realization of Nibbāna (cf. *Jivanmukti* of the Vedānta). This is deliverance from the vortex of life and death, as taught in early Buddhism or Theravāda.

Inspite of the metaphysical approach of the Mahāyānists their conception of deliverance is basically not different from that of the Therāvadins. Developing, perhaps, such Theravāda tachings as the one found in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (I, p. 62) which says that suffering as well cessation of suffering is found in this fathom-long body, the Mādhyamikas identified saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa. They pointed out that Nirvāṇa as the Absolute is the only real which, when viewed through empirical modes such as logic, reasoning and deduction appear as the phenomenal world–the saṃsāra. The Mādhyamikas stressed the fact that the saṃsāric process is the result of imagination (*kalpanā*) and views (*diṭṭhi*) both of which are bonds. Thus, according to the Mādhyamika teachings deliverance is attained by the destruction of these bondages (*Mdhvt.* iii, *v.* 5). According to the Vijñānavāda teachings deliverance from the saṃsāric process is to be obtained only by stopping the unmanifested instincts of imagination (*abhūtaparikalpavāsanā-vaicitranirodha*).

The concept of deliverance in Tantrism was influenced by both Mādhyamika and Vijñānavāda ideas. According to Tantrism deliverance is attainable by the realization of the Truth throuhg wisdom (*prajñā*), and esoteric rites are means of gaining this realization.

A very noticeable change in the concept of deliverance is found in later Mahāyāna Buddhism. It is quite clear that the early Theravāda taught that one is one's own refuge and one should never seek refuge in any external power ; that each person has to work out his own deliverance (*D.* II, p. 100). By overemphasising the compassionate nature (*kāruṇā*) of the Buddha the later Mahāyānists represented deliverance as a gift bestowed by the Buddha upon the helpless, but faithful worshipper. Mere faith which was earlier regarded as an obstacle to the attainment of deliverance became the key to deliverance.

The rise of the Bodhisattva-cult and also the Bhakti cult of the *Bhagadgītā* and Hinduism greatly influenced the further development of the conception of deliverance on these lines. Avalokiteśvara (q.v.), the personification of the *Karuṇā* aspect of the Buddha, plays the role of the great saviour of all his worshippers. It is mainly in the Jo-do (Pure-land or Amidism) school of Japanese Buddhism that deliverance came to be regarded as a gift of Amida or Buddha Amitābha or Amitāyus, obtainable through faith on the part of the worshipper. The devotees are plainly instructed to give up reliance on personal effort. Instead they are taught to chant the *Nembutsu* formula with complete faith in the saving power of the Buddha Amitābha. This act of faith is considered sufficient to put an end to the unsatisfactory saṃsāric existence and secure birth in the Western Paradise called Sukhāvatī (C. Eliot, *Japanese Buddhism*, London, Second Impression, 1956, p. 360 ff.). See also BHAKTI.

S.K.N.

DELUSION (*moha*): deluded view, false impression or opinion regarding the facts of existence.

According to Buddhism the pleasures enjoyed by man through the gratification of his senses are temporary (*anicca*) and illusive (*māyākata : M.* II, p. 261) and as such they never provide lasting satisfaction. The enjoyment of such temporary pleasures only prolongs his existence as a worldling in the cycle of existence (saṃsāra), subject to all the miseries of life. Lasting happiness could be obtained only by the renunciation of such sense attractions and realising the transcendental state of Nirvāṇa, the *summum bonum* of Buddhism. In order to achieve this noble aim (*sadattha*) he should view life's ordinary pleasures as ultimately vain and work towards the goal in the way recommended. Therefore, if he were to give into the enjoyment of sense pleasures indiscriminately by following the path of the worldlings given over to the enjoyment of sense pleasures (*seyyathāpi gihī kāmabhogino : Vin.* I, pp. 203, 204) or the path of self-indulgence (*kāmasukhallikānuyoga : Vin.* I, p. 10) he does so because he fails to see the true nature of these pleasures. This failure to see things as they really are (*yathā-bhūta : D.* I, p. 83 ; *S.* IV, p. 188 etc.) in this manner is called delusion or *moha*. As an ordinary worldling that fails to see the higher truths such a person is aptly described as following the current (*anusotagāmin : A.* II, pp. 5, 6; *Sn. v.* 319) in the sense that he merely follows the path of non-resistance to sensual attractions. As against

him is the person who fights against this current (*sota*) of worldly pleasures and moves upstream towards release and Enlightenment who is accordingly described as 'going against the current' (*paṭisotagāmin : A.* II, 6 : at *M.* I, 168 the Buddha describes his dhamma by this term).

The five-fold sense-pleasures (*pañcakāmaguṇa :* i.e., form, sound, smell, taste and touch enjoyed respectively by eye, ear, nose, tongue and body) that ensnare man by their being pleasing (*iṭṭha*), lovely (*kanta*), agreeable (*manāpa*), pleasant (*piya-rūpa*), endowed with attraction (*kāmūpasaṃhita*) and enticing (*rajanīya : D.* I, p. 245=*M.* I, pp. 85, 504 ; *Nd.* I, p. 26 etc.) are therefore directly described as ' delusion ' in the following passage which may be quoted here as it emphatically brings forth the Buddhist concept of delusion ; " owing to what reason are the five-fold sense-pleasures described as delusion. For the most part, both gods and men become deluded, confounded and bewildered regarding the five-fold sense-pleasures : having become deluded, confounded and bewildered thereby and also blinded, confused, obstructed, covered, closed, circumscribed and enclosed by ignorance are they. Therefore, the five-fold sense-pleasures are declared to be delusion." (*kiṃkāraṇā mohanā vuccati pañcakāmaguṇā yebhuyyena devamanussā pañcasu kāmaguṇesu muyhanti, sammuyhanti, sampamuyhanti : mūḷhā, sammūḷhā, sampamūḷhā avijjāya andhikatā, āvutā, nivutā, ovutā, pihitā, paṭicchinnā, paṭikujjitā : taṃkāraṇā mohanā vuccanti pañcakāmaguṇā : Nd.* I, p. 26).

The person who is deluded in this manner can make out various wrong theories about existence—theories like the doctrine of annihilation (*uccheda-diṭṭhi*), of eternalism (*sassata-diṭṭhi*), of a persistent soul (*attavāda*) etc. as evidenced by the prevalence of a large number of philosophical views at the time of the appearance of Buddhism in India (*D.* I, p. 27). In one place the Buddha clearly says that when holders of such views become bewildered and deluded by such theories what they preach become senseless talk (*vācā-vikkhepa*) because they have missed the Truth. It is such false and erroneous beliefs about the nature and destiny of man in the universe that is accordingly called delusion or *moha*. Such delusion itself becomes his saṃsāra which consequently becomes dangerous and difficult to traverse (*palipathaṃ duggaṃ saṃsāraṃ mohaṃ : Sn. v.* 638). Thus, it is clear why delusion is given as one of the three basic roots of evil action (*akusala mūla*) in the threefold springs of action : greed (*lobha*), hatred (*dosa*) and delusion (*moha*), which is one of the most fundamental doctrines taught in Buddhist psychological ethics. When a person is motivated to action by any of these springs of action he becomes so deluded that he fails to understand situations and to see the truth (e.g., *duṭṭho atthaṃ na jānāti dhammaṃ na passati : It.* p. 84). All activities motivated by any of these springs of action would be unskilful (*akusala*) while those motivated by their opposites—*alobha, adosa* and *amoha* would be skilful (*kusala : D.* III, p. 214).

Delusion or confusion under the term *moha* is sometimes used synonymously with the better known term ignorance or *avijjā* (*It.* pp. 56, 57 ; *Sn. v.* 730 ; *Dhs.* p. 1061) and is explained (at *Nd.* II, p. 98) as ignorance (*aññāṇa*), of the Four Noble Truths, of the past (*pubbanta*), of the future, (*aparanta*), of the past and the future (*pubbanta-aparanta*) ; of the mutual dependence of causally conditioned events (*idappaccayatā paṭiccasamuppannesu dhammesu*) and any such ignorance, lack of insight....etc. that is called delusion (*moha*), confusion (*pamoha*), bewilderment (*sammoha*) etc. It is given as an (moral) impurity of man's character (*kiñcana*) and a fire (*aggi : D.* III, p. 217). Its emergence in his mind will always be for his downfall (*Nd.* I, p. 16) and is compared to a dart (*salla :* ibid. p. 59).

Complete freedom from delusion (along with the other two of the triad) is tantamount to complete freedom of the mind (*D.* III, p. 270), and to the realisation of Nibbāna (*A.* I, p. 159 ; *Ud.* p. 85). Once all forms of delusion are overcome one becomes Enlightened and a seer of the Truth (*sabbamohaṃ atikkanto buddho dhammesu cakkhumā : Sn. v.* 161). There cannot be delusions in one who has achieved freedom through understanding (*paññāvimuttassa na santi mohā : Sn. v.* 847). Once it disappears its opposite (*amoha*) occupies its place thereby replacing ignorance with knowledge and darkness with light. See also AVIJJĀ, MOHA.

A. G. S. K.

DEMOCRACY. The term ' Democracy ' in its historical setting had come to mean ' rule by majority decision ', and this concept has been analysed with much finesse by students of the subject.[1] The term itself means 'rule by the people ', derived, as it

1. E.g., *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 14th Ed., s. v. 'DEMOCRACY' and bibliography given therein. Also *cf., ERE*, Vol. 6, s. v. "GOVERNMENT".

is, from the Greek *demokratia* (from *demos*, 'the people', and *kratos*, 'rule', *cf.* Vedic *kratu*). Although the classical definitions of the term are too well-known to be reiterated here, it has to be stated at the outset that the present-day rapid diffusion of the idea of democracy has resulted in the term being used (both in concept and application) of systems of government which may not at all be 'democratic' in the original sense. 'Democracy', then, is a much confused term in modern political parlance.

Varying forms of democratic rule have existed both among the primitive peoples and in the advanced civilizations the world over, from ancient times. In its original sense as 'rule by majority decision', three forms of democracy have been distinguished : (i) 'Direct democracy' or government in which all the citizens as a body, acting under procedures of majority rule, directly enjoy the right of making political decisions. This is the oldest form of democracy known to humanity, and was in vogue in the ancient Greek city-states. (ii) 'Representative democracy' in which the same right may be exercised not in person but through representatives chosen by and responsible to the citizens concerned. (iii) 'Liberal or constitutional democracy', which is really representative democracy in which majority rule is exercised within a framework of constitutional restraints, as in modern parliamentary practice. This last form of democracy is designed to guarantee fundamental minority rights within any given community in which such rule obtains.[2] These forms of democracy, in varying degrees, were also known in North India from Ṛgvedic times upto the Buddha's day, as may be seen from studies in Indian political history.[3]

The term 'democracy' and the adjective 'democratic', however, are more loosely employed in modern times to denote any form of government or political movement aiming at socio-economic justice—the *modus operandi* being regarded as inconsequential. However, such governments and political movements also theoretically claim that in their case too it is the people who rule inasmuch as such rule is said to have the approbation of the people concerned, according to their own criteria.[4] The present study, it is hoped, will enable an evaluation of these forms of rule in terms of Buddhist thought.

The Buddhist conception of democracy as an instrument for the furtherance of the human good stems from Buddhist socio-political philosophy. This philosophy, in turn, results from an ethical theory based on a view of reality founded on Buddhist thought. For the present purpose it would suffice to note the Buddhist view of man's position on this earth and examine the ethical theory.

While the *summum bonum* of Buddhism is to be attained only through the development of the human potential by an extension of human capacity, Buddhism looks at man in what one may call 'the *saṃsāric* context'. According to Buddhism life does not begin at conception and end at death. Till man attains emancipation, existence is a continuum through innumerable lives, changing, as it does, being part of a universal flux. Birth and death only demarcate a visible link in the 'stream of becoming' (*bhavasota*) or life. If life is but one stream, man, as a psychosomatic unit (*nāma* and *rūpa*) is conditioned not only through biological, social, economic and such other factors, but also through his psychological inheritance coming from the distant past. This latter factor is popularly known as '*karma*', which is but the operation of non-deterministic causal laws in the sojourning (*bhava*) of the *saṃsāric* individual. And till he attains emancipation man proceeds in existence. If that be the position of man on earth, it is imperative, from the Buddhist point of view, that he be granted the optimum conditions necessary to work out his emancipation as early as possible. It is here that the Buddhist ethical theory comes in for consideration.

The Buddhist ethical theory asserts that (the nature of existence being what it is) there is only one way—*ekāyano maggo*[5]—for the perfection of man,[6]

2. See fn. 1.

3. E.g., P. Basu, *Indo-Aryan Polity*, London, 2nd Ed., 1925 ; K. P. Jayaswal, *Hindu Polity*, Calcutta, 1934, and Romila Thapar, *A History of India*, Vol. I, Penguin Books, Reprint 1969.

4. For instance, the Communist 'People's democracies' claim that the collective ownership of the means of production ensures that the will of the people will be carried out. *Britannica Micropaedia*, Vol. III, p. 458 (s.v. DEMOCRACY). Also cf. Y. Todorsky, 'Democracy in Action,' *Soviet Military Review*, August, 1976, No. 8, pp. 2 ff.

5. cf. *S.* V., p. 168 ; *Dhp. v.* 274.

6. "This way of life is considered both possible and desirable because man and the universe are just what they are. It is, therefore, justified in the light of a realistic account of the nature of the universe and of man's place in it."— K. N. Jayatilleke, *The Message of the Buddha*, a posthumous work, ed. Ninian Smart, London, 1975, p. 240. Also cf. K. N. Jayatilleke, *The Principles of International Law in Buddhist Doctrine*, Extract from the "Recueil des Cours"., Leiden 1967, Vol. II. p. 479 f.

and that, as the first step in that direction, a morally good life is a *sine qua non*'. Purity in life helps generate the psychological background for higher mental development essential for emancipation. Since Buddhism expects one to be concerned not only with one's own spiritual well-being but with that of others too, the ' one way ' it advocates for human perfection has not only a personal, but a social dimension, as well. Demands of the moral life at both the personal and social levels lead to the social philosophy of Buddhism and the cultivation of the Buddhist social ethic. And, it is mainly through the economic and political affairs of a people that the social ethic of a given religion could be put into practical application.[8] Buddhism would, therefore, opt for that form of polity which would best enable the practice of its social ethic ; and this, incidentially, would mean any form of polity which accepts the 'right view' of life as subsumed under the Buddhist term *sammādiṭṭhi*. Thus it will be noted that although both monarchical and republican forms of government obtained in North India during the Buddha's day, early Buddhist literature shows no preference for one form of govern ment over the other. While righteous kingship in the former (cf. the Buddhist concept of *dasarājadhammā*) and the democratic features of the latter, (cf. *satta aparihāniyadhammā*) have been highly valued, it has also to be emphasized that as implicit, for instance, in the *Cakkavattisīhanāda* and *Aggañña Suttas* of the *Dīgha Nikāya*[8a] Buddhism measures human affairs in terms of a Universal Norm (*Dhamma* or Righteousness) and also holds that a good end can only be reached by good means ; a goal by bad means is never advocated. For Buddhism, therefore, it is imperative that the chosen government not only subserves its ends, but subserves them righteously, i.e., in accordance with the Universal Norm : *dhammen'eva no adhammena*."[9] This conception of a Universal Norm means that in the Buddhist view " ultimate sovereignty resided not in any ruler, human or divine, nor in any body governing the state nor in the state itself, but in Dhamma, the eternal principle of righteousness."[10] Buddhist monarchs (as did King Indravarman II of Champa) seem to have maintained that the heavens themselves are governed in accordance with this principle. Since it is possible to show from the Buddhist point of view that "even in the cosmos as a whole, it is merit and desert that count and all are equal before the cosmic justice of Dhamma",[11] and that " any man of his own free will may aspire to and attain the status of a Brahmā or Buddha ",[12] it can well and truly be said that the universe, in Buddhism, is conceived on the democratic model. It is against this background that the Buddhist view of democracy as a polity among mankind has to be examined.

The Dhamma or the Universal Norm operating in the terrestrial realm has to seek expression through institutions of human polity, and this may be possible through many forms of government. It has already been noted (*supra*) that early Buddhist literature showed no special preference for any particular form of government in North India during the Buddha's day. As the *Cakkavattisīhanāda Sutta* suggests, if there has to be any restructuring of politics, it should really be through moral reform, and the chosen form of polity of a given people should be respected.[12a] To the Buddha the success of a political administration depended on the measure to which such an administration acted in consonance with the Dhamma " as revealed by, or as implied in the socio-ethical concepts" (enunciated by him[13]. In this context early Buddhst literature suggests that Buddhism would uphold democracy as the ideal form of polity. Since Buddhism credits the human personality with a dignity and a moral reponsibility, it would look upon every human bing as qualified to be vested with the sovereignty immanent in the Dhamma, in the management of human affairs. This, Buddhism indeed does, by the vesting of supreme legislative power in the people as a whole, through a theory of social contract (*infra*). Buddhism would agree with Jean Jacques Rousseau

7. cf. *S.* V, p. 187; *Miln.* p. 33 f. *et Vism* I, p. 6 ff.

8. Cf. O. H. de A. Wijesekera, *Buddhism and Society*, (Tenth Locture under the Dona Alpina Ratnayake Trust), Colombo, 1952, p. 15.

8a *D.* III, p. 61 *et* 83f.

9. Cf. *D.* III. p. 83 f.

10. K. N. Jayatilleke, *The Principles of International Law in Buddhist Doctrine*, p. 478. Jayatilleke adds: "This is not to be interpreted to mean that Dhamma is some sort of mysterious entity but that it is only to the extent to which states conform with Dhamma in their internal and foreign policy that man can achieve his legitimate aspirations for peace, prosperity and happiness." also cf. T. W. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Pt. III, (SBB. Vol. IV), London, Reprint 1965, p. 80 fn. 3. This eternal principle of righteousness is generally described in the Canonical texts as the one that the Cakkavatti Monarch follows.

11. K. N. Jayatilleke, *loc. cit.*

12. K. N. Jayatilleke, op. cit. p. 518 ; Also cf. ibid. p. 478.

12a Cf. The advice of the Cakkavatti Monarch to the Rulers coming under his way that they should be morally good and should carry on the administration as before. See D. III, p. 61.

13. O. H. de A. Wijesekera, op. cit. p. 15.

that the assumption of man's responsibility for his own governance "is of the essence of human dignity "[14] and that" no man can without degrading himself beneath the level of humanity, be denied a personal share in the making of basic political decisions.[14] As Rousseau's defence of this proposition is considered today a "decisive contribution to the theory of modern democracy, "[15] it may be noted that the teachings of the Buddha should also be regarded as consonant with democratic thought at its best.

A theory of a democratic conception of both the state and the law is to be found in the *Aggañña Sutta* (Discourse on Knowledge regarding the Beginning) of the *Dīgha Nikāya* [16], and is shared by all schools of Buddhism. It is based on the premise that all human beings are born with equal rights, socially and politically. Although certain democracies known to historical antiquity recognized the equality of all citizens in a given community or state (sometimes with reservations)[17], it is only with the advent of Buddhism that the fundamental equality of all mankind as one community gains recognition for the first time in human thought [18]. Though couched in a legendary setting, the *Aggañña Sutta* could be looked upon as giving a better insight into social evolution than the Brahmin theory it was intended to replace [19]. In origin, all human beings, in the words of this Sutta, were "like unto themselves and not unlike" (*aññesaṃ sadisānaññeva no asadisānaṃ*)[20], though class distinctions and the like were to arise later among them. Of course, Buddhism does not deny differences (*vemattatā*) between individuals resulting from other factors. However, it upholds the equality of man "in the sense that man's essential nature is the same whatever the individual differences due to heredity, environment or karmic factors may be. His basic needs, material, psychological and spiritual are also fundamentally the same although men may differ in their interests and capacities due to their divergent historical evolution"....[21] This conception of an absolute equality between man and man in respect of man's essential nature is buttressed in the Buddhist texts with a number of arguments which are anthropological,[22] biological, [23] ethical, [24] legal, [25] moral, [26] religious, [27] and sociological,[22] all of which need not engage our attention here.[29](See EGALITARIANISM

Before going further into the *Aggañña Sutta* it is necessary to refer to another theory with a bearing on the Buddhist conception of democracy. This stems from the reliance Buddhism places on human nature. Buddhism believes in the innate goodness of man. The human mind, says the Buddha, is pure by nature, though defiled by inflowing defilements.[30] Fundamentally, human nature is considered good, and the human mind is compared to gold ore, defiled with iron, copper, tin, lead or silver, but when purified resplendent with its natural lustre, as when one attains the transcendental state.[31] Therefore, Buddhism would repose reliance on the natural ability of man to arrive at correct judgements though no two men can be placed on a par with each other. Although the general lack of restraint on the part of the multitude (*dussīlo hi bahujjano*)[32] was not unknown to Buddhism, unlike the Greek oligarchies, Buddhism was never cynical in its attitude

14. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Vol. 7, p. 180.
15. loc. cit.
16. *D.* III, 80 ff.
17. For instance, in the ancient Greek city-states women and slaves enjoyed no democratic rights.
18. The concept of the equality of all mankind as the underlying ethical basis for democracy started germinating in the West only during the mediaeval period, and with the impetus received through the American and French Revolutions has now resulted in modern constitutionalism.
19. Cf. T. W. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Pt. I, (SBB. Vol. II), p. 107. The Brahmin legend alluded to is the one regarding the creation of the Four Castes, as accepted by Brahmanism.
20. *D.* III, p. 93 ff. v.l. *aññesaṃ* (ibid. p. 93 fn. 12) should be preferred to *anaññesaṃ* in the P. T. S. Edition of the text.
21. K. N. Jayatilleke, op. cit., p. 518.
22. D. III, pp. 93 ff. (*Aggañña Sutta*).
23. Sn. pp. 117 ff. (*Vāsettha Sutta*).
24. D. III, p. 250 f. (*Sangiti Suttanta*).
25. M. II, p. 88 (*Madhura Sutta*).
26. Ibid II, 86, (*Madhura Sutta*).
27. Ibid. II, 147, (*Assalāyana Sutta*).
28. Ibid. II, 149. (*Assalāyana Sutta*).
29. For a discussion of such arguments, see K. N. Jayatilleke, op. cit., p. 516 f. Also cf. G. P. Malalasekera & K. N. Jayatilleke, *Buddhism and the Race Question*, *UNESCO*, 1958, pp. 35 ff.
30. *Pabhassaraṃ idaṃ cittaṃ tañca kho agantukehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭhanti* (*A*. I, p. 10).
31. *A*. II, p. 16.
32. *Dhp. v.* 320. John Stuart Mill, the utilitarian, also doubted somewhat the rationality of the majority.

towards the common man[33]. The Buddha picked up the man of his choice—introducing him as the'man of wisdom'(*viññū puriso*)—from amongst the ordinary people.

It is against such an ideological background that the *Aggañña Sutta* needs evaluation. The Sutta suggests that at a critical stage in the prehistoric evolution of human society man deemed fit to effect a social contract for the management of his affairs. It is said that in the course of social evolution property rights had to be established, and this was effected through mutual agreement. As problems of human sustenance on the one hand, and law and order on the other, arose, (to quote the *Sutta*), the people said: "What if we were to divide up the rice and set a ceiling thereupon ! And so they divided up the rice and set a ceiling. Now, some being ..... keeping his own portion in safe custody stole and made use of another's share. They caught him, and addressed him thus : Truly, O being, thou hast wrought evil, in that, while keeping thine own share in safe custody, thou hast stolen another's and made use of it. Thou art not, O being, to do likewise hereafter. Ay, good sirs, ... he replied them. But a second and yet a third time he did so. They caught him again, and, in like fashion admonished him. Some smote him with the hand, others with clods, and yet others with sticks. With such a beginning ..... did theft, censure and falsehood manifest themselves. "[34] What is put forward here through a legendary framework is a view of social evolution founded on the Buddhist theory of human equality (*cf.* "like unto themselves and not unlike") with implicit acceptance of the intrinsic goodness of man. This contract of society, therefore, is based on democratic concepts, and would further foster democratic thought. (It is known how the ideas of utilitarians and social contract theorists have also gone into the shaping of modern democratic thought which developed from the 17th century onwards.)

This contract of society, says the Sutta, was followed by a contract of government. The latter, according to authoritative studies[35], necessarily postulates the former as a prior condition. The Sutta states as follows : "Now, those beings .... assembled together and bewailed thus : Evil has, indeed appeared among beings in that theft, censure, falsehood and punishment are (now) manifesting themselves. What if we were to select a being who would be indignant when indignation is right, who would censure that which rightly deserves censure and would banish him who should well and truly be banished. And (in return) we shall bestow on him a share of (our) rice.....Then those beings approached the one among them who was the most handsome, the most pleasant, the most attractive and the most capable, and said unto him : Come now, good sir, be indignant at that which rightly deserves indignation, censure that which should rightly be censured, and banish him who deserves to be banished. And we shall contribute to thee a proportion of our rice. Ay, good sirs, said he in assent and did so, and they gave him a proportion of their rice. Chosen by the whole populace ..... is what is meant by Mahā Sammata ; So Mahā Sammata (the Great Elect) was the first standing expression to arise .... Lord of Fields is what is meant by Khattiya ; so Khattiya (Noble) was the next expression to arise. He who gladdens others through the Norm or Righteousness (*Dhamma*)..... is what is meant by Rājā (Ruler) ;this was the third standing expression to arise."[36]

While this Sutta, as stated earlier, affords good insight into social evolution, it would be difficult to assert (as done by Rhys Davids) that it is "much nearer the actual facts" [37] than the Brahmin theory it repudiates—the latter, of course, being no more than fanciful. Although monarchical rule could certainly have its origins in the free choice of an unsophisticated people, the king was generally where he was, as a present-day student of the subject puts it, "largely because he had, so to speak, climbed up on the shoulders of others", [38] and this seems to be borne out, though not

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33. J. P. Sharma (*Republics in Ancient India, c. 1,500 B.C. to 500 B. C.*, 1968, p. 242) is not justified in his view that the Buddhist Sangha, like the Greek oligarchies, was based on a belief in the 'unwisdom of the multitude'.

34. D. III, p. 92. (Author's translation from the original Pali text). We are agreed that the translation of the *Aggañña Sutta* passage '*Yan nūna mayaṃ sālīṃ vibhajeyyāma mariyādaṃ ṭhapeyyāmāti* (D. III, p. 92) should read as 'What if we were to divide up the rice and set a ceiling thereupon.' Rhys Davids translates this as 'Come now, let us divide off the rice fields and set boundaries thereto' (*Dialogues of the Buddha*, III, p. 87) which we think is not as precise as it should be and thus presents a somewhat different picture.—E-in-C.

35. E.g., see E. Barker, *Social Contract*, Oxford University Press, London, Reprint 1948, p. xii f.

36. *D.* III, p. 92 f. (Author's translation).

37. T. W. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Pt. I, (*SBB*. Vol. II), p. 107.

38. Trevor Ling, *The Buddha*, London, Reprint 1974, p. 58.

quite explicitly, by the Buddhist texts, elsewhere.[39] What the sutta puts across in this instance is the Buddhist view of how a ruler should be elected, and the method implied is patently democratic, although the ideal ruler so elected appears to be aristocratic. He is Mahā Sammata (the Great Elect) inasmuch as he is the choice of all the people. As may be noted in Buddhist monastic discipline (*infra*), unanimity is to be preferred to majority decision. The *Aggañña Sutta*, therefore, is more prescriptive than descriptive, and in its theories of contract of society and contract of government it clearly upholds a democratic conception of both the state and the law.

Certain forms of democratic government were known to ancient India from pre–Buddhistic times. In the Rgvedic period (although kingship was also known) there had been a form of ' direct democracy ' in that all the members of the tribe have occasionally assembled together to discuss matters of importance,[40] as in the case of the ancient Greek city-state. ' Direct democracy ' was feasible where numbers were limited. Since the ancient Indian republics appear to have " emerged from the Vedic tribes and retained much more tribal tradition than did the monarchies, "[41] it is possible that " in the transition from tribe to republic they lost the essential democratic pattern of the tribe (which was ' direct democracy ') but retained the idea of government through as assembly representing the tribe."[41] Thus, in the republics of the Buddha's day, a shift towards ' representative ' democratic practice is to be noted, in that the elders of the republic represented the people, and such practice at least as far as the Vajjians were concerned, seems to have been ' constitutional ', as well.[42] And in the oft-quoted words of the Marquess of Zetland, " it is, indeed, to the Buddhist books that we have to turn for an account of the manner in which the affairs of these early examples of representative self-governing institutions were conducted ".[42a] It has been assumed that Buddhism, especially in the democratic practices of its monastic community, was influenced by such republican forms of government.[43] It is possible to argue both for and against this assumption. The commonplace argument that the Buddha's admonition to the Saṅgha in the wake of his observation that the republican Vajjians should be expected not to decline but to prosper so long as certain ' conditions of welfare ' were observed by them,[44] is often cited in support of this contention.[45] However, as stated earlier, it cannot be said that Buddhism viewed any particular form of government with special favour. Therefore, it is also possible that the Buddha passed no value judgement in this matter. While the Buddha would have certainly cherished the democratic principles of republican polity, it could be maintained that his observations regarding the Vajjians " cannot be regarded as favouring republicanism, any more than if he had said that King Ajātaśatru could, if he was clever enough, break the Vajjian confederacy, his statement could have been interpreted as approving autocracy. "[46] In fact, the organization of the Buddhist monastic community discloses well both republican and monarchical characteristics, while early Buddhism, as noted by Przyluski,[47] was aristocratic in outlook. Borrowings and adaptations are no doubt possible, but inadequacy of source materials prevents research into the question as to who borrowed from whom and to what extent. The Buddha himself was an educated intellectual hailing from an aristocratic republican clan. Furthermore, he had obviously preferred ' direct democracy ' (*infra*) to the ' representative ' type. What could be said for certain is that the

39. At *D*. I, p. 9, *Khattavijjā* (Science of power or craft of government) is condemned as a 'low art' (*tiracchānavijjā* and a 'wrongful occupation' (*micchājīva*), and this is further corroborated by *Jataka* No. 528 in which *Khattavijjā* seems to involve Machiavellian tactics. *Khattiyamāyā* (Ksatriya tricks, in *Jātaka* No. 546) and *Khattadhamma* (Political science, in *Jātaka* No. 537) respectively, are not looked upon with approbation. Cf. T. W. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Pt. I, (*SBB*. Vol II), p. 18, fn. 3, and U. N. Ghoshal, *A History of Indian Political Ideas*, Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 65 f.

40. This is the *samiti* of Ṛgvedic society. Cf. Basu, op.cit. pp. 67 ff., where a criticism of the views of Ludwig and Zimmer egarding the *Samiti* is also made.

41. Romila Thapar, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 50.

42. See *D*. II, p. 74, where reference is made to the "established ancient Vajjian constitution" *paññatte porāṇe Vajjidhamme*). Also cf. *DA*. II, p. 519.

42*a*. G. T. Garratt (Ed.), *The Legacy of India*, Oxford, First published 1937, Reprint 1938, p. xi (Introduction). Also cf. The Marquess of Zetland in s.v. 'Homo Sapiens,' *B. C. Law Volume*, pt. I, Calcutta, 1945, p. 3.

43. *Vide Infra*, n. 45.

44. *D*. II, pp. 73 ff.

45. Cf. K. P. Jayaswal, op. cit. pp. 33 *et passim* ; S. Dutt, *Early Buddhist Monachism*, Asia Publishing House, 1st Ind an Ed. (revised), 1960, p. 119 f. ; U. N. Ghoshal, op. cit., p. 76 f. ; K. N. Jayatilleke, op. cit., pp. 521 et 525.

46. P. V. Bapat, *2500 years of Buddhism*, Delhi, 1956, p. 453.

47. J. Przyluski, *Le Concile de Rājagṛha*, Paris, 1926, pp. 308 ff. et., pp. 367 ff. Also cf. H. Oldenberg, *Buddha*, tr. Hoey, Calcutta ed. 1927, p. 155.

Buddha should be accredited with the honour of establishing a democratic institution " for the good of its members as well as of mankind so that it may continue to function on a democratic basis after his death. " [48]

Although Buddhism is imbued with the spirit of democracy as noted above, the external requirements or the outer trappings of democracy may be less apparent in the Buddha's instructions to the layman. This is due to the fact that the layman is free to follow any political system of his choice so long as it would righteously (*dhammena*) pave the way for the pursuit of the Buddhist ideals. Such requirements, however, are to be noted well in the corporate life of the Buddhist Saṅgha since it is hedged in by specific considerations of monastic life. The polity governing an *āvāsa* (monastic colony) illustrates the point:[49] While the entire monastic community is referred to as the " Saṅgha of the Four Quarters, present and not present " (*cf. āgatānāgatassa cātuddisassa saṅghassa*),[50] for administrative purposes each *āvāsa* governed itself through its own *Saṅghakammas* or Ecclesiastical Acts, for which it is necessary that all the qualified members at the *āvāsa* should assemble. (See SAṄGHAKAMMA). Anyone unable to attend should remain for the time being ' outside the boundary ' (*cf. nānāsīmāya ṭhita*)[51] or should send his consent (*chanda*)[52] by proxy. Of course, for different kinds of *Saṅghakammas* quorums are prescribed, but not committees. What obtains here is ' direct democracy ' in that an attempt is made to secure the participation of every qualified member of the *āvāsa* in the Act concerned. In fact one may wonder whether the staking out of *āvāsas* cannot be construed as an attempt to implant firmly in the mind of the Saṅgha the concept of ' direct democracy' as opposed to ' representative democracy ' to which the establishment of a central monastic organization would have invariably led. However, as far as present-day large and pluralistic lay societies are concerned, Buddhism should naturally be expected to opt for ' representative democracy ' as the only praticable alternative (*supra*).

The form of a *Saṅghakamma*, together with the various stages in it, shows that in both conception and execution it is completely democratic. Quorums, committees, resolutions, proclamations, voting, and such-like democratic procedures were all known and referred to by their technical terms[53]

For a *Saṅghakamma* to be a valid act, unanimous consent is considered necessary.[54] If there be a division of opinion, it becomes a case of *Adhikaraṇa* or Dispute (*vivādādhikaraṇa*) which should be settled in accordance with the rules for the settling of such disputes.[55] Amongst these rules, one with a special significance for the Buddhist conception of democracy needs to be singled out for emphasis. This is known as the *Yebhuyyasikā*, in which the majority vote is recognized.[56] However, in the procedure adopted, provision is made for special steps to ensure that the majority vote is in consonance with the *Dhamma*—the eternal principle of righteousness.[57] This is cardinal to the Buddhist conception of democracy. This attitude is somewhat paralleled today by the British constitutional tradition, which, " having long been associated with the idea of parliamentary sovereignty, is conceived in moral rather than in legal terms."[58] From the foregoing observations it has to be concluded that Buddhism would value and hold in esteem whatever that is democratic in any given form of polity—but with the significant proviso that what is considered 'democratic' could also be deemed *dhammika* or 'righteous,' in the Buddhist sense of the term.

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48. K. N. Jayatilleke, op. cit., p. 520.
49. For a detailed treatment of what is stated from here onwards, see S. Dutt, op. cit., pp. 120 ff.
50. *Vin.* II, p. 147. This, as may be noted, is a concept transcending spatio-tempored considerations.
51. Cf. *Vin.* I, p. 320.
52. Vin. I, p. 121 f.
53. Cf., e.g., *Vin.* I, pp. 316 ff. et *Vin.* II, pp. 93 ff. Also see G. T. Garratt, op. cit., p. xi (Introduction by the Marquess of Zetland).
54. *Vin.* I, p. 319.
55. *Vin.* II, pp. 93 ff.
56. *Vin.* II, pp. 84 et 97. Also see *M.* II, p. 247.
57. *Vin.* II, pp. 85 *et* 97 ff.
58. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Vol. 7, p. 182 : "Most Englishmen would agree that the majority, acting through proper parliamentary channels, has a legal right to do anything it wishes, but would also agree that there are many things a majority has no moral right to do, and that if those things were attempted, even by act of Parliament, they would still be in violation of the principles of the constitution." *loc. cit.*

DEMONOLOGY. The early Indologists focussed a fair deal of attention on the study of Indian mythology (which, of course, included demonology), but, although scholars like Macdonnel and Hopkins have done detailed investigations into Vedic and Epic mythology, it appears that a similar study of Buddhist mythology has not taken place, apparently because it was felt that the gods and demons of the Buddhist scriptures and the legends which surrounded these mythical beings were borrowings, repetitions and continuations of the mythology of Pre-Buddhistic, Aryan India, or because belief in these mythical beings was so widespread and varied in each country where Buddhism took root that the subject was considered to be too vast an undertaking. This vastness and variety is particularly true of the demonology of Buddhism which is, in fact, a rich storehouse that could be of immense interest and value.

However, there have been sporadic and limited attempts to record the demon-beliefs in the Buddhist scriptures and, more recently, excursions, particularly by anthropologists, into the popular demonologies of Asian countries, such as Tibet, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Korea, China and Japan. Even the latter studies, nevertheless, have suffered from the absence of a detailed and comprehensive study of the demonology of the Buddhist scriptures, which has, obviously, an intimate connection with the popular demonologies of these Buddhist countries. The present article, however, does not seek to undertake this monumental task which awaits the competent research it deserves, but only attempts to give a brief and introductory outline.

It will be no fact for surprise that the demonology of Buddhism depicts a stage in the evolution of Indian, nay, the whole, of Asian demonology, and that the basic features of Buddhist demonology derive from the Pre-Buddhistic, particulary the Vedic, conceptions. However, it is striking to note that Buddhist demonology reflects greater resemblances with the Atharvavedic rather than Rigvedic notions, the former, representative of the period when the primitive cults of southern India were penetrating the Aryan conceptions. The demonology of Buddhism, in fact, acquires greater interest in that it appears as a mid-way stage in the passage from the ethical and abstract forms which had emerged as a result of the influence of the metaphysical Upaniṣadic period back to the religious ideas of the Pre-Aryan period which seem to have remained with the least change in the isolated Deccan plateaux.

Nevertheless, as in all demonologies, the demons of the Buddhist scriptures are very much anthropomorphic in nature. From all descriptions, the demons resemble human beings in appearance, except that they are distinct by their fearsome and monster-like features, their monstrous nature being emphasized by the possession of heads, tails and claws of ferocious animals like tigers, crocodiles, hawks and serpents. Although the earlier canonical literature does not give sufficient data regarding their external appearance and only emphasizes their fearsomeness as well as their connection with Evil, the *Jātakas* are very vivid in their descriptions. Demons have hairy bodies, unkempt hair, large, often red, eyes. They are fat-bellied, with huge mouths, long sharp teeth, some jutting out like tusks of elephants. They are of gigantic size and dark in complexion, like the Dasyus the Aryans met in India. They are more man-eaters than mere flesh-eaters. They are sub-human but with supernatural powers, powers which they generally use for evil purposes. They are capable of changing their forms, and appear as human beings, when they can be distinguished only by the absence of a shadow or of the beating of eye-lashes.

A classification of all beings that exist, found in some of the early canonical literature, (*D.* III, 234; *M.*,I., 73; *A.* IV, 459) gives three categories of beings belonging to the subhuman level viz: (1) the inhabitants of *niraya* or hell; (2) brutes (*tiracchānayoni*), (3) the ghost-world (*pittivisaya*, i.e. the realm of *petas*): but another canonical classification adds *asura*, a further sub-human category, though this class seems to be a class apart in that they are rather fallen gods in eternal conflict with the gods and rarely with humans, except perhaps indirectly (see further s.v. ASURA).

The word *yakkha* is also used often in the sense of demon as early as the *Dīgha Nikāya* (*D.* II, 346) but not always as such, when they appear on the side of goodness rather than evil as in the *Ambaṭṭha Sutta* where the *yakkha* uses his power to defend Truth and Justice (*D.I.*, 95). *Rakkhasa* (s.v), too, is another word used to denote demons, some *asuras* also being described as *rakkhasas* (*Sn.* 310). *Rakkhasas* are also associated with the ocean like the *asuras*, and are often protectors and guardians of

lakes and ponds devouring those who attempt to cross their terrain. *Piśāca* (q.v.) is one of the earliest terms for demon in the Buddhist scriptures and are rarely, unlike the afore-mentioned categories, depicted as associated with the good. They are almost always demoniacal and seen as filthy, despicable creatures. *Petas* (q.v.), too, often share the filthy appearances of *piśācas* and are skinny and possess various kinds of deformities which are believed to be results of their past evil deeds, most often arising from their main trait of greediness. The word *kumbhāṇḍa* appears to be a more neutral term but they are classified with *yakkhas*, *rakkhasas* and *asuras* as in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*. *Dānaveghasas* who are only mentioned once or twice in the canonical literature, are grouped as one of the two classes of *asuras*.

However, it is clear that all these terms are identical with the Vedic terms and may differ only in some of the characteristics attributed to them by the Buddhists. Generally most of the beings in Buddhist demonology bear the characteristics of the preceding Indian demonology. Apart from their ferocious and frightful appearances, they remain agents of disease, insanity, barrenness, etc. Some of them expect sacrifices and can be propitiated or exorcised (see EXORCISM).

The most conspicuous change that takes place after the assimilation of this Vedic and popular demonology into Buddhism is that they are all subservient to the Buddha. With this they also come within the powers of men to control by means of virtue and cultivated mental powers. The demons themselves are not incorrigibly evil beings but may be harnessed to the service of Truth and Goodness. This fact is well exemplified in the *Āṭānāṭiya Suttanta* (s.v.), the *Ratana Sutta* (q.v.) and the *Mahāsamaya Suttanta* (q.v.). In the *Āṭānāṭiya Suttanta*, the four great kings (*cattāro mahārājāno*) who are divine but rule and control demons, are all devotees of the Buddha. It is Vessavana, also named Kubera, who rules over crores of *yakkhas* who gives the *Āṭānāṭiya Suttanta* as a rune to the Buddha so that he may give it to his followers who meditate in the woods and are frightened by non-believing *yakkhas*. This is an interesting allusion as it reveals the prevalent Buddhist belief that there are believing *yakkhas* and unbelieving ones, the believers being adherents of the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha, some of these *yakkha*-adherents being mentioned by name in the Canon, eg. *Sātāgira* (q.v.) and *Hemavata* (q.v.). *Ālavaka* (s.v.), the yakkha, is tamed by the Buddha. Some of the demonesses, referred to as *yakkhinī*, are also converted by the Buddha and become benevolent goddesses, one such being *Kālī*, the child-devouring demoness causing barrenness in women who, after her conversion, becomes the goddess to whom prayers are offerred for fertility. The conversion of these demons also implies their subsequent support for Virtue and Justice, and some of them hence become servants of Yama, the god of the departed who, from his throne in the netherworld sits in judgement over the deeds of men and punishes evil-doers (see YAMA). Such demons are *nirayapālas* or Yamapālas, who are perhaps the only subterranean group in Buddhist demonology.

In the Buddhist demonology, these sub-human beings are reborn to these unfortunate states as a result of their evil actions, often their abuse of their lives as human beings. This is found most emphasized in the *Petavatthu* where detailed narratives are given to illustrate the evil deeds which brought their doers to the pathetic and disabled plight in their world of intensified suffering. The Buddhist concept of rebirth is worked deeply into these narratives. At any rate, all demons, like all other beings, are reborn and are never an immortal species as stressed by the *Mahāsamaya Suttanta*. Māra (Death), who seems to take them all, is the personification of Evil but is sometimes referred to as a divine being, a *devaputta* and is himself subject to rebirth, just as much as Sakka, the lord of gods, is and has his successors in office. Māra, however, has as his retinue hosts of demons.

Trevor Ling gives special emphasis to the position of Māra in Buddhist demonology. He writes: "The Buddha .... appears to have made a new contribution to the demonology of his day. Out of the notion of the commonplace hostile demon, in conjunction with one or two other major concepts, such as that of Mṛtyu (Death personified) and Namuci, another great demon hostile to human welfare, there emerges in the teaching of the Buddha, the figure of Māra, the Evil One, the supreme head of all the forces that militated against human well-being and holy living. Instead of the experiences of evil being regarded as happening at random, they now begin to be seen as a part of the total evil in human experience which is brought into focus as having a unitary character. That is to say, all human experience of evil is seen as having a common root and source, and as having shared effects. To put it in these terms, however, is already to have moved into

the realm of abstract thinking and analysis. And this is precisely how the Buddhist notion of Māra, the Evil One, was used to serve as a bridge concept, a transition from the popular demonology on the one hand, which saw only chaos and random evil attacks from demons, to the idea of a common root for the ills which all humanity suffers, on the other. The importance of the concept lay in its use in religious practice. Whereas a peasant woman who encountered something terrifying in the darkness of the night might exclaim: "How terrible for me! There is a demon after me!": a Buddhist sister would in similar circumstances react by saying, 'Now who is this? It is that foolish Māra (for Māra's power, as every Buddhist knew, had been conquered once for all by the Buddha)": [*The Buddha*, New York, 1973, pp. 75 f.] Ling sums up, quoting another of his works that the teaching of the Buddha 'does not close the frontier of thought where it touches animism and popular demonology, it allows it to remain open, but controls it from the Buddhist side, and for Buddhist purposes' (Ling, *Buddhism and the Mythology of Evil*, London, 1962, p. 80).

An elaborately evolved Buddhist demonology manifests itself in the earliest important architecture of Buddhism, which came into being about the third century after Asoka, viz. the stūpas of Bharut and Sānchi, the ornamented gateways of which feature sculptures of figures from Buddhist demonology such as the male *yakṣa* and the female *yakṣī* whose main attribute is fertility. The *yakṣas* are the symbols of masculine virility while the *yakṣīs*, with their swollen, exaggerated breasts and wide pelvis, and almost always represented with a tree, are unmistakeably symbols of fecundity. However, the demons in Buddhist lore are still neither ferocious nor terrifying in their appearance, though they are depicted as guardians of sacred monuments, and it takes greater mixing up with popular lore before they assume their horrifying features.

As suggested in the earlier paragraphs, the spread of Buddhism seems to have been accompanied by gradual assimilation of the popular demonologies of the countries which Buddhism traversed or in which Buddhism took root. We have noted, through the evidence of its architecture, the transformation already taking place in Central India, in the third century after Asoka. As witnessed by the later Buddhist literature, art and folklore, the process intensifies and grows more complex in Southern India and becomes even more conspicuous as Buddhism spreads to countries whose cultures and racial compositions are more and more remote and different from the Indian. All the same, these various demonologies were given a Buddhist twist and orientation in all instances. The demons were made to appear as subordinate to the Buddha and as tameable by any human being through the mental powers acquired by the cultivation and application of the Buddhist virtues of *mettā* (friendliness) and *karuṇā* (compassion). Often the chanting of the Buddhist *suttas* and *gāthās* replaces the spells and charms of the indigenous demon cults, thus conferring magical qualities on the discourses of the Buddha or psalms in praise of him, his doctrine or his Order.

Sri Lanka is a very clear example of a country where the folk demonology has been greatly influenced by Buddhism, Buddhism being influenced by the demonology in turn. The Buddha has been considered as holding supreme control over the demons and both the oral tradition and the ancient historical chronicles like the *Mahāvaṃsa* and *Dīpavaṃsa* not only indicate the existence of an elaborate polydemonism but also go on to state that the Buddha visited the island in order to rid it of its demon-inhabitants, and had in fact the miraculous powers to succeed in doing so. Legends connected with the exorcist rituals known as *bali*, narrating the birth of this art, claim that the Buddha himself it was who gave powers to *Vesamuni*, the chief of the *yakkha* hordes of Sinhalese folk religion, who is no other that the guardian god, Vessavana or Kuvera of the *Āṭānāṭiya Sutta* where he is pictured as the ruler of the demon realm of the "North". In SriLanka, Buddhism has in fact helped to prevent the rise of demonolatry by its assertion that the Buddha and those who are honest adherents of his doctrine possess the power to drive away demons and to provide protection for the sick and disabled.

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BANDULA JAYAWARDHANA

DENGYŌ DAISHI, (767 - 822 A. C.) meaning the, 'Propagator of the True Religion', is the post-humous title by which the eminent Japanese Buddhist monk Suicho is better known. He is the founder of the Tendai (Chinese T'ien-t'ai) school of Buddhism in Japan. He is also the founder of the temple on Mount Hiei (Hieizan) which, under the name of Enryaku-ji, became the most famous centre of Buddhist activity during the Heian period.

Dengyō Daishi, a descendant of a Chinese immigrant, was born in 767 A.C. in Shiga (identified with modern Otsu in Lake Biwa), a farm in the Omi province. He entered the Order at the age of fourteen years and received ordination at Nara in 785 A.C. He found the monks in Nara to be more inclined to interest themselves in political affairs and also to be engaged in worldly pursuits than in spiritual advancement. He soon concluded that life in Nara was quite uncongenial to religious pursuits, and therefore, retired to the isolated Mount Hiei to lead a life of solitude. This very act of his taking up residence in Mount Hiei itself is proof of his remarkable courage, a characteristic which enabled him to overcome numerous obstacles and reach great heights as a spiritual leader. Being far-sighted, Dengyō Daishi, soon after taking up residence in Mount Hiei, entered into cordial relationship with Shintoism by honouring the Shinto deity Sanno who was supposed to be the lord of that place. Though he was not interested in political matters, he was fully aware of the value of royal patronage, and therefore, did his utmost to maintain good relations with the Emperor. Thus, he helped the Emperor Kwammu to shift the capital from Nara to Miyoko. On the one hand, Dengyō Daishi knew that this change of capital would enable the Emperor to rid himself of the direct influence of Nara monks and, on the other, he also realized that this would, in the long run, weaken the position of Nara monks. He rightly considered that such a change would ultimately help to further his own religious plan.

Soon after settling down on Mount Hiei, Dengyō Daishi gathered a few followers and managed to build a small monastery. He himself made a life-size image of Yakushi Nyorai BHAIṢAJYAGURU (q.v.) in whose protective power he seems to have had great faith.

Dengyō Daishi was dissatisfied not only with the city life in Nara but also with the schools of Buddhism prevalent in Nara. He directly rejected the teaching of the Hossō (q.v.) school which precluded a certain category of men from attaining deliverance. His aim was to preach a doctrine which emphasized the universality of salvation. He thought that the best way to put across this idea of universality of salvation was by emphasising such teachings as found in the *Hokkekyō* (*Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra*). Discarding the method followed by Sanron and Hossō schools in interpreting this sutra, he adopted the method set out by Shotoku Taishi (q.v.) and Ganjin (q.v.) and soon busied himself with the task of reviving the Ekayāna (sole vehicle) doctrine preached by them. He also depended, to a certain extent, on the teaching of universality of salvation put forward by the Kegon (q.v.) and Ritsu (q.v.) schools. By studying the relevant scriptures and preaching on these even to monks in Nara, he established himself as a monk of great learning.

However, he was not content with learning the scriptures. Wishing to acquaint himself more with this doctrine, Dengyō Daishi went to China in 804A.C. and resided at the Kuo-ching temple on Mount T'ien-t'ai. There he was reordained according to the rules of the T'ien-t'ai school and studied the doctrine under the monk named Tao-sui. In the meantime, he studied the teachings of the Shingon (q.v.) under Shun Hsiao at Yueh-chou and those of Ch'an (Zen) from a monk at T'ang Hsing. He returned to Japan the following year bringing along with him many texts of the Tendai school and also those belonging to esoteric Buddhism (Mikkyō). Emperor Kwammu was greatly attracted towards Mikkyō teaching but unfortunately Dengyō Daishi was not quite conversant with its rites and rituals and as such had to seek the assistance of his junior contemporary Kūkai. These two worked in collaboration for sometime but before long their relations got strained and Dengyō Daishi had to give up the hope of incorporating esoteric ideas in his teachings.

After returning from China Dengyō Daishi met with moderate success. About this time there were minor influxes of people from Korea and China into Japan. Dengyō Daishi's teachings helped to bring about a congenial atmosphere and better understanding among the men of different nationalities. In fact, Emperor Kwammu considered Dengyō Daishi to be his spiritual guide. He even sanctioned the founding of the Tendai-Hokkeshu in 806 A.C.; but unfortunately for Dengyō Daishi, Emperor Kwammu, who had been his great benefactor, died the same year. From there starts the most difficult years in Dengyō Daishi's life.

He realized that as long as he had to depend on Nara for ordination he could not hope to establish firmly his newly founded teaching, which went directly against the old schools of Nara. On more than one occasion he had the bitter experience of finding his own students, who had to go to Nara to receive ordination, deserting him either being dazzled by the splendour of city life or being won over by the monks of Nara. Since returning from China he was determined than ever before to break himself free from the influence of Nara. As he himself had received re-ordination in accordance with the rules of the Tien-t'ai school in China, he considered himself entitled to continue the succession by bestowing ordination on others. Thus, in 807 he held one such ordination which is described as the first *Ichijo-tai-kai* held in Japan. But owing to great opposition from Nara, Dengyō Daishi was not granted permission to hold any more ordination ceremonies. Dengyō Daishi, however, was not completely discouraged by this opposition. There was no irregularity in his request as there were already in existence two such ordination Halls (*Kaidan*) besides the one at Nara. Dengyō Daishi argued that it is a denial of justice to insist that his pupils who follow Mahāyāna doctrine should submit themselves to Hinayāna rules. However justifiable his case was Dengyō was unable, during his own lifetime, to get imperial sanction to establish an independent *Kaidan*. Yet he did not give up his campaign or his religious pursuits. Even in the midst of his campaigns for religious independence, he found time to attend to scholarly work. He wrote several works of which his commentary on the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra* and the work called *ShugoKokkai-sho* (Defence of the Country) are the best known.

In recognition of his learning and service to the cause of religion, the title 'Dengyō Hoshi' was conferred on him shortly before his death. Dengyō Daishi died in 822 A.C. with his wish of having an independent *Kaidan* unfulfilled. However, it did not take very long for the rulers to realize the validity of Dengyō Daishi's claim and consequently in 827 A.C. the Emperor granted permission to establish a *Kaidan* at Hiei and to confer ordination independent of Nara.

History of Japanese Buddhism bears witness to the magnitude of Dengyō Daishi's achievements. Though he based his doctrine on the T'ien-t'ai school of China, Dengyō Daishi was able to infuse it with a distinctly Japanese flavour. That his doctrine did enormously influence the later Japanese Buddhist thought is seen from the fact that the teachings of most of the eminent later Japanese Buddhist teachers such as Honen, Shinran, Eisai Dogen and Nichiren and many others are devoted mainly to emphasise some views found in the teachings of the Tendai School. The small temple he founded on Mount Hiei became an important centre of Buddhist activity even during his own life-time. It was officially declared to be 'the Seat of Buddhist Religion for ensuring the security of the Country' (*Chingo-kokka no Dojo*). This monastery he founded flourished to become a great school of Buddhist thought and art which immensely influenced the cultural and religious life of the Japanese people. With the passage of time the impact of Dengyō Daishi's achievements was felt more, and in further recognition of his great services his earlier title of Dengyō Hoshi was changed by Emperor Seiwa, in 866, to Dengyō Daishi.

S.K.N.

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DEPENDENT ORIGINATION, the English term which has come to be commonly used by translators to designate the specifically Buddhist concept of causation usually referred to in Buddhist scriptures by the terms *paṭicca-samuppāda* (Pali) and *pratītya-samutpāda* (Skt.). The term 'conditioned genesis' has been used as an alternative translation while the concept has also been discussed as 'the principle of conditionality,' or 'relativity'.

The theory or doctrine covered by the term consists principally of the statement as a universal law, that all phenomena (*dhammā*), mental or physical, are dependent on conditions for their occurrence and that nothing occurs independently, isolatedly or fortuitously: all phenomena in the universe, however seemingly static, are, for the Buddhists, merely events and the doctrine of dependent origination maintains that these events arise as a result of the confluence and concomitance of conditions; that the succession of events is regulated by the conditions which prevail at its arising, or, to put it differently, converge at the point of its happening. For a tree to grow from a seed, the conditions of earth and water must converge, even as much as the condition that the seed must be fresh and unbroken has to be fulfilled (*S.* III,, 54). Otherwise, the seed will probably be succeeded by a dried piece of organic matter

returning to the earth as humus. A flame is succeeded by a flame, or in other words, a flame continues to burn, provided it has, among other conditions, fuel (*upādāna*) which sustains it. In short, there is a necessary connection in the succession of events. The nature of a preceding event has an affinity with the nature of its successor, although this nature is likely to vary according to the other conditions prevalent at the latter's origination. The universe in Time is not a mere series of events. Events have a lineage, a geneology, a history. Certain events are connected with certain others, and if the past repeats itself, certain events in the future can be predicted with a fair amount of confidence, and this can be said of man and of his mind too, even though with less certainty. Each man's life, or the human predicament in general, is a result of conditions, obeying similar laws as other events in nature. That is the doctrine of dependent origination as implied by the literal sense of its Pali (or Sanskrit) equivalent, and generally found to be accepted in the Buddhist literature of most schools. Dependent origination as a law is held to be applicable to all phenomena, physical and mental, individual and social, historical and eschatological.

In most contexts, however, where this statement of the conditioned arising of phenomena is asserted in the Buddhist texts, it is invariably and immediately followed up with the assertion that the conditions being removed, the phenomena concerned cease to be, or more precisely, cease to arise. This second aspect is one which the early Buddhist writers seem to be eager to stress, perhaps through a desire to emphasize the contingent element which they saw in causation. If conditions give rise to events, the conditions being absent, the events would not follow, they maintained. If the flame lights up when the fuel is supplied, it could also be made to flicker and die out by removing the fuel. In other words, the Buddhist law of causation is a law of contingent causation.

This contingency in causation assumed great importance for the Buddhist because of its implication for their ethic, their soteriology and the place such a tenet accords to the role of human effort and will in the eradication of pain and suffering. The implication became all the more obvious when placed in contrast with a strictly deterministic view of causation, theistic or naturalistic, and its significance would be clear when we reflect that the goal of the religious life, according to the Buddhists, was the liberation from suffering.

Despite the literal meaning which would make it broad enough to embrace the general principle discussed above, the term 'dependent origination' has been usually used in a narrower and more specific sense which confines its meaning to the special application made of the general principle, the universal law. This application has been made for the purpose of tracing the exact conditions or factors which give rise to individual suffering, or rather, to the individual personality which forms the base for that suffering. The analysis which takes place as a result of applying this universal law to the problems of suffering leaves us with a series of eleven causal factors which are independently and together operative in the emergence of the individuality, together with its inevitable concomitant of suffering. Each of these causal factors can be stated in terms of the formula: By X conditioned is/are Y.

In an assembly of these eleven causal relationships, eleven factors emerge which are independently necessary and together sufficient for the origination of suffering, each factor (X) giving rise to its successor (Y) and finally conjoined to bring about the complex result *dukkha* which has its various manifestations in decay and death (*jarā-maraṇa*), sorrow (*soka*) lamentation (*paridevа*), pain (*dukkha*), grief (*domanassa*) and despair (*upāyāsa*), appearing sometimes singly, sometimes in various combinations. These eleven factors, in order of their most familiar occurrence in the texts, are as follows:—

1. *Avijjā* (trsl. Ignorance)
2. *Saṅkhāra* (trsl. Karma-formations or synergies or dispositions)
3. *Viññāṇa* (trsl. Consciousness)
4. *Nāma-Rūpa* (trsl. Mentality and Corporeality: Name and Form or Mind and Body).
5. *Saḷāyatana* (trsl. six Bases, i.e. the five sense-organs with the Mind as the sixth).
6. *Phassa* (trsl. Contact or Impression).
7. *Vedanā* (trsl. Sensation).
8. *Taṇhā* (trsl. Craving or Desire or Thirst)
9. *Upādāna* (trsl. Clinging or Grasping).
10. *Bhava* (trsl. the Process of Becoming).
11. *Jāti* (trsl. Birth, or Rebirth).

All these factors perpetuate and sustain the life process. The process may, in fact, be traced as beginning with factor (1), which when represented by

X, Y of the formula would represent factor (2): this would be the first of the eleven causal relations: but in the next, i.e. the second, factor (2) in fact would be X and factor (3) would be Y. This process would continue, with each succeeding factor becoming the preceding factor in the next causal law until we reach factor (11), which functions as X for the whole mass of suffering (*dukkhakkhanda*) that is identifiable with life itself. This last is sometimes referred to as a twelfth 'link', whence the title 'twelve-fold formula' sometimes given to the special application of the principle of dependent origination, although perhaps not so accurately, since it is not given as a condition but the effect.

Some Western scholars, in order to retain the distinction between the general principle and special application, have described the latter as "the Chain of Dependent Origination," the metaphorical epithet having been originally introduced by Burnouf, as is suggested by Thomas (*History of Buddhist Thought*, London, 1933, p. 58). This epithet apparently derives from the fact that the dovetailing of each preceding factor as a "link" into the successor builds up the picture of a chain.

This description, although challenged, (see, ibid. p. 58) is not altogether inaccurate as it shows the manner in which each "link" connects itself with the next, and all of them connect with each other, the first with the last. It may be remarked that the scriptures repeat the process from the effect back to all the links as it does from the first "link" to the effect, and sometimes even pick up at some convenient point in the chain according as it is relevant to the context of a discussion or discourse. The *Visuddhi-magga* (*XVII*), in fact, points out the various ways in which the Chain, with its relevant sections, are presented.

Simultaneity.

A rational examination will show that it could not have been meant that the sense-organs (*saḷā-yatana*) cease to be, immediately after contact (*phassa*) and the consequent arising of feeling (*vedanā*). While contact may or may not cease, the sense-organs must be considered as remaining, not only till the arising and decline (or persistence) of feeling but throughout all the succeeding processes or "links" even until decay and death (*jarā-maraṇa*) and the *dukkhakkhanda* complex. Similarly may it be said of *viññāṇa*, *nāma-rūpa*, *taṇhā*, *upādāna*, *bhava*. They are the most obvious of the factors which demand the simultaneity of the other conditions. Thus it is obvious that the doctrine of dependent origination assumes the simultaneous presence of conditions at the arising of the *dukkha-khanda* phenomenon. But this must not distort the fact that the doctrine also assumes a sequential order that projects beyond a single life-span. The traditional exposition of Buddhaghosa (*Vism.* xvii) divides the "chain" into three successive lives: it is the *avijjā* (factor 1) and *saṅkhāra* (2) of a past life which give rise to our present conscious existence (3): it is the process of becoming (*bhava*) in the present life (10) which is the cause of future rebirth (*jāti*). Nyanatiloka points out that this is not merely a "commentarial interpretation," but is also clearly and in a most unambiguous manner supported by canonical Sutta-texts (*Guide through the Abhidhamma Pitaka*, Colombo, 1938, pp.141 f.).

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DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY, a term "applied to the explanation of experience and behaviour in terms of phenomena of the unconscious, and especially of the deep unconscious"[1] and described[2] as the "science of unconscious mental processes.."[3] It is one of the two meanings of psychoanalysis (a term invented by Freud), the other being a particular method of treating nervous disorders. Psychoanalysis, which originally was an attempt at explaining pathological mental phenomena, has, in its character of depth psychology, become a study of normal mental life, especially with the discovery that the dreams and mistakes, such as slips of the tongue of normal men, have the same mechanism as neurotic symptoms. It has been now established that the difference of mental life between so-called normality and neurosis is only a matter of degree.[4] This finding based on the Freudian dictum, "we are all somewhat hysterical," sounds like a rewording of the Buddhist observation, "all worldlings are prone to be mentally ill" (*S.* III, pp. 2-3; *A.* II, pp. 142-3; *Vbh A*, p. 186).

1 James Drever, *A Dictionary of Psychology*, Penguin Books, 1953.
2 To attempt at a definition of the term'depth psychology' is beyond the scope of this article.
3 *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, U.S.A., 1973, p. 721a.
4 Philip Rieff, *Freud: The Mind of the Moralist*, New York, 1959.

Depth psychology, as mentioned above, is described as the "science of unconscious mental processes." rather than as the "science of the unconscious." This suggests that the modern research in the field of psychology has rediscovered the Buddhist concept of dynamic mental life. Though the concept of the dynamic nature of mind is new even in modern psychology, it has been a fundamental principle in Buddhism. In Buddhism mind is described in dynamic terms as a flow (*sota*), a continuum (*santāna*), a running (*javana*), or a process (*vīthi*).

Depth psychology, in its completeness as a science of the mind, is closer to Buddhism than to other sciences such as metaphysics, epistemology, logic and theology, all of which are sciences of the mind in their own way. But, even depth psychology deals with the mind only to the extent of transforming hysterical misery into everyday unhappiness. Even with its new research with new terminology it has not and it does not allow itself to go beyond that to the ideal state of psychological maturation which is as deep as that of an *arahant*, the ideal of psychological perfection in Buddhism. Thus, Buddhism focuses on the mind more than any of the other sciences of the mind. In Buddhism, the personality of man is conditioned and sustained by the activity of the mind (*manas*) and consequently the character and destiny of man are also likewise determined by the mind.[5] It must be added here that man, according to the teaching of the Buddha, is a psycho-physical combination of mind and body (*nāma-rūpa*). Sensation (*vedanā*), perception (*saññā*), mental formations (*saṅkhāra*) and consciousness (*viññāṇa*) are the non-physical factors in man collectively regarded as mind (*nāma*) and the four great primaries or elements (*cattāri mahābhūtāni*) which are described as extension (i.e., earth- *paṭhavi*), cohesion (i.e., water- *āpo*), heat (i.e., fire - *tejo*) and vibration (i.e., wind- *vāyo*) are the physical factors in man collectively regarded as body (*rūpa*).. These five different groups (*rūpa* or the material component on the one hand and *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṅkhāra* and *viññāṇa* on the other) into which the psycho-physical entity called man is analysable are referred to in Buddhist texts as *khandhas* (aggregates), and their totality, i.e., the *pañcakkhandha* (five-fold aggregates) constitute the basis of the so-called individuality or personality.

Depth psychology considers mental life from three points of view, viz., the dynamic, the economic and the topographical.[6]

From the dynamic point of view, mental processes result from the interplay of forces which are originally in the nature of instincts.

By empirical analysis, there are two groups of instincts, those which are directed towards self-preservation, and the object instincts, which are concerned with relations to external objects.

But by speculation it has been formulated that there are two fundamental instincts which lie concealed behind the manifest ego instincts and object instincts, namely, *eros* (or the unifying instinct), the instinct which strives for ever-closer union, and *thanatos* (or the death - i.e., destructive - instinct) which leads toward the dissolution of what is living. The manifestation of the force of *eros* is given the name *libido*, which comes from the Latin word for "lust."

In Buddhism, *kāma* is the word for "lust," and like the word *libido*, it can be used to mean the sexuality in its narrow sense as well as the enjoyment of the five senses in general. But the *libido* as explained in modern psychology resembles the Buddhist concept of *kāma-taṇhā* (craving for sense-gratification). Craving for sense-gratification is a manifestation of greed (*lobha*); and greed is a basic root (*mūla*) of unwholesome motivation. This Buddhist term "root" is conceived in psychology as motive, force, drive, instinct, inclination, etc.[7] But "root" is a more appropriate term, for while it suggests the cause of unwholesome (as well as wholesome) motivation, it also implies the possibility of rooting out completely those forces without leaving even that "bit of unconquerable nature in each of

5 *Manopubbaṅgamā dhammā*
manoseṭṭhā manomayā
Manasā ce paduṭṭhena
bhāsati vā karoti vā
Tato nam dukkhamanveti
Cakkaṃ'va vahato padaṃ
Manopubbaṅgamā dhammā
manoseṭṭhā manomayā
Manasā ce pasannena - bhāsati vā karoti vā
Tato nam sukhamanveti - chāyā'va anapāyini (*Dhp. vv.1-2*)

6 This article is based on the developed theories of depth psychology largely formulated in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, U.S.A., 1973, and in some texts published in 1973 and 1974. The purpose of this article is not *to* educate the reader on depth psychology, but to show its relation to Buddhism.

7 For details of these Buddhist concepts, see under their headings.

us" at which Freudian psychology as well as modern psychology stop. Furthermore, the Buddhist concept of motivation is more comprehensive than the psychology based on the western concept of man being born of sin. As Jung pointed out in criticizing Freud, Buddhism, too, admits that man has motives which are both good and bad. In Buddhism motivations of human behaviour are traced to six roots which fall into two groups as wholesome (*kusala-mūla*) and unwholesome (*akusala-mūla*): the wholesome roots are charity, amity and wisdom (*alobha*, *adosa* and *amoha*) and the unwholesome roots are greed, hatred and delusion (*lobha* or *rāga*, *dosa* and *moha*). The concept of craving for sense-gratification as a pleasure principle is much broader than the notion of pleasure conceptualized in the *libido*; and the therapy for the mentally ill is much more deep and radical in Buddhism than in psychology, for psychology aims at bringing a person to his normal behaviour free from neurosis, while this normal person, according to Buddhism, is a worldling (*puthujjana*) whose mental illness continues until the final stage of arahantship is attained. This is evidenced in the *Aṅguttara-Nikāya* (*A*. II, pp. 142-3):

"Monks, there are these two diseases. What two? Disease of body and disease of mind. Monks, there are beings who can claim freedom from suffering from bodily disease for a year....or even a hundred years. But, monks, those beings are hard to find in the world who can claim freedom from mental disease even for one moment, apart from those in whom the defilements (*āsavā*) are destroyed, namely, arahants".

The *ego instinct* (of the early Freudian threefold scheme of the *libido*, the ego instinct and the death instinct), too, according to later theory, falls within the *eros*. Generally, the *libido* and the ego instinct are said to function through the "pleasure principle" and the "reality principle" respectively. The reality described in this particular "reality principle" is foreign to the Buddhist concept of reality. In Buddhism, this psychological reality is also a manifestation of craving (*taṇhā*). Considering the Buddhist concept of this psychological reality, it is interesting to note that in the final analysis Freud accepted that "this reality principle," also at bottom seeks pleasure, although a delayed pleasure.....Actually, the substitution of the reality principle for the pleasure principle does not imply a dethronement of the pleasure principle but only a safeguarding of it. A momentary pleasure, uncertain in its results, is given up, but only in order to gain an assured pleasure coming later.[8] The concept that the ego instinct manifests itself as self-preservation, self-love, self-assertion, self-respect, self-continuity etc. shows how far it seeks pleasure and how far it is subject to craving. In this respect, it is only a form of craving called *bhava-taṇhā* (craving for self-preservation) in Buddhism. As the *libido* and the *ego instinct*, working basically on the pleasure principle, are the two manifestations of the *eros*, likewise *kāma-taṇhā* and *bhava-taṇhā* are the two manifestations of *lobha* (greed). Further, the distinction between the *libido* and the *ego instinct* could be seen even between *kāma-taṇhā* (craving for sense gratification) and *bhava-taṇhā* (craving for self-preservation)[9] in Buddhism.

Of the two fundamental instincts in depth psychology, *eros* and *thanatos*, *thanatos* (or the death instinct), the instinct for destruction, dissolution, separation, annihilation etc., resembles *vibhava-taṇhā* (craving for self-annihilation) of the threefold classification of craving (*taṇhā*) in Buddhism, viz., *kāma-taṇhā*, *bhava-taṇhā* and *vibhava-taṇhā*. Among the meanings given by various scholars to describe *vibhava-* and *vibhava-taṇhā*, "craving for self-annihilation" stands quite appropriate in its psychological sequence.[10] In Buddhism craving for self-annihilation and craving for self-preservation are not contradictory opposites. They are mere contrasts that work within the framework of craving. But their roots of motivation differ. While craving for sense-gratification and craving for self-preservation spring from the root greed (*lobha*), craving for self-annihilation springs from the root hatred (*dosa*); and it finds expression in all forms of aggression. It manifests as aiming at annihilation of self, but when redirected outward it can manifest itself as hostility to others. Worldlings when touched by painful feeling, "weep, wail, cry, knock the breast and come to utter bewilderment" even to the extent of destroying external objects. Just as people are attracted by pleasure-giving experiences, they are repelled by painful experiences. (Thus, greed and hatred are two primal unwholesome instinctual roots in Buddhism). This subtle function of hatred in its craving for self-annihilation has been redis-

8 M. W. Padmasiri de Silva, *Buddhist and Freudian Psychology*, Sri Lanka, 1973, p.85.
9 M. W. Padmasiri de Silva, op. cit. p. 131. In the same source pp. 129 ff. Secondary Narcissism has been compared with the Buddhist concept of *māna* (pride).
10 *Uccheda-diṭṭhi-sahagato rāgo vibhavataṇhā*: *DA*. III, p. 988.

covered in modern psychology by taking *thanatos* or the death instinct as a force for the source of aggression.[11]

Thus, depth psychology in its dynamic point of view seems an exposition of *taṇhā*, the fundamental force of unwholesome motivation in Buddhism, *eros* resembling *kāma-taṇhā* and *bhava-taṇhā* and *thanatos vibhava-taṇhā*, which fall within the primal instinctual root *lobha* and *dosa* respectively. The other primal instinctual root is *moha* (delusion), which is beyond the scope of western psychology. In Buddhism, this is the most fundamental unwholesome root of motivation. It prevents man from seeing the true nature of things. It is this root that keeps the worldling (even the psychologists of repute like Freud as long as they remain worldlings - *puthujjana*) mentally ill as Philip Rieff pointed out in his work on Freud: "Aware at last that he is chronically ill, psychological man may nevertheless end the ancient quest of his predecessors for a healing doctrine. His experience with the latest one, Freud, may finally teach him that every cure must expose him to new illness."[12] The mental health formulated according to modern psychological thinking as the ideal state is a manifestation of this instinctual root "delusion", according to Buddhism. On the other hand, the degree of mental health associated with *Nibbāna* as described by the Buddha (see *M.* I, pp 173, 511;) is attainable only by arahants, persons of high psychological maturation from the Buddhist perspective.

From the *economic* point of view, depth psychology admits that the mental processes are regulated by two principles, viz., the pleasure principle and the reality principle. According to the reality principle, which is foreign to the reality Buddhism speaks of, the pleasure of satisfaction is postponed and feelings of pain are temporarily tolerated in order to gain an assured pleasure coming later. Thus, like the pleasure principle, the reality principle, as Freud admits, also at bottom seeks pleasure. In other words, the mental processes are bent on gaining pleasure and avoiding pain. The functioning of the pleasure-pain principle in this manner is compared in Buddhism to the change of the four modes of behaviour, viz., walking, standing, sitting and lying down, in each case change implying a shift from pain to pleasure, which pleasure in turn would reduce itself to a state of pain on the principle of diminishing returns. According to Buddhism, the pleasure principle and the reality principle or the pleasure-pain principle of the psychologists are the outcome of ignorance (*moha*) of the most fundamental fact of life, i.e., the inevitable existence of *dukkha*. (The Pali word *dukkha*, often translated as "suffering", embraces all types of displeasurable experience - sorrow, fear, worry, pain, despair, discord, frustration, agitation, irritation, etc.) Thinking on the line of the pleasure-pain principle, psychoanalysts believe that, according to the reality principle, even religions postpone pleasure to the next life. But Buddhism does not advocate the idea that by renouncing pleasure in this life one can gain pleasure in the next life. According to Buddhism, to gain the ultimate peace of mind, i.e., Nibbāna, what has to be renounced in this life or in any other life is not pleasure or pain but craving (or desire: *taṇhā*) in all its forms. The *Suttanipāta* (*vv.* 766 ff.) in a *résumé* explains as to how craving works on the mental behaviour:

> The man whose heart's desires are gratified
> is glad indeed to see success secured.
> But, if his heart's desires and aims be foiled,
> he smarts as if a dart had wounded him.
> Yet, should he shun desires as he would shun
> a snake's head underfoot, by vigilance
> he overcomes the world's seductive lures.
>
> (Trsl. *HOS.* Vol. 37, p. 185)

From the *topographical* point of view, depth psychology regards the mental apparatus as a composite instrument and endeavours to determine at what points in it do the various mental processes function. It is said that the mental apparatus is composed of an *id*, an *ego* and a *super-ego*.

The *id* is the reservoir of the instinctive impulses. It contains everything that is inherited, that is present at birth, that is fixed in the constitution—above all, therefore, the instincts, which originate in the somatic organization and which find their first mental expression in *id* in forms unknown to us.[13] This concept of *id* closely resembles the Buddhist concept

11 Some scholars take Nirvana as resembling the death instinct. But the Buddhist concept of Nirvana is far away from this death instinct which is a form of craving in Buddhism. In fact, Buddhist Nirvana stands in opposition to both craving for self-preservation and craving for self-annihilation. In Buddhism, the concept of self-preservation is an illusion involved in *sassata-diṭṭhi* (heresy of personal immortality), and the concept of self-annihilation is an illusion involved in *uccheda-diṭṭhi* (heresy of annihilation).

12 Philip Rieff, *Freud: The Mind of the Moralist*, New York, 1959, p.392.

13 Sigmund Freud, *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis*, London, 1949, p.2.

of *dsavas*[14] (cankers), grouped into four as *kāma* (sensuality), *bhava* (lust for life), *diṭṭhi* (speculation) and *avijjā* (ignorance). As *id* is said to contain everything that is present at birth, it resembles the Buddhist *kamma* (volitional activity), the motive force of all actions, good and bad, performed in the past. But the concept of *kamma* still remains beyond the scope of the academic psychology and the mental chemistry theories.

The *ego* is the most superficial portion of the *id*. The *id* works on the pleasure-principle and always desires instinctual satisfaction whenever an internal tension is felt. While the *id* is never in direct contact with "reality", mediating between it and the external world, it is the *ego* which works on the reality-principle. It decides whether the demands of the *id* are to be satisfied at all or postponed according to the necessities of self-preservation in the real world.[15] This concept of the *ego* resembles the Buddhist concept of *attavāda-upādāna* (clinging to belief in a self). While the doctrine of *anatta* (non-self) remains a basic teaching of Buddhism, it has been often pointed out that it is quite difficult for the worldlings to be free from the belief in a self. *Avijjā* (ignorance, i.e. not understanding suffering, its origin, its cessation and the way leading to the cessation of suffering) is the cause for this clinging and *bhava-taṇhā* (craving for self-preservation) is a manifestation of it. "It is an established psychological fact that desire produces an emotional investment into its object and also strong conscious images relating to the same object. If we, for instance, strongly desire a continuation of life, this desire will strengthen the conscious stream by adding more emotions and ideations, and this will be felt to be a *causal factor* towards new life."[16]

The *super-ego*, which develops out of the *id*, dominates the *ego* and represents the inhibitions of instinct characteristic of man."[17] It is said that the *super-ego* forms when the child is about five years old and takes the place of the parents and later of the teachers and other influential persons in society. Accordingly, depth psychology accepts that many of the neuroses arise out of the inability to transcend certain childish attitudes; and, therefore, the attempt of the psychoanalyst is to make the patient realise this fact. "But very often, a mere realisation, in the sense of a purely intellectual acceptance of the truth does not effect the cure. It must come not as a realisation but as a revelation - flash; the truth, in other words, must be experienced."[18] But the psychoanalyst stops as soon as the patient is transformed from an immature adult into a mature one without realising that an adult, with his lusts (*rāga* or *lobha*), hates (*dosa*) and delusions (*moha*) is still a child, in more senses than one, in Buddhism.

In depth psychology, consciousness, too, has a topographical reference; for processes in the *id* are entirely unconscious, while consciousness is the function of the *ego's* outermost layer, which is concerned with the perception of the external world.[19] The most important concept in depth psychology is that of the *unconscious*. Freud thought that the *unconscious* was the larger part of the mind. And then there were the *conscious* and the *pre-conscious* realms of the mind. The *conscious* realm of the mind is that of which the individual is aware at the time. The *conscious* part of the mind is small in comparison to the *pre-conscious* and the *unconscious*. It is constantly shifting and changing and gains its consciousness from the external world for the time. Thus, Freud remarks, "There is no need to characterise what we call conscious; it is the same as the consciousness of philosophers and of everyday opinion. Everything else that is mental is in our view unconscious. We are soon led to make an important division in this unconscious. Some processes become conscious once more without any trouble.....What is conscious is conscious only for a moment."[20] Further, Freud points out that in the conscious perception of the intellectual processes some perceptions persist while others pass in a flash. In this manner, Freud introduces the concept of the *pre-conscious*, and remarks, "Everything unconscious that behaves in this way, that can easily exchange the unconsious condition for the conscious one, is therefore better described as 'capable of entering consciousness' or as pre-conscious."[21] In other words, the *pre-conscious* is that part of the mind the contents of which are easily recalled or brought into consciousness. The *pre-conscious* could be considered as the

14 M. W. Padmasiri de Silva, op. cit. p.61.
15 P. M. Rao, *The Problem of Sin*, Buddhist Publication Society, Ceylon, 1969, p.11.
16 Rune Johansson, *The Psychology of Nirvana*, London, 1969, p.81.
17 *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, op. cit. p.721 b.
18 P. M. Rao, op. cit. p.28.
19 *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, op. cit. p.721 b.
20 Sigmund Freud, op. cit. p.19.
21 ibid. loc. cit.

seat of ordinary memory and is more like the *conscious* than the *unconscious* . The *unconscious* is always engaged in mental processes of which the individual is unaware, but at the same time his behaviour is being influenced by these unconscious mental processes. Thus, the *unconscious* by itself is not static but dynamic. Another characteristic of the *unconscious* is that it is predominantly emotional and full of such desires as are repressed from the consciousness and that which never become conscious.[22]

Buddhism is a psycho-ethical system. In this system, man is considered a "psycho-physical unit whose 'psyche' is not a changeless soul but a dynamic continuum"[23] composed of a mind process (*viññāṇa-sota*) which is being conditionally built up all the time (*paṭiccasamuppanna*), effecting change for better or for worse according to the direction given and the degree of control exercised over it. By this system, conscious acts are to be regulated according to its ethical system, for a conscious act performed with a motive (*cetanā*), good or bad, results in *kamma*.[24] Thus, *kamma* becomes the motive force of all actions, good and bad, performed in the present life as well as in the previous lives. And it is also this motive force that brings back to the dying man the memory of his actions concentrated in the shape of a last-thought (*cuticitta*). Thus, when the *pre-conscious* is taken as the seat of memory, in Buddhism it is at a deeper level than in psychology. At the time of his death an act performed by a man even a hundred thousand crores of aeons ago might present itself before him. Again, the death, however quick or sudden it may be and under whatever circumstances it occurs, is always preceded by a thought that modifies the character of the next birth (*VbhA*. p. 156).[25] After death with the last-thought or death-consciousness (*cuticitta*) there begins again with the rebirth-consciousness (*paṭisandhi-citta*) the continuous flow of the mind including unconscious and subconscious processes, as well as conscious processes which persist until one reaches the psychological maturation in arahantship, whereafter one ceases to be reborn with the ceasing of death-consciousness (Cf. *Vsm*. PTS. p.460). Death-consciousness and rebirth-consciousness are both aspects of *bhavaṅga*.[26] "*Bhavaṅga* can be better termed "subconscious"[27]in the sense of a state of semi-awareness or the lowest degree of consciousness".[28] It is "always accompanied by some degree of awareness."[29] But it is free from thought-processes. Hence it is called *vīthimutta*, *vīthi* meaning a process; and mind when it is active is known as opposed to *vīthimutta*. A thought-process is *cittavīthi*, and the activity is often referred to as a *visayappavatti*, a process having reference to an object. Thought-processes begin when the flow of *bhavaṅgacitta* is disturbed by a thought. When the *bhavaṅga* ceases to flow, there arises mind (*mano*) performing the function of attention, and this followed upon by sensory awareness (*indriyaviññāṇa*) and several varieties of mental cognition (*mano-viññāṇa*) proceeding one after another in regular succession and leading to full cognition of the external world. The series of mental states from subconsciousness to active cognition would be, in order, *bhavaṅga-viññāṇa*, *mano*, *indriya-viññāṇa* and *mano-viññāṇa*. Thus, the state of *bhavaṅga* or *vīthimutta* is referred to as the natural condition of the mind. In this condition it is free from all moral impurities, and shines in its own radiance. It is only as a result of external influence that it loses its natural lustre and becomes stained with impurities (*DhsA*. p.140). It is interesting to note that the *ālayaviññāṇa* (q.v.) of the Yogācāra school of Buddhism is also defined in practically identical terms as being mind in its pure state, shining in its natural lustre (*Lank*. p. 222).[30] This *ālayaviññāṇa* (the store-consciousness) of the Yogācāra school corresponds roughly to Jung's *collective unconscious*. But, while Jung's concept of the collective unconscious bears some similarity to the *ālayaviññāṇa* concept of later Buddhism, the Freudian *unconscious* resembles the concept of the unconscious in early Buddhism, viz., the concept of *anusaya*[31] (latent tendencies) and the concept of *mano-saṅkhāra* (mental dispositions). *Anusaya* and *mano-saṅkhāra*, like the *unconscious*,

22 Sita Ram Jayaswal, *Personality*, India, 1957, pp. 37–8.
23 K. N. Jayatilleke, *Buddhism and Science*, Buddhist Publication Society, Ceylon, 1958, p.3.
24 *Cetanāhaṃ bhikkhave kammaṃ vadāmi; cetayitvā kammaṃ karoti kāyena vācāya manasā: A*. Vol.III,p.415.
25 E. R. Sarathchandra, *Buddhist Psychology of Perception*, Colombo, 1958, p. 84.
26 E. R. Sarathchandra, op. cit. p.83.
27 "Subconscious" is a "term employed mainly by the French school of psycho-pathology, for processes of the same order as conscious processes, but occurring outside the personal awareness of the individual, often employed loosely, as equivalent of unconscious." (James Drever, *A Dictionary of Psychology*, Penguin Books, 1953).
28 M. W. Padmasiri de Silva, op. cit., p.61.
29 Edward Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India*, London, 1962, p. 132.
30 E. R. Sarathchandra, op. cit. pp,82–96.
31 See W. F. Jayasuriya, *The Psychology and Philosophy of Buddhism*, Colombo; and M. W. Padmasiri de Silva, op. cit.

lie latent in the deeper levels of the mind and influence the behaviour of the worldlings (*puthujjana*) without their knowledge. Thus, they constitute an aspect of unconscious motivation. However, the *mano-saṅkhāras* have a wider dimension extending through innumerable births which clinical psychology has not uncovered still. And of the seven *anusayas* (*D.* III, p. 254), *vicikicchānusaya* (*anusaya* of scepticism) and *avijjānusaya* (*anusaya* of ignorance) remain beyond the scope of psychology. Of the remaining five *anusayas*, *kāmarāgānusaya* (*anusaya* of sensuous craving) resembles the *libido*, *paṭighānusaya* (*anusaya* of repugnance) the *thanatos*, and *diṭṭhānusaya* (*anusaya* of speculation) *mānānusaya* (*anusaya* of conceit) and *bhavarāgānusaya* (*anusaya* of craving for existence), the ego. To get an insight into the working of the *anusayas* and the *mano-saṅkhāras*, a special kind of knowledge like extrasensory cognition (e.g., *cetopariyañāṇa*) is necessary. Likewise, in depth psychology, to get at unconscious processes a special technique like the hypnotic method or that of free association, is necessary. But, while psychology brings into consciousness the unconscious motivation of certain patterns of abnormal behaviour and thereby makes one's behaviour normal, Buddhism aims at rooting out completely the very motives which prompt not only abnormal but also undesirable, though 'normal', patterns of behaviour. Thus, as a therapy for mental illness Buddhism is more radical than psycho-analysis. Furthermore, the concept of mental health in Buddhism, as demonstrated above, is wider than that of psychology. "The psychologist stresses society, the personal success and effectiveness in this world, the unceasing activity (towards badly defined, even dubious and contradictory, goals). The Buddha stressed the individual development to internal freedom and intelligent judgment, 'disinterested' action, balance and stability."[32]

E. HECTOR PERERA

32 Rune E. A. Johansson, *The Psychology of Nirvana*, London, 1969, pp. 136 f.

DE-PUNG, (Dre-pung) or Bras-spuns or Hbras-spuns, meaning 'rice heap,' and so named after Dhanyakaṭaka (q.v.) in Andhra, is one of the biggest monasteries in Tibet, situated about three miles to the west of Lhasa. This monastery, which belongs to the Ge-lug-pa,, was founded in 1418 A.C. by Je-she-rab-sen-ge gal tsab-je. This serves also as college, which is divided into four sections, namely Blo-gsal-glin, Sgo-man, Bde-yans and Snags-pa, each having a separate abbot. The hall of congregation which is called T'sogs-ch'en-lha-k'an is common to the whole monastery. Its divine protectors are the five nymphs of long life, known in Tibetan as Tse-rin-ma, whose images, along with that of Hayagriva, guard the entrance.

A very large number of monks attend this monastery to pursue religious studies and they are accommodated according to their nationalities and the provinces from which they come. In 1641, the chief abbot of this monastery, the fifth in succession, was made the ruler of Central Tibet by Mongols and thence started the rule of Dalai Lamas. (q.v.). This monastery, seems to have been in constant feuds with the other monastery in the neighbourhood, called Ser-ra (See L.A. Waddell, *Lamaism*: pp.63, 188, 228, 268–9; D. L. Snellgrove, *Buddhist Himalaya*: p. 302.).

S.K.N.

DESANĀ. Derived from the root *dis* - to point out, instruct, preach , the word in Buddhism has come to mean both the act of preaching or imparting religious instruction and the content of such preaching, hence a sermon. The word *desanā* in these contexts is generally coupled with the word *dhamma* resulting in the compound *dhamma - desanā*: a religious discourse or the preaching of the Dhamma.

It is recorded in the early Buddhist texts that the Buddha, soon after his Enlightenment, expressed a reluctance to preach the doctrine to others on the ground that it would not be easily comprehended by the average worldling both on account of its profundity (*gambhīraṃ duddasaṃ aṇuṃ*, *M.* I. p. 168) and the challenge it throws (*paṭisotagāmiṃ*) at the general nature of the uncultivated human mind (*ālayarāmī kho panāyaṃ pajā ālayaratā ālayasammuditā*: ibid. p. 167). Here the contemplated act of preaching is referred to as *desanā* (.....*appossukkatāya cittaṃ namati no dhammadesanāya*: loc. cit.) This same idea is re-echoed in a statement ascribed to the Buddha in which he appears to tell his close disciple Ānanda that instructing others in the good doctrine

is no easy task (*na kho Ānanda sukaraṃ paresaṃ dhammaṃ desetuṃ*: *A*. III. p.184). Nevertheless, it is historically true that the Buddha was no silent sage and that his message for escape from the ills of life or cycle of saṃsāra was received by different people at different levels according to their intellectual maturity (*addasaṃ satte apparajakkhe mahārajakkhe tikkhindriye mudundriye svākāre dvākāre suviññāpaye duviññāpaye*; ibid. p. 169),

The Buddha is also characteristically described as preaching to the world a doctrine which is truly wholesome at the beginning, the middle and the end (*so dhammaṃ deseti ādikalyāṇaṃ majjhe kalyāṇaṃ pariyosānakalyāṇaṃ sātthaṃ savyañjanaṃ*: *D*.I. p.62).

The Buddha's preaching of the doctrine (*desanā*) is further referred to as being lofty, ennobling and elevating (*sāmukkaṃsikā dhammadesanā M*. II. p. 145). This is said of the Buddha's teaching of the Four Noble Truths and this stands in contrast to his preliminary (*ānupubbi*) socio-moral instructions to the uninitiated listeners on themes like practice of charity (*dānakathaṃ*), moral virtue (*sīlakathaṃ*) and ill-effects of the pursuit of worldly pleasures (*kāmānaṃ ādīnavaṃ*; loc.cit.) These preliminary instructions seem to prepare the mind of the listener (the mind is ready, softened, devoid of hindrances, uplifted and pleased: *kallacittaṃ muducittaṃ vinīvaraṇacittaṃ udaggacittaṃ pasannacittaṃ*; loc. it.) for the receipt of the higher, loftier doctrine which in turn is described as revealing and illuminating (*seyyathāpi bho Gotama nikkujjitaṃ vā ukkujjeyya paṭicchannaṃ vā vivareyya mūḷhassa vā maggaṃ ācikkheyya andhakāre vā telapajjotaṃ dhāreyya cakkhumanto rūpāni dakkhintīti evameva bhotā Gotamena anekapariyāyena dhammo pakāsito*; loc.it).[1]

While this appears to be the general pattern of the Buddha's method of preaching the doctrine, there are instances where it is added that he singles out a person from his audience who is capable of comprehending the doctrine (*bhabbe dhammaṃ viññātunti*; *Ud*. p. 48) and addresses his preaching to him. According to a story in the *Udāna* (loc.cit) the Buddha picks out Suppabuddha Kuṭṭhi out of a large congregation (*mahatiyā parisāya parivutaṃ dhammaṃ desentaṃ nisinnaṃ*) as the one who would readily grasp the doctrine and starts preaching to him, commencing with the preliminary and initial instructions (*ānupubbikathaṃ kathesi*). Suppabuddha Kuṭṭhi here turns out to be the Buddha's sole concern and ere long, in consequence of the preparatory preaching, he, or more accurately his mind, becomes ready to receive the lofty and ennobling doctrine.

Pursuing further this idea of making a sermon (*desanā*) totally relevant to a single person, later commentarial Pali works like the *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā* afford us many interesting stories which appear to relate to the time of the Buddha. Rūpanandā, a bhikkhunī of exceeding physical charm, who was very conceited about her beauty, was to be set right by the Buddha by giving her the correct kind of admonition (*DhA*. III. pp. 115f). The Buddha is shown contemplating as to what sort of sermon (*dhammadesanā*) would be most meaningful (*sappāya*) to her (*kīdisī nu kho tassā dhamma-desanā sappāyā'ti cintetvā*; loc. cit.) and using a more or less audio-visual technique of teaching he reveals to her the basic truths of the religion. She was discovered by the Buddha to be one who was particularly enamoured of the beauty of form (*rūpagaruka*) and was very conscious of her own attractive figure. Thereupon the Buddha concluded that her arrogance about her bodily charm was the one that needed immediate correction and that the most effective way to do it would be through the medium of the human body itself (*rūpeneva assā rūpamadanimmadanaṃ sappāyanti saṃviṭṭhānaṃ katvā* loc cit.). It is said that the Buddha so contrived as to show her the different phases of deterioration of the human body as it gets through to maturity and decay in the life process. Thus he brought about a shattering of her false value scales and reestablished a humility and sensibility in her approach to life. This sermon addressed to Rūpanandā and the Buddha's dialogue with her reflects one of the most comprehensive types of *desanā* undertaken by the Buddha.

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1 In keeping with a tradition found in the *Aṭṭhakathās*, *desanā* is also looked upon as being twofold as *sammutidesanā* and *paramatthadesanā*, i.e. conventional teaching and absolute teaching. This concept is apparently derived from the twofold division of truth as *sammutisacca* and *paramatthasacca*. It is interesting to observe that the Commentary (*AA*. I, pp. 94f.) gives such instances as reference to men, women, *khatriyas* and brahmanas as a sample of conventional teaching, while reference to *anicca*, *dukkha*, *anatta*, *khandha*, *dhātu*, *āyatana* etc.. comes under the category of absolute teaching.

As another characteristic of the Buddha's method of *desanā* it is said that he preached the Dhamma both in brief (*saṅkhittena*, *A*. I. p.53) as well as in detail (*vitthārena*, loc. cit.). The brief sermons of the Buddha were generally expanded and commented upon for clarification by his eminent disciples like Sāriputta and Mahākaccāna (*M*. I. p.113).

It is also said that the Buddha discourses extensively on a theme (*idaṃ akusalanti kho Upaka mayā paññattaṃ tattha aparimānā padā aparimānā vyañjanā aparimānā tathāgatassa dhammadesanā*; *A*. II p. 182) in order that his message may be adequatelty and accurately conveyed.

One of the finest examples of Buddha's brief sermons is the one which he addressed to Bāhiya Dārucīriya (*Ud*. p. 8). It is almost cryptic and enigmatic. "Thus, O Bāhiya, you must train yourself: In the seen there will be just the seen, in the heard just the heard, in the imagined just the imagined, in the cognized just the cognized. When it is thus with you Bāhiya, you will there be not. When you will there be not, then you are not in this world, in the other, or anywhere between. This itself is the end of suffering."

JOTIYA DHIRASEKERA

DESIRE. a feeling of longing which is primarily amoral and often, but not necessarily, accompanied by an element of active striving directed at either achieving something lacking in the individual's present situation or removal of something undesirable. Hence aversion, too, is a negative form of desire. For example, one may desire the association of good friends and at the same time desire to drop the company of bad ones. This feeling of longing which is primarily innate, gradually develops and becomes complex through the interaction between the individual and society, for most of these developed and complex desires reflect norms, standards and aspirations prevalent in any given society. The nearest behavioural term for desire is drive.

It is seen that such terms as want, wish, need, urge and even the term craving are indiscriminately used as synonyms of desire. But it is evident that there are differences in shades of meaning connoted by each term. For instance, wish is weaker than desire, whereas craving connotes a much stronger feeling. This indiscriminate use of terms is often met with in English writings on Buddhism wherein the Pali term *taṇhā* is rendered as desire. Undoubtedly there is some affinity between the meanings connoted by these two terms. Yet, this does not at all justify the total identification of these two terms. The difference in nuances makes it apparent that the Pali term *taṇhā* conveys a morally and ethically bad meaning while desire has no such fixed moral colouring. Therefore, it appears that *taṇhā* could be more appropriately rendered into English as craving. (See DEFILEMENTS).

Though the use of the word desire to translate the Pali term *taṇhā* appears to be a harmless misrendering, it has given room for unjustifiable criticisms to be levelled against Buddhism as a religion which speaks of 'negation" or 'extinction' of all desires. In a footnote in *The Compendium of Philosaphy* (pp. 244f.) Mrs. Rhys Davids has duly drawn the attention of the readers to this fact when she says, "Much harm hereby has been wrought by translators, whose cheapening of the word 'desire' has justified the superficial criticism which perennially speaks of Buddhist ethics as the 'negation' or extinction of all desires'. Craving.....serves admirably for *taṇhā* (cf. also *ERE*. Vol. IV, pp. 665 ff.).

It should, however, be noted that translators alone are not to be blamed for this lack of precision in the use of terminology for, even original Pali Buddhist texts themselves use such terms as *āsā* (*UdA*. p. 363 *Dhp*. v.410) and *icchā* (*Nett* p. 23) which are more akin in meaning to desire as synonyms of *taṇhā*. In spite of such usages it is apparent that terms such as *āsā*, *icchā*, *āsīsanā*, *apekkhā*, *pihā*, *esanā*, in some instances *kāma* and specially *chanda* with a qualifying term prefixed as *dhammacchanda* or *kāmacchanda*, connote the meaning of desire as defined above. *Nett* (p. 53) defines the term *āsā* as the desire (*āsīsanā*) for things obtainable in the future. It is explained that a desire (*āsā*) for such things arises with the thought that 'inevitably it will come' (*yā bhavissassa atthassa āsīsanā avassaṃ āgamissatīti āsāassa uppajjati*). The same source defines *pihā* as the aspiration (*patthanā*) for things obtainable in the present; seeing something better, a desire (*pihā*) arises to be like that. These definitions bring out also that element of active striving which often accompanies desire. This aspect is more marked in *chanda* which the commentaries define as 'desire to do' (*kattukāmyatā*). Thus, *kusalacchanda* means desire to do good. The *Caṅkī Sutta* (*M*. II. p. 174), too, illustrates the activating nature of desire (*chanda*) when it says that one cannot make an effort unless one has desire (cf. also *Sn*. *v*. 865).

A general analysis of the content of desire reveals that some desires are innate and some are developed through the individual's interaction with the environment; that primarily desires are amoral and that they get their moral colouring in accordance with the moral value of the goal strived after and the means adopted thereto; that, though for the most part, desires are egoistic there could also be altruistic desires, and that desires could also be categorised as mundane and spiritual. Desires being so complex and numerous Buddhism adopts a very methodical and practical approach to the problem of desire.

In a very broad and general description Buddhism points out that the world is bound, ensnared and assailed by desires (*icchā*: S.I, pp. 40, 44), that desires are the bane of mankind (*Dhp. v* 359), that desires are difficult to be got rid of and that all desires are not completely satiable (cf *S.* I, p. 44). It demonstrates how with the satiation of one desire a number of others spring up. Thus, it accepts the position that certain mundane desires such as the one to amass wealth and receive gain are not easily overcome-*duppajahā* (cf. *A.*I, p 86; *Sn. vv.* 766 ff.). Reminding the adverse consequences of desires it points out in the *Kāma Sutta* (*Sn.* loc, cit) that as one becomes glad when one's desires are fulfilled one also begins to smart, as if wounded by a dart, when one's desires are thwarted. Further it explains how desires, though appearing to be weak, gradually crush the one who desires, thus causing much pain of mind. The *Piyavagga* of the *Dhammapada*, too, explains how the non-acquisition of desirable things as well as the non-aversion of undesirable ones bring about unhappiness. In short, it declares desires as the cause of grief and fear (*kāmato jāyati soko kāmato jāyati bhayaṃ*). The adverse effects of the non-fulfilment of desires is pithily embodied in the often repeated formula which says that the inability to obtain what one desires as well as the inability to eliminate what one deslikes generates unhappiness and suffering (*D.* II. p. 305, *Vin.* I, p. 10, cf. *Vism.* pp. 504 ff.). Discoursing in the same vein Buddhism recommends the reduction (*appicchatā*) and regulation of desires (*kāmesu vineyya gedhaṃ*: *Sn. v.* 152).

Adopting a very methodical and a practical approach Buddhism accepts the position that desires are a common characteristic of mankind and that the activating factor of desires stimulates beings to action. Therefore without denouncing downright all desires in general, Buddhist ethical teachings enlighten the individuals regarding the true nature of desires, their functions, the adverse effects that result from their non-fulfilling, how far they conduce to success in house-hold life and also how they could be directed to spiritual gain.

It is seen that social ethics of Buddhism clearly sanction the entertainment and cultivation of desires conducive to the well-being and progress of the individual household life and society. Such well-known suttas as the *Siṅgālovāda* and *Vyagghapajja* (*D.* III. pp. 180 f. *A.* IV. pp. 281 f.) bear ample testimony to this. While approving such desires Buddhist ethics lay down norms and standards which are to be followed in fulfilling them. Such ethical teachings as the five precepts and the theory of kamma clearly demarcate the limits up to which one could entertain and cultivate desires without transgressing ethical boundaries. Buddhism does not merely let the end justify the means adopted. It emphatically states that one should not attempt to fulfil one's desires, however justifiable and legitimate they may be from one's point of view, by adopting unjust means (*Dhp. v.* 84). This attitude is further inculcated in the individual by the theory of kamma which debars one from performing any act that is harmful to others.

Similarly while not debarring an individual from entertaining beneficial desires, Buddhism points out how the egoistic factor in desire could lead one astray. Being activated by egoistic desires one begins to perceive the world in a rather selective way, interpreting and registering only those aspects of the world which have relevance to one's desires. Even a simple desire like the one to seek one's own success in life, overwhelmed by egoism, could completely blur one's true perspective and discretion, and motivate one to adopt a particular mode of behaviour which could be unethical. Being aware of the influence of desires on behaviour and character of the individual, Buddhism lays down the norm that one's ethical and social standing is judged by one's action (*kammanā vasalo hoti, kammanā hoti brāhmaṇo. Sn. v.* 142)

Buddhism clearly distinguishes between lay-life and the life of a monk. It accepts that by going-forth (*pabbajjā*) from lay-life one not only abandons the mode of lay-life, but also renounces the mode of thinking, expectations, wishes, aspirations and desires pertaining to lay-life. Thus, Buddhism adopts a different attitude to desires when they are viewed from the point of view of a recluse. When so viewed most of the desires which are unavoidable to a layman appear as obstacles in the path of spiritual progress which a recluse is completely devoted to follow.

From the point of view of a monk, household life as well as enjoyment of desires thereof, is regarded as belonging to a lower status (*A*. III. p. 374). Therefore, a recluse is admonished to give up all mundane desires, and instead advised to cultivate a desire for spiritual advancement. This does not, however, mean that laymen are not encouraged to entertain spiritual desires. The ultimate desire of all Buddhists, both lay and monk, is the attainment of Nibbāna. Considering this as the master desire, all Buddhists are required to entertain and cultivate their desires in keeping with the ethics pertaining to their particular vocation..

Therefore what Buddhism teaches is not a complete negation or extinction of desires at all levels, but the entertainment, cultivation and devoted pursuit of those desires which are permissible to one's vocation in life and which conduce to the well-being of oneself and others alike, and which also directly contribute to the fulfilment of the *master desire*, namely the attainment of Nibbāna. It is in order to inculcate such an attitude to desires in the individual that Buddhist ethics dissuade one from prettling with attachment to desires (*Dhp.v.*83) and getting obsessed by them (ibid.*v.*218), and advise one to remain calm and maintain balance of mind when affected by numerous vicissitudes of life (*Sn.v.*268). It is to help one to further this same attitude that Buddhism puts forth the ideal of few desires (*appicchatā*) and contentment (*santuṭṭhi*) which both laymen and monk could adopt and follow in accordance with the ethical norms and standards pertaining to their modes of life.

S. K. N.

DESTINY. The term, signifying in the English language the idea of an inevitable necessity, is philosophically understood to denote an event or occurrence that is unavoidable and predetermined, and is usually associated with the end, goal or climax of a series of events in the life of an animate individual or group of individuals or of the universe as a whole. By an extension of meaning, it is sometimes applied to other inanimate objects. The idea has its equivalent in Pali Buddhist literature, both canonical and commentarial, expressed in such words as *niyati*, *gati*, *abhisamparāya*, etc. bearing different shades of meaning in different contexts but broadly taking two forms, viz: Unconditioned Necessity and Conditioned Necessity.

Unconditioned Necessity, commonly occurring under the title of *niyati* as a theory propagated by the rival contemporaneous philosopher Makkhali Gosāla, is outright rejected by the Buddha while Conditioned Necessity is accepted by him as a principle which operates in the universe. According to Conditioned Necessity, what is expected to take place as a consequence of earlier action is held to be surmountable by the removal of one or more of the conditions necessitating the result. This principle is usually, if not almost always, applied to volitional action (*kamma*), mainly of human beings. The moral repercussion to the action is considered a natural and necessary event but nevertheless as much conditioned as the bursting into flame of a lamp-wick ignited where air is present but never doing so when the same action is repeated in a vacuum. The removal of one condition will suffice to prevent the ignition.

The philosophy of Unconditioned Necessity which Gosāla is reported to have maintained seems to have held Destiny as implying an unalterable human lot with predetermined stages of existence through which all beings had to pass to finally enter, without any striving or effort on their part, a predetermined end called *saṃsārasuddhi* which Prof. Rhys Davids (*Dialogues of the Buddha*, I, p.73) translates as 'purification through transmigration,' the meaning suggested by the context of its *locus classicus*, the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* (*D*. I. p.54) or 'perfection' (But see Barua: *A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, Baranasi, 1921,p.304.) bearing a moral sense. The Buddhists described this theory as one of the fixed false views (*niyata-micchā-diṭṭhi*: *Tikp.* II, p. 168; see also *Kvu.* V, 4; VI, 1 and *Points of Controversy* (*PTS.*), London, 1915, pp. 177, 268, 388 and especially 355, n.6). Gosāla is portrayed as denying all possibility of human effort, in short, as an uncompromising determinist but with a strange teleology of moral perfection attained by all beings through the impersonal external agency of Destiny.

On the other hand. the idea of Conditioned Necessity which underlies the basic Buddhist idea of *kamma* and *vipāka* which the Buddhists upheld, may be gleaned from texts as early as the *Dīgha Nikāya*. For instance, we have in the *Mahā Parinibbāna Sutta* (*D*.II,p.91), a dialogue in which Ānanda questions the Buddha as to the destiny of certain individuals who had died at a village called Nādika: "Where has he been reborn, what is his destiny?" (*tassa kā gati ko abhisamparāyo*: loc. cit.: translation, Prof. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, II, p.98) asks Ānanda regarding the monk Sāḷha who was one of those who

had died at this village, and the Buddha answers that this monk, having destroyed the intoxicants (*āsava*), had already in this life attained arahanthood, which implies that there was no further bourne or destiny for him. Asked similarly of the nun Nandā, the Buddha points out that since she had completely destroyed the five bonds (*orambhāgiyā saṃyojanā*) which, according to Buddhist teaching, bind a person to *saṃsāra*, she would be declared to have become an inheritor of the highest heavens, there 'to pass entirely away' as never-to return to this mundane world of suffering. The Buddha's answer to all other questions of Ānanda regarding several other individuals who had died at Nādika takes the same shape of conditions being declared which give rise to their succeeding state that is described as destiny. The necessity and inevitability inseparably associated with the idea is nothing more than causal necessity as found in nature, applied here to the plane of human activity. It is in this sense that the Buddhists would speak of death (*maraṇa*) as being the destiny of all that have birth (*jāti*), for birth brings with it the conditions that lead ultimately to death.

The relationship between the destiny of beings and the moral or immoral quality of their actions is further emphasized in the concept of the *sattānaṃ cutūpapātañāṇa*, the exceptional insight which enables one to see beings born according to their own *kamma* (*yathākammūpage satte*), that those beings who followed evil ways in bodily actions, words or thoughts, insulted the noble ones, held evil views, acted according to their evil views, at the dissolution of the body after death, have appeared in the lower worlds, in painful states of existence, in the world of suffering, hell. In fact, this insight enables one to recognize, reconstruct as it were, the past from the present, remembering not only individual births and deaths but many formations and dissolutions of the worlds (*D*.I,pp. 82f.) This power, it is claimed , one gains through the faculty of clairvoyance, *dibbacakkhu*, (q.v.), the divine eye.

The idea of predictability associated is similar, as is illustrated in this same context where the Buddha further advises Ānanda that rather than keep on repeatedly questioning him on the occasion of each death, as though the mastery of a capacity to see the destiny of an individual's rebirth is a superhuman task or mysterious, esoteric skill, it would be good to realize that anyone could acquire the ability of prediction of this kind, even of one's own rebirth. One could declare it of one's own self (*attanā va attānaṃ vyākareyya*: *D*. II,p.93) by the mastery of a technique or methodology (*dhammādāso dhammapariyāyo*: loc. cit.) "a way of truth called the Mirror of Truth": (trsl. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues*, II, p.99). In other words, the destiny of an individual, including that of oneself, may be predicted by anyone mastering the true nature of things. The consequences may be foretold by the antecedents, in fact, as one sees oneself in a mirror, a telling simile which demonstrates the certainty of the power that may be acquired as well as the certainty of the cause-and-effect relationship. The reflection in the mirror is certain, inevitable.

At the same time, by the very fact of the conditional nature of this necessity, that destiny is not alterable is not admitted by the Buddhists. Volitional action being a condition necessitating the character of any state of an individual or of his destiny, the destiny can be altered by volitional actions of one's own (*attā hi attano nātho. Dhp. v*.380). The removal of the condition or conditions will ensure the liberation from destiny (*gativippamokkha*) which means the attainment of Nibbāna. The assertion of man's power within himself to alter his course is emphatic:

attanā va kataṃ pāpaṃ attanā saṅkilissati,
attanā akataṃ pāpaṃ attanā va visujjhati,
suddhi asuddhi paccattaṃ nāñño aññaṃ visodhaye.
Dhp. v. 165.

By oneself, indeed is evil done; by oneself is one injured,
By oneself is evil left undone; by oneself is one purified,
Purity and impurity belong to oneself; no one purifies another.

trsl. Radhakrishnan.

Even there one may get the impression that certain actions bring insurmountable results, of the *ānantarika kamma*, their inevitability is the consequence of the immediacy of their fruition, as suggested by the meaning of the adjective itself, which implies there is no interval between the life in which the action takes place and the rebirth in which the consequences take fruit. Nevertheless, even here, the Buddhists hold that the consequences having been gone through, there is the possibility of the alteration of the career thereafter, even to the extent that one can set one's course towards enlightenment and become one proceeding towards enlightenment (*D*.I.p.156; see also Rhys Davids, *Dialogues*, I,p.190 and *PED* s.v. *sambodhiparāyaṇa*). It is even said of Devadatta that he will one day attain to enlightenment.

At any rate, what is positively clear is that *kamma* in general, as explained by the Buddha, is not an equivalent of an unalterable destiny. On the contrary, the Buddha classifies various kinds of *kamma*, pointing out that their consequences are prevented by the nature of the offence as well as by the character of the individual concerned. A trifling deed, he says, can take the weak personality to hell while the man of stronger character surmounts it by his own strength (*A*. I, pp. 253 f.). Summing up his exact position as against rigid determinism, he says : "Exactly according as this man does a deed, in such a manner will he experience (the result of) it,' — that being so there is no holy living, there is no opportunity afforded for the perfect ending of ill. But, monks, if one should say : 'Exactly as a man does a deed that can be experienced (hereafter), exactly in such a manner does he experience the fruition thereof' — that being so there is living of the holy life : there is opportunity afforded for the utter ending of ill." (Woodward, *The Book of Gradual Sayings*, I, *PTS*, London, 1951, p. 230). Briefly speaking, the Buddha points out that a rigid deterministic assertion of destiny would imply a meaninglessness in moral practice and a denial of hope for mankind.

The idea of an appointed course as a destiny is also found and accepted in Buddhist literature in the notion of *mahâpurisa* (q.v.), the great Man of History or Superman whose personality will affect the history of mankind; but even such beings are conceived as having no fixed destiny but a choice of alternatives, political or spiritual, that of becoming a world-ruler, *cakkavattin* or an enlightened one, a Buddha.

The Buddhists seem to have held a view on the destiny of the universe and its denizens as well, but this too is not a teleological but a cyclic one, for which see ESCHATOLOGY. See also AKIRIYAVĀDA, CAUSALITY, CONDITIONALITY, DETERMINISM AND INDETERMINISM, NIYATIVĀDA, TELEOLOGY.

BANDULA JAYAWARDHANA.

DESTRUCTION, (*vināsa*), in the sense of dissolution (*bheda*, *bhaṅga*, *vibhava*), decay, disintegration (*khaya*, *vaya*), extinction (*uccheda*) etc. has several important aspects as understood in Buddhism. In discussing them we may first mention the important concept in the Abhidhamma philosophy of incessant, momentary (*khaṇika*) destruction of all phenomena. This is traceable to the early Buddhist teaching of impermanence (*anicca*) which reveals the dynamic character of all existing phenomena. The ethical idea of the riddance of defilements (*kilesappahāna*) leading to the destruction of all suffering (*dukkhakkhaya*) in the state of Nirvāṇa, is also an equally important concept. As a corollary to this destruction of defilements comes the idea of the complete cessation of becoming (*bhava-nirodha*).

According to the Buddha's explanation of existence, the concept of 'being' does not imply an unchanging entity but only a ceaseless process of becoming, nevertheless with the distinct identity of each retained. In this process everything is a product of antecedent conditions, these conditions themselves being merely the antecedent aspects of the same incessant process. Thus origination (*uppāda*) and destruction (*vaya*) are inevitable characteristics of all phenomena. Everything in the world is conditionally produced (*paṭiccasamuppanna*) and the destruction of everything thus produced is inevitable. This great truth of nature is found classically expressed in the well-known formula "all conditioned things are impermanent : origin and dissolution is their very nature" (*aniccā vata saṅkhārā-uppādavayadhammino : D.* II, p. 157; *S.* IV, p. 28). In this Pali phrase the two terms *uppāda* and *vaya* express this idea of origin and destruction that is continuously taking place in the world. There is nothing in the world that is exempt from this law of destruction. This destruction is said to be the culminating point in impermanence (*bhaṅgo nāma aniccatāya paramā koṭi : Vism.* p. 642). Elsewhere in the Nikāyas this idea is expressed in the phrase "whatever is subject to the law of origination is also subject to the law of destruction :" (*yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhammaṃ : D.* I, p. 110; *Vin.* I., p. 11).

Time (*kāla*) is the medium in which this destruction and origination takes place. When considered in this light every so-called existence turns out to be a becoming (*bhava*) in time. Nothing remains the same for two consecutive moments. Thus it leads to a theory of universal momentariness (*khaṇika-vāda*) wherein the cause of destruction becomes nothing but origination itself. This destructive nature of time is found expressed in a verse occurring in the *Jātaka* (II, p. 260) where it is said:

> 'Time consumes (lit. devours) all beings along with itself. And he who has become a time-devourer (i.e. *arahant*) has burnt up that which consumes beings."

kālo ghasati bhūtāni-sabbān'eva saha'ttanā
yo ca kālaghaso bhūto-sa bhūtapacaniṃ paci'ti.

This idea is further developed in the Abhidhamma to mean that entities disappear as soon as they appear. This concept of the momentary destruction (*khaṇa-bhaṅga*) of formations converts the universe into a kind of cinema, making existence a series (*santāna*) of moments whose difference the ordinary human eye is not able to notice.[1] This type of apparent permanence is sometimes designated as *ṭhiti* (moment of duration) in the threefold process of origination, moment of duration and destruction (*uppāda: ṭhiti: bhaṅga*).

Successive moments following one another evoke the illusion of stability and persistence. The dynamic concept of existence (*bhava*) is the essence of reality as taught in Buddhism.

In contrast to this concept of momentary destruction, which, owing to its philosophic nature, could be called abstract, is the concrete kind of destruction of physical objects as exemplified by the breaking up of a pot by the stroke of the hammer. Such breaking up of the pot as well as its creation out of a lump of clay could also be described as outstanding moments in this dynamic process. In this case the incessant process of change has been expedited by some external cause. The breaking up of the pot only brought to the fore the destructible(*pabhaṅgura, bhidura*) nature inherent in matter. Destruction of life has also to be similarly explained.

The ethical idea of the destruction of defilements is a very important concept in Buddhism. It is the doctrine on which the entire Buddhist practice is based. Destruction of the causes of rebirth, which is tantamount to the destruction of all suffering (*dukkhakkhaya*), is the duty of every individual. All spiritual exertion understood by terms such as *padhāna* and *sammā-viriya* is always aimed at the destruction of defilements. This destruction is collectively expressed by the term *nirodha* or *dukkha-nirodha* which is accordingly equated to Nibbāna (*nirodho nibbānaṃ: S.* I, p. 136; *D.* II, p. 36). Under this are included the destruction of passion, hatred and delusion (*khayā rāgassa, khayā dosassa, khayā-mohassa : M.* I, p. 5; *A.* I. p. 299), of cravings (*taṇhānaṃ khaya; Dhp. v.* 154), of all the *saṅkhāras* (*saṅkhārāṇaṃ khaya:* ibid. *v.* 383 or *saṅkhāra-nirodha; S.* III, p. 60), of the clinging (*upādānakkhaya: S.* II, p. 54; *A.* III, p. 376), and of birth (*jātikkhaya S.* V. p. 168, *A.* I, 167 etc.). It is also said that once consciousness (*viññāṇa*) ceases to exist the whole psycho-physical process (*nāma-rūpa*) ceases as well (*viññāṇassa nirodhena-ettha etaṃ uparujjhati; Sn. v.*1037).

The use of the term *nirodha* in the sense of 'destruction' needs some explanation here. Being the abstract noun from *nirujjhati* (ceases) the term is used in Buddhist texts to express the idea of cessation of a process as in the case of the term (*bhava-nirodha*, which means the 'cessation of the process of becoming'. The idea of destruction comes as an extension of this primary meaning.

According to the Buddha's teaching this destruction or termination of phenomenal existence (*bhava-nirodha*) is the only way out of the suffering involved in *saṃsāra*. The condition that is attained after achieving this destruction is left unexplained (*avyākata*) as being beyond definition. Those thinkers who misunderstood this concept of the inexpressible state of freedom from becoming maintained that a doctrine teaching the 'destruction' (i.e. cessation) of empirical becoming amounted to nihilism. Accordingly they proclaimed: "ascetic Gotama is a nihilist as he lays down the annihilation, the destruction and the dis-appearance of the existant being" (*venayiko samaṇo Gotamo sato sattassa ucchedaṃ vināsaṃ vibhavaṃ paññāpeti: M.* I, p. 140). The Buddha denied the charge and explained his position by saying that what he taught was suffering and the destruction of suffering (*dukkhañceva paññāpemi dukkhassa ca nirodhaṃ*: ibid.) enabling the attainment of the indestructible state (being in itself unconditioned or *asaṅkhata*), wherein individuality (*atta-bhāva*) ceases.

Destruction of phenomenal existence is more comprehensively and convincingly expressed in the reverse order orf the Law of Conditioned Genesis (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) where it is shown how the destruction of the preceding cause destroys the succeeding effect (which would be the cause of another effect) until the entire process of becoming and the whole mass of suffering (*kevala-dukkhakkhanda*) is destroyed (*Vin.* I, p. 1; *S.* II, p. 14). This complete destruction of becoming is graphically expressed in the Nikāyas by the simile of the palm tree reduced to a stump (*tālāvatthukata*) thereby making it impossible for it to sprout again (*M.* I, p. 370; *S.* I, p. 69 etc.).

1. See Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic, II*, p. 93.

As an extension of the general law of destruction inherent in all phenomena this universe is also said to be periodically destroyed by water, fire and air and then re-evolved (*A*. IV, pp. 100ff; *Vism*. p. 420). According to this theory, a great period (*mahākappa*) of cosmical evolution is to be divided into four incalculables (*asaṅkheyya*) which are i. period of devolution (*saṃvaṭṭa-kappa*): ii. of duration of devolution (*saṃvaṭṭaṭṭhāyī-k*). when the world remains devolved: iii. of evolution (*vivaṭṭa-k*): iv. of duration of evolution (*vivaṭṭaṭṭhāyī-k*.) when the world remains evolved (*A*. II, p. 142; *Vism*. p. 419).[2] Here too, we may observe that in keeping with the dynamic nature of phenomena the world is changing continuously and these four stages are the special occasions in the process. See further CAUSALITY.

A. G. S. K.

DETACHMENT. A concept of very great significance in the religious culture of Buddhism. Its Pali equivalent *virāga* is formed of *vi* (-away from, without, opposite of) + *raj* to delight in, to be attached to. *Virāga* or detachment is the basis of the Buddhist soteriology of release from *saṃsāra* or cycle of births and deaths (*virāgā vimuccati:* through detachment one gains release). Thus, *virāga* is even equated to Nibbāna (*virāgo nirodho nibbānaṃ*: *S*.I. p.136). This is primarily so because the fetters or *saṃyojanas* which tie a being down to *saṃsāra* begin with attachment as the first which is diversely referred to as *kāmacchanda* (excitement of sensual pleasure), *kāmarāga* (sensual passion) or *abhijjhā* (covetousness). It also heads the three roots of evil or *akusala-mūla* under the name of *lobha* or greed. Attachment, under the name of *rāga*, is also on the other hand a joy-giving, exhilarating manifestation of craving or thirst: *taṇhā* (*yāyaṃ taṇhā-....nandirāgasahagatā tatra tatrābhinandinī*: *S*.V. p. 421). Pleasant and agreeable things of the world give rise to this craving (*yaṃ loke piyarūpaṃ sātarūpaṃ etth'esā taṇhā uppajjamānā uppajjati ettha nivisamānā nivisati. D*. II.p.308), thereby prolonging *saṃsāric* continuity *ponobhavika*), propelling beings from one existence to another.

The key to the successful acquisition of this virtue of detachment is to see through the transparency of the pleasantness of the things of the world (*yaṃ kiñci loke piyarūpaṃ sātarūpaṃ*) and see that they are devoid (*suññā*) of the virtue of being oneself or one's own (*attena vā attaniyena vā*: *M*. I. p.297). In terms of the fleeting nature and transitoriness of all things, one sees no basis for attraction, whether these things be personal as constituting the nominal self or *pañcakkandha* or be of the world, standing beside the person (*bahiddhā*). It is through this cultivated and enlightened outlook of not looking at things as though they were permanent and lasting (*niccato*), as wholesome and comforting (*sukhato*) and as being one's own or under one's command (*attato*) that one is assured of release or *vimutti*. For one is consequently disenchanted and finds no steady or lasting source of pleasure in the things of the world (.....*rūpasmiṃ nibbindati....nibbindaṃ virajjati virāgā vimuccati*: *M*. I.p.139). Such a person is acclaimed as one of mature wisdom (*evaṃ passaṃ bhikkhave sutavā arivasāvako*....loc. cit.), as one who has acquired the necessary poise not to be lured by sense stimuli (.....*cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā na nimittaggāhī hoti na anuvyañjanaggāhī: D*.I p.70).

But the general run of beings in the world incline towards attachment. (Also referred to as *ālaya*). Hence *pajā* or common worldlings are referred to as delighting in or stimulated by attachment: *ālayaratā, ālayasammuditā*: *M*.I. p. 167). This partiality or absence of equipoise warps the mind of the worldling and prevents him from taking a detached, analytical and realistic view of life. In consonance with the Buddhist description of the man perfected, the *arahant* as 'the one who has completely acquired the virtue of detachment' (*asesavirāganirodhā....S*. V, p.421), the *Dhammapada* says that he does not cling to the pleasures of the world (*yo na lippati kāmesu Dhp*. *v*. 401) like the drops of water on the lotus leaf which do not stick to it. Consequent on this detachment, the *arahant* reaches a state of impurturbability of mind (*āneijappatta*) which opens for him the doors to unfettered joy and happiness.

JOTIYA DHIRASEKERA.

2. It may be remarked here that the *PED* takes *saṃvaṭṭa* and *vivaṭṭa* to mean evolution and devolution respectively. But the two connotations should be in the reverse order as is evidenced from the text (*D*. III, pp. 84-5), where the world is said to become habitable when it is *vivaṭṭamāna* or evolving.

DETERMINISM AND INDETERMINISM. The *Vinaya* (*Vin.* I, pp. 39f.) records that when the yet-unconverted Upatissa, the later Sāriputta, questing for a way of life, questioned Assaji, one of the Buddha's first five disciples, as to what constituted the Buddha's teaching, Assaji summed up the purport (*attha*) of the doctrine in the following lines, confessing to being incompetent to give the whole of it.[1]

"Those things which proceed from a cause, of these the Truth-finder has told the cause.
And that which is their stopping - the great recluse has such a doctrine"[2] (trsl. I.B. Horner; *The Book of the Discipline*, IV, p. 54.)

This succinct summing up has been so remarkable for its accuracy and precision that it has come to be accepted, in the course of the history of Buddhist thought, as a ready-made, and therefore the most frequently-quoted formula[3] for giving a summarized statement of the essential doctrine. It is very significant that in this epitome of Assaji, the two polar, or apparently polar, concepts of causal genesis (*paṭicca-samuppāda and idhappaccayatā*) and cessation or liberation of the individual (*nirodha*), should lie side by side on the same plane of importance. It is the polarity of these two fundamental concepts that brings Buddhism into direct confrontation with the dilemma of Determinism and Indeterminism, whose main tenet too consists of the assertion that all phenomena are governed by causal laws, or in other words, that no event takes place which is not the result of one or more other events; that whatever happens at some specific moment is the outcome of something that happened at a previous moment, and Indeterminism which denies the absolute necessity of a causal order and, at its mildest, maintains that, at least in the sphere of human activity, novelty and independence prevail, or are possible.

It is the challenge to interpret reality without compromising the truths the Buddhists intuited in both these concepts that has brought forth from Buddhism its unique and distinctive responses to the ideas of Chance and Possibility, Fate and Predetermination, Omniscience and Prediction, Freedom and Moral Responsibility which are inextricably bound up with the problem of Determinism and Indeterminism and which, in however rudimentary a form, it seems to have had the good fortune to encounter in the earliest days of its growth. Obliged to investigate philosophically all these problems, Buddhism has had its characteristic answers to all of them, and broadly speaking, appears to have maintained a singular and remarkable consistency throughout.

In the process of working out a positive position the Buddhists have made an attempt to clear the background by critically examining not only the currently existent theories but also the logically possible interpretations which, in their opinion, are likely to lead to erroneous conclusions. Applying the customary logic of the four alternatives (*catuṣkoṭi*), they classify all the logically possible causalistic theories into four broad categories, accommodating each contemporaneous theory in one or other of these categories.

Since this classification provides us with a convenient scheme within which to understand the Buddhist viewpoint on this subject, and also the standpoints they rejected, we shall adopt it as the basic framework of our own discussions below.

The Buddhist records[4] make this classification on the basis of the concern with the Universe divided into two elements, viz. the subjective and the objective, the microcosm and the macrocosm, the self and the world (*attā ca loko ca*), Thus, we have theories which posit that the self and the world are:

1. Self-caused (*sayaṃ kataṃ*)
2. Caused by an external agency (*paraṃ kataṃ*)
3. Caused both by self and an external agency (*sayaṃ kataṅ ca paraṃ kataṅ ca*)
4. Neither self-caused nor caused by an external agency but uncaused (*asayaṅkāraṃ paraṅkāraṃ adhiccasamuppannaṃ*)

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1 For details of legend, see ASSAJI (i)
2 *Ye dhammā hetuppabhavā tesaṃ hetuṃ Tathāgato āha-tesañ ca yo nirodho evaṃvādī mahāsamaṇo.*
3 There is also much literary and inscriptional evidence to show that the verse was widely known and apparently very popular among the Buddhists of all times. See S. Konow, *Corpus Inscriptionorum Indicarum*, Vol. II, Pt. I, 1929, pp. 152 f.; H. Johnson, *The Gopalpur Bricks*, *JRAS*, 1938, pp. 549 f.; B.C. Law, *The Formulation of the Pratītyasamutpāda*, *JRAS*, 1937, pp. 290 f.; *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, Ed. Nanjio, p. 444. *Āryapratītyasamutpāda* in *Ārya Śālistamba Sūtra*, ed. Sastri, p. 26.
4 *D.* III, pp. 137 f.; *S.* II, pp. 18 f.

There are some basic pre-suppositions which are common to all these categories. (These have been discussed elsewhere. See CAUSALITY). But pre-suppositions peculiar to each category, based both on common ones and those peculiar to itself have existed, on which it was easy to construct separate and entirely contrasting theories, sometimes one category giving rise to diametrically opposed Deterministic and Indeterministic positions. This type of theory had, in fact, sprung up in Buddha's day, creating a wilderness of theories in a wilderness of assumptions.

The Buddhists seem to have taken note of most of these assumptions and their entailments, and examined them all, often subjecting them to severe criticism. But the main purpose of the Buddhist examination of these four categories seems to be not so much to identify and classify the doctrines of the current schools and hold their teachings up to scorn, but to isolate the notions underlying them which are prone to reappear in human thinking and to discover and expose their inadequacies in terms of the Truths that had been discovered by themselves. We therefore notice in the relevant literature a lesser concern with a comprehensive, clear-cut picture of the theories they opposed and the various details of doctrine and authorship. We often find the literature greatly mixing up doctrines and authors, and the tendency increases as we move away from the date of the Buddha. But rather than analysing total philosophies, the Buddhists seem to be having a greater interest in identifying the notions they opposed and with exposing their weaknesses. They do not seem to be even concerned to assert the points of agreement with their rival schools. Buddhism functions as a searchlight employed to ferret out notions which lead men astray from the Right Path, which they claimed they were showing. Thus, taking its own causal thesis, the *paṭicca-samuppāda*[5] as a fifth alternative and as a vantage point from which to view the other four categories, Buddhism critically examines the fundamental concepts and assumptions which underlie each of the four positions, subjecting them to a criticism which remains strictly consistent with its own thesis.

Non-Causation and Chance. The concept of an Indeterministic Universe underlying the fourth category, namely, the doctrine of *adhicca-samuppanna* was, perhaps, the concept that came under the heaviest fire of the Buddhists since it had far-reaching implications when applied to the realm of human behaviour. It was probably the most disastrous to the 'good life' they recommended, which they believed was firmly rooted in the trust and belief in the regularity of Causation, as operating on human behaviour.

The word *adhicca-samuppanna*, it has been surmised[6], is a Buddhist neologism constructed on the analogy of the word *paṭicca-samuppanna*, apparently with the purpose of emphasising the contrast in the two concepts which have a common basis, namely Causation. The 5th century commentator, Dhammapāla (*UdA.* p 345), explaining the term, makes the suggestion that the word denotes the concept of *yadṛccha* meaning 'chance', which, though already in parlance in Indian philosophy (e.g. *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, I, 2,2)[7] of the Buddha's day, does not seem to be equally familiar to the Pali *Nikāyas* where the word appears to be untraceable. But Dhammapāla does not seem to see a distinction between the concept of chance and non-causation, or is too much of a philosopher of his time to take the meanings of common usage into account. In the same breath as he says *adhicca-samuppanna* is *yadicchāya-samuppanna*, he says that the *adhicca-samuppannavāda* is the theory of arising without any cause[8]. Nevertheless, it seems to be necessary to make the distinction in order to understand what exactly the Buddhists brought under the

5 *S.* II, pp. 18 f.; *D.* I, pp. 18—40.

6 K. N. Jayatilleke suggests that the term is derived from *adhi* + *i*(*t*)*ya* (gerundive) meaning 'having come on top of' as compared with *prati* + *i*(*t*)*ya*, meaning 'having come on account of'. "The *PTS.* Dictionary derives the etymology of the term from Skṛ. *adhṛtya* P. *adhicca* (from *dhṛ*. to bear, support): but it appears more likely that this word was coined on the analogy of *paṭicca* (in *paṭiccasamuppāda*, *paṭicca-samuppanna*) in order to distinguish this concept from the latter" (*Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, *Allen and Unwin*, London, 1963 p. 445).

7 *Kālaḥ syabhāvoniyatir yadṛcchā-bhūtāni yoniḥ puruṣa iti cintya,*
Saṃyoga esaṃ na tvatmā-bhavad ātmapi, aniśaḥ sukha-dukkha-hetoḥ (quoted from S. Radhakrishnan, *The Principal Upanishads*, London, 1953 p. 709.)

8 *Adhicca-samuppanno' ti yadicchayā samuppanno, kena kāraṇeṇa vinā uppanno' ti adhiccasamuppannavādo dassito*, (*UdA.* p. 345).

fire of their criticism as "neither self-causation nor causation by an external agency (*asayaṁkāraṃ aparaṁkāraṃ*) but *adhicca-samuppanna*."

A definite difference seems to have existed for the Buddhists who recognize the concept of chance as holding a distinct meaning in common parlance. The Buddhists seem to be alive to this idea of chance-events as separate or different from *karmically*-caused events, in the realm of conventional truths or propositions "generally acknowledged by the world as true" (*sacca-sammata*) or "truths by consensus". A chance-event, for instance, in commom parlance, would be a sudden piece of misfortune that may befall one in the wake of an earthquake or a storm. It may be an unexpected piece of good-luck which may visit one in gambling or in mining. The *Moliya-Sivaka Sutta* of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (*S.* IV, p.230) seems to admit of chance-events of this kind. This *sutta* depicts the Buddha as telling Sivaka that changes in the seasons (*utupariṇāmajāni*),stress from untoward happenings (*visamaparihārajāni*), sudden attacks from without (*opakkamikāni*) are among the eight kinds of causes of human experience (*vedayitāni*) of which ripening of the results of one's own action (*kammavipākajāni*) is only one. Previous actions (*pubbekata-hetu*) are certainly not the only factor, the *sutta* insists. All (a person's) suffering is not due to (his) previous action. As such, it is clear that, while the causal series set moving by one's own actions is seen as operating on a man's life, the other factors mentioned do not belong to that series. They seem to bear an external and accidental character in terms of the action-consequence series, or, the 'moral-repercussion series', as one may call it. The word *visamaparihārajāni* is commentarially (*SA.* III, p. 81) illustrated, among others, by the example of one hastily going out in the night and being bitten by a snake.[9] But there is no attempt on the part of the Buddhists to deny that these events are caused. They do not belong to the moral-causation series, *kammavipākaja*, particularly as relating to the activities of the past life: *pubbekatahetu*, that is all. They are not depicted as uncaused events. They are events that come within the purview of one's experience (*sāmaṃ*, *S.* IV, p. 230) and acknowledged as true by the consensus of opinion (*sacca-sammata*). Thus, for the Buddhists, they seem to have some suggestion of empirical reference which would prevent them from including events of this category under the term *adhicca-samuppanna* which seems to have had for them quite a different connotation as we shall see below.

The sense in which the Buddhists understood the term *adhicca-samuppanna* seems to be more accurately evidenced by the somewhat early record of the *Brahmajāla Suttanta* (*D.* I, pp. 28 ff.), where the Buddha is depicted as explaining away the psychological origin of the *adhicca-samuppanna* thesis, thus:

"There are, brethren, certain gods called Unconscious Beings.[10] As soon as an idea occurs to them, they fall from that state. Now it may well be, brethren, that a being, on falling from that state should come hither, and having come hither, he might go forth from the household life into the homeless state. And having thus become a recluse, he, by reason of ardour and so on .....reaches up to such rapture of heart, that, rapt in heart, he calls to mind how that idea occurred to him but no more than that (*saññuppādaṃ anussarati, tato paraṃ nānussarati*). He says to himself, "Fortuitous in origin are the soul and the world. And why so? Because formerly I was not, but now am. Having not been, I have come to be". (*trsl.* Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Pt. I, p. 41).

The philosopher caricatured in this passage is suffering under an illusion. He is making a mistake of interpretation. But that mistake is not one of confusing between events of the kind mentioned by the *Moliya-Sivaka Sutta* (loc. cit.), and events of one's own making. That distinction seems to be of little interest to the Buddhists in this context. They seem to be focussing their attention on the fact that the philosopher is interpreting the event of his appearance on earth, i.e., his coming into existence, as an event without antecedents. They perhaps heard in the philosopher's conclusion: "Having not been, I have come to be," echoes of the doctrine of Being coming out of Non-Being which had also become at one time the object of Uddālaka Aruṇi's criticism: "How can Being come out of Non-Being?" (*katham asataḥ sa; jāyeta? Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 6.2. 2).[11] They protested against this doctrine of uncaused events, non-causation, as a false doctrine, a misconception

9 *Visama-parihārajāni ti, mahābhāva-vāhanesu ākoṭanādito va avelāya carantassa sappadaṃsana-kuppipāsādito va visamapariharato jātāni* (*SA.* III. pp. 81 f.)

10 Asaññasatta, q.v.

11 Radhakrishnan, op. cit.

arising as a result of fallacious inference from a limited experience, an inference fallacious because the data for inference are inadequate. The *adhicca-samuppannaka* philosopher, due to limitations of his retrocognitive vision, could not see the extension of the causal series beyond the point to which his (*jhānic*) observation could go. He, therefore, concluded there was no point beyond that, that the causal series ended there and stretched no further back, whereas, according to the Buddhists it extended back to the past beyond conceivable distance. Non-causation, then, which the term *adhicca-samuppanna* signified, seemed to the Buddhists entirely a construction of the mind, a mental construction which did not correspond with the facts of the world, as in it there was no instance where causation was observed to be ceasing. The concept of *adhicca-samuppanna* had a non-empirical base and this was the notion with which the Buddhists were at war, not the notion of chance-events for which, according to them, there existed an empirical base.

The notion of a beginningless beginning, or, in Hobbesian phraseology, "a beginning from itself" thus found in the Indeterministic position which asserted Non-causation, appears to have been in direct contradiction with the position of the Buddhists who were strongly opposed to categorical pronouncements on the subject of ultimate origins. The *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (*S.* II, p. 177), for instance, devoting a whole chapter (*saṃyutta*) to the theme, has the refrain: "Incalculable,[12] is the beginning, brethren, of this faring on,[13] the earliest point[14] is not revealed of this running on, the faring on, of beings cloaked in ignorance, tied to craving" (trsl. Mrs. Rhys Davids & Woodward, *The Book of Kindred Sayings*, II, pp. 118 f.).

This notion of the incalculability or inconceivability of beginnings obviously derives in turn from the Buddhist thesis of conditionality (*idhappaccayatā*) that is found conjoined with their own particular causal view. In fact, the principle of conditionality seems to have been consistently applied here and even ignorance (*avijjā*) and craving (*taṇhā*) which are depicted as persistent root-causes of *saṃsāric* existence in the above passage, and which are also crucial links (*nidāna*) in the twelvefold nexus of the *paṭicca-samuppāda*, are both described as conditioned (*idhappaccayatā*): "the extreme point of Ignorance is not apparent, so that one may say, 'Ignorance was not before: it has since come to be'. And this statement, monks, is made. Nevertheless, this thing is apparent: Ignorance is conditioned by this or that"[15] (*A.* V, p. 113; trsl. Woodward, *The Book of Gradual Sayings*, V, p. 78). This declaration is again repeated in the same words in the same text to affirm the conditioned nature of 'craving-to-become,' (*bhava-taṇhā*, *A.* V, p. 116). Conditionality in fact is generally asserted of all the links in the *paṭicca-samuppāda*.

Here the Buddhists seem to be taking the precaution that they should not be making the mistake of asserting of Ignorance (*avijjā*) what the *adhicca-samupannika* philosopher (*supra*) was asserting of himself, viz: coming to be after having not been. They obviously feel that such a statement would imply that Ignorance is equivalent to Being that has come to be from Nothing. But, while Uddālaka tried to resolve the contradiction that arose by asserting the eternity of Being a priori (*sato natthi vināso asato natthi sambhavo*),[16] the Buddhists try to remain ruthlessly consistent with their doctrine of causation or conditionality by holding that this law operates on Ignorance itself.

At the same time, the Buddhists seem to have cast a passing frown on the opposite view which they would probably describe as a view in the other extreme (*ante*), namely, that 'the world gives birth to nothing new'. Such a view, as the *Brahmajāla Suttanta* (*D.* I, pp. 15 f.) indicates, was contemporaneously held, that "The world gives birth to nothing new, is steadfast as a mountain peak, as a pillar firmly fixed" and this view was vehemently opposed by the Buddhists. In the *Sāmaññaphala Suttanta* (*D.* I, p. 56), which is normally considered the most reliable of the sources for the philosophies of the Buddha's contemporaries, the similies of the motionless mountain and the immovable pillar recur and are attributed to one of the so-called six heretics, Pakudha Kaccāyana (q.v.), who is further stated

12 *Anamatagga*, see *KS.* II, p. 118, fn. 1, sv. *PED.*
13 *Saṃsāro*
14 *Pubbākoṭi*
15 *Idappaccayatā*
16 See *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* (2. I, 10 *SBB.* 2.1.22. Vol. 45 p. 343; cf. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, Ch. 6, 2. 2.

in this text to have maintained that the world was composed of seven ultimate elements which 'move not, neither do they vary, nor trench one upon another' (*D.* I, p. 56).

At any rate, perhaps as a tenet of Pakudha Kaccāyana, or perhaps as an independently-evolved doctrine but in direct contrast to the idea of a universe with an initial and independent beginning, there seems to have prevailed a school of thought which maintained the idea of a motionless universe which the Buddhists described as a heresy (*diṭṭhi*). This view, expressed in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* passage: "Winds do not blow, rivers do not flow, women with child do not give birth, the sun and moon do not rise or set. (They all) stand firm as pillars" (*S.* III, p. 202),[17] it has been proposed,[18] may have been the proto-type of the later doctrine of *avicalitanityatva*, motionless permanence. (See MATERIALISM).

The Buddhists seem to have been quick to sense the implications of a denial of novelty in the universe. Such a position would be least compatible with their important doctrine of change (*anicca*) which in turn is so intimately and inalienably connected with their distinctive view of causation. To them, every event, every moment, was as much a beginning as it was a continuation of the past — each new birth an unprecedented re-assembly of the elements of existence (*khandhas*). The Buddhists' objection would not be so much to a concept of beginning as it was to a concept of unconditioned beginning, whose acceptance would amount to a denial of their own principle of conditioned origination (*paṭicca-samuppāda*) as a universal law admitting of no exceptions. In application of their constantly-invoked principle of the middle (*majjhena*), the Buddhists would assert the doctrine of Becoming as against the two extreme doctrines of Being and Non-Being, and in conformity with this, would affirm the concept of continuous beginning under the operation of conditions (*paccaya*).

It is a striking fact that, addressing one 'venerable Kaccāyana' who has asked him what the 'right view' is, the Buddha says, "Now, he who with right insight sees the uprising of the world as it really is, does not hold with the non-existence of the world. And he who with right insight sees the passing away of the world as it really is, does not hold with the existence of the world." (*S.* II, pp. 16 f.). The uprising and passing away, the Buddhists tell us, are realities; they are the realities, with 'everything exists' (*sabbaṃ atthi*) and 'nothing exists' (*sabbaṃ natthi*) as the two unreal extremes. Dependent origination (q.v.) or Conditiond Genesis (*paṭicca-samuppāda*) is given as the Buddhist alternative, as the doctrine of the middle (*majjhena*) taught by the Buddha. Uprising of the world (*lokasamudaya*) and passing away of the world (*lokanirodha*), origination and termination, a paradoxical union, a strange joint reality of Being and Non-Being, is the reality of Becoming. But Buddhism is only content when it has pointed out that intrinsic to this Becoming is conditionality, the dependence on a confluence of *paccayas*. The Reality is conditioned Becoming — that is, that things are of causal origin, they are *hetuppabhava*.

The Buddhists were apparently aware that from the concept of a static universe it was a few steps to what they thought was the road of moral ruin, the path to decline, to blind, false views. From such a concept, they knew, one could argue forward to either an Indeterministic thesis or a Deterministic one. They problably saw that a logician could debate from a static universe to a denial of change and, therefore, a denial of causation and, from this, mere logical argumentation would bring him to an Indermistic conception of the universe. On the other hand, by the same kind of reasoning, the logician could argue that an unchanging, motionless system where there was no place for novelty and origination, innovation and initiative, would imply a universe governed by rigidly unalterable laws, by Strict Determinism. Such logic, or argumentation, while being totally consistent with its parts, perhaps, would construct universes of fantasy so remote from the facts of the world, and that is probably why the Buddhists declared their own thesis to be 'beyond the sphere of mere logic' (*atakkāvacara*, *D.* I, pp. 17-32).

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17 *Na vātā vâyanti, na najjo sandanti, na gabbhiniyo vijāyanti, na candimasuriyā udenti na apenti vā esikaṭṭhayiṭṭhitā* (*S.* III, p. 202).

18 K. N. Jayatilleke (op, cit, pp. 145 f. 255 f.); D. J. Kalupahana (*Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, The University Press of Hawaii, 1975. p. 39) suggests this doctrine, held by Kaccāyana, as having maintained a theory of Natural Determinism (*svabhāvavāda*).

II. Indeterminism In The Microcosm. It may be remarked at this point that the Indeterminism and Determinism that was being discussed above by the Buddhists as faulty doctrines were making reference to the universe in general, the macrocosm, the soul-and-the-world understood together as a single totality. The Buddhists were counterpoising their thesis of Conditioned Genesis (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) as the alternative, having in mind their own conception of the universe (*loka*) which finds definition in the following passage of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (*S.* IV, p, 95):[19] "That by which one is conscious of the world,[20] by which one has a conceit of the world[21] that is called 'the world' in the Ariyan discipline. And through what is one conscious of the world? And through what has one a conceit of the world? Through the eye, friend, through the ear, the nose, the tongue, the body, through the mind one is conscious of the world. That is called 'the world' in the Ariyan discpline" (trsl. Woodward, *The Book of the Kindred Sayings*, IV, p. 59). This world (*loka*) arises from conditions. It is of causal origin (*hetuppabhava*), the Buddhists went on to say, with insistent re-iteration throughout their scriptures, always counterpoising this cardinal teaching of theirs between the metaphysical notions that are derived from the concepts of Being and Non-Being. Such metaphysical concepts, which are beyond the realm of experiental conception, as far as they are concerned, the Buddhists claim, are irrelevant. These notions help nobody with the problem of living, and it is philosophy that is concerned with the problem of living that interests the Buddhists. Any other engagement in philosophy is an unfruitful, sophhistical occupation or a sterile intellectual pastime, where men "addicted to to logic and reasoning" (*takkī..vīmaṃsī*) are beating out a thesis by their own argumentations (*takka-pariyāhataṃ vīmāṃsānucaritaṃ*: see also PRAGMATISM).

As such, with regard to the doctrine of Indeterminism and Determinism, it is their application and relevance in the field of human action that has the main attraction for the Buddhists. Thus, what stand they took towards these two polar doctrines in the ethical sphere, their relation to the microcosm, is the aspect which deserves our closest attention.

(I) Ahetuvāda. In this connection, the references to *ahetuvāda*, which is a term that seems to have come into vogue at some later stage in the history of Buddhist thought, provides us with a fair deal of significant information. Perhaps the most useful clue is found in the astute observation of the commentator Dhammapāla, who defining *adhicca-samuppanna* as an indeterministic doctrine (*kena ci kāraṇena vinā upanno ti adhicca-samuppanno dassito*: *UdA.* p. 345) says that, "as such *ahetuvāda* must be included in *adhicca-samuppanna* (*tena ahetuvādo' pi saṅgahito*: loc. cit).

The problem arises, what exactly was the claim and content of this *ahetuvāda* and how exactly does it qualify to be included under the *adhicca-samuppanna* thesis. The nature of Dhammapāla's contention gives us the impression that our commentator was not speaking here of a merely logically possible philosophical position like *adhicca-samuppanna*, but of a philosophy which was most probably a prevalent species of doctrine that was being preached in India in the Buddha's day. What was this doctrine?

The *Sāmaññaphala Suttanta* (*D.* I, pp. 47 f.), which is our most reliable source for the philosophies contemporaneous with Buddhism, contains no philosophy which is designated *ahetuvāda*, although all the six philosophies mentioned there are introduced by some name or nick-name. Nevertheless, the *Mahābodhi Jātaka*, obviously a much later compilation than the above-mentioned *Suttanta*, refers (*J.* V, p. 237), to Pūraṇa Kassapa as an *ahetuvādin* whose doctrine, in that earlier source, has been designated *akiriyaṃ*. A *Majjhima Nikāya* passsage (*M.* II, p. 403) In itself without any assignment to a propounder, but containing the identical words attributed in the *Sāmmaññaphala* passage to Pūraṇa, is described as expressing an *akiriya-vāda*. The *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*A.* I, p. 173), referring to three schools of *akiriyavādins* or 'deniers of the deed' mentions as the third, one called a doctrine of *ahetu-appaccaya*. The *Dīgha* passage reads as follows:

"To him who acts, O king, or causes another to act, to him who mutilates or causes another to mutilate, to him who punishes or causes another to punsih, to him who causes grief or torment, to him who trembles or causes others to tremble, to him

19 See also *A.* II, p. 49; arising & destruction of the world, *S.* IV, p. 85.
20 *Lokasaññi*
21 *Lokamānī*

who kills a living creature, who takes what is not given, who breaks into houses, who commits dacoity, or robbery, or highway robbery, or adultery, or who speaks lies, to him thus acting there is no guilt. If with a discus with an edge sharp as a razor he should make all living creatures on earth one heap, one mass of flesh, there would be no guilt thence resulting, no increase of guilt would ensure. Were he to go along the south bank of the Ganges striking and slaying, mutilating and having men mutilated, oppressing and having men oppressed, there would be no guilt thence resulting, no increase of guilt would ensue. Were he to go along the north bank of the Ganges giving alms, and ordering gifts to be given, offering sacrifices and causing sacrifices to be offered, there would be no merit thence resulting, nor increase of merit. In generosity, in self-mastery, in control of the senses, in speaking truth there is neither merit, nor increase of merit" (trsl. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Pt. I, pp. 69 f.).

A perusal of these statements attributed to Pūraṇa makes it quite clear that this "heretical" philosopher (*titthakāro*) was maintaining that evil actions had no ensuing guilt (*pāpa*) or bad results and good ones no good results, that in other words, there was no correlation of action and result on a moral basis or on an ethical criterion. No moral law ensured for virtue desirable consequences and undesirable ones for vice. Morality, if it had any sense or meaning at all, had no application to actions. On further scrutiny, it would even appear that this implied that actions had no effects; that, not only was there no morality but no such thing as rsesult of deeds (*vipāka*).

It is certainly not difficult to see, in the light of the above tenets of Pūraṇa, that this doctrine should definitely be accommodated under the title of Non-causation, *adhicca-samuppanna*, Indeterminism. Accordingly, *ahetuvāda*, as exemplified by Pūraṇa's teaching cited in the *Sāmaññaphala*, was a sub-species of Indeterminist philosophy. This specific title *ahetuvāda* serves to confine its reference to Indeterminism as applied to human action only, and to human morality in particular. If there was no correlation between actions and results, or, rather, between one kinetic event and another, then, there would be no regular law connected with human action, and in the absence of such, it would be legitimately considered an Indeterministic philosophy. It is distinguished from the broader or larger category of Indeterminism only by the fact that the regularity here being denied is ethical regularity, the existence of a moral law.

Of course, it must be admitted that there is no attempt on the part of Pūraṇa to deny existence of a phenomenon classifiable as action, but only the denial of moral action, of the results of action for the doer of the action, although one may get the former impression from the fact that this doctrine is called the doctrine of Non-action (*akiriyaṃ* or *akiriyavāda*, q.v.).

It may be inferred from the ascription of the term *ahetuvāda* to Pūraṇa's doctrine that the appellation was always used by the Buddhists with an ethical connotation. *Ahetuvādins*, then, according to them, would be deniers of causal correlation between deeds and their results in the moral sense, in the sense that some classes of actions are said to be 'good' and other classes 'bad'. It is probably in this sense that the Buddhists refer to the doctrine of Makkhali Gosāla too as an *ahetuvāda*. A lengthy passage attributed to him in our chief source, the *Sāmaññaphala Suttanta* (op. cit. pp. 53 f.) is there described as an exposition of the doctrine of "purification through transmigration" (*saṃsāra-suddhi*). A section of this passage recurs in identical words in the *Majjhima Nikāya* (*M.* I, pp. 408 f.) and under the label *ahetuvāda*, runs as follows :

"There is, O king, no cause, either ultimate or remote, for the depravity of beings; they become depraved without reason and without cause. There is no cause, either proximate or remote, for the rectitude of beings; they become pure without reason and without cause. The attainment of any given condition, of any character, does not depend either on one's own acts, or on the acts of another, or on human effort. There is no such thing as power, or energy, or human strength or human vigour. All animals, all creatures, all beings, all souls in plants[22] are without force or power or energy of their own. They are bent this way and that by their fate[23], by the necessary conditions of the class[24] to which they belong, by their individual nature[25], and it is

22 *Sabbe sattā, sabbe pāṇā, sabbe bhūtā, sabbe jīvā.*
23 *Niyati*
24 *Saṅgati*
25 *Bhāva*

according to their position in one or other of the six classes[26] that they experience ease or pain". (trsl. Rhys. Davids, op. cit. p. 71).

On a *prima facie* survey of this passage, the Buddhists may quite legitimately label the teaching it refers to as an *ahetuvāda* in the same sense that Pūraṇa's doctrine is labelled by them with the same term and Dhammapāla too would be correct if he should classify such a doctrine as Indeterministic (*adhicca-samuppanna*) in the sense we have discussed above. If beings became pure without cause, or impure without cause, such events could be rightly considered as originating without antecedents, as beginningless beginnings in the moral world. This would mean for the Buddhists that such a doctrine could easily be accommodated under the title of non-causation.

Thus the denial of ethical action made Makkhalī both an *ahetuvādin* and an *adhicca-samuppannika*. This latter classification has further support from the fact that Makkhalī denies not only self-causation but also external-causation (*n' atthi attakāre n' atthi para-kāre*: *D.* I, p. 53) which makes him, according to the *catuṣkoṭi* logic, an *adhica-samuppannnika*. Makkhali's emphasis on the corollary of the denial of moral correlation, namely the denial of human initiative and effort, gains special attention in an *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*A.* I, pp. 173 f.) *sutta* where three categories of the deniers of human effort are named (and condemned as) *akiriyavādins* (see further AKIRIYAVĀDA) of which one category is the doctrine of *ahetu-appaccaya*, which is obviously synonymous with *ahetuvāda*.

Besides the above reasons, there seems to be a non-philosophical explanation too as to why Makkhalī's teaching came to be referred to as an *ahetuvāda* or *ahetu-appaccaya* doctrine. This is the simple fact that the *Sāmaññaphala* passage, which is our *locus classicus* for the doctirine of the heretical philosophers (*titthakāras*), opens the exposition of Makkhalī's doctrine with the two key concepts of "no cause, no condition" ((*n' atthi hetu n' atthi paccayā = ahetu appaccaya*) and at a time when the scriptures were retained by oral tradition, such key-words served as convenient mnemonic devices for recalling frequently required references, such as those to the much-anathematized *tittha-kāras*. Pūraṇa's doctrine was called *akiriyavāda* apparently for a similar reason. The term *ahetu-appaccaya* seemed to have gained preference ever the title of *saṃsārasuddhi* in the *Dīgha*, perhaps by reason of the former's brevity and the latter's complexity.

At any rate, the following facts emerge. At some stage in early Buddhist writings, Makkhalī's doctrine, as also Pūraṇa's, came to be referred to, rightly or wrongly, as an *ahetuvāda*. Despite the difference that Pūraṇa was actually maintaining, the absence of *effects* or consequences of action and Makkhali the absence of *causes* or conditions, apparently the Buddhist writers were at this stage able to see the common amoralist implications of both teachings, and with the Buddhist's strongly moralist penchant, probably felt the need to use the term as a term of anathematization and stigmatization, so much so that Makkhalī firstly and Pūraṇa secondly became the butt of their criticism and satire for any amoralist teaching.

Meantime, the term *adhicca-samuppanna* seems to have retained a predominantly philosophical and technical sense associated with the idea of Indeterminism with regard to the Universe.

III. Fatalism and Determinism. But the picture is not as clear-cut as it may seem. A close scrutiny of the above-quoted passage will show that the Buddhist writers who called Makkhalī an *ahetuvādin* were taking him at his word when he speaks of "no cause and no condition" (*n' atthi hetu n'atthi paccayā*) while in fact they, together with Makkhalī himself, seem to be unaware that he is asserting a kind of causation.

Makkhalī in this passage is denying not only moral correlations but actions, the capacity for choice, volition, initiative, effort etc., in human beings. Such a denial is no qualification for a doctrine to be described as an Indeterministic one. It may be taken as a contradiction of the possibility of events without antecedents which the earlier interpretation made above maintained, qualifying Makkhalī to be classed as an Indeterminist.

Makkhalī's doctrine is a strange combination of these contradictions. Denying moral causation and the results of moral action, he does not deny the possibility of moral purification, nor the occurrence of suffering (*dukkha*) and happiness (*sukha*) in the lives of men, and not denying these, he seems to be asserting causation unwittingly. To Makkhalī, it is

26 *Chalābhijāti*

true, man's joys and sorrows and all the many vicissitudes of his life are not caused by what he does, but, it does seem to imply that they are certainly not without a cause. He admits that, in the course of his *saṃsāric* sojourn, an individual experiences happiness (*sukha*) and suffering (*dukkha*) and finally attains his purification, terminating his suffering through the implied agency of Fate (*niyati*). This being so, it is no surprise that he denies cause and conditions (*hetu* and *paccaya*) as understood by the Buddhists who maintain both the succession and confluence of conditions as required for effects.

That Makkhali accepted causation and the kind of causation he accepted are both well demonstrated in the rest of his credo appearing in the *Sāmaññaphala* as a continuation of the passage already cited (*D.* I, p. 53). It runs thus in Basham's paraphrased translation :

"There are .... 8400 great *kalpas* through which wise and fool alike will take their course and make an end of sorrow. There is no question of bringing unripe *karma* to fruition, nor of exhausting *karma* already ripened, by virtuous conduct, by vows, by penance, or chastity. That cannot be done. *Saṃsāra* is measured as with a bushel,with its joy and sorrow and its appointed end. It can neither be lessened nor increased, nor is their excess or deficiency of it. Just as a ball of thread, when thrown, unwinds to its full length, so fool and wise alike will take their course, and make an end of sorrow." (*History and Doctrines of Ajivikas*, Luzac & Co. Ltd., London, 1951; p. 14).

It is clear from this that Makkhali conceived of a universe where all life was moving towards a fixed and final end, i.e. purification (*visuddhi*). Beings were journeying through time, a fixed period of time, experiencing fortunes and misfortunes, joys and griefs, laughter and tears, moving, "ripening", "maturing" towards that particular end where sorrow is ended. It is this aspect which merited for Makkhali's teaching the title of *saṃsāra-suddhi* (trsld. by Rhys Davids as 'purification through transmigration': op. cit. p. 53). But, although the sojourn of beings in *saṃsāra* was thus guided by a purpose, this teleology was not inspired by an Intelligence operating behind it; only by a ruthlessly impersonal principle or power oblivious to men's temporary joys and griefs. This was indeed Makkhali's Cause in a sense, a Final Cause.

But already the idea had been suggested in the first part of the passage of a kind of all-governing, all-sustaining Cause or Causes, in the lines: 'All animals, (*sattā*), all creatures (*pāṇā*), all beings, (*bhūtā*), all souls in plants (*jivā*),[27] are without force or power or energy of their own. They are *niyati-saṅgati-bhāva-pariṇatā* (*D.*I. pp.53 f.). This expression, which seems to be idiosyncratic to Makkhali's doctrine, is obscure and ambiguous, giving rise to a diversity of interpretations by recent scholars who have devoted a fair amount of interest to understanding the meanings of the various members of the phrase. But, all in all, the phrase really elaborates on, or elucidates rather than adds any concept drastically altering the teleological theme, the theme of a destination (= purification, *visuddhi*) suggested through the concept of *saṃsāra-suddhi*. Despite the nuances of meaning these different interpretations may effect in the total picture, one thing is clear, that we may say with some assurance that Makkhali was definitely positing a cause or causes outside moral ones for the existence of suffering and happiness, good and evil, the evolution and progress and final emancipation of beings in the world and also maintaining that this factor was beyond the control of any individual. No action or effort of an individual (*attakāra*) or that of another (*parakāra*) could change the present weal or woe, the direction and destination of that individual or of any other being. When the fixed time elapses, and Makkhali appears to have thought in aeons of time, all beings, who by then would have passed through the various necessary phases of existence, would finally find purification or liberation from sorrow. The simile of the ball of thread functions as a most telling and apt expression of the idea of fixedness that the philosopher was supposed to convey. It may be noted, however, that, in his soteriology, Makkhali, amoralist as he was thought to be, identified the end of sorrow (*dukkhassanta*) or life's *summum bonum* with moral purity (*visuddhi*), or, at least so that Buddhists understood him to do.

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27 *DA*. I, 161 maintains :

sattā	—	camels, oxen, donkeys etc.
pāṇā	—	breathers, those who have one or two faculties.
bhūtā	—	beings, those enclosed in eggs or membraneous sheets.
jīvā	—	living things, plants e. g. rice, wheat etc.

See also *MA*. III, p. 120 and *Dialogues of the Buddha*, I, p. 71, n. 2.

But the phrase *niyati-saṅgati-bhāva-pariṇatā* is important for us in the understanding of the features peculiar to Makkhali's Determinism, or what type of Determinism or Indeterminism he held at all to have earned so much of criticism from the Buddhists. Whatever meanings the separate members of the phrase may bear, from a closer examination of the passage cited above, it appears to be the crucial phrase by which Makkhali explained the various vicissitudes that beings undergo in that long journey to the final predetermined end, his explanation for the varying fortunes and misfortunes and inequalities, the sorrows and joys that beings are subject to in life, or, rather, in the many lives which it is their lot to live.

Buddhaghosa's explanation (*DA*. I, pp. 161 f.)[28] is brief but illuminating and lends support to the above view: that the phrase is intended to be Makkhali's explanation of the cause or causes of the fortunes or misfortunes of beings existing in *saṃsāra*. It is distinct from his telcology and soteriology which discuss the ultimate goal and purpose of that existence. Drawing as he does from the older sources, this 5th century commentator, takes the first three members as separate though interdependent concepts, explaining the fourth, *pariṇatā*, as meaning "development" or "evolving". Thus, according to Buddhaghosa, Makkhali refers by the word *pariṇatā* to the propulsion towards variety, the diversity and the manifoldness in the universe which is manifested in change. *Niyati*, Buddhaghosa takes for fate or destiny, consciously or unconsciously making no effort to associate the word with the later Buddhist concept of *niyāma* which was obviously familiar to him. *Saṅgati* means for him, a movement or progress according to the "six classes" (of which later) and *bhāva* is the individual nature or particularity of each being, equivalent with *svabhāva*. In terms of this commentary, then Makkhali's Determinism explained change and diversity by a plurality of causes, these causes being conceived as inseparably intertwined with each other, but at the same time having independent meaning.

Recent scholarship has dwelt persistently with the problematic phrase. Basham (op. cit. p. 225), while pointing out the possibility of alternatively translating it as: 'ripened by (*pariṇatā*) the nature' (*bhāva*) of the lot (*saṅgati*) of (i.e. decreed by) Destiny (*niyati*), or as 'brought about by (*pariṇatā*) the existence of (*bhāva*) union (*saṅgati*) with Destiny (*niyati*), prefers to follow Buddhaghosa in taking the 'three first elements as in *dvandva* relationship' and translates Makkhali as maintaining that all beings are developed by Destiny (*niyati*), chance (*saṅgati*) and nature (*bhāva*).

Virtually all the modern researches have agreed that *niyati* stands for Fate or Destiny conceived as a relentless impersonal hypostatized principle operating on all beings and that it was one of the most important ingredients in Makkhali's system. It is quite early in their history, that Makkhali and his followers, who were generally known as Ājivikas, came to be referred to philosophically as *niyativādins* (see NIYATIVĀDA) in the literature of Jain writers like Śilaṅka[29] and Ñāṇavimala[30], and even later Hindu writers[31]. In fact, Basham, leaning heavily on Jain sources (op.cit. p.226), would place *niyati* as the fundamental category, to which *saṅgati* and *bhāva* act as subordinate factors. Supported by Buddhaghosa and Ñāṇavimala, Basham identifies *bhāva* with the inherent character of individuals, understood by *svabhāvavādin* school of materialist philosophers as a kind of causal factor intrinsic to the nature of things. Rejecting Hoernle's[32] translation of *saṅgati* as 'environment', whom he thinks, has erred in following

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28 *ettha niyatīti niyatatā,*
saṅgatīti channaṃ abhijātīnaṃ
tattha tattha gamanaṃ
bhāvo ti sabhāvo yeva.
evaṃ niyatiyā ca saṅgatiyā ca
bhāvena ca pariṇatā nānappakārataṃ
pattā. Yena hi yathā bhavitabbaṃ
so tatheva bhavati, yena na bhavitabbaṃ so na bhavatīti dasseti: (*DA*. I, p. 161).

29 *Sū*. i, 1, 2, 2-3 fol. 30 quoted by Basham.
op. cit. p. 227.

30 See Basham (op. cit. pp. 226-239; Jayatilleke, op. cit. p. 142).

31 See Basham (op. cit. pp. 226-239; Jayatilleke, op. cit. p. 142).

32 *ERE*, I. p. 261.

Buddhaghosa, Basham interprets the term as 'lot' or 'chance', and notwithstanding this interpretation, obviously because of the dominant position he accords to the concept of *niyati*, he concludes Makkhali's doctrine to be an "absolute determinism" or "Fatalism" in which "the only effective cause was *niyati*, which was not merely a first cause, but in its aspects as *saṅgati* and *bhāva*, or chance and inner character, was also the efficient cause of all phenomena. *Saṅgati* and *bhāva*, the manifestation of *niyati* in individuals, were only apparent and illusory modifications of the one principle, and did not in fact introduce new causal factors into the universal process". (op. cit. p. 227).

But it is the interpretation of the meaning of the term *saṅgati* which has led to the variety of modern interpretations in the placing of Makkhali as a Determinist or Indeterminist, and, if he belonged to the former, to the understanding of those particular features of the Determinism he upheld.

Barua (*A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, Banarsidas, Varanasi, 1970, p. 278) himself was perhaps the first to remark on introducing the concept of 'chance' into Makkhali's system. He says : .... the first portion of the doctrine ascribed to Gosāla in the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* ought to be separated from the rest on the ground that the doctrine of non-causation or the hypothesis of chance does not fit well into the deterministic theory of Gosāla. We think there is no other conclusion to be drawn from the significant passage in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (V, 126). Āryaśūra also identifies the doctrine of non-causation with that of nature (*bhāvavāda*: loc. cit.).

It is probably following up on this suggestion of Barua that Jayatilleke (*The Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1963, p. 145) attempts a reconciliatory explanation in order to accommodate both concepts. He agrees with Basham's interpretation of the term *saṅgati* as 'chance', but because of this very fact, would be at variance with him that *niyati* should be given "an exaggerated importance", which, he hints, is not warranted by the *dvandva* relationship assumed by Buddhaghosa whom Basham has already drawn to his support. Jayatilleke thinks that "Makkhali does not become a Strict Determinist" since the opposite category of 'chance' or Indeterminism plays a significant part in his system. He proposes that Makkhali was probably "a syncretist thinker whose doctrine was highly eclectic in character" apparently compromising to believe in or trying to ingeniously harmonize the concepts of "*niyati*, as well as *svabhāva* (=*bhāva*) and *yadṛcchā* (=*saṅgati*) and possibly even *pariṇāma*." The *niyativāda* which Makkhali accepted, Jayatilleke suggests, was probably that future events like salvation for all were strictly determined and that human effort had little to do with the shaping of the future.

Kalupahana (*Causality, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, The University Press of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1975, pp. 33 ff.) returns to Basham's interpretation of Makkhali as a Determinist but he does so for the very same reason that he differs with both Basham and Jayatilleke that the term *saṅgati* stands for "chance". On the strength of Buddhaghosa's definition (*DA*. I, p. 161; *SA*. II, p. 341) of *saṅgati* as *channaṃ abhijātinaṃ tattha tattha gamanaṃ:* 'movement or progress according to any one of the six types of existence (*chaḷabhijāti*), which is further substantiated by Śīlaṅka commenting on the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* (I, 1.2.3.), Kalupahana interprets *saṅgati* as meaning "species" and opines that Jayatilleke's attempt to reconcile the polarities of Chance and Fate by making Makkhali a syncretist thinker is unwarranted. He sums up the relationship of the concepts, differing with Basham seemingly, as to the supremacy of *niyati*. "According to the Ājīvika theory of existence," he states, "a thing has to fall into one of the six categories of existence. The particular characteristics possessed by a thing determine the nature of the species into which it falls.[33] It is the "concurrence" of these characteristics that is denoted by the term *saṅgati*. The concurrence is not haphazard. It is strictly determined by Destiny (*niyati*). Once the nature of the species is determined by Destiny (*niyati*) that species begins to evolve (*pariṇāma*) according to its nature (*bhāva* = *svabhāva*) ... Destiny is placed at the beginning because of its universality and all-comprehensiveness. It is *the* cause that accounts for the manifold diversity of the universe. Then comes a more specific factor, species (*saṅgati*), and lastly, nature (*bhāva*) that is the nature of that particular species." (op. cit. pp. 35f.) Associating *bhāva* with the concept of the *svabhāvavādins* and explaining *svabhāva* as "inherent nature whereby the individual was only an automation functioning according to the dictates of the stuff out of which his physical personality was composed", Kalupahana sees in Makkhalī a Materialist and his system as an organic and logically coherent whole",

33 See also s.v. *abhijāti*, Basham, op. cit. pp. 14ff., 243 ff.

leading from a theory of complete Natural Determinism to a doctrine of Fatalism" (op. cit. p. 37). Kalupahana's final conclusion as to the evolution of Makkhali's doctrine from a Natural Determinism into Fatalism, viewed in the light of the following comment by Pande (*Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, Alahabad, 1957, p. 339, a much earlier work), becomes open to objection. Making the distinction between Natural (causal) and Supernatural (Fatalistic or Divine) Necessity (*niyati*) Pande says, quite relevantly and cogently: "The belief in a natural Niyati, and the belief in a super-natural Niyati, it must be noted, arise from two diametrically opposed sources. The former is the result of reflection over the regularity of phenomena; the latter of reflection over their accidentality, especially in the sphere of human matters. Since the accidental is wherein merely the cause is unknown, in earlier times, when curiosity ran very much ahead of knowledge, the idea of a Supernatural necessity is likely to have impressed the minds of men forcibly. The accordance with probability, therefore, Niyativada should in general be taken to have reference to this type of necessity". In fact, the classification of Makkhali's *niyati* as a supernatural determinism adds greater strength to Kalupahana's interpretation of *saṅgati* as 'species' rather than the 'chance' of Basham and Jayatilleke. In agreement with Pande, it is easy to see that Supernatural Determinism, particularly Fatalism, is more usually the causal explanation for accidental events than for normal, regular events. It is actually untoward happenings (*visamaparihāra*) or sudden attacks from without (*opakkamikāni*) that, in the early strata of thought, seek their explanation through the concept of Fate or Destiny, by reason of the mystery or immediate causal inexplicability that characterizes such phenomena. For instance, if a man who has generally been kind and good in the estimation of his kith and kin is struck with lightening and is killed, the reason for that happening has to be explained more than that his kindness was rewarded by his benificiaries. That an efficient hunter went out hunting and brought back his kill or was killed in the jungle is no matter for explanation but if he stumbled on an extra-ordinary-sized gem on his way, it arouses enough curiosity to demand a causal interpretation out-side the normal and obvious explanations. Once these phenomena were explained by a supernatural principle, the more regular kind of event too fell into place. As a matter of fact, Makkhali does not appear to have seen the distinction between chance-events and the normal, natural or regular events, unlike his Buddhist contemporaries did in the *Moliya-Sīvaka Sutta* (loc. cit). For him, since all events were to be explained by the impersonal, impartial principle of Fate, the need to make such a distinction or explain causally the differences and inequalities between one kind of event and another did not arise. The actions of men, and the events arising in association with them in the form of causes or consequences seemed to him as much the result of "the lot" which was determined for men by their presence in *saṃsāra*. There was no difference between such an event and the event of a man going out in the night and being stung by a snake or a fisherman dragging in his net with a treasure-trove in it. Thus *kammic*.[34] events were on a par with the accidental and had Fate for their cause. Changes in nature such as climatic or seasonal changes (*utuparināma*) too were not different from the *kammic* or the accidental. *Niyati* determined them too, and if there were shades of difference, they were explained by the adjuncts of *niyati*, namely *saṅgati* and *bhāva*. Then, since there was no need to make a distinction between regular events and chance-events, the need to specifically mention chance as a causal factor in the phrase *niyati-saṅgati-bhāva-pariṇatā* did not arise. It seems to be more likely that Makkhali was taking *saṅgati* to mean 'species', since the birth of beings in any one of them and not another seemed to be striking enough and intriguing enough a phenomenon to demand a special explanation. It appears to be coherent with Makkhali's doctrine that he should be concerned with the characteristics of the species or class to which a being belonged, and that he would be maintaining these too to be determined by Fate. One notes the added fact that Makkhali, with his biological leanings, seems to be greatly

34 According to the Buddhist record (*D.* I. pp. 53 f.) of the *Sāmaññaphala Suttanta*, Makkhali seems to have spoken of 500 sorts of *kamma*, and again 5 according to the 5 senses and yet again 3 (according to the three-fold division of act, word and thought which was also a division of the Buddhists and Jains) and also a whole *kamma* and a half-*kamma* (*addha*). But both Buddhists and Jains referred to Makkhali's doctrine as an *akiriyavāda*. Either there was a subtle shade of difference between *kammavāda* and *kiriyavāda*, and Makkhali maintained a *kammavāda* as against a *kiriyavāda* or Makkhali understood *kamma* in a different sense from that of the Buddhists and the Jains.
Śīlaṅka writing in the 9th century presents the *niyativādins* as arguing against *karma* (Basham, op. cit. p. 232) stating that it is logically inconsistent to consider it the cause of joy and sorrow.

concerned with the classification of beings, the *abhijāti* classification being part and parcel of his teleology. (see MAKKHALĪ GOSĀLA). The classes to which beings belonged, in other words, their hereditary characteristics, were a result of their Fate. Heredity, in short, was explained by Fatalism. The classes or species into which beings were born were phases which they had to pass through for purification which would bring about liberation from the sufferings of *saṃsāra*. And, since Makkhalī took heredity as a determinant, he probably took even the sociological facts of caste-division to be a product of Fate, birth in any one of them being a necessary phase in a being's *saṃsāric* development which had to be resigned to and which was idle to protest against as the Buddhists, with their *kiriyavāda* doctrine, seemed to be doing. The physical determinism implied in the interpretation of *bhāva* as the material particularity of an individual being might also be understood as superceded by a supernatural determinism which attributed to Fate the determination of such particularity. The physical defect of a person born crippled was assigned him by his Fate.[35] Such a characteristic was necessary for him for his purification and liberation. In the same way as ice was cold and fire hot, an individual had tendencies of hate or love which was caused by Fate, as a part of a necessary lot, necessary for purification.

Makkhalī's philosophy, then, appears to have been a refined form of supernatural determinism,[36] or more exactly a fatalism, which probably also accounted for the wide popularity he might have gained among an agrarian population which was probably his audience — a popularity which seems to have made him a force to contend with for both the Buddhists and Jains. His botanical imagery of the 'ripening' (*pariṇatā*) plant which he used to describe the effortless "maturing", within a given period of time, of the destiny of an individual (and to whose biographical and philosophical significance in Makkhalī's thinking Barua draws attention: op. cit. pp. 30 ff), must have served as a very expressive communication of his doctrine to such a population.

Thus, though the Buddhists preferred to see Makkhalī as an *ahetuvādin*[37] in the specific Buddhist sense of that word (discussed above) this did not preclude his teaching from being quite legitimately classified by them as a *doctrine of external* causation (*paraṃ kataṃ*), i.e., as a deterministic philosophy or *niyativāda*. Exactly this classification has been made, in fact, by the Jains who seem to have described Makkhalī's doctrine as a *niyativāda* and classified it as a variety of external causation. As pointed out by Kalupahana (op. cit. p. 5), the Jain commentator Śīlaṅka, defining the word *aññakaḍam* (the Jain equivalent of the Buddhist *paraṃ kataṃ*) occurring in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* (I, fols 30—31) lists five theories of external causation that prevailed in his day, probably tracing back their origins to pre-Buddhistic times, viz: (1) *Kāla* (Time); (2) *Īsvarakṛtaka* (creation by God); (3) *Svabhāva* (Nature); (4) *Karma* (Action); (5) *Niyati* (Fate).

Apparently at a later stage in the history of these philosophical developments, Pūraṇa Kassapa too seems to have been confounded with Makkhalī, both by the Jains and the Buddhists. The Jains refer to him as a *niyativādin*, while the Buddhists in some of their texts attribute to him his doctrine elsewhere attributed to Makkhalī. Whatever the accuracy of

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35 "Under the compulsion of Destiny they experience various repulsive conditions, such as being hump-backed, one-eyed, a dwarf .... death, disease, and sorrow-" Śīlaṅka (*Sū.* II, 1, 12, fol-288) quoted by Basham (op. cit. p. 234, fn. 3): see also Jayatilleke (op. cit. p. 147).

36 This supernatural "Fate" was apparently even above the control and power of the gods, since Makkhalī seems to have believed in gods, devils, purgatories and even Nāgas, as his cosmological list shows. Probably it resembled the 'Fate' of the ancient Greeks. According to Śīlaṅka writing in the 9th century, the *niyativādin* argument against the theistic explanation *vis-a-vis* their own doctrine of Fate seems to have been as follows ".... happiness and grief do not come about by the agency of God: (if they do) is God formed or formless? If he has form, he has no more the capacity to create all things than has the ordinary man (who has also form). If he is formless, his inactivity must be greater than that of empty space (which is also formless). Moreover, if he be subject to passion and other (emotions), since he is not superior to us (mortals), etc .... he is not the maker of the universe. And if he were devoid of passion, the variety of good and evil fortune, of lord and poor man, which he has caused in the world, would not come about. Therefore God is not the creator". (Śīlaṅka *Sū.* i, 1, 2, 2, fol. 30 requoted from Basham, op. cit. p. 231).

37 The *Majjhima Nikāya* (*M.* I. 407) contrasting the Buddhist viewpoint with *ahetuvāda* calls itself *hetuvāda*, and with *akiriyavāda* as *kiriyavāda*.

the Jain contention, the Buddhist confusion is not without an understandable basis. Since the Buddhists saw Pūraṇa as denying effects (*vipāka*) and Makkhali as denying causes (*hetu*), it was natural for them to see both these philosophers as proclaiming the possibility of events occurring in isolation, of occurrences which have no antecedents, of actions which have a beginning from themselves. As long as Makkhali's tenets of *niyati* and *saṃsārasuddhi* are not taken into account, both philosophers may be seen as holding a common doctrine against moral causation and moral responsibility – *logical determinism*. Buddhist Criticism of Buddhaghosa (*DA*. I, p. 161) seems to have understood as the essence of Makkhali's doctrine the ideas of the predetermination of the future. He sums up (loc. cit.) his doctrine as maintaining that 'whatever should happen will happen in the same way, whatever should not happen will not happen', thereby perceiving beneath it the *niyativāda* dogma of the unchangeability and inexorability of events to come, the fixedness of happenings in the world'.

Jayatilleke (op. cit. p. 142) was perhaps the first modern scholar to observe the metaphysical notion of Time assumed in this *niyativāda* doctrine. He traces the terms of the conception of Time as a hypostatized entity to the *Atharvaveda* (19, 53, 54) where, in the hymn to Kāla, it is conceived as 'having everything under its control' and as 'a supreme force', eternally existent but 'producing both past and future'.

The beginningless, timeless reality of Being assumed in these Vedic musings seems to have been rationalized by Uddālaka who by an argument of pure reasoning, concluded, like Parmenides, that Being is and cannot come out of Nothing. Jayatilleke (op. cit.) points out that this *a priori* premise of Uddālaka has been realized by a school of Materialists mentioned in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, when they assert that 'what is does not perish, from nothing nothing comes'. He parallels this with a statement ascribed by the Jain commentators Śīlaṅka, Ñāṇavimala and Abhayadeva to the *niyativādins*, viz., that which is not to be will not be, nor does that which is to be, perish. Jayatilleke then argues that the difference between these two statements is purely of the tenses of the verb 'to be'. Being is conceived in the former as 'what is' and in the latter as 'what will be'. Non-Being as 'what will not be of the latter' instead of 'what is not' of the former. The misconception of Being, accordingly, gives rise to the further misconceptions that events of the future in some way already 'exist' and from this the deterministic thesis that every happening in the past, present and future is unalterably fixed. This makes Jayatillake suggest that Buddha's advice in the *Niruttipatha Sutta* (*S*. III, p. 69), enjoining the desirability of keeping distinct the usages of the verb 'to be', is probably a warning against logical conclusions of the above kind and notes that this advice was in fact given regarding the *ahetuvādins*, *akiriyavādins* and *natthikavādins* whom the Buddha declares to have adhered to these linguistic conventions, purely out of fear of public censure. If Jayatilleke's conclusions are correct, then it may also be surmised that the Buddha probably believed that these three schools of thought would, otherwise for fear, have declared the eternity and fixity of Being, confusing the three tenses, that being the logical conclusion of their argument.

Predictability: The idea of the predetermination of future events inherent in the *niyativādin* view of the universe admits also the possibility of prediction and is closely associated with the claims to omniscience. If events of the future were destined to happen, then it should be possible for an omniscient person to predict them with certainty, for omniscience would by definition include precognition. Such claims to omniscience were quite common among the religious teachers of the Buddha's day. Both Pūraṇa and Mahāvīra are depicted in the early Buddhist texts as each claiming omniscience for himself, while the Jain texts quoted by Basham (op. cit. pp. 275f.) hint that at least his own devotees believed Makkhali to be omniscient. This view, Basham further suggests, is supported by the late Tamil work *Civañāṇacittiyar*, (ibid.) which is stated to be referring to him as omniscient. At any rate there is definite Buddhist evidence that Makkhali[38] laid claim to prophetic powers. Whether that claim was derived from his philosophy, however, is uncertain.

38 *S*. IV, p. 398; see also Jayatilleke (op. cit. pp. 15f.) where the author points out the deterministic connection; also Basham, (op. cit. pp. 50 f.) where he states that Gosāla practised penance in order to acquire magic power and superhuman sight. He further adds : "The Jaina and Buddhist tradition about Gosāla agrees with that of the Buddhist concerning the six heretics that magical powers were part of his stock in trade, and it appears that he was capable, either honestly or by fraud, of producing psychic phenomena". Hoernle is quoted (loc. cit.) as showing from the evidence of the *Uvasaga Dasāo*, c. II, p. 108 n.) that "Gosala claimed to have attained Jina-hood', which implied omniscience.

Whatever this may be, it is clear that the claims to omniscience were associated in the minds of the Buddhists with the deterministic thesis of the *niyativādins*, and that they laughed it away by pointing to the absurdity of the explanations the *niyativādins* had to resort to in order to defend their claims to fore-knowledge. The *Sandaka Sutta* (*M.* I, pp. 519 f.) does not fail to catch the humorous aspect of the subject. Some of these claimants to omniscience, it maintains, may enter an empty house to obtain food, a dog may bite one, he may, without anticipation, encounter fierce animals. He has sometimes to ask people their names, or the names of places or sometimes even to inquire the way. To get over their discomfiture, they had to maintain that their actions were inevitable, implying that no fore-knowledge would have sufficed to avert their occurrence. The *Sutta* apparently does not labour the obvious lameness of the argument and seems to be satisfied with describing the doctrines of such teachers as unsatisfactory preoccupations, as *anossāsikāni brahma -cariyāni*. Omniscience is shown by the Buddhist as a claim of one of the four types of religious teachers whose doctrines are false (*M.* I, pp. 519-520). See further OMNISCIENCE.

The Buddha, questioned as to his omniscience by Vacchagotta, a non-Buddhist, says that a correct description of him regarding his supernatural knowledge would be to speak of him as a "threefold knowledge — man" (*tevijjo*, *M.* I, p. 482). This threefold knowledge, he says, consists of (1) retrocognition of past lives (*pubbenivāsānussati ñāṇa*), (2) the knowledge of the passing away and coming to be of beings according to the consequences of their actions (*cutūpapātañaṇa* or *dibbacakku* as it is sometimes referred to and (3) the knowledge of the destruction of defiling impulses (*āsavakkhaya-ñāṇa*). The relevant passage in the *Tevijja-Vacchagotta Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 482) puts it in the Buddha's own words "I, Vaccha, whenever I please, recollect a varitety of former habitations, that is to say, one birth, two births .... (etc.) upto a hundred thousand and many an aeon .... etc. Thus I recollect diverse former habitations in all their modes and details. And I, Vaccha, whenever I please, with purified *deva*-vision surpassing that of men .... see beings as they pass hence and come to be; I comprehend that beings are mean, excellent, comely, ugly, well-going, ill-going according to the consequences of deeds. And I Vaccha, by the destruction of the cankers, having realized here and now by my own super-knowledge the freedom of mind and the freedom through wisdom that are cankerless, entering thereon, abide therein. Vaccha, expounding that the recluce Gotama is a threefold-knowledge man, you would be one who speaks in accordance with what has been said by me, you would not be misrepresenting me with what is not fact ...." (trsl. I. B Horner, *Middle Length Sayings*, II, p. 160).

This threefold knowledge, it may be noted, refers to the past and present events and does not seem to include prophesy. This fact has admirably been noted and queried by the Buddha's own contemporaries and answered (*D.*III, p. 134) by him in the following manner. "Wanderers who hold other views than ours may declare: "Concerning the past, Gotama the Recluse reveals an infinite knowledge and insight[39] but not so concerning the future, as to be what the why of it. (If they were to say so), then those wanderers would fancy, like so many silly fools, that knowledge and insight concerning one kind of thing are to be revealed by knowledge and insight-engaged upon another kind of thing. Concerning the past, Cunda, the Tathāgata has cognition reminiscent of existences.[40] He can remember as far back as he desires and concerning the future there arise in him knowledge born of Enlightenment[41] to this effect: This is the last birth, now there is no more coming to be" (trsl. T.W.&C.A.F. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Pt. III, 1957, p. 126).

This passage seems to give us a clue to the area of prediction indulged in by the Buddha in the *Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta* (*D.*II, pp. 92f.) and the Buddha's attitude to prediction. Here, Ānanda, in his typical manner, has inquired of the Buddha the status and destiny of several devotees who are known to have died. The Buddha in answer reveals not only where they have been born but also their particular spiritual status, i.e., whether they are *sakadāgāmins*, *anāgāmins*, *arahants*, etc. who will attain enlightenment and these predictions obviously fall into the second category of super-knowledge viz. *cutūpātañāṇa* which is a knowledge attainable by anyone prepared to master the methodology (*dhammapariyāya* indicated by the Buddha, as the rest of the Buddha's statements in the text show).

39 *ñāṇa-dassana*
40 *sattānusāri-viññāṇaṃ*
41 *Bodhijaṃ ñāṇaṃ*

The possibility of predicting the future event at a less advanced stage is not ruled out. The canonical writings virtually take for granted the possibility of knowing the future as well as the past (*atītānāgata*) through inference based on the knowledge of the nature of causal phenomena (*dhamme ñāṇa*). See INFERENCE.

Thus the Buddhist universe seems to be a predictable universe, predictability being possible in areas of spiritual development. But the powers of prediction seem to be related to degrees of knowledge inferential or supernormal, both of which depend on the knowledge of causality, of the consequences of deeds and the conditionality of things.

Theological Determinism, Buddhist Criticism of: Omniscience was an attribute of the God-creator known to the Buddhist Nikāyas (see GOD) and although no direct criticism by the Buddhists of the idea of a God-creator's fore-knowledge is noticed in the early literature, the idea of Brahmā as all-knowing (*aññadatthudaso*) is satirized by depicting him confessing ignorance and referring an inquirer's question to the Buddha (*D.* I, pp. 215 f.), who is only a three-foldk-nowledge man (*tevijjo*).

But the connections of Determinism and Theism are seen by the Buddha even more directly. Although the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* (loc. cit) or any other early record supplies us no evidence that Makkhalī was a theist, there is no doubt theological implications could be seen in the deterministic teleology of the *saṃsārasuddhi* doctrine, and, with the development of theistic philosophies in India in later times, it is probable that the author of the *Mahābodhi Jātaka* (*J.* V. pp. 227f.) had seen these implications when he described Makkhalī as teaching an *issaranimmāṇa-hetūvāda*, a doctrine of a personal God-creator. If the cosmos and all its beings were leading a singular way towards the final goal of purification, it was easy to imagine that this purposive cosmos was being directed to its benign goal by a benevolent personal Being having power over them all. Our Jātaka writer not only sees the resultant determinism in these conclusions, but also perceives in them a proneness to a challenge of the Creator's goodness and omnipotence. Its argument seems :

"If there exist same Lord all powerful to fulfil
In every creature bliss or woe
That lord is stained with sin. Man does but work his will" (trsl, H. T. Francis in Cowell's *The Jātaka*, London, 1957, Vol. V, p. 122).[42]

It is evident that the most significant implication of this sarcasm is the challenge to the notion of moral responsibility involved in an assertion of unqualified theistic determinism.

The challenge to the notion of the God-creator as benign, however, has been noticed even earlier than the *Mahābodhi Jātaka*, when the *Devadaha Sutta* (*M.* II, p. 222) criticizes the *issara-nimmāṇa-hetu* doctrine as one held by the Niganṭhas[43] whose syncretism probably upheld the divine creation as a causal factor in the universe, together with the many other factors they accommodated; 'If the pain and pleasure beings undergo is caused by a God-creator', the Buddhists sarcastically comment, "then certainly the Jains were created by an evil God-creator in that they undergo such severe austerities voluntarily undertaken in order to liberate themselves from saṃsāra." (trsl. Horner, *Middle Length Sayings*, III, p. 10).

It serves to expose the contradiction involved in theistic determinists advocating personal responsibility for self-salvation in a God-designed universe.

The *Devadaha Sutta* (loc. cit.) criticism, however, seems to be intended to expose another contradiction as well. In fact, that the criticism of theism contained therein is an argument against design, not only from the existence of evil in the world, self-imposed or otherwise, but from the illogicality of positing a diversity of result from a single cause. This is done by showing that if we are to deduct from the realities around us, the existence of both good and evil will entail the admission of two God-creators, one of evil nature (*pāpakena issareṇa*) and one of good (*bhaddakena issareṇa*). The Niganṭhas, so the *Devadaha Sutta* argues, who will admit that they are undergoing suffering in the form of austerities, must have been created by an evil God while the Buddha, who claims that he is living in a state of happiness, must be evidence of a benign God. There must be then

42 *Issaro sabbalokassa sace kappeti jīvitaṃ-iddhivyasanabhāvañ ca kammaṃ kalyāṇapāpakam-niddesakārī puriso issaro tena lippati* (*J.* V. p. 238).

43 The text using Niganṭhas which may have probably covered prevalent rival philosophies. Hoernle however translates this as Jainas (loc. cit.) but Radhakrishnan (*Indian Philosophy*. Vol. I, p. 312) maintains the Jainas were atheistic.

in the universe where both suffering and happiness eixst, two God-creators. Variety in the universe must then be proof against monotheism.

But it is obvious that, together with and beyond this sarcasm, the main criticism by the Buddhists of the doctrine of divine creation is the implied denial of initiative and of the possibility of human effort and enterprise. It sees no difference, in this respect, between the determinism of Makkhali and others and that of the *issaraṇimmāṇa-hetu* doctrine. "For those who fall back on the idea of creation by God as the essential reason", says the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*A*. I, 174), "there is neither desire nor effort, nor the sense of 'ought' and 'ought'not', a formulae repeated with only the relevant adjustments, in criticising the *ahetuvādins* (loc. cit.).

It is very likely that the Buddhists would share with Śilaṅka (*Sūtrakṛtāṅga* I, fols, 30—31) the classification of *issara-nimmāṇahetu* (*Isvarakṛtaka*) in the category of external causation (*paraṃ-kataṃ*), although it must be admitted that the other Vedic conception, that of a self-creating God, would be described by them as a theory of self-causation (*sayaṃ-kataṃ*), when the Buddhist texts speak of *sukha-dukkha* experience by an individual as *sayaṃkata* or *paraṃkata*.

But theology apparently sought a way out of the discomfiture resulting from those criticisms of the contradiction between divine design and individual responsibility, God's goodness and the existence of evil. The attempted compromise has been recorded by the commentator Dhammapāla (*UdA*. p. 345): "It is the belief of some that God (etc.) in creating the soul[44] and the world, does not create them entirely of his own accord but takes into consideration the good and evil of each being (considered as) a cooperative cause and thus the soul and the world is self-caused and caused by another (*sayaṃ kataṅ ca paraṃ kataṅ ca*). It may be surmised that this criticism also applied to the Jainas whose syncretism may have accomodated the theism of this brand together with individual responsibility.

Psychological Determinism, Buddhist Criticism of: Hypostatization of any kind does not appear to have been agreeable to the Buddhist viewpoint pervaded as it was by the concepts of *anicca* and *anatta*. Thus, implications similar to those they saw in the *niyativāda* seem to have been detected by them in the *kammavāda* of the Jain contemporaries of the Buddha, whom they call the Niganṭhas.

Despite the fact that the Jainas themselves declared their doctrine to be a *kriyāvāda*, a doctrine of action (*Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, ed. Dhanapati, p. 286 quoted by Barua, *Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, Delhi, 1970, p. 196 fn. 3; 4 and p. 377), the Buddhists display no hesitation in classifying it as an *akiriyavāda* although it must also be admitted that the Jainas equally unreservedly, used the same epithets to counter-charge the Buddhists. In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*A*. I, p. 173), where the Buddhists classify the Jaina doctrine along with the *ahetuvāda* and the *issara-nimmāṇavāda* (discussed above), under the label of *akiriyavāda*, the term used, it may be noted, is *pubbekata-hetu*. This term is chosen by the Buddhists, in all probability to emphasize the distinction between their own doctrine of *kamma* and that of the Jainas. *Pubbekatahetu* the Buddhists define as a doctrine which claims that everything (*sabbaṃ*) is the consequence of past action (of an individual) apparently meaning by 'everything' all an individual's experiences. The *Devadaha Sutta* (*M*. II, pp. 222 f.) presents the Jainas as maintaining that 'whatever the individual experiences, whether pleasant or painful or neither pleasant nor painful all is due to what was previously done'. In short, the Buddhists understood the Jaina doctrine as a proclamation of psychological determinism, containing for them the implication that 'murderers, theives, the unchaste, liars slanderers, etc. etc. all become such persons as a result of past actions, without any immediate responsibility on their part for their becoming so'.

It is in this very conception that the Buddhists see the beginnings of hypostatization of *karma*. The *pubbekatahetu* meant that an individual having done a deed, was converted into a *helpless victim of its consequences*, the effect of the deed becoming independent and, therefore, byeond his control, an inevitable, inexorable consequence. Thus it is that Śīlaṅka is able to list *karma* among the external causation (*annakaḍaṃ-paraṃ kataṃ*) category of causal theories. The Jainas, in fact seem to have conceived *karma* as a kind of attenuated substance which impinges or flows into the individual who has to undergo the result of his deeds.

That the Buddhists were directly aware of this Jaina doctrine of *karmic* substance is well brought out in the Buddhist version of Jaina soteriology recorded

44 the word *attā* implying 'the individual' as against 'the world',

in the *Devadaha Sutta* (*M*.11,p.214) where the Buddha reports them as prescribing that 'by the burning up, by the making an end of ancient deeds, by the non-doing of new deeds, there is no overflowing into the future. From there being no overflowing into the future comes the destruction of deeds; from the destruction of deeds comes the destruction of anguish; from the destruction of anguish comes the destruction of feelings, from the destruction of feeling, all anguish will be worn away. (*Middle Length Sayings* III, p.6). The idea of materialness of *karma* from which were derived the notions of "burning up" and "overflowing into the future" were pointed out by the Buddha as leading to a faulty ethic of severe austerities. It seemed to be argued that since an individual had to undergo all the consequences of the *karma* acquired by him in the past and a large residue remained to be undergone at any moment, it could be exhausted only by undergoing the suffering due more intensely during a shorter period–what otherwise this individual may have to undergo at a later time, perhaps in several existences. Hence the prescription of severe asceticism (*tapas*), self-punishment (*daṇḍa*) or penance. This was to be achieved by intense effort and striving. Striving was also the means of preventing the inflow of new quantities of *karma*. Exhausting the store of *karma* of the past, one had to prevent any new stores accumulating for the future, and this had to be and could be done only in the present; in the here and now, (*diṭṭhadhamma*) as the Jainas seemed to have called it. Thus, the Buddha presents Nāthaputta as advising his followers "If there is, Reverend Jains, an evil deed that was formerly done by you, wear it away by this severe austerity. That which is the non-doing of an evil deed in the future is from the control of body, control of speech, control of thought, here and now" (loc. cit.).

The *Devadaha Sutta* is largely a polemic directed to the exposure of the numerous assumptions of this soteriology which, from the Buddha's own viewpoint, were faulty and, therefore, leading to spiritual disaster, rather than salvation. The Buddha raises here a series of questions that seem to undermine the very core of the Jaina ethic and metaphysics.

He begins with five questions which are primarily of an epistemological tendency. They challenge that the Jainas knew directly what they maintained, pointing out their dependence on their belief in the omniscience of Nāthaputta, (exposed by him elsewhere as false: see supra): He asks "Do you yourselves know (1) that you yourselves were in the past, that you were *not* not? (2) that you yourselves did this evil deed in the past, that you did *not* not do it? (3) that you did not do an evil deed like this or like that? (4) that so much anguish (*a*) has been worn away? (*b*) is to be worn away? (*c*) all anguish will be worn away? (5) the getting rid of unskilled states of mind?

But besides the main concern of these questions with knowledge, they seem to make subtle assaults on the Jaina presuppositions. Question (1) for instance, may relate also to the problem of continuity that has been pinpointed in the *Acela Kassapa* and *Timbaruka Suttas* (op. cit.) in connection with the experiencer and the experience, a problem which may be directly connected with a doctrine of *pubbekatahetu*. Question (2), in like manner, may be considered as indirectly questioning the concealed assumption of agency. Question (4) appears to be the most relevant to the present subject of the materialness of *karma* and obviously challenges it in all its three subdivisions the quantative character attributed to *karma* by the Jaina soteriology: (*a*) the quantity of *karma* decreased by austerity at any particular time (*b*) the quantity yet to be exhausted (3) whether the total quantity is at all exhaustible. The Buddhists who also preached the doctrine of *diṭṭhadhamma*, the here-and-now, yet rejected a doctrine of a material conception of *karma* from which they draw a distinction.

The *Sutta* also seems to be subtle enough to perceive the contradiction to which the *pubbekatahetu* doctrine, with its underlying feature of *karmic* inexorability (*niyati*), is brought with the immediately succeeding prescription of non-doing of 'new deeds' contained in the Jaina ethic (discussed above). The unalterability of *karmic* consequences which the Jainas advocated, is shown by a series of questions by the Buddha (*M*.III, pp.220—221) to be inconsistent and contradictory to the advocacy of striving and effort by their own argument of inexorability to consequences. Striving and effort are shown to be fruitless in utter contrast to the equanimity-based detached striving advocated by the Buddhists in consistancy with their doctrine of conditionality (see EQUANIMITY). Jaina asceticism is therefore seen by the Buddhists not only as a self-contradiction but also a self-condemnation: "if the experiences of a human being are determined by their past actions, the Niganṭhas who in this life undergo extreme forms of suffering would have been of evil nature in their past lives." they seem to say. The Buddhists see no other justification for such suffering as the Jainas inflicted on themselves.

The impasse of irreconcilability of psychological determinism and the admission of the possibility of new deeds as well as the existence of new deeds in acts of abstinence which the Jainas named striving and effort — is seen by the Jātaka writer who has adjusted his formula against all other forms of determinism. Against the *pubbahetu* doctrine too: if one's experiences of pleasure and pain are due to what was done in the past, that person is paying his debt, to wit, his former sins, who, when freed from debt, would be smeared by his evil acts, the implication being that all sufferings of the present are acts of atonement and therefore one cannot speak of new deeds but only consequences. It would amount to a total denial of responsibility. And this denial is to be considered the most righteously condemnable, for 'if the doctrine of the former deed' is accepted the necessity for action or inaction ceases to be–there is no need or possibility of liberation (*nirodha*).

The Jainas apparently arrived at this impasse by their attempt to reconcile the deterministic and indeterministic notions. Their syncretism claimed at the same time *niyati* and *aniyati*, inexorability and alterability, self-causation and external causation. This is why the Buddhists classified them in their *catuṣkoṭi* category as the rejectable thesis of *sayaṃ kataṅ ca paraṃ kataṅ ca*.

Ethical Determinism, Buddhist Criticism of: There remains to be examined the *catuṣkoṭi* category of self-causation (*sayaṃ kataṃ*). The term 'self-causation' in so far as it made reference to the world[45] (*loka*) or macrocosm, applied in all likelihood to the Vedic and Upanishadic concept of the self-creating Brahmā on the one hand and probably *svabhāvavāda* materialism on the other. The Buddhist texts are certainly aware of such a conception of Brahmā (q.v.) and their arguments against such self-creation theories would be identical with those they use against the idea of Fortuitous Origination. A self-creation theory, to them, seemed a demand for the suspension of our belief in causation at an arbitrary point and the positing of a power in a phenomenon to bring itself into being, to produce itself. In other words, self-causation would mean the identity of the cause and the effect.

This in fact is also the very definition by which the Buddhists understood the self-creation theory in its application to the individual, or, in the terminology of its exponents themselves, to the soul (*atta*). The Buddha quotes Acela Kassapa as having told him that self-creation means that one and the same person both acts and experiences, i.e. that the cause and effect are one, or are contained in the one. From this position it is an easy step to conclude: "whatever is the self for me that speaks, that experiences and knows, that experiences now here, now there the fruition (*vipāka*) of deeds (*kamma*) that are lovely and that are depraved, it is this self for me that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, that will stand firm like unto the eternal" (*M*.I, p.8). In fact, to explain misery and happiness as of one's own making, results of one's own actions, it would be necessary to assume an abiding self that persists as the cause and the effect or self-continuing in both. This is why we see the Buddha (*S*. II, loc. cit.) declaring to Acela Kassapa that the theory of self-creation leads to eternalism (*sassata-vāda*), a wrong view (*niccā-diṭṭhi*: *M*. I, p. 8).

This position is in utter opposition to the other wrong view, the view of external causation which the Buddhists understand as maintaining that one acts, the other experiences (*S*. II, loc. cit.). Buddha's statement that this would lead to annihilationism (*uccheda*) makes it possible that not only external agents are meant. If the individual himself, who performs the act, is counted as not the one who experiences the consequence as for instance in the *pubbekatahetu-vāda*, -minus the soul theory of the Jainas, might imply, then one cannot speak of cause and effect. Each act, each phenomena, would be discontinuous. If there is no continuity, then one speaks rightly of the cause as external.

The important fact for the problem of Determinism and Indeterminism is that the Buddha, rejecting these two categories, self-causation and external causation (which are in fact the key-concepts of the four *catuṣkoṭi* categories discussed above) as leading to the two extremes (*ubho ante*), presents as the alternative what he calls the middle way, the theory of dependent origination or conditioned genesis (*paṭicca-samuppāda*), conditionality. In fact, in all circumstances where the Buddha is confronted with the deterministic problem, as in the representative instance of the *Acela Kassapa* and *Timbaruka Suttas* (*S*. II, loc. cit.), the four categories of causation are exposed as perverse only to substitute the theory of the *paṭicca-samuppāda* as the right view. In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*A*. III, p. 440), the Buddha is recorded as

45 *D*. III, pp.137 f.: also see D, J. Kalupahana op. cit. pp. 5 f.

caying "He who has achieved right view cannot besome one who will fall back on the view that happiness and suffering are self-wrought, wrought by another, wrought by oneself and another, or arise fortuitously, without act of self or another. What is the cause of that? Monks, to one who has achieved the right view cause and causal origin of things are rightly discerned."

If we may grant as much consistency to the Buddhists as the depth and complexity of their thought elsewhere demonstrates, we must expect that their viewpoint on this problem must steer clear of the faults and weaknesses of Determinism and Inderterminism pointed out by them in their criticism of the two extremes and the four causal categories. The twelvefold nexus of the *paṭicca-samuppāda* which describes the human individual, and his predicament must avoid the errors of eternalism and annihilationism and must demonstrate the process as free from these characteristics. Since the Buddhists have been constantly and vehemently critical of the Rigid Determinism contained in the *Fatalistic Teleology of Makkhali*, of the psychological determinism of Nātaputta's *pubbekatahetuvāda*, of the theistic determinism of the *issaranimmāṇavāda*, we must expect the links (*nidāna*) of the twelvefold nexus, *avijjā* to *dukkhakkhanda*, to be free of the compulsive necessity which makes effects *inexorable*. We must anticipate this feature, at least in the sphere of human action, and the twelvefold nexus must assert instead the possibility of human initiative and endeavour, of novelty in the universe of man, if not in all nature. Since the brunt of the Buddhist criticism of the contemporaneous or possible Determinisms consisted in the tirade against the denial of responsibility and the doctrine of inaction entailed by them, the twelvefold nexus must permit at some stage in its causal series, the possibility of a contribution to the process on the part of the individual, without which the course of the process may take a different turn. To express it reversely, and perhaps rather crudely, there must be in the series of conditions in the twelvefold nexus a point of vulnerability at which an original contribution must be able to redirect or reverse the process and include another and a new causal series which would terminate, in the final instance, as far as the individual is concerned, a halting of the total causal process; an absolute liberation or freedom from it. In short, it must admit the possibility of novelty.

On the other hand, the criticisms that the Buddhists have directed against a doctrine of total Indeterminism, of absolute beginnings tantamount to denial of causality and the logical sequal of this denial in amoralism, such as that of Pūraṇa, as well as their criticism of the concept of the doer (*kāraka*), together with its corollary concept of the eternity of the soul (*ātman*) must lead us to expect that the *paṭicca-samuppāda* and its twelvefold nexus must be free from any similar criticism and must instead be totally infused with the concepts of *anicca* and *anatta*.

The Buddhists seem to solve this difficult problem with the paradoxical notion of Becoming, of dependent origination which is equivalent to constant birth and constant death. Becoming was conceivable only in terms of novelty and continuity existing together. Change is expressible only in these two terms. This means the denial at the same time of eternalism and annihilationism. It makes the individual who acts and the individual describable in the very apt formula of the *Milinda-pañha*, (*Miln.* p. 40) that he is "neither him nor another" (*na ca so na ca añño*).

We have in fact records of the Buddha directly presenting us with the concept of originality in human action which would imply the admission at the same time of originality in the universe, the absence of Rigid Determinism. Confronted with the challenge of defining the meaning of the terms self-caused (*sayaṃ kataṃ*) and caused by another (*paraṃ kataṃ*) to one who denied them, the Buddha says (*A.* III, p. 337) "Since there is initiative (*ārabbha-dhātu*) and men are known to initiate, this is among men the self-agency, this the other agency". (Trsl. Hare, *The Book of Gradual Sayings*, III, p. 238). This faculty is not a transcendental, metaphysical element but one that may be illustrated by the common place activity of stepping forwards (*abhikkamante*) and stepping back (*paṭikkamante*). It is apparent that the psychological element of volition and decision is being alluded to. To step forward and to step backward involves on the part of the individual concerned an act of decision between alternatives. The Buddha supports this thesis further by the evidence of five other psychological elements which are admitted as existing and which are suggestive of the operation of volition and decision, namely, the elements (*dhātu*), of (1) endurance (*nikkama*), (2) endeavour or exertion (*parakkama*), (3) resistance (*thāma*), persistence (*thiti*) and planning (*upakkama*). This volitional factor was probably considered to be the base and centre for the origination of action, where originated the contribution of the individual to the causal process. It is the element, or perhaps some aspect of it, which the Buddhists described in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*

(*A*.I,p.173) as the desire to do (*chanda*) and the effort to do (*vāyāma*) whose denial by the holders of the *ahetu, pubbekata-hetu* and *issaranimmāṇa-hetu* doctrines made them righteously contemptible (*saha-dhammika-niggaha*) as the deniers of the hope of liberation for mankind, a potential which, according to the Buddhists, was inherent in their very causal principle (*paṭicca-samuppāda*) according to which all causally conditioned phenomena (*paṭicca-samuppannā dhammā*) possess the characteristic of cessation (*nirodha-dhammā*). This makes change also admit alterability, and causality imply alterability by effort.

It is this volitional factor (*cetanā*) which makes the Buddha emphatically differentiate his theory of action (*kamma*) from that of the Jainas as in the *Upāli Sutta* (*M*. I, pp. 372 f.) where they are reported to be giving pride of place to the physical expressions of action, viz., bodily action (*kāya-kamma*) as against mental action (*mano-kamma*) to which the Buddha gives primacy.

The Buddhist paradox, however, insists that no element can arise without cause or condition. It is constantly reiterated that no absolute beginning is conceivable of the human process in its cycle of repeated birth (*saṃsāra*). The twelve factors (*nidāna*) of the *paṭicca-samuppāda* as we have seen above are each conditioned. This includes Ignorance (*avijjā*) which is usullly listed first (see above). The *Nidāna Saṃyutta* (*S*. II, pp. 1–132) is profuse with similes which compare with the operation of conditioned genesis in man, natural phenomena like the flow of rivers down mountains and into the sea, water seeking its own level or the growth and withering away of trees. The *Bhūmija Sutta* (*S*.II, pp.37f.) seems to be almost clinching the debate: "In the case of those recluses and brahmins who believe in *karma*, however, they say that happiness and ill have been wrought, it is because of contact that they come to pass. In no one of those four views is it possible to show that these recluses and brahmans will experience happiness or ill without contact" (trsl. Rhys Davids, *Kindred Sayings*, II, p. 30). The role of conditioning in the evolution of the human personality, beginning with contact (*phassa*) with its environment, is unhesitatingly and forcefully asserted. It is necessary, and, in fact, inescapable that for the purpose of coherence and comprehensive undei standing, the element of initiative, the factor of voli tion, must be placed within the framework of the above causal thesis.

Such an explanation seems to be inferable from a discourse in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*A*.I, p.175) which directly suggests the critical point, the point of vulnerability as it were, from which the process may be considered to be reversible. In a broad outline of the *paṭicca-samuppāda*, this *Sutta* (loc. cit.) tracing the dependent origination of the individual from its conception, states as follows: Based on the six elements there is descent to the womb. This descent taking place, name and shape come to pass. Conditioned by name and shape is the six-fold sphere (of sense). Conditioned by the sixfold sphere is contact. Conditioned by contact is feeling. Now to him who has feeling, I make known: This is ill, this is the arising of ill, this is .... etc. (Woodward, *Book of Gradual Sayings*, I, p. 16).

It must be inferred that, since the Buddhists' purpose must be to reverse the causal process leading to misery and anguish and turn it in the direction of happiness and liberation, the decisive function of causes must be the point at which the Buddha can be assumed to be fruitfully preaching the four noble truths as shown above. If this is so, it is after the arising of feeling that the point of reversibility, the point where the individual may take his turn, must be traced. This is further supported by a *Majjhima Nikāya* passage: "Depending on eye .... and visible form arises visual consciousness: meeting together of the three is contact (*phassa*); because of contact arises feeling or sensation (*vedanā*); what one feels, one perceives (*sañjānāti*); what one perceives one reflects on (*vitakketi*); what one reflects on, one is obsessed with (*papañceti*); what one is obsessed with, due to that, concepts characterized by such obsessed perception (*papañcasaññāsaṅkhā*) assail him with regard to visible form congnizeble by the eye, belonging to the past, the future and the present", quoting which Ñāṇānanda (*Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thought*, Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy, 1971, p. 51), with great perceptivity, observes the impersonal nature of the process up to feeling, the emergence of the notion, or rather the misconception, of the doer, and the final submergence and surrender to the environment, the objective order of things.

BANDULA JAYAWARDHANA.

DEVA, the heavenly beings or 'gods' as understood in Buddhism. In explaining the term *deva*, a late Pali work, the *Khuddakapāṭha* commentary (p. 123), gives two etymologies. The first of these connects it with *dibbati* to play, to sport etc.: they are *devas* because they sport (*dibbanti devā*). In explaining their playful nature it is further said that 'they enjoy themselves with the five sensual pleasures (*pañcahi kāmaguṇehi kīlanti*). The second etymology connects the term with *div*, (Lat. *divus*, *deus*) in the sense of heaven or sky in its shining aspect, thereby describing them as 'the shining' or 'the radiant ones.' Thus, they shine by their own splendour (*attano siriyā jotanti:* cp. Skt. *jyotanāt*). This second explanation concerning their shining aspect is the one that is historically more acceptable. "*Deva* meant originally bright, and later was applied to all the bright ones, the sun, the sky, the stars, the dawn, the day etc."[1] Sometimes the word *devatā* (s.v.) is used in the same sense as *deva*. Yet there are certan differences in the use of the two terms.

The use of the term *deva* in literature is not confined to heavenly beings alone. The same Pali work (*KhpA.* p. 123) accordingly classifies *devas* into three classes as i. *devas* by consensus (*sammuti-deva*) ii. *devas* by birth (*uppatti-deva*) and iii. *devas* by purification (*visuddhi-deva*). To the first category belong those humans who are respectfully referred to as '*deva*' such as royal personages. Gods by birth are the heavenly and other deities while the third class comprises those saints who have cleansed themselves of all passions and become released (i.e. Buddhas and *arahants*). In the present discussion it is the second category with whom we are concerned.

Birth as a *deva* is the result of good *kamma* and hence beings secure birth in *deva*-worlds by leading lives of ethical purity in the human and other non-*deva* existences. Accordingly, there are records in the Buddhist works as to how the *deva*-worlds found their hosts increasing during the time of the Buddha when he was preaching his doctrine of ethical purity as a means to happiness (*D.* II, p. 271; *A.* 1. p. 143). This was a cause for joy among the *devas* who held meetings, and gave expression to their joyous sentiments. A discussion of this nature, supposed to have been held on the full moon day of the month of *Āsāḷhā* (June—July), is described in the *Janavasabha Sutta* (*D.* II, pp. 207—8).

The importance of the place given to the *devas* in Buddhism may be gauged also from the part they have played in the life of the Buddha himself. It is recorded that Gotama in his penultimate existence was born in the Tusita heaven where he stayed until the *devas* there reminded him that the time was appropriate for him to be born among the humans. On the day of his conception his mother dreamt that the four Lokapālas (s.v.) took her to the Himalayas where their queens bathed her to remove all human stains from her. At the time of his birth it was the *devas* who received him first. In his entire life of eighty years, both as the *bodhisatta* and as the Buddha, the *devas* played a very intimate role in all the important events of his life (Renunciation, Enlightenment, First Preaching etc.). Their dealings with him as their teacher (*satthā*) were almost a daily occurrence.

When the Buddha started his career as a teacher in India in the 6th century B.C. what served as the theological and mythological background for his teaching was the popular polytheism of Brahmanism which had been developing from the Vedic times onwards. This polytheism consisted not only of the Vedic gods like Indra, Soma, Varuṇa etc. but also of hosts of various other spirits such as *nāgas*, *yakkhas*, *gandhabbas*, *kumbhaṇḍas asuras*, tree spirits etc. Propitiation of these and many such other *devas* was a part of the popular religion in India at the time. To the religion of enlightenment and release promulgated by the Buddha came to be added a ritualistic side with the propitiation of these *devas* as a prominent feature. The existence of these invisible *devas* was not only taken for granted but positively asserted in some early texts.

Certain incidents recorded in the Nikāyas may be cited as evidence for this view. According to one such reference (*D.* II, pp. 86—99; *Vin.* I, pp. 228—9) when Sunidha and Vassakāra, the two chief Magadhan ministers, were building a fortress at Pāṭaligāma to repel the Vajjians, thousands of *devatās* began to haunt the plots of ground there. It is said that by doing so these *devatās* were forcing the ministers to build dwelling places in this particular place which they had taken possession of. Later the ministers invited the Buddha for a meal and at the thanksgiving he is said to have uttered the following:

1 S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, I, p. 76.

2 These *devatās* were of three classes as high (*mahesakka*), middling (*majjhima*) and low (*nīca*).

"Wheresoe'ver the prudent man shall take up his abode
Let him support the brethren there, good men of self-control,
And give the merit of his gifts to the deities who haunt the spot.
Revered, they will revere him: honoured, they will honour him again;
Are gracious to him as a mother to her own, her only son.
And the man who has the grace of the gods, good fortune he beholds".
(*Dialogues of the Buddha*, II, p. 93.)

Here no gifts are made direct to the *devas*. The monks are the recipients of food from the laymen. The merit acquired through such acts, here referred to as *dakkhiṇā* (s.v.), are directed towards the *devas* for their benefit. Elsewhere (*A*. III, p. 77) the Buddha explains to Mahānāma, the Licchavi, that a good clansman uses his lawfully obtained wealth to make offerings and thereby revere the *devas* (*balipaṭiggāhaka*), who will in turn become gracious and wish him long life and success. The same is said in respect of one's parents, wife and children, colleagues and co-workers as well as recluses and *brāhmans*. They, too, are believed to be equally capable of wishing long life to those who serve them well.

In another place (ibid. p. 45) the Buddha enumerates five different kinds of obligatory gifts or donations (*bali*) and *devas* rank together along with kinsmen, guests, spirits of the dead (*pubbapeta*) and kings as worthy recipients. The two introductory verses to the *Ratana Sutta* (*Sn*. vv. 222—3), contain a request to the *devas* to diligently guard the human beings who offer them gifts (*bali*) during day and night.[3]

When the young *brāhman* Saṅgārava questioned the Buddha (*M*. II, p. 212) as to whether there were gods, the Buddha, answering in the affirmative, added further that "it is a much endorsed view that the gods do exist" (*ucce sammataṃ .... lokasmiṃ yadidaṃ atthi devāti*). The commentary (*MA*. III, p. 454) adds that even young children (*susudārakā'pi*) know that there are gods.

According to Buddhist literature there are many classes of *devas*. Their classification is fundamentally based on the division of existence into the three categories as sensuous sphere (*kāma-loka*), material sphere (*rūpa-lo.*) and immaterial sphere (*arūpa-lo.*) containing a total of 26 *deva*-worlds. (See DEVA-LOKA). The sensuous sphere contains six *deva*-worlds as Cātummahārājika, Tāvatiṃsa, Yāma, Tusita Nimmāṇarati and Paranimmitavasavatti. The *devas* of the fine-material sphere are divided into sixteen classes depending on their *jhānic* attainmets. Thus, the three Brahmakāyika *deva*-worlds, Brahmapārisajja, Brahmapurohita and Mahābrahmāṇo belong to the first *jhāna* while the three Brahmalokas, Parittābha, Appamāṇābha and Ābhassara belong to the second *jhāna*. To the third *jhāna* belong Parittasubha, Appamāṇasubha and Subhakiṇṇa, while Vehapphala and Asaññasatta are allotted to the fourth *jhāna*. These eleven Brahmalokas along with the five Pure Abodes (*Suddhāvāsa*: s.v.), where only the non-returners (*anāgāmins*) are born, make the sixteen fine-material spheres.[4] The four classes of *devas* of the immaterial sphere are those of the sphere of unbounded space (*ākāsānañcāyatana-deva*). pertaining to the fifth *jhāna*, of unbounded consciousness (*viññāṇañcāyatana-*) of the sixth *jhāna*, of nothingness (*ākiñcaññāyatana-*) of the seventh *jhāna* and of neither perception nor non-perception (*nevasaññānāsaññāyatana-*) of the eighth *jhāna*. It is only the Suddhāvāsa *devas* who attain Nibbāna directly from that existence, for all the others are liable to return to earth and work further for their salvation.

While birth in the *brahma*-worlds mentioned above is said to be brought about by the attainment of the corresponding *jhānas*, there are other *deva*-existences which are not generally listed in such *jhānic* schemes. For instance, the *devas* in the fourfold Ābhā (radiant) *deva*-worlds (Parittābhā, Appamāṇābhā, Saṅkiliṭṭhābhā and Parisuddhābhā) are born in those states in consequence of their total concentration on radiance (*ābhā*) at various levels (*M*. III, p. 147).

Sometimes these various *deva*-existences are divided into generic groups. Accordingly, these last mentioned two classes, along with Appamaṇābhā and Parittābhā-*devas* mentioned earlier, belong to one generic group designated as *Abhā-devā* (q.v.). In the same manner, Brahmapārisajja, Brahmapurohita

3 *Divā ca ratto ca haranti ye baliṃ — tasmā hi ne rakkhata appamattā.*
4 For this list and a discussion on them see Francis Story, *Gods and the Universe in Buddhist Perspective* Wheel Publication, 180/1: pp. 12 ff.

and Mahābrahmāṇo are called Brahmakāyikā *devā*[5] while Parittasubha, Appamāṇasubha and Subhakiṇha are called Subhā-*devā*.[6]

In addition to these *devas* inhabiting various *deva*-worlds, there are also many other kinds of deities inhabiting the universe like terrestrial deities (*bhummā devā*) and tree-deities (*rukkha-devatā*). When the Buddha preached the first sermon at Benares it was the *devas* of the earth (*bhummā-devā*) who raised the first cry (*saddaṃ anussāvesuṃ*) proclaiming the important event to the Cātummahārājika-*devas* who in turn proclaimed it to the next higher group, Tāvatiṃsa. In this manner news was spread upto the Brahma world (*S.* V, pp. 423—4; *Vin.* I, pp. 11—2 etc.).

It was also the *devas* who first appreciated the significance of the event by saying that the Tathāgata has set arolling the wheel of righteousness that cannot be reversed by anyone else in the world, not even by one of their own kind (*devena vā*). Similarly do the *devas* act when they hear a noble disciple (*ariya-sāvaka*) achieving enlightenment (*A.* IV, p. 119)

Tree-deities (*rukkha-devatā*) are frequently mentioned in Buddhist literature (*Vin.* I, p. 28; *S.* I, p. 201; *A.* III, p. 370; *J.* I, pp. 168, 423 etc.). With trees as their abodes (*vimāna*) they receive offerings from devotees for which they help them in return (*J.* III, p. 24; *V.* p. 511). Sujātā's offering of milk-rice to such a deity regarding the birth of a son is a well-known example in Buddhist lore (*J.* I, pp. 68—9). See under DEVATĀ.

A class of deities (*deva-kāya*) believed to be presiding over the weather conditions and described as the cloud-group (*valāhaka-kāyika*) are discussed in the *Valāha Saṃyutta* (*S.* III, pp. 254 ff.). They are atmospheric deities (*ākāsacārikā-devā*) capable of causing changes of weather (*SA.* II, p. 351). Five groups are enumerated each group presiding over cold (*sīta*), heat (*uṇha*), rain-clouds (*ābbha*), wind (*vāta*) and rain (*vassa*). When it occurs to them that they should delight for their own enjoyment (*sakāya ratiyā rameyyāma*), the weather becomes cold in keeping with their wish. Similarly when each of the other four classes of deities entertain the wish to delight for their own sake the weather too become hot, cloudy, windy and rainy respectively. The commentary (*SA*, II, p. 351) gives further explanations about these abnormal weather conditions which are not due to seasonal changes (*utusamuṭṭhāna*) but are caused by these *devas*. For instance, cold during summer and extreme cold during winter: heat during winter and extreme heat during summer: dense rain-clouds that remain covering the sun and the moon for weeks: rain-clouds that appear during April — May (*Citta-Vesākha*): gales, cyclones and other untimely storms that blow breaking and cleaving trees: torrential rains during the rainy season and other untimely rains: all these are caused by these *devas*. The texts (*SA.* II, pp. 351—2) record an incident which shows how a *deva* produces rain at will. Once a *vassa-valāhaka deva* went to an *arahant thera* in the Himalayas and after introducing himself caused, at the *thera's* request, a heavy rain to fall for an extent of three *yojanas* by singing a song and raising the hand. These cloud-group *devas*, who seem to be a kind of weather spirits, are described as long-lived (*dighāyuka*), lovely (*vaṇṇavanta*) and endowed with many comforts (*sukhabahula*).

An extremely fascinating class of *devas* called *Gandhabbakāyika* are also said to be endowed with similar qualities (*S.* III, pp. 250 ff). Reminiscent of the Gandhabbas or the heavenly musicians living in the Cātummahārājika heaven, they seem to be a kind of spirits associated with the fragrance of trees, of whom ten varieties are enumerated (ibid, pp. 249 ff). Each variety is associated with a particular part of the tree such as the roots (*mūla*), pith (*pheggu*), leaves (*patta*) etc. and they probably reside in that particular part of the tree. The commentary (*SA.* II, p. 350) explains that these *devas* are born of the fragrance (*gandha*) of each of these parts of the tree.

In order to be born among these *devas* the aspirants have to be of good behaviour and also offer incense prepared from that particular part of the tree over which they like to inhabit. Thus a person wishing to be born as a dweller over the roots (*mūlagandhadeva*) should make offerings of root-incense and make the appropriate wish.

Mention may also be made of a class of *devas* possessing lovely form who are called *Manāpakāyikā* and are described as having the power to assume any colour, produce any sound or to obtain any kind of happiness (*sukha*) they like (*A.* IV, pp. 264 f). *Manosattas* are the *devas* who in their previous lives had

5 Nyanatiloka, *Buddhist Dictionary*, p. 32.
6 *DPPN.* II, p. 1233.

died having been habitually devoted to a particular idea. For instance, the Niganṭhas who take only warm water and would rather die than take it cold are born as *Manosattas* (*M.* I, p. 376).

When discussing *devas* we cannot forget the *Mahāsamaya Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* (II, pp. 253 ff.) where sixty classes of *devas* are enumerated by name. This *sutta* was preached at Mahāvana in Kapilavatthu where the gods (here called *devatā*) of the 10,000 world-systems had come to see the Buddha and his disciples, and were joined by four deities (also called *devatā*) from the Suddhāvāsa *deva*-world. The Buddha, after remarking that the visit of these *devatās* is a common feature in the lives of all Buddhas, whether past, present or future, enumerated the names of (*devakāyānaṃ nāmāmi*) the *devas* present one by one. The enumeration begins with a list of *yakkhas* followed by the four *Lokapālas* (s.v.) and their hosts and various classes of Asuras. Next follow the sixty classes of *devas* (*saṭṭhi-devanikāyā*) beginning with the *devas* belonging to the four primary elements (i.e. *āpo devā, paṭhavi-d°, tejo-d°* and *vāyo-d°*). These sixty classes of *devas* are given in six groups of ten each while each group is introduced with a stanza having a refrain that describes them as "endowed with psychic powers, shining, comely and renowned" (*iddhimanto jutimanto vaṇṇavanto yasassino*). It is noteworthy that even the most important Brahmanical gods such as Indra, Soma, Varuṇa, Brahmā, Viṣṇu etc. are just included in the list without any special significance attached to them. Most of the *devas* mentioned are mere names to us. "Most of them were probably local deities, the personifications of natural phenomena, guardian spirits, fairies, harpies, naiads, dryads and many others, who are here represented as adherents of the Buddha come to do him honour".[7] When we exclude the better-known Brahmanical *devas*, the majority of the names in the list refer to *deva*-groups like the *devas* presiding over the four primary elements referred to earlier. The *Vāruṇā* might refer to the followers of Varuṇa. Both Sun (*Suriya*) and Moon (*Canda*) gods are mentioned along with their followers while *Manda-valāhakas* are given as the *devas* presiding over the constellations (*nakkhattas*). *Khiḍḍāpadosikā* and *Manopadosikā* are two classes of *devas* living in the Cātummahārājika heaven.

Buddhist literature frequently treats of the *karmic* causes which bring about birth as *devas* as was shown earlier when discussing the *Gandhabbakāyika-devas*. As a further example we may cite the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (IV, p. 265) which lists eight properties which a virtuous woman must have in order to secure birth among the *Manāpakāyika-devas*, who are renowned for their physical beauty. The *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (I, p. 228) states seven vows by the fulfilment of which one can become Sakka, king of the gods. An entire book of the Canon, the *Vimānavatthu*, lists the good deeds by means of which devotees were reborn as *devas* in magnificent mansions(*vimāna*).

The impermanent nature (*aniccatā*) of heavenly comforts is also repeatedly given expression in the Buddhist works. According to a characteristic passage found in the *Nikāyas* the *devas*, on hearing the Tathāgata's teaching about impermanence, become afraid, quake and tremble saying "it seems, sirs, that we who thought ourselves permanent are after all impermanent: that we who thought ourselves stable are after all unstable: not to last, sirs, it seems are we: so it seems, sirs, that we are impermanent, unstable, not to last, composed about with a personality group" (*S.* III, p. 85.). The *bhikkhuṇī* Upacālā does not like the pleasures of the *devas* because they are bound by the bonds of passion (*kāmabandhanabaddhā*: *S.* I, p. 133). In their troubles they have to seek refuge in the Buddha. They cannot know the ways of the released saints (*Sn. v.* 644). They have to achieve release through a human birth.

W. M. McGovern has collected some valuable information about the *devas* from the *Abhidharmakośa* and other Buddhist Sanskrit works.[8] This information may be summarised as follows: *devas* of the six *Kāma*-heavens partake of ordinary digestable food used by the humans, while those in the upper regions of *Kāmadhātu* and the lower regions of *Rūpadhātu* take food that is partaken of by contact only. Inhabitants of the upper regions of *Rūpadhātu* take food by contemplation only while those of the *Arūpadhātu* do so by knowledge of it. Clothes are used in all *deva*-worlds except the *Arūpa*-heavens while sexual differentiation remains only in the *Kāma*-heavens. The *devas* of the first two *Kāma*-heavens, Cātummahārājika and Tāvatiṃsa, unite by copulation. For the Yāma-*devas* a single embrace is enough while the mutual holding of hands is enough for the Tusita-*devas*. For the Nimmāṇarati-*devas* a mutual smile constitutes sexual union while a single glance serves the purpose for the Paranimmitavasavattins.

7 Ibid. p. 564.
8 William Montgomery McGovern, *A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy*, I, pp. 79-80.

In all the heavens birth is apparitional (*opapātika*). In the *Kāma* heavens shortly before a *deva* is born one of the *devīs* finds a flower in her hand. Thereby she knows that a child is to be born to her. The birth takes place after seven days by the child appearing suddenly on her knees. At the time of the birth the children are as if five to ten years old.[9] Precious vessels filled with divine food that appear spontaneously provide them with food while magic trees provide the clothing. *Devas* of the *Rūpa* and *Arūpa* heavens are born fully grown without the aid of parents. The *Rūpa-dhātu devas* are also born fully clothed. All the *devas* are said to speak only the Aryan language, a kind of heavenly Sanskrit which they know without having to learn it. The *devas* of the four lower *Kāma* heavens enjoy pleasurable objects by ruling over and enjoying the sense-pleasures they find around them. Inhabitants of the fifth *devaloka* enjoy themselves by creating pleasurable objects and then ruling over and enjoying them (*nimmāṇa-rati*). The *devas* of the sixth *devaloka* rule over and enjoy the sense objects especially created for their enjoyment by others (*paranimmitavasavatti*).

It is said that the *devas* know three things the moment they come into being: what their previous existence was, where they have been reborn and by means of which *kamma* they were born as *devas*.[10] They know no illness until they die. However, when a *deva* is about to pass away five signs of warning are shown forth: his flowers fade; clothes get soiled; sweat exudes from the armpits; the body loses its colour; he takes no delight in his *deva*-seat. On seeing this the other *devas* cheer him up with three encouragements: go hence, friend, to the happy state (*sugati*): when you go there win the gain that is good to win: having won it may you become well-established therein. Clarifying further the Buddha says that for a *deva* the state of man is reckoned a happy state because as a man he acquires confidence (*saddhā*) in the doctrine and discipline proclaimed by the Tathāgata and when such confidence becomes firmly established he is regarded as having made a great acquisition (*It.* pp. 76—7).

A fact to be noted here is that both human (*manussa*) and heavenly (*deva*) courses of existence (*gati*) are regarded as happy courses (*sugati*) as opposed to the three woeful states (*duggati*) of hell (*niraya*), animal kingdom (*tiracchāna-yoni*) and the ghost-realm (*petti-visaya*).

The Buddhist *devas* can be regarded as being in a hierarchy. Going from the lower to the higher the order observed is that of the three *dhātus* of *Kāma*, *Rūpa* and *Arūpa*. As one goes higher the *devas* become increasingly spiritualised. Thus a passage in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (V, pp. 409 f.) explains how the heavenly pleasures of the six *deva*-worlds become pleasanter and pleasanter (*abhikkantataro ca paṇītataro ca*) as one ascends higher and higher through the heavenly planes. (See also *M.* II, p. 194).

There are four ways in which *devas* pass away: exhaustion of life (*āyukkhaya*),of merit(*puññakkhaya*), of food (*āhārakkhaya*) and anger (*kopa*). When a *deva* who has done a major meritorious deed is born in a *deva*-world where the life-span is short (*appāyuka*) he passes away owing to the exhaustion of life: when a *deva* who has done a small meritorious deed is born in a *deva*-world where the life-span is long he passes away owing to the exhaustion of merit: forgetfulness to eat when occupied with the enjoyment of sensual pleasures makes him pass away owing to the exhaustion of food: the fourth cause of their passing away is the anger that arises on seeing another god having greater splendours than himself. After their heavenly existence *devas* may be reborn on earth or in some other existence except in the case of the *Suddhāvāsa* gods who attain arahantship there itself.

The fact that the worlds of the *devas* are depicted as places of happiness (for details see under DEVA-LOKA) makes people desire birth in them. Their long-life (*dighāyu*), comfortable ways of living (*sukha-bahula*), physical beauty (*vaṇṇavanta*), authority (*ādhipateyya*) etc. make their life attractive to men. (see CELESTIAL). The Buddha himself has remarked that the royal bliss among men is insignificant in comparison with celestial happiness because of the difference of life-span between gods and men (*A.* IV, pp. 252 f). Establishing themselves on the general Buddhist teaching that birth in a *sugati* — a better birth after death, human or divine — is brought about by *karmic* activity that is rooted in non-greed (*a-lobha*), non-hatred (*a-dosa*) and non-delusion (*a-moha: A.* III, p. 339), the Buddhists perform good *kamma* in order to be reborn among them. Thus a statement in the *Jātaka* (I, p. 169) says "Leading righteous lives people filled the city of the gods." (*manussā dhammaṃ caritvā .... devanagaraṃ pūrayiṃsu*). But the enlightened attitude should be not to wish for these temporary heavenly

9 However, according to the Pali tradition, they are born in the full flower of youth: *DPPN.* I, p. 1118.
10 *Avadānaśataka* : *BST.* p. 303.

pleasures but to persevere for the achievement of final freedom as an *arahant*. Hence the practice of the pure life (*brahmacariya*) for the purpose of being born in a heaven is condemned as a mental bondage (*cetaso vinibandha*) that prevents him from doing the correct kind of spiritual effort. (*D*. III, p. 238; *M*. I, p. 103: *A*. III, pp. 249 f.). Thus the virtuous life as a human being is preferable to that among the *devas*. Human beings who were righteous were sometimes taken to Tāvatiṃsa to instruct the *devas* as recorded in the *Makhādeva Sutta* (*M*. II, p. 79). In the *Sakkanamassana Sutta*, god-king Sakka explains why he worships virtuous human beings (*S*. I, p. 234). The inhabitants of Uttarakuru are said to excel the Tāvatiṃsa *devas* in unselfishness, greedlessness and fixity of life-span while the men of Jambudīpa are said to excel both the Uttarakurus and the Tāvatiṃsa *devas* in heroic nature, mindfulness and ability to live the higher life (*A*. IV, p. 396).

Recollection or proper consideration of deities (*devatānussati* q.v.) is igiven as one of the six kinds of recollections (*anussati*) leading to peace of body and mind (*D*. III, pp. 250, 280; *A*. III, p. 284; *Visnt*. p. 197).[11] The *devas* to be recollected are those from the lowest *deva-loka* to the highest *brahma-loka*. The ultimate aim of the recollection is the attainment of perfect concentration (*samādhi*) which is to be achieved in stages. First the meditator has to imagine the existence of all these *devas* and then recollect that it was their faith (*saddhā*), morality (*sīla*), knowledge (*suta*), liberality (*cāga*) and wisdom (*paññā*) that secured them their birth in the heavenly worlds. Next he has to see that he himself is endowed with those qualities: when he does this his mind ceases to be overwhelmed by lust, hatred and delusion: as a result the mind becomes upright and develops wisdom: this results in joy and zest followed by calmness of body: with his heart composed he leads the correct kind of life free from suffering. This edifying and purifying power of *devatānussati* is admitted by the Buddha when he says (*A*. III, p. 314) that some people achieve purity by freeing themselves from the bonds of greed (*gedha*) through *devatānussati*.

Buddhist literature portrays the *devas* as helpers of the virtuous. They worship not only the saints but even those laymen who lead virtuous lives (*S*. I, p. 234).

See also BRAHMALOKA, CELESTIAL, DEVALOKA, DEVATĀ AND GUARDIAN DEITIES

A. G. S. K.

DEVADATTA. Buddhist ecclesiastical history presents Devadatta as being foremost among the miscreants in the Buddhist monastic order who attempted both to assail the Buddha personally and to bring about dissension in the community of monks, most others of the same temperament being included under Chabbaggiyā (q.v.) or their followers.

According to the tradition preserved in the Pali texts, Devadatta is Buddha's brother-in-law, being the brother of Yasodharā (Skt. Yaśodharā) whom he married as Prince Siddhattha (Skt. Siddhārtha: *DhA*. III. p. 44). His father was Suppabuddha Sākya. The *Mahāvaṃsa* (Chp. 1. *vv*. 21, 24) gives the name of Devadatta's sister, i.e. wife of Prince Siddhattha as Bhaddakaccānā. The *Mahāvastu*[1] (Vol. II. p. 96) presents Devadatta standing in a different relation -ship to Yaśodharā, not as her brother as in the Pali tradition. For, after the renunciation of Prince Siddhārtha, he approaches Yaśodharā who is virtually left a widow and suggests to her that she becomes his wife. 'My cousin (*bhrātā*) is become a mendicant', says he, 'so be thou now my wife' (*mama bhrātā pravrajito. Āgaccha mama agramahiṣī bhaviṣyasi;* loc. cit.).

Devadatta makes his first appearance on the Buddhist scene in the company of five other Sākyan youths (viz. Sākyan chief Bhaddiya, Anuruddha, Ānanda, Bhagu and Kimbila) all of whom sought ordination under the Buddha (*Vin*. II, p. 183). Even at this early stage, an indication is given of his distorted religious enthusiasm. While his comrades reached spiritual heights ranging from *sotāpatti* to arahantship, Devadatta developed psychic powers of the mundane or worldly type (*pothujjanika iddhi:* loc. cit.). By the exercise of these powers, he is said to have won Prince Ajātasattu over to his side and assured himself of adequate material comforts. Becoming completely arrogant on this account, he thinks it fit to ask the Buddha that the authority over the management of the Saṅgha be transferred to him, on the grounds that the Buddha was now ageing. The Buddha was evidently aware of the dangers that lay in the personal control of the monastic community and pointed out that he would not entrust it even to Sāriputta or Moggallāna. This right of personal control of the congregation, the Buddha did not even reserve for himself, a position which he clearly defines in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* (*D*. II. p. 100), in reply to Ānanda's request to the Buddha

11 These six *annussatis* are *Buddhānussati*, *Dhammā-*, *Saṅghā-*, *Sīlā-*, *Cāgā-* and *Devatā-*.

1 *Mahavastu Avadāna*, Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series, No. XXI, Vols. I-II.

to issue final instructions to the community of monks before his passing away. The Buddha, at the same time, had been forewarned about these ambitious moves of Devadatta but he dismissed the warning, pointing out that Devadatta, on his part, was thereby seeking his own ruin. However, as the *Vinaya* points out (*Vin.* II. p. 189), the Buddha's refusal to grant Devadatta his request turns out to be the first cause of his bitter enmity with the Buddha (*Devadattassa bhagavati paṭhamo āghāto ahosi:* loc. cit.).

At this stage we discover a proclamation being made in Rājagaha by the venerable Sāriputta, at the request of the Buddha, about the change in the character of Devadatta intimating that neither the Buddha, the Dhamma nor the Saṅgha was to be held responsible for any of the misdeeds committed by Devadatta (*yaṃ devadatto kareyya kāyena vācāya na tena buddho vā dhammo vā saṅgho vā daṭṭhabbo. Devadatto' va tena daṭṭhabbo-ti.* loc. cit). This incident, as well as the repercussions it had on the history of the *sāsana*, appear to have been a matter of much public interest. According to the *Abhayarājakumāru Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* (*M.* I. p. 393) Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta appears to have given publicity to the view that the Buddha was hard on Devadatta in making such a proclamation that Devadatta was incorrigible (*atekiccho*) and was destined to suffer in hell (*āpāyiko nerayiko kappaṭṭho*). He also held that Devadatta was provoked and angered by that (*tāya ca pana te vācāya Devadatto kupito ahosi anattamano;* loc. cit.).[2]

The *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā* (the commentary on the *Dhammapada*), a much later work which gives dramatic rendering to the life story of Devadatta adds that the Sākyan Suppabuddha was angry with the Buddha because he had not only deserted his daughter Yasodharā in renouncing the household life but also had turned hostile to his son Devadatta after ordaining him as a disciple in the Buddhist order (*mama puttaṃ pabbājetvā tassa veriṭṭhāne ṭhito: DhA.* III, p. 44).

Devadatta, thereafter makes many attempts on the life of the Buddha. He unsuccessfully engages a man to assassinate the Buddha. He himself rolls a rock upon the Buddha as he was walking below the Gijjhakūṭa mountain. The Buddha on this occasion has a miraculous escape but a splintered piece of rock injures the Buddha's foot. This act of Devadatta, committed with criminal intent, is ranked among the heinous crimes which bring about their fruition without delay and interruption (*ānantarikakamma*, q.v.). Pursuing further his line of crimes he instigates the elephant-keepers of Rājagaha to send the elephant Nālāgiri charging at the Buddha, whom the Buddha, with ease as well as dignified charm, pacifies on the spot. These misdeeds of Devadatta, while contributing to the glory and prestige of the Buddha brought about Devadatta's own downfall.

Failing in all his endeavours to get the Buddha out of his way, he plans to cause a schism in the Order (*saṅghabheda;* ibid. pp. 196 ff.). With this end in view he asks the Buddha to make five austere ways of living incumbent on all Buddhist disciples, possibly in the belief that the Buddha would invariably refuse to do so and that he could hold it against the Buddha in the eyes of the public who generally regarded ascetic ways in religious life with great esteem. Devadatta's request was that all Buddhist disciples should, all their life, 1. be forest-dwelling (*āraññaka*), 2. subsist on begged food (*piṇḍapātika*), 3. make robes only of dust-heap cloth (*paṃsukūlika*), 4. reside only at the foot of trees (*rukkhamūlika*) and 5. abstain from eating fish or meat (*macchamaṃsaṃ na khādeyyuṃ*). These , the Buddha leaves to the option of the disciples. Devadatta, at any rate, pursued his plan and succeeded in breaking away from the parent body with five hundred junior, immature monks (*navakā ceva honti apākataññuno ca;* ibid. p. 199), in the face of the Buddha's warning that it was a very grave crime and that he should refrain from committing it (*alaṃ devadatta mā te ruccī saṅghabhedo garuko kho devadatta saṅghabhedo' ti;* loc. cit).

According to Pali literary sources Devadatta was not without company in his schemings and machinations against the Buddha. In his desire to assail the harmony of the Buddhist Saṅgha and bring about a schism therein he attempts to enlist the support of Kokālika, Katamorakatissa, Khandadeviyāputta and Samuddadatta. But they appear somewhat diffident and need much persuasion. Elsewhere we find Kokālika advising Devadatta not to trust Sāriputta and Moggallāna, presenting them as being evil-minded (*mā āvuso devadatta sāriputtamoggallāne vissāsi. Pāpicchā sāriputtamoggallānā pāpikānaṃ icchānaṃ vasaṃ gatā iti. Vin.* II. pp. 199 f.). He also had the support of a partisan group of nuns headed

2 Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, in fact, is seen instigating Prince Abhaya of Rājagaha to challenge and accuse the Buddha on this account (*M.* I. p. 392).

by Thullanandā (*Vin.* IV, pp. 66, 335) who upheld Devadatta and his group as stalwarts in the *sāsana*.

Post-canonical Buddhist texts, in their assessment of the character of Devadatta and his crimes against the Buddha, seem to reckon with many strands of current religious traditions in addition to the basic historical data. Despite the hostility shown by Devadatta to the Buddha he did not stand totally condemned in all sections of the Buddhist community. Some found in him a ready friend who was at their service both in prosperity and adversity (*Devadatto amhākaṃ maṅgalāmaṅgalesu sahāyo udakamaṇiko viya niccappatiṭṭhito: DhA.* I. p. 65). He was even preferred to venerable Sāriputta as a patron (loc. cit.).

On the other hand, the fact that Devadatta was offensive to the Buddha who is an unquestionable embodiment of virtue and a symbol of perfection, has subjected Devaddtta to continuous and sustained chastisement. The *Vinaya* (*Vin.* II. p. 193) already hints at Devadatta being destined for birth in hell for causing physical injury to the Buddha (*idaṃ bhikkhave devadattena paṭhamaṃ ānantarikakammaṃ upacitaṃ yaṃ duṭṭhacittena vadhakacittena tathāgatassa ruhiraṃ uppāditan' ti.*) The *Abhayarājakumāra Sutta* (*M.* I. p. 393) re-echoes this idea (see *supra*). The *Milindapañha* (p. 101) records it for us again that Devadatta was born in hell for his crimes against the Buddha and his disciples. It is in the *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā* (*DhA.*. I. pp. 122 ff.) that we get the most elaborate stories of Devadatta sinking alive, in his human form, into Avīci hell, and the painful tortures he is undergoing there as punishment for his crimes against the Buddha. There is an added note of tragedy in the last scene of Devadatta's life before his disappearance from earth. Here we see a repentant Devadatta who in his last days, as he was ailing for over nine months, is determined to come back and see the Buddha. But the Buddha is seen predicting that Devadatta would never set his eyes again on the Buddha in this life. It did happen as the Buddha predicted and Devadatta sank into the Avīci hell, without being able to behold the Buddha but professing faith in him (*pāṇehi buddhaṃ saraṇaṃ gatosmi; ibid.* p. 125) in what appears to be a parting eulogy charged with considerable emotion. The grand finale of this whole Devadatta episode is the consoling assurance given that after a hundred thousand aeons have passed Devadatta would end up being a *paccekabuddha* by the name of Aṭṭhissara (q.v.).

The centuries that followed the final passing away of the Buddha witness many attempts at reviewing the activities of Devadatta. While they are unanimous in making him suffer in Avici hell for what is termed an *ānantarika kamma* (q.v.), they offer different reasons for such behaviour on the part of Devadatta. The *Apadāna*, a work of questionable authenticity whose canonical standing appears to be challenged by the Dīghabhānakas (*DA.* I. p. 15) looks upon what the Buddha suffered in the hands of Devadatta as being retributive. For each of Devadatta's criminal acts like hurling a rock at the Buddha, hiring an assassin and releasing a charging elephant at him, an evil deed of the past committed by the *bodhisatta* is cited (*Ap.* I. p. 390, *vv.* 15—20, *tena kammavipākena devadatto silaṃ khipi*, etc.). The basic stand taken here is on the theory of *kamma* and *vipāka*, i.e. action and reaction, in which case the heavy tax levied on Devadatta who steps in,as it were, to prop up the operaton of the law of *kamma* seems to be only remotely justifiable.

On the other hand, stories of the *Jātaka* collection, in terms of the popular *kamma* theory they uphold find more scope for greater involvement of Devadatta in his hostility towards the Buddha. Devadatta's hostlity becomes an issue of saṃsāric genesis, extending back to many lives of the past to a period beyond historical reckoning. It is located in the *Serivāṇija Jātaka* (*J.* I. pp. 111 ff.).

According to this story of the past, the *bodhisatta* was once an itinerant trader hawking his wares from town to town. Another such trader with whom he had come to a business agreement turned hostile to him as he lost a fortune on account of his own unscrupulous and fraudulent character. He really was hoisted with his own petard but swore vengeance on the *bodhisatta*. This, the Jātaka story claims, was the begining of Devadatta's hostility towards the Buddha (*idaṃ paṭhamaṃ devadattassa bodhisatte āghātabandhanaṃ: J.* I. p. 113). On the other hand, the *Vinaya* (*Vin.* II. p. 189) which could be regarded as being more authentic cites a historical incident relating to the living Buddha as the cause of Devadatta's animosity (see *supra*).

The *Mahāvastu*, too, records instances of Devadatta's hostility dating back from the distant past. In a discussion relating to the seventh *bhūmi* of the *daśabhūmayaḥ*, (Vol. I. p. 156) it is said that the *bodhisatta* as a caravan leader in one of his former lives was attacked by Devadatta with a band of highway robbers. This, the text traces to Devadatta's

long-standing enmity extending through *saṃsāra* (*pūrvavairānusaṅgapratibaddhamānasaḥ*).

It is of interest to note that the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra*, a Buddhist Sanskrit text whose origin is close to the beginnings of the Christian era, makes the Buddha pay a high tribute to the monk Devadatta in terms of Devadatta's relationship to him in his former lives. The Buddha calls him the wholesome friend (*kalyāṇamitra*) on account of whom he was able to perfect his accomplishments for Buddhahood (i.e. *pāramitā*) and acquire other superhuman and transcendental powers. He also goes further to say that Devadatta would, at a future date, become a Buddha by the name of Devarāja. In this work, the historical harshness of Devadatta's life has, more or less, evaporated and he is harmoniously blended with the *bodhisattva* in characteristic Mahāyāna style. Whatever might be the judgement about the character and activities of Devadatta, favourable or otherwise, it is truly revealing to note that nearly ten centuries later history records an event in his favour. Fa-hsien states in his *Travels* that in India there are companies of the followers of Devadatta still existing who regularly make offerings to the three previous Buddhas, but not to Śākyamuni Buddha.[3]

JOTIYA DHIRASEKERA

DEVADŪTA, literarlly means heavenly messengers. They, in fact, are a symbolic representation of warnings and reminders to the mortals of the human plane of the fleeting and perishable nature of life and hence of the need to hasten the correction and perfection of life on earth. They are also explained, often in the commentarises, (See *MA*. IV. pp. 231 ff; *AA*. II. pp. 227 ff;) as messengers of the god of death, a Buddhist concept in which old age (*jarā*), disease (*vyādhi*), death (*maraṇa*) and sometimses even a new-born babe are considered as the messengers of death or *niaccu*. They serve on the one hand as a deterrent from evil ways of life and on the other to usher in the period of religious retirement (*pabbajjāsamaya*).

The Indians, being a deeply religious people from very early times, had divided the career of a person into four main stages with clearly defined duties for each stage (*caturāśrama-dharma*). During the third of these stages, viz. *vānaprastha*, the man who has already fulfilled the obligations of the household, retires to the forest to spend the evening of his life in meditation. The time to start this stage of renunciation was when the signs of old age began to appear. This was a pre-Buddhist practice, but Buddhist writers have referred to it as being practised also by certain Buddhist kings. Hence, we have an entire *jātaka* story in which the king Makhādeva hands over the kingdom to his son and retires to the forest as a hermit, on seeing the first grey hair, which is called a *devadūta*, on his head (*J*. No. 9). The *Jātaka Commentary* (*J*. I, pp. 138—9) explains the term *devadūta* here in three ways: i. Deva is *Maccudeva* or the god of death and his *dūtas* or messengers are those of death. When grey hairs appear on one's head it is as if one is standing before the god of death and, therefore, the grey hairs are said to be the messengers (*dūta*) of death (*deva* or more precisely of *Maccudeva*). ii. They are also called *devadūta* because they are messengers like the gods (*devā viya dūtā*), for, when grey hairs appear on a person's head it is as if a god (*deva*) were to appear in the space above him and tell him point blank 'you will die on such and such a day.' iii. Also they are like the messengers sent by the Buddhas and the *arahants* who are designated as *visuddhideva* or those who have become gods by purity, for it is on seeing an old man, a sick man, a corpse and a monk that all the *bodhisattas* renounce the world and go forth from home to homelessness. A fact to be remembered here is that these portents that prompt a *bodhisatta* to renounce the world are called *pubbanimittā* (signs, which herald) and no *devadūtas*, but the symbolical concept and the classification are the same. The *Nimi Jātaka* (*J*. No. 541) could also be considered a similar story. As the material supplied by both *jātakas* is of the same value for the topic under discussion, the details of this *jātaka* are not discussed here.

In the *Majjhima Nikāya* (II, pp. 74 ff.) is also found the *Makhādeva Sutta*, wherein the story of King Makhādeva is given somewhat differently from the *Jātaka* version. According to this *sutta* the king first establishes the custom of renouncing the household life on the appearance of the first grey hair. This custom is faithfully followed by many kings of this line upto King Nimi, who was the last king to do so. At the end of the discourse the Buddha says that following the Noble Eightfold Path preached by him is superior to this type of renunciation, for, while the former leads to Nibbāna, the latter only leads to the *brahma*-world. These words of the

3 *Travels of Fa-hsien*, translated by James Legge, Oxford, 1986.

Buddha show that this pre-Buddhist practice has been given accommodation in Buddhism and as such it is not a purely Buddhist practice. In this *sutta*, too, the grey hairs that appear on the King's head are referred to as *devadūtā*, which term the commentary (*MA*. III, p. 310) explains as referring to the messengers of death.

In the *Majjhima Nikāya* (III. pp. 17 ff.) there is a *Devadūta Sutta* according to which there are five *devadūtas*. The occasion for the talk on them is that when sinful people die and are reborn in hell, they are presented to king Yama, the god of death, by the guardians of hell, for inquiry and punishment. Yama questions them about each of the five *devadūtas* that appear among men. The purpose of this interrogation is to show that birth, old age, illness etc. are the messengers of death and as such mortals should be mindful of them, avoid doing wrong and do good always. The following are the five *devadūtas* referred to here: i. A young baby, lying on his back fallen prostrate among his own excrements, symbolising the phenomenon of birth (*jāti*) which is sorrow and seeing which people should realise that they, too, are subject to this sorrow and that without doing bad things they should perform good actions in body, mind and speech. ii. An old man or woman, 80, 90 or 100 years old, aged, crooked as a gabled roof, bent, leaning on a stick, going along palsied, miserable, youth gone, toothless, hair thinned, skin wrinkled, stumbling along with limbs discoloured and symbolising the phenomenon of decay (*jarādhamma*) iii. A man or woman, afflicted with illness, suffering, grievously ill, fallen prostrate among his own excrements, rising up and getting to bed with the help of others and symbolising the phenomenon of illness (*vyādhidhamma*). iv. A thief, an evil-doer, caught by the king's officers and being subjected to various punishments such as lashing with whips, canes and rods and even decapitation with a sword, symbolising the unpleasant retribution of evil actions. v. A man or a woman, dead for one, two or three days, swollen, discoloured, decomposing and symbolising the phenomemon of death (*maraṇadhamma*).

According to the text, any individual who, without taking notice of these *devadūtas* as reminders of the miseries of existence, does not perform meritorious actions and instead is engaged in evil actions, would be subjected to all types of tortures by the guardians of the hell and these tortures are described in great detail in the next few pages of the book.

In a similar but a shorter *sutta* at *A*. I, pp. 13 ff. three out of the above five *devadūtas* are mentioned in a different order. The descriptions in both places are identical. The Buddha explains these three as the three *devadūtas* (*tīni devadūtāni*). In this passage too, the framework of the story is the same as in the earlier place: people who lead immoral lives in word, deed and thought, are after death brought before Yama, subsequent to whose interrogation the guardians of hell subject them to all types of punishment.

The same Buddhist concept is also found in the *Dhammapada* (*v*. 235) where a grey-haired person, compared here to a yellowing leaf, is told that the messengers of death (*yamapurisā*) have come near him.

For Western parallels on this Buddhist concept see *JPTS*. 1885, pp. 62 ff.

A. G. S. K.

DEVALOKA: heavenly worlds, literally 'worlds or realms of the gods.' (*deva:* god — loka: world). In Buddhism, *devalokas* are referred to as possible planes of existence in which beings of the human world would be reborn after death as a reward for the good deeds done or the virtuous lives led by them.[1] Synonymous with the idea of *devaloka* are also the phrases like '*sugatiṃ saggaṃ lokaṃ*' (*S*. III, p. 243. See *Ud*. 50 where this phrase is used coupled with '*devānaṃ tāvatiṃsānaṃ sahavyataṃ*' which means 'in the company of the *Tāvatiṃsa* gods.), an idea which is undoubtedly inherited from the Vedic past of ancient India (Cf. Vedic references like *saha devesu gacchati; Rv*. 1, 125. 5. and *tapasā ye svar yayuḥ;* ibid. 154. 2. In fact, the idea recurs with greater frequency in the *Upaniṣads: Pratipadyate svargaṃ lokaṃ: Ch*. 3, 13. 6; *Eti svargaṃ lokaṃ: Brh*. 5.3.1.) While on the one hand this concept of reward in the life after death is referr ed to as 'birth in the god - world' (*devalokūpapatti; A*. I. p. 115) it is also referred to, on the other, in a slightly different idiom as 'joining the company of the gods' (*devānaṃ sahavyataṃ upapajjeyyaṃ: M*. I. p. 289). Many such ideas of Buddhist cosmogony are evidently both derived from and nurtured by pre-Buddhist Indian traditions. (With regard to description of life in the *deva* worlds and its evaluation in relation to basic Buddhist values see CELESTIAL and

1 Later Buddhist tradition makes it possible even for animals to reap such rewards. See the story of Maṇḍuka Devaputta at *VvA*. pp. 217 and *Vism*. p. 208 ff.

HEAVEN. For details of each *deva* world see under its own name.)

The Buddhist concept regarding the location of the *devalokas* in relation to the human world is seen registered at two places in an early record relating to the preaching of the first sermon, the *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta* by the Buddha. It is stated there (*S. V.* p. 423 f; *Vin.* I. pp. 12), in identical terms that the first batch of gods, after those residing on the earthly plane (*bhummā devā*) to rejoice over the preaching of the doctrine by the Buddha and make a joyous exclamation were the gods of the Cātumahārājika or the world of the Four Guardian Deities. They are followed, ascending higher and higher, by the gods of Tāvatiṃsa, Yāma, Tusita, Nimmānarati and Paranimmitavasavatti. Thus, it appears that the *devalokas* or the abodes of the gods are viewed as being above the earth, in layers as it were, one above the other, increasing in excellence as they ascend higher. This set of six *devalokas*, including the Cātummahārājika, constitutes the heavenly abodes of the sensual plane (*kāmadhātu*) which are also referred to as *cha-kāmāvacaradevā* (*DA.* I. p. 120).

In the report about the recital of *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta* referred to above, after the *devas* of the Paranimmitavasavatti, i.e. the highest of the six heavens of the *kāmadhātu*, the Brahmakāyikā devā who belong to the group of the fine material sphere or *rūpadhātu* and are, therefore, a grade higher than the gods of the *kāmadhātu* make their appearance. Both sources in the Canonical Pali texts which record the preaching of the *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta*, the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* and the *Vinaya Mahāvagga*, bring their list of the heavenly hosts who participated in this event to a close after the Brahmakāyika gods.[2] The identical arrangement and listing of the heavenly world occurs in the *Kevaḍḍha Sutta* (*D.* I. pp. 215 ff.) according to which a *bhikkhu*, seeking an answer to the question as to where the four great elements cease to exist completely, without residue, traverses through the entire range of heavenly worlds, starting with the Cātummahārājika and ending up in the world of Brahmakāyika devas over whom Mahā Brahma presides. As being of practical interest to the Buddhists this list appears to have sufficed.

On the other hand, it is interesting to note that the *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta* which is contained in the *Paritta* collection (*Catubhānavārapāli*) of the Theravāda tradition of Sri Lanka, unlike the *Saṃyutta* and *Vinaya* versions, mentions by name the fifteen Brahma worlds belonging to the *rūpadhātu*, on the pattern of the *Kathāvatthu*, starting with Brahmapārisajja and ending with Akaniṭṭha, the last five of which are the Pure Abodes or Suddhāvāsa of the Anāgāmins. This expansion of the *sutta*, in its passage from being a classical text of Buddhist doctrine to become a popular piece, with dramatic episodes of Buddhist *Paritta* recital (i. e. recital of protective and benedictory chants) reflects editorial handling by later monk-scholars who apparently were not unwilling to accomodate new religious traditions and aspirations whose emergence and growth is witnessed continuously.

Speaking of *deva* worlds or abodes of the gods, one has to make two important observations about this list. In the first instance, while the six different abodes of the *devas* of the *kāmadhātu* are mentioned severally by name, the *devas* of the *rūpadhātu* are only referred to, apparently in part, under the single generic name Brahmakāyika. Secondly the heavenly hosts of the *arūpadhātu* are not mentioned at all. Perhaps, their very nature of total isolation and abstraction in relation to mundane existence prevented them from involvement in such worldly events.

It is fairly evident that the Buddhists were nevertheless aware of the presence of more gods besides those mentioned in this list. In the discussion relating to 'contemplation on *devas*' or *devatānussati*, the above mentioned gods of the sensual plane are referred to by name and on reaching the Brahmakāyikā devā it is said that there are gods even beyond them (*santi devā Brahmakāyikā santi devā tatuttarim*, *A.* III, pp. 287, 314).

For a fuller and more complete list of *devas* of the entire set of three *dhātus* (*kāma*, *rūpa* and *arūpa*

2 The *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta* preserved in Chinese (i.e. in the *Saṃyukta Āgama* of the *Taisho*, Nos. 109 and 110) repeats, more or less, the same pattern in its listing of the *deva* worlds. Sutra 109, translated by An-shih-kao, gives the names of the six *kāmāvacara devalokas* severally and refers to the Brahma *lokas* as "all Brahma worlds." (*Chu fan chiai*). Sutra 110 which is translated by I-tsing, on the other hand, leaves out the names of the six *deva* worlds and refers to them collectively as the six *kāma* heavens (*liu yu tien*). Thereafter the Brahmas are briefly referred to as Brahma hosts (*fan tien* and *fan chung*) alluding perhaps to the Pali reference to Brahmakāyika.

DEVALOKA

DEVA	BRAHMA			BÅHIRAKA (Non-Buddhist)
KÅMÅVACARA (KÅMADHÅTU)	RŪPÅVACARA (RŪPADHÅTU)		ARŪPÅVACARA (ARŪPADHÅTU)	
Sensuous Sphere	Fine-material Sphere		Immaterial Sphere	
	3 Jhānabhūmi (3 x 3)	5 Suddhāvāsa	4 Āruppas	Asaññabhava (20)
	Brahmakāyika			
1. Cātummahārājika (1)	1. Brahmapārisajja (1)	1. Aviha (10)	1. Akāsānañcāyatana (15)	(See *D.* I. p. 28 and *DA.* I. p. 118)
2. Tāvatiṃsa (2)	2. Brahmapurohita (2)	2. Atappa (11)	2. Viññāṇañcāyatana (16)	
3. Yāma (3)	3. Mahābrahma (3)	3. Sudassa (12)	3. Ākiñcaññāyatana (17)	
4. Tusita (4)		4. Sudassi (13)	4. Nevasaññānāsaññāyatana (18)	
5. Nimmānarati (5)	**Ābha**	5. Akaniṭṭha (14)		
6. Paranimmitavasavatti (6)	4. Parittābha (4)			
	5. Appamāṇābha (5)			
	6. Ābhassara (6)			
	Subha			
	7. Parittasubha (7)			
	8. Appamāṇasubha (8)			
	9. Subhakiṇṇa (9)			
	Vehapphala (19)			

(On the evidence of the *Kathāvatthu*, p. 207, and Buddhaghosa's commentary on the *Sāleyyaka Sutta* at *MA.* II. p. 333).

whose denizens are all referred to under the general name of *deva*, including also the Brahmās of the latter two categories, we have to look elsewhere. The *Sāleyyaka Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* (*M*. I. p. 289) in enumerating the different planes of existence in which a man of virtue may aspire to be born after death mentions twenty-five different stations at the heavenly (*deva*) level.[3] Opening the list with the six heavenly worlds from Cātummahārājika to Paranimmitavasuvatti and ending with the last of the four Formless Abodes or *āruppas* of the immaterial sphere, i.e. *nevasaññānāsaññāyatana* the sutta seems to reckon with the entire range of divine life or divine abodes of the *kāma*, *rūpa* and *arūpa dhātūs*. Buddhaghosa in his commentary to the sutta makes some valuable observations (*MA*. II. p. 333). His main interest appears to be in the heavenly planes at the level of Brahmas. He relates these Brahma abodes to the development of *jhanas* (Skt. *dhyāna*.) by the Buddhist disciple. The Brahmakāyikā, for instance, are referred to as resulting from the development of the first *jhāna* (*brahmakāyikānaṃ devānaṃ ti paṭhamajjhānabhūmidevānaṃ*: loc. cit). He adds that by taking both *rūpa* and *arūpa jhānas* as the basis one could develop insight and thereby attain arahantship (*Rūpārūpajjhānaṃ pādakaṃ katvā vipassanaṃ vaḍḍhetvā arahattaṃ pāpunāti*; loc. cit).

He is also, at the same time, critical of this classification. He points out that there is no separate heavenly world by the name of Ābha (no. 8) and that it is only a descriptive term applicable to the three Ābha heavens, viz. Parittābha, Appamāṇābha and Ābhassara (nos. 9, 10, 11). The same is said to be true of Subha (no. 12) in relation to the Subha heavens (nos. 13, 14, 15) ie. Parittasubha, Appamāṇasubha and Subhakiṇṇa. This observation of Buddhaghosa appears to be backed by a much older tradition. The *Kathāvatthu* (p. 207), in a list which appears to include the *devas* of the *kāmadhātu* and *rūpadhātu* also leaves out the names Ābha and Subha as referring to specific *deva* worlds and includes only the three subdivisions of each of these as pointed out above. Further, even the Brahmakāyika to which we have referred earlier as possibly being a generic name appears to be treated so in this context in the *Kathāvatthu*. In place of the Brahmakāyika we have its three subdivisions: Brahmapārisajja, Brahmapurohita and Mahābrahma. This *Kathāvatthu* list which also begins with the Cātummahārājika ends with Akaniṭṭha (i.e. no. 21 both in the *Kathāvatthu* and *Sāleyyaka Sutta*), having reckoned with devas only of the *kāmadhātu* and *rūpadhātu*.

According to the *Sāleyyaka Sutta*, beyond these and surpassing them are the 4 Āruppas or deva abodes of the Formless or Immaterial Sphere (*arūpadhātu*), i.e. *ākāsānañcāyatanūpagā devā* etc. In the list of Brahma worlds proper, beginning with Brahmakāyika or Brahmapārisajja the first nine are set apart, according to the commentary (*MA*. II. p. 333), for those who reach jhānic attainments (3 *jhānas*: first, second and third)

The next five consisting of Aviha, Atappa, Sudassa, Sudassi and Akaniṭṭha are given as the Suddhāvāsa or Pure Abodes where those who have reached the stage of *Anāgāmin* or 'Never- Returner' on the Buddhist path of religious perfection are born. Those who develop meditation with an eye towards Formless Sphere attainments are said to be born after death in the Āruppas or Formless Sphere. The fruit of arahantship stands outside these deva worlds. Buddhaghosa introduces into this list of *deva* worlds the Abode of the Unconscious or Asaññabhava from non-Buddhist quarters (*Asaññabhavo pana bāhirakānaṃ tāpasaparibbājakānam ācariyo ti*) and makes thereby the *deva* worlds to total up to twenty-six (*chabbīsati devalokā nāma: MA*. II. p. 333).

JOTIYA DHIRASEKERA

3 1. Cātummahārājika, 2. Tāvatimsa, 3. Yāma, 4. Tusita, 5. Nimmāṇarati, 6. Paranimmitavasavatti. 7. Brahmakāyika, 8. Ābha, 9. Parittābha, 10. Appamānābha, 11. Ābhassara, 12. Subha, 13i 13. Parittasubha, 14. Appamāṇasubha, 15. Subhakiṇṇa, 16. Vehapphala, 17. Aviha, 18. Atappa, 19. Sudassa, 20. Sudassi, 21. Akaniṭṭha, 22. Akāsānañcāyatana, 23. Viññāṇañcāyatana, 24. Ākiñcaññāyatana, 25. Nevasaññānāsaññāyatana.

A somewhat similar list appears in the *Saṃkhāruppatti Sutta* of the same Nikāya (*M*. III. p. 100 ff.) in which the only difference is that the plane of the Brahmakāyikā devā is subdivided into seven in terms of the magnitude of their realm each of which is resided over by a Brahma described as Sahassa, Dvisahassa, Tisahassa, Catusahassa, Pañcasahassa Dasasahassa and Satasahassa, relative to the size of the realm.

DEVĀNAMPIYA TISSA, king of Sri Lanka during whose reign (250—210 B.C.) the official introduction of Buddhism to the island occurred. He was the second son of Muṭasiva and a junior contemporary of emperor Asoka of India (See. ASOKA (5)) with whom he had developed a close friendship, though the two had never met. His reign is of special significance in the history of Sri Lanka and that of Buddhism.

Tissa was a man of vision and in his political wisdom, he even before his elevation to the throne, developed a close friendship with the Indian emperor Asoka. At the initial stage of his rule Tissa sent envoys headed by his chief minister and nephew named Ariṭṭha (See ARIṬṬHA (4),[1] bearing costly presents to Asoka. These envoys were graciously received by the Indian emperor. The effect of this diplomatic relationship has to be assessed in the light of the political situation current at the time in Sri Lanka and the policy of Maurya imperialism, though by then, Asoka had given up conquest by war (*digvijaya*) and had firmly resorted to conquest by the spread of Dhamma (*dhammavijaya*). During this period in Sri Lanka, apart from the Royal House at Anuradhapura to which Tissa belonged, there were several *kṣatriya* families at Kājaragāma and Candanagāma in Rohaṇa and many other places, exercising authority in their principalities[2] irrespective of the title they bore, be that '*gāmaṇi*' or '*parumaka*'. These local rulers would not have readily acknowledged Tissa's overlordship. This surmise is reinforced by the fact that "the first thing that Tissa did after the inauguration of his rule was to send envoys bearing costly presents to Asoka"[3] and also in the centuries that followed there emerged supreme a *kṣatriya* family in Mahāgāma (See DUṬṬHAGĀMAṆĪ). It is plausible that the expansion of the Maurya empire would have necessitated Tissa to send the mission to the Maurya emperor, as Paranavitana puts it "to obtain the consent and support of the Indian potentiate for his assumption of regal status" (ibid). Emperor Asoka's reciprocal presents to Tissa consisted of (i) gifts material i.e. the five insignia of royalty and the paraphanalia necessary for a royal consecration and, (ii) gifts spiritual — the gift of the *dhamma* i.e. an exhortation to embrace Buddhism. In addition the rank of the commander of the army (*senāpatiṭṭhāna*) was bestowed on Ariṭṭha by emperor Asoka. This too would have had a bearing on the politics of Sri Lanka favourable to Tissa. When Tissa received the gifts and the message, he heeded to the superior power and had a consecration for a second time with the regal insignia presented to him by emperor Asoka. With the second consecration Tissa came to be known by the name of Devānampiya (pleasing to the gods) Tissa. Tissa was his generic name. It was by this name Mahinda Thera addressed the king at the first encounter at Missakapabbata (See MIHINTALE). The King looked astonished at this call for, by then, he commanded the respect of his subjects as King Devānampiya Tissa. It must be noted that the title Devānampiya used by Tissa and his successors had been a title used by emperor Asoka himself. It is surmised that with the second consecration Tissa assumed the honorific title Devānampiya (pleasing to the gods) to place himself in proximity to Asoka who must have been highly respected in Sri Lanka.

As the second consecration was held with the blessings of Asoka, Tissa fortified himself as a sovereign ruler and was thus the duly consecrated king of Sri Lanka leaving all other *kṣatriya* families in the island to follow him. The second consecration was performed in the month of *vesākha* and it is obvious that at the arrival of the Buddhist mission there was political stability in the island. It must also be recalled that when Mahinda was selected to head the mission to Sri Lanka, he gave thought to the situation prevalent at the time and "concluded that it was not yet the time to go there". He, therefore tarried for sometime awaiting the accession of Tissa to the throne (*VinA.* 1. p. 69) and in the interim, there was Tissa's mission to Asoka which paved the way to welcome the Buddhist mission and accept with alacrity the gift of the *dhamma* sent by emperor Asoka.

Tissa's first official function after he was acclaimed King of Sri Lanka had been the participation in a national festival (*nakkhatta*) on the full-moon day of *Jeṭṭhamūla* (May-June: Sinhala: *Poson*). On this day the king proclaimed the festival and accompanied by a large retinue set forth to Missakapabbata to enjoy the pleasures of the chase. On the same day Mahinda along with his companions had arrived

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1 *bhāgineyyaṃ mahāriṭṭham amaccam pamukhaṃ* *Mhv.* XI, *v.* 20

2 C. W. Nicholas and S. Parmavitana, *A Concise History of Ceylon*, Ceylon University Press, Colombo 1961, p. 60-62.

3 op. cit. p. 41.

at the same mountain. Tissa climbed the mountain and came to the spot where elder Mahinda was standing, awaiting Tissa's arrival. When Mahinda called out "Come here, Tissa", the king was surprised (supra), but when Mahinda disclosed his identity and informed the purpose of his arrival, the king was pleased and greeted the *thera*. Mahinda had an interview with Tissa during which syllogisms were used and the king proved himself intelligent and quick-witted. Mahinda was satisfied that the king was able to understand the *dhamma* and therefore, to him he preached the *Cūlahatthipadopama Sutta* (*M*. I. pp. 175-84). Having listened to this discourse the king and his retinue of forty-thousand people embraced Buddhism (*VinA*. I. p. 77). The conversion of King Devānampiya Tissa laid the foundation for the establishment of the *Buddha-sāsana* in Sri Lanka.

Tissa was a duty-bound host. He invited the monks to his palace at Anuradhapura on the morrow. Having returned to the capital he made all arrangements to receive the *theras*. Seats were prepared inside the palace for the *theras*. This gave a better opportunity for the members of the royalty to wait upon the *theras* and acquaint themselves with the life of a recluse and consequently, first to enter the Order were members of the royalty (infra) which greatly facilitated the propagation of Buddhism in the island. The king called upon the five-hundred ladies headed by Anulādevī, the wife of one of king's brothers, to make obeisance to the *theras*. On this occasion, after the meal was over, Mahinda preached the *Petavatthu*, the *Vimānavatthu* and the *Saccasaṃyutta* (*S*. V. pp. 414-478), to the people assembled and the five-hundred ladies attained *sotāpatti* (the fruition of the First Path). By then the news of the arrival of the *theras* had received publicity and multitudes of people assembled at the palace gate. The king ordered the hall of the state-elephant to be decorated and made arrangements for the *thera* to preach to a larger crowd. On this occasion Mahinda Thera preached the *Devadūta Sutta* (*A*.I. pp. 138-42). As the gathering grew still larger, the king shifted the venue having prepared the seats in the park Nandanavana at the southern gate of the city. Here, the *thera* preached *Āsivisopama Sutta* (*S*. IV 172-5; *Mhv*. XVV. *v*, 4 gives it as *Bālapaṇḍita Sutta*).

On the second day after the arrival of the *theras*, Tissa realised the necessity of a suitable place for the *theras* to reside and, therefore, he invited them to Meghavana — a park which was neither too far away from nor too close to the city. There he got a structure built in haste and the *theras* spent the night there. In the morning the king went to Meghavana and bestowed the park on the *theras*. It must be emphasised that the consecrated boundaries were fixed by the king himself ploughing a furrow to mark them so as to include his own city within them.[4] This incident is eloquent of the devotion and the enthusiasm of the king to establish the *sāsana* in the island. In this park the king built various buildings for the use of the *Saṅgha* and in course of time it came to be known as Mahāvihāra — the leading monastery and the centre of Theravāda Buddhism. For seven days the *thera* preaced in the city and the king extended his patronage. When the *thera* preached the *Mahā-appamāda Sutta* and exhorted the king to be diligent and returned to Cetiyagiri — another name for Missakapabbata, the king suspecting that the *thera* was getting ready to depart from the island hastened to Cetiyagiri and inquired about the intentions of the *thera*. When the king was told that it was time for the *theras* to observe the *vassa* i.e. the period of retreat (See VASSA) and the monks had to stay in one place, the king caused the construction of sixty-eight caves at Cetiyagiri for the use of the monks during the rainy season (*Mhv*. XVI. v. 12; *VinA*. I. p. 82).

Tissa was a willing participant in the establishment of the *Buddha-sāsana* in Sri Lanka. On the seventh day of Mahinda's visit, Ariṭṭha (See ARIṬṬHA (3) — a minister entered the Order along with his fifty-five brothers and attained Arahantship. During the construction of the *stūpa* named Thūpārāma (infra) Abhaya- a brother of the king entered the Order with thousand men. Men from various villages entered the Order in large numbers. When Anulādevī, the king's sister-in-law, desired to enter the order and posed a problem to Mahinda Thera, the king willingly and forthwith sent his experienced minister Ariṭṭha to emperor Asoka with the *thera's* message to his sister Saṅghamittā (See SAṄGHA-MITTĀ) to come over to Sri Lanka to establish the *bhikkhuṇī sāsana* (the Order of the Buddhist nuns). Ariṭṭha was also asked to bring a branch of the Sacred Bodhi Tree. The king allowed Ariṭṭha too to enter the Order after completing his mission.

It was Mahinda's desire to get a *stūpa* built. On his advice the king built the Thūpārāma — first *stūpa* in Sri Lanka enshrining the collar-bone relic

4 Nicholas and Paranavitana, op. cit. p. 50 *Mhv*. XV. v. 182. f.

of the Buddha. This *stūpa* still continues to receive the veneration of millions of Buddhists the world over. He also built a nunnery known as the *Upāsikāvihāra* as the residence for the ladies who took upon themselves the observance of ten precepts and awaited the arrival of Saṅghamittā. In this *vihāra* Saṅghamittā lived with her company of nuns and the king built twelve other buildings on the same spot to meet the requirements of Saṅghamittā. Later it came to be called Hatthālhaka Vihāra.

Tissa's religious fervour is to be seen from the reception he accorded to Therī Saṅghamittā and to the branch of the sacred Bodhi Tree on their arrival. They were received with befitting ceremonial by the king himself at the seaport of Jambukola and conveyed to Anuradhapura in a magnificient procession after having been paid honour at a number of places on its way (*VinA.* 1, p. 98). The planting of the Bodhi branch was a great event in the history of Sri Lanka and was done with much ceremonial and honour. In the presence of Mahinda thera, Saṅghamittā therī, the nobles, the *kṣatriyas* of Kājaragāma and Candanagāma and Brāhmaṇa Tivakka and people from many parts of the country, the Bodhi Tree was planted on the terrace prepared for it. Saplings grown from the seeds of the Sacred Bodhi Tree were subsequently planted by the king near the port of Jambukola, at the gate of the village of the brāhmaṇa Tivakka, at Thūpārāma, Issaranimmānavihāra, Paṭhamacetiya, and at distant places — Cetiyapabbata, Kājaragāma, and Candanagāma in the district of Rohana and in thirty-two other places at a distance of one *yojana* from one another.

With the planting of the Sacred Bodhi Tree and its saplings there was established an unseverable bond between the king and his subjects. One writer succinctly says, "It is doubtful if any other single incident in the long history of their race has seized upon the imagination of the Sinhalese with such tenacity as this of the planting of the aged tree, like its pliant roots which find sustenance on the face of the bare rock and cleaves their way through the stoutest fabric, the influence of what it represents has penetrated into the innermost being of the people till the tree itself has become almost human."[5]

When Buddhism was established in the island in its various aspects — monastic order including monks and nuns, residences for them, and shrines for worship, Tissa wanted to find out from Mahinda thera whether Buddhism had well established itself in the island. On being told that the religion will take root only when a person born in Sri Lanka of Sri Lankan parents, studies the Vinaya in Sri Lanka and expounds it in Sri Lanka, the king made arrangements to hold a Vinaya recital at Thūpārāma. Ariṭtha, who had twice been to Maurya Court as envoy to help the king and who entered the order after accomplishing his second mission, possessed the required conditions, expounded the Vinaya at this assembly (*Mhv.* XV. *vs.* 180 ff). Thus on the initiative of Tissa, fulfilling the wish of Mahinda, the *saṅgha* in Sri Lanka became an independent and truely national institution. The wisdom of this policy has been amply demonstrated by the course of events in the history of Buddhism in Sri Lanka, for the king or the stateand the people looked upon Buddhism as an institution that must be maintained and defended at all costs.

In addition to the religious buildings already mentioned Tissa has been credited with the establishment of a number of other *vihāras* namely Issarasamaṇa to the south of the city, Vessagiri, Paṭhamakathūpa, the refectory called Mahāpāli and the Jambukola Vihāra at the landing place of the Sacred Bodhi Tree. He also constructed the tank called Tisāvāva at Anuradhapura.[6] He put to fruitful use the artisans belonging to eighteen families who were sent to Sri Lanka along with the sacred Bodhi Tree. Thus, Tissa was able to build up a super culture in the island. Archaeological remains of this period bear ample testimony to this.

It must be remarked that of all the missions sent in various directions by Emperor Asoka, the mission to Sri Lanka was the most fruitful and the credit must go, at least in part, if not the whole, to Devānampiya Tissa for extending his patronage. From the time of his demarcating the consecrated boundaries of Meghavana, Tissa made the monarchy a part and parcel of the *sāsana*. Thus from its inception the Buddha *sāsana* in Sri Lanka included the king, the *saṅgha* and the people. Without one the other two cannot and would not sustain, and even to this day this bond remains unchanged.

M. KR.

5 P. E. Peiris, *Ceylon and the Portuguese*, pp. 3, 4 quoted in G. P. Malalasekera, *Pali Literature of Ceylon*, p. 24.

6 Nicholas and Paranavitana, op. cit. p. 52.

DEVARĀJA CULT, the cult of the 'God-King' was originally Hindu, particularly of Śaiva tradition, and was absorbed into Mahāyāna Buddhism through Hindu influence. In Buddhism this cult is connected with the worship of Avalokiteśvara who, by religious speculation and popular piety is invested with immense wisdom and the power to work miracles. The result is that as Buddhism tended to become more and more popular and absorbed into itself forms of Hindu belief and worship Avalokiteśvara became the cosmic ruler resembling Brahma in Hinduism. It was in this manner that Avalokiteśvara came to be associated with the ideology of Devarāja.

This cult of the Devarāja developed into a significant aspect of the religion only in south-east Asian countries, especially in Cambodia, where Hinduism and Buddhism not only exist harmoniously side by side, but have yielded a happy synthesis. Sherman E. Lee (*A History of Far Eastern Art*, Thomas and Hudson, Britain, 1964, p. 227) states that this cult probably originated in Java under the great Śrī Vijaya empire, but it became the characteristic expression of Cambodian religion, society and art. The Javanese version was probably derived from the Hindu cult of the World Ruler *Cakravartin*. In Cambodia where the cult took an extremely developed form the king is identified with Brahma, Śiva, Viṣṇu or Avalokiteśvara in whom are centred all power, religious and secular. B. Rowland (*The Art and Architecture of India*, p. 216) observes that this identification of Cambodian rulers as incarnation of the popular deities occurred even in their life-time.

This concept of the Devarāja prevailed in Cambodia as a state-cult from about the ninth century, with the establishment of Śaivism there. An inscription of 802 A.C. referring to its introduction in the reign of King Jayavarman II (802—53 A.C.) who came from Java, states that when King Jayavarman II had established a firm footing in the region of Angkor in Cambodia he proclaimed his independence of Java and adopted the supreme title of "King of the Mountain" and solomnized it with a religious ceremony. A great stone phallus, symbolic of the energy of the god Śiva was erected on the summit of Phnom Kulen, a hill near Angkor, and by means of an esoteric ritual conducted by a *brāhmaṇa* named Hiranyadama who 'having carefully extracted the essence of the *Śāstras*, with full knowledge and experience of the mysteries, established for the prosperity of the world the magic rites of the Devarāja'. Thus the king was transformed into an incarnation of the god, manifest in the form of the Devarāja or "God-King". (Wim Swann, *Lost Cities of Asia*, London, 1966, p. 126; B. Rowland, op. cit. p. 269).

The ritual and cult of the Devarāja was thus centred around a sacred symbol like the phallus, or the statue of the Buddha which was imbued with the essence of divine kingship. This symbol was installed in a temple-mountain which, again, is described in the inscriptions as located on top of a mountain in the centre of the capital and, magically, in the centre of the universe. The consecration of this symbol and the continuance of the cult centering round it were designed to ensure the magic essence of kingship which is vital to the security and prosperity of the state.

Thus the religious monuments in Cambodia built after the introduction of this cult into that country in the ninth century as seen above can be described as representations of this cult. Under this cult, these monuments in Cambodia developed magnificently both in art form and size as is apparent from a comparison of the gigantic and beautiful Bayon (q.v.) and the Angkor Vat, constructed after the development of this cult with the Prei Kouk (6th—7th century) of modest dimensions, built before its introduction (cp. Lee. op. cit. p. 227f.).

Connected with the cult of the Devarāja is also the concept of the World Mountain, as seen above, known in Hindu mythology as Mount Meru or Kailāśa. In Buddhist literature, too, as in the *Mahāsudassana Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* (*D.* II. p. 169ff.) descriptions of the fabulous residence of the universal king (*Cakravartin*) occur. Przyluski, in a comparative study of these descriptions concludes that the residence of the Indian *Cakravartin* is made after the model of the terraced towers surmounted by a temple. The universal monarch resides there because, being like the sovereign of the gods, he must live like him at the summit of the cosmic mountain (cp. *JCBRAS*. New series, Vol. I, p. 136).

This concept of the World Mountain is also represented in Cambodian architecture along with the cult of the Devarāja. To begin with the temple of the Devarāja which was usually of modest dimensions was constructed on a natural mountain. From this simple beginning developed the great complex of stone architectural monuments of Angkor Vat

and the Bayon, the latter of which is the finest example of the Buddhist monuments in Cambodia symbolizing this cult of the Devarāja.

B. Rowland (op. cit. p. 216) points out that the elevation of the pre-Khmer type of cella into a summit of a stepped pyramid of the later period simulated the imagined shape of this mythical world mountain and is the result of the development of the cult of the temple mountain and of the Devarāja. The instalation of such a facsimile of the mountain at the centre of the world was designed, magically, to transfer the naval of the world to the Khmer capital and to ensure the dominance over all the empire (cp. ibid. p. 268 f.n. 11).

It is not only the location of the temple and its architectural form that conform to the concept of the Devarāja. The sculptures of these temples too, as a whole, are significantly a portrayal of this cult. Also it is noteworthy that these sculptures perform a dual purpose of symbolizing the god as well as the king. Thus, for instance, the balustrades of the broad causeways that cross the moat at the gateways of the temple of Bayon, are formed by teams of stone clossi, gods on the one side, and demons on the other, using the body of a gigantic serpent as a rope in their churning of the 'milky ocean'. "The auspicious product of this collaboration between all the supernatural forces is the elixir of fortune and longevity, the Devarāja, or here, more accurately, the Buddharāja, in the guise of the bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara (the most conspicuous sculpture of the Bayon), whose beneficent, all encompassing gaze ensured the prosperity of the four quarters of the realm" (Wim Swann, op. cit. p. 158). These faces of the bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara (*EB*-Vol. II, Pl. LX.) have also been identified as idealized portraits of its builder, King Jayavarman VII himself, looking in all directions thus performing the dual purpose mentioned above (for further details, see BAYON).

The great gallery of the bas - reliefs of the Bayon which Wim Swann (op. cit. p. 160) describes as the most fascinating feature of this temple of the Devarāja contains, for the first time, scenes from the Khmer history and every day life. A considerable portion of the reliefs is devoted to King Jayawarman's wars with Champā. Here, in these bas-reliefs and other sculptures one would see that the sculptor has made an attempt to identify their own king with the patron deity, the bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara in the present instance and express that identification by means of sculpture depicting scenes from his own personal life.

The temple of Angkor Vat was the temple of the Devarāja of King Suryavarman II and was dedicated to the honour of god Viṣṇu, his patron deity. In this case the cult image was not the phallus but a gold statue of the god, astride his winged mount, the Garuḍa. At Bayon, similarly, a nāga-king protects the Devarāja in the guise of the meditating Buddha from the "cosmic storm" (see. *EB*. Vol. II, Pl. LIX).

At Angkor Vat most of the sculptures are concerned with the different incarnations of god Viṣṇu since that temple is dedicated to the honour of that god. But here too, an identification of the reliefs with a portrayal of Khmer life, as for instance in the scene of the army on the march is possible (cp. Sherman E. Lee, op cit. pp. 223, 336 ff.)

Wim. Swann's observations of these Khmer sculpture in general, and of one sculpture in particular are worth quoting *verbatim*. "The Khmer school of portrait and sculpture which evolved in response to the Devarāja cult occupies an extremely high position in world art. Of these the most striking is the superb head presumed to represent the great Jayavarman himself, now in the National Museum of Phaom Penh. These sculptures manifest a rare synthesis of individual portrait characteristics and on abstract, hieractic symbol of power." (Wim Swann, op. cit. p. 161).

Wim Swann (op. cit. p. 129) describes the impact of this cult on mediaeval Cambodia in the following eloquent words. "The cult of the Devarāja, initiated by Jayavarman II together with its associated deificatien of the royal ancestors, was to assume paramount importance in the culture of Angkor. It provided the mystical basis for the absolute power of the Khmer rule, worshipped as both king and god, and supplied the motivation to erect structures unsurpassed in grandeur and scale even by the pharaohs. What is more, the temple mountain of each king became his mausoleum at his death and could not be used by his successor to perform the rites necessary to enlist the co-operation of the deities on whose benevolence the rice-crop, and hence the very existence of the nation, depended. Hence, each sovereign had to erect a new 'God — mountain'. Culturally, this ensured a continuity of architectural and decorative traditions and left one of the richest artistic legacies of mankind. Economically,

the growing profusion of temples involving an enormous expenditure on both construction and maintenance, imposed a crushing burden which was eventually to prove disastrous"

In Java the great Buddhist monument Barabuḍur (q.v.) has been identified by Przyluski as a mountain temple (*JGIS*. III, p. 169). He says: "In short, Barabudur is a reduction of the cosmic mountain sorrounded by seventy three stūpas. At any rate it is widely different from the old Indian *stūpas*. It is an imperial construction designed ... to seal the mystic union of the empire and of the universe. The emperor, king of the mountain (Śailendra), identifies himself with the central *stūpa*. The Devarāja is at the same time Akṣobhya, Bhaṭṭāra Buddha and Śiva - Buddha ...."

The Burmese looked upon the Tower of Mandalay as the centre of the world, i.e. Meru, and the king of Pegu in the fourteenth century had thirty - two provinces, whose governers with the king, made up the number of gods in Indra's paradise (*JCBRAS*. New Series, Vol. I, p. 140).

S. Paranavitana (*JABRAS*. New Series, Vol. I. pp. 129—83) is of opinion that though this cult of the Devarāja was not as popular and widespread in Sri Lanka as in Cambodia and other south east Asian countries, yet a logical reasoning leads to the assumption that the royal palace built by King Kassapa I (473—91 A.C.) of Sri Lanka on the rock fortress of Sigiriya was an abode of the god-king, in this instance Kuvera being the god with whom King Kassapa I identified himself, and also himself resided there. S. Paranavitana argues that when it is seen that this concept was prevalent in Further India and Indonesia so as to leave a deep impression on the history and monuments of those lands it is difficult to believe that it was altogether unknown in Sri Lanka. The religious teachers who propagated these beliefs in those distant lands came from India and it is possible that they on their way to south coast Asian countries passed through Sri Lanka and found conviction in the mind of the ruler of the island and that he made an effort to put them into practice.

The practice of embellishing the Buddha with princely adornment in Indo - China (see *EB*. Vol. III, Pl. LXXV) is also said to be connected with the cult of the Devarāja. In Siam too the Buddha shared with the ruler the function of protecting the kingdom (cp. D. Seckel. *The Art of Buddhism*. Art of the World series, 1964, pp. 182f.)

Sir Charles Elliot (*Hinduism and Buddhism*. Vol. III. London, 1921, p. 116 f.) states that this concept of the Devarāja is not a very conspicuous feature in Hinduism and that, therefore, the Cambodians have probably come within the sphere of another influence.

This concept of the God-King is also related to the veneration and worship of the dead rulers which is a fundamental form of primitive religion in all parts of eastern Asia. In China, Sir Charles Elliot (op. cit.) observes that the idea that the great should be buried in monumental tombs is a widespread notion where also the belief prevails that a spirit can be made to reside in a tablet or an image.

W.A.C.H. Dobson (cp. *A Reader's Guide to the Great Religions*, Ed. Charles J. Adam. U.S.A. 1965) points out that animism, fertility cults and particularly ancestor worship were features of the earliest recorded Chinese religious practices of the Shang dynasty which survived between the sixteenth and the eleventh centuries B.C. In the subsequent three centuries, i. e., eleventh to the eighth century B.C. when the Chou dynastry superseded the Shang dynasty, the royal religion seems to have been influenced by these primitive religious beliefs, as is shown by some archival documents and inscriptions on bronze sacrificial vessels which point to the fact that the royal religion was concerned with the cult of the royal ancestors, i.e., the former kings.

H. R. PERERA

DEVATĀ, A term meaning deity and resulting from the combination of *deva*, a divinity and the qualitative abstract suffix *tā*, literally meaning "condition, nature or power of a *deva*." Although the word is a feminine substantive it has come to mean any divine being, synonymous with the standard term *deva*. Thus the *Saṃyutta* commentary (*SA*. I, pp. 13-4) explains the word *devatā* as a term applicable to *devas* (male) as well as female divinities (*devadhītā*) while the *Vimānavatthu* commentary (*VvA*. p. 21) includes in the category *brahmās* as well. The word thus appears to indicate a concept closely parallel to the western idea of the *numen*.

Although the two terms *deva* and *devatā* have been indiscriminately used to include all the categories of gods mentioned in Buddhist literature,there

is still a differentiation which is fairly clear. Most generally stated, this differentiation would be that while the term *deva* refers to the denizens of the heavenly worlds (e.g. Cātummahārājika, Tāvatiṃsa etc.) the term *devatā* refers to those deities dwelling outside these worlds, in trees, forests etc. (*rukkha-devatā*, *vana-* etc.).

In the *Cullaniddesa*, a commentarial Pali work, is found (section 308) a five-fold enumeration of *devatās*, which seems to have been based on the various views held by the religious sects that were prevalent in Buddhist India. The first group consists of ascetics of whom five varieties are given. In each of these varieties the leaders or rather the clerical members are presented as *devatās* to the lay disciples. Thus, the Ājīvaka leaders are the *devatās* for the Ājīvaka ascetics. In like manner for Nigaṇṭhas, Jaṭilas, Paribbājakas and Aviruddhakas. The second group consists of five kinds of domestic animals whose behaviour was imitated by certain ascetics as a religious practice. These animals are the elephant, horse, cow, dog and crow which are regarded as the *devatās* for those ascetics who follow this practice of imitating the behaviour of the animal of their choice. This may be traced back to a totemistic origin. The third group consists of the deities Vāsudeva, Baladeva, Puṇṇabhadda, Maṇibhadda and Aggi, who were the *devatās* for those who worshipped them. To the fourth group belong *nāgas*, *supaṇṇas*, *yakkhas*, *aruras*, *gandhabbas*, *mahoragas*, moon, sun, Inda and Brahma, who are the *devatās* for the sects that worship them. The fifth group is given as *deva-devatā* and *disā-devatā*, the first of which seems to represent the *devas* in general while the second represents the personification of directions.

An important category of *devatās* frequently referred to in literature are the tree-deities (*rukkha-devatā*: *Vin.* I, p. 28; *S.* I, p. 201; *A.* III, p. 370; *J.* I, p. 168 etc.). Living in trees, using them as their abodes (*vimāna*), they receive offerings from their devotees for which they help them in return (*J.* I, p. 423; III, p. 24 ; *V.* p. 511). Generally they help good people (J. III, p. 343). In a number of Jātaka stories the bodhisatta figures as a tree-deity (e.g. Nos. 19, 74, 109, 272, 283, 294, 298), They are generally depicted as righteous and at times they preach the Dhamma. (*J.* I, p. 322). They prevent people from making animal sacrifices to them (J. I, p. 169). According to an incident related in the *Dhammapada* commentary (*Dh. A.* II, pp. 16f.) a tree-deity takes much trouble to stop a human sacrifice that was going to be performed for him. Devotees regard them as wise and expect them to judge their cases (Ibid. p. 1, 98). Normally they are invisible to the naked eye, but if and when they want they can make themselves visible to their devotees (Ibid. p. 423).

Very often these *devatās* are depicted as living in communities. A Nikāya passage (*M.* I, p. 306) refers to the friends, colleagues and blood-relations (*mittā-maccā ñātisalohitā*) of a *devatā* residing in a *sāla* tree. According to the commentary (*MA.* II. p. 372), they consisted of *devatās* residing in flower-gardens (*pupphārāma*), orchards (*phalārāma*), forests (*vana*), medicinal plants (*osadhi*), grass (*tiṇa*) and giant-sized trees (*vanaspati*). Very often they are referred to as having children (*Vin.* IV, p. 34; *J.* I. pp. 328, 442 etc.).

The incident referred to at *Vin.* IV, p. 34, affords interesting reading: a certain *bhikkhu* in Āḷavī, while making preparations to put up some buildings, felled a tree wherein a *devatā* resided, despite the *devatā's* request not to do so. While cutting down the tree the arm of the *devatā*'s son, too, was cut. The *devatā* was so angered that he decided to kill the *bhikkhu*. On second thoughts he gave up that idea and reported the matter to the Buddha who praised him for his patience and directed him to a tree elsewhere. The commentary (*Vin.A.* IV, p. 759) gives the additional information that it is an accepted custom among the tree-dwelling deities (*rukkhadhamma*) that if a *devatā's* tree happens to be cut down, a risk that they very often had to face, he or she should not become angry over it.

According to the *Rukkhadhamma Jātaka* (Vol. I, pp. 327 f. : see also *J.* V, p. 511) it is safer for the tree-deities to live in forest trees, which are in clusters, than in isolated single trees which can easily be torn down in storms (e.g. *J.* I, p. 48).

There seems to be an accepted ritualistic way of soliciting the help of a tree-deity. The *Palāsa Jātaka* (*Vol.* III, pp. 23 f.) describes how this is normally done. First the devotee clears the areas surrounding the trees of weeds and grass, levels the ground, encircles it with a boundary, sweeps and spreads sand over the place, gives the five-finger palm mark (*pañcaṅgulikāndi datvā* : this mark is supposed to provide magical protection against evil..) with scented water on the tree, offers flower-garlands, perfumes and incense, lights a lamp and circumambulates the tree.

Barren women are supposed to obtain children by praying and offering oblations to tree-deities. The case of Sujātā is a well-known instance in Buddhist lore (*J.* I, pp. 68—9). A similar case is recorded in the *Hatthipāla Jātaka* (No. 509). According to the latter reference a king and his chaplain, both of whose wives bore no children, were accustomed to offer oblations (*balikamma*) to a *rukkha-devatā* to the value of a thousand pieces of money but without success, whereas a beggar woman's prayers for sons had been answered. Coming to know this the chaplain threatened to cut down the *devatā's* tree if the request was not granted within seven days. The *devatā* got alarmed and after much effort granted the request through Sakka's help.

Offering oblations was the usual way in which the favours of *devatās* could be obtained. Those *devatās* who were wont to receive oblations are referred to as *balipaṭiggāhakā devatā* in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (III, p. 77). The Commentary (*AA.* III. p. 262) describes them as the protective deities that have come down in the family traditions (*kulappaveniyā āgatā ārakkhadevatā*) and the offerings to them mainly consisted of the best of rice-gruel and of rice (*agga-yāgu-bhatta*). According to an incident recorded in the *Vinaya* commentary (*VinA.* V.p.960) when the carts of the two merchant brothers Tapussa and Bhallika came to a halt suddenly they made an offering to the *devatās* of the highways (*magga-devatā*), whereupon a *devatā* appeared to them in person and requested them to make an offering to the Buddha who was staying nearby just after his Enlightenment. It also seems to have been a custom that before felling a tree people make offerings and request the deity in advance to go elsewhere (*J.* IV, pp. 153-4). Through fear of offending the inhabiting *devatās* people hesitate to fell a tree that has received worship as the abode of a *devatā* (loc. cit).

Rukkha-devatās are capable of assuming any form. Sometimes they assume fearful shapes to scare their enemies (*J.* II, pp. 357, 439).

Those *devatās* who preside over and protect lands, houses, building sites, fields etc. are collectively called *vatthu-devatā* (*PvA.* p. 17). There is a reference to them in a recurring passage found in some of the early Buddhist texts (*D.* II, p. 87; *Vin.* I, p. 228; *Ud.* p. 88) according to which, when these *devatās*, who are of three categories as high (*mahesakkha*), middling (*majjhima*) and low (*nīca*), inhabit a particular locality (*vatthūni pariganhanti*) they get the rulers of the area to put up buildings there. Commenting on this passage the commentary (*DA.* II, p. 540) says that the *devatās* force the architects (*vatthuvijjāpāṭhaka*) to do so by possessing them (*sarīre adhimuccitvā*). The passage also explains the reason for their doing so. There are two types of these *devatās*, the believing (in the Dhamma : *saddhā-devatā*) and the unbelieving (*assaddhā-d.*); the believing ones like to get the buildings put up for the sake of several benefits that would thereby accrue to them. These are : the owners of these buildings, before coming into residence, would celebrate the event with an auspicious ceremony by inviting the *Saṅgha* as a result of which the *devatās* would have the opportunity of seeing the virtuous (*sīlavantānaṃ dassanaṃ*), of listening to Dhamma discussions and thanksgiving speeches and finally they would benefit by the transference of merit (*patti*) s.v. *PED*) done at the conclusion of the ceremony.

The incident in relation to which this information about the *devatās* is recorded is the erection of fortifications by Sunīdha and Vassakāra, the two Magadhan ministers, to keep the Vajjians away from Pāṭaligāma. The behaviour of the *vatthu-devatās* there was seen by the Buddha with his divine eye and he told Ānanda about it. Subsequently the two ministers entertained the Buddha and his disciples for lunch at the thanksgiving of which he made the following satatement, which is also important regarding the Buddhist attitude towards *devatās* : "Wherever a wise man takes up his abode there he offers gifts (*dakkhiṇā*) to the *devatās* of the place: respected and revered by him they in turn respect and revere him : they sympathise with him as a mother with her son : he who enjoys the sympathy of the *devatās* always prospers." Here is seen how the Buddha accomodates a widely held popular belief in his system. These references to *devatās* inhabiting trees, fields, houses, roads, gardens, etc. do not exhaust the list. For instance, among the sixty classes of *devatās* enumerated in the *Mahāsamaya Suttanta* (*D.* II, p. 259), there are the spirits presiding over the four primary elements (*mahābhūta*). Another reference worth quoting is the one referring to the *devatās* who were presiding over the cloister (*caṅkamana*), the hermitage (*paṇṇasālā*) and the cell (*pariveṇa*) etc. where Bodhisatta Siddhattha was practising austerities in their severest form (*MA.* II, p. 289). When the bodhisatta fainted and fell down on the ground, some of these *devatās* thought that he had passed away while some refused to believe so (*M.* I, p. 245). It is also said

here that some of these *devatās* volunteered to introduce divine essence of food (*oja*) through the pores of his skin when the *bodhisatta* decided to avoid food completely. He refused to maintain himself that way. A *devatā* presiding over the seas is also mentioned (*J.* II, p. 112). This divinity is usually the goddess (*devatā*) Maṇimekhalā, who was placed by the four *Lokapālas* (q.v.) to protect virtuous people who might suffer shipwreck (*J.* IV, p. 17; VI, p. 35).

There are literary contexts wherein the term *devatā* is used to include all categories of deities. For instance, in the *Mahāsamaya Suttanta* the deities that come to the Buddha's presence from the 10,000 world-systems are referred to as *devatās* (*D.* II, p. 253). Similar uses are found at *S.* I, p. 26 and *SA.* I. p. 124. The deities of the Pure Abodes (Suddhāvāsa) are also sometimes referred to as *devatās* (*D.* II pp. 253-4). The *Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta* (*D.* II, p. 139) describes how the *devatās* from the 10,000 world-systems were weeping at the Tathāgata's impending passing away. A passage in the *Dīgha* commentary (*DA.* II, p. 413) uses the term *devatā* to include all the deities from the lowest to the highest. In the form of meditation called the Contemplation on Deities (*devatānussati*) the term used always is *devatā* and not *deva*. There are many references in the Pali Nikāyas to *devatās* visitng the Buddha, specially in the early hours of the morning, and discussing the Dhamma with him. Such visitors are always referred to as *devatās* and not as *devas* : (e.g. *Devatā Saṃyutta* : *S.* I, p. 45). In these visits the *devatās* are said to assume a beautiful form (*abhikkantavaṇṇa*, i.e. "in festive garb") like human beings going to see a dramatic performance (*naṭasamajjādini gacchantā manussā viya*). These forms could be assumed only by the deities of the sensuous sphere (*kāmāvacara*) and those below them, while those above them cannot assume physical forms owing to their subtle nature (*SA.* I, p. 14).

A phenomenon that is referred to several times in literature is the ability of the *devatās*, (referring to all deities) to congregate in a small space without any difficulty (*A.* I, pp. 64-5; *SA.* I, p. 74).

Generally the *devatās* interfere in the affairs of men to help them in the correct path. But certain incidents recorded in literature show that *devatās* sometimes tend to be malevolent and lead men astray. Thus, a female *devatā* tries to tempt the *thera* Samiddhi away from his religious life (*S.* I, pp. 8-9); See also *Samiddhi Jātaka* (Vol. II, pp. 56f.) A *devatā*, described as one belonging to the Māra's host (*mārakāyikā devatā*), encourages the pseudo-monk Migalaṇḍika to commit murder (*Vin.*, I, p. 69).

Sometimes the term *devaputta* also stands for *devatā*, Candima (moon-god) and Suriya (sun-god) being two well-known *devaputtas* in Buddhist mythology.

A. G. S. K.

DEVATĀNUSSATI, recollection (*anussati*) of or contemplation on deities (*devatā*), is the sixth of the six or ten practices of recollection, which are to be developed (*D.* III, p. 28; *Vism.* p. 197); a type of meditation on deities and their special qualities, qualities on account of which they obtained their divine status, such as faith (*saddhā*), morality (*sīla*), learning (*suta*), generosity (*cāga*) and understanding (*paññā*: *D.* III, pp. 250, 280; *A.* I, pp. 42, 210-11), *PS.* I, pp. 48, 95-96; *Vism.* pp. 225f; *Lal.* p. 23).

As to the practice of this meditation, the following procedure is given in the texts: "an aryan disciple, O Mahānāma, develops his contemplation on deities in this manner: 'there are deities of the Realm of the Four Kings (*devā cātummahārājikā*), there are deities higher than that. And those deities were possessed of faith such that on dying here they were reborn there, and such faith is present in me too. And those deities were possessed of virtue .... of learning .... of generosity .... of understanding such that when they died here they were reborn there and such understanding is present in me too. On the occasion, Mahānāma, on which a noble disciple recollects the faith, the virtue, the learning, the generosity, and the understanding that are both his own and those of deities on that occasion his mind is not diseased by greed, or obsesssed by hate, or obsessed by delusion, his mind has rectitude on that occasion, being inspired by deities." (*A.* III. pp. 287 f.)

Thus, an impure mind can be purified by means of this recollection. When a noble disciple contemplates on the five qualities beginning with faith on account of which the deities attained their divine state and discovers those same qualities to be existing within himself, then his mind is calmed, delight arises in him and the defilement of his mind is abandoned (*A.* I, p. 210). His mind is not obsessed by lust (*rāga*), ill-will (*dosa*) and delusion (*moha*); he is upright in heart and becomes free from greed (*gedha*), i.e., the fivefold sensuous pleasure (*A.* III,

p. 313). With upright heart, he acquires enthusiasm for the letter and spirit of the Buddha's teaching (*atthavedaṃ dhammavedaṃ*), i.e., for the Truth, and the joy that goes with it (*dhammūpasaṃhitaṃ pāmujjaṃ*). In him who is thus joyous is born zest (*pīti*); of one of zestful mind the body is calmed (*kāya-passaddhi*); he whose body is calmed experiences happiness (*sukha*); the mind of the happy one is concentrated (*A.* III, p. 288; V. pp. 331-332). It is said that he is capable of purging his mind of its defilements (*ye cittassa upakkilesā te pahīyanti*, *A.* I, p. 210). It culminates in wisdom (*paññā*), after putting an end to the mental intoxicants (*āsava*, *Ps.* I, pp. 95-96). In this manner those who practise *devatānussati* reach Nibbāna (*A.* I, p. 30; III, pp. 314, 452).

UPALI KARUNARATNA

DEVĀTIDEVA, an epithet of the Buddha, meaning 'god of gods' or 'god above gods', from the combination of *deva* and *atideva*, used in late Buddhist literature (e.g. *Vvu.* p. 62; *J.* IV, p. 158; *Miln.* pp. 241, 258; *Mhvu.* I, p. 106 etc.). As the Buddha is the person who has gone even beyond divinity (*atideva-patta*) by attaining the highest position over anyone in the universe, including all super-human beings, he is given this epithet. Accordingly, the *Saṃyutta* Commentary (*SA.* I. p. 207) explains the term thus: "the meaning of attaining to the position of a god above the gods is the attainment of the position superior to gods and to *brahmās*" (*atidevapatto'ti devānaṃ atidevabhāvaṃ brahmāṇaṃ atibrahmabhāvaṃ patto*). The Buddha attains to this position through purity which means spiritual perfection (*visuddhivasena*, *VvuA.* p. 18).

A fact to be noted here is that this epithet appears only in late literary works thereby showing that it came into vogue with the gradual deification of the Buddha. Yet, the idea that the Buddha is above the gods and such other super-human beings, which lies at the basis of this concept, is of frequent occurrence in the Nikāyas. For instance, the Buddha describes himself to Upaka, the Ājīvaka, as having no peer in the world of men and gods (*sadevakasmiṃ lokasmiṃ natthi me paṭipuggalo: Vin.* I, p. 8). In the frequently occurring formula "*iti'pi so bhagavā* ...." (*S.* V. p. 197) he is described as the teacher of both gods and men (*satthā devamanussānaṃ D.* I, p. 62). He is also described as having understood this world along with gods, Brahmās, Māras etc. (*D.* I. p. 62). And further, whatever in the world with its *devas*, Māras, and Brahmās is seen, heard, felt and discerned, all that is understood by him (*D.* III, p. 135). He denies that he is a *deva* and calls himself a Buddha (*A.* II, p. 38) thereby implying that a Buddha is superior to gods, and is in a distinct class by himself. See Further BUDDHOLOGY.

A. G. S. K.

DEVOTION, generally means the fact or quality of being devoted to religious observances or a solemn dedication to an object or a person. In a general sense, devotion has frequently being regarded as co-extensive with the entire field of facts relevant to religion. Devotion is the inner, intimate, essential side of worship. It is the self-dedication to a deity or to any one invested in thought for a time with some of the qualities of a deity. Devotion then involves the deliberate movement of the will towards the object of worship. However, the meaning of this term cannot be adequately expressed in one English word. The terms such as belief (*saddhā*), affection (*pema*), serene confidence (*pasāda*) and faith (*bhatti*) convey different aspects of the meanings embodied in the term devotion. At an initial stage when the Buddhist disciple is drawn towards the Master, it seems to be the emotion of *pema* which stimulates him. This affectionate devotion (*pema*), together with reverential respect (*gārava*) gets the disciple ready for a good deal of profitable religious activity including renunciation of household life and joining the Order as a monk (*so khvāhaṃ bhante bhagavati pemañca gāravañca hiriñ ca ottappañca sampassamāno agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajito: S.*V. p. 89). This quality of *pema* when coupled with *saddhā* or faith born of early stages of conviction, safeguards the disciple from falling into states of degeneration (*apāya* or *duggati*) after death (*Tathāgate cassa saddhāmattaṃ hoti pemamattaṃ. Ayaṃ pi kho Mahānāma āgantā apāyaduggativinipātaṃ: S.*V. p. 379). It also assures the disciple of birth in a happier plane of existence (*yesaṃ niyī saddhāmattaṃ pemamattaṃ sabbe te saggaparāyaṇāti: M.* I. p. 142). Thus *pema*, with its high note of emotional quality, while being useful as a preliminary virtue seems to be somewhat limited in its effectiveness towards the attainment of the Nibbānic goal of early Buddhism which requires adequate maturing of wisdom. Strangely enough, a solitary instance in the *Theragāthā* tells us that the disciple who generates this quality of *pema* in his religious life tends to be one who is possessed of *bhatti* (Skt. *bhakti*) a term which later came to imply in Buddhism an advanced stage of religious devotion, almost in

a new direction (.. *tamhi janayetha pemaṃ so bhattimā nāma ca hoti: Thag. v.* 370). In this developed sense, *bhatti* takes its place in Buddhism at a relatively later date. Hence, we find the Commentary explaining *bhatti* in this early context as faithful adherence to the creed (*yathānusiṭṭhaṃ patipattiyā tattha bhattimā nāma, ThagA.* II. p. 158), as distinct from personal attachment to a divinity or surrender to his will.

The concept of devotion in Buddhism differs from that of the theistic religions. While in the earlier Theravāda tradition devotion is accompanied by knowledge (*ñāṇasampayutta*) the Mahāyāna gives pride of place to devotion through emotion. Veneration of the Buddha Amitābha and the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra* in the schools of the Mahāyāna is characteristic of the latter.

The fact that the Buddha has discouraged excessive veneration paid to him personally proves, that he had believed that it would hinder one's path of deliverance. Just before his passing away, the Buddha is said to have declared that whosoever lives in accordance with the Dhamma is the one who honours and venerates the Buddha (*D.* III, p. 138). The story of Vakkali (*S.* III, pp. 119 ff.) is another instance where the Buddha has discouraged personal attachment and has encouraged his disciples to lead their lives in accordance with the *Dhamma.*

Instead of prayers and hymns uttered in the name of God in the theistic religions as a mark of devotion, in Buddhism, meditation or contemplation on the virtues of the Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha is closely bound up with the expression of devotion to them. A good Buddhist contemplating on these three, necessarily comes to a definite conviction of the qualities of the Triad without attaching blind faith to any one of them. That is why the Buddha has recommended repeatedly the meditative recollection on the qualities or attributes of the Buddha (*Buddhānussati*), the Dhamma (*Dhammānussati*) and the Saṅgha (*Saṅghānussati*) in the following manner. 'Thus indeed is the Buddha, He is the worthy one, the fully enlightened, endowed with vision and conduct, well gone, the knower of the worlds, the incomparable one, the tamer of men, the teacher of gods and men, the enlightened and the Blessed One. Well expounded is the Dhamma by the Buddha, advantageous in this life with immediate result, inviting everyone to see for himself, leading to Nibbāna, to be comprehended by the wise, each one for himself. Of perfect conduct, of upright conduct, of dutiful conduct and of righteous conduct are the disciples of the Buddha, that is to say the four pairs of men, the eight persons. This Order of the Buddha's disciples is worthy of offerings, of hospitality, of gifts, of salutation with clasped hands, as an incomparable field of merit to the world.'

Considering the attributes of the Buddha, one would at once understand that he is not a God and therefore, he should not be followed with blind faith. His teachings i.e. the Dhamma constitutes the Four Noble Truths (*cattāri ariyasaccāni*) and the Noble Eight-fold Path (*ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo*) which lead to Nibbāna. His disciples i.e. the Saṅgha are those who have attained or are striving to attain Nibbāna. They are the living examples of those who are striving. The meditation on the Triad thus purifies the defiled mind (*A.* I, pp. 208 ff.). One who practises such devotional meditation would do no evil and would try to follow the Buddha's way. Such a person would be devoid of lust (*rāga*), ill-will (*dosa*) and infatuation (*moha*). As a result of this, there would arise in him a joy (*pīti*) which produces calm (*passaddhi*). Calm leads to ease (*sukha*) and ease to concentration (*samādhi*). Thus the devotional meditation on the Triad would lead to the attainmnet of mental concentration which is the basis of liberating insight. This is well stated in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (III, pp. 285 ff; see also *M.* I, pp. 37 f.). When a noble disciple contemplates on the Buddha (same for Dhamma and Saṅgha) at that time his mind is not enwrapped by lust, ill-will and infatuation and at that time his mind is rightly directed towards the Buddha, and with a rightly directed mind the noble disciple gains enthusiasm for the goal and for the Dhamma, gains the delight derived from the Dhamma. In him who is delighted thus, joy arises; the body and mind of him who is joyous become calm. He who is calmed in body and mind feels at ease and then the mind obtains concentration.

The Pali Nikāyas also deal with the psychological and the epistemological aspects of devotion. Although self-reliance is the ideal inculcated in Buddhism the average man constantly needs dependence on others. Belief is necessary where knowledge is not available. Hence the vast majority of the Buddhists recognized the need for belief on the basis of their faith in the knowledge and wisdom of the Buddha. Herein we have the justification for the doctrine of devotion. This fact is further reinforced by the assessment of the Buddha by Sāriputta who is acknowledged to be among the wisest and the

greatest disciples of the Buddha. 'Sir, I am pleased in you. I think there never has been nor will there be, nor is there now any other, whether wanderer or brahmana who is greater and wiser than the Buddha, that is to say as regards the higher wisdom.' The stereotype formula which accompanies the birth of confidence in, and devotion to the Buddha may be illustrated by the words attributed to Brahmana Brahmāyu on the occasion of his conversion: 'It is excellent, good Gotama. Just as good Gotama, one might set upright what had been upset, or disclose what was covered, or show the way to one who had gone astray, or bring an oil-lamp into the darkness thinking that those with vision might see material shapes, even so is Dhamma made clear in many a figure by the good Gotama. So I am going to the revered Gotama for refuge and to Dhamma and the Order of monks' (*The Middle Length Sayings*, II, p. 331).

For further details see BHAKTI, FAITH and SADDHĀ.

I. K.

DHAMEK STŪPA, one of the outstanding Buddhist monuments at Sārnāth, near Bārāṇasi. Its remains, as they were discovered in 1834, measured 110 feet in height, 93 feet in diameter and 292 feet in circumference. The lower part of it, to a height of 43 feet, is built of stone, each fastened to the other by iron cramps. The upper part, which had been built of bricks, is not in a good state of preservation. The top of the *stūpa* appears to have been completed with a stone umbrella supported by the brick cap that was discovered among the ruins. The lower part of the *stūpa* has eight projecting faces, each 21 feet in width with intervals of 15 feet between them. These projecting faces seem to have had a seated statue of the Buddha in each of them (*ASIAR*. I, pp. 105 ff.).

The projections are ornamented with flowing foliage, generally of lotus leaves and buds, and below them, encircling the monument, is a band of sculptured oranment of the most exquisite beauty (J. Fergusson, *History of Indian Architecture*, I, p. 67). Benjamin Rowland (*The Art and Architecture of India*, p. 127) and Percy Brown (*Indian Architecture*, third revised and enlarged edition, p. 56) remark that this is the most notable feature of this ruined and shapeless monument and is the exact sculptural equivalent of the magnificently painted ceilings of the Ajaṇṭā cave temples.

In the process of the excavations of this monument was found an inscribed stone slab with the stanza "*ye dharmā hetuprabhavā* ...." in the upper region of the *stūpa*. Its script is of the sixth century A.C. (*JASB*. IV; *Pl*. IX; *ASIAR*. I, p. 105).

The purpose and the date of construction of this monument are not, however, definite. Benjamin Rowland (op. cit. p. 126) presumes that it was a memorial erected to commemorate the Buddha's ordaining of his successor, Maitreya, and J. Fergusson (op. cit. p. 68) states that it was probably constructed by the sons of Mohi Pala (Mahīpāla?) and was destroyed by the Muslims in 1017, before its completion, but neither of them substantiates the conclusions.

J. Ph. Vogel (*Buddhist Sculptures from Benares*, pp. 221 ff.) perhaps gives the most acceptable suggestion. The basis of his conclusion is the information found in an inscription (*I.A*. XIV, pp. 139 f.) unearthed from a mound in the vicinity of the Dhamek Stūpa. This inscription states that a *stūpa* called the Dharmarājika and (a shrine called) the Dharmacakra were restored by Sthirapāla and Vasantapāla, on the orders of Mahīpāla, king of Gauḍa. Vogel identifies the Dhamek Stūpa with Dharmarājika of the inscription and suggests that Dharmarājika was the ancient name of the Dhamek Stūpa.[1] Further, the fact that the slab on which this inscription is found has also a sculpture of two deer on either side with a wheel in the centre, suggests that the *stūpa* and the shrine were connected with the Buddha's first turning of the Wheel of the Law.

The following account from Hsuan-tsang (S. Beal, *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, III, p. 292), when compared with the information given in the above inscription, shows that it most probably refers to Dhamek Stūpa. "To the west of the *vihāra* (in which is a life-size image of the Buddha represented as turning the Wheel of the Law), is a stone *stūpa* built by Asoka-rāja. Although the foundations have given way, there are still 100 feet or more of the wall remaining. In front of the building is a stone pillar about 70 feet high. The stone is altogether as bright as jade. It is glistening, and sparkles like

1 The immediate forms in the process of evolution of the term would be Dhammaraika, Dhamreka, Dhammeka and Dhammek (Vogel, op. cit. p. 223, *n*. 3).

light; and all those who pray fervently before it see from time to time, according to their petitions, figures with good or bad signs. It was here that Tathāgata, having arrived at enlightenment, began to turn the Wheel of the Law."

The information in the inscription and the account by Hsuan-tsang has made it possible to determine a few noteworthy facts about the Dhamek Stūpa, namely, that it was originally known as the Dharmarājika Stūpa and was first built by king Asoka to mark the spot at which the Buddha turned the Wheel of the Law, and that it was restored by Sthirapāla and Vasantapāla who were probably the sons of Mahipāla. The account of Hsuan-tsang also shows that the *stūpa* was in a ruined state when he visited it and that there were several other *stūpas* around it. The *vihāra* with the life-size image of the Buddha, mentioned in Hsuan-tsang's account, could be identified with the Dharmacakra shrine of the inscription.

H. R. PERERA.

DHAMMA (1). The famous Indian epic, *Mahābhārata*, in its introductory chapter, makes the following remark about the four aspects of human life that the Indians accepted as being ultimate:

> "What we find in this book (i.e., the *Mahābhārata*) relating to *dharma*, to practical life (*artha*), to sensual pleasure (*kāma*) and to salvation (*mokṣa*) can be found elsewhere, but what is not written therein can be found nowhere else in this world."[1]

This incredible statement, which is no more than an expression of a sectarian (i.e., *brahman*) pride that came to be imposed on a nation, has been blindly accepted as a criterion for evaluating all schools of thought, not merely those that emerged in the Indian sub-continent, but also those that appeared anywhere on earth. It is not surprising to see some of the Indian scholars, whose way of life came to be dominated for centuries by the Brahmanical philosophy, accepting the truth of this statement. However, it is indeed surprising to find the so-called critical scholarship of the West falling a victim to this claim, so much so that even a leading German Indologist like M. Winternitz is forced to admit :

> "*Dhama*, 'law and custom', or 'morality', *artha* 'utility', 'advantages', 'practical life,' and *kāma*, 'sensual gratification', are the three aims of life, to a certain extent the be-all and end-all of human existence, according to Indian ethics. The final aim of all striving is *mokṣa*, 'deliverance', to which the various sects and philosophical systems indicate different paths."[2]

With the rare exception of two scholars, R. Spence Hardy and T. W. Rhys Davids, who were alert to the misinterpretations of the conception of *dhamma* in Buddhism, especially its interpretation as "law", almost every leading Western interpreter of Buddhism has accepted this unphilosophical and prejudiced claim of the *Mahābhārata*. More than a hundred years ago, Spence Hardy, commenting on the term *dhamma* in Buddhism, made the remark:

> "It is not unfrequently translated 'the law', but this interpretation gives an idea contrary to the entire genius of Buddhism."[3]

In spite of Hardy's remark Western scholars have continued to understand the conception of *dhamma* in Buddhism as being not very different from that found in the mainstreams of the Indian philosophical

1. *The Mahābhārata*, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona: 1933, I. 1. pp. 261 f.
2. M. Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature*, translated from the original German by Mrs. S. Ketkar, New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, Second Edition, reprinted 1977, I. p. 326, n.1
3. R. Spence Hardy, *Eastern Monarchism: An Account of the Origin, Laws, Discipline, Sacred Writings, Mysterious Rites, Religious Ceremonies and Present Circumstances of the Order of Mendicants founded by Gotama Buddha*, London: Partridge and Oakey, 1850, p. 167.

tradition.[4] A fresh look at the conception of *dhamma*, in all its variety and richness, therefore, seems appropriate at this time.

The essentialist tradition in philosophy has its roots in primitive religion. This is true of the Indian as well as Western philosophical traditions.[5] In the essentialist traditions, the change from religion to philosophy pertain merely to *language* and not to *content*. From remote antiquity, primitive man has handed down the idea that heavenly bodies are gods, and in primitive religion this idea is expressed in story form couched in a discursive language and embroidered in myth and legend. However, when primitive religion gave way to critical philosophy, this discursive language itself was abandoned, and man began to think in terms of laws that govern the starry heavens above and the moral life below. The conception of law replaced the conception of divine beings who were now looked upon as mere embodiments of that law. The transition from the polytheism of the early *Ṛgveda* to the monotheism and monism of the later hymns is therefore marked only by a change in the language rather than content. *Ṛta* became the inexhorable law that governs the universe, including gods. Originally this *ṛta* was understood probably as a physical law, but soon moral, religious as well as social dimensions came to be assumed. Varuṇa became the custodian of the moral law; the sacrificial ritual assumed the form of a religious law and the four castes or *varṇas* made up the social law. In the *Upaniṣads*, *ṛta* came to be replaced by the conception of a permanent and eternal *ātman*, and in the *Bhagavadgītā*, *ātman* gave way to the conception of *dharma*.

In the *Upaniṣads*, *ātman* came to be looked upon as the "essence" in the universe and functioned as the creative force. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* contains a passage where all the salient features of the later Hindu conception of *dharma* are embodied:

> "Verily, in the beginning this world was *brahma*, one only. Being one, he was not developed. He created a still further form, the *kṣatra*, even those who are *kṣatras* (i.e., rulers) among the gods: Indra, Varuṇa, Soma, Rudra, Parjanya, Yama, Mṛtyu, Īśāṇa. Therefore, there is nothing higher than *kṣatra*. Therefore, at the *rājasūya* ceremony, the *brahman* sits below the *kṣatriya*. Upon *kṣatra* alone does he confer this honour. This same thing, namely, the *brahma* is the source of the *kṣatra*. Therefore ,even if the king attains supremacy, he rests finally upon *brahma* as his own source. So, whosoever injures him (i.e., *brahma*) attacks his own source. He fares worse in proportion as he injures one who is better.
>
> He was not yet developed. He created the *viś*, those kinds of gods that are mentioned in numbers: the Vasus, the Rudras, the Ādityas, the Viśvadevās, the Maruts.
>
> He was not yet developed. He created the *śūdra* caste (*varṇa*), Pūṣan. Verily, this (earth) is Pūṣan, for she nourishes everything that is. He was not yet developed. He created a still further form, *dharma*. This is the power of the *kṣatriya* class, namely, Law. Therefore, there is nothing higher than Law. So a weak man controls a strong man by law, just as if by a king. Verily, that which is Law is Truth (*satya*). Therefore, they say of a man who speaks the truth: 'He speaks the Law', or of a man who speaks the law: 'He speaks the Truth'. Verily, both are the same."[6]

4. Almost every modern treatise on Buddhism carries a chapter or some reference to the conception of *dhamma/dharma* in Buddhism. However, major and significant studies of this conception are few and rare. Among these, the following are worthy of note: C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism. A Study of the Buddhist Norm*, London: Home University Library, n.d. (representing a study of the conception of *dhamma* in early Buddhism based on the Pali sources): Magdalene and Wilhelm Geiger, *Pali Dhamma: vornehmlich in der kanonischen Literatur*, Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften; Philosophisch-philologische und historische Klasse, Munchen: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1920, Band 1 (which is a classification and analysis of almost all the important uses of the term *dhamma* in the canonical and non-canonical literature of the Theravādins): Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word Dharma*, London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1923 (which is based on the Sarvāstivāda conception as explained by Vasubandhu in his *Abhidharmakośa*).
5. For an analysis of the Western philosophical tradition, see John Dewey, *Quest for Certainty*, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, (Capricorn Books), 1960, pp. 14-16.
6. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* I. 4. 11-14.

In the same *Upaniṣad* is found the identification of *ātman* with *dharma*.[7] The simple equation seems to follow thus: *Ātman* or *brahman* is the reality or source of the universe. The three castes, *kṣatriya*, *vaiśya* and *śūdra*, have all arisen from that source. *Ātman* or *brahman* is not only the source of *dharma* or Law, but it is identical with it. *Dharma* is also the Truth (*satya*). Hence we have: *ātma/brahma-dharma-satya*.

This is the definition of *dharma* in the *Upaniṣads*, and the philosophical justification of this conception of *dharma* is met with in the *Bhagavadgītā*, which is probably subsequent to the arising of Buddhism. Identifying this conception of *dharma* with that formulated in Buddhism can be done only by an uncritical acceptance of that incredible statement made in the *Mahābhārata* referred to above.

In order to justify the reality of a monistic principle, described variously as *ātma* or *brahma* or *dharma* or *satya*, the Upaniṣadic thinkers had to discover a source of knowledge that reveals no duality. This is attempted at *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*.[8] Such theorizing gave rise to a recognition of the possibility of "non-dual knowledge" (*advaya-jñāna*), emphasized so much in the *Bhagavadgītā*[9] as well as in most other systems of Indian thought. It seems that the uniqueness of the early Buddhist thought lies in the fact that it did not make a deliberate search for an epistemological foundation to establish an idea that was already accepted as being true. The best illustration of this is found in a statement recorded in the *Udāna*[10] which runs as follows :

> "When *dhammā* (in the plural) appear to the *brāhman*, striving and reflecting, his doubts disappear as he understands their causal nature (*sahetudhammaṃ*)."

According to this statement, the *dhammas* appear (*pātubhavanti*) before the *brāhman* who is meditating and reflecting on the nature of existence. These *dhammas* may be anything that is given to the experience of the person — it may be of material form (*rūpa*), of sound (*sadda*), of smell (*gandha*), of taste (*rasa*), of touch (*phoṭṭhabba*), or of concepts (*dhammā*) formed on the basis of one or more of the former. It may be the experience of heat or cold, of love or hate, of a pleasant sensation, upleasant sensation or a neutral one. It may even be a concept formed by the mind, with or without any basis in sensory experience, such as a concept of a permanent self or substance (*atta*). As these appear before him he is confused. They produce doubts in him — doubts as to their reality, as to their nature, as to how they have come to be, as to their source etc. But these doubts soon disappear the moment he understands their causal nature, their arising depending upon conditions and their cessation on the cessation of conditions.

Here there is no implication that the meditation or reflection is an attempt to wipe out the sensory experiences, as is normally done in the process leading to the "cessation of perception and what is felt" (*saññāvedayitanirodha*),[11] which is only complete pacification of mind. Rather, it is an attempt to sharpen one's perception by the elimination of distracting tendencies (*nīvaraṇa*) and developing insight (*paññā*). Buddha's final statement in the "Discourse on the Noble Quest" (*Ariyapariyesana Sutta*), wherein he explains the various practices that finally led to his enlightenment, is significant in this connection. After describing the various stages of the meditative path leading to the higher ecstacies culminating in the attainment of the "cessation of perception and what is felt" Buddha emphatically states :

> "However, one's defilements come to cease as a result of perceiving through wisdom" (*paññāya c' assa disvā āsavā parikkh'yanti*).[12]

Knowledge or cognition, according to the Buddha, does not consist in the elimination of sensory experience, but only the defiling tendencies of mind (*upakkilesa*) arising on occasions of sensory experience. These defilements of mind are explained as "interest and desire" (*chanda-rāga*). A mind that has renounced interest and desire is considered to be pliable (*kammanīya*) and, therefore, not rigid. Such a mind is able to perceive properly whatever

7. Ibid., 2. 4. 11.
8. 2. 4. 14; 4. 3. 30 ff.
9. See the description of *jñāna*, as opposed to *vijñāna*, in the *Bhagavadgītā*, 5.16-17; 6.18-32; 7.17-18 etc.,
10. *Ud.* 1.
11. *M.* 1. pp. 174-175.
12. Ibid., 1. p. 175.

that can be known (*nekkhammaparibhāvitaṃ cittaṃ kammaniyaṃ khāyati abhiññā-sacchikaraṇiyesu dhammesu*).[13]

According to the Buddha, *āsavakkhaya* or the cessation of defilements is freedom and the insight that leads to *āsavakkhaya* is *paññā*. *Paññā* therefore becomes synonymous with *āsavakkhayañāṇa*.[14] The *Ariyapariyesana Sutta* is unequivocal with regard to what Buddha discovered as a result of his attainment of *paññā or āsavakkhayañāṇa*. The description runs thus :

> "It occurred to me, O monks, 'this *dhamma* realized by me is deep, difficult to see, difficult to understand, tranquil, beyond *a priori* reasoning, subtle, intelligible to the wise. However, these beings are delighting in sensual pleasure, delighted by sensual pleasure, rejoicing in sensual pleasure. So that for beings delighting in sensual pleasure, delighted by sensual pleasure, rejoicing in sensual pleasure, this were a matter difficult to see, that is to say, dependent arising by way of conditions (*paticcasamuppāda*). This too were a matter difficult to see, that is to say, the pacification of all dispositions, the renunciation of all attachment, the destruction of craving, cessation (of passion), freedom (*nibbāna*)."[15]

This is the clearest definition of *dhamma* that is claimed to have been discovered by the Buddha. *Dhamma* is here identified with two things : (1) "dependent arising" (*paticcasamuppāda*), and (2) freedom (*nibbāna*). All other uses of the term *dhamma* can be subsumed under one or the other of these two meanings.

Dhamma as "dependent arising": (*paticcasamuppāda*).

It was already mentioned that the highest knowledge or *paññā* does not transcend sense experience. This is extremely crucial to an understanding of the conception of *dhamma* in early Buddhism. *Paññā* arises or occurs when defiling tendencies are eliminated.[16] There is no necessary and invariable connection between sense perception and the arising of these defiling tendencies. According to early Buddhism, they can be eliminated without eliminating sensory experience. The defiling tendencies are looked upon as factors that weaken a person's wisdom or insight (*paññāya dubbalikaraṇa*).[17] However, when these tendencies are eliminated one does

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13. *S.* III.p.232, The *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (II.pp.182-183) refers to four kinds of *dhammā* to be experienced (*sacchikaraṇiyā dhammā*) depending upon four sources of knowledge. The first consists of those that are to be experienced through the body (*kāya*) and these are the eight kinds of freedom (*aṭṭhavimokkha*), the last of which is the cessation of perception and what is felt (*saññāvedayitanirodha*). The second pertains to those that are experienced through memory or reflection (*sati*) and these consist of one's own past existences (*pubbenivāsa*). The third represents those that are experienced with the eye (*cakkhu*, and in this case, *dibbacakkhu*) and consist of death and survival of human beings (*sattānaṃ cutūpapāta*). The last represents those that are experienced through wisdom (*paññā*) and consist of cessation of defilements (*āsavakkhaya*).
14. *Paññā* or *āsavakkhayañāṇa* is generally understood by the essentialist interpreters of early Buddhism as constituting a special insight that transcends sensory experience, though it has never been explained as such anywhere in the early discourses. It is true that this knowledge is generally listed as the last of the higher knowledges, whether they are reckoned as six (*chaḷabhiññā*) or five (*pañcābhiññā*) or three (*tevijjā*). The fact that it is listed as the last of the so-called "higher knowledges" does not necessarily mean that it transcends *sense experience*, though it may transcend the higher knowledges listed prior to it. In fact, all the descriptions in the Pali Nikāyas relating to these higher knowledges single out 'clairaudience' (*dibbasota*) and 'clairvoyance' (*dibbacakkhu*) as transcending ordinary human experience (*atikkantamānusika*). This characteristic, however, is *not* attributed to *āsavakkhayañāṇa* or *paññā*. Yet *paññā* is different from every other higher knowledge (*abhiññā*) primarily because it is free from defiling tendencies (*upakkilesa* or *āsava*), as explained earlier, and not because it transcends sense experience.
15. *M.* 1.167, *Adhigato kho me ayaṃ dhammo gambhiro duddaso duranubodho santo paṇīto atakkāvacaro nipuṇo paṇḍitavedanīyo. Ālayarāmā kho panāyaṃ pajā ālayaratā ālayasamuditā. Ālayarāmāya kho panāyaṃ pajāya ālayaratāya ālayasamuditāya duddasaṃ idaṃ ṭhānaṃ yadidaṃ idappaccayatā paṭiccasamuppādo, idaṃ pi kho ṭhānaṃ duddasaṃ yadidaṃ sabbasaṅkhārasamatho sabbūpadhipaṭinissaggo taṇhakkhayo virāgo nirodho nibbānaṃ.*
16. Ibid, 1.pp.71, 77, 294, 482, 490, 496.
17. Ibid.; 1.pp.36 ff.

not develop "knowledge of everything" or "omniscience" (*sabbaññutā*), which Buddha pointedly disclaimed.[18] *Paññā* is not another faculty of perception distinct from sense experience or the higher forms of knowledge such as clairvoyance, telepathy or retrocognition, but only the absence of defiling tendencies.

All these forms of knowledge are confined to the specious present, that is, immediate past and the present and do not pertain to the obvious past or the future. Even the experience in the specious present, whether it be through the senses or the higher knowledges mentioned above, is not easily handled by the person who has it, because it represents a "big blooming buzzing confusion", to use a phrase from William James.[19] Howevr, if excessive desire and aversion are eliminated and there is no unnecessary attempt to manipulate what is given in experience, Buddha believed that some measure of objectivity relating to what is experienced can be known. Hence, in the process of meditation called "setting up of mindfulness" (*satipaṭṭhāna*), Buddha advised his disciples to observe what is experienced and understand them as they are presented.[20] All the hidden mysteries about phenomena may not be revealed to us in such experience. Yet it is possible to single out events and try to understand them, instead of trying to understand "everything" (*sabbaṃ*). This explains the Buddha's emphasis on understanding events or situations,[21] rather than attempting to have omniscience. For the Buddha, knowledge of *dhamma* (*dhammanvaya*) can be had only by examining such a contextual situation.[22]

In such a situation, although knowledge is still limited and confined, there is no deliberate attempt to manipulate what is perceived because of the absence of defiling tendencies. The term *dhammā* (in the plural) is used to refer to things that appear to the mind in this manner. In this very broad sense, *dhammā* can be taken to mean 'ideas', which have mind as the pre-condition (*manopubbaṅgamā*),[23] for the empiricism of Buddhism does not allow for the recognition of anything that is not presented to a perceiving mind.[24] *Dhamma* as 'idea' need not necessarily be understood in the sense of mental constructs or fabrications of the mind; they are ideas of perception rather than ideas of imagination and hence convey the sense of *phenomena*. In fact, these ideas of perception are explained under the category of twelve gateways (*āyatana*) of experience, and the Buddha, in a short but extremely important discourse called the "Discourse on Everyting" (*Sabba Sutta*) refused to admit anything that does not come under the twelve gateways as part of experience.[25]

Explaining the *Udāna* verse quoted earlier it was said that *dhammā* could mean anything that is presented to the experiencing mind, including the concepts formed on the basis of sensory experience (i.e., ideas of perception) or even those concepts that are formed without any basis in experience, such as a permanent self (*ātman*). However, one's doubts are said to disappear only as a result of perceiving or understanding things as they are being conditioned by causes. This is a very significant assertion. When one perceives things as being dependently arisen, one cannot entertain the belief in a permanent and eternal self (*ātman*) even though one has formed a conception of it. Thus a permanent and eternal self (like *ātman*), which is conceived without any basis in experience, even though it appears as a *dhamma* at first sight, comes to be rejected as a *dhamma*, for the reality of that *dhamma* is not confirmed by the perception of dependence.

What remains are all the factors of experience, whether they be of matter or mind, of pleasant or unpleasant things, beautiful or ugly things, or even of good and bad things. All these factors of experience are understood to be causally conditioned. This means that there are two aspects of the ideas of perception and these two aspects are enumerated in another significant discourse in the *Saṃyutta*

18. Ibid., 1. p. 482.
19. See *Some Problems of Philosophy. A Beginning of an Introduction to Philosophy*, New York: Greenwood Press, 1968, p. 50.
20. *D* II. pp. 290 ff.; *M* 1. pp. 55 ff.
21. *M* 1. p. 69, *ṭhānañ ca ṭhānato .....pajānāti.* Ibid., II. p. 212, *ṭhānaso me taṃ viditaṃ ....*
22. Ibid., 1. p. 69.
23. *Dhp* .1.
24. See *M* 1. p. 295.
25. *S.* IV. p. 15; see Kalupahana, D. J., "A Buddhist Tract on Empiricism," *Philosophy East and West*, Honolulu: 19 (1969): pp. 65-67.

Nikāya called "Discourse on Causal Relations" *Paccaya Sutta*).[26] They are :

(i) dependently arisen or causally conditioned *dhammā* (*paṭiccasamuppanna-dhammā*), and

(ii) dependent arising or causal conditioning (*paṭiccasamuppāda*).

For Buddha, these two constitute aspects of human knowledge and experience.[27] The former represents the things that are causally conditioned and the latter pertain to the relations that subsist among them. Thus, for early Buddhism, the causal relations among events are not the product of human imagination, as they were for some leading empiricists of the Western world like David Hume, rather they are part and parcel of human experience. It is, in fact, not even possible to speak of *dhammā* (things, events, phenomena) without speaking of causal relations. This is indicated by Buddha's qualification of *dhammā* as "dependently arisen" *dhammā* (*paṭiccasamuppannā dhammā*).[28]

Buddha was able to speak of causal events and causal relations as being part of human experience primarily because he did not get involved in a metaphysical conception of time analysed into discrete momentary elements as past, present and future. For him, as it is for a radical empiricist, cognized present or the specious present is no "knife-edge" but a "saddle-back" with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched and from which we look into two directions in time.[29] The unit of composition of our perception is a duration. Hence his statement: "Arising is known, cessation is known and the change of what exists is known" (*uppādo paññāyati, vayo paññāyati, ṭhitassa aññathattaṃ paññāyati*).[30] The recognition of a duration as part of human experience enabled him to present a pluralistic view of the world in terms of *dhammā* (in the plural) which represented events as well as their causal relations. This was his radical empiricism.

However, he also used the term *dhamma* in the singular, along with the term *dhammatā*[31], when speaking of the factual world. This use of the term was confined to the expression of a uniformity as well as the universality of "dependence" (*paṭiccasamuppāda*). This uniformity and universality was arrived on the basis of an inductive inference (*anvaye ñāṇa*),[32] an inference stretching into the dim past and the unknown future. The strength of that evidence, as he understood it, is very clearly expressed in his statement: "Whether the Tathāgatas were to arise in this world or not, this constitution (of the world), this status of *dhamma*, this relatedness of *dhamma*, has indeed remained (*ṭhitā 'va*)."[33] On the strength of that evidence, he was willing to give existential status not only to the individual events and their relations, but also to the uniformity and universality of those relations. Hence "dependent arising" (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) becomes a synonym for *dhamma*, and Buddha was willing to say: "He who sees (*paṭiccasamuppāda*, he sees the *dhamma*."[34]

Since he was prepared to give existential status to the uniformity and universality of "dependent arising", he refrained from characterizing it as an Absolute or recognizing absolute certainty with regard to it, thereby distinguishing between an existential truth and a logical truth. *Dhamma*, in this sense, was therefore never described in the early Buddhist texts as an "absolute truth" (*paramatthasacca*), or even as truth (*sacca*);[35] it does not come within the realm of *a priori* reasoning(*atakkāvacara*).[36] The *dhamma* presented was therefore not the result of *a priori* reasoning (*takkapariyāhataṃ*).[37]

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26. *S* II. p. 25.
27. So was it for Bertrand Russell, see *Human Knowledge. Its Scope and Limits*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1948, p. 439.
28. *S*. II. p. 25.
29. See, William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, New York: Dover Publications, 1950, I. p. 609.
30. *S*. III. pp. 37-38.
31. *M* 1. pp, 324-325.
32. *S*. II. p. 58.
33. Ibid., II. pp. 25-26.
34. *M* 1. p. 190.
35. Ibid., 1. p. 71.
36. However, the term *paramasacca* occurs at *M* 1.p,480 and *A* II.p.115 to refer to Nibbāna as the highest moral experience recognized by Buddha.
37. *M*. 1. p. 167; see also note 15 above.

This is the widest possible use of the term *dhamma*. It represents whatever events and relations experienced, either through the five senses with mind as a co-ordinator, or what is conceptualized by the mind on the basis of impressions coming through the five senses. Anything that is not made available to the mind in this manner is not recognized as *dhamma* in the early Buddhist tradition. This is the reason for Buddha's denunciation of any hidden "essence" in these *dhammas*, which he so openly and unequivocally expressed in his statement: "All *dhammas* are non-substantial" (*sabbe dhammā anattā*).[38] This is a clear rejection of the conception of *ātman* which occurs in the teachings of both the *Upaniṣads* and the *Bhagavadgītā*.

Dhamma as "freedom" (nibbāna).

The *Dhammapada* verse which speaks of the non-substantiality of all *dhammas*, leads us to the other conception of *dhamma* mentioned in the *Ariyapariyesana Sutta* quoted earlier. The complete verse is as follows :

> "When one perceives through wisdom that all *dhammas* are non-substantial, then one is turned away from suffering, and this is the path to purity."[39]

It was mentioned earlier that *dhammas* could either be mental or material, pleasant or unpleasant, beautiful or ugly. The very realization that these *dhammas* are without any hidden essence or substance (*anatta*) and are dependently arisen (*paticcasamuppanna*) permits the elimination of some and the promotion of others. This is one way in which a person can be made to realize the possibility of freeing himself from some of the *dhammas* that are causing him as well as others suffering, without being pessimistic or optimistic about the world. This step is very essential even before one could enter the path to purity and freedom.

Buddha's advice is generally considered to be related to the avoidance of the unwholesome or bad elements of experience and the promotion of the wholesome or good elements (*sabbapāpassa akaraṇaṃ, kusalassa upasampadā*).[40] The reason why the unwholesome elements are to be avoided and wholesome ones are to be cultivated is that this leads to the welfare of oneself as well as others. In the discourse to the Kālāmas,[41] Buddha is represented as examining various *dhammas* that lead to welfare or ill-fare. He questioned the Kālāmas as to whether greed (*lobha*), hate (*dosa*) and confusion (*moha*), when they appear in human beings, contribute to their welfare (*hita*) or ill-fare (*ahita*), and the Kālāmas agreed that they contribute to ill-fare. The absence of these three *dhammas*, therefore, is recognized to be conducive to welfare and happiness.

The absence of greed, hate and confusion is precisely what Buddha meant by freedom (*nibbāna*).[42] It is a life that leads to the happiness of oneself as well as of others. It is the best form of moral life or the highest form of righteousness one can attain in this world. Thus, while both good and bad are referred to as *dhammā*, using a utilitarian criterion, i.e., considering the freedom and happiness attained through the cultivation of the good, the Buddha distinguished between good *dhammas* from bad *dhammas* by qualifying them as "wholesome" (*kusalā dhammā*) and "unwholesome" (*akusalā dhammā*) respectively.[43] Following this qualification, we find the word *dhammā* (in the plural) being used to denote good,[44] and its negation—*adhammā*— used in the sense of bad.[45] Thus, if we were to adopt the distinction so often made, whether such a distinction is justifiable or not, between fact and values, the use of the term *dhammā* to refer to the so-called facts (i.e., dependent arising and dependently arisen phenomena) as well as to values (i.e., good *dhammā*, etc.) is extremely significant. It seems to follow from the view that is emphatically stated in the *Dhammapada* that freedom or purity (if interpreted as an evaluative judgment) can arise primarily by perceiving the causal connectedness of phenomena (which may be taken as a factual judgment).

The use of the term *dhammā*, once again in the plural, to denote good (*kusala*), as opposed to

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38. Ibid., 1.pp.228, 230; *S.* III.pp.132-133; IV.p.401; *A.* 1.p.286; *Dhp. v.* 279; *Thag. v.* 678.
39. *Dhp. v.* 279, *Sabbe dhammā anattā ti yadā paññāya passati — atha nibbindati dukkhe esa maggo visuddhiyā*
40. Ibid., *v.* 183.
41. *A.* 1. pp. 188 ff.
42. *It.* pp. 38 f.
43. *M.* 1. p. 490; see also *M.* 1. p. 171, *jitā me pāpakā dhammā*; 1. p. 180, *pāpakā akusalā dhammā.*
44. Ibid., 1. p. 472, *Ime dhammā samādāya vattitabbā.*
45. *J.* VI. p. 299, *mā h' ev' adhammesu manaṃ paṇidāhi.*

adhammā meaning bad (*akusala*), is also significant, especially in view of the fact that early Buddhism did not present one single moral experience as the embodiment of a universally valid moral law, as it was the case with the absolutistic systems such as the *Bhagavadgītā*, which speaks of "desireless action" (*niṣkāmakarma*) and the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant, which singles out "good-will", regardless of the consequences that follow from them. In early Buddhism, morally good actions are evaluated in terms of consequences, which is also the utilitarian principle of evaluation.

However, the problem faced by utilitarianism is that with the non-recognition of an invariable law that determines what consequences would follow from what actions, there could be no definite moral criterion with which to evaluate actions. Buddhism seems to have overcome this problem in two ways.

First, it was prepared to base its moral principle on the uniformity and universality of 'dependent arising' (*paṭiccasamuppāda=anatta*) which was arrived at on the basis of inductive inference. This relationship is clearly expressed in the *Dhammapada* verse quoted above. Thus, while individual moral experiences or situations are referred to as *dhammā* (in the plural), the uniformity and universality of such moral experiences are arrived at on the basis of an inductive inference, and this moral principle came to be referred to in the signular as *dhamma*. *Dhamma*, in the singular, thus came to mean "righteousness" and *adhamma* (in the singular) came to denote "unrighteousness."[46]

According to this principle, the moral value of a single action is to be determined on the basis of consequences that follow from it, the consequences being the happiness it yields for oneself as well as others, whereas the immoral action is determined on the basis of the unhappiness it produces. This same utilitarian criterion is then extended, by way of inference, to include all possible actions of that particular class. In doing so, early Buddhism seems to be stepping from the position of act-utilitarianism to rule-utilitarianism.

Secondly, another way in which Buddhism was able to avoid the problem confronting utilitarianism was by its willingness to assume that *dhamma* (in the singular) as a moral principle (which is comparable to the principle adopted by the rule-utilitarian) is a relative one and not an absolute principle. Buddha was already aware that philosophers were not willing to remain satisfied with his explanation of the factual world. Whereas he saw everything that is experienced as being dependently arisen (*paṭicca-samuppanna*), others had rejected this principle of explanation and advocated eternal and absolute entities like God (*Īśvara, brahma*), soul or self (*ātman*) or matter (*mahābhūta*). Realizing that everyone in the world was not inclined to accept a moral principle (*dhamma*) based upon consequences, Buddha was willing to consider his moral principle as one adopted by those who have personally experienced the highest state of moral perfection. This may resemble the attitude of the Existentialists who emphasized the need to follow personal experience. However, Buddha did not consider personal experience to be the result of a pre-reflective cognition. For him, the experience of individual moral situations is not the result of a transcendental perception, and hence neither such individual moral experiences nor the uniformity based upon such experiences are ineffable or beyond conceptual understanding.

The most righteous person, according to Buddha, is one who leads a life contributing to one's own happiness as well as the happiness of others.[47] This is the enlightened one (*buddha*), the worthy one (*arahant*) or the freed one (*nibbuta*) and, therefore, *nibbāna* too receives the designation of *dhamma*.

Freedom (*nibbāna*), in the early Buddhist context, is not absolute, as in the absolutistic systems like the *Upaniṣads* and the *Bhagavadgītā*. Some have experienced difficulty in understanding the negative descriptions of *nibbāna*.[48] They assume that the negative descriptions prevail because *nibbāna* is truly transcendent. However, freedom for the Buddha, to use a modern expression, is "lack of constraints". Constraints may be physical, economic, social, political or ideological. Abandoning attachment or aversion toward amenities of life, Buddha had attained what may be called economic freedom. Realizing that all ideas (*dhammā*) are non-substantial (*anatta*), and by not grasping on to any idea as an

46. *Thag. v.* 30
47. This is negatively presented as one who harms neither oneself nor others, see *M.* 1. p. 341.
48. See K. N. Upadhyaya, *Early Buddhism and the Bhagavadgītā*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971, pp. 343-345.

absolute truth (*paramattha-sacca*),[49] Buddha was able to attain freedom from social, political and ideological constraints. In his view, it is only a foolish person (*moghapurisa*) who would present an idea saying: "This alone is the truth, everything else is falsehood, (*idaṃ eva saccaṃ mogham aññaṃ*).[50] Speaking of the world constitutive of such people, Buddha maintained: "I do not, O monks, come into conflict with the world; however, the world conflicts with me, (*nāhaṃ bhikkhave lokena vivadāmi, loko ca mayā vivadati*).[51] By not holding onto views as being absolutely valid, Buddha was able to free himself of certain constraints which a philosopher like Socrates, or a religious teacher like Jesus, or even a political figure like Mahātma Gandhi had to contend with, all of whom had to face unnatural and unfortunate deaths as a result.

This did not mean that Buddha did not have views; only that he did not present his views as absolute or ultimate truths (*paramattha-sacca*). The so-called four Noble Truths (*cattāri ariyasaccāni*) were not looked upon in Buddhism as absolute truths, but only as noble views (*ariyā diṭṭhi*).[52]

However, there was one set of constraints he could not overcome. These were primarily physical. He was indeed subject to old age, disease and death. He claimed that he has overcome old age, disease and death, not in the present life, but in the future, for as a result of non-grasping he was able to avoid any such future existences where he would be subjected to such constraints. Immortality (*amata*) for him meant the absence of re-birth (*a-punabbhava*).[53] Such is the freedom (*nibbāna*) attained by Buddha. That freedom was, according to him, the best possible form of freedom man can attain in this world. It is for this reason that a saint is recognized as one who has attained nobility (*brahmabhūta*) and one who has reached the highest level of morality (*dhammabhūta*).[54]

Thus, following a method comparable to that adopted by a rule-utilitarian, Buddha arrived at the uniformity of moral causation and this moral principle also came to be referred to as *dhamma* (in the singular). Hence we find the statement in the *Theragāthā* :

"Good (*dhamma*) and bad (*adhamma*) are not of equal fruitioning. Bad leads to hell (=unhappiness) and good leads to heaven (=happiness)."[55]

This should not be construed as an absolute and invariable law, permanent and eternal, as it is in the absolutistic systems, nor as a divinely ordained principle, as in theistic systems, nor even as a transcendent and ineffable truth as in existentialist traditions. It is based on the principle of "dependent arising" (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) and is strongly backed by the experience of moral situations, both on the part of ordinary human beings on occasions and on the part of "enlightened ones" (*buddha*) always. It is the *dhamma* that serves as a dominant condition (*ādhipateyya*) in guiding man's behaviour,[56] and since it was not looked upon as a law, it never assumed the status of a "categorical imperative". Buddha was willing to admit that "this moral standard (*dhamma*) protects the virtuous person" (*dhammo have rakkhati dhammacāriṃ*).[57]

However, Buddha was careful not to equate the "moral principle" (*dhamma*) with every "virtuous person" (*dhammacārī*). Although the moral principle is derived from the moral experiences of the freed one (*nibbuta*), every person who adopts that moral principle as a way of life could not be equated with the moral principle unless he has reached the moral perfection attained by the freed one. This is implied in a passage from the *Majjhima Nikāya* where it is said :

"As to this, Ānanda, whatever recluse or brahman speaks thus: 'Indeed there are lovely deeds, there is fruitioning of good life' — I allow this to him. And if he speaks thus: 'The individual I saw here restrained from making onslaught on creatures,

49. See note 36.
50. *D.* 1. p. 187; *M.* III. p. 212.
51. *S.* III. p. 138.
52. *D.* II. p. 80.
53. *S.* 1. p. 174.
54. *D.* III. p. 84; *M.* 1. p. 111; III. pp. 195, 224; *S.* IV. p. 94; *A.* V. p. 226; *It.* p. 57. This is said of the *arahants* at *A.* II. p. 206; *S.* III. p. 83.
55. *Thag. v.* 304.
56. *A.* 1. p. 149.
57. *Thag. v.* 303.

restrained from taking what had not been given, from wrong enjoyment of sensual pleasures, from lying, from slanderous speech, harsh speech, gossiping, who was not covetous, who was benevolent in mind and of right view, I now see at the breaking up of the body after dying arisen in a good bourn, a heavenly world' — this too I allow to hinm. But if he speaks thus: 'Everyone who is restrained from making onslaught on creatures, is restrained from taking what had not been given .... is of right view, at the breaking up of the body after dying arises in a good bourn, in a heavenly world,' — this I do not allow to him. And if he speaks thus: 'Those who know this know rightly. False is the knowledge of those who know otherwise' — neither do I allow this to him. And whosoever obstinately holds to and adheres to that which he has known, seen, discerned by himself as 'this alone is the truth, all else is false-hood' — neither do I allow this to him. What is the cause of this? The Tathāgata's knowledge of the great analysis of deeds is otherwise, Ānanda."[58]

Thus, while it is possible to say that the saint and all those who have entered the final stages of sanctification, like the "stream-entrant" (*sotāpanna*) who have fully embodied this moral principle and are destined to be enlightened (*niyato sambodhiparāyaṇo*)[59] and, therefore, happy, Buddha was not willing to include "everyone" under that category. This is because those who are not completely freed or have not entered the final stages of sanctification, could be swayed away by factors other than what is included in this moral principle. In other words, talk about a certain class of actions and a class of persons who can be identified with that class of actions is different from talk about all people who may embody that class of actions and something more.

This very clearly illustrates the status of the moral principle (*dhamma*) in early Buddhism. It is not looked upon as a 'law' that exists independent of the people who have realized it.

Unfortunately, essentialist interpreters of early Buddhism have found a passage in the *Dhammapada* which they understand as Buddha's recognition of an eternal and permanent moral law :

Na hi verena verāni sammantīdha kudācana
averena ca sammanti esa dhammo sanantano.[60]

Radhakrishnan translated this verse as follows :

"Not at any time are enmities appeased here through enmity, but they are appeased through non-enmity. *This is the eternal law.*"[61]

The recognition of an eternal law would certainly contradict the epistemological standpoint of early Buddhism as explained above. Fortunately, there is no justification for rendering the phrase *esa dhammo sanantano* (for *sanātano*) as: "This is the eternal law." The term *sanātana* does not convey the sense of eternal, permanent or absolute. On the contrary, it means primitive or ancient (*porāṇaka*) and even the later commentators have understood this term in that sense.[62] We have also provided reasons for rejecting the view that *dhamma* represents "law." Therefore, *sanātana dhamma*, properly understood, would mean an "ancient principle", rather than an eternal law.

In fact, a statement in the *Dhammapada* seems to advocate a rejection of such an absolute moral law. The statement runs thus :

"As one does not become a mendicant merely by begging from others, so one does not become a

58. *M.* III. p. 213.
59. *D.* I. p. 56; III. p. 107 sq., 132, 227; *A.* II. p. 89; *S.* II. p. 68, etc.
60. *Dhp v.* 5.
61. S. Radhakrishnan, *The Dhammapada*, London: Oxford University Press, 1954, p. 60.
62. *Dhp A.* I. p. 51.

mendicant by strictly adhering to a universal (moral) principle."[63]

By definition a mendicant is one who goes around begging for food. This may be a universally accepted definition. Yet in the eyes of the Buddha, it is not the one important criterion for deciding who a mendicant is. There are other factors which, together with begging, may constitute a mendicant.[64] Sometimes, these other factors may even be more important than mere begging. What is being denied here is the adoption of one universal law as an objective criterion, either of fact or of value. The foregoing analysis should clarify Buddha's definition of *dhamma* (in the singular) both as "dependent arising" (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) and as "freedom" (*nibbāna*) presented in the passage from the *Ariyapariyesana Sutta* quoted earlier.

Dhamma as the basis of social and political philosophy.

Dhamma in the sense of "dependent arising" and "righteousness" figure very prominently in the Buddha's explanation of social and political philosophy. The *Aggañña Suttanta*,[65] trying to reject the Brahmanical theory of the four-fold caste system, resorts to the theory of causal dependence in order to explain the evolution of society and social institutions. A host of other discourses such as *Vasala Sutta*[66] and *Vāseṭṭha Sutta*[67] openly reject the *brahman* claims to superiority on the basis of birth. According to these discourses, the social status of a person is not to be determined by his birth in a particular caste, having certain specific functions or duties (*svadharma*), but on the basis of his actions (*kamma*), which are in turn evaluated on the basis of the moral principle (*dhamma*) discussed above.

Early Buddhist speculation[68] has it that the gradual decline of humanity from its gloden era dominated by "righteousness' (*dhamma*) occurred when craving (*taṇhā*) appeared among human beings leading to unpleasant consequences. The first king, Mahāsammata (lit. approved by the great population) came to be appointed in order to enforce a moral standard (*dhamma*) and his selection itself was done on the basis of his moral standing. Although selected by the majority, he was expected to rule the country in an impartial way, that is, according to *dhamma*, where suffering for oneself as well as others is to be avoided. "He pleases others by *dhamma*, hence he is a king" (*dhammena pare rañjetīti kho .. rājā*).[69]. In answer to the question as to who a righteous king is, Buddha declared :

> "It is *dhamma*, O monk. Herein, monk, a universal monarch, a *dhamma*- man, a *dhamma*-king relying just on *dhamma*, honouring the *dhamma*, revering the *dhamma*, esteeming the *dhamma* as his banner, *dhamma* as his flag, with *dhamma* as his dominance, sets a *dhamma*-protection for the warriors and the attendant armies, for brahmans

63. *Dhp. v.*266; *Gāndhāri Dharmapada*, ed. John Brough, Oxford University Press, 1962. 67. The Pali version reads as follows :

    Na tena bhikkhu so hoti yāvatā bhikkhate pare,
    vissaṃ dhammaṃ samādāya bhikkhu hoti na tāvatā.

    This verse has created much controversy among the editors and translators of the various versions of the *Dhammapada*. Radhakrishnan translates the second line as follows: "He who adopts the whole law is a mendicant, not one who adopts only a part," which would be compatible with the theory he wanted to propose that *Dhammapada* and *Bhagavadgītā* are almost identical in recognizing an absolute moral law. By taking *na tāvatā* as an independent clause, and giving it a special meaning, indpendent of *yāvatā* in the previous line, Radhakrishnan seems to be ignoring the correlative use of these two terms, *yāvatā* and *tāvatā*. John Brough, in his excellent edition of the *Gāndhāri Dharmapada*, has endeavoured to show that *veśma* (household) is preferable to *vissaṃ* (universal). This may appear to be appropriate if we look at this verse in the context of the devaluation of the household life in the later Theravāda tradition. However, the *Dhammapada* verse in Pali seems to us as conveying a more profound meaning than that suggested in the Prakrit version.
64. Buddha did not propose any strict and invariable method of defining names, as was done in the Confucian tradition with "rectification of names" (*cheng ming*).
65. *D*, III. pp. 80 ff.
66. *Sn* pp. 21 ff.
67. Ibid., pp. 115 ff.
68. *D*. III, p. 85.
69. Ibid., III, p. 93.

and householders, for town and country folk, for recluses and brahmans and for beast and bird."[70]

It would be almost impossible to give any meaning other than "righteousness" to the term *dhamma* in the above context and the "righteousness" is what has been explained above on the basis of the earliest Buddhist literature.

The last of the major uses of the term *dhamma* in the early discourses is derived form the uses mentioned above, namely, *dhamma* as dependent arising and *dhamma* as righteousness. The teachings of Buddha, embodying those two conceptions of *dhamma* also came to be designated *dhamma*. It is a *dhamma* said to be well-proclaimed (*svākkhāto*), empirical (*sandiṭṭhiko*), not confined to any particular time (*akāliko*), verifiable (*ehipassiko*), practical (*opanayiko*) and to be experienced by the wise (*paccattaṃ veditabbo viññūhi*).[71]

Dhamma/dharma in later Buddhism.

The first significant variation in the conception of *dhamma* discussed above appeared with the Sarvāstivāda school, which was looked down upon by almost all other schools of Buddhism as being heretical. The Sarvāstivāda school, which maintained its literature in Sanskrit, represented the views put forward by a few leading philosophers such as Dharmatrāta, Ghoṣaka, Vasumitra, Buddhadeva and Saṅghabhadra. These philosophers attempted to provide an explanation of *dharma*, based more on the etymology of the term than in terms of its actual usage in the early discourses. Deriving the term from the root *dhṛ* "to support,' the Sarvāstivādins, ,for the first time, defined *dharma* as that which 'supports unique and general characteristics" (*sva-sāmānya-lakṣaṇadhāraṇāt dharmaḥ*).[72] It is clear that this definition signalled the re-introduction of the essentialist perspective of the *Upaniṣads* and the *Bhagavadgītā* which the Buddha so carefully and consistently avoided. This definition should remind one of the manner in which an essentialist-cum-empiricist philosopher like John Locke arrived at the conception of substance. According to Locke,

> "The idea then we have, to which we give the general name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist, *sine re substante*, without something to support them, we call that support *substantia*; which according to the true import of the word, is in plain English, standing under or upholding."[73]

Similarly, the Sarvāstivādins, in their metaphysical search for an ultimate ground or support of the perceived characteristics, themselves subject to change and transformation (*anyathātva*), posited the conception of substance (*svabhāva*, *dravya*) which is supposed to remain unchanged during the three periods of time, past, present and future.[74] Substance thus came to be eternal. The *sva-lakṣaṇa* or the unique characteristics, mentioned in the above definition of *dharma*, was identified with this substance.[75]

This indeed was the most heretical position that ever emerged in the Buddhist philosophical tradition. It was therefore not surprising that not only the Sthaviravāda schools like Theravāda and Sautrāntika, but also the Mahāyāna schools like Mādhyamika and Yogācāra, all focussing their criticism on the Sarvāstivāda conception of *dharma*.

The early Theravāda, that is, the pre-Buddhaghosan tradition, as embodied in texts like the *Kathāvatthu*, openly rejected the Sarvāstivāda notion of substance (*svabhāva*) which is supposed to exist during past, present and future.[76] The Sautrāntikas not only rejected the notion of substance as

70. *A*. III, p. 149.
71. *Vin*. 1, pp. 12, 17, 19, etc.; *D*. II, pp. 93, 217, 222, 228; III, pp. 5, 102, 227; *M*. 1, pp. 37, 141-142, 320; II, pp. 120 ff.; *S*. 1, p. 87, 220; II,pp.28, 69, 199; IV, pp. 272 ff.; V, pp. 343, 363; *A*. 1, pp. 149, 207-208, 222; II, pp. 212, 285, 312, 315; IV, p. 211; V, pp. 183, 329.
72. *AbhKvy*. p. 12.
73. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Alexander Campbell Fraser, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1894, vol. 1, p. 392.
74. *Abhk*, v. 26; *Abhidharmadīpa* with *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*, ed. P.S. Jaini, Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1959, pp. 269;260; *Tattavasaṃgraha* with *Pañjikā*, ed. B. Krishnamacharya, Baroda: Gackwad Oriental Research Institute, 1926, vol. 1, pp. 504-505.
75. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, ed. Pralhad Pradhan, Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967, p. 341; *AbhKvy*, pp. 524, 529.
76. *Kvu*. 1.6.

being not different from the notion of substance or essence (*ātman*) in the pre-Buddhist traditions,[77] but also wanted to go back to the discourses (*sutta, suttanta*) as the *locus classicus* of Buddha-word. Hence their name, Sautrāntika or those who hold the *sūtras* or *sūtrāntas* as the primary sources (*sūtrapramāṇikā*).[78] Unfortunately, their continued adherence to a metaphysical conception of time and change, different from what was found in the early discourses, prevented them from providing a satisfactory solution to the problems posed by the Sarvāstivāda conception of *dharma*.[79]

Mahāyāna that arose as an attempt to popularize Buddha-word and also as a reaction against the metaphysics of the Sarvāstivāda school which abandoned the anti-substantialist or anti-essentialist position of early Buddhism, was faced with two conflicting issues. The first was to understand the difference between the enlightened one (*buddha*) and an ordinary human being. They appeared to be certainly different with regard to their behaviour. As explained above, *buddha* or an *arahant* was different from an ordinary man, not because he has developed a special intuition or a way of knowing, but because he has eliminated craving (*rāga*), aversion (*dosa*) and confusion (*moha*) which arise on occasions of sensory experience. But the Mahāyānists had difficulty accepting this position, for the Sarvāstivādins had already poisoned the well when they claimed that what one experiences through the senses as *dharmāḥ* (in the plural) are partly substantial (this is, constitution of *svabhāva* that does not change) and partly non-substantial (that is, possessed of changing characteristics, *lakṣaṇa*). Therefore, instead of recognizing the validity of sense experience the Mahāyānists leaned towards accepting tarnscendence of sense experience. This problem is clearly reflected in the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature of the Mahāyānists, especially in the *Vajracchedikā-Prajñāpāramitā*, which has the following statement:

"What do you think, Subhūti? Is there any *dharma* which has been fully known by the Tathāgata as 'the utmost, right and perfect enlightenment,' or is there any *dharma* which has been demonstrated by the Tathāgata?"

"No. As I understand the Blessed One's teaching there is not any *dharma* which has been fully known by the Tathāgata as 'the utmost, right and perfect enlightenment,' and there is no *dharma* which has been fully known or demonstrated by the Tathāgata — it is not to be seized, not to be talked about; it is neither *dharma* nor no-*dharma*."[80]

Following seems to be a summary of the ideas expressed in this text :

"From the *dharma* should one see the Buddhas,
For, the *dharma*-bodies are the Guides
(i.e. Buddhas).
Yet *dharma*'s true nature should not be discerned,
Nor can it, either, be discerned."[81]

Rejecting the Sarvāstivāda notion of substance (*svabhāva*), the Mahāyānists were here suggesting an epistemology for the concept of *dharma* they had accepted. For them, the *dharma* of Buddha transcends ordinary apprehension, and hence conceptualization. "It should not be discerned; neither can it be discerned."

This is further elaborated by Nāgārjuna when he insisted that reality (*tattva*) is non-conceptual (*nirvikalpa*).[82] In order to establish this view Nāgārjuna had to show not only that there is no substance (*svabhāva*)[83] but also that all conceptual thinking is empty (*śūnya*). Although the former was achieved by a mere denial of substance (*na hi svabhāvo bhāvānāṃ pratyayādisu vidyate*),[84] the latter he attempted with remarkable ingenuity. In the *Mūlamādhyamakakārikā*, an opponent is made to raise the following objection :

77. *AbhKvy*, p. 362.
78. Ibid., p. 11.
79. See David J. Kalupahana, *Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis*, Honoulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976, p. 107.
80. *VajP*, p. 32.
81. Ibid., p. 56.
82. *Mādhyamakakārikā* 18.9 (*Mdhvṛ*. p. 372)
Aparapratyayaṃ santaṃ prapañcairaprapañcitaṃ
nirvikalpaṃ anānarthaṃ etat tattvasya lakṣaṇaṃ.
83. *Mādhyamakakārikā* 15 (*Mdhvṛ*. pp. 259-279).
84. Ibid., 1.3 (*Mdhvṛ* p. 78).

"If everything is empty, there is no origination and destruction. That would be to admit the non-existence of the four Noble Truths. In the absence of the four Noble Truths, there would neither be understanding (of suffering), nor elimination (of the cause of suffering), nor cultivation (of the path leading to the cessation of suffering), nor realization (of the cessation of suffering). If these are non-existent, then also the four noble 'fruits' do not exist. In the absence of the four noble 'fruits', there would not be those who have attained the 'fruits' nor those who have attained the path.

In the absence of these eight types of persons, there would be no Order. From the non-existence of the four Noble Truths, the true *dharma* also does not exist."[85]

But Nāgārjuna's way of dealing with his objection seems purely dialectic. He argues :

"Since there is no *dharma* whatever which is not dependently arisen (i.e., not relative), no *dharma* ever exists which is not empty.

If all existence is not empty, there is neither origination nor destruction. You must therefore wrongly conclude that the four Noble Truths exist."[86]

The argument seems to be as follows: Every *dharma* is relative. Hence every *dharma* is also empty. If a *dharma* is not empty, but has a substance (*svabhāva*), then it is not relative, is not dependently arisen. But there is no *dharma* that is not relative. Therefore, there is no *dharma* that is not empty. Thus, if one accepts non-emptiness, one also has to accept non-relativity and as a result one has to reject origination and destruction. If one does not accept origination and destruction, one cannot speak of the four Noble Truths. Thus, it is not the acceptance of emptiness (*śūnyatā*), but its non-acceptance that makes it difficult to speak of the four Noble Truths.

The important question that can be raised at this point is whether Nāgārjuna is prepared to accept origination (*utpāda*) and destruction (*vyaya*) as empirical facts. In the *Ratnāvalī*, he seems to assert them.[87] However, in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, he seems to reject them when he said :

"Since existence (*sat-tā*) of things that are non-substantial is not evident, the theory that 'when that exists, this comes to be' (*asmin satīdaṃ bhavati*) is not possible."[88]

What made him assert existence and arising in one context, and deny them in another? The only possible explanation is that from a worldly or conventional point of view (*saṃvṛti*) both existence and arising are valid, but from a transcendent point of view (*paramārtha*) both are invalid. This is Nāgārjuna's famous theory of two truths.[89] Although Nāgārjuna adhered to the view that ultimate reality (*tattva*) is beyond conceptualization (*nirvikalpa*), he did not work out an epistemology to explain this idea. It was, therefore, left to the idealists as well as the logicians of the idealist school to explain the problem of knowledge relating to this conception of *dharma*.

While the absolute idealists like Vasubandhu adopted one approach to this problem of knowledge, logicians like Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti seem to have taken a slightly different one.

Vasubandhu recognized the validity of a non-dual knowledge attained by the *yogin* in the highest stage of meditation. This knowledge is said to be free from the normal subject — object duality associated with sensory experience. In the *Triṃśikā*, he maintains:

"When consciousness is without an objective support, then consciousness is established in 'mere ideation' (*vijñaptimātrā*), since in the absence of anything to grasp, there is no grasping.

When (he) is without thought, without objective support, his knowledge is supramundane. There is turning away from the object, through the abandonment of the two kinds of weaknesses (i.e., the belief in a self and the belief in real elements, *dharma*).

85. Ibid., 24.1-5 (*Mdhvṛ*. pp. 475-489).
86. Ibid., 24.19-20 (*Mdhvṛ*. pp. 505-506).
87. *Ratnāvalī*, ed. G. Tucci, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, London, 1934 (New Series), p. 318.
88. *Madhyamakakārikā*, 1.10 (*Mdhvṛ*. p. 86).
89. Ibid., 24.8 (*Mdhvṛ*. p. 492).

That is the realm without defiling tendencies (*anāśrava*), inconceivable, good, permanent, happy with released body; this is what is called *dharma* of the great sage."[90]

Thus, 'mere ideation' (*vijñaptimātra*) or the "undifferentiated ultimate reality" comes to be equated with *dharma*, and this is to be realized, not through sense experience, nor with the higher knowledges such as telepathy, but at the highest stage of meditation.[91] It is the special experience of the contemplative (*yogi-pratyakṣa*).

In contrast to this epistemology, logicians like Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti, not willing to give up sense experience altogether and still suspicious of the process of conceptualization, recognized what may be called "pre-reflective" experience. For Dinnāga, perception (*pratyakṣa*) involves two stages: first is the experience of the object (*artha*) which is external (*bāhya*) and which possesses a distinctive character (*svalakṣaṇa*).[92] This is non-conceptual (*avikalpaka*). Thus, veridical perception is the result of the removal of conceptualization (*kalpanāpoḍha*) on occasions of sensory experience, for here there is no denial of an exetrnal object, but only conceptualization based upon that. This is followed by conceptualization into mental substance (*ātman*) and material substance (*svabhāva*, *dravya*), which bring along with them all the defiling tendencies. The difference between Dinnāga's position and that of the Sarvāstivādins is that the former considered the *svalakṣaṇa* or the "unique characteristic" to be the *dharma*, while the latter assumed that it is the substance (*svabhāva*) which remains unchanged during the three periods of time. Whether this is a mere play on words is not a matter that can be settled at this point.

The difference between Vasubandhu and Dinnāga seems to be that while the former defined veridical perception as "being devoid of mental construct (*kalpanāpoḍha*) and non-illusive (*abhrānta*)," the latter accepted the first part of the definition and dropped the second, thereby maintaining that illusiveness (*bhrānti*) is not a universal characteristic of sense experience, but only of conceptualization (*savikalpa*).[93]

All the Mahāyāna schools mentioned above began with a distrust of sensory experience, primarily as a result of the essentialism so openly embraced by the Sarvāstivāda school. While emphasizing the transcendence of sense experience, these Mahāyāna schools made a concerted effort to uphold the non-substantiality (*nairātmya*) of phenomena (*dharmāḥ*) by emphasizing emptiness (*śūnyatā*).[94] Whether their position is consistent or not cannot be settled at this stage. However, it would be important to note the basic difference between their perspective and that of early Buddhism.

Early Buddhism emphasized the non-attachment (*virāga*) to what is given in sensory experience as a means of achieving freedom (*saññāvirattassa na santi ganthā*),[95] thereby assuming that it is possible to have sensory experience and yet remain undefiled by them. The Mahāyāna schools, fearful of the speculations of the Sarvāstivādins, maintained a necessary and invariable connection between sense experience and the emergence of defiling tendencies. Hence they advocated abandoning sense experience.[96] These two represent two different forms of transcendence, which many who have spoken of transcendence in Buddhism have overlooked. However, none of these schools, with the exception of Sarvāstivāda, seems to have understood *dhamma or dharma* as an absolute "law" or "norm" or "salvific truth" that transcends this world, yet serving as a foundation or support for it.

90. *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, ed. S. Levi, Paris: Librarie Ancienne Honore Champion, 1925, *Triṃśikā* 28-30.
91. Ibid., *Viṃśatikā*, 21.
92. See *Dignāga, On Perception*, being the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, translated and annotated by Masaaki Hattori, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (Harvard Oriental Series 47), 1968, pp. 24, 27; See also Kalupahana, D. J., "Dinnāga's Immaterialism," *Philosophy East and West*, Honolulu, 20 (1970) : pp. 121-128.
93. Kalupahana, *Philosophy East and West*, p. 127.
94. *The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines*, translation by Edward Conze, Bolinas : Four Seasons, Foundation, 1973. p. 19; see also *Madhyamakakārikā* 4.9 (*Mdhvṛ*. p. 127); 13.8 (*Mdhvṛ*, p. 247); 24.1-40 (*Mdhvṛ* pp. 475-518); *Vijñaptimātratasiddhi*, *Viṃśatikā* 10.
95. *Sn*. 847.
96. *Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines*, p. 14.

The Theravāda form of Buddhism that spread to Sri Lanka and other South East Asian countries remained untouched by the Sarvāstivāda speculations until the advent of Buddhaghosa and the rendering of the old Sinhala commentaries into Pali. In his commentary on the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* (called *Atthasālinī*), Buddhaghosa introduced for the first time the conception of substance (*svabhāva*) into the Theravāda definition of *dhamma*. According to him, *dhamma* is "that which bears its own nature" (*attano pana sabhāvaṃ dhārentīti dhammā*).[97]

Buddhist scholars of the 12th century, following the lead given by Buddhaghosa, adopted a definition of *dhamma* which is identical with that of the Sarvāstivādins. For them, *dhamma* is not merely "that which supports its own nature", as Buddhaghosa defined, but it is "that which supports unique and general characteristics" (*sabhāva-sāmañña-lakkhaṇaṃ dhārentīti dhammā*).[98] This they did in spite of the warnings of the 7th century scholiast, Ānanda, that "there is no *dhamma* other than the nature of supporting" (*na ca dhāriyamānasabhāvā añño dhammo atthi*).[99]

This substantialist definition of *dhamma*, though it was popular with some of the philosophers writing commentaries and sub-commentaries on the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*, seems to have remained rather uninfluential among other writers of the Theravāda tradition. As the Mahāyānists did, the later Theravādins seemed to have emphasized the transcendent aspect of *dhamma*, while strictly adhering to the view that *dhamma* is non-substantial (*anatta*). More often, we come across the definition of *dhamma* as being the "ninefold transcendent *dhammā*" (*navalokuttara-dhammā*).[100] These nine include the four paths (i.e., those of the stream-entrant, the once-returner, the non-returner and the *arahant*), the four fruits (thereof) and *nibbāna*. Even according to Buddhaghosa, who, as mentioned earlier, was responsible for introducing the essentialist interpretation of *dhamma* into the Theravāda tradition, "transcendent" (*lokuttara*) means "morality" (*sīla*) which is "free from defilements" (*anāsavaṃ*),[101] and the ninefold transcendent *dhammā* mean no more than that. They represent the best personifications of the moral principle mentioned earlier when we discussed early Buddhism. Here there is no attempt to communicate a subtle and remarkable insightful discernment that there is a conceptual unity in diversity, or even a continuity is a soteriological process. It does not represent *one truth* or *reality* existing independently of the men who discover it. It is the exemplary life of those beings who have overcome or are attempting to overcome craving (*rāga*), hate (*dosa*) and confusion (*moha*) and who serve as a moral standard for the rest of mankind. That indeed is the *dhamma/dharma* that made Buddhism so unique in the philosophical and religious thought of mankind, uniquely different from that found in the *Mahābhārata/Bhagavadgītā*, and which drew the veneration of all the Buddhists throughout the centuries as a doctrine well-proclaimed (*svākkhāto*).

D. J. KALUPAHANA.

DHAMMA (2) Introductory: Analysis is one of the characteristic features that is evident in the teachings of the Buddha. The main idea behind Buddhist analysis is to reject the view of the existence of a permanent entity which, in the Upaniṣadic and some other systems of Indian thought, was called the soul (*ātman*) which was held to underlie the whole of existence including man. The Buddha, as is evident from his words recorded in the *suttas*, has analysed existence from a variety of standpoints. We therefore see existence being analysed into what is called mind-and-matter (*nāmarūpa* q.v.) five aggregates (*khandha*, q.v.), the six primary elements (*dhātu* q.v.), the twelve perceptual bases (*āyatana*, q.v.) and the eighteen elements of perception (*dhātu* q.v.). And, *dhamma* assumes the functions of a generic term in the method of analysis adopted in the scholastic systematization of early Buddhism.

97. *DhsA.* p. 39.
98. *Abhidhammatthavikāsinī* (*Abhidhammāvatāra-ṭīkā*), ed. A. P. Buddhadatta, Colombo: Anula Press, 1961 p. 11.
99. *Abhidhammamūlaṭīkā* (*Atthasālinī-Ītatthapadavaṇṇanā*), ed. D. Pannasara and P. Vimaladhamma, Colombo: Maha Bodhi Press, 1938, p. 21.
100. *Dhs.* 1447 (p. 245).
101. *Visuddhimagga*, ed, C. A. F. Rhys Davids, London: The Pali Text Society, 1975, p. 13.

The term *dhamma*[1] is used in the *suttas* with reference to "things" which arise and vanish depending on causes. They are sometimes called *saṅkhāra* and sometimes *saṅkhata* which consist of both physical and psychological phenomena. The common characteristics of those phenomena are appearance (*uppāda*) and disappearance (*vaya*); sometimes a third characteristic is added, namely becoming otherwise of that which is existing (*ṭhitassa aññathatta*) which, later on, came to be interpreted as duration (*ṭhiti*). These *dhammas* are, therefore, impermanent (*anicca*), a source of misery (*dukkha*) and unsubstantial (*anatta*).

Although the term is used in this sense in the *suttas*, it has never been used there in an attempt to classify the whole of existence in a systematised scheme which is the case with the Abhidhamma and other scholastic works.

In the context of analysis, the term is very often used in the plural number as (Pali) *dhammā*. or (Skt.) *dharmāḥ*, both in the *suttas* and in the later works to mean the component elements of the universe, the elements into which the whole of existence could be analysed. Unlike in the analysis of existence into categories like *khandha* etc. which represent a kind of subjective treatment of the same mental and material phenomena from different standpoints and in which the human personality or the process of perception serves as the starting point, here, in the *dhamma*-analysis, the approach is purely objective and impersonal. Thus, the *dhammas* are units as opposed to aggregates or groups; units which defy any further analysis.

The terms: "element", "ultimate", "thing" and "entity" used very often with reference to *dhammas*, are liable to be misunderstood, for the doctrine of *dhammas* never conflicted with the unsubstantialist position (*anattavāda*) of Buddhism. No school of Buddhism admitted the *dhammas* to be things in themselves, as substance or even as qualities cohering in a substance. In fact, a distinction is never made in Buddhism between substance and attributes.

Why a Theory of DHAMMAS?

Existence, i.e. man and his environment, is often analysed in the *suttas* into five *khandhas*, the six *dhātus* and the twelve *āyatanas*. The term *dhamma* which occurs in the *suttas* in the sense of "the things of existence" is used in the Pali *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* as a generic term in a scheme of analysis which seeks to embrace the whole of existence. This conception of *dhamma* developed into a theory which explained not only the content but also the dynamics of the entire universe from the Buddhist point of view. Why did the Buddhists find it necessary to evolve a theory of *dhammas* when there was the theory of *khandha-āyatana-dhātu* already in the *suttas*?

What the Buddha and his immediate disciples understood by *dhammas* are things that obtain on the empirical level. They were quite satisfied with the analysis of man and his environment into *khandha* etc., since it was deemed quite sufficient to reveal the true nature of existence as being devoid of a permanent entity underlying it. It is the belief in the existence of a permanent substance behind mental and physical states that produces the notion of "I" and "mine", and it is this notion that stands in the way of realising the true nature of existnence, the realisation which is very fundamental to attaining freedom. As is evident from the *suttas*, the Buddha was concerned only with making man understand suffering and the way out of it. For this purpose the earlier analyses are quite sufficient.

But, some time after the demise of the Buddhae new problems cropped up, and his followers wert faced with the problem of understanding the exacs meaning of the words of the Buddha. Emphasis began to be shifted from empiricism to metaphysic., In their attempt, in this direction, the Buddhists differed among themselves, giving rise to different schools of thought. Side by side with this new development within the fold of Buddhism was also the external influence exerted on it by non-Buddhist schools which criticised some of the tenets of Buddhism.

Now the schools diverted their attention to interpreting the words of the Buddha to meet the criticisms levelled and arguments adduced against them by non-Buddhist as well as the other Buddhist schools. For this purpose, the scholiasts had to analyse the whole of existence and, while so doing, they found the analysis into *khandha* etc. already current in the *suttas*, highly inadequate.

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1 The term is used also in another very important sense, viz., teaching, the norm, or the law (see DHAMMA (1). "Things" (i.e. DHAMMA-2) may be considered the subject-matter of the teaching (i.e. DHAMMA-1).

The *khandha* theory, in which mental phenomena are analysed into four aggregates and the phenomena of matter left unanalysed, was inadequate because, on the one hand, the *khandhas* are not single *dhammas* but aggregates of a number of *dhammas*. Everything that is material, for example, is considered one aggregate called the *rūpakkhandha*. In *rūpakkhandha*, therefore, there are a number of material elements, called *rūpadhammas*. In like manner, consciousness of all kinds, i.e., different states and aspects of the mind, constitute one aggregate called the *viññāṇakkhandha*. The same is true of the other three aggregates. On the other hand, there are some *dhammas* which could not be included in any of the five aggregates. Origin (*uppāda* or *samudaya*,) cessation (*vaya* or *nirodha*) and change (*aniccatā*) for example are neither mental nor material, but are characteristics common to both. There are other *dhammas* which analysis yields, but not included in any of the aggregates. This leaves the very analysis into *khandhas* utterly inadequate when viewed from the point of view of the analysis into *dhammas*.

These observations apply with equal force to the other methods of analysis such as *nāmarūpa*, *dhātu* and *āyatana*. It is true that some of the twelve *āyatanas* and eighteen *dhātus* are single "elements" but at least one of them, namely, the *dhammāyatana* or *dhammadhātu*, consists of a number of units which analysis yields, for the three aggregates, *vedanā*, *saññā* and *saṅkhāra* as well as some aspects of matter are included in the *dhammāyatana* and *dhammadhātu*.

Evolving a new method of analysis which embraces the totality of existence was the primary concern of Abhidharma schools of Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda. The scholiasts of these two schools found the concept of *dhamma* current in the *suttas* very convenient and useful in formulating a threoy of *dhammas* which they thought was satisfactory in explaining the universe.

The Development of the Theory :

There are a multitude of phenomena (*dhammas*) which are mainly psychological, such as the thirty-seven constituents of enlightenment (*bodhipakkhiyā dhammā*, q.v.) and different aspects of passions (*kilesa*, q.v.) enumerated under different categories such as unwholesome roots (*akusala-mūla*), mental hindrances (*nivaraṇa*), fetters (*saṃyojana*), latent passions (*anusaya*) and so on, scattered all over the *suttas*. An attempt has been made in some of the *suttas* (e.g. *Saṅgīti Sutta*, *D.* III, pp. 207-71; *Dasuttara Sutta*, ibid, pp. 272-93; *Anupada Sutta*, *M.* III. pp. 25-29) at putting these *dhammas* together and classifying them on some meaningful basis.

When we come to the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* of the Theravādins, especially its first book, the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* (q.v.), the same material that is found in the *suttas* are seen to be re-arranged and re-grouped from a variety of standpoints. Thus, in addition to the classifications of the same *dhammas* under categories such as "the defiled" (*sāsava*) and "the purified" (*anāsava*), "the conditioned" (*saṅkhata*) and "the unconditioned" (*asaṅkhata*) which are traceable in the *suttas*, the totality of existence is being analysed and classified from the point of view of ethics into three broad categories as "those that are wholesome" (*kusala-dhamma*), "those that are unwholesome "(*akusala-dhamma*) and "those that are neither wholesome nor unwholesome" (*avyākata-dhamma*).

Those instances of consciousness and those mental concomitants which are ethically wholesome are called *kusala-dhamma*. Likewise all instances of consciousness and mental concomitants which are ethically unwholsome are called *akusala-dhamma*. The last eategory of *dhammas*, called the *avyākata*, has four subdivisions, namely, the resultant consciousness (*vipāka-citta*), the functional consciousness (*kriyā-citta*), the elements of matter (*rūpa*) and the unconditioned "element", namely, Nibbāna.

This is an entirely new classification which is peculiar to the Theravāda Abhidhamma. And in this classification are found some new phenomena creeping into the category of matter; these are the properties of matter such as femininity (*itthindriya*) and even some phases of matter, namely , its (*rūpassa*) origin (*upacaya*), continuity (*santati*), decay (*jarā*) and impermanence (*aniccatā*).

Here one can see how the Theravādins achieved what they thought was comprehensiveness by including in the category of matter those phenomena, i.e., origin, impermanance etc. — which did not find their place in the earlier classifications into *khandha*, *dhātu* and *āyatana*.

The Vaibhāṣikas, i.e., the Sarvāstivādins, who were probably aware of the defects of the inclusion by Theravādins of phenomena like the origin and continuity (*upacaya* and *santati*) of matter in the category of matter, made an entirely new classification

in which the whole of existence is treated under categories, namely, the category of matter (*rūpa*), of mind (*citta*), of mental concomitants (*caitta* or *caitasika*), of the forces which are neither material nor mental (*rūpacitta-viprayukta-saṃskāra*), or simply (*viprayukta-saṃskāra*) and the unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*).

What is significant in this classification is the invention of a new category, the *viprayukta-saṃskāra*, in which not only the phenomena like the characteristics of the conditiond (*saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa*) namely, origion ((*jāti*), duration (*sthiti*), decay (*jaratā*) and destruction (*anityatā*) but even some new forces such as *prāpti* and *aprāpti* are included.

There are seventy-five *dharmas* in all; of the seventy-five, eleven are elements of matter, one is mind, forty-six are mental concomitants, fourteen are *viprayukta-saṃskāras* and three are *asaṃskṛta-dharmas*.

This school had invented a new element of matter by which they hoped to explain the link that exists between an action (*karma*) and its result (*vipāka*); it is described as the vehicle of moral qualities and is called *avijñapti* (q.v.) unmainfested matter. Although by no means physical, since it lacks the general characteristic of matter which is impenetrability, it nevertheless is brought under matter because of its close connection with the physical act.

Unlike the Theravādins who recognised every conceivable instance and aspect of mind as different *dhammas*, the Vaibhāṣikas, while accepting the existence of six types of sense-perception, considered mind (*citta*) to be a single *dhamma*. It is the *manas* in the role of an independent perceptive faculty that cognises the non-sensuous or abstract objects. *Cakṣurvijñāna* and other types of consciousness are the same pure *manas* when associated with the visual and other sense-data; the difference being only in the objects with which mind is associated. *Manovijñāna* again is the same pure consciousness when associated with a previous moment of the same run of consciousness without the participation by any of the five senses.

There are forty-six *caitta-dharmas* of which ten are *cittamahābhaumikas* which are present in every moment of consciousness and are comparable to the common *cetasikas* of the Theravāda list. Another ten are called *kusalamahābhaumikas* which are comparable to the *kusala-cetasikas* of the Theravādins. Six are *kleśamahābhaumikas* which are not always absolutely unwholesome; they are sometimes neutral (*avyākṛta*) in the progress towards final deliverance, but are nevertheless always obscured (*nivṛta-acchādita-kliṣṭa*) by promoting the belief in the existence of a personality. Two *caittas* are present in every moment of unwholesome consciousness and are called *akusala-mahābhaumika-dharmas*. Ten are secondary passions called *upakleśa-paritta-bhaumika-dharmas;* and the remaining eight *caittas* do not have any definite place in the scheme but are capable of entering into various combinations; they are called the *aniyata-bhaumika-dharmas*.

The most interesting is the category of fourteen *viprayukta -saṃskāras* in which a number of new *dharmas* are included.

In the last category called the unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) there are three *dharmas* of which space (*ākāśa*) is one. The inclusion of *ākāśa* in this category is also a new development (see *Abhidharmadīpa* with *Vibhāṣā-prabhāvṛtti*, pp. 65ff; *Abhk.* ii, *vs.* 22 ff).

Most probably, under the influence of this Vaibhāṣika-classification, the later Theravādins have modified their method of classification, and hence one finds the same *dhammas* which are classified in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* under the three categories of *kusala*, *akusala* and *avyākata*, being re-classified into four, namely, the category of mind (*citta*), of mental concomitants (*cetasika*), of matter (*rūpa*) and Nibbāna.

All instances and aspects of consciousness—be they *kusala*, *akusala* or *avyākata* — are treated in this classification as *dhammas* in the *citta*-category. There are eighty-nine such instances and aspects of mind. Twenty one of them are *kusala;* twelve are *akusala* and fifty-six are *avyākata* in two subdivisions, namely, *vipāka-cittas* consisting of thirty-six *dharmas* and *kriyā-cittas* consisting of twenty.

Likewise all mental concomitants, enumerated in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* under *kusala* and *akusala*, come under the category of *cetasika* in this classification. There are fifty-two *cetasikas* in all: twenty-five of them are *kusala*, fourteen are *akusala* and thirteen are common, since they associate themselves with both *kusala* and *akusala* (*sabbacitta-sādhāraṇa*; see CETASIKA).

The twenty-seven instances of matter enumerated in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* under *avyākata* come under *rūpa*-category. The commentators add one more

element of matter, namely, *hadaya-vatthu*, the physical base of mind, and make a total of twenty-eight material elements (see R0pa. I).

The Theravādins recognise only one *dhamma* as the unconditioned and that is Nibbāna.

Thus, it is seen how the schools evolved a new method of analysis and classification which, they thought, eliminated the defects inherent in the older methods and served their purpose of explaining the entirety of existence.

The Sautrāntika school has declared many of the *dharmas* listed by the Vaibhāşikas as merely ideal and reduced the number to forty-three.

The Mādhyamika school was not interested in finding out the number of *dharmas*, the number of categories among which the *dharmas* could be distributed and so on: it was only interested in finding the exact nature of *dharmas* (i.e. *dharmatā*) which the other schools had enumerated. Thus, in the direction of analysis and classification, there is no development of the *dharma*-theory in the Mādhyamika school.

The Yogācāra school, although not very much interested in enumeration and classification, has maintained a list of one-hundred *dharmas*, of which eleven are *rūpa-dharmas*, eight are *citta-dharmas*, fifty-one are *caitasikas*, twenty-four are *viprayukta-saṃskāras* and six are unconditioned (*Abhsy*. pp. 3-12; *mahāyānasatadharma-vidyāmukhaṃ*).

This school arrived at this number by inventing and adding new *dharmas* to the existing Vaibhāsika-list of seventy-five, the most significant among them being the invention of the eighth *vijñāna* called the *ālaya*.

Dharma	Theravāda	Vaibhāşika	Saurāntika	Yogācāra
rūpa	28	11	—	11
citta	89	01	—	08
caitta	52	46	—	51
viprayukta	—	14	—	24
asaṃskṛta	01	03	—	06
Total	170	75	—	100

The Nature of the Dhammas :

In the early *suttas* there are numerous instances where the *dhammas* are generally characterised as impermanent (*anicca*), a source of suffering (*dukkha*) and unsubstantial (*anatta*). *Anicca* refers to the causal origination (*paṭicca-samuppāda*) of all conditioned things (*saṅkhata-dhamma*); *dukkha* to the unrestful and conflicting and, therefore, unsatisfactory nature of the same conditioned things in their defiled (*sāsava*) state to be found in ordinary men (*puthujjana*) as opposed to their purified state (*anāsava*) to be found in the *arahants*. That the *dhammas* are devoid of any underlying substance (*anatta*) refers both to the conditioned and to the unconditioned.

Moreover, one frequently comes across statements made in the *suttas* that the conditioned phenomena are of the nature of origination(*uppāda, pabhava, samudaya*) and cessation (*vaya, nirodha*);[2] sometimes, three characteristics are given of the conditioned phenomena, namely, origination, cessation and becoming otherwise of that which is existing (*tīnimāni bhikkhave saṅkhatassa saṅkhata-lakkhaṇāni katamāni tini? uppādo paññāyati, vayo paññāyati, ṭhitassa aññāthattaṃ paññāyati: A*. I, p 152; cp. *S*. III, pp 38 ff.).

According to the scriptures quoted, all conditioned things are of the nature of origination, change and cessation. These characteristics are an elaboration of the fact of change (*anicca*) which characterises all conditioned things as opposed to the unoriginated (*ajāta, abhūta, akata*), permanent (*nicca, dhuva*), non-deteriorating and non-cessationist (*accuta, anirodha, amata*) nature of the unconditioned element (*asaṅkhatadhātu*), that is Nibbāna (cp. *Ud*. p. 80, *It*. pp. 37f. etc).

The three characteristics, *anicca, dukkha* and *anatta*, as descriptive of the nature of *dhammas*, are consistently upheld by all schools of Buddhism, down the ages. And, that is the reason why Buddhism generally came to be known as a system which took the unsubstantialist position (*anattavāda*) with regard to existence. In keeping with this basic tenet all schools of Buddhism, except perhaps the Vātsiputriyas, denied the reality of the individual (*satta*,

2 *aniccā vata saṅkhārā uppādavayadhammino* (*S*. IV, p. 14; *A*. I, p. 286, 296, II, p. 248; Here *saṅkhāra* is the same as *saṅkhata*).
ye dhammā hetuppabhavā . . . tesañca yo nirodho; *Vin*. I, p. 40
yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhammaṃ : Vin. I, p. 16.

puggala) or the soul (*atta*) while recognising the absolute reality of the unconditioned. Differences arose, however, when the schools tried to interpret the nature of the elements into which the so-called individual is analysed: whether these elements are real or unreal, or to what extent they are real, if at all.

There are schools which, while denying the reality of the individual, admit the reality of the elements of which the so-called individual is constituted. These schools may, therefore, be characterised as those that deny the reality of the individual (*pudgala-nairātmya-vādins*) but advocate the realtity of the elements (*dharma-vādins*). To this category fall the "Hīnayāna" schools of Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda. They have developed a system called the 'Abhidharma' and may as well be described as the 'Abhidharma-schools'.

This situation led to the emergence of a school which questioned the authority of the Abhidharma and appealed to return to the *suttas* in preference to Abhidharma. This school questioned the reality of many of the *dharmas* of the Abhidharma schools and rejected some of them as merely ideal. This is a kind of reaction to the Abhidharma systems. As this school based itself on the *suttas* and rejected the authority of the Abhidharma, it is called the Sautrāntika school.

The Mahāyāna-schools, especially the Mādhyamikas, rejected the reality of the *dharmas* on the ground that since the *dharmas* depend on other *dharmas* for their origination, existence and cessation, they are devoid of a nature of their own (*niḥsvabhāva*) and, as such, are unreal (*śūnya*).

The Yogācāra school, while accepting most of the views held by the Mādhyamikas, maintained the reality of consciousness alone.

These two schools may, therefore, be described as *dharmanairātmyavādins*, those who denied the reality of *dharmas* as well.

The following is an examination in brief of the views held by the schools with regard to the nature of *dharmas*.

Theravāda School:

It is in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, the first book of the Pali *Abhidhamma-Piṭaka* of the Theravādins, that is found for the first time in the history of Buddhist thought, a comprehensive analysis of existence, analysed and classified from a variety of standpoints which is mainly ethical; no metaphysical questions were raised and attempted to be answered. Consequently, there is no theory of *dhammas* as such formulated in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*.

Such a theory is found only in the Pali commentaries and the Abhidhamma manuals compiled in Sri Lanka from the fifth century A.C. onwards. In this theory is seen the influence of the Sarvāstivāda school; and this was possible because there was close contact between the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins as early as the third century B.C., as is evident from the *Kathāvatthu*, the fifth book of the Theravāda *Abhidhamma-Piṭaka*. In this text, for example, is found the Sarvāstivaāda theory of tri-temporal existence (*sabbamatthi*) being discussed and discarded as a fallacy by the Theravādins.

The Theravādins of Sri Lanka do not appear to have contributed much to the philosophical development of Buddhist thought. This may be explained by their isolated existence in Sri Lanka, away from the intellectual activity which was going on in India, where not only the Buddhist but also non-Buddhist schools came to grips with each other in their search for a satisfactory interpretation of existence. Buddhadatta, the author of the *Abhidhammāvatāra*, and his junior contemporary Buddhaghosa, the great Theravāda commentator, were both natives of India where they had been evidently in touch with Indian Buddhist traditions. This may explain why in the *Abhidhammāvatāra* is found a new classification of *dhammas* into four categories as *rūpa*, *citta*, *cetasika* and *nibbāna*. It is also to be noted that in the writings of these two scholars are found the traces of the *Sautrāntika* theories of *khaṇa*, *paramāṇu*, etc. The trend inaugurated by these two writers was later continued and developed by other writers like Anuruddha, the author of the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, and *Sumaṅgala*, the author of the *Abhidhammatthavikāsinī*, the *Abhidhammatthavibhāvinī*, the sub-commentaries (*ṭīkā*) on the *Abhidhammāvatāra* and the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* respectively.

Thus, in the Theravāda texts are found no less than three definitions of *dhammas*. One definition says that *dhamma* means "the absence of a being or a soul" (*nissatta-nijjīva: DhsA.* p. 38; *DA.* I, p. 99). This is not a new interpretation of *dhammas*, it is in perfect aggreement with the position taken up in so many *suttas* that *dhammas* are "things" which are unreal because they are dependent by nature

(*paticca-samuppanna*). Perhaps, this definition represented the tradition maintained in the Mahāvihāra when Buddhaghosa came to Sri Lanka.

The definition that "*dhammas* are those that bear their own nature" (*attano lakkhaṇaṃ dhārentīti dhammā*: *Vism.* p. 481; *VbhA.* p. 45; *sabhāvadharaṇato dhammā*: *DhsA.* p. 40) definitely represents a new way of thinking; it is similar to the Sarvāstivāda definition of *dhammas*, in which a tendency towards realism is noticeable.

This is more pronounced in the definition given by Buddhadatta, namely, that the *dhammas* possess particular and general characteristics (*sāmaññaṃ vā sabhāvo vā dhammānaṃ lakkhaṇaṃ mataṃ: Abhvt.* v. 633). And Sumaṅgala comments that *dhammas* are things which bear their own particular and general characteristics (*sabhāva-sāmañña-lakkhaṇaṃ dhārentīti dhammā: Abhidhammattha-vikāsinī*, ed. A. P. Buddhadatta, Colombo, 1961, p. 11). This is identical with the Sarvāstivāda definition (*sva-sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-dharaṇāt dharmāḥ: AbhKvy.* p. 12).

But neither Buddhadatta nor Buddhaghosa seems to have understood *sabhāva* the way *svabhāva* was understood by the Sarvāstivādins. Buddhadatta took both *sāmaññña* and *sabhāva* to be the characteristics (*lakkhaṇa*) of *dhammas*. Hardness (*kakkhalatta*), for example, is the particular characteristic (*sabhāva-lakkhaṇo*) of earth (*paṭhavi*); and forming (*ruppana*) is its general characteristic (*sāmañña lakkhaṇa*); the former is peculair to earth whereas the latter is common to all elements of matter.

They never considered *dhammas* to be things in themselves, or as substances with attributes: Earth is not the substance of which hardness and forming are attributes. The correct position is that earth is hardness or matter is forming, for, there is nothing called hardness apart from earth or earth apart from hardness; there is no forming apart from matter or matter apart from forming and so on.

But the fact remains that, according to these writers, the *dhammas* exist and possess their own nature, particular and general. This position is not exactly in accord with the *suttas* which considered these *dhammas* to be mere bubbles, a mirage and so on (*phenapiṇḍūpamaṃ rūpaṃ, vedanā bubbulūpamā marīcikūpamā saññā saṅkhārā kadalūpamaṃ māyūpamañca viññāṇaṃ: S.* III, p. 142). But, in defining *dhammas* as "things which possess their own particular and general characteristics" one notices a tendency towards realism on the part of the Theravādins.

This tendency is more pronounced in Anuruddha's *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha* where the author puts all four categories of *dhammas* on the same level as far as their reality is concerned. He uses the term *abhidhammattha* in referring to these *dhammas* and treats them as real in the philosophic sense (*tattha vuttābhidhammatthā catudhā paramatthato: Abhs.* p. 1).

The Theravādins have thus developed the *dharma*-theory to a point where *dhammas* are considered ultimate and real: ultimate in the sense that it is *dhammas* alone which obtain in the ultimate analysis of existence; and real in the sense that they possess their own characteristics. The latter statement should be understood in a qualified sense, because in actual fact there is no difference between the *dharmas* and their characteristics: the characteristics themselves are the *dhammas*.

What is the nature of reality that the impermanent *dhammas* enjoy? Reality in this case does not mean independent existence. It is true that *dhammas* exist but they exist depending on causes (*suddhadhammā pavattanti hetusambhārapaccayā*). When the causes are no more, the *dhammas* cease to exist. Attempts have been made to determine the duration of a *dhamma*, the interval between origin and cessation of a *dhamma* (*Kvu.* xxii. 8, *Abhkbh.* iii, 15). For this purpose the Theravādins made use of the three characteristics of that which is *saṅkhata* (conditioned), *uppāda*, *vaya* and *ṭhitassa aññathatta* (*A.* I, p. 152). They explained *uppāda* as origination (*jāti*), *vaya* as cessation (*bhaṅga*) and *ṭhitassa aññathatta* as decay (*jarā*). Since *jarā* implies a modification of the same *dharma* – a situation that leads to the acceptance of *pariṇāma-vāda* – *jaratā* was sought to be explained as *ṭhiti* (subsistence). It is only in a figurative sense that *ṭhiti* is called *jaratā*, because it is during this phase that a *dhamma* turns towards its own destruction (*nirodhābhimukhavatta*).

These three represent the three momentary phases of a *dhamma* in its real existence; a *dhamma* arises in the first moment, persists in the second moment and ceases to exist in the third.

Thus, the *dhammas* are real; the real is momentary; it is not permanent, not substantial, not entitative. They are components; the components are real; the combination is appearance and is, therefore, not real.

II. The Vaibhāṣika School :

The *dharmas*, according to this school, are realities, i.e., things that really exist (*satvastu: Abhidharmadīpa* with *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛttī*, abbreviated: *Abhd.* ed. P. S. Jaini, Patna, 1959, p. 38). Reality is efficiency (*arthakriyākāritva*); and efficiency is described as origin (*jāti*), subsistence (*sthiti*), decay (*jarā*) and destruction (*nāsa: Abhd.* p. 105)[3]. What does not originate, subsist, decay and vanish does not exist and is, therefore, not real. Thus, reality is synoymous with origin, subsistence, decay and destruction. Since origin etc. are an elaboration of the doctrine of impermanence (*anityatā*), reality may be considered as impermanence.

In the opinion of the Vaibhāṣikas, every *dharma* that exists in the phenonenal sphere is affected simultaneously by the four forces of *jāti*, *sthiti*, *jaratā* and *nāsa*. They explain that, although the four forces may be opposed to each other, yet their effect may result in some single real fact, as, for instance, supposing three assassins have resolved togehter to kill a man hiding in some dark recess: one of them pulls him out (*jāti*), the other seizes him (*sthiti*) and the third stabs him (*nāsa*), all acting simultaneously. The reality is the moment of action, of its being achieved. (*AbhKbh.* ii, 46).

Against the idea of a *dharma* which is simultaneously originating, subsisting, decaying and vanishing, the very natural objection was raised by other Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools that production (*jāti*) and destruction (*nāsa*) could not be simultaneous. The Vaibhāṣikas met the objection by pointing to the difference between a *dharma* in itself, i.e., its real nature or substance (*svabhāva*) and its efficiency moment, its function or manifestation, or characteristic (*lakṣaṇa: AbhK.* pp. 259–60; *Abhkvy.* 26). The former explains the continuity of phenomena, the latter their perceptibility.

It is this twofold nature of *dharmas* that is brought out in the definition of *dharmas* as things which bear their own particular and general characteristics (*svasāmānyalakṣaṇa-dhāraṇāt dharmāḥ: AbhKvy.* p. 12). *Svabhāva* or own nature is synonymous with *svalakṣaṇa*, individual and specific character. Whatever is possessed of a specific character possesses its own nature and is, therefore, real. The terms used as synonyms of *dharma* are *svabhāva*, *svalakṣaṇa*, *drayya* and *paramārthasat* (*AbhK.* I, p. 325. IV, pp. 108, 158f, VI, p. 139).

This *svabhāva* which is *paramārthasat* is the real essence of the *dharma* and does exist for ever (*sarvadā*): in the past, the present and the future. It represents the potential appearances of a *dharma* into phenomenal world, and this appearance is called its *lakṣaṇa* which is perceptible. *Svabhāva* again represents the past appearances of a *dharma* as well. The future potential *dharmas* are classified into two categories; those that will appear (*utpatti-dharma*) and those that are suppressed and will never appear (*anutpatti-dharma: AbhK.* I, pp. 246–250).

When the Vaibhāṣikas maintain, as they do, that everything exists for ever (*sarvaṃ sarvadā asti*) it means that all *dharmas* exist in the three periods of time, and the emphasis put on the reality (*svabhāva*) of *dharmas* is indicative of the conception that not only their present, but their past as well as future transition, too, represent something real. From this fundamental tenet the Vaibhāṣikas derive their name, Sarvāstivāda, doctrine that "everything exists"

As is evident from the *Kathāvatthu*, some of the Sarvāstivāda views such as that everything exists (*Kvu.* pp. 115f.) and that the past and the future are real, are vehmently criticised by the Theravādins. This shows that the early Theravādins have maintained the phenomenalist view of existence as against the substance (*svabhāva*) – view of the Sarvāstivādins. Thus, although they used the word *sabhāva* in defining *dhammas*, they never made the distinction between *svabhāva* and *lakṣaṇa* of *dharmas*. Although they were very much careful in avoiding it, a tendency toward realism is noticeable in their interpretation of *dhammas*. And, there was at least one scholar who noticed this tendency and cautioned about it in his writings.

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3 These four forces (*saṃskāra*) are called the *sasṃkṛta lakṣaṇa* and are a development of the three characteristics of the conditioned mentionded in a *sutta* (*A.* I, p. 152), namely, *uppāda*, *vaya* and *ṭhitassa aññathatta*. The Vaibhāṣikas have split the "*ṭhitassa aññathatta*" into *sthiti* and *jarā*; cp. *AbhKbh.* ii, 45; *Mdhvṛ.* pp. 145, 171; *Catuḥśatakavṛtti*, p. 232.

Our reference is to Ānanda who wrote the sub-commentary to the Buddhaghosa's commentaries on the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*. While adopting Buddhaghosa's definitions of *dhammas* as "those which bear their own nature" he immediately sounded a warning against any wrong implications that this definition may carry. "There is no *dhamma*," he says, "over and above the nature of bearing" (*na ca dhariyamānasabhāvā aññe dhammo nāma atthi: Abhidhammamūlaṭīkā, Dhammasaṅgaṇiṭīkā*, ed. D. Paññāsāra and P. Wimaladhamma, Colombo, 1938 p. 21). Taking the example of "forming" (*ruppana*) as the characteristic nature of "form" (*rūpa*), Ānanda maintains that there is not "form", etc. apart from "forming", etc., nor earth, etc. apart from hardness, etc. (*nahi ruppanādihi aññe rūpādayo, kakkhalādihi ca aññe paṭhavi ādayo dhammā vijjanti;* ibid. pp. 21-22). Here is a definite denial of a "substance" (*sabhāva-svabhāva*) over and above the perceptible characteristics.

Ānanda's determination to sound this warning seems to have sprung from the fear that the generally accepted definition of *dhamma* as that which bears its own nature may be misconstrued to mean that there is a substance, because, according to Yaśomitra, *svabhāva* is equivalent to *ātma* (*svabhāvate ityātmatahi: AbhKvy.* p. 362). Furthremore, the Sarvāstivāda view that substance (*svabhāva*) exists during the three periods of time – the past, the present and the future – has been rejected by Ānanda (*Mūlaṭīkā*, p. 46).

These views represent the Sautrāntika school which adopted a phenomenalistic view of existence.

There was another school which occupied an intermediate position between the Sarvāstivādins and the Theravādins; it maintained the reality of the present facts and that part of the past ones which has not already lost their influence. But it denied the reality of the future ones and of that part of the past ones which had ceased to exhibit any influence. In the *Kathāvatthu*-commentary such opinions are attributed to the Kassapiyas (*KvuA.* i, 8).

The Vātsiputriyas (Vajjiputtiyas or Vajjiputtakas) with the Sammitiyas (*Kvu.* pp. 1ff.) held tenaciously to the doctrine of the individual (*puggala*) as a quasi-permanent entity, neither completely identical with, nor different from, the elements. They seem to have argued that the stream of momentary *dharmas* cannot completely substitute the individuality and that, therefore, some kind of synthetic unity must be accepted as a satisfactory explanation of the basic facts of experience such as memory, moral responsibility and rebirth.

There is also the issue involving the duration of a *dhamma*. In interpreting the three characteristics of phenomena (*saṅkhata-lakkhaṇa: A.* I. p. 152), the Sarvāstivādins developed a theory of four characteristics by splitting *ṭhitassa aññathatta* into two, namely, *sthiti* and *jaratā*. The recognition of the two characteristics of subsistence and decay as applicable to one momentary *dharma* is one of the main features of the Sarvāstivāda theory. The Thervādins recognised three moments, namely, nascent (*uppāda*), static (*ṭhiti*) and cessant (*bhaṅga*) in the duration of a *dhamma*. However, Ānanda rejected the static moment as not warranted by the *sutta*-passage (*A.* I, p. 152) and attributed this rejection to the Abhayagirivāsins.[4]

III. Sautrāntika School :

The *dharma*-theory of the Abhidharma schools is a polemic against the substance, the permanent and the universal conceived as real in the systems of the *ātma*-tradition. This theory ended up as a radical pluralism where a number of elements were considered real (*svabhāva*) in the ultimate sense. It is about this theory that the Sautrāntika school is mainly concerned.

The Sautrāntikas were a school which based itself solely on the *sūtras*, *suttas* (hence its name), and rejected the authority of the Abhidharma. What this school advocated could be described as a partial modification of the Sarvāstivāda theory of *dharmas*. As a critical realism this school developed the doctrine of conceptual construction (*vikalpa*) as complementary to the doctrine of elements.

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4 *santati-paccuppannaṃce'ttha aṭṭhakathāsu āgataṃ; addhapaccuppannaṃ sutte: keci khaṇapaccuppannaṃ cittaṃ cetopariyañāṇassa ārammaṇaṃ hotīti vadanti:* (*DhsA.* p. 421).
kecit Abhayagirivāsin'oti vadanti; te pana cittassa ṭhitikkhaṇaṃ na icchanti, (*Mūlaṭīkā*, p. 140).
Ānandācariyo pana cittassa ṭhitikkhaṇaṃ eva natthi, bhaṅgakkhaṇe rūpuppādo natthīti catusamuṭṭhānikānipi rūpāni cittassa uppādakkhaṇe yeva hontīti āha (*Abhidhammatthavikāsinī*, p. 304).

They declared many of the *dharmas* listed by the Sarvāstivādins as merely ideal.[5] (*prajñapti sat*). They cut down the number of *dharmas* (there are seventy five of them in the Sarvāstivāda analysis) to forty (Appendix D. *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, restored from Chinese and Tibetan into Sanskrit by N. A. Sastri, Adyar Library Series, No. 32).

Among the *dharmas* they rejected are what the Sarvāstivādins categorised as *viprayukta-saṃskāra*, which are fourteen in number. They concentrated mainly on four of them, the characteristics of the conditioned, namely, origination (*jāti*), duration (*sthiti*), decay (*jarā*) and cessation (*nāsa*); and argued that the corresponding notions of these four refer not to a single moment, but to a series of them (*santāna: AbhKbh.* ii, 46, *Mdhvṛ.* 444, pp. 523). Even if applied to a single moment, the four characteristics do not have objective counterparts; they are mere values for the fact that a momentary entity appears (*uppāda-jāti*) and disappears (*vaya-nāsa:* loc. cit.)

Even as mere characteristics, they did not recognise duration (*sthiti*) and decay (*jarā*) of a single momentary *dharma*. One of the most important problems connected with the theory of moments (*kṣaṇavāda*) on which the Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas disputed with each other is the recognition of duration and decay of a *dharma*.[6] The Sautrāntikas held that a *dharma* disappears as soon as it appears, without having any time to subsist (*sthiti*) or decay (*jarā*). One of the consequences of the theory of moments, a consequence which was accepted by the Theravādins, the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas, is the denial of motion.

A *dharma* cannot move because it appears; there is no time for it to move. In keeping with this position, motion, too, is given a new interpretation. Motion, according to them, is not the movement of a *dharma*, a visible object; to take an easy example from one locus in space, to another (*disantaragamana*) but is the appearance of different *dharmas* in adjacent locations (*deśāntarotpatti*: *AbhKvy.* p. 33), for in the case of *dharmas* which are momentary, wherever appearance takes place, there itself takes place disappearance (*yatraiva utpattiḥ tatraiva vināśaḥ:* loc. cit. see also *AbhKbh*, ii. 46; *Abhidharmadīpa*, p. 105, n. 2). The classic example given in this connection is the light of a lamp. The so-called light of the lamp is nothing but a common designation given to an uninterrupted production of a series of flashing points. When the production changes place one says that the light has changed. But, in reality, other flames have appeared in other places (see Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, I, p. 99).

They also denied the reality of the past and the future in the direct sense; they admitted the reality only of the present. The future, they contended, was not real before becoming present; and the past was not real after having been present (*AbhKbh. v.* 24 f.)

IV. Mādhyamika School :

Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Mādhyamika school, sees *dharmas* from an entirely different angle. He reinterprets the causal law (*pratītyasamutpāda*) to mean relativity (*śūnyatā*) and, on the basis of that interpretation, undertakes a thorough examination of the *dharma*-theory of the Abhidharma-schools, and comes to the conclusion that nothing is real if taken separately. The system he founded may be described as a revolution from a radical pluralism to a radical absolutism: the change was from a plurality of discrete and momentary elements (*dharmas*) to the essential unity underlying them (*dharmatā*).

He takes every aspect of the *dharma*-theory for examination, viz., the characteristics of the conditioned, the primary and secondary elements, the notions of the agent, the instrument and activity, the distinction between definitum and definition, and so on.

The three characteristics of the conditioned mentioned in the *sutta* (*A.* I, p. 152) have been variously elaborated in different schools. (*AA.* II, p. 252;

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5 *Pañcemāni bhikṣavaḥ sanjñāmātraṃ pratijñā* (*prajñapti*) *mātraṃ vyavahāramātraṃ saṃvṛtimātraṃ, yadutātītodhvanāgatodhvakāsaṃ nirvāṇam pudgalaśceti*: quoted in *Mdhṛr.* p. 389, *Catuḥśatakavṛtti*, pp. 59-60.

6 For a detailed discussion of the Sarvāstivāda view, see *Abhidharmadīpa*, pp. 104–105. The Sautrāntika views are recorded at *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, ed.* P. Pradhan, ii, 46, quoted by P. S. Jaini in *Abhidharmadīpa*, p. 105).

Abhidharmadīpa, pp. 104ff; *AbhKbh.* II, p. 45; *AbhKVy.* pp. 17ff; *Mdhvṛ.* pp. 145, 171; *Catuḥśatakavṛtti*, p. 232). The question with regard to the *dharmas* is about the dynamics of the world: the modes of the combination of *dharmas* to make phenomena, the way in which things appear and disappear. The Mādhyamika criticism is that each one of these three or four characteristics is not a complete definition of momentary *dharmas*, for then we shall have the anomaly of the origination of a *dharma* which has no duration or destruction; or of a thing that dies but was not born at all not to speak of duration (*Mdhvṛ.* p. 146). To escape this predicament it might be held, as did the Vaibhāṣikas, that all three or four together characterise the *dharmas*. But the three or four functions, namely, origination, duration, decay and destruction cannot apply to a thing simultaneously, for they are opposed to each other by their very nature (*Catuś.* xv. 2); nor do they operate on a thing successively, for this would mean that at the time of origination the thing is permanent, and only later it ceases to be and *vice versa*.

As the definition of *dharmas* should apply universally to all things, it is pertinent to ask whether it applies to each one of these characteristics as well, for they, too, are *dharmas*, and should satisfy the definition of *dharmas*. Does origination, for example, like other *dharmas* such as a visible object, originate, endure and cease? If it does not, there would be certain things which are unwarranted exceptions to the universal maxim which thereby loses its compelling character as invariably true of all *dharmas*. If it does, it would lead to the origination of origination and so on, *ad infinitum*.

According to the Sarvāstivādins, all the four forces operate on a thing at once (*AbhKvy.* pp. 174ff; *Mdhvṛ.* pp. 545 ff.). This they have to maintain in view of their theory of momentariness (*kṣaṇavāda*). The Mādhyamikas point out that the momentary cannot be accepted because a momentary *dharma* cannot decay, being unitary; if it has an end, it must have a beginning and a middle. So nothing is really momentary; and, as a result, the entire structure built upon the momentary must also collapse (*Mdhvṛ.* pp. 149f.; 546; *Catuḥśatakavṛtti*, XV, 12).

A more serious difficulty about the notion of characteristics is: How are we to conceive origination, duration and cessation? Does the thing which is already present in its natural form come into being or that which was non-existent originate? (*Mdhvṛ.* p. 162). When a thing already exists and is in the form natural to it, why and how would it come into being again? And if it does not exist, how does it originate at all? When there is no entity before and after, there is no "it" which comes into being. There is no subject of which, we can predicate that "it" has come into being; there is just origination, but it cannot be predicted of anything.

The difficulty is not one concerning the correct verbal formulation; it is fundamental to any momentary view of things. If whatever exists is just that moment, nothing before or after, how can it be said to originate, endure or cease? We might analyse a thing away into subtler moments, but each moment would be a discrete self-contained element; and there is no movement or change of it into another different state. Each distinguishable state is an element and nothing can be predicted of "it". In fact, there is no "it", the thing which changes or moves from one state to another. The states are the only actuality; they cannot even be compared with one another; they are so discrete and disconnected that no relation can obtain among them.

This is the insuperable difficulty which Nāgārjuna brings home to the Sarvāstivādins in various ways by asking, "What originates"? Not that which is already present; nor that which is not existent; and there is nothing which is neither the one nor the other (*Mdhvṛ.* pp. 160f.) What endures and what changes are also equally inexplicable (op. cit. p. 164). Cessation cannot be understood as self-annihilation or destruction caused by external forces, or both or neither (op. cit. p. 171).

The Mādhyamikas came to the conclusion, as a result of their examination of the *saṃskṛta dharma*, that origination, duration and cessation are inexplicable like illusion, the dream object or the fairy-castle (*Mdhvṛ.* p. 177; *Catuś.* xii. 25).

The *saṃskṛta* being thus untenable, the *asaṃskṛta*, too, is unavailable, for one is relative to the other (*Mdhvṛ.* pp. 177 ff.).

Another notion that Nāgāruna has taken for examination is the distinction made between primary and secondary elements and the grouping thereof. Matter (*rūpa*) is divided into primary matter (*bhūta-rūpa*) and derived matter (*bhautika* or *upādā rūpa*). Likewise, mind (*vijñāna*, *citta* or *manas*) is pure consciousness or mind *par excellence* and the others,

namely, feelings (*vedanā*), perceptions (*saṃjñā*), etc. are mentals (*caitta* or *caitasika*: *Abhidharmadīpa*; pp. 76 ff.) A system which refused to admit any self-becoming or transformation of a substantial being into temporal modes has perforce to explain the causal nexus as mere arrangement of external groupings of the discrete elements. The grouping itself is not an inherent organic feature of the *dhammas*. Nāgārjuna's criticism is that, in the first place, division into primary and secondary elements is untenable, and, secondly, the causal principle which is at the basis of grouping of *dhammas* is unintelligible.

There is no secondary matter apart from the primary causes thereof. If so, it would be adventitious and baseless, and there is no phenomenon that is without cause. Nor is primary matter conceivable without the secondary. For, in that case, this would be a cause which does not issue forth into the effect; it would be no cause at all. The original and the derivative are not intelligible either as related or as unrelated to each other. The effect cannot be understood as similar to, or identical with, the cause. For, propositions true of the one are not true of the other, and *vice versa*. The secondary matter, the objects of the sense for example, are perceptible and are of a sizable magnitude. This serves various empirical uses. Primary matter is imperceptible and serves no utility. The identity of causes and effects cannot thus be countenanced. We cannot however accept the other alternative of an ultimate difference between the two as this would cut at the very root of the causal relation (*Mdhvṛ*. pp. 123 ff.)

These considerations apply with equal force to the mind and the mentals as well (loc. cit.).

Another aspect of the *dharma*-theory that has been examined by Nāgārjuna is the agent and instrument of activity in relation to the existence of mere *dharmas* (*nirvyāpāra-dharmamātraṃ* : *Mdhvṛ*. p. 116; *saṅkhatāni anāgamanato aniggamanato daṭṭhabbāni, tathā nirīhakato avyāparato ca* : *Vism*. pp. 410 f.; *kammassa kārako natthi vipākassa ca vedako suddhadhammā pavattanti* : *Vism*. p. 517).

The functions of the sense-organs, for example, can be taken as that of an active agent (that which sees etc.) or as an instrument of vision (that by which things are seen etc.). In either case, the intention is to provide an account of the cognitive process without having to suppose an immutable substratum like the *ātman*, underlying them.

The Mādhyamika criticism is that the eye does not see itself; and, without self-perception, how can it perceive others? "Seeing oneself would mean the untenable bifurcation of a thing into 'the seer' and 'the seen'. It may be urged that the eye need not see itself to see objects, as fire burns the wood without burning itself. But this is subject to difficulties considered with regard to motion. What is seen cannot be that which has already been seen, or that which is unseen, and there is no third class of objects as "the being seen". Likewise the suggestions may be raised about the seer : Who sees ? Not the seer, for this is a flat contradiction, and there is no third alternative (*Mdhvṛ*. pp. 113 ff.).

The instrument view of the sense-organs does not fare much better. An instrument implies an agent who operates the instrument: one who sees by means of the eye etc. But an agent is untenable, as he cannot be conceived as seeing himself with the eye as his instrument , and without this self-perception how can he perceive others? Nor can he be conceived as perceiving others without perceiving himself (*Mdhvṛ*. p. 117). A further general difficulty is that the seer is not intelligible as identical with, or different from the activity of seeing. And, without the agent there can be no seeing of the object (*Mūlamādhyamikakārikā*, iii, *v*. 6). The considerations in the case of the eye apply equally to the other sense-organs (op. cit. iii, *v*. 9).

Advocating as he does a theory of elements which are discrete and momentary, emerging and subsiding, without any activity or agent, the Sarvāstivādin might welcome the above Mādhyamika criticism as falling in line with his own standpoint: perception on this view would not be the seeing of an object by the percipient, there being no activity, but the momentary emergence into being of an element, called conventionably the eye, simultaneously with that of another element called the sense datum of colour followed by the visual consciousness. But without the activity exerted by a thing, the Mādhyamika cogently urges, there cannot be the emergence of the discrete elements even; they would be utterly inefficient and unreal like the sky-lotus. If we confine ourselves to the phenomenal point of view — if we propose merely to give a trascription of what obtains in everyday experience — we must accept, besides the elements, the activity and the agent. From the noumenal point of view, the elements, too, are as unreal as the activity which the Sarvāstivādin rightly rejects. The Mādhyamika standpoint is that

the modes by themselves cannot offer an adequate explanation of phenomena. Substance must be accepted, too. Both are of empirical validity only.

Nāgārjuna criticises another aspect of the *dharma*-theory while examining the six primary elements (*dhātu*), and that is the definitum (*lakṣya*) and definition (*lakṣaṇa*) aspect. A basic element, to be distinguished from another, must possess specific characters-differentia or difinition — which separates it from others. The Buddhistic definitions of elements, are, for example, hardness of earth, cohesion of water, non -obstruction of space and so on. Is there any distinction between the definitum i.e., the earth etc., and their definition, i.e., hardness etc.? If there is not, we cannot define them; nor distinguish one from the other. Once a distinction is accepted, we may further ask whether the definition is prior to the defining characteristics, or not? If the definition could exist without its specific property, then it would be non-descript in itself and a non-descript entity is a non-entity; such a thing is not an object of experience. If there is no characteristic entity, to what will an attribute or definition apply (*Mdhvṛ*. pp. 129 f.).

It might be urged that these objections militate against the existence of a positive entity (*bhāva*). But, space (*ākāśa*), one of the six primary elements, need not be conceived as a positive existence. In fact, it is the absence (*abhāva*) of obstruction. The conception of *ākāśa* as a negative is not tenable, for a negative fact is but the negation of a positive entity: and if the latter is not available, the former is not so either: *abhāva* is *bhāva* (*Mdhvṛ*. p. 132).

Similar considerations apply to other *dharmas* as well. They do not have an immutable absolute, unconditioned nature of their own (*svabhāva*). Without *svabhāva* when there is nothing as itself — how can there be another?: for, another is but the *svabhāva* of the different (*Mdhvṛ*. pp. 262 — 66). Those who have recourse to such speculations with regard to the real, considering it as positive or as negative, as substance or as mode, (as earth, mind etc.) miss the essence of the Buddha's teaching (*Mdhvṛ*. p. 267). "thou that affirm the existence of things or deny their existence do not perceive the ultimate truth that is the benign cessation" (*Mdhvṛ*. pp. 134 ff.) The Buddha has clearly declared that one should not get into the muddle of views about "is" or "not is"; that is the way of *saṃsāra*, and one does not thereby attain freedom from sorrow (*Mdhvṛ*. p. 269).

While examining the *dharma*-theory in relation to the *anātma*-doctrine, Nāgārjuna rejects both the substance view (*ātma-vāda*) and the modal view (*dharma-vāda*) as untenable. The Buddhists generally conceive *ātma* or *pudgala* as a conventional name (*sammuti*, *prajñapti*) for a series of discrete momentary elements. There is nothing unitary or identical amidst the changing elements, and nothing hidden beneath them as an *ātman*. Phenomena such as memory, recognition, moral responsibility and rebirth are all attempted to be explained on the hypothesis of momentary elements (*Abhidharmadīpa*, *vv*. 27ff.).

The Mādhyamika criticism is that the self (*ātman*) is not the elements (*dharma*) that originate and cease: how can the experiencing subject (*upādātā*) be identical with the experienced states (*upādāna: Mdhvṛ*. p. 576)? The modal view wrongly identifies the agent with the act: the subject and the object (*ekatvaṃ kartṛkarmaṇoḥ*). A multitude of qualities does not constitute a substance. A bundle of states is not the self. Bereft of unity they fall asunder and make for disorder. The substance (or 'self') is the unifying factor which integrates several acts making mental life continuous and coherent. If the *ātman* were totally different from elements, it could be apprehended apart from them: as the table is perceived apart from the chair. It is not so perceived (op. cit. p. 577), and hence it is merely considered to exisn owing to thought-construction (*vikalpa*). *Ātmas*t is the egoity (*ahaṁkāra*) reflected in the elemend enjoying a semblance of independence, identity ana permanence. It is thus a construct read into manifold of elements (*Mdhvṛ*. p. 345).

From the modal view there are the discrete andl momentary states only. There is no principlenoi unity. Yet, mental life is inexplicable without soge kind of unity. From the substance-view thermt' the unitary and identical self, rigid and standee,' aloof from states which it (the self) is presumedof[li] shape into order. But the self has no meaning apa,[r] from the states and mental activity. The two, th[s] self and the states (the *ātman* and the *dharmas*)[e] are mutually dependent, and hence are unrea[t] (*Mdhvṛ*. 189–90). "The self is not different from the states," says Nāgārjuna, "nor identical with them there is no self without the states, nor is it to b considered non-existent" (*Mūlamādhyamikakārikā* xxxii, *v*. 8).

The Buddha's teaching is adjusted to the need of the taught as the medicine of the skilled physiciae is to the malady of the patient. He does not prescribe

one remedy to all and sundry. To those wih nihilistic tendencies (*ucchedadṛṣṭi*) the Buddha does not deny the existence of *ātman*, for there is the continuity of *karma* and its results. To those addicted to the dogmatic belief in a changeless substantial *ātman* (*sāsvatadṛṣṭi*) he teaches the no-self (*anatta* — *nairātmya*) doctrine as an antidote (*S.* IV, pp. 400f.); hiṣ ultimate teaching is that there is neither self nor no-self (*M.* I, p. 8) as these are subjective devices (*Mdhvṛ.* pp. 356–60). The real as the indeterminate is free (*śūnya*) from conceptual construction (*Mūlamādhyamikakārikā:* xxii, *v.* 7).

The seemingly divergent utterances of the Buddha may also be taken as addressed not to different individuals, but to one individual in different stages of spiritual progress. The purpose is to wean one away from vice, and to achieve this end the existence of self as meaning continuity of *karma* and its results is taught; then to get rid of attachment, the no-self doctrine is preached; finally for realising complete freedom, giving up of all views is insisted on (*Catuś.* vii. *v.* 15). The real is transcendent to thought and is non-dual in relation to the duality of "is" and "not-is".

It may be urged that the Mādhyamikas, by their criticism of the origination etc. of the conditioned (*saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa*) have nullified the Buddha's key doctrine of causal origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*). The Mādhyamikas reply by pointing out the obtuseness of the Abhidharma system which, according to them, misses the real essence of the master's teaching. In declaring: "this is dependent on that" the Buddha has clearly said that there is nothing in itself, that everything is relative, (*Mdhvṛ.* p. 159). A thing existing in itself in its own nature (*sabhāva* or *svabhāva*) retains the state and form natural to itself. Being already present, it need not depend on any other. It does not come into being. Consequently, the view that things have a fixed nature of their own militates against their dependent origination. "It is thus you", says Candrakirti to the Abhidharmikas, "who uphold the view of fixed nature of *dharmas* that contradict the doctrine of *pratītyasamutpādā*" (*Mdhvṛ.* p. 160). And in consequence thereof, the entire Buddhist philosophy is vitiated. The scriptures say that whosoever perceives the exact nature of *pratītyasamutpāda* perceives the *dhamma*, and whosoever perceives the *dhamma* perceives the Buddha (*M.* I, pp. 190f.; *S.* III, p. 120; *Āryaśālistamba Sūtra*, ed. N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Adyar, Madras, 1950, p. 20; *Bcp.* p. 386; *Mdhvṛ.* p. 160).

Pratītyasamutpāda is not the temporal sequence of origin and cessation of momentary *dharmas*, but their mutual dependence (*imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti: M.* I. pp. 262–64; *S.* II, pp. 28 70, 96 etc; *asmiṃ sati idaṃ bhavati: Āryaśālistamba Sūtra*, p. 2; *Mhvu.* II, p. 285 *Bcp.* p. 182; *Mdhvṛ.* p. 9), their lack of enitity or reality. It is thus equated with the unreality of things (*śūnyatā, niḥsvabhāvatā*).

The Buddha has suggested the doctrine of elements (i.e.; *khandha, dhātu, āyatana, dhamma* etc.) at very many places in his dialogues. But, that he did not mean it to be an ultimate standpoint is evident from certain trends in the *suttas* themselves. In the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, for example, he declared the five aggregates to be illusory, mere bubbles etc. (*S.* III, p. 142). And, in the *Majjhima Nikāya*, it is stated: "depending on the oil and the wick does the light of the lamp burn; it is neither in the one, nor in the other, nor anything in itself; the *dhammas* are likewise nothing in themselves. All things are unreal; they are deceptions; Nibbāna is the only reality" (*M.* III, p. 245).

Basing himself on this statement, Nāgārjuna says-: "In declaring that it is deceptive and illusory, the Buddha means *śūnyatā*, the dependence, the relativity, of things (*Mūlamādhyamikakārikā*; xiii, *v.* 2).

The passages favouring the unreality of *dharmas* may be few and greatly interspersed with texts giving the *dharma*-theory that the *dharmas* exist as *khandhas, dhātus* and *āyatanas*: these may be taken to mean as having phenomenal validity., still their formulation would be significant. But the few texts which speak of them as illusory etc. and fit to be rejected as *diṭṭhis* cannot be understood, in any other manner except as the ultmate teaching.

Thus the Mādhyamika system, in a sense, is the reaffirming of the oldest and central teaching of the Buddha, as is recorded in the *suttas*. With the no-soul-theory it relegates the soul, the permanent, the whole and the universal to the realm of the unreal. It maintains them to be purely subjective forms (*vikalpa*) lacking reality. Not empirical in origin, the *vikalpas* are *a priori* forms which the uncritical mind (*bāla-pṛthagjana*) superimposes on what actually are momentary, particular elements of existence. The real is devoid (*śūnya*) of conceptual constructions (*vikalpa*); it is transcendent to thought, and can be realised only in non-dual comprehension (*prajñā*) or intention which is the absolute itself. It is the awareness of things as they really are

(*yathābhūta-ñāṇa, dharmatā*). The absolute, in a sense, transcends phenomena, (*dharma*) as it is devoid of the empiric and, in a vital sense, is immanent or identical with phenomena as their reality. The difference between the two, *dharmatā* and *dharmas*, is theoretical and not real. "There is not the least difference between the absolute and the universe", declares Nāgārjuna, "the universe viewed as whole is the absolute; viewed as a process, it is the phenomenal. This same world, when causes and conditions are disregarded, is called the absolute" (*yā ajavaṃ javībhāva upādāya pratītya vā so pratītyanupādāya nirvāṇamupadiśyate: Mūla-mādhyamakakārikā*, xxv. *v*. 9;

na saṃsārasya nirvāṇāt kiñcidasti viśeṣaṇaṃ na nirvāṇasya saṃsārāt kiñcidasti viśeṣaṇaṃ; ibid, xxv. *v*. 19).

V. Yogācāra-school :

The Yogācāra-school which went to the extremes in idealism by teaching a form of doctrine that varied from subjectivism to solipsism made a significant modification to the Mādhyamika doctrine of *śūnyatā*. It denies the reality of *dharmas* on a different basis, The statements 'all is real' or 'all is nothing', according to this school, both refer to incorrect forms of *śūnyatā*. "That which is devoid (*śūnya*) is real while that of which it is devoid is unreal" (*Madhyāntavibhāgasūtrabhāṣya-ṭīkā*, p. 13). With this logic, the Vijñānavādins of this school contend that the reality of consciousness (*vijñāna*) must be accepted, as it cannot be denied at all, while the duality of subject and object with which it is apparently infected must be considered non-existent. *Śūnyatā* applies to this unreal aspect and not to *vijñāna* which is real.

They maintain two contentions: *Vijñāna* is real, not the apparent. *Vijñāna* alone is real, not the object. The first is against the Mādhyamikas for whom both the knowing consciousness and the object known are relative to each other and are, therefore, nothing in themselves, i.e., unreal. The second is against the Abhidharma-systems which uncritically accept the object as real on a par with *vijñāna*. Both are extreme positions according to the Vijñānavādins who claim to steer a middle course between the two (*Triṃśikābhāṣya*, p. 15).

They advocate the unreality of objects on three grounds. In the first place, there is want of conformity between the usual form of knowledge (e.g. chair, table etc). and the object which, according to the Sarvāstivādins, is the atom (*paramāṇu*) singly or in combination. The cognition is of the gross object, the atom cannot serve as the object-condition for cognition (*Viṃś*. p. 11). What appears in knowledge has no counterpart outside, and what is supposedly outside does not appear in knowledge. The whole, or a combination, (*avayavī*), consisting of parts (*avayava*) is not accepted. The Sarvāstivādins had already denied the reality of the whole.

Secondly, the difficulties inherent in accounting for cognition on dualistic basis, viz., knowledge here and the object there with an apt relation between the two, and the inconceivability of an unknown object, throw doubt on the reality-hypothesis (*Tattvasaṃgraha*, pp. 571 ff; *Prvār*. pp. 242 ff.).

Thirdly, the occurrence of illusion, dream-object, mirage etc. proves that *vijñāna* can have a content without there being a corresponding object outside (*Viṃś*. p. 9; *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, p. 6). This shows the self-contained nature of *vijñāna*, its content being the result of its own minor modifications. It manifests the object content, from time to time, owing to its own internal modifications effected by its latent forces (*vāsanā* : *Viṃś*. pp. 3ff).

The trend of Buddhism has always been subjective; it had denied the objective reality of many of the entities which are commonly taken as real, and reduced them to mere ideas. The Yogācāra-Vijñānavādins held that not only certain forms of objectivity but objectivity itself is the work of creative thought. In consequence, they rejected the duality of subject and object with which consciousness is apparently infected. While the Mādhyamika Śunyavādins consider the logical constitution of a thing lacking in essence, the Yogācāra Vijñānā-vādins viewed it psychologically: the object cannot stand by itself; it is nothing without the consciousness on which it is superimposed. It is *vijñāna* that can undergo modification, and it can purify itself by getting rid of the superimposed duality (*Madhyāntavibhāga-Sūtrabhāṣya-ṭīkā*, pp. 42f.).

With this bias in favour of *vijñāna*, the Yogācārins criticise the Mādhyamikas for denying the reality of *vijñāna*. Their argument is that everything may be analysed away as illusory, but the illusion itself implies the ground on which the illusory construction can take place (*Triṃśikābhāṣya*, p. 15). This ground is none other than *vijñāna*. Accepting the *śūnyavāda* of the *Prajñāpāramitā sūtras*, they modify the *śuñyavāda* of the Mādhyamikas; they give substance to *śūnyatā* by identifying it with

vijñāna that is void of duality (*dvayaśūnyatā*: *Madhyāntavibhāgasūtrabhāṣya-ṭīkā*, p. 9). They explain the *dharmas* of the phenomenal existence which are experienced in common consciousness as imaginary (*parikalpitasvabhāva*), which is the final effect and false objectfication (*vikalpa*) that does result from the causal evolution of *citta*, called the *ālaya-vijñāna* (*Sūtrāl.* ii, *v.* 23, ix, *v.* 78, xi, *v.* 39 etc.).

Degrees of truth and Reality :

Although there is no explicit reference made in the early *suttas* to a Buddhist theory of truth and reality, certain canonical statements carry implications of such a theory. There are two *sutta*-passages which particularly refer to such a teaching. One is in the *Suttanipāta* and the other in the *Dīgha-Nikāya*.

The *Cūlaviyūha Sutta* says that there is only one truth, a second truth not being available (*Sn. v.* 884). This only truth undoubtedly refers to Nibbāna as the only reality which is the absolute.

The *Poṭṭhapāda Sutta*, after giving what is called the three modes of personalities (*atta-paṭilābha*), namely, the gross personality (*olārika-atta-paṭilābha*), and the immaterial personality (*arūpa-atta-paṭilābha:* psychological personality (*manomaya atta paṭilābha*) *D.* 1. p. 195), explains that those are mere names, expressions, turns of peech, designations used in common parlance, which the Tathāgata uses without being led astray by them (*D.* 1, p. 202).

These two passages show implicitly that the different personalities are but concepts which are conventional while the absolute, i.e., Nibbāna, is the only reality.

Analysis of the so-called personality into *dhammas* is undertaken for the sole purpose of denying the existence of a permanent entity like the *ātman*. However, compared to the personality, the *dhammas* may be considered more real, since it is only when there are *dhammas* that the designations such as being or personality find any validity (*S.* I. p. 135, *Miln.* p. 28; *Abhidharmadīpa* with *Vibhāṣā-prabhāvṛtti*, p. 255).

In the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*, too, we do not find an explicit theory with regard to the doctrine of reality. In the subsequent development of the Theravāda thought, however, we find the formulation of such a theory. In the *Milindapañha*, for instance, the terms *sammuti* and *paramattha* are used with reference to conventional and philosophic truth respectively.

Later, in the commentarial literature, the technical usage of these terms became established. While commenting on the relevent passages of the *Poṭṭhapāda Sutta*, Buddhaghosa gives the standard Theravāda-definition of *sammuti* and *paramattha:* There are two kinds of talk by the Buddhas; being, man, deity, etc. are conventional talk (*sammuti-kathā*), whereas impermanence (*anicca*), suffering (*dukkha*), no-soul (*anatta*) aggregates (*khandha*), etc. are talk that involve the highest truth (*paramattha-kathā*: *DA.* II, pp. 382–83). He also quotes an older authority in support of his argument: symbolic talk (*saṅketa-vacana*) is true, because it is conventionally accepted; philosophic talk (*paramattha-vacana*) is true because the *dhammas* bear the characterisitic of reality (*dhammānam-bhūtalakkhaṇam*: loc. cit.).

It would seem, according to the definition given above, that the *dhammas* are real in the ultimate sense. The definition of a *dhamma* as that which bears its own nature (*attano svabhāvaṃ dharantīti dhātuyo : VbhA*, p. 77; *Vism.* p. 411), at once, gives Theravāda a decidedly realistic character from the philosophic point of view. This clearly marks a departure from the position taken up in the *suttas* in which all *dhammas* are given a relative reality compared to the ultimate reality of Nibbāna. Since *dhammas* and Nibbāna are of fundamentally different natures, they are not classified together in the *sutta*. But, in the Abhidhamma, especially in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, we find such a classification in which matter (*rūpa*), and the absolute (Nibbāna) are treated as things which are neither good (*kusala*) nor evil (*akusala*) but indeterminate by nature (*avyākata*). Still later, in the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, Nibbāna as well as the other *dhammas*, namely, *citta cetasika* and *rūpa* are brought under the common category of *paramatthas*, i.e., things which are real in the ultimate sense.

It should, however, be mentioned that, in spite of their characterisation of the *dhammas* as real, the Theravādins were mindful of the doctrine of flux as applied to all conditioned *dhammas*, because they maintain that the *dhammas*, although real, are not eternal or perduring; they are all subject to the process of change.

The Vaibhāsikas (i.e., the Sarvāstvādins) developed a new theory in which they accepted the reality of *dhammas* on two levels, namely, substance or own nature (*svabhāva*) and characteristics (*lakṣaṇa* ; *AbhK.* ch. V, *v.* 26. *AbhKvy*, p. 21 *Abhidharmadīpa:*

with *Vibhāsāprabhāvṛtti*, pp. 259–60; *Tattvaasaṅgraha* with *Pañjikā*, ed. by E. Krishnamacharya, Baroda, 1926, pp. 504f.). The former explains the continuity of *dharmas* while the latter their perceptibility. "Substance" or "own nature", which explains the continuity of *dharmas*, had to be considered as unchanging and eternal; thus their existence during the three periods of time: past, present and future. On the other hand, characteristics refer to the phenomenal attributes of the *dhammas* which are subject to the laws of change.

This tendency towards extreme realism created a reaction among the Buddhists themselves, and this reaction is seen in the Sautrāntika and the Mahāyāna schools of Buddhism.

The Mādhyamika school advocated a twofold truth, namely, the conventional truth (*saṃvṛti satya* or *prajñapti sat*) and the absolute truth (*paramārtha satya : Mdhvṛ.* ch. xxiv). All but Nirvāna that passes as *paramattha* for the Theravādins are included by them in their (*samvrti satya*) *Paramārtha* refers to the absolute reality which is ineffable. This stand is in perfect agreement with the early *suttas* which speak of only one truth (*ekaṃ hi saccaṃ na dutiyamatthi : Sn. v.* 884). Thus the Mādhyamika stand may be considered as a corrective to the Abhidharma-realism of the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins.

The Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda school which went to the extremes in idealism gives a theory of reality in three degrees, namely, *parikalpita*, *paratantra* and *parinișpanna* (*Sūtrāl.* ch. ii, *v*, 23; ix, *v.* 78; xi, *v.* 39 etc.; cp. *Lank.* pp. 68, 131–134,; 193, 225–229).

Parikalpita-svabhāva refers to the phenomenal existence, i.e., *dharmas* which are experienced in common consciousness. It is the final effect and the false objectification (*vikalpa*), resulting from the causal evolution (*pariṇāma*) of *citta*. It is identified with *nāmarūpa*, *khandha*, etc., in other words, with *saṃsāra* or *dukkha-satya*, the truth of suffering, the first Noble Truth.

Paratantra-svabhāva is the causal evolution of *citta*, already referred to, and is identified with causality (*pratītyasamutpāda*).

Parinișpanna-svabhāva is the absolute reality, i.e. Tathatā.

Paratantra (or *pratītyasamutpāda*) has two aspects, because it is of double potentiality, namely, impure *paratantra*, i.e. the defiling nature (*sāsrava* or *saṃklesa*), which results in origination (*samudaya* or *pravṛtti* or *pratītyasamutpāda-anuloma*) and pure *paratantra*, i.e. the purifying nature (*anāsrava* or *vyavadāna*) which results in cessation (*nirodha* or *nivṛtti;* i.e. *pratītyasamutpāda-pratiloma*). In other words, *paratantra* is *saṃsāra* by its *samudaya* or *parikalpita*-aspect, and it is Nirvāṇa by its *nirodha* or *parinișpanna*-aspect; since *saṃkleśa* leads to *saṃsāra* whereas *vyavadāna* leads to Nirvāṇa.

Paratantra or *pratītyasamutpāda* as the causal evolution of *citta*, i.e. *ālaya-vijñāna*, results in false objectification, and this is impure *paratantra*. The ultimate reality i.e. *parinișpanna*, is realised by pure *paratantra* when the evolution of *citta* is suppressed, when the false objectification ceases, and *vijñāna* ceases to imagine whereby it comes forth in its static transcendent essence (*Sūtrāl.* ch. ix, *v.* 78, and its *Bhāṣya*.)

It will now be seen that there is a way in which the teachings embodied in the *suttas* can be interpreted to give a consistent and satisfactory theory of reality: Nibbāna or Tathatā is the ultmate reality; this is the first category of reality. The *dhammas*, i.e. the elements yielded by analysis, come under the second category of relative or contingent reality. The notion of soul, person, being, etc., not being factors yielded by analysis, can be placed in the third category of illusion. Such a theory is in consonance with the teachings embodied in the early *suttas*, and does represent the general Buddhist view of reality.

UPALI KARUNARATNE

DHAMMABHŪTA, an epithet of the Buddha used in the Pali texts which literally means 'become (*bhūta*) the Truth, i.e. Dhamma (*D.* III, p. 84; *M.* I, III; *Thag. v.* 491; *DA* III, p. 865, *AA*.V. p. 72). The significance of the term *dhammabhūta* lies in the fact that the Buddha, by this term, is identified with the Dhamma. This point is explicitly brought out in the following statement made by the Buddha himself. "He who sees the Dhamma sees me, and he who sees me sees the Dhamma (*S.* III. p. 120).

Dhamma in this particular context means *Paṭicca-samuppāda* (q.v.) as is evident from the identification of the Dhamma with the *Paṭiccasamuppāda*, made

in a statement attributed to the Buddha elsewhere that, he who sees the *Paṭiccassamuppāda* sees the Dhamma and he who sees the Dhamma sees the *Paṭiccasamuppāda* (*M.* I, p. 191; *Sal.* p. 2).

This Dhamma, i.e., the *Paṭiccasamuppāda*, is what the Buddha comprehended on his attainment to Enlightenment, Buddhahood or Bodhi (See. *S.* II, pp. 10f.). It is the Truth of the universe, the truth of *saṃsāra*, the eternal law that governs the entire phenomenal existence. It holds good irrespective of the appearance or otherwise of the Buddhas in the world (*S.* II, pp. 25–26). The primary task of the Buddhas is to discover this Truth by realisation and reveal it to others (loc, cit.).

Thus, by virtue of knowing, the knower becomes identified with the known, i.e., the Buddha becomes identified with the Dhamma, and hence the epithet *dhammabhūta.*

It would be of interest to note at this stage that the Buddhist texts refer with unfailing regularity to the basic initiation into the truths of Buddhism (i.e. *dassanasampadā* or attaining the state of *sotāpātti*) with the words *diṭṭhadhamma* (perceived the Dhamma) *pattadhamma* (arrived at the Dhamma), *viditadhamma* (grasped the Dhamma), and *pariyogāḷhadhamma* (immersed oneself in the Dhamma; *M.* I. p. 380; *A.* IV. p. 186). It is already felt here that the grasp of the Truth is virtually leading to a total identification with it.

He becomes a perfect man who, as the phrase goes, knows (*jānāti*) and sees (*passati*), having become the eye (*cakkhubhūto*), the knowledge (*ñāṇabhūto*), the Truth (*dhammabhūto*) and the highest (*brahmabhūto*); he leads and guides the world as the master of the Truth (*dhammassāmi*), who proclaims it to the world (*vatta pavatta*) and leads others to it (*atthassa ninnetā*) and thereby the giver of immortality (*amatassa dātā*, *M.* I. p. III; pp. 195, 224, *S.* IV. p. 94).

The Arahants are those who have grasped and absorbed this Truth proclaimed by the Buddha and are, therefore, referred to as born of Truth (*dhammaja*) creatures of truth (*dhammanimmita*) and heirs to the truth (*dhammadāyāda*; *D.* III, p. 84).

This idea of the Dhamma being identified with the Buddha, i.e., the known with the knower, is perhaps the nucleus which found its full development in the *dharmakāya*-concept of the Mahāyāna schools.

See DHAMMA (I), DHAMMACAKKHU, and DHARMATĀ BUDDHA.

UPALI KARUNARATNE

DHAMMACAKKA (skt. Dharmacakra); literally the wheel of the doctrine, i.e. the doctrine as comprehended by the Buddha on his gaining enlightenment and the doctrine as taught by him subsequently.

The association of the concept of the wheel with the doctrine or the Truth which the Buddha discovered (*adhigato kho me yaṃ dhammo*; *M.* I, pp. 167f; *Vin.* I. pp. 5ff.) is to be traced back to the Buddha himself. For soon after his enlightenment or attainment of Buddhahood, and after some persuasion that he should make known to the world the truth he had discovered (*desetu bhante bhagavā dhammam..* loc. cit.) the Buddha decides to go to Bārānasī (Benares) to preach the doctrine to the five ascetics (*pañcavaggiyā bhikkhū*) who had been his erstwhile colleagues while he was searching for a state of peace for mankind (*anuttaraṃ santivarapadam pariyesamāno; M.* I. p. 165; *S.* II. p. 25). In reply to a question by a stranger whom he met on the way as to whither he was journeying, he replied that he was proceeding to the city of Kāsis, in order to set rolling (*pavattetuṃ*) the wheel of the doctrine (*dhamma-cakkaṃ*). This is the first time that this idiom is used to refer to the preaching of the doctrine and it is used by the Buddha himself at the very beginning of his ministry. The forward or progressive revolving movement of the wheel (Pali: *pavattana* or Skt. *pravartana*) is indicative of advance and extension. It is in this same sense that a Cakkavatti or a Universal Monarch calls upon his wheel-treasure (*cakkaratana*) to start rolling (*pavattatu bhavaṃ cakkaratanaṃ*; *D.* II, p. 172). This conquering wheel of the Universal Monarch which conquers territories for him in all directions is not to be confused with the peace-conferring *dharma* wheel of the Fully Enlightened One which is set rolling to proclaim to the world the Truth he had discovered.

In both these cases it is the wheel's function of rolling on, thereby implying advance and extension temporally and spatially, that comes to the fore. Perhaps, with a view to stressing the infallible fulfilment of the functions of the Cakkavatti's wheel too, its technical perfection is assured under the description 'that it has a thousand spokes and is complete with hub and rim' (*sahassāraṃ sanemikaṃ sanābhikaṃ sabbākāraparipūraṃ:* loc. cit).

Associated with the idea of proclaiming or publicising his doctrine by the Buddha, another image used in the Buddhist texts is that of the drum.

In the works already cited (*M.* I . p. 171; *Vin.* I. p. 8) in which the Buddha declared that he was going to the city of Kāsis to set rolling the wheel of the doctrine, he also speaks of beating the drum of immortality (*āhañchum amatadundubhiṃ*). However, the reference to the rolling of the wheel to indicate the preaching of the doctrine has been, more or less, standardised in the *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta* (*S. V.* p. 420 ff; *Vin.* I, p. 10 ff.) in which the *devas* of all planes of existence speak of the event saying, 'the dhamma wheel has been set rolling: '*dhammaccakkam pavattitaṃ*. It is further commended by them as being 'irreversibly set in motion:' *appativattiyam*, which in other words means that the teaching of the Buddha shall remain unchallenged everywhere, at all times (*appativattiyaṃ samaṇena vā brāhmaṇena vā devena vā mārena vā brahmunā va kena ci vā lokasmiṃ ti*, *S.*V: p. 423; *Vin.* I. p. 12)

However, this emphasis of the word *appativattiya* which means 'irreversible' has been completely missed by the monk tradition of Sri Lanka which has persistently translated it into Sinhala as 'cannot be conducted, cannot be held, cannot be established' Sinhala: *no pävätviya häki*. This is inspite of the commentarial tradition contained in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga Aṭṭhakathā* which comments on it as, *nayidaṃ tatheti paṭilomaṃ vattetum asakkuneyyuṃ* i.e. none would be able to challenge its veracity and turn it back. *PsA*, *SHB*. vol. XXI p. 440).

While it is thus said that the word of the Buddha would spread, unresisted and unchallenged, through time and space, the process of the spread of the Dhamma is further propped up by saying that the Venerable Sāriputta as the custodian of the Dhamma would give further momentum to the Dhamma wheel which has already been set rolling by the Buddha (*evaṃ eva kho tvaṃ Sāriputta mayā anuttaraṃ dhammacakkhaṃ pavattitaṃ sammadeva anuppavattessiti*, *S.* I. p. 191. See also *Sela Sutta*, *Sn. vv.* 554–557, for the same idea).

Thus, it becomes clear and must correctly be grasped that the concept of *dhammacakka*, i.e. of the Dhamma as a wheel has its origin in the idea of *dhammacakkappavattana* or setting the wheel rolling and not independent of it. It is at the level of proclaiming or propagating the doctrine (*desanā*) that the wheel symbol becomes meaningful and not at the level of comprehending the Truth. At the time of comprehending the Truth, the imagery used alludes to the appearance of the eye (*cakkhum*), light (*āloko*) and wisdom (*paññā*). Nevertheless, owing perhaps to the significance which the wheel subsequently acquired as a symbol of the Dhamma, an attempt is made in the commentaries (See. *PsA*. loc. cit.) to apply the term *dhammacakka* retrospectively to the Truth comprehended or wisdom acquired (*paṭivedhañāṇa*) by the Buddha at the time of his enightenment (*Dhammacakketi paṭivedhañāṇe ca desanāñāṇe ca. Bodhipallaṅke nisinnassa hi bhagavato catusu saccesu dvādasākāraṃ paṭivedhañāṇam pi isipatane nisinnassa dvādasākāram eva saccadesanāya pavattakaṃ desanāñāṇampi dhammacakkaṃ nāma:* loc, cit.) The connotation of the Dhamma in this context, too, appears to be the same as that referred to in the *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta*, where it is briefly referred to as the Four Noble Truths which, in terms of the threefold (*tiparivaṭṭa:* thrice turned) view point of 1. fact, 2. goal and 3. achievement, gives the doctrine comprehended by the Buddha and its exposition by him a twelvefold manifestation (*tiparivaṭṭaṃ dvādasākāraṃ yathābhūtaṃ ñāṇadassanaṃ*; *Vin.* I, p. 11 and *dvādasākāraṃ eva saccadesanāya*; *PsA*. loc. cit).

The *Paṭisambhidāmagga* in its *Dhammacakkakathā* of the *Yuganandhavagga* (*Ps.* II, pp. 160 f.) is eloquently comprehensive in its description of *dhamma* in the compound *dhammacakka*. All the 37 items of *Dhamma* which make up the *bodhipakkhiyā dhammā* are mentionded (*D.* II. p. 119f.) together with items like *samatha* and *vipassanā*. No item which is essential for the Buddhist path to salvation is left out. Thus, the completeness of the process of proclaiming the Buddhist doctrine for the benefit of mankind is established by the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*. *Paramatthajotikā* (*SnA*. II. p. 454) undoubtedly re-echoes this when it says that the rolling of the wheel (*cakkaṃ vattemi*) is in terms of the Dhamma which consists of the *bodhipakkhiyadhammas* such as the four *satipaṭṭhānas* (..*anuttareneva catusatipaṭṭhānādibhedabodhipakkhiyasaṅkhātena dhammena cakkaṃ vattemi*: loc. cit).

The Commentary to the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, having extended the use of the image of the wheel (*dhammacakka*) which has its origin in the idiom of setting the wheel rolling (*dhammacakkaṃ pavattetuṃ*: *M.* I. p. 171, *Vin.* I. p. 8), which means the expounding of the doctrine, to the bodhisatta's realisation of the Truth at the foot of the Bodhi tree (*Bodhipallaṅke nisinnassa hi bhagavato catusu saccesu dvādasākāraṃ pativedhañāṇaṃ pi*: *PsA*: loc. cit.) goes further to use the verb *pavatteti* - sets in motion, sets rolling - with reference to the said

wheel, even the time of the bodhisatta's enlightenment under the Bodhi tree. At this point the commentator discovers that it makes very little sense to speak of setting in motion (*pavatteti*), i.e. of propagating, any portion of doctrine (*Katham hi bhagavā bodhipallaṅke nisinno maggakkhaṇe indriyabalabojjhaṅgamaggaṅgādibhedaṃ dhammaṃ ca pavatteti*, op. cit. p. 444). He says that what instead happened was that this same Dhamma was used for the purpose of destroying the hosts of defilements (*so yeva ca dhammo kilesasattughātāya pavattanato*, loc. cit.). In this sense, he argues, it turns out to be a wheel of assault (i.e. a weapon: *paharanacakkaṃ viya*). Thus, through what appears to be an awkward and clumsy process the author of the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* commentary adds to the *dhammacakka* of beneficent character a further role of being a destructive discoid weapon, saying that it is so in that the Dhamma is used or stands for the purpose of destroying the hostile forces of defilements (*kilesasattughātāya pavattanato:* loc. cit.)

Utilising in this manner the symbolic wheel of the *dhammacakka*, on loan as it were, in the process of destroying defilements undoubtedly involves a historical distortion. Even in the field of Buddhist art it is the Dhamma as the Buddha's refreshingly new message to the world that has come to occupy a prestigious position. The need to set the wheel of the Dhamma rolling in this manner was universally acclaimed when Brahmā Sahampati himself made the following utterance: "Lord, let the Lord teach *dhamma*, let the well-farer teach *dhamma;* there are beings with little dust in their eyes who, not hearing *dhamma*, are decaying" (*Middle Length Sayings*, I, p. 212). The first teaching of the Dhamma consequently became a much celebrated event. A Sāñci sculpture of the 1st century B.C. (See *EB.* Vol. III, Pl. CXIII) depicts this with much vibrancy and vicacity. A wheel of considerable proportions is placed firmly on a two-tiered pedestal, the whole monument reaching to a height well above the heads of the standing worshippers. The presence of deer, freely mingling in the congregation, is reminiscent of the deer-park (*migadāya*) at Isipatana. This undoubtedly marks an early aniconic representation of the preaching of the first sermon.

The Bārhut Stūpa, South gate, Prasenajit Pillar (early 1st century B.C.) shows a wheel, similarly placed on a pedestal, within what looks like a shrine specially constructed to house it. It is to be noted that even at this early stage, parts of the wheel, its hub and the rim are ornamented with floral decorations. Here the wheel, obviously intended to represent the Buddha aniconically, is honoured with a garland which is pendent from its hub, in keeping with the canonical tradition of the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* (*mālaṃ vā..āropessanti: D.* II. p. 142). A group of visiting pilgrims, some on foot and others in a chariot drawn by four horses, are shown circumambulating the shrine (i.e. performing *pradakṣiṇā*). An elephant leads part of the group who appear to be coming out having completed their *pradakṣiṇā*. Two persons are shown standing within the shrine in the posture of adoration. On the roof of the shrine the words, *bhagavato dhama cakam :* 'Buddha's Wheel of the Law' are inscribed. Zimmer, in his *Art of Indian Asia*, PL. 36 c identifies this scene as King Prasenajit driving in a chariot to worship the Sacred Wheel. A scene very similar to this is, depicted on a railing of the same *stūpa* (See *EB.* III 4. Pl. CXII). The total composition of the scenes, with vehicles, men and animals on the move, and persons depicted in postures of veneration reflect the idea of a *cetiyacārikā* or a pilgrimage to a holy shrine, referred to in the same *sutta* (*D.* II. p. 141).

Thus, in Buddhist art where the concept of the *dhammacakka* reached its peak of development, it plays a dual role. It has a symbolic value where it stands aniconically, like the Bodhi tree and the *stūpa*, to represent the Buddha and a narrative value where it depicts the preaching of the First Sermon or setting in motion the Wheel of the Law — *dhammacakka-pavattana*.

JOTIYA DHIRASEKERA

DHAMMACAKKAPPAVATTANA SUTTA, name given to the first discourse of the Buddha. It is recorded in the Pali tradition of the *Mahāvagga* (*Vin.* I, pp. 10-11) and in the *Sacca-saṃyutta* (*S.* V, pp. 421–24). An abridged version is found in the *Gāmaṇi-saṃyutta* (*S.* IV, pp. 330–31) and the section of the 'middle path' is inserted in the *Dhammadāyāda Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 15), and referred to frequently elsewhere; the account of the noble quest including the gist of this discourse is found in the *Ariyapariyesana Sutta* (*M.* I, pp. 173 ff.).

Apart from being the first discourse chronologically, it is also first in order of importance, as it outlines the basic truth of the new doctrine and is drafted like a manifesto at the beginning of the mission, stating the points of divergence from existing systems and declaring the new course promulgated.

For the full understanding of this all-important document the actual background and the significance of the circumstances, immediately leading up to the event, have to be perceived.

The *Vinaya* account (*Mahāvagga*) opens with the Buddha, immediately after his enlightenment, spending seven days at the foot of the Bodhi tree "experiencing the bliss of emancipation". Then, during the night following, he pondered over (*manasikāra*) the origination and the cessation of all phenomena.

Subsequent weeks were spent in the neighbourhood, experiencing the bliss of emancipation, when, on one occasion, two merchants requested to be accepted as his lay-disciples, although the teaching had not yet been promulgated. And immediately after their departure, a doubt arose in the Buddha's mind which was now averse from exertion and inclined to remain quiet (*appossuka*) :

What I through painful striving gained
Why would I now proclaim?
For, those with lust and hate beset
Will fail to grasp the truth.

That which was "deep and hard to perceive and comprehend, too sublime for mere logic" would never be grasped by people whose grasping was bent towards objects of sense.

At this stage the most senior of the Brahmā-gods, Sahampati, drew the Buddha's attention by pointing out that there might be a few, not fully submerged in the mire of lust and hate, but whose eyes were only slightly covered with a little dust of ignorance. If they were not told the new message, they would decay. There would be some who would understand the doctrine.

With compassionate eye of insight in human nature the Buddha now sees the various types of beings, some of little, others of much impurity, some with keen and others with dull intellect, to teach whom would be rarely easy and mostly hard. But out of compassion for those few, the Buddha finally overcomes his hesitation and declares his intention to preach his noble doctrine :

"Ope are the doors to the deathless state;
Ye that have ears, place your trust therin".

It was indeed hard to understand that causal connection, the dependent origination and cessation of all conditioned things, the rejection of every basis of rebirth, the destruction of craving, dispassion, cessation, deliverance. And it was not to people delighting and rejoicing in sensual pleasures that the Buddha's thoughts first turned. But Alāra Kālāma, the teacher to whom Gotama first went for instruction after he had gone forth from home into homelessness, had passed away seven days earlier. Uddaka, the son of Rāma, another teacher to whom Gotama went when he had mastered Aḷāra's teaching, had passed away that same night. Both had taught him different states of mental absorption (*jhāna*), Aḷāra up to the plane of nothingness (*ākiñca*) and Uddaka even further up to the plane of neither-perception-nor-non-perception (*neva-saññā-n-āsaññā*: *M.* I, pp. 164–5), but they had not been able to go beyond. To help them might have been easy, but it was too late now. Still there were his former five companions in the ascetic life. They might have been misguided, but they were sincere, so sincere that they refused to recognise and acknowledge their erstwhile leader, who had abandoned them and the ascetic life; who had given up exertion and turned to a life of abundance (*bāhulla*). Yet when the Buddha spoke to them with an assurance never heard from him before: "Give ear! The deathless has been found! I now instruct! I teach the truth!", he was able to convince the group of five who listened and aroused their minds for insight (*Vin.* I, p. 16).

It is at this stage that the actual discourse begins which has been called in literal translation: "The setting rolling of the wheel of the Norm", or "The foundation of the kingdom of the Norm", or "The foundation of the kingdom of righteousness".

T. W. Rhys Davids in his introduction to the translation of this *sutta* (*SBE.* XI, p. 140) says: "It would be difficult to estimate too highly the historical value of this *sutta*. There can be no reasonable doubt that the very ancient tradition accepted by all Buddhists as to the substance of the discourse is correct, and that we really have in it a summary of the words in which the great Indian thinker and reformer for the first time successfully promulgated his new ideas. And it presensts to us in a few short and pithy sentences the very essence of that remarkable system which has had so profound an influence on the religious history of so large a portion of the human race."

As regards the title of the sutta T. W. Rhys Davids continues: "The name given to it by the early Buddhists — the setting in motion onwards of the royal chariot-wheel of the supreme dominion of

the Dhamma — means not 'the turning of the wheel of the law', as it has been usually rendered, but 'the inauguration, or foundation, of the Kingdom of Righteousness'."*

Thus the setting is clear. Siddhattha Gotama had renounced his life of luxury and self-indulgence in the royal palace; he had also renounced the natural, normal pleasures of a home-life and become an ascetic, practising self-mortification. In this last stage he had been joined by a group of five sectics, Koṇḍañña, Vappa, Bhaddiya, Mahānāma and Assaji, who looked up to him as their leader and who felt disappointed and frustrated not only, when he left them but especially when they heard that he had returned to a "life of plenty". It became, therefore, necessary to explain to them the correct position, that Gotama's views about a life of self-indulgence (*kāmesu kāma-sukhallika*) had not changed: he still considered it as a low practice, unworthy, unprofitable; he also had to explain to them that by giving up his austeritises he had not returned to luxury and devotion to the pleasures of sense. But if he condemned on the one hand self-indulgence as unworthy, he had like wise to condemn self-mortification (*attakilamatha*) as painful, unworthy and aimless. And thus, he proclaims a new path which avoids both extremes and which he, therefore, calls the middle path (*majjhimā paṭipadā*), which makes vision, which gives insight, which produces calming of the passions, intuitive knowledge, awakening to the truth, and realization of Nibbāna.

This middle course is an inward change of heart and mind. Heart with its devotion and mind with its acquired knowledge, — both have to be freed, which can be done according to the new method through the cultivation of correct views free from superstition and delusion, with a clear perception of their nature (*sammā-diṭṭhi*), with thoughts of non-violence, loving kindness and renunciation (*sammā-saṁkappa*), utter truthfulness (*sammā-vācā*) and purity of conduct (*sammā-kammanta*), a sinless, harmless occupation (*sammā-ājiva*), with self-control in duty bound (*sammā-vāyāma*), and above all, the cultivation of a watchful mind (*sammā-sati*) and earnest concentration (*sammā-samādhi*).

The method is given first, because the object of the search was common to all. Yet, there was a difference, and an essential one, which makes the teaching of the Buddha stand apart. What is common to all is the quest for happiness. The difference is in the concept and in the method of conquest.

All search for happiness, because all experience unhappiness, as sorrow or pain in birth, decay and death, as loss from what is loved, as bodily suffering or mental upset, as worry or unrest. To be associated with things disliked, to be separated from what is liked, to live with wishes unfulfilled, that too is suffering. It is this conflict, in which man tries to conquer he does not know what, and which he either tries to forget in self-indulgence, in pleasure-seeking which is not giving happiness, or which he tries to escape in cutting off all sources of sorrow, i.e., conflict in relationship by seeking solitude, temptations of the body by asceticism, wanderings of the mind by systematic thought-control. And thus his positive search for happiness is a mistaken escape from conflict, and whether the escape is made in self-indulgence or in self-mortification, the basis of the conflict, viz. "self", is not understood.

Whether the desire is for more pleasure (self-indulgence) or for less satisfaction (self-mortification) it remains desire. And even if the "self" is sublimated, there still remains the desire of the "higher" self as the basis of the conflict. It is the craving for sense-pleasure (*kāma-taṇhā*), the craving for existence (*bhava-taṇhā*), the craving for non-existence (*vibhava-taṇhā*) which is the cause of conflict (*dukkha*). For, whatever the form of desire, whether eternalistic or annihilationistic, its basis is the concept of "self" which is loved and cultivated, or hated and sought to be destroyed. Hence, if the basis of this conflict is no more, conflict itself will arise no more.

To know the "self", therefore, becomes of the highest importance. And the method of coming to know is the middle path, mentioned earlier.

Thus, this discourse contains the fundamental principles of the Buddha's teaching, the Four Noble Truths: the universal fact of conflict (*dukkha*), which is caused (*samudaya*) by a desire for permanency in the universal flow of the impermanent (*anicca*). The cessation (*nirodha*) of such desire must bring about the cessation of conflict. But the cessation of desire cannot be brought about either by satisfying such desires, or by suppressing them, but only by understanding their true nature, the true nature of life, of "self". This process of understanding, intellectually and emotionally, theoretically and practically, is the middle path, the Noble Eightfold Path, which forms the final of the Four Noble Truths.

Here follows the translation of the text as found in the *Vinaya* account, dotted lines indicating repetitions:

"These two ends, monks, should not be followed by one who has gone forth. Which two? That which is, among sense-pleasures, addiction to attractive sense-pleasures, low, vulgar, bourgeois, base, leading to no good; and that which is addiction to self-mortification, painful, base, leading to no good. Now, a middle course has been thoroughly understood by me, who has gone that way (*Tathāgata*) without following either of these two extremes, which leads to insight, which gives understanding, which conduces to tranquillity, super-knowledge, awakening and Nibbāna. And what is this middle course ....? It is first this Noble Eight-fold Path, namely, right understanding, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration ....

"And this, monks, is the noble truth of conflict: birth is woe, old age is woe, disease is woe, dying is woe; association with what is not dear is conflict, separation from what is dear is conflict, not getting what one wants is conflict, — in short the five aggregates of clinging (physical and mental) are conflict.

"And the noble truth of the cause of this conflict is craving that leads back to birth, along with the lure and lust that lingers longingly now here, then there, i.e., craving for sense-pleasures, craving for existence, craving for disintegration.

"And this is the noble truth of ending the conflict, monks, the complete and passionless cessation of that very craving, its renunciation and surrender, the release therefrom and the absence of longing.

"The noble truth of the method which leads to the ending of conflict is the Noble Eightfold Path.."

Then the Buddha related to the five ascetics how at the thought of the noble truth of conflict, its arising, its cessation, and the method of ceasing, a vision arose within him of things not experienced before, with knowledge, wisdom and insight. He understood the nature of conflict, the necessity of ceasing; and then he realised that the conflict had ceased. It was that vision of realisation that purified him, awakened him in supreme enlightenment. And he knew that his freedom of mind was unshakeable, that this was his last life, that there would be for him no further birth.

And what was the effect of this discourse on his audience? All five rejoiced in his words and were delighted, but only one had understood that whatever is of a nature to arise is likewise of a nature to cease. It was Koṇḍañña in whom arose the pure and stainless eye of insight which gave him the name Aññā-Koṇḍañña.

Among the salient features of this discourse the following are outstanding: (1) exposition of a middle way; (2) logical application of the law of causality; (3) analysis of the symptom reducing it to its base; (4) methodical solution; (5) comprehensive and all-inclusive doctrine.

Only its last feature "all-inclusive" may require some little elucidation. The discourse refers to conflict (*dukkha*) caused by craving for lasting pleasure; but lasting pleasure is unobtainable owing to the impermanent nature (*anicca*) of all things; the conflict arises in the desire for a permanent "self" in an impermanent world: the teaching of *anatta* solves the conflict. The doctrine of dependent origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) is here condensed in the law of causality: Whatever arises is subject to decay. Rebirth, based on action motivated by desire, is the outcome of the will-to-become. Cessation of becoming is the goal (*attha*), elsewhere named Nibbāna, and the road thereto is the culture of both heart and mind, practice and knowledge.

Variations in the Sanskrit texts

Certain variations have crept into the story with the passage of years, and thus we find, e.g., in the *Lalitavistara* (chap. xxvi) that Rudraka, the son of Rāma, had died seven days earlier and Āḷāra Kālāma only three days before the Buddha decided to preach his doctrine to his former companions.

An episode which occurred on his having to cross the Ganges by ferry is not found in the Pali texts. The ferryman refused to cross without being paid his fare; and as the Buddha had no passage-money he traversed the river by air, the ferryman recognising the greatness of the traveller too late. As a result of this incident king Bimbisāra allowed all religious mendicants free passage.

On reaching Bārāṇasi the Buddha does not set out for the Deer-Park immediately, as is related in the Pali *Vinaya* (*Vin.* I, p. 8), but makes the tour of the town for alms-food before going to Isipatana (*Ṛṣipatana*) where the five ascetics dwell. Their reception is equally cool, in Pali and in Sanskrit, although Kauṇḍinya does not express his disapproval in words. Their subsequent discomfort with

the Buddha's approach is vividly drawn in the *Lalita vistara* (loc. cit.) in a comparison with a caged bird's desire to fly away when a fire is placed underneath its cage. Soon they throw off all their reserve and receive the Buddha with all the honour and respect due to a revered teacher. Not only do they receive his bowl and robe, prepare a seat and foot-stool, and water to wash his feet, but they worship at his feet, prepare a full bath for him in a beautiful pond, surrounding him with all their care and attention, love and affection.

Then, on the spot where the Buddha is going to set a-rolling the wheel of righteousness, there appear a thousand seats composed of the seven precious things. The Buddha of the present age, out of respect for those Buddhas who have preceded him in this world-cycle, viz. Krakucchanda, Kanakamuni and Kāśyapa, passes by the first three seats, keeping his right side turned that way, and occupies the fourth seat on which he sits himself cross-legged.

Amidst brilliant light illuminating even the darkest corners of the universe the earth trembles and various celestial phenomena occur, while Brahmā, the lord of the suras-devas, entreats the Buddha to set a-rolling the best of wheels. Following this, a great being, a bodhisattva named Cakravartin, offers the wheel of the Norm, decorated and embellished with precious ornaments and flower-garlands. And although the sky is filled with all the gods of 3000 worlds, and the earth is covered with *asuras*, *kinnaras* and men, yet not a sound is heard; all, hushed and silent, turn their gaze towards the Conqueror (*jina*), who thus passes the first watch of the night in silence. Towards the middle of the night he speaks some words of encouragement, and only during the final watch of the night he addresses the five ascetics about the two extremes to be avoided by one who has left home for homelessness, the extreme of self-indulgence and the extreme of self-mortification. He proposes the Noble Eightfold Path as the middle way.

As in the Pali text, now follow the Four Noble Truths; and till the end of the discourse the versions are identical.

The miraculous, however, reappears immediately afterwards. At the request of Maitreya bodhisattva the Buddha describes the marvellous qualities of the wheel of the Norm; and the *Lalitavistara* continues with several pages enumerating the many epithets of the Buddha and their meanings, concluding thus: "because the knowledge of the Buddha is infinite, not to be measured like the sky, one could live and speak for a whole world-cycle of the qualities of the Buddha without exhausting their enumeration."

Whereas the two accounts given in the Pali Vinaya (*Mahāvagga: Vin.* I, p. 10) and in the Sanskrit *Lalitavistara* (p. 416 ff.) have put this first sermon in its proper place in the consecutive narrative after the enlightenment, the Sanskrit *Mahāvastu* (III, p. 331 ff.) breaks off the course of the Jātaka narratives and makes a fresh start with the insertion of these first events as an independent chapter, although identical to all intents and purposes with the Pali account. A different way of expressing the same idea may be found, e.g., in the opening phrases, where the Buddha (according to the Vinaya account) speaks of the two extremes, "which should not be followed by one who has gone forth" (*dve' me antā pabbajitena na sevitabbā*), which is recorded in the *Mahāvastu* as the two extremes "to which a man who has gone forth is liable" (*dvāvimaū pravrajitasya antau*). The *Mahāvastu* also expands the description of the extreme of self-indulgence with "not conducing to a future life of holiness, to disgust with a worldly life, to dispassionateness, to cessation, to aloofness, to enlightenment, to Nirvāṇa."

The middle path to which the Tathāgata is fully awakened (*Vin.*) is here (*Mhvu.*) described as the *dharmavinaya*. Whereas the Pali account (*Vin.*) details the four Noble Truths immediately after the enumeration of the eight sections of the middle path, the Sanskrit versions (*Lal.* and *Mhvu.*) insert an oratorical question and reply about the Four Noble Truths before describing them each in detail. Likewise the Pali *Vinaya* in the section on the truth of the arising of conflict (*dukkha-samudaya-sacca*) merely refers in general to "the five groups of grasping" (*pañca-upādāna-khandha*), but the Sanskrit *Mahāvastu* and *Lalitavistara* mention the five aggregates by name. On the other hand, the three kinds of craving, explained (*Vin.* and *S.*) as desire for pleasures of sense (*kāma-taṇhā*), desire for rebirth (*bhava-taṇhā*) and desire for non-existence (*vibhava-taṇhā*) have been omitted later (*Mhvu.* and *Lal*).

Again, in the section on the noble truth of cessation of conflict, "the complete and passionless cessation of craving, its renunciation and surrender, the release therefrom and the absence of longing" (*Vin.*) has been re-arranged as "the utter extinction of this craving which is bound up with the passion for pleasure, finding delight in this and that; it is passionlessness, cessation, self-sacrifice, renunciation

and surrender" (*Mhvu.*), to which two further qualifications of craving are added (*Lal.*) namely, "which is bearing and productive" (*janikā, nivartikā*).

Both *Mahāvastu* and *Lalitavistara* have inserted "through right reflection" (*yoniso manasikārā*) in each of the four sentences, where the Buddha speaks of light arising in him on thinking of the four Noble Truths in turn.

All versions speak of the three sections of the four Noble Truths, making twelve modes. The three sections of each truth are the knowledge (*ñāṃa*) thereof, its function (*kicca*) and its accomplishment (*kata*) with respect to the truth of conflict which has to be comprehended (*pariññeyya*), the cause of conflict which has to be eradicatded (*pahātabba*), the cessation of conflict which has to be realised (*sacchikātabba*) and the path leading to the cessation of conflict which has to be developed (*bhāvetabba*). But there is some variation in the Sanskrit version with regard to the internal arrangement of the sections and the modes (*tiparivaṭṭa, dvādasākāra*).

Tibetan versions are found in the Kangyur (*Dulva*, IV, folio 64–7 which compares with the *Vinaya; Mdo.* XXX, fol. 427–30 which compares with the *Sutta Piṭaka* in Pali; and *Mdo*, XXVI, fol. 88–91 which compares with the Sanskrit *Abhiniṣkramaṃa Sūtra* and *Dharmacakra Sūtra*, ibid. fol. 431–4) with slight variations. But these differ much from the Tibetan translation of the *Lalitavistara* which has been incorporated in the 2nd volume of the *Mdo* (*sūtra*) section.

The most notable omission in the Tibetan translation in the *sūtras* (*Mdo*, XXX) is the third section, i.e., the accomplishment, in respect of each of the four Noble Truths. Thus the truth of conflict is stated, the fact that it has to be comprehended is acknowledged, but not the fact of accomplishment, i.e., of comprehension. Likewise, the truth of the origin of conflict is stated as well as the necessity of the cause to be eradicated, but not the fact that the cause of woe has been uprooted. The truth of cessation of conflict is mentiond together with its need to be realised, but not the fact that it has been realised by the Buddha. And finally, the path is known; known is also the necessity of developing; but the actual progress on the path is not referred to. Thus only eight of the twelve modes are shown, although collectively the four truths are said to be viewed in three ways, forming twelve aspcts. Also he final assertion of the Buddha: "Now knowledge and insight have arisen in me so that I know. Sure is my heart's release. This is my last birth. There is no more becoming for me" reads in its Tibetan version : "This knowledge has arisen in me : I have achieved deliverance as never has been achieved before. I have obtained Nirvāṇa so that there will be no future birth."

Following the Pali versions of the *Vinaya* and *Saṃyutta - nikāya* the Norm had been well set rolling not be be turned back by any recluse or brāhman, any *deva, māra* or *brahmā*, or any other creature in the world', the Sanskrit *Mahāvastu*, however, followed by the Tibetan *Chos kyi ḥkhor-lo rab-tu bskor-bahi mdo* (*Dharma-cakra-pravartana Sūtra*), has suppressed the term 'brahmās' twice in this context. The repetition of the omission suggests it to be intentional, but the motive is not clear.

A final diversion is provided by Koṇḍañña (Kauṇḍinya) who understands the meaning of the discourse so well that he acquired the unimpaired and unblemished pure insight that whatever is of a nature to arise is likewise of a nature to cease. This is to be understood as his attainment of the first stage of sainthood, the stream-enterer (*sotāpanna*). But the Tibetan tradition asserts Kauṇḍinya to have become an Arahant (*AMG.* V, 20, 122), so that the second discourse on "non-self" was preached only to the four remaining disciples (See ANATTA-LAKKHAÑA SUTTA).

There are two translations of this sutra in Chinese:

1. *Chuan fa lun ching* by An Shih kas (Taisho 109)

   and

2. *San chuan fa lun ching* by I Ching (Taisho 110).

H. G. A. Van Zeyst

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* He has stated even more: "The whole phrase means, therefore, 'To set rolling the royal chariot: wheel of a universal empire of truth and righteousness." (*Buddhism*, Rhys Davids, 1890, p. 45).

It is our considered opinion that Rhys Davids here is obviously missing the distinctiveness of identity that should be maintained between the *cakkaratana* or the conquering wheel of a Universal Emperor and the *dhammacakka* of the Buddha as teacher whose message was expected to reach those who would benefit by the hearing of it. The *cakkaratana*, on the one hand, is prevailed upon by the king to set

out on a round of conquest (*pavattatu bhavañca cakkaratanam abhivijinātu bhavam cakkaratananti: D.* II, p. 172), and it comes to rest only after the total conquest of the four quarters of the earth for the king who commissions it (*atha kho tam Ānanda cakkaratanaṃ samuddhapariyantaṃ pathavim abhivijinitvā kusāvatiṃ rājadhānim paccāgantvā rañño mahāsudassanassa antepuradvāre atthakaraṇapamukhe akkhāhataṃ maññe aṭṭhāsi* ibid. p. 174). The king, on his part, follows the lead of the *cakkaratana*, accompanied by his four-fold army (*atha kho tam Ānanda cakkaratanaṃ puratthimaṃ disaṃ pavatti anvadeva rājā mahāsudassano saddhiṃ caturaṅginiyā senāya*: ibid. 172). On the other hand, the idiomatically expressed idea of *dhammacakkappavattana: setting the wheel of Dhamma rolling* is a sequel to the plain and straight forward request that the Buddha should preach and give publicity to the Dhamma for the benefit of those who could comprehend it (*desetu bhagavā dhammaṃ desetu sugato dhammaṃ: santi sattā apparajakkhajātikā assavanatā dhammassa parihāyanti: bhavissanti dhammassa aññātāro ti: Vin.* I, p. 5). Far from the idea of establishing a kingdom, the Buddha in its setting, addresses himself to those alone who have the ability and aptitude to receive his new teaching (*apārutā tesaṃ amatassa dvārā ye sotavanto pamuñcantu saddhaṃ:* ibid. p. 7).

The request thus made and the actual occurrence of the event of the first preaching of the doctrine by the Buddha is seen converging in the ecstacy of the hosts of heavenly beings who describe it as, 'the supreme wheel of the Dhamma has been set rolling, never to be reversed (i.e., its truth never to be controverted) by anyone, by the Exalted One at the Deer Park at Isipatana in Bārānasi (. . *evam bhagavatā Bārānasiyam Isipatane Migadāye anuttaraṃ dhammacakkaṃ pavattitam appativattiyaṃ:* — ibid. pp. 11–12). This fixes, once and for all, the down-to-earth reality of the *Dhammacakkappavattana* as the preaching of the newly discovered truth by the Buddha. The remoteness of an idea of founding a kingdom, in like manner, comes to be convincingly established. See also DHAMMACAKKA.

Editor - in - Chief.

DHAMMACAKKHU (Skt. *dharmacakṣu*:), the *dhamma*-eye, the eye of Truth, or insight into reality, is the realisation of the law of causality (*paticca-samuppāda* or *pratītya samutpāda*). The use of the term *dhamma* (*dharma*) in the sense of the law of causality is not strange as the two terms, *dhamma* and *paticcasamuppāda*, have been used synonymously in the *suttas* when it is said: whosoever sees the *paticca-samuppāda* sees the *dhamma*, and whosoever sees the *dhamma* sees the *paticca-samuppāda* (*yo paticcasamuppādaṃ passati so dhammaṃ passati, yo dhammaṃ passati so paticcasamuppādaṃ passati: M.* I, 191; See also *Sal.* p. 2). The term *cakkhu*, literally 'eye', has been used in its developed meaning of knowledge. This is of very frequent occurrence and we find in the *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta* the term *cakkhu* being used synonymously with knowledge (*ñāṇa*), wisdom (*paññā*), vision (*vijjā*) and light (*āloka: Vin.* I, p. 11; *S.* V, p. 422).

Dhammacakkhu is defined in the texts as the knowledge that whatever is of the nature of origination is also of the nature of cessation (*yam kiñci samudayadhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhammam: Vin.* I, pp. 11, 12, 40; *D.* II, pp. 288–89; *M.* I, p. 380). This definition clearly points to the fact that *dhammacakkhu* is the realisation of the law of causality.

Two terms have always been used in the texts as adjectives of *dhammacakkhu*, namely, free from dust (*virajaṃ*) and free from stains (*vītamalaṃ: Vin.* I, p. 11–12; *Abhsy.* p. 67). Thus this knowledge of causality is perfectly pure.

The person in possession of this knowledge is described as 'one who has perceived *dhamma* (*diṭṭha-dhamma*), in possession of dhamma (*patta-dhamma*), in the know of dhamma (*vidita-dhamma*), one who has penetrated *dhamma* (*pariyogāḷha-dhamma*), one who has overcome doubts (*tiṇṇa-vicikicchā*), has surpassed uncertainty (*vigata-kathaṅkatha*), and is self-confident, and not dependent on others, in leading the noble life in the dispensation of the master (*vesārajjappatto aparapaccayo satthu-sāsane: Vin.* I, loc. cit).

The interpretation in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* of *dharmacakṣu* as the realisation of the four-noble-truths (*Abhsy.* pp. 66–67; of. *dharma-jñāna: Abhk.* 194) is not contrary to the view that *dhammacakkhu* is identical with the realisation of causality; for, the four-noble-truths are an elaboration, on an ethical basis, of the law of causality.

A very apt simile has been employed in explaining how *dhammacakkhu* arises: it arises in the mind just as a pure and clean cloth without dust and stains would easily take dye (*seyyathāpi suddhaṃ vattham apagatakālakaṃ sammadeva rajanaṃ paṭiggaṇheyya: M.* I, p. 380). This suggests that for *dhammacakkhu*

to dawn in the mind of a person, the mind should be pure; be rid, at least of the five mental hindrances (*nīvaraṇa*). This purity of mind is identical with the second stage of the triple training, namely, concentration of the mind (*samādhi*).

The arising of *dhammacakkhu* is again described as instantaneous; it arises in the mind of a person while being seated still on the same seat where he listened to a discourse (*tasmim yeva āsane:* loc. cit). This signifies that this knowledge is intuitive. This intuition constitutes the lightning-like transition of the person concerned, from the state of a mundane being (*puthujjana*) to that of a supramundane being (*ariya-puggala;* an *aryan*). It is the knowledge that effects a qualitative change in a person's attitude towards the world, the whole of phenomenal existence, himself included. It is a radical transformation of a person's outlook.

Asaṅga identifies *dharmacakṣu* with what is called the Path of Insight (*darśana-mārga: Abhsy.* p. 67) and explains it as the achievement of purity of path (*mārgasuddhi*) by abandoning through full comprehension (*parijñayā prahāṇena* (loc. cit.). *Darśana-mārga* is the realisation through insight of the Four Noble Truths (*Abhk.* p. 194; *Abhsy.* pp. 66f.).

The terms *darśana* and *parijñā* are very important in explaining *dharmacakṣu.* The Pali equivalents of the two terms are *dassana* and *pariññā.* The term *darśana* or *dassana* means seeing the Truth whereas *parijñā* or *pariññā* means giving up through realisation (loc. cit.).

What one sees is the law of causality, the Four Noble Truths and, according to Buddhaghosa, Nibbāna (*Vism.* p. 697). This seeing of Nibbāna is called realisation through seeing (*dassana-sacchikiriyā*: loc. cit.; cf. *dassanena sampanno: Sn. v.* 152). What one gives up on attaining insight are the three passions, namely, personality belief (*sakkāya-diṭṭhi*), doubts (*vicikicchā*) and clinging to rites and rituals (*sīlabbata parāmāsa: M.* I, p. 9; *Nettl.* p. 14; *Abhk.* p. 181). This is called *pahāna-pariññā: Ps.* I, p. 87; *Vism.* pp. 606, 693; *Abhsy.* p. 76).

The most difficult barrier one has to break through before one gains this insight is the belief in a personality, called *sakkāya-diṭṭhi* or *satkāya-dṛṣṭi.* This is broken through only by understanding the truth that there is no person as such, that the so-called individual is not real, and that it is only an arrangement, for the time being and in a particular way, of the five aggregates of existence (*pañca-upādāna-khandha*), conditioned by causes. This is brought about by realisation of the premise that all phenomena — personality included — are by their nature, dependent in origination and existence. This is nothing but the realisation of the law of causality. This law of causality is the truth of the universe; it governs all phenomenal existence. It holds good irrespective of the appearance or otherwise of the Tathāgatas who only discover it and preach it to others (*S.* II, p. 25). People are unable to realise it because they are given over to sense-pleasures (*M.* I, p. 167). Non-realisation of this truth is the sole cause for *saṃsāric* existence (*D.* II, p. 55). Since *dhammacakkhu* is the realisation of this truth it is synonymous with what is called 'transcending the world' (*yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhammaṃ ti evam abhinivsitvā evameva vuṭṭhānakāle pana ekappahārenipañcahi khandhehi vuṭṭhāti nāma: Vism.* p. 662a

Destruction of doubt is identical with the obtaining of firm faith in the path preached by the Buddha that it is capable of leading the adherents to the desired goal, i.e. Nibbāna.

Faith in the path excludes all possibilities of the adherent taking to wrong paths and, as a result, puts an end to the embracing of vows and rituals as means to liberation.

Although insight into reality, i.e., *dhammacakkhu,* is thus the most important step on the way to spiritual perfection (*arahatta*) and liberation (*vimutti*), yet, it by itself does not constitute spiritual perfection and liberation. In those passages of the early Pali *suttas* which explain the process of spiritual perfection, two stages are shown; the first is the arising of *dhammacakkhu* (*Vin.* I, p. 11) while the second is described as the freedom emancipation of mind from cankers (*āsavehi cittāni vimucciṃsu: Vin.* I, p. 14). See *Āsrava.*

The first stage represents the *darśana-mārga* whereas the second stage is called *bhāvanā-mārga.* The three passions destroyed in the first stage may be called intellectual passions while the remaining passions may be called emotional passions. The former are due to errors of judgmement or want of discrimination, and are destroyed by insight; the latter are produced by the habits, the emotional nature of beings and are destroyed through proper meditation.

The distinction thus made between the two stages expresses the sychological fact that spiritual perfection can never be only intellectual or only ethical. A person in possession of *dhammacakkhu* is on the better part of the way to perfection; but he has not yet reached complete perfection and absolute freedom called Arahantship; he has yet to strive further and put an end to all cankers which are in him before he attains Arahantship. The stage of *dhammacakkhu* represents the initial and intellectual aspect of perfection whereas the stage called *āsavakkhaya* represents its final and ethical aspect. The former helps one bring about the latter within oneself, for it is insight that makes one meditate properly.

In the *sutta* passages that describe the attainment of perfection and liberation are found a number of stages that precede it. The *Alagaddūpama Sutta* has three stages, namely, insight into reality (*yathābhūtañāṇa*), aversion (*nibbidā*) and detachment (*virāga*) from all conditioned things (*M.* I, p. 139). The *Dasuttara Sutta* (*D.* III, p. 288), gives nine stages, the last three of which are the same as those given in the *Alagaddūpama*. The final stage given in these *suttas* is of course liberation (*vimutti*). The knowledge of this liberation is identified with Arahantship (*M.* I, p. 138).

The two phrases, i.e., *dhammacakkhum udapādi* and *āsavehi cittaṃ vimucci*, representing the two stages of perfection, were used, in what might be the earlier passages of the Pali Canon, without any technical import attached to them. The four stages of perfection, namely, *sotāpatti*, *sakadāgami*, *anāgāmi* and *arahatta* which we find widely used in the passages which might be considered 'later', on the other hand, are highly technical in character with definite functions performed in, and with definite states attained through, them. As these four stages found favour with the writers of the subsequent period, the term *dhammacakkhu* and the idea it represented went almost out of usage. The *Milindapañha*, a Pali work compiled during the period that intervened between the compilation of the Pali Canon and that of the Pali commentaries, has employed the term *sotāpatti-phala* alternately with *dhammacakkhu* (*Miln.* p. 16), as if the two are identical. The commentators mostly preferred the term *sotāpattiphala* to the term *dhammacakkhu*. Yasa, according to the *Vinaya*, for instance, gained *dhammacakkhu* on listening to a discourse by the Buddha (*Vin.* I, p. 16). But, both the *Jātakaṭṭhakathā* (*J*, I, p. 82) and the *Visuddha-janavilāsini* (*ApA.* p. 87) which record the same incident say that Yasa was established in the *sotāpattiphala*. The case of *Aññā-Koṇḍañña* (*Vin.* I, p. 11; *S.* V. pp. 420–24; *J.* I, p. 82; *ApA.* p. 87) and Sāriputta (*Vin.* I, p. 40; *J.* I, p. 85; *ApA.* p. 90) may be cited as further examples.

As a result of the tendency on the part of the later writers to omit the term *dhammacakkhu* in favour of the term *sotāpattiphala*, the idea of *dhammacakkhu* did not develop any further. It lagged almost where it was born. The idea of freedom of the mind from cankers, however, remained in usage in phrases like *khīṇāsava*, one in whom biases are destroyed, i.e., an Arahant, *āsavakkhaya*, destruction of biases ,i.e., Arahantship, and *āsavānaṃ-khaya-ñāṇa*, knowledge of the destruction of biases etc., as it is descriptive of the stage which it represents.

Whenever the commentators came across the term *dhammacakkhu* in contexts which demanded an explanation, unlike in the narrative contexts where they have always replaced it with *sotāpattiphala*, they explained it as "insight into dhammas" (*dhammesu vā cakkhuṃ*) or as 'the eye made of dhamma' (*dhammamayaṃ vā cakkhuṃ: DA.* I, p. 237). The two alternative definitions thus given betrays the uncertainty, on the part of the commentator, as regards the exact meaning of the term. The *Manorathapūraṇī* explains *dhammacakkhu* as the insight one gains or the path of stream-entry which means the grasp of the Four Noble Truth (*dhammacakkhuṃ ti catu-sacca-dhamma-pariggāhakaṃ sotāpatti-magga-cakkhu: AA.* II, p. 356). As the Four Noble Truths embrace the elements of existence, both the conditioned and the unconditioned (*samsāra & nibbāna*), *dhammacakkhu* means insight into the elements which is brought about in the moment called *sotāpatti-magga*. The *dhammacakkhu* is again identified, in the Pali commentaries, with one of the first three supra-mundane paths, namely, *sotāpatti magga*, *sakadāgāmi-magga* and *anāgāmi-magga* (*heṭṭhimā-maggattayasaṅkhātam ñāṇam dhammacakkhu nāma: DhsA.* p. 306; *tinnam maggānam etam adhivacanaṃ: DA.* I, p. 237).

This identification suggests also the possibility of persons attaining any of the first three paths in one stroke, without having to pass them in succession. Thus there are three types of persons who gain *dhammacakkhu:* 1. The person who attains *sotāpattiphala;* 2. The person who attains *sakadāgāmi phala* in one stroke, and 3. The person who attains *anāgāmiphala* in one stroke.

Since path (*magga*) and fruition (*phala*) are two of the seven thought-moments (*cittakkhaṇa*) arising in immediate succession in a thought process (*citta-vīthi*) called the *javana-vīthi* (*Vism*, p. 610) and the person who has entered the path is immediately established in its fruition, the identification in the commentaries of the person who has gained *dhamma-cakkhu* with a person who is established in the *sotāpattiphala* (a *sotāpanna*) is quite tenable. But we may add that a person who is established in one of the next two fruitions, namely, *sakadāgāmiphala*, and *anāgāmiphala*, in one stroke, without undergoing the lower stagses, i.e., *sotāpatti* etc., may also be called one who has gained *dhammacakkhu*.

All these are called the trainees (*sekha*), those, who are still undergoing the training leading to perfect liberation. They still possess the biases within themselves which they will have to destroy before they attain perfect liberation. In fact, the Buddha himself has explained *dhammacakkhu* as seeing *dhammas* with the knowledge of a trainee (*sekha-ñāṇa*: *Vin.* I, p. 17).

There are also disciples who take both steps, i.e., *dhammacakkhu* and *āsavakkhaya*, together and reach perfect liberation in one stroke. They do it at the moment called the *arahattamagga*, the fourth and final stage. Although they possess *dhammacakkhu*, they are called *khīṇāsava* or Arahant because the term *khīṇāsava* is of primary importance and it presupposes *dhammacakkhu* as well.

The Arahants, the perfectly liberated ones (*sammadaññā vimutta*), whether in one stroke or in stages, in contradistinction to *sekha*, are called *asekha*, the trained, those who have completed the training.

Sekha is one who knows things intuitively (*abhijānāti*), but there are passions to be given up (*pariññeyya*) by him. *Asekha*, on the other hand, is one who both knows things intuitively and has given up all passions (*pariññāta*: *M.* I, pp. 4ff; *Ps.* I, pp. 5, 22, 87; *Nettl.* pp. 19f; *Vism.* p. 606; *Abhsy.* pp. 66f.).

An entirely different view of *dhammacakkhu* is expressed in the *Mahāvastu* according to which *dhammacakkhu* is one of the five eyes possessed by a Buddha. It is said there that the Buddhas, on approaching the Bodhi-tree but before attaining the supreme enlightenment, become gifted with the five eyes, namely, 1. the eye of flesh (*māṃsacakṣu*), 2. divine-eye (*divya-cakṣu*), 3. the eye of wisdom (*prajñā-cakṣu*), 4. the *dharma*-eye (*dharma-cakṣu*) and 5. the Buddha-eye (*Buddha-cakṣu*). The *dharma-cakṣu* is identified wth the ten powers (*dasa-bala*) possessed by a Buddha (*Mhvu.* I. p. 159). This seems to be a different tradition which is not known in other schools of Buddhism. We do not find *dharma-cakṣu* being identified with *dasa-bala* anywhere else in Buddhist literature.

UPALI KARUNARATNE

DHAMMACETI, (also called Dhammacetiya, Dhammaceḍi, Rāmādhipati and Siriparamamahādhammarāja), king of Pegu Burma (1460–1491 A.C.). He was formerly a Buddhist monk in Burma and was not of the royal family. While he was a Buddhist monk, he helped a princess of Pegu to escape from the Burmese court where she was detained. This princess was married against her will to the king of Ava, and later she became the famuous queen Shin-sau-bu. In 1453 A.C. she assumed sovereignty in Pegu, and Dhammaceti, who helped her when she was in distress, was made her chief minister. Subsequently he became her son-in-law and successor.

Dhammaceti's reign was the most prosperous period for Buddhism in Pegu. Though he had returned to the lay life nis heart was with the *sāsana*. He was not merely a protector of the Order but was also a reformer. According to Ray, "the greatest part of the transformation of the Sangha in Burma was due to the great religious reformation of Buddhism carried out in the 15th century by King Dhammaceti" (Ray. B. R. *Sanskrit Buddhism in Burma*, University of Calcutta, 1936, p. 67). Bode says: "Dhammaceti's reign was doubly memorable. He was famous far beyond the limits of his own country for his statesmanship and magnificence, and renowned in the whole Buddhist world for his piety" (Bode M. H. *The Pāli Literature of Burma*, London, 1966, p. 37).

Dhammaceti was the author of the Kalyāṇi inscriptions. From the text of the inscriptions it is clear that he was determined to give the Saṅgha in Rāmaññā a duly consecrated place for the performance of their religious ceremonies. The effect of this was the purification of the religion by settling on intricate and highly technical questions that pertained to the proper method of defining and consecrating a *sīmā*. To Dhammaceti the question appeared to be very vital, for he explains, that there were in southern Burma six schools of monks who would not meet for *uposatha*. King Dhammaceti himself studied the

authoritative texts on the problem and sent a mission to Sri Lanka charged to obtain an authoritative ruling as to the proper method of consecrating a *simā* and conferring ordination. The monks sent by him received the *upasampadā* ordination afresh from the monks in Sri Lanka who had preserved an un-broken succession of the Mahāvihāra fraternity, within consecrated boundaries on the Kalyāni (modern Kelani) river, near Colombo. On their return to Pegu, Dhammaceti staked out a *simā* at Pegu, consecrated in the manner prescribed by the monks in Sri Lanka and named it Kalyāni Sīmā. Within this *simā*, the *upasampadā* could be conferred as from the direct spiritual successors of Mahinda, Emperor Asoka's missionary to Sri Lanka, and thus the link in succession of teachers broken in Rāmañña was restored (Law B.C. *History of the Buddha's Religion*: trsl. of *Sāsanavaṃsa*: London, 1952, pp. 48–52f.) During the following three years all the monks in Dhammaceti's kingdom were re-ordained. It is mentioned that 15,666 monks received *upasampadā* ordination and the king having purified the *sāsana* in this manner made the newly reformed Saṅgha, which came to be called the *Sīhala Saṅgha* the only recognised sect in his country. All other distinctions that were prevalent in the Saṅgha were obliterated. From this Theravāda reformation it is clear that Dhammaceti denied the existence of the Mahāyāna and its allied cults by ignoring them altogether.

King Dhammaceti established the Kalyāni Sīmā by using his royal authority to support his own deep conviction. The experience gained by him when he was a monk may have compelled him to establish orthodoxy in the Saṅgha, at least within his kingdom. The Kalyāṇī inscriptions bear testimony to the fact that the restoration of the *upasampadā* ordination by itself was a very vital matter for the Burmese saṅgha and the monks who received *upasampadā* ordination from Sri Lanka claimed superiority over the rest of the Buddhist monks and they established themselves as the *Sīnhala Saṅgha* in Burma.

King Dhammaceti received a copy of the *Vajirabuddhiṭīkā* (var. *Vinayagandhi* or *Vinayaganti*), a sub-commentary that explains difficult passages in the *Vinaya* commentaries from its author Mahā Vajirabuddhi of Sri Lanka. At the Kalyāni Sīmā, he set up a number of inscriptions on stone recording in a summary form, from all available records, the history of the rise and progress of Buddhism in Burma, and they form a very interesting chapter in the history of Buddhism.

M. KR.

DHAMMAHĀTU objects of mind, things that are the objects of mentation, i.e., the objects of representative imagination or ideation, and according to the *dhātu*-classification, which is an investigation into the functions of consciousness, it is one of the eighteen *dhātus*.

Buddhism takes up the position that the mind (*mano*), along with the eye, the ear, etc., is also one of the sense-organs (*manindriyaṃ*). But it also plays the additional role of recording sense-data received through the other five organs and making it available back to them according to need. Thus, while the five sense-organs (besides the mind) keep distinctly to their own spheres of activity and do not cross over to the others (*na aññamaññassa gocaravisayaṃ paccanubhonti*: *M.* I, p. 295), the mind operates in and through all of them and they in turn lean on the mind (*imesaṃ kho āvuso pañcannam indriyānaṃ nānāvissayānaṃ nānāgocārānaṃ na aññamaññassa gocaravisayaṃ paceanubhontānaṃ mano paṭisaraṇaṃ.. mano ca nesaṃ gocaravisayaṃ paccanubhoti ti:* loc. cit.). It is this additional role of the mind in acting as a repository to all sense-data that precedes which makes the cognitive process complete and meaningful. The perceptual processes of the sense-organs, including the mind itself, acquires their own character through this and is being guided by and assessed with the mind. (See the 18 *manopavicāras* at *M.* III, pp. 216 f.). It is this repertoire which constitute the *dhammadhātu*, and the mind uses them all the time in the same way as the eye uses form (*rūpa*) and the ear uses sound (*sadda*). (Note *manasā dhammam viññāya* .. loc. cit).

In the terminology of the Abhidhamma the purely ideational process (*suddha-mano-dvāra-vīthi*) occurs through the mind-door when images or ideas or concepts (*dhammā*) come into focus, in the same way as perception occurs through doors of the other senses when material objects come into focus. An idea, or an image, or a concept, in this case, is termed *dhammārammaṇa* (*Dhs.* pp. 27, 29, 75; *DhsA.* p. 72; *Abhs.* p. 13) in analogy with an external material object which is called *rupārammaṇa* etc.

The revival of an idea is based on past experience. Any kind of experience through the five senses can be revived as an idea, a concept, or an image in the mind. Whatever is constructed by the mind must be based, inversely, on what has been experienced by the senses. The *Atthasālini* refutes the view that images include those objects which have not been experienced by the senses. What has not been experienced by the senses can only be conjured up by

the divine eye, and not by the mind (*DhsA*. p. 72). A number of examples are given to illustrate the proposition that what is conceptually revived is only what has been previously experienced. This revival is said to happen naturally (*pakatiyā*), that is, without the usual antecedent of sensory stimulation (*DhsA*. p. 72 ff.).

The revival of an idea may be of several varieties. There may be a revival of one's own experience (*diṭṭha*: the term is perhaps used here to include all sense data directly experienced) or a revival of information or knowledge gathered from a secondary source (*suta*). A third form of conceptual revival would be imaginative construction, a combination of the memory of what one has learned from other sources (*ubhaya-sambandha*: *DhsA*. p. 73 ff.). As an example of the last kind of ideation is mentioned the instance of a man who, with the information he has gathered about the appearance of the Buddha, is able to construct in his imagination a picture of what the Buddha who will be born in the future would look like (loc. cit.).

In the Theravāda school *dhammadhātu* consists of five categories, namely, *vedanākhandha*, *saññākhandha*, *saṅkhāra-khandha*, subtle form of matter described as matter which is signless, not impinging and included in the *dhammāyatana* (*yaṃ ca rūpaṃ anidassanaṃ appaṭighaṃ dhammāyatana pariyāpannaṃ*) and finally the unconditioned (*asaṅkhata-dhātu*), i.e., Nibbāna (*Vbh*. p. 89). The same five categories are given in explanation of *dhammāyatana*, too (*Vbh*. p. 72).

The subtle form of matter, in this case, consists of the following fourteen items : femininity (*itthindriya*), masculinity (*purisindriya*), vital force (*jīvitindriya*), intimation by the body (*kāya-viññatti*), intimation by speech (*vacī-viññatti*), element of space (*ākāsa-dhātu*), edible food, i.e., nutrition (*kabaliṅkāra-āhāra*), lightness of matter (*rūpassa lahutā*), pliancy of matter (*mudutā*), adaptability of matter (*kammaññatā*), integration of matter (*upacaya*), continuity of matter (*santati*), decay of matter (*jaratā*) and impermanence of matter (*aniccatā*; *Dhs*. pp. 134, 147).

The *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha*, in defining *dhammāramma*ṇa which is identical with *dhammadhātu* or *dhammāyatana*, gives six items as its constituents, namely, (1) *pasāda-rūpa*, the sensitive portions of the five senses, (2) *sukhuma-rūpa*, subtle matter, (3) *citta*, mind, (4) *cetasika*, mental properties which are identical with *vedanā*, *saññā* and *saṅkhārakhandhas*, (5) Nibbāna and (6) *paññatti*, concepts (*Abhs*. 13). Thus, the *abhidhammattha-saṅgaha* definition of *dhammāramma*ṇa has added three more categories to the *dhammadhātu* of the *Vibhaṅga*. They are (1) *pasāda-rūpa*, *citta*, and *paññatti*, *sukhuma-rūpa* being more or less identical with the subtle form of matter given in the *Vibhaṅga*.

According to the *dhamma*-classification where we get eighty two *dhammas* in all, counting mind as one *dhamma*, *dhammadhātu* contains seventy-five *dhammas*, namely, mind, one in number; mental properties, fifty-two in number; twenty-one types of matter, i.e., five *pasāda-rūpas* and sixteen *sukhuma-rūpas*, and finally Nibbāna. The seven *dhammas* excluded are the three elements, namely, the element of extension (*pathavi*), of heat (*tejo*) and of motion (*vāyu*), plus four sense-objects, namely, visible form (*rūpa*), sound (*sadda*), odour (*gandha*) and savour (*rasa*); the tangible objects being identical with the three elements of extension, heat and motion (*Abhs*. p. 27).

This is the extent to which the doctrine of *dhammadhātu* is developed by the Theravādins. The other schools, especially, the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra too, have developed their *dharmadhātu* in line with their own classifications of the elements of existence.

The Sarvāstivādin definition of *dharmadhātu* has five categories, namely, *vedanā-skandha*, *saṃjñā-skandha*, *saṃskāra-skandha*, *avijñapti* and the *asaṃskṛtas* (*Abhk*. i, *v*. 15). *Avijñapti* is unmanifested matter, the vehicle of moral qualities, a variety of karma. The *asaṃskṛtas*, unconditioned, are of three kinds, namely, space (*ākāśa*) and two forms of *nirodha*, *pratisaṃkhyā* and *apratisaṃkhyā*. These five categories contain sixty-four *dharmas* out of a total of seventy-five; the three *skandhas* yielding sixty *dharmas* divided into (1) mental properties (*caitta-dharma* or *citta-saṃprayukta-saṃskāra-dharma*), forty-six in number and (2) elementary forces (*viprayukta—saṃskāra-dharma*), fourteen in number. The eleven *dharmas* excluded are the five sense-organs, five sense-objects and the mind.

The Yogācāra school has four categories included in their *dharmadhātu*, namely, the *caitasika-dharmas* fifty-one in number, *citta-viprayukta-dharmas* twenty-four in number, six *asaṃskṛta-dharmas* and one subtle form of matter; making a total of eighty-two *dharmas*. The eighteen *dharmas* excluded are

eight kinds of *citta*, and ten kinds of matter (*Vidyā-mātrasiddhi*, i, 5b). The six *asaṃskṛta-dharmas* of the Yogācāra school are the three *asaṃskṛta-dharmas*, of the Sarvāstivādins plus *acala*, *saṃjñā-vedanā-nirodha* and *tathatā*. 'Subtle form of matter' is an aspect of matter of which we have no sensuous knowledge; it is an object of the mind. The atoms, for example, cannot be seen; they can only be inferred. The Yogācārins have placed this aspect of matter in a separate category. This includes, but is not confined to, the *avijñapti-rūpa* of the Sarvāstivādins.

All the three schools have the unconditioned, the mental properties and some subtle form of matter included in their *dharmadhātu*. Only the Theravādins have mind (*citta*), as an item of their *dharmadhātu*.

The common feature of the *dharmas* that form the *dharmadhātu* is that they are apprehended by the intellect directly without any intermediate agency of the senses. In the apprehension of sense-objects there is likewise participation of the intellect; but these *dharmas* are non-sensuous objects; they are the exclusive domain of the receptive intellect, just as colour is the exclusive domain of the sense of vision. They are external with regard to mind.

It would be clear from the foregoing explanation that, unlike the *skandha*-classification which embraces only the conditioned things, i.e., the phenomenal existence, or simply, *saṃsāra*, the *dhātu*- and *āyatana*-classifications cover the whole of existence, both the conditioned things and the unconditioned, or simply, saṃsāra and Nibbāna. See DHĀTU-I

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DHAMMĀNUPASSANĀ, contemplation on *dhammas* (*dhammesu dhammānupassī*), is the last of the four applications of mindfulness (*satipaṭṭhāna*, q.v.), the other three being *kāyānupassanā*, *vedanānupassanā* and *cittānupassanā* (*M*.I, p. 56 ff; *D*. III, p. 221). It is thus one of the thirty seven qualities contributing to supreme enlightenment (*bodhipakkhiyā dhammā*: *D*. II, p. 120; *M*. I, pp. 56, 60 ff; *Vism*. p. 678 f.).

The word *dhammānupassanā* is a compound, *dhamma* and *anupassanā* being the components.

The term, *dhamma*, which has several applications, is not defined in the context, but, some examples are given instead. In the two *Satipaṭṭhāna Suttas* (*D*. II p. 300 ff; *M*. I, pp. 60 ff.), the following categories are cited as examples of *dhamma*; namely, the five mental hindrances (*nīvaraṇa*, q.v.), the five aggregates of clinging (*upādānakkhandha*, q.v.), the six internal bases of perception and their corresponding external objects (*āyatana*, q.v.) the fetters (*saṃyojana*, q.v.) which arise on account of them, the seven factors of enlightenment (*bojjhaṅga*, q.v.) and the four truths (*sacca* q.v.).

Out of these categories the *upādānakkhandha* or the five aggregates embrace the entire sphere of phenomenal existence (i.e., *saṃsāra*, q.v.) while in the two categories-*āyatana* and *sacca*, both *saṃsāra* and Nibbāna are included. *Nīvaraṇa* and *saṃyojana* as well as *bojjhaṅga* cover a part of *saṃsāra*, the former two being the cause of *saṃsāra*, i.e., the obstacles to realisation of Nibbāna, whereas, the last category, i.e. *bojjhaṅga*, constitutes the path leading to the cessation of *saṃsāra*, i.e. realisation of Nibbāna.

The second term, *anupassanā*, a nominal form from *anupassati*, means contemplating on, observing or seeing properly. In explaining the term, the *Vibhaṅga* gives synonyms such as *paññā*, *pajānana*, *amoha*, *dhammavicaya* and *sammādiṭṭhi* all of which denote some aspect of knowledge (*Vbh*. p. 202).

Dhammānupassanā thus means contemplating on and seeing *dhammas* in their proper perspective.

The following is the description of *dhammānupassanā* as given in the two *Satipaṭṭhāna Suttas*:

A monk is aware whether or not the five mental hindrances are in him. He knows of their arising and of his getting rid of them. He also knows of the non-arising in future of these vanished hindrances. He knows the nature of the five aggregates which constitute the objects of clinging, their genesis and passing away. He is aware of the six internal bases of perception, i.e. the six organs of sense, and their corresponding external objects, and fetters which arise on account of them; he also knows how a fetter arises and how it is put aside and that, in the future, there shall not arise again a fetter that has been put aside. He is aware whether the seven factors of enlightenment are present in him or absent; he knows how they arise and develop. He is also aware

of unsatisfactoriness (*dukkha*), its origin and cessation and also of the path leading to its cessation.

So does he continue to contemplate on these things; he even contemplates on how a *dhamma* comes to be and how it passes away. When he contemplates on these *dhammas* he only concedes a nominal existence for them in so far as such conceptualising is necessary to build up a correct vision (*yāvadeva ñāṇamattāya*) and acquire the necessary poise of mind (*patissatimattāya*). This is the same even with regard to the concept of one's own body (*atthi kāyo ti vā . . .*). This leaves him unattached to the world (*anissito ca viharati na ca kiñci loke upādiyati, D.* II, pp. 292, 314). He abides independent, grasping after nothing in the world. (*D.* II, p. 300 ff; *M.* I, p. 60 ff.).

All *dhammas* constitute objects of the mind; it is by the arising of attention (*manasikāra*) that they present themselves to the mind as objects. By the ceasing, therefore, of attention comes the ending of mind-objects (*S.*V. p. 184). By fully understanding the nature of these *dhammas*, the deathless state, i.e. Nibbāna is realised (*S.*V, p. 182). The *Nettippakaraṇa*, therefore, describes *dhammānupassanā* as the signless gateway to freedom (*animitta-vimokkhamukha, Netti.* p. 123). The practice of *ānāpānasati* in its final four aspects, i.e. contemplating on impermanence (*anicca*), detachment (*virāga*), ceasing (*nirodha*) and casting away (*paṭinissagga*) brings about *dhammānupassanā* (*M.* III, p. 84).

The *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta* gives instructions as to how this state is brought about; a monk abides contemplating on *dhammas*, ardent, composed and mindful, by restraining both covetousness and discontent with regard to things in the world. As he thus abides, either some *dhamma* presents itself to his mind or bodily discomfort or drowsiness of mind scatters his thoughts abroad to externals. Thereupon he should direct his attention to some pleasurable objects of thought. As he so directs, delight springs up in him. In him thus delighted arises zest, full of zest as he is, his body becomes calm. With the body calmed, he experiences ease. In him who is at ease, the mind is concentrated. He reflects thus : "That aim on which I set my mind, I have attained. Now let me withdraw my mind thencefrom". So he withdraws his mind therefrom and neither starts nor carries on a thought-process. Thus he is fully conscious : "I am without thought, initial or sustained. I am inwardly mindful. I am at ease" (*S.*V. p. 156). As he so abides, his mind is purified, and emancipated by achieving freedom from the *āsavas* (*S.*V. p. 158).

Six things have been listed as impediments to the practice of *dhammānupassanā*, namely, delight in activity, gossip, sleep, company, being without guard over the sense-doors and being immoderate in eating (*A.* III, p. 450).

It is clear from the above description that *dhammānupassanā* according to the Pali tradition is knowledge brought about by contemplating on (*anupassanā*) *dhammas*; and it is this knowledge that is instrumental in effecting freedom from the *āsavas* i.e., in realising Nibbāna.

In Buddhist Sanskrit literature, too, *dharmasmṛtyupasthāna* (the Sanskrit equivalent of Pali *dhammānupassanā*) is one of the four *smṛtyupasthānas* (*satipaṭṭhāna*) and one of the thirty-seven *bodhipākṣyadharmas* (*bodhipakkhiyā dhammā*) and means the same as in Pali literature (*Śikṣ.* p. 1427; *Daśabhūmika Sūtra*, p. 259; *Kāśyp.* p. 95, *Abhk.* p. 165 ff. *Dhsaṃg.* p. 9).

The practice of *dharmasmṛtyupasthāna* and its resultant knowledge are described in the Sanskrit texts as follows :

A person, having reflected on the elements of his own personality, turns his thought towards the external world, the universe in general. He understands that all elements (*dharmas*) are adventitious and extraneous, just like dust, smoke, clouds or frost, merely accidental adjuncts of space. He acquires perfect knowledge of them, knowledge which is free from all delusion and darkness. He realises that the *dharmas* arise from causes and are thus relative and interdependent. They are impermanent and fragile in nature, like a pot of unbaked clay or a town built of sand. They may be compared to the flame of a lamp, a clot of foam, a gust of wind, the plaster washed away in the rainy season, the stem of a plantain tree or an empty fist. They are caused by ignorance and do not really exist. The movements of things in the universe are dependent on one another (*Lal.* p. 24, *Sūtrāl.* p. 141; *Śikṣ.* p. 236 ff.).

The *dharmas* are, in fact, unintelligible. The sprout springs from the seed, but it is neither the same as the seed nor different from it. A seed can give an impression which is neither the same as

the original nor different from it. The fire is produced by the friction of two pieces of wood, but no one can see whence it came or whither it has gone. One sees things on account of the contact between the eye and the external objects, but the latter are not in the eye. In the same way, sound is produced by the combined action of the bodily organs and the wind, but all sound is but an echo. It may be produced by means of a stringed musical instrument which is played with the hand, but no one can perceive whence it comes or whither it goes. Thus, the *dharmas* are due to primary and secondary causes, and they are void within and without. There is no essence or reality in them (loc. cit.).

In brief, understanding of *dharmas* in their fourfold nature, i.e., impermanency, unsatisfactoriness, voidness and unsubstantiality, both with regard to their general and special characteristics, is called *dharmasmṛtyupasthāna* (*AbhK.* pp. 165 f.).

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DHAMMĀNUSĀRĪ The term *dhammānusārī*, together with *saddhānusārī*, seems to indicate the two apparently different ways *via* which the goal of *Nirvāṇa* or release from *saṃsāra* is sought and attained in Buddhism. The term means 'one who is led by the *dhamma*' or 'one who follows the *dhamma*'. The *Visuddhimagga* defines this term as : 'he follows the *dhamma* called understanding' (*paññāsaṅkhātaṃ dhammaṃ anusarati*), or 'he follows by means of the *dhamma* (*dhammena vā anusarati*: *Vism.* p. 660). The commentary to the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*AA.* IV, p. 4) adds here that *dhamma* means wisdom (*paññā*).

The term *dhammānusārī* occurs in several classifications in Buddhist literature. The *Saṅgīti Sutta* (*D.* III, p. 254) mentions *dhammānusārī* as the sixth of seven individuals (*puggala*), the other six being : one who is freed both ways (*ubhatobhāgavimutta*), one who is freed by insight (*paññāvimutta*), one having bodily testimony (*kāyasakkhi*), one who has formed the (right) view (*diṭṭhippatta*), one who is freed through faith (*saddhāvimutta*) and the one who follows by faith (*saddhānusārī*). The *Visuddhimagga* (p. 659) describes these seven terms in the following words : 'One who develops the faculty of faith by contemplating the impermanent nature of things, with determination, is called a faith-follower at the stream-entry-path moment; at the other seven moments he is called 'one who is freed by faith'. One who is tranquil and develops the faculty of concentration by contemplating on the unsatisfactory nature of things is called 'one having bodily testimony' at all moments. One who attains to the highest fruit by developing the formless trance (*arūpa-jhāna*) is called 'one freed both ways'. One, who being very intelligent, develops the faculty of wisdom, is called 'one who follows the *dhamma* at the stream-entry-path moment, and at the subsequent six moments he is called 'one who has formed (right) views'. At the moment of the highest fruition he is called 'a wisdom-liberated one'.

In another classification of six persons (*S.V.* p. 200; *M.*I, p. 226), *dhammānusārī* is given as the fifth, the others being: the perfected one (*arahā*), the non-returner (*anāgāmi*), the once-returner (*sakadāgāmi*), the stream-entrant (*sotāpanna*) and the faith-follower (*saddhānusārī*).

The *Cullagopālaka Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 226), wherein the identical list of six persons occur, shows the difference between the stream-entrant and the *dhammānusārī* by comparing the stream-entrant to a young calf and the *dhammānusārī* to a calf just born. The *Indriya Saṃyutta* (*S.V.* p. 200), too discusses the six above individuals and shows their difference in the development of five faculties (*indriya*) which are the faculty of faith (*saddhā*), endeavour (*viriya*), mindfulness (*sati*), concentration of mind (*samādhi*) and wisdom (*paññā*). An *arahant* is one who has fully developed and matured (*paripūrattā*) the five above faculties; a non-returner has a slightly less development in the same faculties than the *arahant*; a once-returner has a development in the same faculties slightly less than a non-returner; a stream-entrant has a development in the same which is slightly less than that of a once-returner; the *dhammānusārī* has a development in those faculties slightly less than that of a stream-entrant; and the faith-follower has a development in the same faculties slightly less than that of the *dhammānusārī*.

The commentary to the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (*SA.* III, p. 240) says that there are two means to realise higher spiritual attainments (*lokuttara-dhamma*). One who attains the state of a stream-entrant does so by adhering to one of these two means. One who follows the faith means is called a faith-follower (*saddhānusārī*) at the path-moment (*maggakkhaṇa*) and is called a faith liberated-one (*saddhāvimutta*) at

the moment of fruition (*phalakkhaṇa*). One who follows the wisdom means is called a *dhammānusārī* at the path-moment and a wisdom-liberated-one (*paññāvimutta*) at the moment of fruition. A slightly different version is given in the *Majjhima* commentary (*MA.* II, p. 120), according to which one who is on the path to the realisation of the fruit of stream-entry is called a *dhammānusārī* and when he attains this fruit, he is called 'one who has formed the (right) view' (*diṭṭhippatta*).

W.G.W.

DHAMMĀNUSSATI (Skt. Dharmānusmṛti), or contemplation on the *dhamma*, is the second in a list of six (or ten) contemplations (*anussati*, q.v) which are found enumerated in canonical Pali texts (*D.* III, pp. 250, 280; *A.* I, pp. 30, 42 etc.) as well as in comparatively early Buddhist Sanskrit Literature (*Ssp.* pp. 60, 1443). The canonical references (*A.* I, pp. 30, 42) speak of these six contemplations as being conducive to mental culture and spiritual development and include them in the list of forty objects of contemplation (*kammaṭṭhāna*, q.v.). These canonical ideas are further stressed and elaborated in commentarial and post-commentarial works, amongst which the *Visuddhimagga* and *Vimuttimagga* contain a detail treatment of the subject.

In discussing *dhammānussati* the *Visuddhimagga* defines the term *dhamma* in this context as denoting not only the teachings of the scriptures but also the ninefold supramundane states (*lokuttara dhamma*). This additional connotation appears to be superfluous and unwarranted. According to the *Vimuttimagga* (P. V. Bapat, *Vimuttimagga and Visuddhimagga, a Comparative Study*, Poona, 1937, p. 66) *dhamma* means both Nibbāna and practices leading to Nibbāna and enumerates these practices as follows : the four foundations of mindfulness, the four right efforts, the five powers, the seven factors of enlightenment and the Noble Eight-fold Path. It is clear from canonical references themselves that *dhamma* in this context meant the Doctrine, i.e., all what the Buddha has taught (*A.* III, p. 312; V, p. 329).

A zealous contemplator who is bent on contemplating on the *dhamma* is expected to go into solitary retreat and reflect, turning over and over again in the mind, the numerous good qualities of the *dhamma* specially directing his attention to its six excellent qualities namely, that the (1) *dhamma* is well proclaimed (*svākkhāta*), (2) visibly bears fruit in this very existence (*sandiṭṭhika*), (3) timeless (*akālika*), (4) inviting of inspection (*ehipassika*), (5) onward leading (*opanayika*), and (6) that it is to be individually experienced by the wise (*paccattaṃ veditabbo viññūhi*). See DHAMMA I.

It is apparent from canonical references in the latter part of the *Dīgha Nikāya* (III, pp. 250, 280, i.e., in the *Saṅgīti* and in the *Dasuttara Sutta* respectively) and in the *Saṃyutta* and in the *Aṅguttara* that the practice of *anussati* is of comparatively late origin and does not belong to the earliest phase of Buddhism. This could have come into being as a result of the process of popularisation and liberalisation of the teaching at a comparatively early period.

It is seen that the primary function of *anussati* is to cleanse the mind of its defilements (*A.* I, p. 207 f.; III, pp. 285, 312). This basic contemplation on the *dhamma*, dwelling on its cardinal virtues, is referred to as *dhammuposatha* (*A.* I, p. 208) and is said to produce, through the purge of the mind (*cittassa upakkamena pariyodapana*) the stimulating phase of joy referred to as *pāmujja*.

Dhammānussati, in particular, induces one to become more attuned and receptive to *dhamma*. When contemplating on the excellent qualities of the *dhamma* his mind does not become possessed by lust (*rāga*) hate (*dosa*) and delusion (*moha*); it becomes upright and detached from the five-fold sensuous pleasures (*A.* III, p. 312). The mind being totally directed towards the *dhamma*, his faith in the Buddha and the *Dhamma* increases pervading his whole being. In fact *dhammānussati* would serve as a spiritual check to any type of transgression, for when one encounters an opportunity for transgression one is naturally made conscious of the excellent qualities of the *Dhamma*, thus arousing in him a sense of moral shame and fear with regard to his imminent act of transgression.

In this connexion, it is worth bringing to mind the role of *dhammādhipateyya* (i.e., the *dhamma* as a deterrent) which together with *attādhipateyya* (i.e., the self as a deterrent) and *lokādhipateyya* (i.e., the world as a deterrent) is discussed at length in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*A.* I, p. 147 f.). Discussing the role of *anussati*, the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*A.* III, p. 285 f.) states further that the development of

anussati insulates the ariyan disciple against the normal vicious and evil traits of the world (*visamagatāya pajāya samappatto viharati savyāpajjāya pajāya avyāpajjo viharati*) and that he consequently accords fully with the Norm (*dhammasotaṃ samāpanno dhammānussatiṃ bhāveti*). With his mind upright the zealous contemplator becomes enthusiastic about the spirit and essence of the *dhamma;* he experiences joy that accompanies the *dhamma;* in one so joyous is born zest (*pīti*), the body of him whose mind is zestful becomes calm, with his body calmed he experiences happiness (*sukha*); and the mind of the happy one is concentrated (*A.* III, p. 285; V, p. 329 f.; *The Path of Freedom—Vimuttimagga*, Colombo, 1961, p. 150).

Already in the canonical texts, it is clearly stated that by adopting any one of the six *anussati* as the basis of contemplation, a Buddhist disciple would be able to detach his mind from greed or *gedha* which is attachment to sensual pleasures of the world (i.e., *pañcakāmaguṇa*) and through this gradually work his way towards the attainment of Nibbāna.

UPALI KARUNARATNA

DHAMMAPADA, the second book of the *Khuddaka Nikāya* of the *Sutta Piṭaka*, is perhaps the most popular and most widely known work of Buddhist canonical literature. It is an anthology of 423 verses grouped in 26 chapters, chiefly referring to the ethical doctrines of Buddhism, but at the same time containing some of the fundamental tenets of the Buddhist doctrine. The verses, many of which also occur in other canonical works, embody the actual spirit of the Buddha's teaching, if not the very words of the Buddha. The *Dhammapada* has been greatly revered because of its high moral value. It was the first Pali text ever printed in Europe and has been translated into many European languages. In Sri Lanka every novice is expected to make a thorough study of the *Dhammapada* before he receives the higher ordination. Thus, while any fully ordained monk in Sri Lanka would be able to recite the whole of the *Dhammapada* from memory, many of its verses are also often on the lips of pious laymen. The *Dhammapada* verses are a popular text for sermons among Buddhist preachers.

The title *Dhammapada* has been interpreted in various ways. Both the words *Dhamma* and *pada* lend themselves to different renderings. It is clear that in this context *Dhamma* would refer to either doctrine, law, truth, or righteousness or virtue. The use of the word *pada* is more ambiguous. Of its several meanings, the ones applicable here would be word, verse, sentence, line; way, path; portion, constituent, footstep. The combined word *Dhammapada* has thus been variously translated as 'Path of Virtue', 'Way of Rightcousness', 'Footstep of Religion', 'Path of Religion', 'Stanzas of the Dhamma', 'Words of the Truth', Utterances of Religion', 'Sections or Portions of the Dhamma', 'Collection of Words or Verses on Religion', etc. None of these renderings are inconsistent with the compound word *Dhammapada* and it cannot be said with certainty what its meaning was originally intended to be.

The work consists of 423 verses divided into 26 chapters, the longest being the last chapter *Brāhmaṇa Vagga* with 41 verses, and the shortest being the *Arahanta Vagga* and *Atta Vagga* with 10 verses each. For the most part the verses are grouped according to their subject-matter and named after the ethical or doctrinal topic with which they deal. A few chapters are named after a characteristic, eg., *Yamaka* 'Twin Verses', or by a descriptive heading *Pakiṇṇaka* 'Miscellaneous'. Others again have illustrative titles, e.g., *Puppha Vagga* has been named after the simile of the flower employed throughout the chapter, so also *Nāga Vagga* after the simile of the elephant and *Sahassa Vagga* after the comparison with a thousand. The titles of the 26 chapters are as follows: (1) *Yamaka Vagga*, the Pairs; (2) *Appamāda Vagga*, Heedfulness; (3) *Citta Vagga*, the Mind; (4) *Puppha Vagga*, the flowers; (5) *Bāla Vagga*, the Fool; (6) *Paṇḍita Vagga*, the Wise; (7) *Arahanta Vagga*, the Arahant; (8) *Sahassa Vagga*, the Thousands; (9) *Pāpa Vagga*, Evil; (10) *Daṇḍa Vagga*, Punishment; (11) *Jarā Vagga*, Old Age; (12) *Atta Vagga*, the Self; (13) *Loka Vagga*, the World; (14) *Buddha Vagga*, the Enlightened One; (15) *Sukha Vagga*, Happiness; (16) *Piya Vagga*, Affection; (17) *Kodha Vagga*, Anger; (18) *Mala Vagga*, Impurities; (19) *Dhammaṭṭha Vagga*, the Righteous; (20) *Magga Vagga*, the Path; (21) *Pakiṇṇaka Vagga*, Miscellaneous; (22) *Niraya Vagga*, Woeful State; (23) *Nāga Vagga*, the Elephant; (24) *Taṇhā Vagga*, Craving; (25) *Bhikkhu Vagga*, the Mendicant; (26) *Brāhmaṇa Vagga*, the Brāhmaṇa.

The *Dhammapada* contains in its beautiful and elegant verses sayings embodying the ethical and philosophical teachings of the Buddha. Both these

aspects are observed in the very first pair of verses. While it deals with the doctrine of *karma*, the law of moral causation, it also indicates the importance of the mind in assessing morality, which is a significant factor in the Buddha's teachings.[1] A chapter (2) has been devoted to *appamāda*, 'heedfulness', a quality often recommended by the Buddha, and included in the very last exhortation to his disciples.[2] It was this chapter that was preached to Asoka after hearing which he became a follower of the Buddha.[3] The *Citta Vagga* enables one to understand the Buddhist conception of mind. The *Arahanta Vagga* is devoted to the description of the Arahant, the one who has reached the goal. He is thus represented in beautiful lines : *santaṃ tassa manaṃ hoti, santā vācā ca kamma ca, sammadaññā vimuttassa upasantassa tādino* (Tranquil is the thought, tranquil the word and deed of him who, rightly knowing, is wholly freed, perfectly peaceful and equipoised: *v.* 96). In the *Jarā Vagga* the uselessness of the body is graphically portrayed with the use of similes, e.g., *v.* 150 : *aṭṭhīnaṃ nagaraṃ kataṃ, maṃsa-lohitalepanaṃ, yattha jarā ca maccū ca māno makkho ca ohito* (Of bones is this city made, plastered with flesh and blood. Herein are stored decay, death conceit, and detraction). In this chapter are found two verses of special significance, the beautiful verses uttered by the Buddha soon after enlightenment, *vv.* 153, 154.[4] In the *Buddha Vagga* are included three verses 183-5, which are said to have been originally recited by the *bhikkhus* fortnightly, in place of the *pātimokkha* precepts. These verses indicate the ideal life of a *bhikkhu*. Verses 190-2 of the same chapter refer to the Four Noble Truths, the fundamental doctrine of Buddhism. The *Sukha Vagga* illustrates the illusive nature of worldly happiness and, here, the way one should conduct himself in such a deluded world is set forth. The five precepts of a layman are incorporated in verses 246, 247 of the *Mala Vagga*. The *Magga Vagga* is named after the Noble Eightfold Path which it describes. Verses 277-9 of this chapter deal with the three characteristics of existence, viz., *anicca* (impermanency), *dukkha* (unsatisfactoriness) and *anatta* (non-substantiality,) the fundamental tenets in Buddhism. In the *Taṇhā Vagga*, the subject of which is craving, the chief root of suffering and cause of *saṃsāra*, this fact is vividly illustrated by means of a simile[5] and clearly emphasised.[6] The next chapter *Bhikkhu Vagga* describes the ideal life of a recluse. The true *bhikkhu* is thus described in a luminous pithy verse :

santakāyo santavāco, santavā susamāhito,
vantalokāmiso bhikkhu, upasanto ti vuccati.

(The monk who is calm in body, calm in speech, calm in mind, well-composed, emptied of all appetite for the world—such a one is called 'tranquillised' : *v.* 378). The last chapter *Brāhmaṇa Vagga* describes

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1 Cp. *Cetanāhaṃ bhikkhave kammaṃ vadāmi*, Monks, I say that determinate thought is action (*A.* III, p. 415).

2 *Vayadhammā saṅkhārā, appamādena sampādetha :* decay is inherent in all component things; work out your salvation with diligence (*D.* II, p. 156).

3 *Dpv.* vi, *v.* 53; *Mhv.* v, *v.* 68.

4 *v.* 153. *Anekajāti-saṃsāraṃ, sandhāvissaṃ anibbhisaṃ, gahakārakaṃ gavesanto, dukkhā jāti punappunaṃ* (Many a birth have I traversed in this round of lives and deaths, vainly seeking the builder of this house. Sorrowful is repeated birth).

v. 154. *Gahakāraka, diṭṭho'si; puna geham na kāhasi. Sabbā te phāsukā bhaggā, gahakūṭaṃ visaṅkhitam. Visaṅkhāragatam cittam taṇhānam khayam ajjhagā.* (O house-builder, you are seen; never again shall you build the house. All your rafters are broken; your ridge-pole is shattered. My mind has attained the unconditioned, achieved is the end of cravings).

5 *v.* 338. *yathā pi mūle anupaddave daḷhe, chinno'pi rukkho punadeva rūhati,*
evampi taṇhānusaye anūhate, nibbattatī dukkham idam punappunaṃ.

(As a tree cut down sprouts forth again, if its roots remain uninjured and strong, even so, the propensity to craving not being done away with, this suffering springs up again and again).

6 *v.* 354. *sabbadānaṃ dhammadānaṃ jināti-sabbaṃ rasaṃ dhammaraso jināti.*

sabbaṃ ratiṃ dhammaratī jināti. taṇhakkhayo sabbadukkhaṃ jināti. (The gift of truth excels all gifts; the flavour of truth excels all flavours; the pleasure in truth excels all pleasures; he who has destroyed craving overcomes all sorrow).

the attributes of a *brāhmaṇa*. The Buddha's idea of a *brāhmaṇa* is made clear in verse 393.[7]

The *Dhammapada* is a valuable book for the study of Buddhism in that it gives a succinct picture of Buddhist thought and feeling. The attitude to be adopted by the disciple on the impermanent and fleeting nature of this world is clearly expressed in verse 46 :

pheṇūpamaṃ kāyamimaṃ viditvā,
marīcidhammaṃ abhisambudhāno,
chetvāna Mārassa papupphakāni,
adassanaṃ maccurājassa gacche

(Perceiving this body to be similar unto foam, and comprehending its mirage-nature plucking out the flower-tipped arrows of Māra, let him go beyond the sight of the Lord of Death). The contentment and peace enjoyed by the true disciple is thus described :

susukhaṃ vata jīvāma, verinesu averino;
verinesu manussesu, viharāma averino

(Happy indeed we live, benevolent among those that hate. We live free from hatred amidst hateful men : *v.* 197);

susukhaṃ vata jīvāma, yesaṃ no natthi kiñcanaṃ;
pītibhakkhā bhavissāma, devā Abhassarā yathā.

(Happily indeed we live, we that call nothing our own. Feeders on joy we shall be even as the Radiant Devas : *v.* 200);

suññāgāraṃ paviṭṭhassa, santacittassa bhikkhuno
amānusī ratī hoti, sammā dhammam vipassato.

(The bhikkhu who had retired to a lonely abode, who has calmed his mind, who clearly perceives the doctrine, experiences a joy transcending that of men : *v.* 373). Nibbāna, the goal of deliverance, is the subject of several verses distributed throughout the work, e.g., *vv.* 23, 203, 368. The ideals of self-control and self-culture, of such significance in Buddhism, are set forth in *v.* 94. The importance of striving is expressed in *v.* 112. With the aid of a beautiful simile the wise one is thus described :

yathā'pi rahado gambhīro, vippasanno anāvilo,
evaṃ dhammāni sutvāna, vippasīdanti paṇḍitā

(Even as a lake, deep, extremely clear and unperturbed, so come the wise to clearness, having hearkened to the Teaching : *v.* 82).

The *Dhammapada* is essentially a book of sayings and is of great value as a manual of ethics for both the layman and the monk. Thus we read :

na paresaṃ vilomāni, na paresaṃ katākataṃ;
attano va avekkheyya, katāni akatāni ca.

(One should not regard the faults of others, things done and left undone by others. One should rather consider what by oneself is done or left undone : *v.* 50); or

akkodhena jine kodhaṃ, asādhuṃ sādhunā jine,
jine kadariyaṃ dānena, saccena alikavādinaṃ

(Overcome anger by loving-kindness, evil by good. Conquer the niggardly with liberality, with truth the speaker of falsehood : *v.* 223). Similar sentiments are also expressed in verse 5 :

na hi verena verāni, sammanti 'dha kudācanaṃ,
averena ca sammanti, esa dhammo sanantano

(Hatred never ceases by hatred in this world. Through loving-kindness it comes to an end. This is an ancient law). Again we read :

na taṃ kammaṃ kataṃ sādhu, yaṃ katvā anutappati,
yassa assumukho rodaṃ, vipākaṃ paṭisevati.

(That deed is not well done which, being done, one afterwards repents, and the fruit whereof is received with tears and lamentations : *v.* 67), or

selo yathā ekaghano, vātena na samīrati,
evaṃ nindāpasaṃsāsu na samiñjanti paṇḍitā

(Even as a solid rock is unshaken by the wind, so do the wise remain unmoved by praise or blame : *v.* 81), or

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7 *na jaṭāhi na gotena, na jaccā hoti brāhmaṇo;*
yamhi saccaṃ ca dhammo ca, so sucī so ca brāhmaṇo;

(Not by matted hair, nor by family, nor by birth does one become a *brāhmaṇa;* but in whom there exist both truth and righteousness pure is he, a *brāhmaṇa* is he). For a summary of the contents of each chapter of the *Dhammapada*, refer B. C. Law, *A History of Pali Literature*, Vol. I, pp. 200-214.

ārogyaparamā lābhā, santuṭṭhiparamaṃ dhanaṃ,
vissāsaparamā ñāti, nibbānaṃ paramaṃ sukhaṃ

(Health is the highest gain, contentment is the greatest riches, a trusty friend is the best kinsman, Nibbāna is the supreme bliss : *v.* 204), or again

na tena paṇḍito hoti, yāvatā bahu bhāsati,
khemī averī abhayo, paṇḍitoti pavuccati

(A man is not wise because he speaks much. He who is comforting, friendly and harmless, is called wise : *v.* 258). It is for the impressive sayings contained in its charming verses, that the *Dhammapada* is highly esteemed by Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike, and it is not surprising that it has been referred to as 'that most beautiful and richest of collections of proverbs.'[8]

The *Dhammapada* verses are composed in easy and lucid style and the language is smooth and elegant. A striking feature of the work is the wealth of similes from everyday life which have contributed to enhance the beauty of the verses.[9] The images are simple, yet impressive. The very first pair of verses contain vivid similes to indicate the inevitability of the law of *kamma*. The tranquillity enjoyed by the wise is compared to the deep lake, clear and calm (*v.* 81). The fool who associates with a wise man, but derives no benefit from the association is said to be like the spoon which gets nothing of the flavour of the soup (*v.* 64). Such similes and metaphors are repeatedly met with and by the use of contrast the good and bad sides are described in parallel language (e.g., *vv.* 51-2; 64-5). A more involved metaphor with a play on words is found in *v.* 344. A figurative expression which interpreted literally would convey a completely incorrect meaning is contained in *v.* 294. Another example of such a figurative expression is *v.* 283. A good example of a riddle, containing a series of puns, is verse 97, for it could mean : The man who is faithless (*assaddho*), who is ungrateful (*akataññū*), and has cut off alliances (*sandhicchedo*), who has destroyed opportunities for them (*hatāvakāso*), and is an eater of vomit (*vantāso*), is a supreme man! The meaning intended, however, is : The man who is not credulous, who knows the unmade, who has severed all ties, who has put an end to the occasion (of good and evil), who has vomited all desires, he indeed is a supreme man. Simple but emphatic is the language in *v.* 60 :

dīghā jāgarato ratti, dīghaṃ santassa yojanāṃ,
dīgho bālānaṃ saṃsāro, saddhammaṃ avijānataṃ

(Long is the night to the wakeful, long is the league to the weary, long is the sequence of rebirths to fools that know not the sublime truth). The uselessness of the physical body is vividly expressed through the image of a gourd cast away in autumn (*v.* 149) and the fleeting nature of existence through the familiar simile of a water bubble (*v.* 170). A splendid word picture is found in *vv.* 153-4, the first utterance of the Buddha after enlightenment. An impressive simile is the comparison of the wise words of one who does not practise them to the flower that is beautiful and colourful but devoid of fragrance (*v.* 51). Two chapters of the work, the *Puppha Vagga* and the *Nāga Vagga*, have derived their titles from the similes employed in them.

Occasionally repetitions of verses are met with e.g., *v.* 80 of the *Paṇḍita Vagga* and *v.* 145 of the *Daṇḍa Vagga* are the same except for the last words which are synonyms. Verses have been grouped into chapters according to subject-matter and sometimes several consecutive verses of a chapter form a close group, almost a little poem in itself, e.g., *vv.* 328-30; 110-15. Even outside the *Yamaka Vagga*, the chapter on twin verses, verses forming couplets are often met with, e.g., *vv.* 51-2; 64-5; 244-5. There are a few verses out of place in a chapter, e.g., *vv.* 104, 105, 109 of the *Sahassa Vagga*, *v* 128 of the *Pāpa Vagga*, *vv.* 331-3 of the *Nāga Vagga*. The *Pakiṇṇaka Vagga* (Miscellaneous Chapter), which one would normally expect to find at the end of the work, occurs in the middle. Most of the verses are in *anuṣṭubh* metre while some are in *triṣṭubh* and *vaitālīya*. Very few in the *jagatī* metre are also found.[10]

The *Dhammapada* is probably a later anthology than the *Thera-Therī-gāthā*.[11] The oldest known Pali work in which the *Dhammapada* is expressly mentioned in the *Milindapañha*. There are quota-

8 H. Oldenberg, *Buddha : His Life, His Doctrine, His Order*, p. 195.
9 For a detailed study of the similes and metaphors in the *Dhammapada* and glimpses of the social and political conditions to be gleaned therefrom, refer, *The Image World of the Dhammapada* by B. G. Gokhale in *JBRAS*. Vols. 31, 32 (1956, 57), pp. 78 ff.
10 For a study of the metres used in the *Dhammapada* see Fausböll, *Dhammapadam*, 1855 edition, pp. 436 ff.
11 *DPPN*. I, p. 1144.

tions from the *Dhammapada* without the source being mentioned, in the *Mahā Niddesa* and *Culla Niddesa* (which are the canonical commentaries on the *Suttanipāta*), the *Kathāvatthu* which is traditionally dated in the third century B.C. and also in the *Nettippakaraṇa* and *Peṭakopadesa*. According to the *Dīgha* commentary the Dīghabhāṇakas and Majjhimabhāṇakas had certain differences of opinion regarding the composition of the *Khuddaka Nikāya* as concluded at the first Council but were agreed on the *Dhammapada* being included in it.[12] Asoka is said to have been converted to Buddhism after listening to Nigrodha explain the *Appamāda Vagga*, the 2nd chapter of the *Dhammapada*.[13] Thus, while the date of the work cannot be laid down with certainty, it cannot be later than the earlier half of the third century B.C.

The verses of the *Dhammapada* have been compiled from various sources. More than half of them have been taken from other canonical books. The anthology includes also some sayings which were originally not Buddhist but drawn from a common stock of worldly moral maxims which formed a vast floating literature in India and which have found a place also in the *Manusmṛti*, the *Mahābhārata*, the *Pañcatantra*, the *Hitopadeśa* and the Jaina texts. The canonical texts in which the *Dhammapada* verses are found to occur are the *Mahā Vagga* of the *Vinaya*, *Majjhima Nikāya*, *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, *Udāna*, *Itivuttaka*, *Suttanipāta*, *Vimānavatthu*, *Petavatthu*, *Theragāthā*, *Therīgathā*, *Jātaka*, *Niddesa*, *Kathāvatthu*. *Dhammapada* verses are also met with in the following later Buddhist works : *Milindapañha*, *Nettippakaraṇa*, *Peṭakopadesa*, *Dīpavaṃsa*, *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, *Paramatthadīpanī*, *Atthasālinī*, *Divyāvadāna*, *Mahāvastu*, *Lalitavistara*, and the Brāhmanical works already mentioned.[14] T. W. Rhys Davids is of the opinion that while the compiler of the *Dhammapada* borrowed the verses traced in the earlier canonical works from the sources thus discovered, in those instances where the verses recur in later Buddhist works, it is not likely that they were taken from the *Dhammapada* but more probable that they were taken from the sources from which the *Dhammapada* itself drew.[15]

The Pali *Dhammapada* under discussion is the best known recension of the work and the only one that has survived intact. Three other recensions of the work are the *Dharmapada* in Gāndārī Prākrit of which a little more than half has been recovered, the *Udānavarga* in classical Sanskrit, compiled by Dharmatrāta, complete in its Tibetan and Chinese versions, but only less than 2/3 of the Sanskrit original of which have been recovered from central Asian manuscripts and a *Dharmapada* in Buddhist Sanskrit which is lost apart from two chapters[16] and a few isolated verses quoted in the *Mahāvastu*. While the Pali recension definitely belonged to the Theravāda school, the *Udānavarga*, and the *Dharmapada* quoted in the *Mahāvastu* probably belonged to the Sarvāstivāda and Mahāsaṅghika schools, respectively. There are four Chinese translations of the *Dhammapada* : (1) *Fa-chü-ching* dated 224 A.C. being the oldest Chinese version, (2) the *Fa-chü-p'i-yü-ching* translated between 290-306 A.C. which is a different translation of the same version as the earlier work but includes explanatory stories and is thus a *Dhammapada* commentary,[17] (3) the *Ch'u-yao ching* dated 398-9 A.C., a very much larger work and also in the nature of a commentary, but the basic text of which was the *Udānavarga*, (4) the *Fa-chi-yao-sung-ching* of late 10th century A.C. which has the verses of the preceding work and is the latest Chinese version of the *Udānavarga*. Apart from these was a Chinese version contemporary with the *Fa-chü-ching* and with the same title, translated by a man from Yüeh-chih, but completely lost. The Chinese translations are based on two recensions : a text very similar to the Pali, and the *Udānavarga*. Some of the additional chapters of the *Fa-chü-ching* may

12 *DA*. I, p. 15.

13 *Dpv*. vi, *v*. 53; *Mhv*. v, *v*. 68.

14 For further details refer, Fausböll, *The Dhammapada*, 1900, p. viii; T. W. Rhys Davids' Review of Fausböll's 2nd edn. of the Dhammapada in *JRAS*. 1900, p. 561; A. P. Buddhadatta, *Pali Sāhityaya* (in Sinhala), Part I, pp. 93 ff.

15 T. W. Rhys Davids, op. cit.

16 The *Sahasravarga* (*Mhvu*. III, pp. 434-6) which corresponds to the *Sahassa Vagga* of the Pali *Dhammapada*, and verses from an unnamed source (*Mhvu*. III, pp. 421-3), which appear to be the Sanskrit version of the *Bhikkhu Vagga*.

17 This is the one translated by Beal.

have been drawn from another text which could not have been the Prākrit recension. This could be from the lost portions of the Buddhist Sanskrit *Dharmapada* quoted in the *Mahāvastu*, or still another recension. Thus, four recensions of the *Dhammapada* are definitely known : the Pali, the Gāndhārī Prākrit, the *Udānavarga* and the Buddhist Sanskrit quoted in the *Mahāvastu*, and there is a possibility of there having been a fifth which was the source of the unidentified portions of the *Fa-chü-ching*[18]. The *Dhammapada* formed the basis for the *Dharmasamuccaya* compiled in Nepal in later times.

The Pali is the shortest of the *Dhammapada* recensions. The Prākrit, like the Pali, also has 26 chapters although there are many differences in the arrangement of chapters and verses. The Prākrit is much larger than the Pali but more akin to it than the *Udānavarga* which has nearly 1000 verses. It is probable that about 330-340 verses are common to all three recensions. This would represent about 5/6 of the total verses in the Pali text. For the most part there is little agreement in order, but occasionally consecutive verses are found in the same order in all three texts. In a few chapters like the *Sahassa Vagga* there is fairly close agreement in the verses included in all four recensions, while in other chapters there are many differences. In its different recensions the *Dhammapada* was dispersed throughout the Buddhist world. While it had been generally accepted that the Pali *Dhammapada* with its 423 verses represented the earliest recension and the *Udānavarga* with nearly 1000 verses was the latest recension, with the Prākrit coming next to the Pali, and the Sanskrit *Dharmapada* quoted in the *Mahāvastu* coming after it, this has been challenged in more recent times.[19]

A commentary on the Pali *Dhammapada* exists by the name of *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā* (q.v.). The commentator not only gives an exegesis of each of the verses contained in the *Dhammapada*, but also an account of the persons and circumstances, traditionally believed to have led to the utterance of the verse.

The *Dhammapada* was the first Pali text to be printed in Europe. An edition of the text in Roman characters, with a translation in Latin was for the first time published by Fausböll in 1855. Weber translated it imo German, in 1860. It was translated into English for the first time by Max Müller in 1870, and published as an Introduction to *Buddhaghosa's Parables translated from Burmese*, by R. Rogers, later reprinted in *SBE*. Vol. X, 1881. The work was edited for the P.T.S. by S. Sumangala in 1914. Since then there have been several editions and English translations and it has also been translated into French, Italian, Russian, Swedish and Japanese. The work is also available in Burmese and Siamese editions, in Devanāgarī script, in many Indian vernaculars, and in Tamil translation, apart from numerous editions and translations in Sinhalese.[20]

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18 See J. Brough, The *Gāndhārī Dharmapada*, p. 34 ff.

19 For conflicting theories regarding the chronology of the different recensions of the *Dhammapada*, see Barua and Mitra, *Prākrit Dhammapada*, 1921, pp. xxiv, xxxv; John Brough, op. cit., pp. 26 ff.

20 Latin : V. Fausböll, *Dhammapada*, Hauniae, 1985; 2nd. ed., London, 1900.

German : A. Weber, ZDMG; XIV, 1860, and *Indische Streifen*, Vol. I, 1868; *Das Dhammapadam*, Ein. Vers. sammlung, aus der Englishchen Uebersetztung von Prof. M. M. Metrisch ins Deutsch ubersetzt, Leipzig, 1885; by L. V. Schroder, Leipzig, 1892; by K. E. Neumann, Leipzig, 1893; by P. Dahlke, 1919; by R. O. Frank, 1923.

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DHAMMAPADAṬṬHAKATHĀ, the commentary on the *Dhammapada* a voluminous work which not only explains each verse of the *Dhammapada* philologically and exegetically, but in the course of describing the circumstances which led to its utterance, incorporates a mass of stories of the nature of the *Jātakas* (s.v.).

As pointed out by Burlingame, the *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā*, like several of its kind, is in name and form a commentary. But in point of fact it has become nothing more or less than a huge collection of legends and folk-tales. The actual commentary or the exegesis of the text occupies only a very small space and is relegated to the background while narratives, or to be more precise, sermons in the form of narratives (recorded as preached by the Buddha himself in the form of *dhammadesanā* or religious instruction), constitute the bulk of the commentary[1]. As a collection of legends the work enjoys among the Buddhists a popularity second only to that of the *Jātakas* and it is a favourite source of sermons for many *dhamma*-preachers.

On the basis of the *Dhammapada* text, the commentary, too, is divided into twenty-six chapters. However, there are only 299 stories in the commentary as compared to 423 verses of the *Dhammapada*, the reason being that sometimes groups of two or more verses[2] form the subject of a single story. The purpose of the commentary is to explain "Where, when, why, for what purpose, with reference to what situation, with reference to what person or persons," the Buddha uttered each of the verses of the *Dhammapada*. The connection between the circumstances and the verses may often be only traditional, but the incidents recorded have a value of their own, as they relate to events in the life of the Buddha and his disciples. The stories vary greatly in length, a few are very short[3] while the bulk of them are long, the longest being the *Udena-Vatthu* (*DhpA*. I, pp. 161-231), which contains stories within stories. The

1 See Burlingame, *Buddhist Legends*, Part I (HOS. Vol. 28), p. 26; Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II, p. 192.

2 e.g., 9 verses in *Sambahulānaṃ Bhikkhūnaṃ Vatthu* (*DhpA*. IV, pp. 101-112). 6 verses in *Sūkarapotikāya Vatthu*, IV, pp. 46-51.

3 e. g., *Paṭhavikathāpasutapañcasatabhikkhūnaṃ Vatthu* (op. cit., I, pp. 333-5); *Āgantukapañcasatabhikkhūnaṃ Vatthu* (op. cit., II, pp. 161-3)

shorter ones resemble the *Udāna Suttas* in structure consisting of a very brief account of the occasion for the utterance of the verse. The structure of the longer stories, which form by far the bulk of the work is more complex.

For the most part eight sub-divisions are observed in this type of story :

(1) Quotation of a word or two of the *Dhammapada* verse forming the subject of the story; (2) the name of the place where the verse was uttered and the person with reference to whom it was spoken; (3) the story proper, which is the story of the present of the person in question ending with a quotation of the (4) verse or verses by the Buddha himself; (5) word for word commentary on the verse; (6) brief statement of the spiritual benefits which accrued to those who heard the sermon; (7) subsidiary narrative in the nature of the story of the former birth of the person in question; (8) identification of the characters of the story of the past with those of the story of the present. Sometimes the story of the past is narrated before the story of the present[4]. Others have only the story of the present.[5]

The story of the past has been introduced in different ways. Very often it is narrated in order to show one's past *kamma*, which resulted in some happy or unhappy condition in the present life, as in the very first story, the *Cakkhupālatthera-vatthu*. Less often it is introduced exactly in the manner of the bulk of the *jātakas* to indicate a parallel circumstance in a previous birth.[6] These stories resemble closely in structure the stories of the *Jātaka* commentary.

The similarity between the stories of the *Dhammapada* commentary and the *Jātaka* has often been pointed out, but a striking difference is that while the verses in the *Jātaka* are very much linked with the prose and form part of the story of the *Jātaka*, in the *Dhammapada* commentary there is no organic connection between the narrative and the verses.

Of the stories the longer ones are more interesting and appear to be more authentic. The verses are also appropriate to the story.[7] In the *Mahālipaṭṭhavatthu* (*DhpA*. I, pp. 263-81) which gives an account of Sakka's present and previous births, the verse specifically relates to Sakka. In the case of the very short stories where even the characters are unnamed, there is no real narrative connected with the verses and there is reason to believe that the story was invented to provide a framework for the verse.[8]

Some stories have a common title but the contents are completely different.[9] Others have a common title and similar contents varying only in the extent of detail.[10] Sometimes, a similar occasion for the utterance of the verse is found in several chapters with only the names of the personages different.[11] Very often in the course of the narrative leading to the verse in question, *Dhammapada* verses from another chapter are quoted.[12] While many of the stories of the past can be identified with the *Jātakas*, quite a common feature in the narratives is to quote *Jātakas* by name, said to have been narrated by the Buddha in the course of the sermon.[13]

While the *Dhammapada* contains many aspects of the teachings of the Buddha, in the commentary the recurrent theme is the theory of *karma* which is illus-

4 *e.g., Kāḷiyakkhiṇī Vatthu* (op. cit. I, p. 45 ff.).

5 e.g., *Cūḷakāḷa-Mahākāḷa Vatthu* (op. cit., p. 66 ff.); *Cundasūkarika Vatthu* (op. cit., pp. 25-9).

6 e.g., *Thullatissatthera Vatthu* (op. cit., p. 37 ff.); *Devadattassa Vatthu* (op. cit., pp. 133-50).

7 e.g., *Kosambaka Vatthu* (op. cit., pp. 53-66); *Devadattassa Vatthu* (op. cit., pp. 133-50); *Cundasūkarika Vatthu* (op. cit., pp. 125-9).

8 e.g., *Āgantukapañcasatabhikkhūnaṃ Vatthu* (op. cit., II, pp. 161-3); *Aniccalakkhaṇa Vatthu* (op. cit., III, p. 405 f.); *Dukkhalakkhaṇa Vatthu* (op. cit., pp. 406 f.); *Anattalakkhaṇa Vatthu* (op. cit., pp. 406 f.)

9 e.g., *Aññatarabhikkhussa Vatthu* (op. cit., I, pp. 281-3, 290-7).

10 *Pasenadi Kosala Vatthu* (op.cit., III, p. 264 ff.).

11 Thus (a) *Attadatthattherassa Vatthu* (op. cit., pp. 158-60); *Tissattherassa Vatthu* (op. cit., pp. 267-9) and *Dhammārāmattherassa Vatthu* (op. cit., IV, pp. 93-5). (b) *Maṭṭikammaṭṭhānikatthera Vatthu* (op. cit., I, pp. 325-7) and *Pañcasatavipassakabhikkhūnaṃ Vatthu* (op. cit., III, p. 165 f.).

12 e.g., *Kosambaka Vatthu* (op. cit., I, pp. 53-66); *Udena Vatthu* (op. cit., I, pp. 161-231).

13 e.g., *Maccharīyakosiyaseṭṭhi Vatthu* (op. cit., p. 366 ff.); *Kosambaka Vatthu* (op. cit., pp. 53-66).

trated with concrete examples from stories of previous births in the bulk of the tales. Thus, in the very first story of Cakkhupāla, even as he attains arahantship he loses his eyesight, as a result of a *karma* in a previous birth, when as an eye-physician he had blinded a woman who attempted to cheat him out of his fee for curing her of an eye-ailment. Several subsidiary narratives have been introduced in the *Udena-vatthu* (I, p. 161 ff.) to show how the karma of the past birth has a bearing on the present. The reason for the tragic death of Moggallāna, engineered by the Jainas, is traced to his *karma* in a previous birth (III, pp 65-71).

This is not the only occasion where the hostility of the Jainas is indicated. Throughout the collection they are treated with contempt. There are two occasions recorded (the stories of Ciñcā : III, pp. 178 ff. and Sundarī : III, p. 474 ff.) when they attempted to cast calumny on the Buddha and discredit him morally.

The commentary incidentally records various incidents in the Buddha's life. The performance of the twin-miracle is described in the *Yamakappāṭihāriya-vatthu* (III, pp. 199 ff.). The *Kosambaka-vatthu* (I, pp. 53 ff.) records how the Buddha retired to the forest to be away from the quarrelsome monks of Kosambi. The *Pūtigattatissatthera-vatthu* (I, pp. 319 ff.) is a good example of the Buddha's kindness, where he ministers to the needs of Pūtigatta-Tissa and even bathes him, when he is suffering from a miserable skin-disease.

Biographies of eminent disciples are contained in some stories. Thus the life-stories of Sāriputta and Mogallāna are described in the *Aggasāvaka-vatthu* (I, pp 83 ff.). Among others whose stories are given are Mahākappina (II, pp 112-127), Visākhā (I, p. 384 ff.), Paṭācārā (II, p. 260 ff.), Kisā Gotamī (II. pp. 270 ff.), Aṅgulimāla (III, p 169 ff.). In the story of Visākhā, the chief lay woman-disciple of the Buddha, is found a delightful picture of the finest type of Indian womanhood. The story of Paṭācārā is one of the most tragic, in any literature The history of the Saṅgha when the first nunnery came to be built is traced in the *Uppalavaṇṇātheriyā-vatthu* (II, p. 48 ff.).

Some stories show traces of popular Buddhism. In the *Maṭṭhakuṇḍali-vatthu* (I, p. 25 ff.), mere faith in the Buddha results in heavenly birth. In the story of Pūtigatta-Tissa, it is said that he realised arahantship as a result of a wish made after an offering to an *arahant* in a previous birth (I, p. 1319 ff.).

The *Dhammapada* commentary has numerous references to kings, e.g., Pasenadi, Bimbisāra, Ajātasattu and to ancient Indian tribes like the Licchavis and Mallas. The heretical ascetics have been referred to as Acelakas, Niganṭhas, Ājīvakas and Jaṭilas.

This collection is not wanting in humorous stories, e.g., the story of the obstinate donkey included in the *Nandatthera-vatthu* (I, p. 115 ff.) and the story of the pork-butcher in the *Cundasūkarika-vatthu* (I, pp. 125-9). Miserliness is the theme of the humorous stories in the *Maṭṭhakuṇḍali-vatthu* (I, p. 25 ff.) and the *Maccharikosiyaseṭṭhi-vatthu* (I, p. 366 ff.). A very amusing story is that of the two ascetics, Devala and Nārada, included in *Thullatissatthera-vatthu* (I, p. 37 ff.), where the haughty, insolent and obstinate ascetic Devala is put to humiliation.

A most delightful story is that of Nanda, who became a *bhikkhu* unwillingly, but was enticed to remain in the Saṅgha by the promise of a following of celestial nymphs (I, p. 115 ff.). The Jain ascetics are made the subject of a ludicrous story in *Garahadinna-vatthu* (I, p. 434 ff.) Sakka figures in many amusing stories, e.g., the *Rohiṇīkhattiyakaññā-vatthu* (III), p. 295 ff.) and the *Catunnaṃ Sāmaṇerānaṃ-vatthu* (IV, p. 176 ff.).

Stories are found, where animals play a part, the most frequently mentioned being the elephant. Of these, the outstanding story is the *Kosambaka-vatthu* (I, p. 53 ff.) where the noble elephant Pārileyyaka ministers to all the needs of the Buddha when he retired to the forest. The mythical bird *haṭṭhiliṅga*, capable of carrying many human beings, figures in the *Udena-vatthu* (I, p. 161 ff.), in which he carries away Udena's mother and drops her in a forest.

Some of the finest stories centre round some seven-year old novices, e.g., *Vanavāsī-Tissatthera-vatthu* (II, p. 84 ff.), *Paṇḍitasāmaṇera-vatthu* (II, pp. 127 ff.), *Saṅkiccasāmaṇera-vatthu* (II, p. 240 ff.), *Sukhasāmaṇerassa-vatthu* (III, p. 87 ff.). A very amusing story is the *Catunnaṃ Sāmaṇerāṇaṃ-vatthu* (IV, p. 176 ff.).

There are stories of good and benevolent tree-spirits, e.g., the *Cakkhupālatthera-vatthu* (I, p. 3 ff.), *Ekuddānakhīṇāsavattherassa-vatthu* (III, p. 384 ff.) etc. Evil spirits figure in the *Sūkarapetassa-vatthu*

(III, p. 410 ff.), *Duccaritaphalānubhāvasattānaṃ Vatthu* (III, p. 479 ff.) etc.

Most of the stories in this collection are in the nature of edifying legends. Some of the themes in the stories of the *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā*, as in the case of the *Jātaka* commentary, are well-known in universal literature far beyond India. Thus in the *Cūlapanthakatthera-vatthu* (I, p. 239 ff.), a king of Bārānasi wanders incognito in the city at night in order to gain first-hand information of the opinions of his subjects. The story of Kisāgotamī who wanders around in despair with the dead child in her arms, in search of a mustard seed from a house where no one has died, belongs to the typical Indian 'consolatory stories'. W. Geiger remarks, 'for this reason when we meet with a similar anecdote in the Alexander legend in a few versions of Pseudo-Kallisthenes as well as in Arabian, Jewish, Persian, and Coptic narratives of Alexander, it is more probable that the Buddhist legend influenced the Greek legend'.[14] On the other hand, Geiger is of the opinion that the episode of the wooden elephant in the story of Udena, was influenced by the legend of the Trojan horse which found its way to India. The story of Saṅgharakkhita (I, p. 300 ff.), is the original version of the story which has spread to many countries in various degrees of modification. The story of Paṭācārā is one of the three main sources of the legend of St. Eustace, the other two being *Nigrodhamiga Jātaka* (No. 12), and *Vessantara Jātaka* (No. 547). The legend of Ghosaka has travelled all over the world.[15]

Like the *Jātaka* commentary, this work, too, is a veritable mine of information on ancient India. It contains a wealth of information regarding the social and economic conditions and is not lacking in material for political conditions, too. Thus, the *Viḍūḍabha-vatthu* (I, p. 337 ff.) contains an account of the route of the Sākyas. Ajātasattu's victory over Pasenadi is referred to in the *Kosalarañño Parājayassa-vatthu* (III, p. 259 f.).

The *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā* has borrowed many stories from canonical works as well as from commentaries which came before it. Burlingame has made a detailed study of these parallel stories.[16] It has derived only a few stories from the *Dīgha*, *Majjhima* and *Aṅguttara Nikāyas*. It has taken 17 stories from *Saṃyuttā*, 15 of them almost identically worded. For example, the story of Godhika (I, p. 431 ff.) is very similar to the version in *Saṃyutta* (I, p. 120 ff.). The *Vinaya* is the source of 17 stories. Twelve stories have been derived from the *Udāna*, the stories of Nanda (I, p. 115 ff.) and Sīvali (IV, pp. 192 ff.) being almost verbally identical with the *Udāna* versions. Almost a third of the *Udāna* is contained in the *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā* which has numerous stories in common with the *Theragāthā*, *Therīgāthā* and the *Aṅguttara* commentaries. A comparison of the parallel stories in the *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā* and the *Aṅguttara* commentary reveals that the two versions are derived independently from a common original.[17] Versions of the six stories that make up the *Udena-vatthu* (I, p. 161 ff.), are found in sections in the *Aṅguttara* and *Majjhima* commentaries and in the *Visuddhimagga* and were probably derived from a common source. Three stories are derived from the *Khuddakapāṭha* commentary, one of which is the story of Sāriputta and Moggallāna (I, p. 100 ff.), which is parallel to the *Khuddakapāṭha* commentary version (p. 202 ff.). The *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā* is more closely related to the *Jātaka* commentary than to any other work, for, over fifty stories, comprising more than a fifth of the entire work, are derived from the *Jātaka*. Nearly half of these stories are *verbatim* versions. Apart from these, many other *jātakas* are referred to and many *Jātaka* verses quoted. Thus in the *Devadattassa-vatthu* (I, p. 133 ff.) fourteen *jātakas* are referred to and twelve verses quoted. Needless to say, the literary style of our work has been largely influenced by these numerous quotations. The style is simple and the language easily intelligible.

Burlingame is of opinion that internal evidence proves conclusively that Dhammapāla's commentaries on the *Theragāthā*, *Therīgāthā*, *Vimānavatthu* and *Petavatthu* are later than the *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā*, which is referred to four times in the *Theragāthā* commentary and once in the *Vimānavatthu* commentary. Twenty-five to thirty stories contained in these four commentaries of Dhammapāla are

14 Geiger, W., *Pali Literature and Language*, p. 193 f.
15 See E. W. Burlingame, *Buddhist Parables*, pp. xx, xxi.
16 See *HOS*, Vol. 28, p. 45 ff.
17 See The Story of the Merchant Ghosaka (*Ghosakaseṭṭhi*) in its twofold Pali form, with reference to other Indian parallels by E. Hardy in *JRAS*, 1898, p. 741 ff.

derived from the *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā*, from which the *Theragāthā* commentary has taken nineteen stories. It has also been named as the source of the stories of Jambuka (*ThagA.* II, p. 118 ff.) and Saṅkicca (*ThagA.* II, p. 254 ff.), and the *Aṅguttara* commentary and *Dhammapada* commentary as the sources of the story of Vakkali (*ThagA.* II, p. 147 ff.). Of the *Vimānavatthu* commentary the stories of Maṭṭhakuṇḍali (vii, 9), Uttarā (i, 15), Sirimā (i, 16) and Revatī (v. 2) and of the *Petavatthu* commentary the three stories of Pūtimukha (i, 3), Lohakumbhi hell (iv, 15), and Saṭṭhikūṭa (iv, 16) are derived from the *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā*.

Thus the *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā* is to be dated after Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga* and commentaries on the *Vinaya* and the four *Nikāyas* and the *Jātaka* commentary, but before Dhammapāla's commentaries on the *Theragāthā*, *Therīgāthā*, *Vimāna vatthu* and *Petavatthu*. Burlingame has dated the work at approximately 450 A.C.

As mentioned in the prologue of the work, the Pali *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā* is the translation of a *Dhammapada* commentary which existed in Sinhala, but, like all the other Sinhala commentaries, is no longer extant. Opinion is divided regarding the authorship of the work. The colophon at the end of the work ascribes the authorship to Buddhaghosa, but the *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā* as also the *Jātaka* commentary are so very different in language and style from Buddhaghosa's commentaries that it is difficult to accept that the well-known Buddhaghosa was the author of either of them. Those who are not inclined to dismiss the colophon, explain this difference in language and style as due to the difference in the subject-matter in the texts commented upon, and they also point out the fact that Buddhaghosa was not writing original commentaries but translating or compiling from various Sinhala commentaries.[18] But others find it impossible to accept that Buddhaghosa was the author of this work.[19] Still, there is every reason to believe that there was no great interval between Buddhaghosa's commentaries and our work.

Many of the stories of the *Dhammapada* commentary find their parallels in later literature. The frame story and embedded stories in the *Udena-vatthu* (I, p. 161 ff.) in the *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā* are parallel to the story of Udena in the Sanskrit *Kathāsaritsāgara*. Stories corresponding to the subsidiary narratives in the *Udena-vatthu* are found in *Divyāvadāna*, *Kathāsaritsāgara* and the Tibetan *Kangyur*. The story of *Ghosaka* (I, p. 169 ff.) has its parallel not only in the earlier commentary on the *Aṅguttara* but also in many Sanskrit works and in almost all of the literatures of the world. The *Divyāvadāna* has four stories also found in the *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā*, viz., the stories of Meṇḍhaka, (*Divy.* p. 123 ff. and *DhpA.* III, p. 363 ff.), of the Twin-Miracle (*Divy.*, p. 143 ff. and *DhpA.* III, p. 199 ff.) of Culla-Panthaka, Cūḍāpakṣa (*Divy.* p. 483 ff. and *DhpA.* I, p. 239 ff.), and the story of Mākandika (*Divy.* p. 515 ff.) with the story of Māgandiyā (in *DhpA.* III, p. 193 ff.).

The Pali *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā* formed the source for the stories in the Sinhala work *Saddharmaratnāvaliya* written by Dharmasena Thera in the 13th century A.C. It is not a word for word translation of the Pali commentary, but follows more or less the same arrangement of chapters. Written in flowery language it often expands on the stories in the Pali work, with similes and metaphors drawn from local life. Stories of the *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā* have been very popular among the Sinhalese and have also been incorporated in various religious works in Sinhala. A glossary in Sinhala to the Pali *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā* by the name of *Dampiyā-Aṭuvā Gāṭapadaya* was compiled by king Kassapa V (913-23 A.C.).

The commentary on the *Dhammapada* has been edited for the Pali Text Society by H. C. Norman in 5 volumes, the last volume of Indexes having been compiled by Lakshmana Shastri Tailang (*PTS.* 1906-1915). Of the Sinhala editions mention may be made of those by Gunaratana, Mulleriyāve, Colombo, 1886; by W. Dhammānanda Thera and M. Nārissara Thera, Colombo, 1898; by Dīpaṅkara and Dharmasena, Ambalangoda, 1905. There is a Burmese edition by U. Yan, Rangoon, 1903. The entire work has been translated into English by E. W. Burlingame, with a long and valuable introduction, *Buddhist Legends HOS.* Vols. 28, 29, 30. Selections of tales have been translated into English by Warren in *Buddhism in Translations;* into French by L. de la

18 B. C. Law, *A History of Pali Literature*, II, pp. 450, 452. G. P. Malalasekera, *A History of Pali Literature in Ceylon*, p. 95 ff.

19 M. Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II, p. 192; W. Geiger, *Pali Literature and Language*, p. 32; Norman, *Dhammapada* (*PTS.* edition), Introduction, p. xiv; Burlingame, *HOS.* Vol. 28, p. 59 f.

Vallee Poussin and G. de Blonay in *Revue de l'histoire des Religions*, Paris, Vol. 26, 1892, p. 180 ff.; Vol. 29, 1894, pp. 195 ff., 329 ff. A translation of late Burmese versions of some *Dhammapada* stories is contained in *Buddhaghosa's Parables* by T. Rogers, London, 1870.

The *Fa-chu-p'i-u-ching* is a commentary on the *Dhammapada* in Chinese which widely differs from the Pali work in the arrangement of verses and also with the verses. It has a translation by S. Beal.[20]

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NOTE :

The reader's attention is drawn, in passing, to the apparent distortions of the meaning of *gāthās* which seem to be taking place, at times, in the process of commenting on them in the *Aṭṭhakathā*, resulting in a lamentable loss of the vitality of the poignant themes of the *gāthās* which are of canonical *sūtra* origin. An interesting point of comparison is verse No. 168 of the *Dhammapada* which reads as follows in Pali :

uṭṭhaṭhe nappamajjeyya-dhammaṃ sucaritaṃ care
dhammacārīsukhaṃ seti-asmiṃ loke paramhi ca.

The main theme of this *gāthā* is, 'living a life of religious earnestness' which is implied in the words "*dhammaṃ sucaritaṃ care*'. Necessary pre-requisites for this are *uṭṭhaṭhe nappamajjeyya* (striving and diligence). The reward for leading such a religious life (*dhammacārī*) is happiness in this life and the life after (*sukhaṃ seti asmiṃ loke paramhi ca*). This verse, therefore, seem to contain a basic injunction of Buddhism applicable to all grades of disciples, lay and clerical. But the commentary, (*Dhp A.* III. p. 165) in its attempt to fix a context for this utterance, relates it to the newly-enlightened Buddha's going out on his alms-round in Kapilavatthu and perhaps would have consequently seen in *uṭṭhaṭhe* of the *gāthā* a reference to begged food or *uṭṭhaṭha-piṇḍa*. The further comment on *uṭṭhaṭhe* as *uṭṭhahitvā paresaṃ gharadvāre ṭhatvā gahetabbapiṇḍe* is even more interesting. Thus this basic general Buddhist injunction which requires of every adherent diligence and energetic exertion is reduced to be one applicable only to monks going out on their alms-round. But a comparison of this verse (168) with No. 25 would dispel any doubt with regard to its broad-based applicability. No. 25 reads as follows :

Uṭṭhāhena'ppamādena-saññamena damena ca
dīpaṃ kayirātha medhāvī-yaṃ ogho nābhikīrati.

Our suggestion that both these verses breathe the same spirit and should be viewed together is further supported by the discovery of both these verses in the Gāndhārī *Dhammapada*, placed in the same *vagga*, viz. the *Appamāda* (*Apramada* in Gāndhārī), No. 168 opening the *vagga* and No. 25 following it. In fact, two more verses with this same burden of *uṭṭhāna* or energetic exertion, Nos. 24 and 280 of the Pali version, follow as Nos. 3 and 4 of the *Apramāda vagga* of the Gāndhāri

Another such example of what could be considered a serious doctrinal enfeeblement is the comment on verse No. 157 of the Pali *Dhammapada*. This verse which opens the *Attavagga* reads as follows :

attānaṃ ce piyaṃ jaññā-rakkheyya naṃ surakkhitaṃ
tiṇṇaṃ aññataraṃ yāmaṃ-paṭijaggeyya paṇḍito.

A student of Pali should have no serious difficulty in translating the second half of this verse which raises the controversial issue. '*Paṇḍito* : the wise man/ *paṭijaggeyya* : should keep vigil, be vigilantly awake/ *tiṇṇaṃ aññataraṃ yāmaṃ* : during one of the three

20 S. Beal, *Dhammapada with Accompanying Narratives*, translated from the Chinese, Calcutta, 1878.

watches of the night'. This again turns out to be a well-considered religious injunction to the adherent who is keen on his own well-being. Wakefulness as a prelude to introspective analysis is implied here, and that in terms of everyday of one's life. That is the emphasis laid in the phrase, 'during one of the three watches of the night'. The urgency and importance of this wakefulness : *paṭijaggeyya* (Skt. *pratijāgarti*. Also note the Pali forms *paṭijāgareti* : *A*. I. p. 142 and *jāgarati* : *natthi jāgarato bhayaṃ*: *Dhp. v.* 39; and *dīghā jāgarato ratti* : *Dhp. v.* 60) is the main stress here. That is why it is insisted on as a daily exercise. This accords well with the Buddhist idea expressed elsewhere: *ajjeva kiccaṃ ātappaṃ ko jaññā maraṇaṃ suve* (*M*. III. p. 187) : 'today itself, one should zealously endeavour. For who knows whether one would die tomorrow'.

But in the hands of the commentator this verse puts on a completely new garb (*DhpA*. III. p. 138f.). First and foremost, he reads into the word *yāma* (which means one of the three watches of the night) a new meaning : 'one of the three stages of life, viz. childhood, youth and old age'. Spread over such long divisions of time, the urgency of the religious pursuit which was the main burden of the verse as indicated earlier, gets obliterated. Besides, this is a very unusual extension of meaning for the word *yāma*, it being invariably associated with *ratti* (*M*. I. pp. 22, 273; *A*. I. p. 114; IV p. 168; *J*. I. p. 243). In support of this, the commentator invokes with great confidence the authority of the Buddha himself: *tattha yāmaṃ ti satthā attano dhammissaratāya desanākusalatāya idha tiṇṇaṃ vayānaṃ aññataraṃ vayaṃ yāman ti katvā dassesi* : (*DhpA*. III. p. 138). This change of meaning necessitates further adjustments. The verb *paṭijaggati* (also note the use of forms of *jaggati*, as intransitive verb in the sense of keep awake, *appaṃ rattiyā supati bahuṃ jaggati* at *A*. III. p. 156) which means 'to keep awake' is used in this verse as an intransitive verb, using *yāmaṃ* in the accusative case, adverbially. The commentator gives it a transitive rendering, giving it the meaning of 'tending, looking after' and supplying as its object *attānaṃ*. This enables him to pack into the verse a new idea which is not even hinted at originally. It is suggested that he who fails to do good deeds (*kusala*) in the earlier stages of life should do so even latterly and thereby serve his cause : *attāpaṭi-jaggato*.

As a final sample of this process of devitalising of the verses of the *Dhammapada* in the process of commenting upon them, let us cite verse No. 241 which occurs in the *Malavagga*. The comments are divorced both from the historical setting in which the ideas are expressed and the psycho-ethical context of their origin. The relevant portion of the verse is :

asajjhāyamalā mantā-anuṭṭhānamalā gharā

By the word *manta* in Pali is meant the scriptures, hymns and incantations of the *Vedas* and *Brāhmaṇas* whose functional value lay in their recital or *sajjhāya*. Hence their non-recital or *asajjhāya* is their very undoing. But the commentator who tries to make the word *manta* more meaningful in its context, refers to it as learning or skill : *yā kāci pariyatti vā sippaṃ vā yasmā asajjhāyantassa ananuyuñjantassa vinassati vā nirantaraṃ vā na upaṭṭhāti* (*DhpA*. III. p. 347). But the commentator could not be worse off the mark than when he comments on *anuṭṭhānamalā gharā* and says : *yasmā pana gharāvāsaṃ vasantassa uṭṭhāy' uṭṭhāya jiṇṇapaṭisaṅkharaṇādīni akarontassa gharaṃ nāma vinassati tasmā anuṭṭhānamalā gharā ti vuttaṃ* (loc. cit.), i.e. absence of seasonal repairs to building is the cause of their crumbling. It is not only too much of a truism but in itself lacks any spirit that is edifying. But on the other hand, set in the context of Buddhist ideas, its original and literal meaning is 'absence of zealous striving' or lack of *uṭṭhāna* (*ud* + V *sthā*) is the slur upon household life.' *Uṭṭhāna* or zealous striving is held out in Buddhism as a pre-eminent virtue in the life of the Buddhist disciple, both monk and layman. We have already pointed that the Gāndhāri *Dhammapada* brings together four verses dealing with this quality under its own heading called *apramāda* (*Dhp. vv.* 168, 25, 24, 280). In the life of the layman, acquisition of wealth is always associated with this quality of *uṭṭhāna*. (*uṭṭhātā vindate dhanaṃ* : one obtains wealth through zealous striving, *Sn. v.* 187; *uṭṭhāna-virīyādhigatehi bhogehi* : with wealth acquired through effort and striving, *A*. III, p. 45). Hence the absence of this quality invariably implies the breakdown of household efficiency. Brick and mortar of the building (*ghara*) should hardly be the concern here.

These few samples have been cited to illustrate our point that in the passage from text to commentary, some at least of the verses of the *Dhammapada* appear to have lost their vibrancy and ethical earnestness.

JOTIYA DHIRASEKERA

DHAMMAPĀLA, distinguished from other authors of the same name[1] as Ācariya Dhammapāla (Dhammapāla, the teacher), ranks next in importance after Buddhaghosa, among commentators of the Pali canonical texts, having written commentaries on seven books of the canon. He was a Tamil by birth and wrote his works in South India, but like Buddhaghosa and Buddhadatta he was a celebrity of the Mahāvihāra in Anuradhapura, Sri Lanka.

After Buddhaghosa had compiled the commentaries on the major works of the Pali canon there remained the commentaries on the *Khuddaka Nikāya* to be written. Buddhadatta, a contemporary of Buddhaghosa, compiled the commentary on one of them, the *Buddhavaṃsa Aṭṭhakathā*. Most of the remaining commentaries are the work of Dhammapāla. He wrote the commentaries on the *Udāna*, *Itivuttaka*, *Vimānavatthu*, *Petavatthu*, *Theragāthā*, *Therīgāthā* and *Cariyāpiṭaka*, giving all these commentaries the common title of *Paramatthadīpanī*.[2] He was also the author of several other works in the nature of commentaries and sub-commentaries, viz., the commentary on the *Nettippakaraṇa*, *Paramatthamañjūsā*, which is a *ṭīkā* on Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga*, *ṭīkā* on each of the *Aṭṭhakathās* of the *Dīgha*, *Majjhima* and the *Saṃyutta*, bearing the common title of *Līnatthappakāsinī*.[3] Besides these, the *Gandhavaṃsa* and *Sāsanavaṃsa* also ascribe to Dhammapāla certain other works, his authorship of which however cannot be established. There are the *ṭīkās* on the *Aṅguttara* commentary, on the *Jātaka* commentary bearing the same title of *Līnatthappakāsinī*, a *ṭīkā* on the *Nettippakaraṇa Aṭṭhakathā*, a *ṭīkā* on the *Buddhavaṃsa Aṭṭhakathā* called *Paramatthadīpanī*,[4] and an *anuṭīkā* on the *ṭīkā* on the commentaries on Abhidhamma called *Līnatthavaṇṇanā*.[5] It is highly improbable that Dhammapāla Ācariya was the author of these works. A *ṭīkā* on the *Aṅguttara* by the name of *Sāratthamañjūsā* is known to have been written by Sāriputta Saṅgharāja,[6] while it seems hardly likely that Dhammapāla would have written a *ṭīkā* to his own commentary on the *Nettippakaraṇa*. They may have been the work of a later Dhammapāla.

Dhammapāla, like Buddhaghosa, gives very little information about himself in his writing. In the colophons to his works he has stated that he compiled them while residing at Badaratittha-vihāra.[7] While this same information is given in the colophon to the *Nettippakaraṇa Aṭṭhakathā*, in the epilogue of this work Dhammapāla mentions that he was living in a *vihāra* built by Dharmāsoka at Nāgapaṭṭana where the Buddha's doctrine was flourishing. Thus, it is to be concluded that Badaratittha-vihāra was situated at Nāgapaṭṭana. In the prologue to his works Dhammapāla states that he is following the traditional interpretation of the texts as handed down in the Mahāvihāra. It would thus appear that Dhammapāla was a native of Nāgapaṭṭana (Negapatam, Nāgapattinam), studied at the Mahāvihāra in Anurādhapura, Sri Lanka,[8] and wrote his commentaries at Badaratittha-vihāra in his native town of Nāgapaṭṭana. Nāgapaṭṭana is situated on the south-east coast of India, 34 miles to the east of the city of Tanjore. The *Sāsanavaṃsa*, too, states that Dhammapāla hailed from Padaratittha in the Tamil country, near the island of Sri Lanka (*Sīhaladīpassa samīpe Damilaraṭṭhe Padaratitthaṃhi nivāsitattā*).[9]

Although this is all the information that can be gleaned from Dhammapāla's own works, some interesting details pertaining to his early life are recorded by Hsüan-tsang who visited south India in 640 A.C. It is now generally accepted that Dharmapāla of Nālandā and Dhammapāla, the Pali commentator were two different persons.[10] Hsüan-tsang who describes Dharmapāla the celebrated teacher of

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1 The *Gv.* mentons four (p. 66 f.).
2 Dhammapāla's name is given in the colophons of these works as the author's name and his authorship is thus established beyond doubt.
3 *Gv.*, pp. 60, 69; *Sās.*, p. 33; *Sāsanavaṃsadīpa*, *vv.* 1191-4, 1231-2.
4 *Gv.*, loc. cit.
5 *Gv.*, loc. cit.; *Sās.*, loc. cit.
6 A. P. Buddhadatta, *Pāli Sāhityaya* (in Sinhala), I, p. 260.
7 var. Padaratittha°, Badari°, Padaritiṭṭha°, Baddharatiṭṭha°, Vadattitthā°, Vasitittha°.
8 It is known from the account of Buddhaghosa in the *Mahāvaṃsa* that the ancient Sinhalese commentaries were not available in India (*Mhv.*, xxxvii, *v.* 227).
9 *Sās.*, p. 33.
10 See *ZDMG*, 1897, Vol. 51, p. 105 ff.; *ERE*, IV, p. 701 f.

Nālandā who was the teacher of his teacher Sīlabhadra earlier in his travels, when he reached Kāncipura in south India and heard from the monks of a Dhammapāla who had been born there, confused this Dhammapāla with his teacher's teacher. But, as it has first been pointed out by Hardy,[11] this information would correctly apply to Dhammapāla, the commentator. Hsüan-tsang writes of him thus : He was the eldest son of a high official of the city. He was a boy of good natural parts which received great development as he grew up. When he came of age a daughter of the king was assigned to him as wife, but on the night before the ceremony of marriage was to be performed, being greatly distressed in mind, he prayed earnestly before an image of the Buddha. In answer to his prayer a god bore him away to a mountain monastery some hundreds of *li* from the capital. When the brethren of the monastery heard his story they complied with his request, and gave him ordination, and the king on ascertaining what had become of him treated him with increased reverence and distinction.[12] The identification of Kāncipura mentioned by Hsuan-tsang with the present Conjeevaram situated 43 miles to the south west of Madras, has led scholars to conclude that Dhammapāla was born at Kāncipura (Conjeevaram).[13] Dhammapala mentions nothing of Kāncipura in his works and this would lead to the rather improbable assumption that Dhammapāla was born at Kāncipura (Conjeevaram), and lived and wrote his works at Nagapatam nearly 100 miles away from his native place. No such problem arises if we accept Fergusson's identification of Kāncipura with Nāgapaṭṭana, which he has arrived at without any reference to Dhammapāla's works. Fergusson argues that the description of Kāncipura in the *Life of Hsüang-tsang* by Hoei-li, as the sea-port of south India for Ceylon, the voyage to which took three days, would make it impossible that it referred to Conjeevaram which was situated 34 miles from the coast and was by no stretch of imagination a sea-port. According to Hsüan-tsang he travelled about 260 miles from Nellore before he reached Kāncipura and this, too, would indicate Nāgapaṭṭana which is just that distance from Nellore, rather than Kāncipura (Conjeevaram) only 140 miles from Nellore. Fergusson, therefore, concludes that there must have been two towns by the name of Kāncipura, one presently so known and the other Nāgapaṭṭana, reduplication of place names in Indian Geography being nothing unusual.[14] This identification of Hsüan-tsang's Kāncipura with Nāgapaṭṭana would confirm the fact that Hsüan-tsang's description would apply to Dhammapāla the commentator, and not Dharmapāla of Nālandā. Further there would be no contradiction in Dhammapāla's works and Hsüan-tsang's account about Dhammapāla's native town which was Nāgapaṭṭana.

Like Buddhaghosa, Dhammapāla based his works on the ancient Sinhalese commentaries. He rewrote in scholastic Pali the old expository material available in Sinhala. He probably also made use of the Dravidian commentaries available in south India in his day. Dhammapāla follows a common method of writing the commentaries on the canonical works. In each work is a prologue in verse, where the first four verses are identical in all the works, in which the author pays homage to the Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha.[15] After writing a few words on the work he is commenting on, he states that he is following the method of the ancient commentaries (*Porāṇ'aṭṭhakathānayaṃ*), as handed down in the Mahāvihāra, in verses identical in most of the work. After the prologue follows an introduction in prose giving the traditional account of how the work came to be compiled, explaining the title of the work, its place in the canon, the composition of the work in chapters, verses, etc. A detailed commentary follows thereafter. In poetical works like the *Thera-* and *Therīgāthā*, *Petavatthu* and *Vimānavatthu*, the circumstances which led to the utterance of the verse are given, in the course of which is narrated a biographical account of the person connected with the verse. Next the words of the verse are explained philologically and exegetically. These expositions are essential for the correct understanding of the texts. In prose works like the *Udāna*, too, words and phrases are taken up in turn and a detailed explanation given. The commentaries to the *suttas* are lengthy and in the nature of dissertations. Dhammapāla concludes his works with an epilogue in verse. In the first few lines he describes the work which formed the subject of his commentary. The

11 *ZDMG*, ibid.
12 Watters, *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India*, II, p. 226.
13 e.g., Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Psalms of the Sisters*, p. xvi.
14 *JRAS* (New Series), Vol. VI, 1873, p. 265.
15 These four verses are also found in Dhammapāla's commentary to the *Nettippakaraṇa*.

last fourteen lines are common to all his works in which he repeats that he has followed the method of the ancient commentaries. He then describes his own work calling it in each case the *Paramatthadīpanī* (elucidation of the ultimate meaning). Finally, he invokes blessings on the doctrine and the people. At the end of all his commentaries is a colophon giving the author's name as Dhammapāla Ācariya, resident of Badaratittha-vihāra. Internal evidence indicates that the *Theragāthā* commentary was written before the *Therīgāthā* commentary, and the *Vimānavatthu* commentary before the *Petavatthu* commentary. All four of them have been written after the *Dhammapada* commentary, as indicated by the fact that stories have been taken from the latter.[16]

Dhammapāla's works show that he was well-read and well-informed and possessed much exegetical skill. His explanation of terms is very clear. There is much in common between the works of Buddhaghosa and Dhammapāla. In the opinion of T. W. Rhys Davids they seem to have been educated at the same university. "They have very similar views, they appeal to the same authorities, they have the same method of exegesis, they have reached the same stage in philological and etymological science (a stage far beyond that reached at that time in Europe), they have the same lack of any knowledge of the simplest rules of the higher criticism. So far as we can at present judge, they must have been trained in the same school".[17] Malalasekera says thus of him, "Yet Dhammapāla shows much individuality in the treatment of his subject. He confines himself rigidly either to questions of meanings of words or discussions of ethical import in his texts; he is, however, not so ethically insistent as Buddhaghosa; his style is simpler, less garrulous, less diffuse, and shows more of the grammarian and the academician than of the exegetical compiler and fanciful etymologist."[18] Mrs. Rhys Davids observes, "the presentation of verses, solemn or otherwise, in a framework of prose narrative is essentially the historical Buddhist way of imparting canonical poetry. Dhammapāla's chronicles are, for the most part, unduplicated in any other extant work; but not seldom they run on all fours, not only with parallel chronicles in Buddhaghosa's commentaries, but also with the prose framework of poems in *Suttanipāta* or *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, not to mention the *Jātaka*."[19] Compared to Buddhaghosa's works, Dhammapāla's commentaries give much less information regarding religious and social conditions of his time. Thus the commentaries on the *Vimānavatthu*, *Petavatthu* and *Cariyāpiṭaka* contain no references to incidents in Sri Lanka. There is evidence to indicate that Dhammapāla was acquainted with the *Bhagavadgītā*.[20] Dhammapāla's works are important in that the contents taken from the old Sinhalese and Dravidian commentaries, date back to a period much earlier than Dhammapāla himself, and represent the most ancient orthodox tradition. "Such defects as he had were but the shortcomings of his age, when higher criticism, as we now know it, was yet unborn, and when faith took the place of historical and scientific investigation."[21]

There is no direct evidence to fix Dhammapāla's period, but it is generally accepted that Dhammapāla was slightly posterior to Buddhaghosa and that he probably lived in the latter half of the 5th century A.C. Neither of them refer to each other in their works but in the commentary on the *Nettippakaraṇa*, Dhammapāla refers to Buddhaghosa's *Atthasālinī* by name and quotes from it.[22] Dhammapāla, as the author of the *ṭīkā* on Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga*, and the *ṭīkās* on Buddhaghosa's commentaries to the first three Nikāyas, must have certainly flourished after Buddhaghosa. In more recent times a later date, viz., the 10th century has been suggested,[23] but the evidence for this is far from conclusive, and it seems untenable in view of the fact that Dhammapāla has to be dated before Hsüan-tsang who refers to him in his itinerary in the 7th century A.C.

16 *HOS*, Vol. 28, p. 56.

17 *ERE*, IV, p. 701.

18 G. P. Malalasekera, *The Pali Literature of Ceylon*, p. 115.

19 *Psalms of the Brethren*, p. xxv.

20 See P. V. Bapat, in *IHQ*, 1937, Vol. XIII, p. 720.

21 Malalasekera, op. cit., p. 116.

22 *Nett.*, pp. 215, 240.

23 A. P. Buddhadatta, *The Second Great Commentator—Ācariya Dhammapāla*, in *Corrections of Geiger's Mahāvaṃsa etc.* (*A Collection of Monographs*), Ceylon, 1957, pp. 196 f.

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LAKSHMI R. GOONASEKERA

DHAMMARUCI. One of the heterodox sects of Sri Lanka, which branched off from the Theravāda (*Mhv.*, v, *v.* 13). According to the *Nikāyasaṅgraha* (q.v.) this secession took place four hundred and fifty years after the passing away of the Buddha and in the fifteenth year of the reign of *Vaṭṭagāmani* Abhaya (29-17 B.C.). The *Nikāyasaṅgraha* gives the following account of the origin of the Dhammaruci sect : Once a monk called Mahā Tissa, who had lived earlier in an unimportant, remote place, came to stay at Anurādhapura on the special invitation of the king (*Mhv.*, xxxii, *v.* 82), and became the incumbent of the Abhayagiri monastery which the king had specially constructed for him. Later the monks of the Mahāvihāra charged Mahā Tissa Thera with having frequented the families of laymen (*kulasaṃsaṭṭha*) and imposed on him the punishment of expulsion known as *pabbājaniyakamma*, banishing him from his area of residence (*Mhv.*, xxxiii, *v.* 95; *Nikāyasaṅgraha*, p. 10). Mahā Tissa's disciple, Bahalamassu Tissa (big-bearded Tissa), was not in agreement with the findings of the Mahāvihāra and raised objections to the charge. Thereupon, the monks of the Mahāvihāra charged him also with having sided the "impure", and imposed upon him the act of *ukkhepaniya*, according to the *Vinaya*. This antagonised Bahalamassu Tissa, and he with a large following of monks went to the Abhayagiri, and stayed there, forming a separate faction and refusing to return to the Mahāvihāra (*Mhv.*, xxxiii, *vv.* 96-97). According to Walpola Rahula, "This was the beginning of dissensions in the Saṅgha which had till then united under the influence of the Mahāvihāra. Although the monks of the Abhayagiri lived as a separate group from the Mahāvihāra, there was no difference between the two at the beginning either in theory or in practice, except that the Abhayagiri monks did not agree that the charge against Mahā Tissa was justifiable according to the *Vinaya*" (Walpola Rahula, *History of Buddhism in Ceylon*, Colombo, 1956, p. 84).

They were strengthened as a separate monastic division by the arrival of some monks from Pallarārāma in South India who were descendants of the Vajjiputtakas in India. Their teacher was called Dhammaruci. This group of monks was received at Abhayagiri to reinforce their position. Thenceforward the monks of the Abhayagiri were known as the Dhammaruci sect, after the name of the great teacher in India, Bahalamassu Tissa himself having taken the name Dhammaruci (*Nikāyasaṅgraha*, loc. cit.). The *Vaṃsatthappakāsini* says that Dhammarucika was the name given to the monks of Abhayagiri when they broke away from the Mahāvihāra (*MhvA.*, I, p. 175) and gives the points they differed from the Theravādins (ibid., pp. 676-77). These points concerned minor teachings of the *Vinaya*. The Dhammarucikas had constant contact with various Buddhist sects and new movements in India from which they derived inspiration and strength. According to Walpola Rahula (op. cit., p. 85), "They were liberal in their views, and always welcomed new ideas from abroad and tried to be progressive. They studied both Theravāda and Mahāyāna and widely diffused the Tripiṭaka.... The Abhayagiri monks, therefore, appeared in the eyes of the Mahāvihāra to be unorthodox and heretic." He further observes that, "....the *Nikāyasaṅgraha* says that the monks of the Abhayagiri, who were known as Dhammarucikas, accepted and proclaimed as the teaching of the Buddha the *Vaitulya-piṭaka* composed by the heretic brahmanas called Vaitulyas who had assumed the garb of *bhikkhus* in order to ruin Buddhism during the time of Asoka; and that the monks of the Theriya-nikāya, having compared their doctrine with the dharma and the vinaya rejected it as false teaching" (Rahula, op. cit., p. 89) Here the reference is to the Mahāyāna sūtras, according to Rahula.

The Dhammarucikas became active in the time of king Meghavaṇṇābhaya, who, after an enquiry into the matter, sent sixty of them into exile. They again became powerful in the time of Mahāsena through the influence of Saṅghamitta, and almost

succeeded in destroying the Mahāvihāra. But disaster was averted by the intervention of the king's friend and counsellor, Meghavaṇṇābhaya, and Saṅghamitta was killed through the machinations of one of the queens (*Mhv.*, xxxvii, *vv.* 17, 26-28).

When the Dhammarucikas accepted *Vaitulyavāda*, a *mahāthera* named Ussiliyā Tissa, himself a leading monk at the Abhayagiri, wished to avoid unpleasant consequences of the situation as had happened earlier in the time of Vohārika Tissa (see *Mhv.*, xxxvi, *v.* 91). He, therefore, left the Abhayagiri with about three hundred monks and lived at the Dakkhiṇagiri, cut off from the Dhammaruci sect. One of this new group, a *mahāthera* named Sāgala, began to teach religion there; and from that time a new sect, called Sāgaliya, came into existence. (Rahula, op. cit., p. 92).

M.KR.

DHAMMASAṄGAṆĪ, also less frequently known as the *Dhammasaṅgaha*, heads the traditional list of the seven Canonical compositions in Pali that constitute the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*.

Abhidhamma is a special *dhamma* in the sense that it resorts to a special terminology in its discussion of the philosophical contents of the teachings of the Buddha. Nevertheless, there appears hardly any fundamental difference between the views of the *Sutta Piṭaka* and those of the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*. *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* being a pre-eminently analytical treatise develops almost to a point of perfection the methodology germinally found in the *Sutta Piṭaka*. In this process, it is claimed, that the *Abhidhamma* gains the lead over the *Sutta Piṭaka*.

The main subject of inquiry in the text is technically called the *dhamma* and it is to be noted that the text is significantly named the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi-saṅgaha* in terms of its subject matter. The title in either form could be meaningfully translated as the *Manual of Psychological Ethics* (C. A. F. Rhys Davids) in terms of its scope, and as the *Compendium of Phenomena* (Nyānātiloka) in terms of its contents. The term *dhamma* as used here being a blanket term denotes mental phenomena as well as material phenomena and mundane states as well as supramundane states.

The text of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* begins with a table of contents called the *mātikās*. It consists of a twofold division of themes under the terms of *Abhidhamma* and *Suttanta* (*Sutta*). The first division contains 22 triads and 100 dyads whereas the second division 42 dyads. These 164 *mātikās* in the Pali *Abhidhamma* are the themes suggested for treatment. Then follow four chapters dealing respectively with consciousness/mind (*citta*), matter (*rūpa*), elimination (*nikkhepa*) and lastly elucidation (*atthuddhāra/aṭṭhakathā*).

At the outset the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* classifies the *dhammas* under three heads namely wholesome/skilful (*kusala*), unwholesome/unskilful (*akusala*) and indeterminate (*avyākata*). The *Atthasālinī*, the Commentary to *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* makes it clear that there are four analyses in the four different chapters. The analysis of consciousness/mind (*cittavibhatti*) in the first chapter called the *Cittuppādakaṇḍa* (section on the appearance of consciousness/mind) undertakes to examine 89 forms of consciousness obtaining in the four different planes of existence (*bhūmi*). It begins the discussion of 65 mental constituents consisting of 56 such constituents mentioned in the text together with 9 supplementary factors brought under *yevāpanaka* in the text and identified in the Commentary. Thus the chapter on consciousness/mind contains a comprehensive list of the types of consciousness arranged under the above-mentioned heads. After each type follows a long list of mental factors with which it is constituted.

The purpose of this chapter seems to present (1) a classification of consciousness and (2) a detailed analysis of the single types of consciousness. The classification is introduced in the principal sentences in terms of the contexts covering different types, for example "at a time when... a state of consciousness has arisen... " In these descriptions the respective types of consciousness are briefly characterized with the help of certain categories.[1] The detailed analysis follows in the concluding parts of such principal sentences : "... at that time there are : sense impression etc." The enumeration of mental factors mentioned in the list are also called the *dhammas* (loc. cit.).

1 Nyanaponika, *Abhidhamma Studies*, 1965, p. 33.

In the following (second) chapter (*rūpakaṇḍa*) the analysis of matter (*rūpavibhatti*) is undertaken. It denotes 27 items called *rūpadhammas* (material elements) classifying them under primary (*mahā-bhūta*) and secondary (*upādāya*) elements. These elements are given short and laconic definitions. But the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* does not give formal and general definitions of matter.[2] In spite of this, it is in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* that we are given the most detailed analysis of matter.[3]

Thus in the *Rūpavibhatti* we get a large number of classifications of material elements arranged into ten sections in an ascending numerical order, just as we come across similar classifications of psychical elements in the previous chapter. Such comprehensive classifications are not to be found in any other classical Abhidhamma text.

Thus, division and classification as an important feature in the systematization of the Abhidhamma texts is well exhibited in the Analyses (*vibhattis*) of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*. No doubt it is the analytical outlook of Buddhism that resulted in a tendency towards division, classification and definition of the meaning of terms used in various contexts. This tendency no doubt became marked in the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*. The *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* on the whole exemplifies this tendency.

Definition, though a controversial subject in the Western philosophical tradition, no doubt has much significance in philosophical discourses. So it is worthwhile to examine how this method is used in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*. K. N. Jayatilleke, using a definition offered for *rūpāyatana* (basis of matter)[4] has observed that in such complex definitions several ways of definition are combined together. For instance, there is a definition in extension enumerating typical instances of different kinds of visual phenomena such as hues, shapes, depth, darkness, light, shade and degrees of brightness. Here there is a definition in intention stating that they all have the property of being observable in an actual or hypothetical sense by the eye. Then again there is another form that can be described as a 'definition by definite description', i.e., that it is the form which is dependent on the four great elements, is possessed of hue, brightness and visual appearance and causes impression. Lastly there is an addition of partly synonymous verbal phrases (e.g., *rūpampe'taṃ... rūpadhātupe'sa*) which is called bi-verbal definition[5].

The *Nikkhepa-kaṇḍa* the third chapter, is more or less a comprehensive summary of the distribution of the *dhammas* under the remaining triads and dyads. The remaining list of the *mātikas* as tabulated in the table of contents is dealt with in this chapter thus covering the whole list within the scope of the first three chapters of the text. Thus the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* proper seems to end with this chapter.

Immediately following this is a supplementary chapter consisting of questions and answers. The questions are repetitions of those found in the *Nikkhepakaṇḍa* but with some alterations. The answers are on the whole worded more tersely than those in the *Nikkhepakaṇḍa*. According to Buddhaghosa the text of this chapter has been composed by Sāriputta in order to elucidate the contents of the third chapter of the present text of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, for those who found it difficult to comprehend. That possibly is the reason that it is named the *Atthuddhāra* or the *Aṭṭhakathā*. But he also mentions in the same place that the *Mahā-aṭṭhakathā* (a commentary that was available at his time, but now extinct) attributes its authorship to the Buddha himself. Here it may be observed that according to the Theravāda tradition the whole *Abhidhamma* was expounded in all detail by the Buddha himself and was later communicated by him to Sāriputta in brief who subsequently transmitted it to others. Whatever it is, the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* was preached first and thus it occupies the first place in order.

Considering the nature and purpose of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* it must be mentioned that *Abhidhamma* is not a speculative but a descriptive philosophy. It has therefore adopted two complementary methods : that of analysis and that of investigating the relation of things. As a text the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* presents its philosophy mainly through the method of analysis while the method of relation is followed in its philosophical discussions as explained by its Commentary[6].

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2 Y. Karunadasa, *Buddhist Analysis of Matter*, Ceylon, 1967, p. 12.
3 *Dhs.*, pp. 124 ff.
4 *Dhs.*, pp. 67, 139.
5 K. N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, p. 299.
6 *DhsA.*, pp. 59-61.

The problem of mind and body has drawn the attention of many a thinker throughout the world and it is not surprising that our text too, understands the importance of these two concepts. The tradition of the *suttas* is aware of and eloquent on the closely bound up inter-relatedness of mind and body (or matter), the two terms consistently used being *nāma* and *rūpa* respectively. Of these two, the body component is restricted to a life-time while the mind runs through *samsara* or series of lives of the individual.[7]

If we are to concentrate on the main issue taken up in the text we at once notice that the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* has discussed two of the principal concepts of high philosophical importance i.e. mind and body or matter. In the first chapter devoted to the concept of mind, or consciousness it is referred to in no less than eleven terms (*citta, mano, mānasa, hadaya, pandara, manodhātu, manāyatana, manindrīya, viññāṇakkhandha* and *tajja-manoviññāṇa-dhātu*, p. 18). Thus the term *citta* appears to have been used in a wide context. The second chapter, which is devoted to a discussion of the concept of matter, describes matter as that which is not mental (*a-cetasika*) and that which is devoid of mind (*citta-vippayutta*). But at times when Buddhism uses *nāma* and *rūpa* separately, they seem to denote two distinct realities as is evident from phrases such as *namañ ca rupañ ca*. But these two terms, when used as a compound after the term *viññāṇa* as in the formula of the *Paṭiccasamuppāda*, they appear to stand for the physical basis of life as such and not as two separate realities. The nature and mutual relation of these two realities have become a highly controversial problem in the philosophical world (Mind and Body problem). It is a much known fact that Buddhism reflects the concept of a soul as an unverifiable, metaphysical concept and maintains that everything is subject to change. Thus mind and body are viewed in terms of this philosophical standpoint. They are treated as real (in a limited sense) and are taken to be capable of influencing each other. Yet the existence of each is held to depend on causes and conditions.

The *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, in keeping with the perspective in the rest of the six canonical *Abhidhamma* texts, does not include heart-basis (*hadaya-vatthu*) as one material element serving as it were the physical basis of the mind. Thus the number of material elements enumerated in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* are twenty three. But when the cardiac theory came on the scene, later works on *Abhidhamma* made an attempt to explain why the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* did not consider including the heart-basis in its list of material elements[8].

It is also interesting to observe that our text contains two classifications of absorptions (*jhāna*) of the realm of form (*rūpāvacara*). According to one there are four absorptions while according to the other there are five. But the latter classification is not mentioned in the *suttas* where usual descriptions of those spiritual attainments are given. Further the *Atthasālinī*[9] explains how the figure five is obtained by splitting the second of the quartet into two items and treating them as the third and the fourth which are respectively included in the pentad. Thus the fourth in the quartet becomes the fifth in the pentad. Regarding this latter classification which consists of five absorptions the *Atthasālinī* and the *Visuddhimagga* seem to rely much on the descriptions found in the *Vibhaṅga*. The reason for this difference is given as the difference in the recipients and that in the method of preaching. Yet the *Visuddhimagga* explains that in terms of meaning both are identical since the pentad includes the quartet. Here one may note that while one classification enumerates the four *jhānas* as are described in the early canonical texts the other presents a five-fold division based on the former, the additional state of *jhāna* resulting from a splitting up of the second state in the traditional list. Of the two items of *vitakka* and *vicāra* (which are mind-processes of different levels) which are got rid of according to earlier tradition, on the attainment of the second *jhāna* (*vitakka-vicārena vūpasama....*), only the former, namely *vitakka* is eliminated at this stage (*avitakkaṃ*) and the latter (*vicāramattaṃ*) is said to survive. This new classification which the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* appears to uphold is again mentioned in the *Milindapañha* where the new grouping as *vitakko vicāramatto*[10] is listed as one of the six possible divisions of *samādhi*[11]. (For further details regarding this new development in the division of *jhanas*, see JHĀNA).

7 *D.*, II, pp. 63-64; *S.*, II, p. 114.
8 *VismṬ.*, pp. 449-50; *Abhik.*, p. 271; *Vism.*, VI, pp. 64-65.
9 *DhsA.*, p. 180.
10 *DhsA.*, p. 179.
11 *Miln.*, p. 337.

In a comparative study of absorptions Walpola Rahula notes that the treatment found in the Mahāyāna and Sarvāstivāda *Abhidharma* is closer to that of the original Pali *suttas* than that found in the Theravāda *Abhidhamma*, particularly in the later Abhidhamma texts[12].

Buddhism being a religious philosophy whose ideal is that of emancipation from ignorance and suffering, the search for knowledge has been made conditional and relative to the religious considerations. Thus the whole pursuit of knowledge is taken to be a means to that ideal and is coloured so to say with the ethical and religious considerations. But that in no way vitiates the true character of the problem. Therefore, both the understanding and discipline of *nāma-rūpa* have always been recommended.

In so doing Buddhism has accepted the fact that human conduct has a social reference in almost all actions and derives its moral significance very largely from our relation to our fellow-beings, in other words, to society. Thus the psychological data in Buddhism serve the purpose of understanding the different situations one has to face in one's struggle for realization. This, as the reputed translator of the text has recognized, the text of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* contains a wealth of psychological ethics in Buddhism. In keeping with the Buddhist principles of no soul and no God, in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* we are presented with a psychology without a psyche and ethics without an external authority and with no recourse to myths and metaphysics for the sole purpose of deliverance from ignorance and suffering, all through one's own effort.

The *Jñānaprasthāna Śāstra*, the basic Abhidharma text belonging to the Sarvāstivāda School, shows some similarities to the Pali *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*. This was composed by *Kātyāyanīputra* and is alternatively known as the *Aṣṭagrantha*.

SENARATH WIJAYASUNDARA

DHAMMASATTHA (Code of Law). Name of a kind of literary composition, which in the Buddhist countries of Indo-China (Burma, Siam, Cambodia) corresponds to the *Dharmaśāstras*, and which up to modern times served as the foundation of jurisprudence in those countries.

The literature of the *Dhammasatthas* appeared in Rāmaññadesa in the Mon country at a fairly late date, as the earliest references to this kind of work do not allow us to fix it before the XII century. There is no justification in looking for its prototype in India outside the Brahmanic treatises of the same name which, without doubt, formed their source of inspiration.

The most ancient *Dhammasattha* which has come down to us, although in a Burmese translation of the XVII century, is said to have been composed in 1287 A.C. at the request of Wagaru, the king of Pegu. With the help of this we can form an idea of what the original *Dhammasatthas* were like. The work is very short and well set up. At the outset, a preface attributes the disclosure of the precepts contained in this book to the seer (*ṛṣi*) Manu, counsellor of king Mahāsammata. These precepts, couched in an abstract way in the form of Sanskrit *ślokas* are arranged under eighteen heads, which correspond with slight variations to the eighteen *mārgas* of the Code of Manu. It is clear that the author was inspired as far as the juridical section is concerned by the Hindu *Dharmaśāstras*, from which he, moreover, borrowed a few simple rules. At base, however, the statements reflect a social environment vastly different from Indian society. Ideas and practices in use by the indigenous population are shown, which essentially represent local customs, which thereby became partly legalised. The work has no religious character whatsoever. Not only has Brahamanism not left a single trace, but, apart from the opening invocation to the Triple Gem, Buddhism is equally absent, as not a single rule is established on the authority of any canonical text. At the same time one should note that the work is handed down through a translation or an interpretation of an original work in Pali, and that its terminology shows frequent signs of its independence from classical Hindu treatises.

From an examination of the Code of Wagaru we may draw the conclusion that the early *Dhammasatthas* appear to be "de-brahaminised" versions of *Dharmaśāstras* which, however, have been used as mould and model for a civil law of an essentially local character.

12 *Zen and the Taming of the Bull*, p. 109.

The Burmese translation of the Code of Wagaru towards the end of the XVIth century seems to have been the starting point in Burma for an abundance of juridical literature, which only ceased with the British occupation. A list mentions more than one hundred *Dhammasatthas*, either in Burmese or in Pali, both in verse and in prose. About forty are still extant either in their entirety or as extracts, the names of which are given in *Digest* by U Gaung.

This literature developed side by side with the *rājasatthas* or reports of legal decisions attributed to kings or legendary persons, and it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the two types of work. Among the more important ones we quote the *Manusāra-shwemyin* and the *Mahārājasattha*, of the first half of the XVIIIth century, the *Manu-Kye* (translated into English in 1847 by D. Richardson with the title: *The Damathat or the Laws of Menoo*), the *Vannadhamma-shwe-myin*, the *Manu Vannanā*, the *Manu-yin*, composed under the reign of Alaung-paya. This Burmese literature differs from the earlier *Dhammasatthas* by a greater wealth of subject-material, although not so well classified, by a much greater amount of definite local colour, and above all by a very strong imprint of the Buddhist religion. Here we are facing a Burmese Buddhist Code of Law.

The existence of a *Dhammasattha* in Siam is proved by an inscription going back to the end of the XIVth century at the latest. What has made us acquainted with the law of the Ayuthia period is of Mon origin and fairly close to the Code of Wagaru, but of a higher developed technique. This is probably the result of the amalgamation of several versions existing at a much earlier date. As they have come down to us, the collections of Siamese law consist only of the preamble and the frame-work of royal legislation, which, reduced to articles, have been inserted in the body of the work below the statement of the principles which gave them their inspiration.

The same holds good for Cambodia. The *Dhammasattha* of the old Cambodian laws is the same code as that used by the Siamese kings, and it is probable that it was brought to Cambodia together with a good part of the legislation attached to it.

While inspiring the literature of the *Dhammasatthas*, Buddhism has played an important role in the organisation of jurisprudence in the countries of Indo-China. This role is evidenced in four ways:

1. Among people who used to live under the regime of oral tradition and the arbitrary justice of their chiefs, Buddhism introduced the concept which formed the basis of the Hindu *Dharmaśāstras*, viz. that there are laws which rule human society and which are a condition for social order. The precepts of the *Dhammasatthas* are, in fact, presented as a revelation similar to the *smṛti*, which were read by the seer Manu on the wall which surrounds the world. This legend was probably entirely invented by the authors of the first *Dhammasatthas* and taken over by all subsequent versions, with more or less extensive developments. The purpose of this legend is to attribute to the precepts brought down by Manu a supramundane value, respect for which would impress itself upon all and at all times. The name of Manu was retained to indicate that the laws were exclusively dealing with lay society, while the name of king Mahāsammata was associated with them in order to link the new legend with canonical tradition. The *Dhammasatthas* expound the higher principles which should regulate human justice, and laid thereby the foundations of a positive legislation, while restricting at the same time the exercise of royal power. This ceased to be arbitrary as royal pleasure had no opportunity to persist, i.e. to formulate a law, unless in conformity with the precepts of the *Dhammasatthas*. For a very long time the authority enjoyed by these codes was the only counterweight to the absolutism of the kings of Burma, Siam and Cambodia.

2. By setting forth the principles of classification of contentious matter, the *Dhammasatthas* stimulated the phrasing and the arrangement of traditional customs. Thus in good time law became fixed and co-ordinated. Customary regulations were arranged according to their subject under headings which correspond to the various types of litigation, together with the deductions made by the authors and ultimately the commentaries added by them. This arrangement has all the appearance of a codification. The progress made is immense when compared with countries like Laos, where the *Dhammasatthas* do not appear to have penetrated and where the diversity and inconsistency of customs were a source of very great ambiguity of conditions of the law, before modern codes were introduced.

3. The phrasing and arranging of customs necessarily necessitated the authors to make a choice between the various rules as regards their importance. Buddhism did not fail to direct this choice. The Burmese *Dhammasatthas* quote passages drawn

from the scriptures in justification of the preference given in favour of one traditional maxim rather than of another. There is no doubt that Buddhist ethics has contributed to the raising of the level of local rights by its condemnation of customs, too much opposed to its principles, thereby causing their abandonment.

4. As regards the theoretical part of their work, the authors of the first *Dhammasatthas* resorted largely to the Hindu treatises. But the direct influence of India soon disappeared, and it is from the Buddhist scriptures that the authors drew the principles of classification and generalisation of law-regulations. Numerous classifications and distinctions borrowed from canonical and commentarial literature are of the type which have passed into the *Dhammasatthas* and these have been used for juridical purposes. Certain Buddhistic speculations have also served as foundations for juridical interpretations. Finally, regulations drawn up for monks have sometimes been adapted for lay people, as referring to a common moral code. Thus the part played by Buddhism in the building up of local rights has been very important, and it is regrettable that up to now this has been neglected by the historians of law and of religion.

R. LINGAT

DHAMMAṬṬHITIÑĀṆA. It is the knowledge of the regular causal pattern of the unceasing (*saṃsāric*) life-process of worldlings (cf. *kicchaṃ vatāyaṃ loko āpanno jāyati ca jīyatica mīyati ca...* etc. at *S.* II, p. 10), both with regard to its arising and ceasing (*jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇanti ñāṇam. Asati jātiyā natthi jarāmaraṇaṃ ti ñāṇaṃ. Yampi taṃ dhammaṭṭhitiñāṇaṃ taṃ pi khayadhammaṃ vayadhammaṃ virāgadhammaṃ nirodhadhammanti ñāṇaṃ*: ibid. p. 60). It is this unfailing regularity of the causal sequence of the phenomenon of life which the Buddhist texts refer to as *dhammaṭṭhitiṭā* (ibid. p. 25) which is said to exist independent of its discovery by the Buddhas on their enlightenment. The *Paṭisambhidāmagga* (pp. 50 ff.) discusses in detail how the insight with regard to the total network of causal relationship explaining the plight of man, constitutes *dhammaṭṭhitiñāṇa*. It apparently includes both the principle of causality (*yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhammaṃ*), the awareness of which is referred to as the *dhammacakkhu*, the dawning of which signals the entry into the Buddhist path of liberation at *sotāpatti* as well as the total Buddhist analysis with regard to the continuance as well as the cessation of the life process, namely the *idappaccayatā paṭiccasamuppāda*. However, this is only a means and not an end in itself for the Buddhist texts recognise a knowledge beyond this, the knowledge in Nībbāna (*pubbe kho Susīma dhammaṭṭhitiñāṇaṃ pacchā nibbāne ñāṇaṃ*: *S.* II, p. 124) and regard the former as being subject to waning and destruction (note *khayadhammaṃ vayadhammaṃ...* etc. at *S.* II, p. 60).

In the *Visuddhimagga* (p. 671), Buddhaghosa while attempting to fix the identity of insight of discernment leading to emergence (*vuṭṭhānagāmini vipassanā-ñāṇa*) gives *dhammaṭṭhitiñāṇa* as one of several states or qualities which are equated and associated with it.

UPALI KARUNARATNA

DHAMMAVICAYA (Skt. *dharmapravicaya*), investigation of the elements of existence, the second factor of enlightenment (*bojjhaṅga*, Skt. *bodhyaṅga*) and one of the thirty-seven factors contributing to enlightenment (*bodhipakkhiyā-dhammā*, *bodhipākṣyā-dharmā* (*D.* II, p. 79, 303; III, p. 106; *M.* I, p. 11; *S.*V, pp. 63-140; *Dhs.*, pp. 11, 12; *Vism.*, p. 106 ff.).

The term *vicaya* in the compound *dhammavicaya* is explained in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* as research (*pavicaya*), discernment (*sallakkhaṇa*), discrimination (*upalakkhaṇa*), differentiation (*paccupalakkhaṇa*), criticism (*vebhavya*), reflection (*cintā*) and analysis (*upaparikkhā* : *Dhs.*, p. 62). All this suggests a thorough and intensive investigation.

The other term in the compound *dhamma*, according to the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, means "things good and bad", "blameworthy and not blameworthy", "mean and exalted," and things that are constituent parts of darkness and those of light (*S.* V., p. 104). These things may either be internal, i.e., within one's own personality, or external, i.e., outside one's personality (*S.* V., p. 111; *Vbh.*, p. 228). The *Sammohavinodanī* explains things that are internal as internal mental formations (*ajjhatta-saṅkhāra*), and things that are external as external mental formations (*bahiddhāsaṅkhāra*), i.e., mental formations of other persons (*VbhA.* p. 314). From this explanation, *dhamma* appears to cover all mental formations, i.e., the

fourth group of existence (*saṁkhāra-khandha*). It excludes the other four groups of existence.

Another interpretation of *dhamma* in the same compound, *dhammavicaya*, is found in the *Atthasālinī* (p. 147), according to which *dhamma* means the Four Noble Truths (*catu-sacca*). *Catusacca*, in addition to its general and popular meaning, i.e., the teaching of the Buddha, can also mean the elements of existence, for the elements of existence that are analysed and classified in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* under (1) elements that are karmically wholesome (*kusalā-dhammā*), (2) elements that are karmically unwholesome (*akusalā-dhammā*) and (3) the elements that are indeterminate (*avyākatā-dhammā*), are nothing but the Four Noble Truths treated from a different angle.

Systematic attention (*yoniso manasikāra*), i.e. the attention directed towards these elements in order to grasp their special and general characteristics (*Vism.* p. 131) is the food for the arising and perfection of *dhammavicaya sambojjhaṅga* (*S.* V, p. 104). The investigation of the three characteristics of elements of phenomenal existence, i.e., the impermanency, unsatisfactoriness and unsubstantiality, is called *dhammavicaya* (*VbhA.* p. 312), and according to the *Atthasālinī*, this investigation covers the entire existence, for it says that *dhammavicaya* is that which investigates the Four Noble Truths (*DhsA.*, p. 147).

Dhammavicaya is given as one of the many synonyms of the faculty of wisdom (*paññindriya* : *Dhs.*, pp. 11, 62), of right understanding (*sammā-diṭṭhi* : ibid., pp. 12, 21, *Vbh.*, p. 106) of the power of wisdom (*paññābala* : *Dhs.* p. 65), of clear comprehension (*sampajañña* : *Dhs.*, p. 68), of the faculty of highest knowledge (*aññindriya* : ibid. p. 75), of the faculty of him who knows (*aññatāvindriya* : ibid., P. 117), of wisdom (*paññā* : *Netti.* pp. 54, 82), of understanding (*vijjā* : ibid. p. 76) and of knowledge (*ñāṇa* : ibid. p. 191).

All this points to the fact that *dhammavicaya* is the most important of the seven factors of enlightenment; the *Sammohavinodanī* clearly identifies it with the intuitive wisdom (*vipassanā-ñāṇa*) that gives rise to the other factors of enlightenment (*VbhA.* p. 313). And according to the *Milindapañha*, it is by means of *dhammavicaya* that a person realises the Truth (*Miln.* p. 83).

The method of developing *dhammavicaya* is very briefly stated in the *suttas*. One has to begin with mindfulness (*sati*), the first *bojjhaṅga*. Being mindful one examines and applies insight to *dhammas*. Then the *bojjhaṅga* called *dhammavicaya*—which is dependent on aloofness, dispassion and cessation, and which is ending in renunciation, is established in him. Its cultivation by constant practice brings it to perfection (*M.* II, p. 12, III, p. 85; *S.* V, p. 68; *Vbh.* pp. 227, 229). One should develop this effort or *Viriya-sambojjhaṅga* or zest or *pītisambojjhaṅga* when one's mind is slack, because a slack mind can well be aroused by *dhamma* (*S.* V, pp. 112-3; *Vism.*, p. 106).

There are seven conditions that lead to the arising of the *dhammavicaya-sambojjhaṅga*. They are : 1. asking questions on the aggregates of existence (*khandha*), elements (*dhātu*), bases (*āyatana*), faculties (*indriya*), powers (*bala*), factors of enlightenment (*bojjhaṅga*) constituents of the Path (*maggaṅga*), absorptions (*jhāna*), concentration (*samatha*) and contemplation (*vipassanā*); 2., making the basis clear means both one's own person which is the internal basis and one's dwelling, beds, robes etc., which are external bases; 3, balancing the faculties such as faith (*saddhā*), endeavour (*viriya*), mindfulness (*sati*), concentration (*samādhi*) and wisdom (*paññā*); 4, avoidance of unwise persons; 5, association with wise persons; 6, reviewing the field for the exercise of profound knowledge; and 7, resoluteness upon the investigation of the elements of existence (*VbhA.* p. 276 ff.; *Vism.* p. 107).

In Buddhist Sanskrit literature the term *dharma-pravicaya* is used in more or less the same context and the same meaning as it is used in Pali literature, for it is one of the seven factors of enlightenment (*bodhyaṅga*) and one of the thirty-seven qualities contributing to enlightenment (*bodhi-pakṣya-dharma: Dhsṃg.* p. 10; *Daśabhūmika Sūtra*, ed. by J. Rahder, p. 39; *Śspp.*, p. 1437; *Sūtrāl.* p. 144). But, unlike in the Pali literature where it is a quality to be acquired by the disciples here it is applied to the career of *bodhisattvas*, in keeping with the Mahāyāna teachings.

According to the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra*, a *bodhisattva* develops this *bodhyaṅga* when he is established in the stage (*bhūmi*) called *arciṣmati* (*Dbhg.* p. 39); and according to the *Śatasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā*, he develops it while faring along the *prajñā-pāramitā* (*Śsp.* p. 1437).

The *Lalitavistara* states that this *bodhyaṅga*, which is one of the one hundred and eight *dharmā-lokamukhas*, helps a *bodhisattva* complete the knowledge of all elements of existence (*sarva-dharma* :

Lal. p. 24). Vasubandhu teaches that it dispels all causes of doubt and uncertainty with regard to the nature of existence (*Sūtrāl.* p. 144) and enables a *bodhisattva* to preach the doctrine effectively (ibid., p. 106).

He gains several advantages from the study and investigation of the doctrine of elements. He develops all the elements of his personality and experiences sublime happiness at the hour of death. He is reborn according to his wish and always remembers his past existences. He associates with the Buddhas and hears the doctrine preached by them. He is protected by magic spells, does acquire wisdom, faith and concentration and finally attains enlightenment (*Sūtrāl.* p. 83).

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DHAMMAVINAYA, composed of the two words *dhamma* and *vinaya* which mean doctrine and discipline, the compound-word has come to mean religion, dispensation, a system of moral philosophy incorporating in it a doctrine (*dhamma*) and a discipline (*vinaya*) or in other words an organized way of religious life.

The term *dhammavinaya* is widely used in the Pali Piṭakas with reference to the system of philosophy based on natural morality which is founded by the Buddha himself. The systems of Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta, under whom the Bodhisatta Siddhattha happened to live the noble life (*brahmacariya*, q.v.) when the latter was still faring in search of emancipation, i.e., before he became enlightened, have also been referred to as *dhammavinaya* by the Buddha himself (*M.* I, pp. 163, 165).

The distinction is made between the *dhamma-vinaya* of the Buddha and those of others by qualifying the former as rightly proclaimed *svākkhāta*, and the latter as wrongly proclaimed *durakkhāta*, respectively (*A.* I, p. 34). Adherence to wrongly expounded *dhammavinayas* results in the accumulation of much demerit for the adherent, whereas adherence to rightly proclaimed *dhammavinaya* gives much merit to the adherent. He who strives energetically in a wrongly expounded *dhammavinaya* lives a miserable life, whereas in a rightly expounded *dhammavinaya* it is the sluggard who lives a miserable life. And in a wrongly expounded *dhammavinaya* the sluggish person lives happily whereas in a rightly expounded *dhammavinaya* the man of striving lives happily (*A.* I, p. 34).

The dhammavinaya of the Buddha is spoken of as possessing eight excellent qualities (*aṭṭha acchariyā abbhutā dhammā*) and on account of this has been compared to the great ocean (*Vin.* II, p. 238 f. and *A.*, IV, p. 200 ff.) (1) Just as the mighty ocean slopes away gradually with no abruptness like a precipice, even so in the *dhammavinaya* there is a graduated training, a graduated practice, a graduated mode of progress with no abruptness in attaining enlightenment. (2) Just as the ocean has its limits fixed and does not transcend its bounds, even so the disciples do not transgress rules laid down by the Buddha. (3) Just as the ocean does not assort with a corpse, but will quickly force it ashore and pile it on the land, even so the Order of monks does not keep company with an evil monk, but quickly assembling, will cast him away. (4) Just as the great rivers, entering the mighty ocean lose their former names and identities and are termed ocean, even so the four castes, going forth from home into the homeless life proclaimed by the Buddha, lose their former names and lineages and are reckoned recluses (*samaṇa*), belonging to the Order of the sons of the Sākyan (*Sakyaputtiya*). (5) Just as all the streams that flow into the ocean and all the rains that fall from the sky affect neither the emptiness nor the fullness of the ocean, even so, though many monks become completely released into the element called Nibbāna, yet neither the emptiness nor the fullness of Nibbāna is affected. (6) Just as the ocean has but one taste, the taste of salt, even so this *dhammavinaya* has but one flavour, the flavour of emancipation. (7) Just as the ocean has many and diverse treasures, the pearl, the crystal and so forth, even so this *dhammavinaya* has many diverse treasures, namely, the four arisings of mindfulness, the fourfold right effort, the four bases of psychic power, the five faculties, the five powers, the seven factors of enlightenment and the Eightfold Noble Path. (8) Just as the mighty ocean is the home of huge animals : the *timi*, the *timiṅgala* and so forth, even so this *dhammavinaya* is the home of great beings, namely, the stream-winner and the one on the way to the realisation of the fruit of the stream-winner, the once-returner and the one on the way to the realisation of the fruit of the once-returner, the non-returner and the one on the way to the realisation of the fruit of the non-returner, and the *arahant* and the one on the way to arahantship (*A.* IV, p. 200 ff.).

Thus it becomes clear that the concept of *dhammavinaya* implies a total dedication to the religious life enunciated in Buddhism. References to it are always in such contexts as 'wishes to be ordained as a monk in the *dhammavinaya* (*imasmiṃ dhammavinaye ākaṅkhati pabbajjaṃ ākankhati upasampadaṃ : M.* I, pp. 391, 494. See also *M.* II, p. 181). To be a *pabbajita* or ordained monk in the Buddhist *dhammavinaya* is no mean task either. It is referred to as a difficult one (*pabbajjā kho āvuso imasmiṃ dhammavinaye dukkaranti : S.* IV, p. 260), for delight in such a life is not easily acquired (*pabbajitena kho āvuso abhiratī dukkarāti :* ibid.). For the same reason persons who were followers of another faith (*aññatitthiyapubba*) were not admitted as monks to the Buddhist Order at once. They had to undergo a period of probation (*parivāsa*) for four months before they were ordained (*M.* loc. cit. and *S.* II, p. 21).

Having entered the Order, they had to acquire many a virtue in order to make progress in the new way of life (*imasmiṃ dhammavinaye vuddhiṃ virūḷhiṃ vepullaṃ āpajjituṃ : A.* III, p. 8).

Monks who are sceptics, morally shameless, not afraid of wrong, lazy and muddle-headed, do not make progress in this *dhammavinaya;* their opposite qualities, i.e., faith, moral shame and conscientiousness, energy and wisdom, help one make progress in the *dhammavinaya* (*A.* III, pp. 8-9). Monks who are cheats, stubborn, babblers, crafty, insolent and uncontrolled make no progress at all (*A.* II, p. 26; *It.* pp. 112-13). Obsession resulting from coveting, malice, sloth, torper, flurry and by doubts, as well as taking delight in activities, gossip, sleep, society and in coming to a halt midway of one's career, are bad qualities that prevent one from progressing in the *dhammavinaya* (*A.* V, pp. 163-4). Those who do not understand the origin and cessation of the six spheres of contact (*phassāyatana*), who do not understand the real nature of taking delight in them, the misery of them and also the escape from them are far from the *dhammavinaya* (*S.* IV, pp. 43-5). Elaborating as it were on the goal of the Buddhist *dhammavinaya*, it is said that those who understand the way leading to their disappearance, who are averse to them and detached from them and are consequently liberated are those who are established firmly in the *dhammavinaya* (*S.* III, pp. 59-61).

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DHANA, the seven noble treasures (*satta-ariya-dhana*) as referred to in Buddhist literature. These treasures consist not of material wealth, but of seven virtues that occupy an important place in the Buddhist ethical system. As such, they can be treated as forms of spiritual wealth and hence called wealth (*dhana*) in that sense. These seven are : confidence (*saddhā*), morality (*sīla*), shame to do evil (*hiri*), fear to do evil (*ottappa*), learning (*suta*), generosity (*cāga*) and wisdom (*paññā*). At *D.* III, p. 163, these seven forms of *dhana* possessed by the Buddha are contrasted with the material wealth of a world-ruler (*cakkavattirāja*). A superman (*mahāpurisa*), if he were to renounce the household life he would obtain these sevenfold treasures and hence they are much superior to material wealth. It is said that these seven forms of noble wealth (*ariya-dhana*) are the best of riches (*anuttaraṃ uttamaṃ dhanaggaṃ*, ibid., p. 164). This list is also found in the *Saṅgīti Suttanta* (*D.* III, p. 251), where they are given in a list of sevens. Each of these is described in detail at *A.* IV, p. 217, where the Buddha says that Hatthaka Ālavaka possessed these treasures. Here the text refers to them not as *dhana* but as marvellous and wonderful qualities (*acchariya-abbhuta-dhammāni*). The *Mahā-vyutpatti* (Section 78) also gives the same list in Sanskrit as the group of seven treasures (*saptadhana*).

In the *Nikāyas*, however, the list of five, in which *hiri* and *ottappa* are omitted, is more common than the list of seven. These five are given as means of purifying the soiled mind. (*A*, I, p. 210), and also as five noble ways of progress for the noble disciple (*A.* III, p. 80). By the practice of these five qualities a poor man was able to be reborn in the Tāvatiṃsa *deva*-world and to outshine all the other gods in majesty (*S.* I, p. 232). According to the *Saṅkhā-ruppatti Sutta* (*M.* II, p. 99 ff.) the practice and the development of these five qualities bring about birth in all the happy states culminating in the attainment of Nibbāna. A comparison of the two groups of five and seven apparently shows that the group of seven is a later development from that of five.

Even this group of five seems to be an elaboration of an original group of three, given at *A.* I, p. 152, where, only the 3 qualities, *saddhā*, *sīla* and *paññā* are given. Not only *hiri* and *ottappa* but even *cāga* seem to have been added later. Perhaps originally there were only *saddhā*, *sīla* and *paññā* in this group, and *hiri*, *ottappa* and *cāga* were added later as further explanations of *sīla*.

At *ThīgA.*, p. 240, it is said that gold, silver etc. are not suitable for the noble disciples of the Buddha, for these material forms of wealth do not constitute noble wealth (*ariyadhana*) and that their real wealth is *saddhā* and the rest (*saddhādidhanaṃ*), implying, perhaps, these other qualities.

A.G.S.K.

DHĀNYAKAṬAKA, (var, Dhānyakaṭa, Dhanakaṭaka Dhānyaghaṭa), the ancient name for the popularly known city of Amarāvatī in the Āndhra country of South India. Two inscriptions found at Amarāvatī support this identification. A Prakrit inscription of *circa* 2nd century A.C. gives the place name as Dhanakaḍa (*EI.*, xxiv., p. 256 ff.); while in the 6th century A.C. an inscription of Simhavarman II refers to the place as Dhānyaghaṭa (ka) : (*SII.* Vol. 1, p. 25 ff.). This city was situated on the bank of the river Kṛṣṇā. During the reign of the Sātavāhanas, Dhānyakaṭaka was a famous city and it rose to glory as the eastern capital of Sātavāhana monarchs, after their earlier seat Pratiṣṭhāna (modern Paithan on the Godāvari) was stormed by invaders. During this period a great *stūpa* was built there and on inscriptional and other evidence, this *stūpa* at Dhānyakaṭaka is the oldest and extensively sculptured *stūpa* in South India. According to the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa*, this *stūpa* contained the relics of the Buddha himself (*Śrī Dhānyakaṭaka Jinadhātudhare bhuvi*). Tāranātha, the Tibetan historian refers to this place as Dpal-Idan-bras-spun, i.e. Dhānyakaṭaka ('store-house of grain') and also mentions the great *stūpa* there. There is archaeological evidence to show that a community of monks had settled at Dhānyakaṭaka and in course of time it became a famous seat of monastic culture. It was the stronghold of the monks of the Mahāsāṅghika school.

When Hsüan-tsang visited this city in the 7th century A.C. it was in a ruinous condition. He mentions Dhanakaṭaka (Te-na-ka-che-ka) as a country. A note added to the pilgrim's text says "that another name for the country was "Great Andhra", and it is possible that the name Dhanakaṭaka was confined to the district of the capital". (Watters, T., *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India*, London, 1905, p. 216). According to Hsüan-tsang's description, Dhanakataka country was above 6000 *li* in circuit and its capital was above 40 *li* in circuit. The country had a rich soil and yielded abundant crops; there was much waste land and the inhabited towns were few, ...the people were of black complexion, of violent disposition and fond of the arts. There was a crowd of Buddhist monasteries but most of them were deserted, about twenty being in use, with 1000 brethren mostly adherents of the Mahāsāṅghika system. There were above 100 deva-temples and the followers of the various sects were very numerous" Watters. T., op. cit. p. 216). He has also described in detail the Pūrvaśaila (Fu-po-shih-lo) and Aparaśaila (A-fo-lo-shih-lo) monasteries that were situated close to the city of Dhanakaṭaka. His account of Dhanakaṭaka also establishes that long before his travel in Āndhra, this city was a stronghold of the Mahāsāṅghika sect and it attracted pilgrims from various countries. The offshoots of Caitikas, Aparaśailas, Uttara-(Pūrva-)śailas, Rājagirikasand Siddharthakas all seem to have begun as the communities of particular *vihāras* around the Āndhra city of Dhanyakaṭaka where the Caitikas originated (Warder,-A. K., *Indian Buddhism*, p. 293).

The *Gaṇḍavyūha* mentions that Mañjuśrī stayed and preached within the vicinity of Dhanakaṭaka (*EB.* Vol. I, p. 410). According to a Tibetan tradition, Śākyamuni promulgated the *Kālacakra-tantra* in Dhānyakaṭaka (Eliot. C. *Hinduism and Buddhism*, London, 1954, Vol. III, p. 386). The biography of Padmasambhava, written by his disciple, mentions that the Buddha was born as Padmasambhava in Dhānyakaṭa (Evans-Wentz, *The Tibetan Book of Great Liberation*, p. 105). In the Vajrayāna works it is mentioned that the Buddha turned the third wheel of Law at Dhānyakaṭa sixteen years after his enlightenment (Chaudhury, B. N., *Buddhist Centres in Ancient India*, Calcutta, 1969, p. 226). The Amarāvatī pillar inscription records that Siṃhavarman, the Pallava king (1100 A.C.), came to Dhānyaghaṭa and presented an image of the Buddha to the *stūpa* ornamented with jewel , gold and silver (*SII.* Vol. 1, p. 25 ff.). An inscription of 1234 A.C. records a grant to the Buddha who resides at Śrī Dhanyakaṭaka (Hultzsh, E., *El.* VI). In Sri Lanka, the Gaḍalādeniya inscription of 1344 A.C. records that Dharmakīrti, the head of the Saṅgha, restored the two-storied image-house at Śrī Dhānyakaṭa in India with much gold and jewels (*EZ.* IV). After this date there appears to be no reference to this city by its ancient name.

M.Kr.

DHĀRAṆĪ is the term used in Buddhist Sanskrit to designate a magic formula or a protective spell. Derived probably from the verb *dhāreti* (root-*dhṛ*) to bear, support, hold, maintain etc. the term *dhāraṇī* comes to mean that which bears, holds, supports or retains. Thus the term fundamentally means a support to a good memory as a *dhāraṇī* helps to retain some form of knowledge (i.e. a *sūtra*, an experience, a book, a piece of wisdom etc.) in memory.[1] It is the power that sustains wisdom or knowledge. Later this basic meaning was extended to mean a protective spell or a magic formula and as a result the difference between *dhāraṇīs* and *mantras* became more and more obliterated. Thus Tucci (along with Professor Hauer) observes "... we must distinguish two fundamental uses of the *dhāraṇīs*. First of all the *dhāraṇī* seems to have been a help to meditation : this is the meaning that is attributed to the *dhāraṇīs* in the first chapter of the *Mahāsannipāta*. The other use of the *dhāraṇī* is that of a magic formula. It is evident that in the chapter of the *Laṅkāvatāra* as well as in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, they have chiefly the value of magical formula. In fact, the magical meaning takes little by little the upperhand and it becomes the peculiar characteristic of these *dhāraṇīs*."[2] And as magic spells they become apparently meaningless but mysterious conglomerations of syllables occasionally containing one or two intelligible words.

As regards the uses of the *dhāraṇīs*, the four-fold division given in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (as quoted by *BHS* under *dhāraṇī*) seems to embrace their major uses : these are : i. *dharma-dhāraṇī*, whereby *a bodhisattva* is able to remember a book on merely hearing it, without study. ii. *artha-*° whereby '*its meaning*' is remembered. iii. *mantra-*° by which he acquires charms to allay all plagues. iv. *bodhisattvakṣānti-lābhāya-*° by which he acquires the intellectual receptivity of a *bodhisattva*. This classification is given a little differently at *Dhsṃg.*, p. 52.

Regarding the origin of *dhāraṇīs* in Buddhism the observations of B. Bhattacharyya seem to be acceptable. He observes that the *dhāraṇīs* as aids to memory and meditation were first introduced into Buddhism for the benefit of less advanced followers who did not care so much for Nirvāṇa as they did for their material prosperity in this world.[3] As such recruits to Buddhism found it difficult to read the long voluminous *sūtras*, these had to be shortened for their benefit. These shortened forms were called *dhāraṇīs* which were capable of being memorised by such less advanced recruits. This practice was based on the belief that when the *dhāraṇī* is the quintessence of a *sūtra*, its repetition was tantamount to that of the whole *sūtra*. A good instance of this shortening process is the *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā* which was first reduced to hundred stanzas and later to a still shorter form called the *prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya-sūtra*,[4] which was used as a *dhāraṇī* along with a still shorter form called the *Alpākṣarāprajñāpāramitā* (or *Svalpākṣarāp*°). These two *prajñāpāramitā* texts, along with the *Vajracchedikāprajñāpāramitā*, are regarded as great *dhāraṇīs* by the Mahāyānists.[5] Writing about the value of this *Hṛdaya-sūtra* as a *dhāraṇī*, Conze records that "...it carried Yuang-tsang through the Gobi desert, was reproduced in writing on stones, in inscriptions throughout Asia from Kabul to Nara and formed one of the main inspirations of the Zen school...."[6] And it may be observed here that the strange-looking demons that came to harass lonely Hsüang-tsang on his way to India through the Gobi desert disappeared only at the utterance of the *Prajñāpāramitā-hṛdaya-dhāraṇī*.[7]

When used as a protective spell or a rune, *dhāraṇī* becomes a synonym of *rakṣā* (Pali : *rakkhā* : protection) and also of the popular Pali term *paritta*. As could be judged from the contents of these it is seen that originally the protective and benedictory power of a *dhāraṇī* was primarily due to its

1 In this sense *dhāraṇīs* were sometimes called *vidyādharas* or bearers of knowledge. Compare the term *Vidyādhara-piṭaka* referred to later in this article.

2 I.H.Q., 1928, Vol. vi, p. 553.

3 *Introduction to Buddhist Esoterism*, p. 55.

4 Text in Edward Conze, *Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies*, p. 149 ff.; Translation in *Buddhist Mahayana Texts*, *S.B.E.*, Vol. xlix, p. 147 ff.

5 See Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature*, II, p. 316.

6 Edward Conze, op. cit., p. 148.

7 *The Life of Hsüan-Tsang* by Monk Hui-li, Chinese Buddhist Association, 1959, p. 23.

containing some piece of wisdom or truth.[8] But as the *dhāraṇīs* later began to contain mysterious combinations of syllables (*mantras*), the mystical aspect of the combination of sounds also became an important characteristic in them. Such short *mantras* as are found in the body of a *dhāraṇī* are supposed to give added strength to it. And as Tucci observes "...in the Tantric literature of Buddhism we have no more *dhāraṇīs* but *mantras* only, that is the *dhāraṇīs* little by little disappear and are replaced by the *mantras*."[9] Such *mantric* syllables are called *dhāraṇīpada* or *mantradhāraṇīpada* in the chapter on spells in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra* (ch. xxi) wherein the *bodhisattvas* Bhaiṣajyarāja, Pradhāneśvara, the guardian deities Vaiśravaṇa and Virūḍhaka and a number of goddesses give the Buddha various lists of such *dhāraṇī* terms.

The following description of *dhāraṇīs* by Waddell may be quoted here : "In form these *dhāraṇīs* are generally given the shape of the orthodox Buddhist *sūtra*. They purport to have been recited in the usual way by Ananda at the First Council, the place and circumstance where they are delivered is usually mentioned and the words of the spell are often put into the mouth of the Buddha himself. The incantatory formulas constituting *mantras* or spells proper are in a crude style of Sanskrit with recurring cabalistic ejaculatory words such as are also found in Brahmanical *mantras*."[10]

In a discussion of *dhāraṇīs* the chapter on *mantras* in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* (ch. xxi) is important in several respects. First, it contains a large number of talismanic words (*dhāraṇī-mantrapada*). Secondly these talismanic words are given by *bodhisattvas* and others "...for guard, defence and protection: *rakṣāvaraṇaguptaye*) of those devotees who keep the *sūtra* in their memory or in a book." These are subsequently approved and recommended by the Buddha. Thus the *bodhisattva* Bhaiṣajyarāja, while giving such a list of talismanic words, says that these terms had been pronounced by previous Buddhas equal in number to the sands of sixty two Ganges rivers. The Buddha expressed his approval to Bhaiṣajyarāja by saying that by the pronouncement of these talismanic terms out of compassion for creatures their common weal is promoted : their guard, defence and protection is secured.[11]

Next it was the *bodhisattva* Pradānaśūra who wanted to give talismanic words for the use of the preachers of the *sūtra*- so that they could safeguard themselves against demons, giants, goblins, sorcerers, imps and ghosts (*yakṣa, rākṣasa, pūtana, kṛtya, kumbhāṇḍa, preta*).[12]

It is Vaiśravaṇa, one of the four Lokapālas (q.v.), who next volunteers to give another list of talismanic terms for the welfare, happiness, protection, guard and defence of the preachers of the *Sūtra*. He further says that with the spells he gives he would guard those preachers over an extent of 100 *yojanas* so that they can live in safety.[13]

The Pali *paritta* called the *Aṭānāṭiya Sutta* (*D.* III, p. 194 ff.) has some relevance in relation to what is said here for in this Pali *Sutta* too it is the Lokapāla Vaiśravaṇa who gives the Buddha the *Aṭānāṭiya* rune (*rakkhā*) which he might teach his disciples who dwell in lonely places which *yakkhas* haunt, so that by its recitation they might ward them off. The Buddha accepts the rune and recommends it to his disciples.

Virūḍhaka, another of the four Lokapālas, who was present here with a large number of Kumbhāṇḍas too gave a similar list of *dhāraṇī* terms for the same purpose saying that they had been pronounced by 4,200,000 myriads of *koṭis* of Buddhas.[14]

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8 On this principle is based the bibliolatry that is found in Mahāyāna and Tantric Buddhism.
9 I.H.Q., 1928, Vol. iv, p. 553 f.
10 *IA*, 1914, XLIII, p. 38.
11 The *dhāraṇīpadas* given by Bhaiṣajyarāja are as follows : *anye manye mane manane citte carite same samita viśānte mukte muktatame same aviṣame samasame jaye kṣaye akṣaye akṣīṇe śānte samite dhāraṇī ālokabhāse pratyavekṣaṇi nidhiru abhyantara niviṣṭe abhyantara pariśuddhimutkule araḍe paraḍe sukāṅkṣi asamasame buddhāvilokite dharmaparīkṣite saṅghanirghoṣaṇi nirghoṇi bhayābhayaviśodhani mantre mantrakṣayate rute rutakauśalye akṣaye akṣayavanatāye vakkule valoḍa amanyanatāye svāhā.*
12 The *dhāraṇī* given by Pradānaśūra was : *jvale mahājvale ukke tukke mukke aḍe aḍāvati nṛtye nṛtyavat iṭṭini viṭṭini ciṭṭini nṛtyani nṛtyāvati svāhā.*
13 The *dhāraṇī* of Vaiśravaṇa : *aṭṭe taṭṭe naṭṭe vanaṭṭe anaḍe nāḍi kunāḍi svāhā.*
14 Virūḍhaka's *dhāraṇī* : *agaṇe gaṇe gauri gandhāri caṇḍāli mātaṅgi pullasi saṅkule vruśali sisi svāhā.*

Next a large number of ogresses (*rākṣasīs*) simultaneously and in a chorus gave the Buddha another set of *dhāraṇī*-words.[15] They also promised that they would afford protection to such devotees personally. Here it would be of interest to note the various dangers against which this kind of protection is expected : these are : devils (*yakṣa*), demons (*rākṣasa*), ghosts (*preta*), goblins (*piśāca*), imps (*pūtana*), sorcerers (*kṛtya*), spectres (*vetāṇḍa*), gnomes (*kumbhāṇḍa*), demons causing stiffness (*stabdha*), demons causing death (*omāraka*), causing madness (*ostāraka*), spirits causing epilepsy (*apasmāraka*), evil spirits of goblin race (*yakṣa-kṛtya*), evil spirits of non-human race (*amanuṣya-kṛtya*), evil spirits of human race (*manuṣya-kṛtya*), quotidian ague (*ekāhika*), tertian ague (*dvaitīyaka*), ague occurring every three days (*traitīyaka*), ague occurring every four days (*caturthaka*), perpetual fever (*nityajvara*) or irregular or chronic fever (*viṣamajvara*). Even if in his dreams he has visions of women, men, boys or girls it shall be impossible that they hurt him.

The ogresses further said that if an evil spirit were to harass a preacher of Dharma, he would, on hearing this *dhāraṇī*, have his head split into seven pieces and that his evil deed is as serious as that of a parricide or a matricide : at any rate their fate would be very bad. First the ogresses promised that they would always provide protection to the preachers of Dharma against all kinds of dangers. At the exposition of this chapter on *dhāraṇīs* in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra* 68,000 beings obtained the intellectual ability to receive the Dharma (*dharmakṣānti*).

A separate chapter on *dhāraṇīs* is found in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* as well. This is a short chapter (ch. ix), which, according to Suzuki, was added "...when *dhāraṇī* began to enter into the body of Mahayana literature, which took place much later in the history of Mahayana Buddhism in India."[16] The magical phrases given here are similar to those given in the *Saddharmopuṇḍarīka* and their purpose is also to be used mainly against diseases and evil spirits. While giving these magical phrases to the *Bodhisattva* Mahāmati the Buddha describes them as being recited by the Buddhas of the past, present and the future while he recites them to Mahāmati "...for the benefit of the proclaimers of the dharma who will retain them in memory."[17] After giving the *dhāraṇīs* the Buddha adds that if sons and daughters of a good family should hold forth, proclaim and realise these magical phrases no enemy shall ever be able to do them any harm. Just as in the case of the chapter on *dhāraṇīs* in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra* here too these enemies are mainly various kinds of evil and demonic beings. The Buddha further says that if any misfortune were to befall anyone he or she should recite these *dhāraṇīs* 108 times, whereupon the evil ones would turn away and go in another direction wailing and crying.[18] It is also said that he who recites the *dhāraṇīs* given here thereby recites the entire *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* and that these were given by the Buddha for people to guard against the interference of *rākṣasas*.

A few examples of the better known *dhāraṇīs* may be cited here. Special mention may be made of the *Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya Sūtra* of which two versions (as a larger and a shorter) have come down to us and of which mention was made earlier.[19] Designated as both a *dhāraṇī* and a *mantra* the *hṛdaya* is said to alleviate all forms of suffering (*sarvaduḥkhapraśamana*). However the actual *mantra* of the *hṛdaya* (*dhāraṇī*) is the line *om gate gate pāragate parasaṃgate bodhi svāhā* (*O wisdom, gone gone gone to the other shore, landed at the other shore, svāhā*). Another well-known *dhāraṇī* is the one dedicated to the goddess *Uṣṇīṣavijayā* and accordingly known as the *Uṣṇīṣavijayadhāraṇī*. Many *Prajñāpāramitā* texts appear among the *dhāraṇīs* in the Tibetan Kāṅjur. Mention may also be made of the *Pratītyasamutpāda-dhāraṇī* which is intended to help one to understand the doctrine of conditioned genesis.

Just as there are many Pali discourses (*suttas*) incorporated as *parittas* (protective spells) by the Buddhists of Sri Lanka there are many Sanskrit *sūtras* which too are used as *dhāraṇīs*. The *Aparimitāyuḥ Sūtra*, *Ratnolkā-dhāraṇī*, *Mahāmegha Sūtra*, *Nārāyaṇapariprcchā*, *Akāśagarbha Sūtra* and

15 These were : *iti me iti me iti me iti me iti me; nime nime nime nime nime; ruhe ruhe ruhe ruhe ruhe; stuhe stuhe stuhe stuhe stuhe svāhā*.
16 *Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra*, p. 17.
17 D. T. Suzuki, *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*. English Translation, p. 223.
18 op. cit., p. 224.
19 Texts in Edward Conze, *Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies*, pp. 149-53; English Translation in *Buddhist Mahayana Texts*, *SBE*, xlix, p. 147 ff

Anantamukhanirhārādhāraṇī are a few such better known Buddhist Sanskrit *dhāraṇīs*.

The *Mahāmegha Sūtra* mentioned here is a good example of a *sūtra* with *dhāraṇīs*. It begins with the usual words "Thus have I heard...." In the body of the *sūtra* the Buddha recommends the *dhāraṇī* called *Sarvasukhaṃdadā* which "...alleviates all the pains of all the snakes, brings all salvation, then brings the torrents of rain down over India in due season and causes all grass, shrubs, herbs and trees to grow, all seeds to sprout and all juices to flow forth." Next follow the texts of the *dhāraṇīs* consisting of numerous invocations to female deities, to Buddhas and *bodhisattvas* and exorcisms against snakes.[20]

Eight Tantric *dhāraṇīs* to eight goddesses, called *Aṣṭadevīdhāraṇī* are found in the Tibetan Kānjur.[21] The eighth of these may be reproduced as an example.: "*Namaḥ sarvatathāgatebhyaḥ sarvamukhebhyaḥ sarvathā mici mici garja garja sphoṭaya sphoṭaya matha matha daṃa daṃa svāhā*." The benefits of this *dhāraṇī* are that "he who knows this *dhāraṇi* will be rid of impurities and fear. He will experience no harm from robbers and thieves and enemies. Quarrels will not affect him. Weapons will not touch him. He will not have any fear of untimely death. He will always be prosperous. The virtues amassed by a million Buddhas he will understand in one day. After death he will be born in *Sukhāvatī*." *Amoghapāśa-pāramitā-satparipūraka-dh-*° is another such collection of *dhāraṇīs*. A *dhāraṇī* capable of giving freedom from eight fears is the *Aṣṭamahābhayatāraṇi-dh-*° the Tibetan version of which occurs in the Kānjur.

A large number of Tantric *dhāraṇīs* available mostly in Tibetan are of the short *mantra*-type as in the case of the eight *dhāraṇīs* referred to above. A *dhāraṇī* used by the Japanese Buddhists at the ceremony of feeding the *pretas* is the *Amṛta-dhāraṇī*.[22] *Dhāraṇīs* are very often supposed to bring about benefits merely by their chanting. Thus the chanting of the *Aparimitaguṇānuśaṃsā-dhāraṇī* once is said to expiate the sins accumulated through a 100,000 aeons (*kalpas*) : chanting it three times each day will purify the effects of all sins and generate the merit acquired by a 1,000 Buddhas. In this manner the benefits of chanting it are gradually multiplied.[23] A similarly mystically powerful *dhāraṇī* is the *Aparimitāyurjñānahṛdaya*, which is a fairly long *dhāraṇī*.[24] The *Aṣṭadevī-dhāraṇī* is a good example of a *dhāraṇī* meant to propitiate deities. This contains eight *dhāraṇīs* for the propitiation of eight goddesses. He who knows this will be rid of impurities and fear, will experience no harm from robbers, thieves and enemies; quarrels will not affect him; weapons will not hurt him; no untimely death will come to him; he will always be prosperous; after death he will be reborn in Sukhāvatī."[25] The *Avalokiteśvara-ekādaśamukha-dh-*° or simply the *Ekādaśamukha-dh*,° which is said to have been recited by the *bodhisattva* Avalokitesvara in the Buddha's presence is said to be like medicine to all beings, preventing epidemic diseases, dispelling sins and calamities, preventing bad dreams etc.[26] A fairly long *dhāraṇī* imploring Hayagrīva is the *Avalokiteśvara-hayagrīva-dhāraṇī*.[27] *Avalokiteśvara-mātā-dhāraṇī* is a *dhāraṇī* given as preached by the Buddha at Vaiśāli to an assembly of *bhikṣūs* and *bodhisattvas*. Purification of all sins and protection from all dangers are its main benefits.[28] However the best known *dhāraṇī* as well as the *mantra* of the Mahāyāna Buddhists is the well-known six-syllabled *mantra* of Avalokiteśvara *om maṇi padme hūṁ*. The *Avalokiteśvara-padmajālamūlatantrarāja* is a work containing a large number of *dhāraṇīs* associated with some of the principal deities of the Vajrayāna.[29] Two short *dhāraṇīs* capable of purifying one's sins and of giving a favourable rebirth are given in *Āvaraṇa-viśkambhi-dhāraṇī*.[30] *Bahuputra-pratisāra-dhāraṇī* is a *dhāraṇī*

20 See Winternitz, loc. cit.
21 II, ii, pp. 236-7.
22 Vissier, *Ancient Buddhism in Japan*, I, p. 108.
23 *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism*, II, i, p. 16.
24 op. cit., p. 17.
25 op. cit., II, ii, 236-7.
26 op. cit., II, iii, p. 416
27 op. cit., p. 417.
28 op. cit., p. 418.
29 op. cit., p. 419.
30 op. cit., p. 428.

given to king Prasenajit as a protection against poison, weapons, diseases and plagues.[31] A short *dhāraṇī* said to be 100,000 *kalpas* old and is capable of putting an end to defilements is associated with Amitābha : *amito amitobhave amitasambhave amitābha krin tam kare, amitaggana kāratī kare, sarvakleśakṣayaṃ karī svāhā.*[32]

The collection of five *dhāraṇīs* called *Pañcarakṣā* is very popular among the Nepalese Buddhists. These five *dhāraṇīs* are : i. *Mahāpratisarā*, for protection against sin, disease and other evils; ii. *Mahāsahasrapramardinī* against evil spirits; iii. *Mahāmāyūrī* (sometimes *Mārīcī*) against snake poison; iv. *Mahāśītavatī* against hostile planets, wild animals and poisonous insects; v. *Mahārakṣāmantrānusārinī* against diseases. In the Nepalese courts of justice the Buddhists are sworn on the *Pañcarakṣā*.[33] The following observations may be quoted here : "The numerous fragments of *dhāraṇīs* in various languages of Central Asia which have been found in East Turkestan and also the large amount of space which the *dhāraṇīs* occupy in the Tibetan Kānjur and the Chinese Tripitaka are evidence of the great popularity and the wide propagation of this literature in Buddhist countries."[34]

Dhāraṇis were sometimes called bearers of knowledge or *vidyādharas*. This was because through *dhāraṇīs* one could recall or recreate an idea, a vision, an experience, a book etc. thereby using them as supporters, receptacles or bearers of wisdom or knowledge (*vidyā-dhara*).[35] Accordingly the Piṭaka of *dhāraṇīs* referred to by Hsüang Tsang[36] and I-tsing[37] is called both *Dhāraṇī-piṭaka* and *Vidyādhara-piṭaka*. According to this reference of the Chinese travellers the Council of the Mahāsāṅghikas composed five Piṭakas i.e. the three canonical ones and the *Samyukta* and the *Dhāraṇī-piṭakas*.[38] In the Mahayāna treatise called *Ādikarmapradīpa*[39] is found a quotation from the *Vidyādhara-piṭaka* saying that the muttering of *mantras*, practising asceticism etc., although practised for a long time, would become useless if not done with proper concentration.[40]

These references indicate the existence of a separate collection of *dhāraṇīs* fairly early in the history of Buddhism. Soothill[41] observes that the *dhāraṇīs* were in use in China as early as the 3rd century A.C. forming a portion of the *Dhāraṇī-piṭaka*, which he thinks is a later addition to the Tripiṭaka.[42] The *Āṭānāṭiya* rune referred to earlier and the *parittas* like the *Ratana Sutta*, which the Buddha himself has recommended to be used as protective spells, are instances showing their popularity among the Buddhists even at the time of the Buddha.[43] The *Atharvaveda* is a collection of such spells that had been in use in India from very early times. Generally the belief in magic powers on the basis of the power of sound is an inherent element in any popular religion. When Buddhism began to spread through a wider solid strata it was natural that this aspect of religion was given a greater emphasis than had been hitherto given. This was specially so when Buddhism began to be more and more assimilated into Hinduism.[44] These popular elements must have been growing in bulk and in importance as a result of which the Mahāsāṅghikas came to possess a separate collection of *dhāraṇīs* and this was available in the Indian monasteries at the time the Chinese pilgrims visited India in the 7th century. Although not available as a separate collec-

31 op. cit., II, iv, p. 500.
32 op. cit., p. 649.
33 Winternitz, op. cit. p. 385.
34 op. cit. p. 387.
35 See Anagarika Govinda, *Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism*, p. 32.
36 *Hsuang Tsang's Life and Travels* by S. Julian, i, 159; ii, 38; *Chinese Accounts of India*, by S. Beal, p. 38i.
37 *I-Tsing* by M. E. Chavannes, pp. 101, 102.
38 For a discussion on the *Dhāraṇī Piṭaka* see La Valle Poussen in *JRAS*, 1895, pp. 433-6; also Anagarika Govinda, op. cit., p. 31.
39 On this work see *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism*, I, ii, p. 220.
40 *Japāḥ tapāṃsi sarvāṇi-dīrghakālakṛtānyapi anyacittena mandena-sarvaṃ bhavati nisphalaṃ.*
41 W. E. Soothill, *A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms*, p. 284.
42 op. cit., p. 408.
43 Winternitz (op. cit., p. 386), however, observes that "It is not possible to trace *dhāraṇīs* back to the early days of Buddhism, much less to the Buddha himself"
44 It is noteworthy that there is a *Ganapatidhāraṇī* addressed to the Hindu god Ganeśa and said to have been proclaimed by the Buddha. R. Mitra, *The Sanskrit Buddhist Literature of Nepal*, pp. 292, 896.

tion at present, *dhāraṇīs* are available in plenty in Mahāyāna Buddhist literature as was shown in the preceding pages. And the Tantra section of the Tibetan Kānjur is specially rich in this respect. It is perhaps possible that the original *Dhāraṇī-piṭaka* is now available diffused in the Tibetan Kānjur along with the Tibetan *dhāraṇīs* and also among other Mahāyāna works. And this *Dhāraṇī-piṭaka* is not a work of the Mahāsāṅghikas but they only appropriated the existing *dhāraṇīs* as an integral part of their system.

In China the *dhāraṇīs* were known as early as the second century A.C. for, in the *Sukhāvatīvyūha* which was translated into Chinese in that century it is said (in Ch. VIII, *v.* 33) that the beings in *Sukhāvatī* should be strong in the knowledge of *dhāraṇīs*. The early existence of *dhāraṇīs* in Buddhism is discussed by Z. A. Waddel in an article published in the *Indian Antiquary*.[45] Here he observes "the interest and historical importance of these spells is not merely Buddhistic. Most of the charms and their associated rituals (*sādhanā*) exhibit elements, which, like those of the *Atharvaveda*, are manifestly pre-Buddhistic and even pre-Vedic and afford some insight into the religion of the pre-Aryan India.... Several of the gods of the Hindu pantheon are described by these contemporary texts in early or transitional forms."

R. Mitra in his *Sanskrit Buddhist Literature of Nepal* (p. 291) analyses a collection of 39 *dhāraṇīs* (*dhāraṇīmantra-saṃgraha*). After quoting some of those *dhāraṇīs* in illustration Mitra records that all those *dhāraṇīs* have been attributed to Śākyamuni himself who declares that he received them from previous Buddhas or designed them himself by his miraculous power.[46]

Eight *dhāraṇīs* have been found buried at a spot to the South-east of the ancient Abhayagiri *dāgāba* in Anurādhapura, Sri Lanka. These are inscribed on granite tablets in Nāgari characters of about the 9th century A.C. (i.e. the Script of the Pāla kings of Bengal). Thus this find points to cultural contacts between Sri Lanka and this part of India about the 9th century. As regards these *dhāraṇī* inscriptions the following observations may be quoted : "The eight *dhāraṇī* inscriptions discovered near the northern *dāgaba* seems to have been composed by the Vajrayānists who, as attested by a study of the monuments of the 8-10th centuries, appear to have commanded a considerable following in Sri Lanka. These, it appears, were addressed to the *stūpa*, in which were deposited the body-relics of the Buddha. The words *stūpa*, *tathāgata*, *dhātu*, *dhāraṇī*, *dharmacakrapravartana*, *vajrabodhi* are to be met with and such terms indicate the character of these inscriptions. These are as usual in Sanskrit but mostly ungrammatical."[47] It is clear that these *dhāraṇīs* were regarded as protective spells and buried as a protection for the *stūpa*.

The foregoing discussion shows that *dhāraṇīs* could roughly be brought under three types as i. abridged texts, like the *Prajñāpāramitā-hṛdaya-dhāraṇī*; ii. apparently meaningless but mystical syllables strung together like those in the xxi st chapter of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra* and iii. Supplicatory *dhāraṇīs* like the *Aṣṭadevi°*, *Hayagrīva°* etc.

Whatever be their remote origin, the use of *dhāraṇīs* by the Buddhists, whether Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna, has been mainly for purposes of protection from all types of danger and increase of prosperity, thereby providing a major religious requirement of the human heart.

A.G.S.K.

DHARMA. See DHAMMA, 1 and 2.

DHARMACAKRA. See DHAMMACAKKA

DHARMACAKRAMUDRĀ, the symbolic representation in Buddhist art of the Buddha's preaching of the first sermon. The *mudrā* is found in the early aniconic phase of Buddhist art, represented through the medium of symbols ; when the iconic phase followed, the *mudrā* is expressed through gestures of the hand.

45 XLIII, 1914, p. 37 ff.
46 R. Mitra, op. cit., p. 291.
47 N. Mudiyanse, *Mahayana Monuments in Ceylon*, p. 100. The texts of these eight *dhāraṇīs* are given, p. 101 ff.

Many modern writers have preferred to identify various *mudrās* in Buddhist art only in the Buddha (or a Buddhist divinity) represented in human form. On this basis one may argue that the meditative gesture or "*dhyānamudrā*" is available only in the depiction of the Buddha in statuary or painting. This holds ground if one confines the meaning of the word *mudrā* to "gestures made by the hands". The word *mudrā* does not betoken such a limited sense at all. As one scholar has put it, "a great range of opinion regarding the interpretation of the term *mudrā* exists among authorities in the field of Buddhist iconography".[1] *Mudrā* meaning symbol could be applied in a wider sense both to aniconic as well as to iconic representations in art.

The early texts give a vivid picture of how the first sermon was preached at the Deer park (Migadāya) at Sarnath in India (q.v. *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta*).

It is also possible to take the word *dhammacakka* in a wider sense to provide a new interpretation given by the Buddha to a word (*cakka*) prevalent in the repertoire of Vedic or pre-Buddhist Indian lore.

The earliest and the best expression of the dichotomic representation of the *cakka* symbol appears in the aniconic art of the Indian Buddhists found in Sāñcī, Bārhut and Buddhagayā[2].

The *dharmacakramudrā* forming the symbol of the wheel is taken to represent the entire episode of the *dhammacakkappavattana*, the original act of setting the wheel of Dhamma rolling by the Buddha at Migadāya, the Deer-park. The whole episode is symbolically depicted through the aniconic medium with a wheel mounted on a pedestal and flanked on both sides by two deer. In addition to this there are certain instances where the early Buddhist artists have shown the wheel symbol to represent the Buddha (or even his doctrine, Dhamma), when it does not connote the historic episode of *dhammacakkappavattana*. This is explicit in the instances where the wheel is shown with proper honorific paraphernalia such as garlands and divine-beings, hovering above it paying due homage as if they are in the presence of the Buddha[3].

When the anthropomorphic figure of the Buddha was introduced to Buddhist art around the 1st century B.C., the Buddha was shown in the act of preaching. The way he gesticulates, the expression of his hands, thus became the *dharmacakramudrā*, the particular hand symbol. In these instances the Buddha, seated on a throne, is shown keeping his fore-arms bent up towards his chest and making a particular gesture by his hands. The fingers of both hands are made to pronounce as it were, a particular expression.

One of the best examples of this *mudrā* expressed through the anthropomorphic representation of the Buddha is available from the Gupta art of Sarnath (incidentally, the original place where the action took place), and may belong to the 4th or the 5th century A.C.[4] The two deer and the wheel (*cakra*) flanked on either side of it by devotees, carved on the dado of the seat of the Buddha make the picture complete and the symbolism realized.

Other lively examples of the type are available from Gandhāra sites as well as from sites of India proper.[5]

In later Indian art, an extended meaning seems to have been implanted on the episode. Occasionally one finds the Buddha being crowned while he is preaching.[6] The *dharmacakra* is here shown placed on the abacus of a pillar held by two *nāga* genii. The two deer flanking the *cakra* however show that the episode has some connection with the Migadāya scenes.

1 Saunders, E. E., *Mudrā*, New York, 1960, p. 5.

2 *The Glory of Sanchi*, Buddhajayanti Publication, Ministry of Cultural Affairs, Ceylon, pl. no. VII; See also *EB.*, Vol. III, fasc. 3, pls. LXIII, LXV; Zimmer, H., *The Art of Indian Asia*, New York, 1955, Vol. II, pls. 20, 21, 24 from the West and the Southgate carvings of Sāñcī, pl. 87 from Amarāvatī.

3 See Roland, B., *The Art and Architecture of India*, pl. 70 from Amarāvatī.

4 Zimmer, H., op. cit., pl. 102.

5 Zimmer, H., op. cit., pl. 90, top figure from an Amarāvatī pillar carving, pl. 156 from Ajaṇṭā cave II, pl. 177 from Ajanta cave XVII.

6 Zimmer, H., op. cit., pl. 80, from Karli.

At Elura cave X[7], the Buddha is seated on a high-level seat in an unusual style with pendant legs (commonly referred to as the European style). The gesture shown by the hands iş definitely the *dharmacakramudrā*. However, there is no symbolic wheel or the two deer to make the identification complete. This may be a sculpture of the Mahāyāna repertoire. The two *bodhisattvas* flanking the Buddha prove it. In the same shrine complex in cave no. XII, the Buddha is depicted in the *dharmacakramudrā*. Here the Buddha is seated cross-legged (*padmāsana*). On the dado of the seat is carved the *cakka* symbol flanked by the two deer.[8]

A further variation of the *dharmacakramudrā* is seen in the seated Buddha image from Mankuwar.[9] This has a peculiar contrast with the usual hand position found in earlier types reviewed above. The left hand is kept on the lap of the seated figure while the right forearm is bent up with the palm widespread. The statue could be included in the category of *dharmacakramudrā* images (a variant form no doubt) because of the wheel symbol carved on the dado of the seat.

One could presume that local variations and extended meanings were given to the *dharmacakramudrā* type statuary in later times. The influence of Mahāyāna doctrines has primarily effected these changes.

The famous relic casket of king Kaniṣka from Shah-Ji-Ki-Dheri, could be well compared with some of the stone carvings from Ajaṇṭā and Elura. Here the Buddha, in the preaching attitude, is flanked on either side by two worshippers, probably divinities. In many instances the Gandhāra artists have given expression to their own ideal. In one instance the preaching Buddha is depicted with the shaven headed monks in attendance along with divine beings all around. The wheel, symbolising the *dharmacakra* is carved on the dado of the *āsana*. A ram and a gazelle sit facing the opposite directions flanking the *cakra*. They take the place usually occupied by the two deer[10]. The same Mahāyāna theme has reached the south-east Asian theatre of Buddhist art. The lively carving of the Buddha in Caṇḍi Mendut (q.v.) is shown in the usual hand position expressive of the *dharmacakramudrā*. The two deer on the base of the *āsana* (seat) are the only remote connection it has got with the Migadāya episode. The two seated *bodhisattvas* one on either side of the central Buddha figure make the theme easily comparable with similar ones from Mainland India, as referred to above.

The classic example of the application of the theme in an extended sense is the image of *Prajñāpāramitā* that belongs to the Śailendra art of Java[11]. *Prajñāpāramitā* is wisdom deified and symbolized in the goddess of the Mahāyāna pantheon. She is shown preaching the Dhamma in the usual style of *dharmacakramudrā*. A book epitomizing the sacred scriptures, the *Dharmadhātu* of the Mahāyānists, is placed on a full blown lotus that has sprung up from the left side of the lotus seat (*padmāsana*) on which the goddess is seated cross-legged. The gesture she makes by her hands is typical of the *mudrā* given to the Buddha images depicting *dhammacakkappavattana* in classical Indian art.

Dharmacakramudrā is not rare in the Buddha image statuary of the famous Śailendra monument in Java, the Barabuḍur (q.v.). However the Buddha in this instance is definitely not the historical Śākyamuni but one of the five Dhyāni Buddhas, often the Buddha Vairocana.[12]

Another variant type of the post-classical period of Indian art is the Buddha in the *dharmacakra*

7 Zimmer, H., op. cit., pls. 196, 197.

8 For further examples from the Pāla art, See Rowland, B., *The Evolution of the Buddha Image*, pl. 21.

9 *The Way of the Buddha*, p. 160, pl. 66.

10 Saunders, E. D., *Mudras*, New York, 1960, pl. II.

11 Zimmer, H., op. cit., pl. 499.

12 For an Image of the Dhyāni Buddha Vairocana in the *dharmacakramudrā* from Ladakh, See Snellgrove, D. L., and Skorupsiki, T., *The Cultural Heritage of Ladakh*, New Delhi, 1977, pl. II (See also fig. 56). This image is in the regal attire wearing a crown and could well be compared with Pāla crowned Buddha images of Bengal and also with the crowned Buddhas of Southeast Asia. It has a close resemblance to the Prajñāpāramitā of Singharāsi. Of the five Dhyāni Buddhas of the Māhāyana Pantheon, Vairocana Buddha alone is represented in the attitude of preaching. See further other *mudrās* such as *dhyāna*, *bhūmisparśa*, *abhaya*, *varada*, *āsi* etc.

mudrā, with a crown on his head.[13] This type probably may be an innovation of the Pāla Buddhist School of art. However, it has its early origin in the Mahāyāna theme of the Buddha being crowned, as found in the sculptures of the rock-cut cave shrine at Karli referred to earlier.

Other variant forms of the Buddha in the *dharmacakramudrā* are found in Buddhist art of the Far-East. The sculptors of the Tung-Huang caves of western China have probably derived the theme from the Gandhāra school.[14] The theme is available not only in sculpture but in scroll paintings also.[15]

It is natural that when the theme was absorbed into Buddhist art of the Far-East, Korea and Japan, it lost the historical significance of the Migadāya episode. The Buddha depicted in the *dharmacakramudrā* amidst a horde of divinities is definitely the representation of the historical episode, however with emphasis on the superhuman qualities of the Buddha in the presence of divine beings.[16]

Strangely enough, this theme has not been appreciated by the artists of Sri Lanka, ancient or mediaeval. The two or three exclusive images of the Buddha referred to as unusual types by art historians are the only ones, if at all, that could be taken as having some parallelism with the *dharmacakramudrā* type even remotely.[17]

A.D.T.E.P.

DHARMACAKṢU. Buddhist Sanskrit writers have used this term in two meanings : One is identical with the meaning of its Pali equivalent, *dhammacakkhu* (q.v., *Lal.* p. 305), and the other *dharmacakṣu* is identical with ten powers, *daśa-bala* (q.v.); it consists in the intellectual possession of ten powers peculiar to Buddhas (*Mhvu.* I, p. 158 ff.; *Sūtrāl.* 54; *Dhsṃg.* p. 14).

The latter is one of the five eyes of the Buddhas, the other four being the eye of flesh (*maṃsa-cakṣu*), the clairvoyant eye (*divya-cakṣu*), the eye of wisdom (*prajñā-cakṣu*) and the Buddha-eye. In the Pali list of the five eyes of Buddhas, we do not find *dhammacakkhu*; but, there is the all-seeing eye (*samantacakkhu*) in its place (*Nd.* II, p. 133).

UPALI KARUNARATNA

DHARMADHĀTU (1), is a term which is difficult to render into English so as to bring out its exact significance. It is freely rendered as *dharma*-element, idea-element, idea-realm, etc.

The Theravādins only occasionally included the absolute in the *dharmadhātu* as being one of the objects of mind. But the Mahāyānists quite regularly considered it to be the absolute transcendental reality, which is real in the ultimate sense of the word. Thus, it came to be identified with various other concepts such as *bhūtatathatā* (q.v.), *tathāgatagarbha* (q.v.) etc. In this sense the concept of *dharmadhātu* is somewhat similar to the *ātman* and *brahman* concepts of the Upaniṣadic philosophy. But, however, its meaning is more religious than epistemological.

The term *dharmadhātu* is also often translated as the 'sphere of religion.' The term is used in this sense in the following extracts : *'śive virajase'mṛte dharmadhātau pratiṣṭhāpayiṣyati, Lal.* p. 164 (he will establish creatures in the auspicious, pure, immortal sphere of religion); *parijñāto dharmadhātuḥ, vyavasthāpitaḥ sattvadhātuḥ* (*Lal.* p. 254 : he has completely grasped the sphere of religion and established the sphere of creatures); *dharmadhātumeva vicārayamāno* (*Rpp.* p. 4, meditating on the sphere of religion itself). For more references, see *BHS*, s.v.

After the development of the *trikāya* (q.v. three-bodies) doctrine the concept of *dharmadhātu*, too, acquired greater significance. From the beginning *dharmadhātu* was considered to be the Truth. The Truth, it was argued, cannot be separated from the

13 Rowland, B., op. cit., p. 19.
14 Seckel, D., *Art of Buddhism*, Methuan, London, 1944, pl. 23 cf. with pl. 21, Buddha image from Shorchuck, Sinkiang.
15 Seckel, D., op. cit., pl.28.
16 *The Metropolitan Art Bulletin*, May 1965, part I, p. 327, fig. 3, from Kuang-sheng-Ssu in Shansi province of North China, p. 331, fig. 10 from Shansi province, both paintings belong to the 14th cent.
17 Paranavitana, S., *The Art of the Ancient Sinhalese*, Colombo, 1971, pls. 67, 93.

Buddha. Therefore, the *dharma-kāya* (q.v. body of law), which is the true and the highest of the three bodies of the Buddha, came to be identified with the *dharmadhātu*. Thus, it was considered as the primordial law, the cause of all things, from which emanate all, including the moral and metaphysical order.

In the *Gaṇḍavyūha Sūtra* the concept of *dharmadhātu* develops further. Here it comes to mean the universe which is in contrast to the *lokadhātu* (i.e., the ordinary world) which is full of all sorts of particulars. However, it is apparent that the universe, designated as *dharmadhātu*, is not another world that is completely different from the *lokadhātu*. It is the *lokadhātu* itself, as viewed by an enlightened mind, where all forms of particularisation disappear and everything appears as one unit. Therefore, it is said that the *dharmadhātu* is, at one and the same time, both this world and not this world. These are merely two aspects of the same concept that appear to be two distinct worlds when viewed from two different points.

This *dharmadhātu*, which is also known as *Vairocana-vyūhālaṅkāra-garbha* (*Gvyu.* p. 479), is to be realised only by those who are enlightened, i.e., by *bodhisattvas* with the aid of their supernatural, spiritual power (*adhiṣṭhāna*). When looked at from this higher point of view the *lokadhātu* transforms itself into the *dharmadhātu* and the *bodhisattvas* realise that the *lokadhātu* and the *dharmadhātu* are the same. The *dharmadhātu* being the transformation of *lokadhātu*, is neither a vacuum nor a world filled with mere abstractions. Just as the *lokadhātu*, it is also filled with concrete individuals and objects. But unlike in the *lokadhātu*, there is perfect orderliness and complete harmony among these different individuals and objects. These objects are arranged in such a way that there is complete interfusion and interpenetration of all diverse objects. In spite of this interpenetration, each object retains its individuality which by no means becomes an obstacle to interpenetration (see *Gvyū.* p. 512). The *dharmadhātu* is described as a world of radiance where each object, while shining in its own light, does not refuse to take in or reflect the light of other objects.

The Chinese philosophers developed the theory of fourfold *dharmadhātu*, an idea first brought forward by scholars such as Fatsang, Chi-yen and Tu-shun but finally formulated by Teng-kuan. According to this theory there are four different ways of viewing the *dharmadhātu*. The first in viewing the *dharmadhātu* as a world of individual objects. The second is viewing it as the manifestation of one spirit (*ekacitta*) or one elementary substance (*eka-dhātu*). The third is viewing it as a world where all individual objects (*vastu*) are identifiable with one underlying spirit and the fourth is viewing it as a world where each particular object is identifiable with every other particular object and where all differences and particularisations are no more. When viewed in the last mentioned way, one sees that there is complete harmony and interpenetration among the diverse objects of the *dharmadhātu* (see D. T. Suzuki, *Essays in Zen Buddhism*, 1934, Third Series, pp. 121-23, 127 ff. 153 ff. etc.).

The concept of *dharmadhātu* can also be explained as the theory of causation as promulgated by the Avataṃsaka school. J. Takakusu (*Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 117 ff.) considers this as the climax of all the theories of causation. This theory maintains that there is no single being existing independently. Every thing in the universe arises simultaneously, depending on each other, and also mutually influencing each other. Beings are caused by themselves, the universe by itself. Thus, it does not take into consideration ideas of cause and condition (*hetupratyaya*) for these ideas do not hold good in the *dharmadhātu*, which is to be conceived only by spiritual insight. Though explained as the theory of causation, it is quite evident that the concept of *dharmadhātu* is the philosophy of totality and sameness of all things more than the philosophy of causality (see also AVATAṂSAKA).

S. K. N.

DHARMADHĀTU—(2). The term *dharmadhātu* (Pali *dhammadhātu*) originally meant causal cosmic order. Etymologically it is derived from the root *dhṛ* to uphold. It occurs in the Pali Tripiṭaka in the context of Dependent Origination (*Paṭicca-samuppāda*) and later it came to be included in the philosophical teachings of the Buddhas.

Dhātu (order), *dhammaṭṭhititā* (fixed (causal) pattern of phenomena), *dhammaniyāmatā* (regular pattern of (causal) phenomena), *idappaccayatā* (causally connected by way of cause or conditionality) and *dhamma* (law) have been used in the Pali Tripiṭaka as synonymous to *dhammadhātu*.[1]

1 *S.* II, p. 25; *M.* I, p. 396; II, p. 32.

The Tathāgata (Buddha) thoroughly comprehended the *Dhammadhātu* (causal cosmic order). What is this *dhammadhātu*? The Buddha replies in the following words : "On account of birth arises decay and death, whether a Tathāgata arises or not, this order (*dhātu*) exists, namely the fixed nature of phenomena, the regular pattern of phenomena or conditionality. This, the Tathāgata discovers and comprehends; having discovered and comprehended it, he points it out, teaches it, lays it down, establishes, reveals, analyses, clarifies it and says "look".[2]

The *dhammadhātu* revealed by the Buddha is as follows : "This being, that becomes, from the arising of this, that arises; this not being, that becomes not; from the ceasing of this that ceases." In the same context the Dependent Origination of twelve links is given as a description of the above theory.[3]

Dhammadhātu cult. Mahāyāna Buddhists reinterpreted the Buddhalogy to accommodate the theory of celestial Buddhas of the body of Law (*Dharmakāya*) to which they have given the highest place in their Pantheon. Instead of worshipping the bodily relics they worshipped the wisdom of the Buddha, the *Dharmadhātu*. I-tsing reports that after the 7th century A.D. worshipping of the Dharma was prevalent.[4] Archaeologists found some inscribed slabs containing the Buddhist creed i.e., *ye dharmā hetuppabhavā....*" at Minamati and Paharpur in India. More than hundred similar slabs were discovered by Indian archaeologists. An inscription found in Orissa says that one may obtain merit hundred times more by worshipping the *stūpas* with enshrined *Dhāraṇīs* in them than from worshipping of Tathāgata *stūpas* (*stūpas* with bodily relics of the Buddha).[5] As these evidence reveal *dhammadhātu*, (*dharmadhātu*) the doctrine of the Buddha, became an object of worship.

Dharmadhātu worship was introduced to Sri Lanka by Mahāyānists. Monks of Dhammaruci and Sāgaliya sects and the kings who supported Mahāyanists accepted it and venerated it. During the reign of Śilākāla (522-535 A.C.) a young merchant who had betaken himself from Sri Lanka to Kāsipura in India brought hither from there the *dharmadhātu*. The king believing it to be the true doctrine of the Buddha received it with ceremony. He showed it reverence and honour and placed it in a house not far from the royal palace. Once a year he wanted it to be taken to the Jetavana-vihāra in Anurādhapura, and there to have a festival. He made this a permanent feature regarding it as a blessing for all beings.[6] In this context *dharmadhātu* is referred to as 'true doctrine of the Buddha". The *Nikāyasaṅgrahaya*, a sinhalese work of the 14th century A.C., confirming this says that it is a book containing the heretical doctrine of the *Vaitulyavāda* school[7], which has been identified as the Mahāyāna by modern scholars. A sinhalese king named Kasspa, probably Kassapa—IV (898-914 A.C.), renovated the Abhayagiri-stūpa to 140 cubits enshrining in it the *dharmadhātu*.[8] *Dhāraṇīs* have been found in the Vijayārāma-stūpa in Anurādhapura.[9] Relics of the *dharmakāya* (Body of Law) of the Buddha are the *Dhāraṇīs*.[10] Ninety one copper plaques of about the ninth century found within the body of the Indikaṭu sāya (a *stūpa* known by that name) at Mihintale, close to Anurādhapura, containing excerpts from sacred texts of Mahāyāna Buddhism. More than half of them contain fragments from the introductory chapter of the *Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sūtra* and fifteen of them were inscribed with short extracts from the *Kāśyapa-parivarta-Sūtra*.[11] These archaeological evidence prove that the monks of the Sāgaliya sect and the Dhammaruci sect in Sri Lanka practised the worship of *dharmadhātu* and no doubt they have been influenced by the Vaitulyavādins (Mahāyānists).

2 *S.* II, p. 25.
3 *M.* II, p. 32.
4 *A Record of the Buddhist Religion*, trst. by J. Takakusu, Oxford, 1896, p. 150.
5 *EI*, XXVI, 1941-2, p. 171 ff.
6 *Cūlavaṃsa*, trst. I, by W. Geiger, Colombo, 1953, cp. 41, *vv.*
7 *Nikāyasaṅgrahaya*, pp. 16-7.
8 *Saddharmaratnākaraya*, ed. by K. L. Dharmakirti, 1912, p. 333.
9 Nandasena Mudiyanse, *Śāstrīyalipisaṅgrahaya*, Colombo, 1971, pp. 163, 170.
10 *Introduction to the Buddhist Tantric System*, trst. by J. D. Lessing and A. Wayman, Second ed., 1978 p. 107
11 *EZ*, Vol. III, pp. 199-212; IV, p. 238.

The Monks of the Mahāvihāra, orthodox church, who fought against the Vaitulyavādins (Mahāyānists) felt that they also should have an alternative to *dhammadhātu* worship and introduced *Paṭicca samuppāda* (Dependent Origination) and the *Dhammasaṅgiṇī*, the first book of the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*, as objects of worship. As a result of this king Kassapa V (914-123 A.C.) caused to be written the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* on gold plates and he adorned that golden book with all kinds of jewels, and having built a splendid temple in the midst of the town he placed the book in it and caused festive processions to be held in its honour. The position of Sakkasenāpati he granted to his own son and entrusted him with the care of this sacred book. Every year the King had the town festively decorated as the town of the gods and surrounded by his decked-out army, resplendent as the king of the gods in all his royal robes, riding on the back of his elephant, he marched through the streets of the town and brought with great pomp (that book containing) the summary of the true doctrine to the vihāra built by himself, perfectly equipped. There, in the relic temple, under a graceful, jewel-studded *maṇḍapa*, he placed it on the relic cushion and held a festival.[12] Further the Sinhalese Buddhists venerated *stūpas* enshrining sacred teachings of the Buddha such as the *Paṭiccasamuppāda* and the book *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* and numerous other suttas enshrined in them. According to the *Saddharma-ratnākaraya*, a sinhalese work of 14th century A.C., such *stūpas* were called *dharmacetiya*.[13]

Anthropomorphism of dharmadhātu: Mahāyānists further developed the concept of *dharmadhātu* (*dhammadhātu*) by giving an anthropomorphic form to it. They introduced the *Dharmakāya* (body of Law) as the Ādi Buddha, Samanta Buddha, Svabhāva, Jina and *Dharmadhātu*.[14] (It is noteworthy that later Mahāyānists rejected the Ādi Buddha concept). The *Mahāvairocana Sūtra* refers to the *Dharmakāya* (Body of Law) as Mahāvairocana,[15] the principal celestial Buddha of Mahāyānists. According to the *Advayavajrasaṅgraha* Vajrasatva, probably another name for Mahāvairocana, is identified as *dharmadhātu*.[16] This form of Dharmadhātu also was accepted and venerated by Sinhalese Buddhists. There are ancient circular shrines called *vaṭadāge* in Sri Lanka in which the theme of five *Dhyāni* Buddhas of all embracing *dharmakāya* (Body of Law) is found. One of them is the Mādirigiriya *vaṭadāge* which has been dated to 8th century. Polonnaruva *vaṭadāge* of the 12th century is another example. The theme of the *vaṭadāge* includes a *stūpa* in the middle and four Dhyāni Buddhas facing four quarters around the *stūpa*. In this theme Vairocana or Vajrasatva is symbolised by the *stūpa* which has its place in the middle of the *Maṇḍala*. Other four Dhyāni Buddhas are said to have been begotten from Vairocana or Vajrasatva (*dhammadhātu*). All five Buddhas of this *Maṇḍala* in an anthropomorphic form are found at Galvihāra in Polonnaruwa. These archaeological evidence prove that the Sinhala Buddhists worshipped *dhammadhātu* even in an anthropomorphic form which they borrowed from the Mahāyānists.

CHANDRA WICKREMAGAMAGE

DHARMAGUPTAKA (var. Dharmaguptika; Pali : Dhammaguttika), one of the eighteen schools of Buddhism. It is believed to have been so named as it was founded by one Dharmagupta.

Dharmaguptaka is generally regarded as a subdivision of the Mahīśāsaka school. Bhavya, too, while listing it among the ten Sthavira schools refers to another tradition which grouped it as one of the sub-divisions of the Vibhajyavādins.

There is no certainty regarding the date of its origin. The *Kathāvatthu* makes no reference to the school. The *Abhidharmakośa* (iv, *v.* 39) contains a reference wherein it is said that the Dharmaguptakas refused to accept the *Prātimokṣa* rules of the Sarvāstivādins as authoritative. The concensus of opinion among the present day scholars is that the school originated somewhere around the 2nd century B.C. Similarly, there is no inscriptional or textual evidence that enable one to fix the school to any particular location in India. Though Hsüan-tsang and I-tsing seem to have found traces of it in the Uḍḍiyāna region in the 7th century, this evidence is insufficient to conclude that it originated in that

12 *Cūḷavaṃsa*, I, cf. *v.* 52, *vv.* 50-56.
13 *Saddharmaratnākaraya*, p. 300.
14 *JRAS*, Bengal 2(1), 1838, pp. 142-43.
15 *Etude sur Mahāvairocana Sūtra*, ed. by R. Tajina, Paris, 1936, p. 42.
16 Nandasena Mudiyanse, op. cit., p. 154.

region. Przyluski is of opinion that the Dharmaguptakas had their centre in the north-west. Warder thinks that it originated in the Aparanta country (Warder, A. K., *Indian Buddhism*, India, 1970, p. 289).

These scanty evidence about the school could fortunately be supplemented with further information gleaned from the canonical literature of the school, a considerable portion of which is found extant in the Chinese language. Their earliest canon seems to have consisted of the usual three divisions viz. *Vinaya*, *Sūtra* and *Abhidharma*. The *Vinaya Piṭaka* was in four divisions and hence called the *Caturvarga-vinaya*. The four divisions were : *Bhikṣu-prātimokṣa*, *Bhikṣuṇī-prātimokṣa*, *Khandhaka* and *Ekottara*. The *Sūtra Piṭaka* had five divisions : *Dirghāgama*, *Madhyamāgama*, *Ekottarāgama Saṃyuktāgama* and *Kṣudrakāgama*. The *Abhidharma Piṭaka* consisted of four divisions : *Saprasnaka*, *Aprasnaka*, *Saṃgraha Saṃyukta* and *Prasthāna*. Paramārtha and K'uei-chi suggest the existence of a canon consisting of five main divisions, with two separate divisions, one containing accounts of the previous births of the Buddha and the other containing *dhāraṇīs* or *mantras* added to the usual threefold division. However, if ever such an enlarged canon existed, it would have been a late compilation and mainly due to Mahāyāna influence.

A fairly comprehensive idea about the doctrines attributed to the Dharmaguptakas could be gathered from the extant literature, specially from the writings of Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva. Some of the basic teachings of the school appear to have been as follows :

1. The Buddha is not included in the Saṅgha. Hence a gift to the Buddha results in much merit than a gift to the Saṅgha.
2. Although the emancipation of the Buddha is identical with that of a disciple, their ways of attainment differ.
3. Heretics cannot attain the five kinds of superknowledge (*abhijñā*).
4. The body of an *arahant* is completely pure (*anāsrava*).
5. Even among the *devas* the holy life (*brahmacarya*) is practised.
6. Much merit is accrued through veneration of *stūpas*.
7. Realisation of truth (*abhisamaya*) takes place not gradually but all at once.
8. It is through *animitta-samādhi* that one becomes established in righteousness.

Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva themselves are not in agreement with regard to these doctrines. For example, Vasumitra disagrees with the teaching that Buddha is not included in the Saṅgha. Further, he remarks that Dharmaguptaka teachings bear close resemblance to those of the Mahāsāṅghikas, a remark that appears noteworthy due to the fact that the Dharmaguptaka school is generally regarded as being on the side of the Sthavira schools. It appears that though this school had its origin among the Sthavira schools, subsequently it got greatly influenced by the Mahāsāṅghika ideas. This is further evident from the inclusion of *dhāraṇīs* in their canon and also from the special importance they attach to the honouring of *stūpas*.

The Dharmaguptaka school did play a major role in the spread of Buddhism. As Warder points out (see op. cit., p. 289) they made greater efforts than any other school in taking Buddhism outside India. And in this they were extremely successful for, besides the "cult" of the *stūpa*, the Dharmaguptakas have devised some other means of popularising Buddhism among those who preferred the mysterious to the philosophical. *Dhāraṇīs* and *mantras* may have been of much use and help in this regard. They appear to have carried the message of Buddhism along the trade routes from Aparanta into Iran and at the same time into Uḍḍiyāna and after establishing themselves as far west as Parthia, they followed the 'silk route' eastwards across central Asia into China where they became the main and the most influential school during the early period of Chinese Buddhism.

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M. KR.

DHARMAKĀYA. The term originally meant 'the body of doctrine'. Subsequently, it developed into a metaphysical concept in which the truth of the doctrine and the essence of Buddhahood converge, ultimately identifying itself with the essence of the whole universe, the Ultimate Reality.

It is interesting to observe that this development of the concept *dharma-kāya* in Buddhist Sanskrit literature is not without its parallel in the Pali sources, not excluding the canonical texts. Thus, a reference in the *Dīgha-Nikāya* (II, p. 154), recording the Buddha's assertion that his teaching i.e. the Dhamma and the Vinaya, would step in after his passing away to occupy the place he held personally as the Teacher (*satthā*)[1] suggests the presence of the first of the three meanings given above. Herein, though the term *dhamma-kāya* (the Pali equivalent of *dharma-kāya*) is not found to occur, it is apparent from the context that the term *dhamma* (along with the term *vinaya*) is used to connote the 'body of doctrine' which is connoted by the term *dharma-kāya* in later Buddhist Sanskrit works. This interpretation of the term is carried down in the Pali Buddhist literary tradition, and one finds in the *Milindapañha* this role of the Dhamma, as the body of doctrine that stands in place of the Teacher, clearly designated as *dhamma-kāya*.[2] Here, it must be clearly maintained, there is yet no identification, much less a convergence of the Buddha with his doctrine.

It is relevant to take note at this stage of another reference which clearly suggests the identification of the Buddha with the Dhamma. This is where the Buddha tells Vakkali that he who sees the doctrine sees the Buddha and *vice versa*.[3] This type of references are particularly important in tracing the development of the *dharma-kāya* concept for, they bear evidence to a marked tendency that prevailed in early Buddhism to subordinate the *rūpa-kāya* (physical form) of the Buddha to the *dharma-kāya* (the body of doctrine). The second of the meanings given above implying the essence of Buddhahood, is clearly seen in the *Aggañña Sutta* where the term *dhamma-kāya* itself is directly used as an epithet of the Buddha.[4] Undoubtedly this tendency was instrumental in developing and bringing into culmination the *dharma-kāya* concept as the Ultimate Reality.

The third meaning, however, is not found in the early Theravāda tradition although the transition from the first two meanings into the third was primarily due to numerous tendencies and beliefs that operated within the Theravāda tradition itself. Alongside the tendency to subordinate the *rūpa-kāya* to the *dharma-kāya*, there was also a trend to consider the Buddha as a superhuman being. Thus, in one instance it is said that if the Buddha so desired he could have prolonged his life span even for a period of one full aeon, thereby attributing to him a possible longevity, almost bordering on immortality (*D.* II, p. 115). It was believed that the Buddha was capable of creating a mind-made body (*manomaya-kāya*) which enables him to visit the heavens and that he could create exact replicas of his physical form. Similarly, there prevailed also a belief in the multiplicity of the Buddhas, not only of the present Buddhas (*paccupanna-Buddha*) but also of the Buddhas of the past (*atīta-Buddha*) and future *anāgata-Buddha*). See BUDDHOLOGY.

It is also important to take note of another early tendency that certainly paved the way for the *dharma-kāya* concept. In early Pali canonical literature one comes across numerous references to attempts made by the Buddha's disciples to give a metaphysical interpretation to the nature of the Buddha (*D.* III, p. 84; *S.* III, p. 120). The early *suttas* themselves bear testimony to the Buddha's persistent, but not quite successful, endeavour to dissuade his disciples from engaging in this kind of unfruitful persuits.

1 *yo kho, Ananda, mayā dhammo ca vinayo ca desito paññatto, so vo mama accayena satthā : D.* II, p. 154

2 *....dhammakāyena pana kho mahārāja sakkā bhagavā nidassetum.*
Dhammo hi mahārāja Bhagavatā desito ti : Miln. p. 73.

3 *yo kho Vakkali dhammam passati so mam passati yo mam passati so dhammam passati : S.* II, p. 120. Commentary on this passage draws the attention of the reader to the identification of the *dhamma-kāya* with the Tathāgata which occurs in the *Aggañña Sutta* and says that it was this identity which the Buddha was keen on stressing in his admonition to Vakkali (*SA.* II, p. 314).

4 *tathāgatassa h'etaṃ vāsettha adhivacanaṃ dhammakāyo iti'pi : D.* III, p. 84. In fact, it is important to observe in this context, that the term *brahma-kāya* is further given as an equivalent of *dhamma-kāya* and that parallel to these the expressions *dhamma-bhūta* and *brahma-bhūta* are also used. As it does happen in almost in all Buddhist contexts, the word *brahma* in this instance too, is used in the sense of the highest i.e. transcendentally supreme.

With the passing away of the Buddha these tendencies became accelarated and began to operate freely. Thus, within the first hundred years after his passing away there came to be a fairly developed docetic theory regarding the nature of the Buddha's personality and this development was, undoubtedly, one of the causes that led to the division of the Order into Sthaviravādins, who firmly adhered to the belief in the human personality of the Buddha and the Mahāsaṅghikas, who, while not totally rejecting the human existence of the Buddha, laid much emphasis on his superhuman character. This docetic theory was further developed by the Lokuttaravādins.

The traditional Theravādins, while persistently adhering to the belief in the *rupa-kāya* and the earthly existence of the Buddha, vehemently opposed these attempts to depersonalize the Buddha, whether by raising him to the level of the supreme God or to an abstract philosophical concept. These refutations are eloquently expressed in the *Kathāvatthu*.

The Sarvāstivādins, an early Abhidharma school belonging to the Sthaviravāda group, seems to have tried to clearly distinguish between the *rupa-kāya* and the *dharma-kāya* of the Buddha. Thus, the *Divyāvadāna*, a text belonging to this school of thought, records an incident connected with Śrona Koṭikarṇa who addressing *Mahā-Kātyāyana* says that he has seen, through the grace of his teacher, the Buddha in his *dharma-kāya* but not in his *rūpa-kāya* (*Divy.* p. 11). Another reference in the same source (ibid. p. 225) also makes a similar distinction. In both these instances the term *dharma-kāya* is clearly used to connote the body of doctrine, and perhaps, as well as the very essence of Buddhahood as against his *rūpa-kāya*, the physical form. The *Abhidharmakośa* (iv, *v.* 32) suggests the possibility of interpreting the term *dharma-kāya* as 'the means of attaining the Buddhahood' (*Buddhakārakadharma*)[5] as well as the essence of Buddhahood i.e. Nirvāṇa. The same source defines the *dharma-kāya* as a series of pure *dharmas* (*anāśravadharmasantāna*) signifying a state in which all moral, spiritual and intellectual qualities have reached perfection.

While both these interpretations make the distinction between *rūpa-kāya* and *dharma-kāya* more evident and clear, these interpretations are not alien to the early Theravāda view-point. A subsequent development of the concept of *dharma-kāya* on the same line is found in the Satyasiddhi School of Harivarman. As it was seen that excellent qualities[6] obtained by the Buddha when attaining Buddhahood are the same as those attained by *arahants* when attaining arahantship, the Satyasiddhi school tried to resolve this seemingly anamalous position by drawing a distinction between the essence of arahantship and the Buddhahood. Hence Satyasiddhi School adds that the essence of Buddhahood or the *dharma-kāya* consists not only of the five spiritual qualities but also of tenfold powers (*daśa-bala*), fourfold grounds of self-confidence (*catur vaiśāradya*) and so on. This certainly is an attempt to fuse the metaphysical and docetic views regarding the nature of the Buddha.

Such a fusion is seen more markedly in Mahāyāna Buddhism. On the one hand, therein the Buddha is credited with numerous powers and superhuman attainments. He is the embodiment of compassion (*karuṇā*), the saviour who appears from time to time to save the beings from the pangs of *saṃsāric* existence. But on the other, the new ontological conception made them devalue the *rūpa-kāya* of the Buddha. The Mahāyānists did not, however, deny the *rupa-kāya* but considered it as a conjured up appearance in order to conform to the way of the world. According to them the Buddha merely pretended to live and preach out of compassion for the suffering beings. The *Vajracchedikā* directly says that the Buddha is not to be recognised by means of marks in his body, for his real body is *dharma-kāya*. The early Mahāyāna texts defines this *dharma-kāya* as the essence of Buddhahood constituted of perfection of *dharmas* such as *bodhipākṣya-dharmas*

5 The *Abhidharmakośa* gives these *dharmas* as the knowledge of the fact of decay (*kṣayajñāna*), knowledge of the non-origination (*anutpādajñāna*) and right view (*samyagdṛṣṭi*). The *buddhakāraka dharma* seems to be the same as those referred to by such terms as *buddhakāra-dharma*, *bodhikāraka-dharma*, *bodhisattva-kāraka-dharma* or more generally as *bodhipākṣya-dharma*. The Pali parallel is *bodhipakkhiyā-dhammā* (*D.* II, p. 120). These are thirty-seven in number and constitute elements of religious potential which have to be developed to the full in order to attain Nirvāṇa. In other words Nirvāṇa is the state in which these *dharmas* come to be perfected.

6 The five qualities listed by the Satyasiddhi school as constituting the *dharma-kāya* are : morality (*śīla-dharmakāya*); ii, concentration (*samādhi-dh°*); iii, wisdom (*prajñā-dh°*); iv, emancipation (*vimukti-dh°*, and v, knowledge of emancipation (*vimuktijñānadarśana-dh°*).

One is inclined to speculate at this stage whether in the stage of the Buddha being referred to as *dhammabhūta*, which was referred to earlier, he is not a symbol of perfected *dharmas* which lead to enlightenment, viz. *bodhipakkhiyadhamma*. But under further influence of Mahāyāna ontological speculation the *dharma-kāya* came to be equated with *prajñā*, the wisdom at its apex, i.e. knowledge of non-entity (*śūnyatā*) of everything. The Buddhahood or in other words the *dharma-kāya* is the position wherein this wisdom has reached its full perfection. This *prajña* or *dharma-kāya* came to be regarded as the most real of realities, the matrix of all the Buddhas.

Thus, it is seen that according to Mahāyāna the *dharma-kāya* is said to partake both in the noumenal and the phenomenal spheres. Thus, there is an apparent contradiction in the conception of the nature of the Buddha. It is Nāgārjuna who attempted to resolve this contradiction. By adopting a dialectical method he eliminated the phenomenal aspect (*rūpa-kāya*) and established the noumenal aspect as the Ultimate Reality. However, in doing so, Nāgārjuna did not categorically deny the historicity of the Buddha's existence. In granting the historicity of the Buddha he was compelled to make a distinction between the conventional and absolute standpoints of perception. While admitting the reality of the physical body he says that it is done so only to be in line with the conventional point of view and points out that from the absolute point of view the only reality is the *dharma-kāya*. The Tathāgata whom the people have in view (i.e. the *rūpakāya*) is only an image of the virtuous qualities (*kuśala-dharma*) and, therefore, not real when compared with the *dharma-kāya* which he defined as the essence or the reality of the universe.

The Mādhyamika interpretation of the *dharma-kāya* was further developed by the Yogācārins who build their philosophy on the fundamental premise that everything is *vijñaptimātram* which they defined as the ultimate undifferentiated reality. This they equated with the *dharma-kāya* of the Buddha. The attainment of this state of *vijñaptimātram*, according to them, is same as the attainment of Buddhahood or becoming one with the *dharma-kāya*, the Ultimate Reality.

To attain this state a *bodhisattva* has to fulfil the six perfections (*pāramitā*) and acquire omniscience (*sarvākārajñatā*). A *bodhisattva* who attains omniscience in the tenth stage (*bhūmi*) of the *bodhisattva* career does not merely become *a* Buddha but *the* Buddha. While accepting that the essence of Buddhahood or the *dharma-kāya* is the matrix of all the Buddhas, they had to explain the nature of individuals who after successfully completing the *bodhisattva* carrier attain Buddhahood. Hence their attainment came to be described as the attainment of the *sambhoga-kāya* (body of enjoymnt or bliss) through which the Buddha preached the Mahāyāna doctrine to the divine assemblies. Thus arose the *Tri-kāya* concept. However, it is important to note that these are not three separate bodies which are equally real. The only real *kāya* is the *dharma-kāya* The *sambhoga-kāya* and the *rūpa-kāya* (or *nirmāṇakāya* as it was designated at a latter stage) are manifestations of the *dharma-kāya*, or how the *dharmakāya* appears when viewed from two levels of perception.

The *dharma-kāya*, the essence of Buddhahood, appears as the *nirmāṇa-kāya* to the *pratyeka buddhas*, *śrāvakas* and *bodhisattvas* who follow the Hīnayāna teachings. The same *dharma-kāya* appears as the *sambhoga-kāya* to the *bodhisattva* following the course of *bodhisattva* career divided into ten stages. See also DHARMADHĀTU (1) and (2)

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UPALI KARUNARATNA

DHARMAKĪRTI (1), the Buddhist logician of India (circa 750 A.C.), who came after Dinnāga.[1] He was born in south India in the kingdom of Cūḍāmaṇi or Trimalaya.[2] He belonged to a family of non-Buddhist brāhmanas and is said to have mastered all the arts and sciences of his day while quite young. Subsequently he became interested in Buddhism and studied it as a lay devotee. This aroused his interest in the subject and he gave up his brāhmanic religion altogether and went to Nālandā university where he entered the Order under a teacher called Dharmapāla[3], a pupil of Vasubandhu. Thenceforward he built up his scholarly career.

In keeping with the practice obtained at the time, Dharmakirti spent the rest of his life in writing books, teaching, lecturing, conducting public discussions and doing active propaganda. Immediately after the death of Dinnāga (5th century A.C.) there was no person who could continue the academic and intellectual tradition with the same degree of vigour and success as the great logician. His immediate successors like Iśvarasena and Dharmapāla were not equal to the task. Nearly two centuries seem to have elapsed before the lacuna was filled by Dharmakīrti.

Before composing his famous seven treatises Dharmakīrti seems to have been travelling widely in the country, having discussions and disputations with the intellectuals of the time. According to one tradition he met the well-known brāhmanic teacher Kumārila Bhaṭṭa : but as Kumārila lived at least a century later than Dharmakīrti the historicity of the tradition is doubtful.[4] According to another report[5] Dharmakīrti had an interview with a king named Utphullapuṣpa. It is also recorded that he vanquished in debate an opponent, called Kanāḍa Gupta, and his followers. Not only brāhmana teachers but also Jaina teachers are said to have been defeated by him in the Vindhya region.[6] Whatever could be the exactness of these reports the fact that he had triumphant discussions with non-Buddhist disputants seems quite clear. Born in the south, he spent the most active and eventful part of his life in the north and in the evening of his life he retired to a *vihāra* put up by himself in the Kālinga area (Orissa) and passed away, surrounded by his pupils. In Tibetan translations he is known as Ches-Kyi grags pa. It is said of him that 'certainly he is one of the world's greatest philosophers in his own right' (A. K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism*, Motilal Banarsidass, 1979, p. 467).

His Works. Dharmakīrti is the author of seven works on logic and epistemology. These seven treatises are well-known, specially in the Tibetan tradition, where their study is regarded as a scholarly achievement.[7] Out of the seven works only one (i.e. *Nyāyabindu*) is available in original Sanskrit and the remaining six are so far available only in Tibetan translations. It is important to note that in Tibet even Dinnāga's works have been superseded by those of Dharmakīrti. The details of his seven works are given below :

1. *Pramāṇavārtika-kārikā* (*TM.* No. 4210), available in its Tibetan translation under the name *Tshad-ma rnam-hgrel-gyi tshig-lehur-byas-pa*. The original Sanskrit text has not yet been recovered. The work

1 Between Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti there is mentioned a thinker called Iśvarasena in the line of succession but no literary works of his have come down.

2 Cūḍāmaṇi might probably refer to the Coḍa or the Cola country in the Deccan. Does Trimalaya refer to modern Tirumalai?

3 By this time Dinnāga had died. Dinnāga's pupil Iśvarasena seems to have been the intellectual guide of Dharmakīrti. See the the discussion on *Pramāṇavārtika* later in this essay.

4 See *The History of Buddhism in India and Tibet*, by Bu-ston translated into English by E. Obermiller, pp. 152-3 and *A History of Indian Logic* by S. C. Vidyabhusana (1921), pp. 304-5. With regard to this tradition Th. Stcherbatsky thinks that it "is only an afterthought and a pious desire on the part of his followers". He further observes, "At the same time it is an indirect confession that these great *brāhamin* teachers (i.e. Kumārila and Śaṅkara) had met with no Dharmakīrti to oppose them." *Buddhist Logic*, I, p. 35.

5 Bu-ston, ibid., pp. 153-4. Compare also S. C. Vidyabhusana's information (op. cit. p. 305, nt. 2) that Dharmakīrti, in the course of his travels, had been invited by a king in the Vindhya region and also that this king got a verse, eulogising Dharmakīrti, inscribed on his palace gate.

6 For further details about these meetings see Vidyabhusana, op. cit., pp. 304-5.

7 See *Blue Annals*, I, p. 201 and Stcherbatsky, op. cit., p. 37 and Vidyabhusana, op. cit. p. 306 ff.

is divided into four chapters on inference (*anumāna*), validity of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), sense perception *pratyakṣa*) and syllogism (*parārtha-vākya*). The work, which contains about 2,000 aphorisms, is a thorough, as well as a critical, commentary on Dinnāga's chief work *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. According to tradition[9] Dharmakīrti just studied Dinnāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* with the help of Iśvarasena, who was a pupil of Dinnāga. Dharmakīrti made three attempts at studying the work and in the third attempt he surpassed Iśvarasena in understanding it and, thereafter, at Iśvarasena's request he composed his *Pramāṇavārtika*. Dharmakīrti's own commentary (*vṛtti*) on the first chapter (i.e., on inference) of the text is also extant in Tibetan (*TM*. No. 4216).

2. *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (*TM*. No. 4211) is his second work. In Tibetan it is called *Tshad-ma vanam-par nes-pa*. The work is available in its Tibetan translation and the Sanskrit original has not yet been recovered. The work is divided into three chapters on perception, inference and syllogism. It is more or less an abridgement of the *Pramāṇavārtika*, from which more than half the verses are borrowed.

3. *Nyāyabindu* (*TM*. No. 4212), called *Rigs-pahi thigs-pa shes-bya-bahi rab-tu-byed-pa* in Tibetan, is his third work, which further summarises the same three topics dealt with in the preceding work. The text is available in its Sanskrit original and is published as No. 128 in the *Bibliotheca Indica* series, with the commentary of Dharmottara. The English translation of the same is found in Stcherbatsky's *Buddhist logic*, II, p. 1 ff.

4. *Sambandhaparīkṣāprakaraṇa* (*TM*. No. 4214) is his fourth work. Known in Tibetan as *Hbrel-pa brtag-pahi rab-tu-byed-pa* it is a philosophical treatise which examines the problem of relations : available in Tibetan and the Sanskrit original is not yet recovered.

5. His fifth work *Vādanaya* or *Vādanyāya* or *Tarkanyāya* (*TM*. No. 4219) is, as the name suggests, a treatise on the art of carrying on disputations. Known in Tibetan as *Rtsod-pahi rigs-pa shes-bya-bahi rab-tu-byed-pa*, its Sanskrit original has not yet been recovered. Stcherbatsky[9] designates this work as *Codanāprakaraṇa*.

6. His sixth work, *Santānāntarasiddhi* or *Tantrāntarasiddhi* (*TM*. No. 4219) is a philosophical treatise directed against solipsistic views and as such it discusses the problem of the reality of the mind of others. In Tibetan the work is called *Rgyud gshan grub-pa shes-bya-bahi rab-tu-byed-pa* and the Sanskrit original has yet to be recovered.

7. The seventh work, *Hetubindu* (*TM*. No. 4213) is a short classification of logical reasons. The work is divided into three sections, each dealing with a particular aspect of syllogism. The work is designated in Tibetan as *Ctan-tshigs-kyi thigs-pa shes-bya-bahi rab-tu-byed-pa* and its Sanskrit original has yet to be recovered.

His chief work, the *Pramāṇavārtika*, is sometimes regarded as the body of his system and the remaining six as its six feet. According to another tradition the three first works, all of which deal with the same theme of epistemology and logic, are the body and the remaining four the feet.[10]

The problems discussed by Dharmakīrti in his works are mainly perception, inference, validity of knowledge and the syllogistic kind of argument. Those were the main problems tackled not only by his predecessor Dinnāga but also by other non-Buddhist logicians. When Dharmakīrti opens his *Nyāyabindu* with the statement that all successful human action is preceded by right knowledge[11] he epitomises the entire teaching of the Buddha in that one single sentence. The questions, such as what constitutes right knowledge, how could it be obtained and how could it be put across to others, are discussed in the sequel. The subtle technicalities that arise in discussing these topics could be put under the two headings epistemology and logic and, in fact, Buddhist logic in its essence is more epistemological than formal. The transcendental kind of epistemology taught by Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti shows how man's intellect could be perfected without losing sight of the practical side of life. The opening line of *Nyāyabindu* quoted above proves this. With regard to Dharmakīrti's attitude towards the Buddha in the religious aspect, the following words of Stcherbatsky[12] are worth quoting : "....Dharmakīrti most emphatically and clearly expressed his opinion to the effect that the absolute omniscient Buddha is

8 See Bu-ston, op. cit., pp. 152-3; Vidyabhusana, op. cit., p. 307; Stcherbatsky, op. cit., p. 34.
9 *Buddhist Logic*, I, p. 37, See also at *Moc*. V, p. 4613.
10 loc. cit., n. 1.
11 *samyagjñānapūrvikā sarvapuruṣārthasiddhiḥ*.
12 op. cit., p. 39.

a metaphysical entity, something beyond time, space and experience; we can neither think nor speak out anything definite about him, we can neither assert nor deny his existence....".

In his personal character Dharmakīrti seems to have been a proud and self-reliant man with an attitude of contempt for ordinary folk and sham scholarship. Bu-ston[13] quotes a verse attributed to Dharmakīrti in which he claims to have surpassed Dinnāga in wisdom, Candragomin in grammar and Āryaśūra in poetics.[14] Bu-ston also reports[15] that when the *Pramāṇavārtika* and its *vṛtti* were composed, many scholars did not understand it and even the handful who understood it became jealous of him and, declaring the contents of the work to be incorrect, fastened the leaves of his book to the tail of a dog and let it run through the streets where its leaves got scattered. Seeing this Dharmakīrti is reported to have remarked that just as the dog runs through the streets so shall his work be spread throughout the world.[16] The following words of Dharmakīrti also may be a result of similar circumstances : "Mankind are mostly addicted to platitudes, they don't go in for finesse. Not enough that they do not care at all for deep sayings, they are filled with hatred and the filth of envy. Therefore, neither do I care to write for their benefit. However, my heart has found satisfaction in this (my work), because through it my love for profound and long meditation over (every) well-spoken word has been gratified".[17]

Dharmakīrti's mentality here seems to be a result of the conflicts between the Buddhist and the brāhmaṇa thinkers of the day. The period of Dharmakīrti's activity roughly coincides with the time of the revival of brāhmanic thought at the expense of Buddhist thinking. It was only a century later that the great brāhmaṇa thinkers, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Śaṅkarācārya[18] appeared. History had its course and Dharmakīrti's writings were to be preserved neither in his native land nor in his mother tongue, but in Tibetan soil where the study of his seven works is regarded as a scholarly achievement. However, the great amount of commentarial literature that followed his writings is an indication of the popularity of the subject at the time.[19]

In the ultimate analysis the most important thing about Dharmakīrti in Indian Buddhist thought is the fact that he, along with Dinnāga, regarded the Buddha as a metaphysical entity, and embodiment of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and defended this Buddhist system of transcendental epistemology and its logic against the attacks of brāhmanic logicians.

So far Dharmakīrti's works have not been traced in the Chinese Tripiṭaka. Hsüan-tsang does not refer to him either. But I-tsing says[21] that Dharmakīrti made further improvements in logic after Dinnāga. At the time Hsüan-tsang came to India, Dharmakīrti[22] must have been too young to be known and when I-tsing came there in the late 7th century he had earned the reputation as a great thinker.[23] The eventful part of Dharmakīrti's life seems to have fallen between the visits of the two Chinese pilgrims.

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13 op. cit., p. 154.
14 See also Stcherbatsky, op. cit., p. 36, note 3.
15 op. cit., p. 154.
16 See also Stcherbatsky, op. cit., p. 36.
17 Translated and quoted by Stcherbatsky from the *Pramāṇavārtika*. Stcherbatsky, op. cit., pp. 35-6.
18 Stcherbatsky has pointed out that the works of Dharmakīrti exercised a decisive influence over Śaṅkara Renou et Filliozat, *L' Inde Classique*, II, p. 28.
19 For details about this post-Dharmakīrti literature see Stcherbatsky, op. cit., p. 39 ff.
20 In fact this is how Dinnāga describes the Buddha in the opening verse of his great work *Pramāṇasamuccaya: pramāṇabhūtāya jagad-hitaisine :* And the whole of the second chapter of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārtika* is said to be a commentary upon this Dinnāga's verse : See Stcherbatsky, op. cit., p. 38 and n. 2.
21 *I-tsing's Record*, translated by J. Takakusu, p. lviii.
22 Dharmakīrti is also called simply Kīrti (Vidyabhusana, op. cit., p. 136), Bhikṣu, Saugata, Bauddha and Śākya (ibid., p. 150) : he is also supposed to have been designated as *prakaṭa-bauddha* or the avowed Buddhist (*ERE*, IX, p. 852). It should also be mentioned that in the *TM*, while the *Vādanaya* and the *Santānantarasiddhi* of Dharmakīrti are given under his Sanskrit name the remaining five works are given under the Tibetan forms of his name, Chos-kyi grags pa.
23 The attribution of Śāntideva's *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (*Taisho*, No. 1636) and Aśvaghoṣa's *Vajrasūci* (*Taisho*, 1642) to Dharmakīrti in the Chinese Tripiṭaka seems to be due to some confusion. See *MOC*. Vol. V, p. 4613.

DHARMAKĪRTI (2), a Tantric writer of about 850 A.C. In addition to the seven works of the logician Dharmakīrti (1) discussed in the preceding article there are six works catalogued in the *TM.* and attributed also to one Dharmakīrti.[1] The question whether there was a second (and perhaps a third) Dharmakīrti has not so far been discussed. But, if one were to examine carefully, the existence of at least two writers, the second flourishing about a century after the first, becomes clear.

As shown in the preceding article the logician Dharmakīrti wrote only seven works which are accepted and recorded as such by all traditions. There is no confusion as regards these seven works. They all deal with logic and epistemology and all are preserved either in Sanskrit or in Tibetan translations. When the authorship of the seven works of the logician is established, the authorship of six other works poses a question. It is conjectured that these must have been composed by someone other than the logician. None of the works of the second writer have been preserved in Sanskrit, but their subject-matter, as could be judged from their names given in the *TM.*, indicates their different authorship. One is a commentary on the *Jātakamālā* (No. 4151) and another (No. 1158) seems to be an elegy dealing with the Buddha's passing away. Another (No. 1442) seems to be a work on Tantric ritual.[2]

The existence of more than one Dharmakīrti is further established by a list of authors given in the Tibetan chronicle, the *Deb-ther* or *Blue Annals*[3]. Following is the order of a list of Buddhist writers given there : Vasubandhu, Dinnāga, Śvarasena, Dharmakīrti, Devendrabodhi, Śākyabodhi, Vinītadeva, Dharmakīrti, Prajñākaragupta, Ravigupta, Yamāri etc. If the first Dharmakīrti in this list refers to the logician, which fact is clear from the order of the names given, the existence of another sometime later is clearly recorded in this list. Coming after Vinītadeva and before Ravigupta this second Dharmakīrti could be placed about the middle of the 8th century, about a century after the logician.[4] When Tāranātha makes Dharmakīrti a contemporary of the Tibetan writer Jālandharīpa (8th century) the reference may be to this second Dharmakīrti and not to the first as taken by B. Bhattacharyya in his *An Introduction to Buddhist Esoterism*, p. 71.

An oft-recurring difficulty the student of Indology has to face is the lack of a sense of history and chronology among the early Indian writers. Tāranātha's and Bu-ston's works, as well as the *Blue Annals*, are far removed from scientific precision. This difficulty applies to the problem presently discussed, too. That there has been a Buddhist author, or perhaps more than one, in ancient India by the name of Dharmakīrti, other than the logician of the 7th century, is now clear. With the evidence available, the second writer could be placed about the middle of the 8th century. But it is difficult to say whether the six works attributed to the second Dharmakīrti are all the works of the same author. For instance the references to Dharmakīrti in the *Blue Annals* (see its index) themselves show that there were more than two authors by this name excluding the logician. The practice of attributing the authorship of less-known works to well-known authors with a view to investing them with greater importance has been another practice among the ancient writers in India. The present problem is an instance of this phenomenon.[5] Be that as it may the fact that the logician Dharmakirti had one or several successors in Buddhist literary activity in ancient India can be easily accepted. The *TM.* numbers of the six works that have to be attributed to a Chos-kyi grags-pa or a Dharmakīrti other than the logician are :

No. 1158 : *Saṅs-rgyas yoṅs-su-mya-ṅan-las-ḥdas-pa-la bstod-pa* (*Buddhanirvāṇastotra*).

No. 1191 : *Rgyud-kyi rgyal-po chen-po dpal dges-pa rdo-rjeḥi dkaḥ-ḥgrel spyan ḥbyed ces bya-ba.*

No. 1442 : *Dpal rdo-rje ṁkhaḥ-ḥgroḥi bstod-pa rgyum-chags sheṡ-bya-ba* (*Śrī-Vajraḍāka stotradaṇḍakanāma*).

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1 Out of these six works four (Nos. 1191; 2508; 2637; 4151) are given under the name Dharmakīrti and two (Nos. 1158 and 1442) under its Tibetan form Chos-kyi grags pa.

2 Tāranātha's report that Dharmakīrti wrote a Tantric work seems to be due to his confusing the two authors as one. This shows that the writer accepted by the Tantric Buddhists of Java is the second Dharmakīrti. See Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, I, p. 37, n. 2.

3 Vol. I, p. 346.

4 See S. C. Vidyabhusana's chronological order of authors as given in his *A History of Indian Logic*, p. 319 ff.

5 See a discussion of a similar problem under Āryadeva (2), (*E. B.* II, p. 115 ff.).

No. 2508 : *Dkyil-hkhor-gyi thig-gi cho-ga.*

No. 2637 : *Ṅan-soṅ thams-cad yons-su-sbyoṅ-bahi rohi sbyin-sreg-gi dkyil-hkhor-gyi cho-ga (Sarvadurgatiparisobhana-mārahomamaṇḍalavidhi).*

No. 4151 : *Skyes paḥi rabs-kyi rgya-cher bsad-pa (Jātakamālāṭīkā).*

A. G. S. K.

DHARMALAKṢAṆA, name of a school of Buddhist thought, based on the Vijñānavāda (Yogācāra) of Asaṅga. It was Hsüan-tsang, one of the most noteworthy scholars of China, who during his famous travels through India (629-45 A.C.) studied this philosophy under the guidance of Śīlabhadra, and introduced the doctrine by founding the Dharmalakṣaṇa school in China under the name Fa-hsiang-tsung (Japanese: Hossō). Hsüan-tsang's pupil Kuei-chi (632-82) is also mentioned as a founder of this school, for it was he who actually systematised the school with his two important works, the *Tach-eng-fa-yuam-i-lin-chang* (*Taisho*, No. 1861) and the *Cheng-wei-shih-lun-shu-chi* (ibid., No. 1830) which are the fundamental texts of this school.

Hsüan-tsang and his pupil Kuei-chi followed chiefly the annotations and opinions of Dharmapāla of Nālandā on Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā*, which resulted in the *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi* in 30 volumes, the fundamental treatise of the school.

A distinction is made between the specific character (*lakṣaṇa*) and the nature (*svabhāva*) of the thusness (*tathatā*) of *dharma*, thereby separating the fact from the principle. The facts, i.e., the specific characters (*lakṣaṇa*) of the dharma, are the manifestations of the elements. And it is from this tenet that the school derives its name. See VIJÑĀNAVĀDA, VIJÑAPTI-MĀTRATĀ.

H. G. A. VAN ZEYST

DHARMĀLOKA, RATMALĀNE ŚRĪ (1828-1887 A.C.), an erudite Buddhist monk of Sri Lanka, and founder of the Vidyālaṅkāra Pirivena (s.v.) one of the two famous centres of Buddhist and Oriental studies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Sri Lanka, the other being Vidyodaya Pirivena.

Born on May, 28, 1828 as the son of Raigama Vidanelāge Don Korenelis Appuhāmy (father) and Ambepitiyage Dona Adriyānā Hāmine (mother) of Ratmalāna near Colombo, he received his early education as a lay pupil at the Purāṇa-vihāra of Ratmalana where, at the age of nine years, he was ordained as a novice under the name of Ratmalāne Dharmāloka by the chief incumbent of that *vihāra*, Aṇḍupe Sonuttara Thera.

After his ordination Dharmāloka Thera received his primary education under several learned monks among whom were the Revaṭa Thera of the Sunetrādevi Piriveṇa, Udugampola, Ratnapāla Thera, the chief incumbent of the Bodhisamīpārāma of Bellanvila and Maligaspe Dharmakīrti Śrī Maṅgala Nāyaka Thera, the chief incumbent of the Kotte Rajamahāvihāraya.

Later, from 1838 upto 1847, Dharmāloka Thera received his higher education at the Śrī Paramadhammacetiya Pirivena, which was the most famous centre of higher Buddhist studies in the western province of Sri Lanka at that time, under Valāne Śrī Siddhārtha Nāyaka Thera, the founder of that institution. The two *theras* Hikkaḍuve Srī Sumaṅgala and Udugampola Ratanapāla, who were senior students at the same institution at the time, acted as his instructors. During this period, excepting the first two years, Dharmāloka Thera resided at the Paramadhammacetiya Piriveṇa. His subjects of study were Sinhala, Pāli, Sanskrt, poetics, astrology and astronomy. From 1849 to 1854 he is said to have studied astrology further and also the art of painting while staying in the Seven Korales. Some of the paintings in the monasteries where he stayed are said to have been done by him.

In 1860 he received his higher ordination (*upasampadā*) at the Malwatta-vihāra in Kandy with Parakumburę Śrī Saranaṅkara Mahānāyaka Thera as his preceptor (*upajjhāya*). Subsequently he taught a large number of students among whom were Ratmalāne Śrī Dharmārāma (s.v.), whom he ordained as his pupil, and the Gate Mudliyar Simon de Silva.

The greatest service of this monk to the cause of Buddhism was the founding of the Vidyālaṅkāra Pirivena, originally called the Vidyālaṅkāra Śāstrālaya. This latterly became the nucleus of the Vidyālaṅkāra University, presently the University of Kelaniya.

He was the head of this institution from its inception (Nov. 1, 1875) for twelve years, and with

the able assistance of his distinguished pupil Dharmārāma Thera, he developed this institution from very humble beginnings to the position of a world-famous centre of Buddhist and Oriental studies. This institution drew students from all parts of the country and also from abroad. Bādigama Śrī Ratanapāla Thera, Lunupokune Śrī Dharmānanda Thera and Sir D. B. Jayatilaka were among the renowned students of this institution.

Learned debates appear to have been a characteristic feature of this period of literary and religious awakening. As the head of the Vidyālaṅkāra Pirivena, Dharmāloka Thera led several such debates with the parallel institution, the Vidyodaya Pirivena, which had at the time the very distinguished scholar-monk Hikkaḍuwe Śrī Sumaṅgala Thera as its head. Among the themes which were taken up during these discussions, the *Na Ṇa La Ḷa vādaya* (i.e. a controversy over the usage of these four consonants in the Sinhala alphabet), *Pārupaṇa vādaya* (i.e. a controversy over the mode of wearing the robe, covering both shoulders or one) and the *Buddhavarṣa vādaya* (i.e. a controversy over the Buddhist era) are noteworthy. It is also to be noted that these controversies led to the upliftment of the educational standard in both institutions, for they led to much scholarly research in the relevant subjects and the publication of treatises. For instance, learned articles were published by both factions on the *Buddha-varṣa vādaya* in the two newspapers called the *Sarasavi Saňdaräsa* and the *Siṃhala Samaya*.

Dharmāloka Thera has several literary publications to his credit, some of which were compiled and edited with the assistance of his chief pupil Dharmārāma Thera. Among them are the *Sanskṛta Sabda Mālāva*, *Rājacarita*, *Vinayaṭīkāva*, *Satyavilāsinī* and the *Dharmapradīpikāva*. The *Rājacarita* was presented to the Prince of Wales (later, King Edward VII of England) on his visit to Sri Lanka, who bestowed on him the title of "Learned Author". In the year 1879 when Professor Mahādeva Moreśvara Kunte, a renowned scholar from Bombay, visited Sri Lanka our Thera, along with his reputed pupil Dharmārāma, held a discussion with him on the Buddhist doctrines, for three days, the medium of communication being Sanskrit. The government of Sri Lanka appointed him as an examiner (*parīkṣaka*) of the Vidyodaya Pirivena and the Colombo Academy (later Royal College). It was at the request of the then director of education in Sri Lanka that he and his pupil Dharmārāma edited the *Dharmapradīpikāva*.

Dharmāloka Thera started a monthly publication known as the *Satya Samuccaya* in 1873 which continued even after his death. He also started the publication of a newspaper called *Kalak* which aimed at the religious and national upliftment of society, and also assisted the publication of several other newspapers. For the education of Buddhist children in Ratmalana, he founded the Śrī Dharmāloka Buddhist School at Ratmalana in 1878, which at present is a leading Buddhist school in the area.

Among his contemporaries and close friends were the venerable *theras* Hikkaḍuwe Śrī Sumaṅgala, Yātrāmulle Dharmārāma, Potuvila Indrajothi, and Komvala Indrasāra.

He passed away on August 15, 1887, at the age of sixty years.

H. R. PERERA

DHARMA-NAIRĀTMYA or non-substantiality of elements (*dharma*), is a fundamental doctrine embodied in early *suttas*. Subsequently, this doctrine came to be so greatly emphasised by the Mādhyamika writers that it almost came to be considered as a novel contribution by them. However, when one systematically traces the history of the development of this doctrine, it becomes quite clear that this doctrine is the core of early Buddhism and that the Mādhyamikas were merely elaborating on it in order to refute "substantialist" views that came into existence in such Buddhist schools as Vātsīputriyas, Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas, all of which are, quite ironically, schools belonging to the Theravāda tradition.

Of all Buddhist schools it is, perhaps, only the Vātsīputriya school that directly maintained the existence of a kind of personal entity (*pudgala*). The Sarvāstivādins, analysing the so-called personal entity or individual into a number of components called *dharmas*, put forward the view that only these *dharmas* are real. Both the Mādhyamikas and the Yogācārins, viewing the problem from two different standpoints, denied the reality of these *dharmas* as well. Hence, while the Sarvāstivādins came to be known as those who maintained the non-substantiality of the individual (*pudgala-nairātmyavāda*), the Mādhyamikas and the Yogācārins came to be known as those who affirmed the non-substantiality of all *dharmas* (*dharma-nairātmyavādins*).

From the early *sutta* references it becomes abundantly clear that the Buddha emphatically denied the existence of a soul (*atta*). According to him the man is merely a "bundle of perception" (*saṅkhārapuñja*) or a group of aggregates (*khandha*), not discrete and not discontinuous, but continuous and connected by way of causality. He did not posit an agent or a mental substance underlying feeling, perception and so on. Similarly, he rejected the idea of permanence and pointed out that all things in this world are impermanent (*anicca*), unsatisfactory (*dukkha*) and non-substantial (*anatta*). Moreover, Buddha's locution *sabbe dhammā anattā* points to the fact that he affirmed the non-substantiality of all *dharmas*. His teaching on non-substantiality is embodied in the *Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta* (*Vin.* I, p. 13 f.). The components that constitute man or all phenomenal existence are declared to be deceptive and illusory (*S.* III, p. 140 f.). But this is not to deny their functional efficiency which undoubtedly operates more collectively and inter-dependently than individually. The emphasis really is on the absence in any of these components of an essence, an individuality or an endurance, by itself, the words used being *rittaka* (i.e. empty), *tucchaka* (i.e. void) and *asāraka* (i.e. essenceless). In fact the Pali canon abounds with statements to this effect. The theoretical formulation of this view is embodied in the *paṭiccasamuppāda* (s.v.) doctrine, (see also CAUSALITY).

The analysis of the empirical individuality or the whole physical and mental phenomena of existence into numerous categories or groups such as *nāma-rūpa, khandha, āyatana, dhātu*, which appears to be a feature belonging to the early strata of Buddhist thought, received detailed treatment and greater emphasis only in the Abhidharma tradition of the numerous schools of Buddhism. The main purpose of this analysis, undoubtedly, is to illustrate clearly that, apart from these components there remains nothing that can be called a soul or a permanent substance. This standpoint seems to have given rise to a metaphysical problem. If what we refer to as the 'self' is a mirage, a mere name, a designation used in common parlance (*D.* I, p. 202), and if the components that constitute this so-called 'self', too, are devoid of any kind of substance (*sāra*), how are we to explain its continuity and account for its moral responsibility? If there is no enduring entity how can we account for the theory of perception?

The Buddha, in order to explain continuity steered away from both eternalism and annihilationism and adopted an empirical approach. He gave a causal account of the factors operating in maintaining the process of human personality and thereby accounted for one's moral responsibility. Even the process of perception was given a causal explanation (*M.* I, p. 111, 259 f.). But with the development of the Abhidharma tradition the problem was unduly complicated and the explanation that resulted was far removed from and alien to the original teachings of the Buddha.

Thus, an undue complication of the problem is seen in the Sarvāstivāda analysis of the 'self'. According to this analysis, the so-called 'self' is nothing but a congeries of elements (*dharma*). These *dharmas* are considered to be momentary flashings into the phenomenal world out of an unknown source. These *dharmas* are discrete and disconnected and last only one single moment (*sthiti* or *kṣaṇa*). They disappear as soon as they appear. As a result of this new analysis of the phenomena of existence into discrete, disconnected momentary elements, the Sarvāstivādins were at a loss to explain the continuity of the individual. To overcome this difficulty they were compelled to posit a permanent element. Hence, they put forward the view that the *dharmas* have two aspects, the *svabhāva* and the *lakṣaṇa*. The *svabhāva* of a *dharma* is the underlying substratum, which is permanent and, therefore, existing throughout past, present and future. On this basis they explain the continuity of the individual, his moral responsibility. As a corollary of their acceptance of a permanent substance they were compelled to adhere to an identity theory of causality (*satkāryavāda*).

The *lakṣaṇa* aspect of a *dharma* is its phenomenal appearance which is causally conditioned. According to the Sarvāstivāda view every *dharma* appearing in phenomenal life is affected simultaneously by four different forces (*saṃskāra*), the force of origination (*jāti*), decay (*jarā*), duration (*sthiti*) and destruction (*nāśa*). These forces affect every element at every moment of its existence and the elements so affected are called manifested elements (*saṃskṛta-dharma*) as against *ākāśa, pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha* and *apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha* which are designated as *asaṃskṛta dharmas*. Four theories have been put forward by four Sarvāstivāda teachers regarding the nature of the causal characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of *dharmas*. Underlying all four theories is the view that there is one aspect of *dharma* (i.e., *svabhāva* or *dravya*) which remains unchanged throughout. Thus, the Sarvāstivādins, while rejecting the substan-

tiality of the 'self', accepted the existence of an underlying permanent substratum, and hence, their name.

The Sautrāntikas rejected the belief in a permanent underlying substratum (*svabhāva*). They did not even accept the view that elements endure for a moment (*kṣaṇa*). Yet they accepted the causal efficiency of the momentary existence. For them a static moment or a moment of duration is a series of successive movements, with a continuous flow. In order to explain the connection between two successive moments, the Sautrāntikas employed the theory of immediately-contiguous-cause (*samanantarapaccaya*). To explain birth, decay and duration they maintained that birth is a beginning of a series; decay represents the fact that in a given series each successive moment is slightly different from the proceeding one and lastly that destruction is the end of the series. In order to explain the beginning of the series they presented the theory of causation that came to be known as 'being non-existent comes into existence' (*abhūtvā bhāva-utpāda*) which is the same as non-identity theory of causality.

These contradictory views, presented by Hīnayāna schools, as a result of their deviation from the original teaching of the Buddha, provided Nāgārjuna with a golden opportunity of employing his dialectical method to bring into focus the internal conflicts that are found in these theories. Therefore, it should be borne in mind, that the criticism levelled by Mādhyamikas and even by Yogācārins against the conception of substantiality of *dharmas* is not a general criticism directed against the original teachings of the Buddha, but a criticism specifically aimed at those particular schools which upheld such theories, specially against Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika schools.

The Mādhyamikas negated the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika theories by bringing into light the contradictions prevalent in each theory. Mādhyamikas argued that the three characteristics of impermanence are not applicable either singly or collectively to *saṃskṛta dharmas*. They pointed out that these characterisations can function neither simultaneously nor successively. Further they posed the question whether the definition of *saṃskṛta-dharma* applies to each one of these characteristics, for they are also *dharmas*. As a corollary to this question the Mādhyamikas ask how origination, cessation and duration are to be conceived. Pinpointing the inconsistencies within the definition of *saṃskṛta-dharma* they point out the inexplicability of what originate, endures and ceases to be. They reject the modal view as unsatisfactory for explaining phenomena. Nāgārjuna viewed the theory of *svabhāva* in the same way as the Buddha viewed the Upanishadic conception of 'being' (*sat*). Hence, in rejecting the Sarvāstivāda conception of *svabhāva* he even quoted the arguments put forward by the Buddha himself in order to refute the Upanishadic conception of 'being'. Mādhyamikas point out that there is nothing in the world that is not relative or dependent on another. This mutual dependence is designated by them on the essencelessness (*naissvabhāva*) or the non-substantiality of all *dharmas* (*dharma-nairātmya*) which they equate with *śūnyatā* (q.v.), the empirical validity of entities and their ultimate unreality. Thus, elements either as *skandha* or *dhātu*, or *āyatana* are only of empirical validity; in the ultimate sense they are devoid of reality. Such an interpretation was possible because of their adherence to the theory of two truths i.e. conventional truth (*saṃvṛti-satya*) and absolute truth (*paramārtha-satya*). In spite of the difference of approach and method adopted by the Mādhyamikas in rejecting the substantialist view, it is seen that the non-substantialist view they arrived at is just the same as the view put forward by the Buddha when he declared that all elements are non-substantial (*sabbe dhammā anattā*). And in fact, this is affirmed by the Mādhyamikas themselves for they say the Tathāgatas never posit the real existence (*astitva*) of a soul or the aggregates (*Mdhvr.*, p. 443).

The Yogācārins denied the reality of *dharmas* on a different ground. According to them the false belief in a 'self' and 'real elements' is due to the evolution of consciousness (*vijñāna-pariṇāma*) which is caused by ignorance. The discrimination (*vikalpa*) of consciousness into subjective and objective aspects is caused by factors inherent in the store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*). It is consciousness that appears as the subject and the object. Since consciousness is the only reality this subject-object discrimination is endowed with more reality than the consciousness of the 'self' or 'real external objects' which are falsely imagined (*parikalpita*). While the Mādhyamikas considered the logical constitution of a thing and found it lacking in essence, the Yogācārins viewed it psychologically and held that objects cannot stand by themselves, for they are all imagined. This they illustrated by showing that there is want of conformity between the usual form of knowledge and the object which, according to the Sarvāstivādins, is the atom, singly or in combination. The cognition

is the gross object, the atom cannot serve as the object condition for cognition. What appears in knowledge, therefore, has no counterpart outside and similarly what is supposedly outside does not appear in knowledge. They argued that the occurrence of illusion and dreams prove that *vijñāna* is self-contained and that owing to certain latent forces undergo, from time to time, internal modifications or transformations bringing out mental projections which we identify as objects. Basically the Yogācārins accept the *śūnyatā* doctrine of the Mādhyamikas, but identify it with pure consciousness that is void of duality.

UPALI KARUNARATNA

DHARMAPĀLĀ (plural : protectors of the Dharma : Tib. *chos-skyon*), a group of eight deities who are regarded as protectors of Buddhism against its adversaries and worshipped accordingly. Dharmapālā, as the protectors of the Dharma, are Tantric divinities with the rank of *bodhisattva*. They are supposed to wage war mercilessly against demons and other enemies of Buddhism. Usually they are worshipped in a group of eight designated in Tibet as the "Eight Terrible Ones" (*drag-ched*). They are depicted in a fearful aspect—in keeping with the work of guarding or protecting those entrusted to them, so that they may instil fear into the violators of the *dharma*. Brandishing weapons and crushing human and non-human enemies of Buddhism under their feet, they are expected to inspire fear in all anti-Buddhist elements.

The worship of the Dharmapālā under this particular designation, is specially developed in Tibet where Padmasambhava is said to have instituted it in the beginning of the 8th century A.C. when he went to that country at the request of the Tibetan king Detsan. It is also said that in the process of conquering all the malignant forces of Buddhism in that country, he spared only those who promised to become Dharmapālā. Padmasambhava, on his part, promised that they would receive due worship in keeping with their new role (Alice Getty, *The Gods of Northern Buddhism*, p. 148). Thus, the large number of different aspects of the major deities and also the large retinues (*parivāra*) allotted to them seem to represent these aboriginal deities so incorporated.

According to Rene de Nebesky-Wojkowitz, who gives a detailed account of these various divinities in his *Oracles and Demons of Tibet* (London, 1956), these guardian deities are divided into two groups in Tibetan worship. To the first group belong the high-ranking Dharmapālā, who have passed beyond the six spheres of existence in which case they could be described as supra-mundane (*lokottara*). They are called *jig-rten-las'das-pai-srung-ma* in Tibetan. This group comprises the eight standard Dharmapālā referred to earlier. To the second group belong those who are still within the ordinary worldly existence, subject to the laws of karma (*laukika*) and are called *jig-rten-pa'i-srung-ma orjig-rten-ma-das-pai-srung-ma* or simply *dregs-pa*.

The standard group of eight Dharmapālā that comprise the first group are as follows (order as given by Alice Getty, op. cit., p. 148): i. Lha-mo or The Goddess, ii. Tsaṅs-pa or White Brahmā, iii. Beg-tse 'hidden sheet of mail', a warrior god. iv. Yama, v. Kuvera, Vaiśravaṇa, Jambhala, vi. Hayagriva, vii. Mahākāla, viii. Yamāntaka.

Before giving a detailed description of each of these forms it would be of use to give a general description that could be regarded as common to all of them as Dharmapālā. In giving such a description the appearance, attributes, the position of their attendants in the *maṇḍala* etc. have to be taken into account.

Physical Appearance : As regards their general physical appearance (Wojkowitz, op. cit., p. 5 ff.) they are described as wrathful deities, only a few appearing in a peaceful mood. Even these peaceful Dharmapālā can suddenly appear in a ferocious form. They have stout bodies, thick and strong limbs, several heads, a great number of hands and feet, a third eye on forehead etc. Their bodies are of different colours such as black, blue, white, yellow, red etc. Sometimes their bodies are described as smeared with ashes from funeral pyres and with sesame oil or with blood spots or human fat. Many of the minor protective goddesses are depicted as ugly women with long, emaciated breasts and large genital organs, while only a few appear young and handsome. In the wrathful faces of the Dharmapālā the mouth is usually formed into an angry smile with fangs protruding from its corners; while the upper teeth gnaw the lower lip, a terrific storm is supposed to be blowing from the nostrils of the flat-nose : the eyes are angry, protruding, blood-shot and staring.

Frequently, the hair is bound into a tuft with a snake as ribbon : at times it is worn in locks : or else it is plaited and built up into a toupet and adorned with ornaments. While such toupets may be one or many, a toupet with a protruding conch-shell is a special Dharmapālā hairdo. A few deities are depicted with snakes for hair.

Dress : While some are pictured naked, majority appear dressed. Their dress varies from a simple loin cloth to heavy garments of cloth and silk. Usually, the loin cloth is a skin of an animal like the tiger, yak, ox etc. Some wear priestly garments (*chos-gos*) while the dress of the Tibetan aristocracy is also sometimes worn. Cloaks made of silk or horse-hides, vulture-feathers or tortoise-shells and knee-long trousers are also found. While girdles of silk, of jewels etc. are used as belts, bowels of snakes or snakes themselves are sometimes used. Their common fur coat is made from the skins of lions, bears etc.; many have an elephant-skin as a cover on their backs : a human skin also is sometimes worn as an upper garment : armours worn are said to be made of gold, silver, copper, coral, jewels, crystal, cornelian, rhino-leather, conch-shells etc.: helmets, turbans and boots are also worn. Quivers, bow-cases, shields, breast-plates etc. of animal skins also belong to their outfit. A head-dress or a crown decorated with human skulls is usually worn by the more important Dharmapālā. Others wear diadems of gold, silver, jewels etc. Ferocious Dharmapālā are adorned with ornaments made of human bones and garlands of freshly-severed human heads. Green necklaces, garlands of suns and moons, wreaths of gold, of flowers etc. too serve as ornaments : their bangles and ear-ornaments are made of gems and different metals.

Postures and Mounts : A large number of Dharmapālā are depicted in a dancing or a standing position: their feet rest on a lotus, a prostrate corpse, or a defeated enemy. Others are pictured riding their mounts, of which the variety is considerable: among these are birds such as crows, ravens, *garudas*, parrots, vultures etc; horses of various kinds and of colours are common : the ass and the mule are also found : the yak is the typical mount of the deities of Tibetan origin : the elephant, bear, stag, hind, lion and lioness, tiger, buffalo, water-bull, dragon (*makara*), goat, camel, wolf, black dog, black sheep, wild boar, pig, monkey, rat etc. are not uncommon.

Attributes : Their attributes generally consist of arms meant to destroy the enemies of Buddhism, including the priests who break their vows. Their swords are made of iron, copper, crystal, gold, or even of tongues of revived corpses. Some of their blades are pictured aflame, while their knives are sometimes poisoned. The chopper (Skt. *karttrikā :* Tib. *grig-gug*) and the razor (*spu-gri*) are two important weapons. While lances of various metals are quite common, the one made of the thighbone of a demoness (*rākṣasī*) is a special weapon : a red lance with blood-moistened pendants and a five-pointed lance are also mentioned. The banner of victory (*dhvaja : rgyal-mtshan*) and the circular banner with pendants of silk (*patāka : badan*) are also given as their attributes : while they may be made of silk or of human skins they usually carry the picture of some bird or animal. The trident (*tri-śūla : rtse gsum*), sometimes adorned with thunderbolts and colourful streamers of silk, is also a common attribute. Among the other attributes are the battle-axe, sickle, hook (*aṅkuśa*), bow and arrow, hammer, a variety of clubs, pestle, sceptre etc. A mummified corpse in the form of a club, sometimes simplified into an ordinary club with a skull on top, is the special emblem of Yama. Snare (*pāśa : zhags pa*) and magic dagger (*kīla : phur bu*) are two important attributes. Of the many kinds of vessels carried by the Dharmapālā the skull-cups (*kapāla; thod pa*) take precedence. They serve mostly as vessels for offering food and drink to ferocious deities. These are supposed to contain human blood, jewels, freshly torn-out human hearts etc. : iron vessels filled with various liquids are also mentioned. Dharmapālā, who are regarded as owners of treasures (e.g. Kuvera and his forms), carry the wish-granting gem (*cintāmaṇi*) and a sack made from the skin of an ichneumon and filled with gems or an ichneumon from whose mouth jewels are falling. They also carry vessels containing jewels and precious stones. Of the musical instruments which they carry the drum called *ḍamaru* is important : usually it is made of two human craniums : other drums are made of crystal, coral, gold, copper etc. Trumpets made from human thigh-bones (*rkang-gling*), bell (*dril-bn*), conch-shells (*dung-dkav*), flageolets etc. are some of their other musical instruments. The thunderbolt (*vajra : rdo rje*), one of the most important ritual objects used by the Buddhist monks, is a very common attribute of Dharmapālā : it is described as five or nine-pointed and made of gold or meteoric iron. Some deities wield a crossed thunderbolt. Children born of incestuous union seem to be valued for their magic qualities and are given as an attribute of theirs. It would be useful to give the following list of attributes as given by Wojkovitz (op. cit.

pp. 19-20) : rosaries of human skulls, torn-out and blood-dripping hearts, bowel., human legs and arms, corpses of children, severed heads of enemies, heads of tigers, Buddha-images, symbols of sun and moon, dice, coconuts, citrons (*bīja-pūra*), flowers, twigs, ears of rice, bundles of grass, silver mirrors, chains, flaming teeth, torches, wheels, fire-brands, lumps of flaming iron, bellows, horns of antelopes, baskets full of relics, ladles of silver filled with food, various kinds of brooms, scarfs, fans, lamps, swastikas, saws etc. Some are supposed to hold in their hands whole mountains like Kailāśa or a *stūpa*. Of the ritual posture of hands (*mudrā*) that of threatening (*tarjanī-mudrā*) is the commonest.

As regards their residence the fierce Dharmapālā usually reside in palaces or castles built out of skulls or bones and standing on a rock surrounded by a sea of blood. Even its furnishing is done in such a way that one would encounter many a horror. On the other hand, peaceful ones are depicted as living in beautiful surroundings.

In meditation one is instructed first to imagine the particular Dharmapāla's residence and in it an open lotus on which his *vāhana*—if any—is resting and then to imagine him by creating him out of the corresponding seed-syllable (*bīja-mantra*) together with his retinue. Sometimes they are represented in sexual union (*yuga-naddha : yab-yum*) to express the Tantric idea of achieving deliverance by uniting "wisdom" (female principle) with "method" (male principle).

Many Dharmapālā are said to have their own "court" consisting of a "minister of interior" (*many-blon*), "minister of exterior" (*phyi blon*), a commander-in-chief, (*dmag-dpon*), officers (*las mkhan*), messengers (*pho-mya*) etc. These are frequently animals.

An important aspect about the Tibetan Dharmapālā is the large number of different aspects in which they are represented. Every Dharmapāla is given numerous forms with slight variations from one another. This means that the Tibetans have invented a separate deity for each of the different aspects of a concept. Thus *Lha-mo*, the only female Dharmapāla, has more than ten forms, *Yama* and *Vaiśravana*, more than twelve forms, while *Mahākāla* is said to have nearly seventy-five forms : (Wojkowitz, op. cit., pp. 22 ff.). As it would be tedious and of little use to describe all the forms separately, only the basic forms are discussed here.

(1) Lhamo : As the only goddess among these protective deities she seems to represent both the benevolent and malevolent aspects of existence in its female form. Accordingly, she is called Śrī-devi as well as Kālī-devi. However, in keeping with her fearful nature, she has to be identified not with Śrī-devī but with Kālī-devī as the Indian goddess of Time, representing death and destruction. As Lhamo in Tibet she is represented blue in her complexion, has the sword as her special symbol while her mount (*vāhana*) is a mule or a horse. She is the consort of Yama. According to Alice Getty (op. cit., p. 149), she was armed by various gods as one of the most terrifying manifestations of the Mahāyāna pantheon. Accordingly Hayagrīva gave her two dice to determine the life of men, Brahmā gave her a fan of peacock-feathers and from Viṣṇu she received two luxurious objects of which she wears one in her head-dress while the other hangs over her navel : in her right ear she wears the lion given to her by Kuvera, the God of Wealth, while in her left ear she wears the serpent given her by Nanda : the serpent-god Vajra-pānī gave her a hammer. Other gods gave her a mule, who is covered with the skin of a *yakṣa* and whose reins are of venomous serpents.

More than ten different forms of Lhamo as worshipped in Tibet are described by Wojkiwitz (op. cit., pp. 24-7), wherein is found a detailed iconographical account of these different forms as culled from Tibetan works on iconography. As these different forms have fundamentally the features described earlier, their detailed enumeration is not undertaken here.

(2) Sita-Brahmā : Tshangs-pa-dkar-po : Although Brahmā is a very important god in the Hindu pantheon, he occupies only an inferior position in Tibetan Buddhism. Under his Tibetan name *Tshangs-pa* he is represented four-headed and two-handed in keeping with Indian iconographical concepts. But the form peculiar to him in Tibet as a Dharmapāla is said to be the representation of a white, one-headed, and two-handed god called white (*sita*) Brahmā. It is suggested (Wojkowitz, op. cit., p. 145) that the concept of an anicent Tibetan deity was later grafted on to the Indian Brahmā, thereby inventing the white Brahmā in a somewhat late period, for the Brahmā-worship went to Tibet only after Atiśa (q.v.) in the 12th century. His iconographical representations are detailed by Wojkowitz (op. cit., p. 146). The same work (p. 148) quotes a request addressed to this Dharmapālā and this address is worth quoting

here as it reveals the type of duty people generally expect from a Dharmapālā : "Please come from the sky, assuming the perfectly pure religious body, come also from the middle of the gathering clouds of happiness, you who have various arms in order to subdue the evil-minded, rise, you, the great *Tshags-pa*! You who appear in various forms with a conch-shell in the toupet, in order to elucidate the work of appeasement, please come quickly from 'the great palace of *Tshanga pa's* place', you who possess four faces. When carrying out unobstructed the work of broadcasting the Buddhist creed, approach from the palace *Aḍakavatī* (an ancient shrine in Tibet). Your four attributes cause the four continents to quake. Please come here in a brilliant and pleasing aspect. When enlarging the might and extension (of the religion), please come to this place from the thirty-three abodes of the gods, you of heavenly descent, extremely powerful and fierce. When carrying out most perfectly the work of supreme rule, please come from the blue mountain of *Sambhala* in the northern direction—carrying the short spear with a red silk-banner and riding a blue horse—in order to bring into your power the 'three worlds'. When destroying to dust the noxious obstructionists (*vighnas*), please come quickly from the land of the *raksas*, which lies in the south-eastern direction, from the city of *Laṅkā*, you the *bsei-khrab-can* with flaming teeth, in order to destroy all the evil-minded. When guarding dutifully the keeping of the rigid religious vows, please come from *Udyāna*, the abode of the *ḍākinīs*. When letting arise in one's mind the excellent notions of the bodhisattvahood, please come from *Bodhgayā* in India. When guarding dutifully the religious teachings of Tibet, please come from the imperishable, self-sprung *Samye* monastery. When carrying out the task of an executioner (*srog-gi-gshed*) of the noxious *klu* and *bdud*, please come from the cathedral of *Khra 'brug* (an ancient shrine). When protecting the teachings of the holy *dharma* and the religious discipline, please come from the supreme place of pilgrimage called *bTsun mo tshal*. When leading the fierce war-hordes of the *btsan*, please come from the place called *Tshar-gseb* in Tibet. In order to grasp the life-roots of the degenerated age, please come from *La mo byang chub leog*. Please come, *Mahādeva*, great *Tshang-pa*, please come, great king *bs'i khrab can* ! please come you the various fierce 'emanations' who guard the religion, please come, you the eight great *s-grol-ging* : please come, you the 'three commanders of the life-masters' (*srog-bdag-gi-dmag-dpon-gsum*)".

In this usual form he is extremely white in colour, with one face and two hands. He brandishes a long sword of crystal in his right hand while holding in the left a bowl filled with jewels, a snare of lightning and a lance with a silk-banner attached to it. Wearing a white conch-shell in the knot of his hair he is adorned with heavenly jewels and wears a cuirass of gold joined with peacock feathers and adorned with fittings in the form of a *makara*. Appearing in a beautiful, brave and a peaceful form he sees the three worlds with his third eye. He rides a white horse. Another form of his with an angry smile and holding an ichneumon, is also described. White Brahmā is also given as a companion of the three-headed and six-handed Hayagrīva (*rta mgrin*, op. cit., p. 147) : surrounded by a horde of demons he rides in front of Hayagrīva with a sword, a snare, a lance and a bowl of jewels : he wears a cuirass and a helmet. This shows that in addition to his normal peaceful aspect, he also has a fearful aspect (*bsei khrab can*) as a war-god in the company of Hayagrīva. This wrathful aspect of White Brahmā also has several forms (op. cit., pp. 151-3).

(3) **Lgam sring or Begtse :** Regarded as somewhat late in origin as compared with the other Dharmapālā, he is generally considered to be a pre-Buddhist Mongolian deity who came to be venerated by the Tibetans after Atiśa had turned this defeated enemy of Buddhism into a protector of it. One of his various appellations is *Mahā-yakṣa* (*gnod-skyin-chen-po*) while he is also addressed as the religious guardian of Khotan and the obedient servant of Mahādeva, as the lord-commander of all mother-goddesses (*ma-mo*) and of all the demons who dwell in rocks, chief of the eight classes of gods and spirits, the most perfect of all the *yakṣas*, vanquisher of *rākṣasas*, butcher of enemies and *vighnas*, killer of liars, messenger of the *yogis* and watchman of Buddha's teachings : (op. cit., p. 89). He is said to live in a cemetery full of blood and dismembered corpses, and of smoke issuing from the burning of human flesh. Black-coloured revived corpses, laughing horribly, dance here attracted by the stench of blood. Ugly and ferocious wild animals roam about in order to gnaw the corpses. *Yakṣas* and *yakṣinīs* roam about searching for enemies and law-breakers. Ferocious and black-coloured cemetery birds fly about with destroyed enemies in their beaks. In the centre of this macabre place is a lake of blood in the middle of which is a copper mountain : on this, emerging from a sun-lotus and standing on the corpse of a man and on the carcase of a horse is *Lgam sring*. Red in colour his limbs are thick and

short : blood bubbles at the corners of the wide-open mouth : tongue is rolled backward and the fangs of copper are bared : head and body hairs are all aflame like meteors : the three eyes stare full of hatred at enemies : in the right hand he brandishes a flaming sword of copper : he takes the heart of an enemy to his mouth with the left hand : wears a cuirass and helmet of copper : carries a garland of human heads while the whole body is surrounded by flames : (op. cit., pp. 90-1). He is accompanied by his sister who is also his *śakti*, who is known as *Dong dmar ma*. Having the appearance of a *rākṣasī* and a dark blue body, she has red flames issuing from her mouth. Wrinkling her forehead angrily and with the mouth open she rolls her tongue backwards. She bares the four sharp teeth of conch-shell with which she chews a corpse : blood-shot eyes stare at enemies : a conch-shell and precious stones adorn her hair : in her right and left hands respectively are a sword and a dagger (*phur bu*) : skulls, severed heads and bone-ornaments adorn her person : wearing a human skin she rides a black bear : she has a retinue of numerous fearful beings.

(4) **Yama (Gshin Rje)** : As the lord and judge of the dead or as the ruler of those who expiate their sins in hells, Yama could be called the Indian Pluto. He is said to possess three main forms as outer (*bhiy-sgrub*), inner (*nang-sgrub*) and secret (*gsang-sgrub*). In his outer form, as the minister of exterior, he is depicted as a blue, bell-headed god brandishing a club with a skull-cup on top in his right hand and a lasso in the left. A circular ornament, supposed to be representing the *dharma-cakra*, is to be seen on his breast as a special attribute. He stands on a buffalo which is kneeling on a woman. On Yama's left is Yamī, his sister, who offers him a skull-cup full of blood; she is said to look after the female culprits. Eight male and female companions are sometimes given as his retinue. The inner form of Yama is also dark-blue but with a fierce *rākṣasa* head, holding a chopper and a skull-cup in his hands. In the secret aspect the colour of the bull-headed Yama is red and treads upon a bull of the same colour. His attributes are a jewel and a skull-cup. Sometimes Yama is depicted with a human face as well. Nearly ten different forms of Yama are said to be iconographically represented in Tibet. They differ from one another in minor details; dark-blue colour, bull's head, threatening attitude (*tarjanī-mudrā*), club with the skull-cup on top, lasso, iron hook, flaming sword, buffalo mount, lion-cloth of tiger-skin are his usual, common attributes. Sometimes he is three-eyed, bares his fangs and wears a diadem of skulls and a garland of severed heads. In one of his forms he is called "the master of the cemetery".

Two well-known acolytes of Yama known as Citipati in Sanskrit and *Dur khrod bdag po* in Tibetan consist of a pair of skeletons shown in a dancing attitude. They are of a man and of a woman, represented with arms and legs interlaced and dancing on two corpses. Each brandishes a sceptre topped by a skull. These two are usually represented with Yama but may also accompany the *ḍākinī Naro-mk'ha-sp-yod-na* which is the one given by Alice Getty (op. cit., plate LV). Getty records a legend (op. cit., p. 171) according to which the Citipati were, in a former existence, two ascetics who were once lost in such deep meditation that they did not notice that a thief had cut off their heads and thrown them in the dust. Since then they have vowed eternal vengeance on the thief. This story resembles the following legend of Yama as given by Getty (op. cit., pp. 152-3) : There was once a holy man who lived in a cave in deep meditation for fifty years, after which he was to enter into Nirvāṇa. On the night of the forty-ninth year, eleventh month, and twenty-ninth day, two robbers entered the cave with a stolen bull, which they proceeded to kill by cutting off its head. When they discovered the presence of the ascetic, they decided to do away with him as witness of their theft. He begged them to spare his life, explaining that in a few moments he would be entering into Nirvāṇa, and that if they killed him before the time he would lose all the benefit of his fifty years penance. But they refused to believe him, and cut off his head, whereupon hi body assumed the ferocious form of Yama, king of Hell, and taking up the bull's head, he set it on his own headless shoulders. He then killed the two robbers and drank their blood from cups made of their skulls. In his fury and insatiable thirst for victims he threatened to depopulate the whole of Tibet. The Tibetans appealed to their tutelary deity Mañjuśrī(q.v.) to protect them from this formidable enemy, whereupon he assumed the ferocious form of Yamāntaka and waged war against Yama. A fearful struggle ensued, in which Yamāntaka, (lit. 'he who conquers death') was victorious".

It is said (op. cit., p. 152) that Yama was originally a king of Vaiśālī who wished to be master of hell and was reborn accordingly. He is said to sit in the centre of the regions of hell dispensing judgement.

This Dharmapālā is known in China (*Yen-lo-wang*) and Japan (*emmā-o*) as well. In both these countries his representations are alike, a middle-aged man with a fierce expression and a beard (op. cit., p. 153).

(5) Kuvera or Kubera : Known also as *Vaiśiravaṇa* (his patronymic : son of *Viśravaṇa*). He is a god important in several respects. Familiar in the Theravāda tradition also as the guardian of the northern direction, he is very widely worshipped. As the Regent of the North his abode is Ālaka in the Himalayas, abounding in wealth, where he lives as the leader of the *yakkhas*. His functions are two-fold : first as the guardian of the northern quarter (*lokapāla : mahārāja*) under the name *Vaiśravaṇa* and second as the god of wealth as its guardian and distributor under the name Kubera or Kuvera. Thus, his Dharmapālā form belongs to the former type. The name Kuvera (*Lus ngamo*) is the one usually associated with this aspect of the god of wealth, in which aspect he sometimes appears as Jambhala. It is said that in Tibet Kubera absorbed the figure of the aboriginal god of wealth Norlha. As a Dharmapālā in that country, Kuvera has several forms with slight variations.

His Dharmapālā form is usually known under the name Kuvera and is depicted in yellow, red, black or white. He has as special attributes the victorious banner (*dhvaja*), the wish-granting gem (*cintāmaṇi*), the trident (*triśūla*) and the treasure-producing ichneumon (*nakula : gter gyim'u le*). In keeping with his position as the dispenser of wealth he is richly dressed in flowing garments of silk and wears a diadem and ornaments of jewels. He rides either a lion or a horse. When depicted as a ferocious Dharmapālā he is red, three-eyed and carries a red lance. Sometimes the sun and moon discs rest on each of his shoulders. In one of his forms he is depicted in a dancing attitude with sixteen hands and with *śakti :* when appearing as a *Dharmapālā* causing terror to the violators of the Law, he has a ferocious look, sometimes depicted as surrounded by flames, with a flaming sword in hand. In this fearful form he is black in colour and has the appearance of an armoured soldier. Riding a caparisoned horse he lives amidst a fire storm. In his peaceful forms he is depicted white with the vase of ambrosia (*amṛta-kalaśa*) in his left hand. Jambhala, who is sometimes regarded in Mahāyāna theology as an emanation of the Dhāyani-buddha Ratnasambhava, is also regarded as a form of Kubera and is depicted as such with the ichneumon in hand and is golden-complexioned. He too has many forms, both ferocious and peaceful. In addition to the ichneumon, the citron (*bījapūra*) too, is a characteristic attribute to Jambhala (Wojkowitz, op. cit., p. 68 ff.), and the name Jambhala may be probably derived from the term *jambhīra*, which also is a term for the citron or (lemon) he carries.

(6) Hayagrīva (the horse-necked) : He is said to be worshipped in Tibet mainly by the horse-dealers, because he is believed to frighten away the demons by neighing like a horse. When invoked he is said to announce his coming by neighing. Thus, in order to indicate his association with the horse, the head of the animal is shown on his head-dress as his distinctive mark. As one of the 'seven precious things' in Tibet and as the 'airy horse' called *lungta*, the animal is said to be very popular among the nomads of Tibet.

Like the other Dharmapālā, Hayagrīva, too, has several forms with slight variations from one another. According to Getty (op. cit., p. 163), in his simplest form, this god swings a sword in his right hand while holding a lasso in the left. From his dishevelled hair there protrudes a horse-head. He wears a crown of skulls and under a belt of heads a tiger-skin is hanging. He may have one head and four arms, the upper hand holding the skull-topped mace and a flower. Making a mystic *mudrā* with the right hand he steps to the right on a lotus-throne. In another form he has three heads, four arms and four legs which is the form in which he appeared when invoked by Atiśa in Tibet. With the usual crown of skulls and belt of heads he steps to the right on demons. He also has a three headed, six-armed and eight-legged form, holding a thunderbolt, lasso, trident etc. and with three horse-heads protruding from the head-dress. When represented in *yab-yum*, he is three-headed with his usual attributes. He may have *garuḍa* wings and the *śakti* has the crown of heads, the third eye and the skull-cup. In miniatures he is represented as an assistant and carries a small image of Akṣobhya in his hair. He is very often associated with Avalokiteśvara as a minor deity accompanying him. In Japan he is none other than Ba-to Kwannon, while he is little known in China.

A Sanskrit *dhāraṇī* called *Hayagrīva-vidyā* occurs in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya* (*GM.* I, pp. 43-46).

(7) Mahākāla (The Great Black One) : As a Dharmapālā he represents the destructive aspect of time (*kāla*). In the majority of forms he is depicted

as black, his normal colour, while red and white forms are also found. In one of his main Dharmapālā forms in Tibet he is six-handed, black-coloured, one-faced and three-eyed : holds thunderbolt-shaped hilt, rosary of human skulls, a drum, a blood-filled skull-cup, an elephant hide, a trident and a snare : with a gaping mouth, bared fangs and a tongue rolled backwards, his appearance is quite fierce : a snake winds itself around his hair : a ritual mark is visible on the forehead : treads on a white Ganeśa and an obstacle-creating demon : a tiger-skin serves as a loin-cloth : the body is adorned with numerous ornaments such as bangles, necklaces, ear-rings, human bones, crown of skulls, garlands of human heads etc : the whole figure is surrounded by blazing flames and is accompanied by a retinue of four gods and a *śakti* : of these gods special mention should be made of Kṣetrapāla, the guardian of the cemetery, who is described as a fearful *yakṣa*.

In a white form this Dharmapāla is named Cintāmani Mahākāla as he holds the wish-granting gem as the chief attribute : in one of his hands he also holds a skull-cup full of nectar (*amṛta*) into which a vessel filled with jewels is immersed : a ferocious smile is on his face. In a yellow three-headed form he is depicted in *yab-yum*. In a red-coloured form he is one-headed and six-armed holding the usual weapons of a fierce Dharmapālā : he is in *yab-yum*. In this manner nearly seventy-five different *maṇḍalas* of this deity are described. Fundamentally they are the same, differences being in the number of heads and hands or the presence or absence of a particular attribute. Majority of these forms are in *yab-yum* and both deities are normally depicted in a fearful form.

Sometimes Mahākāla is identified with Kuvera as the god of wealth, while he is said to be the tutelary god of Mongolia (Getty, op. cit., p. 161).

(8) Yamāntaka : Regarding the origin of this deity it is said that when Yama, as the demon king of death, was depopulating Tibet in a thirst for victims, Mañjuśrī appeared in this ferocious form and brought Yama under control (Getty, op. cit., p. 164). Hence he is called the Conqueror of Yama—Yamāntaka, whose origin is given in the form of an interesting legend given earlier in the discussion on Yama. Like Yama, Yamāntaka too is usually represented with a bull's head (except as Vajrabhairava, when he has a human head), which is his distinctive mark. As a Tibetan Dharmapālā he is also known under several different names which are Śrīvajrabhairava, Vajrabhayaṅkara, Vajrabhairava, Bhairava and Yamāri. In his simplest form Yamāntaka has a single bull's head, two arms, crown of skulls, belt of heads and the third eye. He is usually figured with his *śakti*. The chopper and the skull-cup, which are his distinctive attributes, are in his right and left hands respectively. He is usually depicted as wearing a belt of heads and stepping to the right.

Getty also records that according to the *Śrīmahāvajrabhairava Tantra*, Yamāntaka, when painted, should have sixteen feet, thirty-four arms and nine heads and is naked and black : he step to the right in this terrible form : his hands hold all the Tantric symbols : his right feet tread on animals and the left on birds. In bronzes he may be treading on demons under which are animals and birds on the reverse or the demons may be supporting the throne.

As regards the cult of the Dharmapālā as obtained in Tibet it has to be generally stated that the offerings made to them vary according to the nature of the Dharmapālā. This means that a wrathful Dharmapālā receives an offering consisting of meat, bone, blood, bile, human flesh etc. while a peaceful Dharmapālā is presented with such things and medicines, sweet and good-tasting food, fragrant incense, pieces of silk etc. Generally both types receive their attributes as offerings.

In the ceremonies held in honour of Dharmapālā music plays an important part. Here, too, while the wrathful deities are given the loud kind of music produced mainly by the instruments made of human skulls and bones, peaceful deities are provided with a harmonious kind of music. Flageolts, trumpets, conch-shells, drums, gongs, cymbals and bells are mainly used for peaceful deities while thigh-bone trumpets made of human or tiger thigh-bones are used for the wrathful ones.

While the worship of Dharmapālā i. performed in the most sacred room of the temple, it includes a religious dance as well. The mountains such as Kailāśa which are regarded as the abode of Dharmapālā are honoured by circumambulating them. Another noteworthy feature of the Dharmapālā who belong to the lower category as classified at the beginning of this essay is their taking possession of certain men and women who act as their mediums : through these persons the deities make their wishes known or give prophetic answers to questions submitted to them. These Tibetan oracles are discussed in detail by Wojkowitz (op. cit., Chapter XXI).

It may also be mentioned that various minor deities regarded as Dharmapālā are ritualistically invoked for various purposes such as protection against evil, bad planetary influences, harming enemies etc. In such rites the influence of the Bon religion is apparent.

As regards the frightful depiction of Dharmapālā it would be the normal thing to depict any kind of guardian or protector with such an appearance. Looking at it from a purely psychological point of view the meaning of their fearful depiction was in order to inspire fear into the would-be wrong-doers as a corrective measure.

A.G.S.K.

DHARMAPALA, ANAGARIKA, (1864-1931), a national hero of Sri Lanka. A Buddhist revivalist and a social reformer who worked indefatigably with dedication to inspire the Sinhala people to free themselves from the degeneration that had befallen them as a result of the foreign domination of the nation for more than three centuries by the Portuguese, the Dutch and the British. He was also the leading spirit in the propagation of Buddhism in many parts of the world in modern times.

Anagarika Dharmapala was born on the 17th of September 1864 as the eldest of four sons of a wealthy and influential Sinhala Buddhist family in Colombo. His father, Don Carolis Hewavitharana, a furniture dealer who migrated to Colombo from Matara in South Sri Lanka, married the daughter of another Colombo Businessman. Though both families were devoted to Buddhism, ironically enough, they named their eldest son Don David as the custom in vogue at that time was to give anglicised names to children.

The Christian missionary education movement launched by the British rulers in collaboration with the Christian Church was in full swing at this time and young David's schooling had to be in one or the other of these institutions; and naturally enough, there were several occasions when his refusal to deviate from his chosen Buddhist ways brought him into conflict with the school authorities. These conflicts sharpened his interest in Buddhism further. He attended several of these schools such as St. Benedict's College and St. Thomas' College. He finished his formal school education at the latter school. In later years he passed his London Matriculation examination.

By this time he had come into contact with several important persons who helped him to gain the necessary training for his future activities. Mohoṭṭiwatte Gunānanda Thero, the renowned orator of the Panadura debate fame, and Hikkaḍuwe Śrī Sumaṅgala Thero, an equally renowned scholar at the time, were two of the earliest among them. Yet the most important person who helped him immensely in his campaign of cultural regeneration was Colonel Olcott, the American savant who came to Sri Lanka in 1880. Colonel Olcott's companion, the Russian philanthrophist Madam Blavatsky was another person who influenced Dharmapala during his formative years. In 1884 when Colonel Olcott visited Sri Lanka for the second time Dharmapala requested that he be enrolled a member of the Theosophical Society. Although Dharmapala was underage at the time, he was admitted as a member. By this time Dharmapala had become an admirer of Madame Blavatsky who accompanied the youngster to the Theosophical Head Quarters in Adyar in India in 1884, despite the disapproval of his parents and well-wishers. However at Adyar Madam Blavatsky dissuaded Dharmapala from pursuing theosophical studies and instead encouraged him to study Pali wherein all the knowledge necessary for him was available. She further encouraged and blessed him to dedicate himself to work for the good of humanity. These incidents strengthened his convictions and in keeping with Madam Blavatsky's advice he returned to Sri Lanka to pursue his chosen career.

At the age of 20 came another turning point in his career when he decided to lead a celibate life (*anagārika*) fully dedicated to national and religious service. Accordingly he obtained permission from his parents and took up residence at the Theosophical Society Headquarters as he believed that the society was working for the welfare of Buddhism. A quotation from one of his admirers at the time would best describe this period of his life : "Nothing was too small or too big for him. He would clean his own room, make his own bed, attend to office work, write all the letters and take them to the post himself.... He would interpret for one, prepare a programme for another, translate a lecture for someone else....would discuss the policy of the paper with the Editor and would correct proofs for him.... He spent well nigh 15 to 16 hours a day in intensive work. He had a pleasant manner, cheerful at all times.... This bundle of energy and goodwill continued his useful career at the Buddhist Headquarters for nearly five years...." (Quoted by Bhikshu Sangharakshita, *Anagarika Dharmapala*, Wheel Publications Nos.70-72, *BPS*, Kandy, pp.30-31)

In 1886 Colonel Olcott and C. W. Leadbeater arrived in Colombo for a campaign to raise funds for Buddhist Education. As they had planned to tour the entire country for this purpose they needed a competent interpreter. The scheme almost fell through for want of one when Dharmapala volunteered his services. Being a junior clerk in the Education Department, he obtained three months' leave and joined Colonel Olcott in his campaign. Colonel Olcott's two storied travelling cart was used as the conveyance. For two months they travelled island-wide, Dharmapala interpreting Colonel Olcott's lectures. This was very sound and timely training for Dharmapala as it offered him a fine opportunity to obtain first-hand knowledge about the true conditions of his fellow countrymen. He clearly saw their weaknesses and backwardness in a fast developing world, how the nation had become lifeless and vigourless with only a proud tradition behind them. In contrast was Colonel Olcott representing the dynamic and innovating vitality of the West. Dharmapala realised that the Sinhala people needed the prodding and inspiration with this brand of dynamism if they were to stand on their own feet and regain their lost glories. Realising this all-important national need he not only translated the ideas of Colonel Olcott and Leadbeater but also gave expression to his own independent views in-keeping with these requirements.

By now Dharmapala had realised the gravity of the destructive activities of the Christian Missionaries. He saw how their alien influence was eroding into the noble aspects of national character and accordingly most of his attacks were directed against these inimical forces. He attacked the people for blindly aping the West and adopting degenerate and un-Buddhistic practices such as meat eating, consuming liquor, adopting alien names, and donning the foreigner's dress. Through these practices the faith of the ordinary villager in the Dhamma had been shaken and to that extent the missionaries and their supporters were successful. In such a situation the vindications of Buddhism by Colonel Olcott appeared to be the best antidote that would awaken the people. Accordingly he applied himself to his mission with dedication and energy he could muster. As a son of the soil the problems were personal to him as well and this gave him extra courage to put his ideas across to the people. Subsequently when Colonel Olcott left for Madras, he carried on the good work with Leadbeater. In the meantime he received a letter from the Colonial Secretary that he had passed the clerical examination and was given a promotion, an achievement to be reckoned with at the time. But as he had by now chosen to dedicate himself to Buddhist missionary work, he resigned altogether from government service despite the persuasion of his father and the Colonial Secretary himself.

During the years 1885-89 his major occupation was Buddhist Theosophical Society work. As the General Secretary of the Buddhist Section of the Theosophical Society, he was the Manager of the *Sandaräsa* paper, the Buddhist Press, Buddhist Schools and the assistant Secretary of the Buddhist Defence Committee. He wanted to strengthen the Sinhala weekly *Sandaräsa* with an English counterpart and accordingly by obtaining English type from Madras with money collected from contributions, the first English Buddhist journal was issued in 1888 as *The Buddhist* under Leadbeater's editorship. While the *Sandaräsa* concentrated on local Buddhist news, the contents of *The Buddhist* were mainly discussions on the Dhamma in relation to Western science and psychology. It enjoyed a wide circulation in Europe, America, India, Japan, Australia etc., creating an interest about the teachings of the Buddha in those distant lands. He also continued his preaching activities in the Colonel's bullock cart. It was during this period that he assumed the epithet Anagārika (homeless) and became Anagarika Dharmapala.

The opportunity of visiting Japan came his way in 1889 when an invitation to Colonel Olcott from the high priest of Japar to visit that country was extended to him as well. On the 18th of January Colonel Olcott, Dharmapala and the Japanese emissary Noguchi left Sri Lanka mainly as ambassadors of goodwill between the two countries. Dharmapala fell ill on the way and had to keep away from the main reception held at Kobe. The visitors were then conducted to the Tendai Sect temple at Kobe by which time Dharmapala had recovered. After Colonel Olcott's address Dharmapala spoke about the eligeo-cultural unity of the two countries. Next, they left for Kyoto from where he decided to return alone to Sri Lanka due to deteriorating health. A farewell military parade was held in his honour at Osaka and in his farewell address he gave eloquent expression to his love and gratitude to the Japanese people.

In the beginning of 1891 Dharmapala was at Adyar with Colonel Olcott and while the latter proceeded to Burma on invitation, Dharmapala decided

to go on a pilgrimage to the Buddhist shrines in India, with a Japanese friend. In January they visited Sārnāth (Isipatana) and Buddhagaya. It was at the latter place that Dharmapala was inspired to dedicate his life to rescue the holy spot from centuries of neglect, and he made a vow to this effect at the Bodhi tree. He was so moved at the pathetic condition of Buddhism in India, and specially of Buddhagaya, that he, along with his Japanese friend, decided to stay there till some Buddhist monks came to be incharge of the place.

Buddhagaya had been entirely neglected with its sculptures removed, images broken and desecrated. Even without familiarising himself with the conditions of the place he obtained the keys of the Burmese Rest and settled down there. Next he wrote a series of letters to Buddhist countries explaining the situation and appealing for help. After staying there for six weeks he left for Calcutta in March 1891 planning to raise funds to purchase the property from the Mahant, its Hindu owner. He continued this work for sometime thereby making several important contacts and making the Buddhist world aware of the problem.

Returning to Colombo Dharmapala founded the Mahabodhi Society on 31st May 1891 with Hikkaḍuwe Śrī Sumaṅgala Thero as President, Colonel Olcott as Director and himself as one of the Secretaries. Dharmapala was determined that on the fullmoon day of *Asāḷha* (June-July), the day on which the Buddha preached his first sermon, Buddhist monks should be in residence at Buddhagaya. Accordingly he persuaded four monks of the Ramañña Nikāya (q.v.) to go there and the party set out on 10th July. The Buddhist flag was hoisted on the site on the chosen day.

Having installed the four monks in the Burmese Rest, Dharmapala forthwith started negotiations with the Mahant for the purchase of the holy site, but it was a tedious task a the Mahant as well as the Indian government was not very cooperative.

On October 25th 1891 Dharmapala gave his first public lecture in India at the Albert Hall in Calcutta on *Kinship between Buddhism and Hinduism*, under the Chairmanship of Narendranath Sen, the Editor of the *Indian Mirror*. The following year the office of the Mahabodhi Society was moved to Calcutta from Colombo. In May 1892 he started the *Mahabodhi* journal to exchange views and news among Buddhist countries. It enjoyed wide popularity and led Dharmapala to be invited to attend the Chicago Parliament of Religions. While doing the magazine he was continuously appealing for funds, arranging meetings etc. to save Buddhagaya from those to whom it was merely a source of income. Meanwhile, he developed a friendship with the Tibetan Buddhists as well and gave a lecture on *Decline and Revival of Buddhism* to the Buddhists of Sikkhim and Tibet and appealed to them to help the cause of the Mahabodhi Society.

In February 1893 Colonel Olcott, Dharmapala and Mr. Edge, a European theosophist, visited Buddhagaya when in the previous evening Mahant's men had severely assaulted the Sinhala monks and their servants at the Burmese Rest. Protest meetings were held; but the Mahant point blank told Colonel Olcott that he would not sell or lease the land on any terms. Even a court case against the assailants fell through due to lack of evidence. The fate of the Mahabodhi Temple still remained unsettled.

The Parliament of World Religions held in Chicago in September 1893 had invited Dharmapala to participate as the representative of Theravāda Buddhism. Sailing by ship he went through London where he was the guest of Sir Edwin Arnold whom Dharmapala regarded as his English guru. Mrs. Besant and Dr. Rhys Davids also met him while he stayed there with Leadbeater, who was his companion in his sojourns with Colonel Olcott in Sri Lanka. Mrs. Besant accompanied him to Chicago where they arrived on the 6th. He delivered his lecture on *World's Debt to Buddhism* on 18th September 1893 and was quite a popular figure at the gathering. The occasion had been described as follows in contemporary news medium. "With his black, curly locks thrown back from his broad brow, his keen, clear eyes fixed on the audience, his long brown fingers emphasising the utterance of his vibrant voice, he looked the very image of a propagandist, and one trembled to know that such a figure stood at the head of the movement to consolidate the disciples of the Buddha and to spread the '*Light of Asia*' throughout the civilised world." (St. Louis Observer, Sept. 21, 1893 : quoted from Bhikkhu Sangharakshita, op. cit., p. 62).

Impressed by his speech Mr. C. T. Strauss of New Yerk, became a Buddhist after receiving the Five Precepts from Dharmapala. He was the first convert to Buddhism on American soil who later became a staunch supporter of the Mahabodhi

Society. Through out the sessions his speeches had drawn big crowds. This lecture not only made him world famous but also opened the eyes of the Western intelligentsia to the greatness of Buddha Dhamma.

When the Parliament of Religions closed on September 27th, he gave a few more lectures and left America on October 10th for India through Japan and China. In the harbour at Honolulu on board he met Mrs. Mary Foster, a middle aged lady, who later became one of his greatest benefactresses. Although the meeting lasted only a few minutes the impression made had been so great that her contributions for Buddhist social activities totalled to nearly a million rupees, with which temples, monasteries, schools, hospitals etc. were set up, both in India and Sri Lanka.

Disembarking at Yokohama on 31st October he was soon in Tokyo where 100 monks had assembled to receive him. His effort to raise funds for his Buddhagaya struggle in Japan having failed, he next visited Shanghai where he delivered a lecture which was translated by Rev. Edkins and Dr. Frank. In February 1894 he was in Siam, where a branch of the Mahabodhi Society was formed. After three busy weeks there he left Bangkok somewhat disappointed at the lukewarm interest of the Southern-Buddhists for his main mission of saving Buddhagaya. In April he was back in Sri Lanka.

By then Dharmapala was internationally recognised as the leading Buddhist missionary of the day.

In Colombo he was given a grand reception and was conducted in procession to the Vidyodaya Pirivena at Maligakanda where Hikkaḍuve Sumaṅgala Thera received him with blessings. Next few weeks he had a lecture tour on his Chicago experiences and the Buddhagaya restoration scheme. In December 1894 he led the first organised pilgrimage to Buddhagaya from Sri Lanka. In February 1895 he was at Buddhagaya, again, carrying with him a beautiful Buddha-image he received from Japan which he installed at the Buddhagaya Temple. Mahánt's men forcibly removed it and threw it into the courtyard below.

This outrageous act led to a court case being instituted against the miscreants which was widely known as the great Buddhagaya case. Although the court decided to leave the Burmese Rest in charge of the Mahabodhi Soicety allowing the image also to be kept there, later in 1910 the Calcutta High Court decided the Rest to be Mahant's property and the image to be removed to Calcutta, thereby thwarting Dharmapala's expectations. However, he was able to celebrate Vesak in Calcutta, for the first time, that year. He left for America for the second time in July 1896 at the invitation of Dr. Paul Camus the founder of the American Mahabodhi Society. This time too in London he met Sir Edwin Arnold and Dr. Rhys Davids in addition to Max Müller. He gave lectures at the Theosophical Society and at Hyde Park. He spent one year in America lecturing and visiting all important cities. In May 1897 he celebrated Vesak in America as well, ceremonially, by lighting 37 candles on an improvised shrine to symbolise the 37 constituents of enlightenment (*Bodhipakkhiya-dhamma*). He gave a lecture on them and chanted the *Maṅgala Sutta*. By September he was in Paris where he participated in the Congress of the Orientalists. After a short sojourn in London he proceeded to Rome where a cardinal promised him an audience with the Pope. However when Dharmapala told the cardinal that he would speak to the Pontiff about the drunkenness which the Europeans had introduced into Sri Lanka, the clergyman not only cancelled the appointment but refused to see our visitor any more !

During the whole of 1898, once again, this time all alone, he travelled by bullock-cart from village to village in Sri Lanka, covering almost the entire island, championing the national, religious and cultural regneration of the Sinhala people. He was able to generate a fresh wave of enthusiasm among the people.

At the beginning of 1889 he undertook a fact-finding tour of North India. A contemporary account of this tour of four months says : "He travelled as a pilgrim, not caring at all for comforts, mixing with the *sanyāsins* ascetics, Hindu pilgrims and with passengers of the third and intermediate classes eating at times the poorest food, sleeping at times in places where the poor slept and gaining an insight into the characteristics of the poor classes, who were suffering from intense ignorance, superstition and poverty" (Quoted anonymously by Bhikshu Sangharakshita, op. cit., p. 76).

Next he proceeded to South India on invitation and undertook a lecture tour wherein he emphasised the need to remove the disabilities cast upon the untouchables. A branch of the Mahabodhi Society was also established in Madras.

For two years from 1902 he was in America for the third time continuing the missionary activities launched earlier. This time his desire was to familiarise himself with the technological advances of the West and accordingly he alternated his lectures with visits to laboratories and technical institutions as well. At Harward University, Boston. he attended a class conducted by the celebrated American psychologist William James, who paid Dharmapala high tribute by inviting him to take the chair while he himself sat with the students saying that Dharmapala was more equipped to speak on psychology than himself. After listening to a short account of Buddhist psychology from Dharmapala, William James had remarked that it would be that kind of psychology that everybody would learn in another 25 years. This shows how much Dharmapala had contributed to make known the deeper doctrines of Buddhism in the West.

Western technological advances had impressed Dharmapala immensely as he knew with first-hand knowledge the backwardness of the East in this respect. His interest in this field was so great that he visited many such institutions in America and England and he was ager to introduce them to the East. In 1904 he started one such institution at Sārnāth, with Mrs. Foster's help, then hurried to Sri Lanka with the desire of helping his own country also in this field. Accordingly he was back in the campaign of touring the country in the bullock-cart with a purpose different from the earlier occasions. This time it was his keen desire to familiarise Sri Lankan people wtih the industrial advances of the West and accordingly his lectures included this aspect also as a theme. He made arrangements for some Sinhala youngsters to go to Japan to learn weaving and such other arts and crafts. Under his initiative the first weaving school was started at Hiniduma off Galle and another at Rajagiriya near Colombo. Mrs. Foster helped their establishment financially. In the same year he lost his father who had been helping him immensely in his philanthropic activities.

In May 1906 he started the Sinhala weekly paper, the *Sinhala Bauddhayā*, mainly to counter-attack the anti-Buddhist activities of various groups, including the Theosophical Society. By this time Dharmapala was of the view that theosophy and Buddhism were different and had fallen out even with Colonel Olcott, after a friendship lasting for 20 years.

In 1907 the Mahant's case regarding the Burmese Rest was decided in favour of the Mahant and the Buddhists had to remove the Buddha-image and the resident bhikkhus who were there from 1896.

The two years from 1911-12 were also spent in touring Sri Lanka, carrying on his campaign of national revival. The *Sinhala Bauddhayā* also was used as a medium for the purpose through his writings. The series of such writings called 'things that should be known' (*dänagatayutu karunu*) are specially significant in this respect. Through them, he exposed the short-comings of the Sinhala people, not sparing even the Buddhist monks. He lamentably argued that while the Sinhala people had surrendered their cultural and religious identity to the Christians, they by now had handed over their economic independence to a class of Indian Muslim traders who had monopolised the retail trade in many areas.

Once again Dharmapala left for Honolulu in 1914 to thank Mrs. Foster for the help she had been giving to the Mahabodhi Society. She gave another Rs. 60,000/- to establish a charitable hospital in Colombo in memory of her father, thereby creating the 'Foster Robinson Free Hospital'. Dharmapala returned through Japan, Korea, Manchuria, China, Singapore and Java giving lectures to big audiences.

The Indian Muslims referred to earlier were becoming aggressive and in 1915 they led an attack on a procession of the Buddhists at Gampola resulting in the Buddhist-Muslim riots. Disturbances spread island-wide and the British rulers interpreting these as a revolt against them proclaimed martial law on 2nd June 1915. For 3 months the Buddhists were subjected to much suppression with influential Buddhist leaders being arrested and indiscriminately shot. Dharmapala too would have suffered the same fate if he did not have the fortune of being in India at the time. Nevertheless, the British government here got him interned at Calcutta for five years from 1915-20.

Dharmapala yet made a virtue of a necessity of the situation by inaugurating work on a *vihāra* at Calcutta. In 1915 he purchased a property for the purpose made possible chiefly by the donations of Mrs. Foster and himself. In the following year the Indian government presented a Buddha-relic and in 1918 work was started. The project was completed in two years. Designated as the Dharmarājika Vihāra, it was ceremonially opened in 1920 by the Governor of Bengal, Lord Ronaldstay, witnessed by a large and a distinguished gathering.

Dharmapala made an eloquent speech to suit the occasion.

He was back home in 1922 with deteriorating health. In July he re-started the *Sinhala Bauddhaya*, which had been suspended during the riots. As his health was giving trouble, he had to enter a sanatorium in Zurich in 1925 where he underwent an operation.

By August 1925 he was in London with plans for establishing a *vihāra* and a branch of the Mahābodhi Society there. After giving some lectures he sailed for San Francisco to appeal to Mrs. Foster for help who agreed to give a regular monthly grant for the purpose. In December he gave a lecture at the New York Town Hall, and an account of this talk that appeared in the *Spectator* is worth quoting here : "Not a move or cough from the audience. Here was a man with a message. He delivered it erect, composed, master of himself and his hearers, with the art of an orator and the dignity of a priest to whom the world is nothing ! When he sat down there was a dead silence, followed by a burst of applause". (Quoted by Bhiksu Sangharakshita, op. cit., p. 89). He gave another celebrated lecture at the Vesak meeting held at Holborn Town Hall. He purchased a house in Ealing, London as the permanent headquarters and named it Foster House in honour of his patroness. Even after coming to Sri Lanka in 1926 he continued his fund-raising campaign for the British Buddhist Mission. He was back in London by mid-1927 with enough funds to purchase a temporary residence till the intended building was put up In the meantime he fell severely ill with bronchitis, and leaving the London mission in charge of his nephew Dayananda Hewavitharana, he came to Sri Lanka. He further sent three Buddhist monks from Sri Lanka along with Devapriya Valisinghe, a trusted follower, to be in charge of the London work.

Now in mid-sixties Dharmapala was entering the last stage of his career. Since his return home from London in 1927, he was bed-ridden with stomach and heart problems undergoing severe pain. He received an additional blow in 1929 when he lost his only surviving brother, Dr. C. A. Hewavitharana, who had been of great help to him. His great benefactress Mrs. Foster died in 1930. By then he had created the Anagarika Dharmapala Trust with funds from Mrs. Foster and his own patrimony. This was to be managed by five trustees for the furtherance of the objects to which he had dedicated himself. In March 1931 he was borne in a chair to a steamer that would take him to Calcutta and he left Sri Lanka for good, arriving in Sārnāth at the end of the month.

While engaging himself in all possible work regarding his last undertaking of building the Mūlaganhakuṭi vihara at Sārnāth, the Anagarika entered the order on 13th July 1931 under Ven. Baruggamuve Revata Thera, receiving the monastic designation Sri Devamitta Dharmapala. In August he delivered a public lecture at Calcutta and by the end of the year he had the satisfaction of seeing the Mūlagandhakuṭi vihāra completed, of which the opening ceremony was held on 11th November 1931. In April and December 1932 he fell ill twice and wishing perhaps to die as a full-fledged monk he received the higher ordination (*upasampadā*) on 16th January 1933, the ceremony being performed by a number of leading monks from Sri Lanka. By this time he had become a real invalid.

By mid-April he was seriously ill. As the condition worsened his physician Dr. Nandy was summoned. His disciple Devapriya Valisinghe and nephew Raja Hewavitharana and the 6 *sāmaneras* who were at Buddhagaya also came to his bedside. He had refused to take medicine saying that it was a mere waste of money. Then he said "Let me die soon; let me be born again; I can no longer prolong my agony, I would like to be reborn 25 times to spread the Dhamma". These were his last utterances. He was sinking. As he refused to eat, food had to be injected against his will. On the 27th April 1933, he suddenly demanded a pen and paper and with difficulty scribbled something, half of which read "Dr. Nandy, I am tired of injections. I may pass away . . ." On the 28th of April 1933 he passed away.

The preceding biographical account delineates the career and achievements of Anagarika Dharmapala on a chronological basis relating all his major achievements as and when they occurred. As such a separate assessment would not be necessary. But, as a concluding synoptical evaluation one could describe him as a national revivalist who reminded his countrymen of the greatness of their religious and national heritage. His relentless attacks on their alien ways very often produced lightening results. His speech and writings clearly show that he had realised that the alien rule of the country was a major cause of national degeneration. While he recognised the benefits of British rule, he was extremely critical

of them otherwise, very often referring to them as 'White brahamins' or 'damn' whites (*para-suddās*). This type of daring criticism inevitably created enemies, but he did not care. His role as a national revivalist is marked as unique as it was unchauvinistic thereby showing the way for genuine national identity.

This much was nationally. His record of contribution on the international level, as was shown above, is equally impressive, for he was undoubtedly the leading Buddhist missionary of the age. As he was deeply disturbed by the fading away of Buddhism from the land of its birth, he became emotionally involved in its restoration, and the massive institutional organisation known as the Mahabodhi Society, with its branches all over the world functioning upto date, speaks for his efforts and contributions in this field.[1]

A.G.S.K.

DHARMARAKṢA : (1) whose name in Chinese is Chu Fa-hu was a descendant of the Yueh-chih people who had settled down at Tunhuang for many generations. His original surname was Chih, and as he became a Buddhist monk at the age of eight under the guidance of an "eminent teacher" with the surname of Chu, he adopted his teacher's surname since then. Being a man of wide learning with a good memory, he always practised austerity with a sense of self-sacrifice. He regretted that the Buddhists of his day (the closing years of the Ts'ao-wei period) only paid their attention to monasteries and the Buddha's images, but neglected the translation of the Mahāyāna scriptures from the Western Regions. Thus, he made up his mind to spread the Dharma and travelled with his teacher to the Western Regions, where he studied thirty-six different languages and collected a large number of original Buddhist scriptures which he brought back to Ch'angan. In the period beginning from the second year of T'ai-shih during the reign of Emperor Wu to the second year of Yung-chia during the reign of Emperor Huai (i.e., 266-308 A.C.) of the Tsin dynasty, he spent the best part of his life in translating Buddhist scriptures into Chinese and completed the translation of more than 150 *sūtras* and *śāstras*. At the end of the reign of Emperor Wu (cir. 274 A.C.), Dharmarakṣa, after a period of hermit-life among the mountains, built a monastery out ide the Blue Gate of Ch'angan and practised Buddhism. His fame spread far and wide and more than a thousand monks and laymen came from different places to study under him. He also travelled to various places to propagate Buddhism and wherever he went his translation works were never interrupted. For example, he translated the *Yogacaryā-bhūmi* (*Taisho*, No. 606) in 7 fascicles and the *Avaivartika-cakra* (*Taisho*, No. 266) in 3 fascicles at Tunhuang in the 5th year of T'ai-k'ang, (284 A.C.); the *Viśeṣacintābrahma-paripṛcchā* (*Taisho*, No. 585) in 4 fascieles, the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka* (*Taisho*, No. 263) in 10 fascicles and the *Pañcaviṃśati sāhaśrikā-prajñāpāramitā* (*Taisho*, No. 222) in 10 fascicles at Ch'angan in the 7th year of T'ai-k'ang (286 A.C.); the *Paramārtha-saṃvṛti-satya-nirdeśa* (*Taisho*, No. 460) in 1 fascicle at Loyang in the 10th year of T'ai-k'ang (289 A.C.); the *Ārya-dharma-mudrā Sūtra* (*Taisho*, No. 103) in 1 fascicle at Chiuchuan in the 4th year of Yüan k'ang (294 A.C.); and the *Daśabhūmika-Sūtra* (*Taisho*, No. 285) in 5 fascicles at Ch'angan in the 7th year of Yuan-k'ang (297 A.C.). His whereabouts during his old age is unknown, but it is said that he died at the ripe age of seventy-eight. According to Seng-yu's *Life of Dharmarakṣa*, it is said that he died at Mien-chih en route to the east in seeking for safety at the time when Emperor Hui of the Tsin dynasty was forced to remove the capital westward to Ch'angan, that is, in 304 A.C. But the *Catalogue of Buddhist Books Compiled* in the K'ai-yuan Period has already pointed out the unreliability of this allegation.

Dharmarakṣa originally lived at Tunhuang, and when his teachings spread far and wide to various places, the people of his time called him the "Tunhuang Bodhisattva". Afterwards, Sun Chuo in his *Tao Hsien Lun* highly praised Dharmarakṣa as a man of great virtue and compared him with Shan Chü-yuan, one of the "Seven Savants of the Bamboo Grove".

According to the *Collection of Records of Translations of the Tripiṭaka* compiled by Seng-yu of the Lang dynasty, Dharmarakṣa translated altogether 159 books in 309 fascicles, but the actually existing

1. This paper is mainly based on *Anagarika Dharmapala, a biographical sketch*, by Bhikshu Sangharakshita, wheel publication 71-72, 1964, BPS., Kandy; Dr. Ananda Guruge's *Anagarika Dharmapala*, Department of Cultural Affairs, Sri Lanka, 1967, also was consulted.

manuscripts at that time were only 95 books. The number has been increased in the catalogues compiled at later times, and it was ascertained in the *Catalogue of Buddhist Books Compiled in the K'ai-yuan Period*, that 91 books in 208 fascicles tran lated by Dharmarakṣa were then extant. (Recent comparative investigations have found that only 74 books in 177 fascicles were actually translated by Dharmarakṣa). Among these are many important scriptures. Apart from the books mentioned above, there are the *Tathāgatācintya-guhya-nirdeśa* (*Taisho*, No. 310, 5) in 7 fascicles, the *Ratnacūḍa-paripṛcchā* (*Taisho*, No. 310 (47) in 2 fascicles, the *Mañjuśrī-buddhakṣetraguṇa-vyūhālaṇkāra* (*Taisho*, No. 318) in 2 fascicles, the *Tathāgata-mahākāruṇika-nirdeśa* (*Taisho*, No. 398) in 7 fascicle , the *Akṣayamati Sūtra* (*Taisho*, No. 403) in 4 fascicles, the *Sūtra on the Appearance of the Tathāgata* (*Taisho*, No. 291) in 4 fascicles, the *Catur-dāraka-samādhi Sūtra* (*Taisho*, No. 378) in 2 fascicle., the *Bhadra-kalpika Sūtra* (*Taisho*, No. 425) in 7 fascicles, the *Sarvapuṇya-samuccyasamādhi Sūtra* (*Taisho*, No. 381) in 3 fascicles, the *Jātaka* (*Taisho*, No. 154) in 5 fascicles, the *Lalitavisāra* (*Taisho*, No. 186) in 8 fascicles, the *Sūtra on Five Hundred Disciples Telling Their Own Nidāna* (*Taisho*, No 199) in 1 fascicle, and so for the.

Ten more books translated by Dharmarakṣa, which were regarded as lost, have now been found but under the names of some other translators. They are the *Sukhāvatī-vyūha* (*Taisho*, No. 361) in 2 fascicles, and the *Pratyutapanna-buddha-sanmukhāvasthita-samādhi Sūtra* (*Taisho*, No. 418) in 1 fascicle (these two were considered as being translated by Chih Lou-chia-ch'an), the *Triskandhaka* (*Taisho*, No. 1492) in 1 fascicle, the *Sūtra on many priests to wash themselves in a bath-house* (*Taisho*, No. 701) in 1 fascicle, the *Sūtra on Kāśyapa's Collection* (of the *Tripiṭaka*, *Taisho*, No. 2027) in 1 fascicle, the *Āmrapāli-jivakāvadāna* (*Taisho*, No. 553) in 1 fascicle and the *Sigālovāda Sūtra* (*Taisho*, No. 16) in 1 fascicle (these five were considered as being translated by An Shih-kao), the *Sutra on Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana going through four roads* (*Taisho*, No. 137) in 1 fascicle (which was considered as being translated by K'ang Meng-hsiang, the *Brahmia-jāla Sūtra* (*Taisho*, No. 21) in 1 fascicle and the *Nagaropama Sūtra* (*Taisho*, No. 713) in 1 fascicle (these two were considered as the translations of Chih Ch'ion).

Dharmarakṣa's translations included the *sūtras* of the *Prajñā* group and those of the *Avataṃsaka* group, the *Ratnakūṭa* group, the *Mahāsannipāta* group, the *Nirvāṇa-Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* group, the *Mahāyāna-sūtra-nipāta* group, the *Mahāyāna-vinaya* group, the *Jātaka* group as well as the writings of Indian Buddhist scholars, presenting such a marvelous variety of subjects that seemed to have embraced almost all the important works then prevalent in the Western Regions. Thus, he opened a wide scope for the development of Mahāyāna Buddhism in China. Tao-an said, "Most of the *sūtras* on *Anutpanna* (unborn) and *Samādhi* of the *Vaipulya* category were translated by this master. Indeed, he has provided a ladder for all sentient beings towards the sublime truth". (See the preface to the *Daśābhūmika Sūtra*). Song-yu also has said, "It is due to Dharmarakṣa's effort that the Buddhist scriptures have become popular in China". (See the *Life of Dharmarakṣa* in the *Collection of the Records of Translations of the Tripiṭaka*).

As regards his style of translation Dharmarakṣa was faithful to the original texts with all details, and he turned away completely from the inclination of earlier translators who were too often tempted to make abridgements at will. Thus his translations, as far as their literary style is concerned, are "in close keeping wth Indian texts without any embellishment,' and they sometimes give one an impression of "bare contents that overweigh the form". Nevertheless, if used as materials for comparative studies with other different versions, Dharmarakṣa's translations are of great help for one to apprehend the original meaning of the *sūtras*. In praise of his translation of the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhaśrikā-prajñāpāramitā* , Tao-an said that it was a very exact translation, and that when one compared it with the same *sūtra* translated by Mokṣala, "they will supplement each other" and enable one "to understand a great deal more." (See the Preface to the *Brief Commentary on the Combined Version of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhaśrikā* translated by Dharmarakṣa and Mokṣala). Again he has said that Dharmarakṣa's translation of the *Daśabhūmika* was "refinement in explanation," and that his translation of the *Sūtra on the Appearance of the Tathāgata* was "fine in literary style," and that his new translation of the *Śūraṅgama Sūtra* "is more minute than the old one." (See the preface to the *Daśabhūmika*). All these translations of his are helpful for comparative theoretical researches. Chih Ming-tu compared Dharmarakṣa's translations of the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-Sūtra* and the *Śūraṅgama Sūtra* with the old versions and compiled them into a combined text for the convenience of students. Further more, Dharmarakṣa also translated the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* and his translation was the

first complete version of this *sūtra* produced in Chinese language. It was revised by the Indian monk Chu Li and again by Po Yuan-hsin, a Buddhist layman of Kucha. Dharmarakṣa himself "gave oral explanations and expounded the profound meanings" of this *sūtra* to some of his disciples, and he also gave lectures on this scripture day and night in a great alms-giving meeting. (See the postscript to the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*). His zeal in propagating the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* created favourable conditions for the popularity of Kumārajīva's new version of this *sūtra* at a later time. His other translations also had influence upon the succeeding ages.

In Dharmarakṣa's translation work he was assisted by a number of scribes and collators. Among these assistants the best known ones were Nieh Ch'eng-yuan and his son Nieh Tao-chen as well as his disciples Chu Fa-ch'eng, Chu Fa-shou, Chang Hsuan-po, Sun Hsiu-ta, Ch'en Shih-lun, Sun Po-hu, Yu-Shih-ya and some others. Nieh Ch'eng-yuan and his son proved most helpful to Dharmarakṣa. Besides copying the translations in the Chinese language at the bidding of the master, they actually had a hand in their composition itself. Take for instance, the *Sūtra on Samadhi called Surpassing the Brightness of the Sun*. Dharmarakṣa's original translation was clumsy and full of repetitions, and Nieh Ch'eng-yuan improved it by making necessary corrections and abridgements. Furthermore, among the non-extant translations by Dharmarakṣa, there is an *Abridged Version of the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa Sūtra*, and it seems probable that it was abridged by Nieh Ch'eng-yuan. His son Nieh Tao-chen understood Sanskrit and was learned in literature. As he had accumulated experiences through his participation in Dharmarakṣa's translation work, he also translated some shorter scriptures by himself after the latter's death. He compiled a catalogue of all the works translated by Dharmarakṣa, and this is known as *Nieh Tao-chen's Catalogue* (sometimes also known as the Catalogue of Dharmarakṣa's Works). According to the materials quoted in *Fei Chang-fang's Catalogue*, there were at least fifty-three works translated by Dharmarakṣa, though some of them were lost, and the dates of all of them are ascertainable. The earliest date was the fifth year of T'ai-shih (in which he translated the *Catur-dāraka-samādhi Sūtra* and that was perhaps the time when Nieh Tao-chen began to take part in the work.

Dharmarakṣa had many disciples, but only a few of them are known to us concerning their lives. Chu Fa-ch'eng should be counted the most famous one. He became a *śrāmaṇera* under the guidance of Dharmarakṣa at early youth, and he was a man of great intelligence. He often gave liberal help on behalf of his teacher, to satisfy those people who came to test dharmarakṣa's virtue on the pretence of borrowing money, thus winning a large number of disciples for the master. During the T'ai-k'ang period he wrote down Dharmarakṣa's translations of the *Yogacaryā-bhūmi*, the *Avaivartika-cakra*, etc., and afterwards he built a monastery at Tunhuang, in which he taught Buddhism without paying attention to his personal welfare. He made a great contribution to the religious edification in that part of the country. His school-mates Chu Fa-hsing and Chu F-ts'un were well-known in their time as hermits who lived in the mountains and engaged themselves in the practice of Buddhism. There was also Chu Fa-shou who wrote down Dharmarakṣa's translation of the *Ārya-dharma-mudrā Sūtra* during the Yuan-k'ang period, but his other deeds are unknown to us.

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LU CHENG

DHARMARAKṢA (2) was a native of Central India. He lost his father at the age of six and was brought up by his mother who maintained their livelihood by weaving. On seeing that the monk Dharmayaṣas was honoured by the people and received abundant offerings, Dharmarakṣa's mother, out of admiration for the *monkish* life, sent the boy to Dharmayaṣas for education. When he was ten years old he practised the recitation of *sūtras* together with his fellow-students and showed his unusual cleverness. Moreover, he had a very good memory and

could memorize more than three hundred *ślokas* daily. At the beginning he studied *śrāvakayāna* Buddhism, but later he met the White-Haired master of *dhyāna*, with whom he carried on a debate for a hundred days. Unable to get the upper hand, he cherished a feeling of admiration towards the master of *dhyāna*, who gave him a copy of the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* written on barks. After reading this *sūtra*, he engaged himself exclusively in the study of *Mahāyāna* Buddhism. At the age of twenty, he was already well-acquainted with more than 60,000 *ślokas* of both *Mahāyāna* and *Srāvakayāna* scriptures. As it was through the inspiration of the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* that he changed his faith from *Srāvakayāna* to *Mahāyāna* Buddhism, his propagation works of Buddhism afterwards were chiefly based on this scripture.

Dharmarakṣa had a cousin who was a good elephant-trainer. He accidentally caused the death of the king's white-eared riding elephant and thus suffered capital punishment. By the king's order none of the victim's relatives was allowed to see the corpse, but Dharmarakṣa alone courageously went up, lamented over him and buried him. The enraged king wanted to have him put to death. Dharmarakṣa said to him composedly, "You killed my cousin because he violated the law, but I buried him because he is my relative. There is nothing wrong in it. Why should you feel offended". Deeply struck by his noble bearing the king asked him to stay and enjoy his entertainment. Dharmarakṣa learned the art of sorcery and had often practised it with efficacy, so that in the Western Regions he was known as a great sorcerer. For this reason the king treated him with great hospitality. But the royal favour soon waned. As he once again offended the king in some matter or other, he fled to Kucha out of fear, bringing along with him the first part of twelve fascicles of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*, the *Bodhisattvavinaya-sūtra* and several other scriptures. But the people of Kucha were *Śrāvakayānists* and did not believe in the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*, thus he was obliged to proceed to Tunhuang where he stayed for several years.[1] At Tunhuang he started the translation of scriptures, and the existing translation of the *Bodhisattva Prātimokṣa* (*Taisho*, No. 1500) in one fascicle was produced by him at that time.

Probably in the 10th year of Hsüan-shih (421 A.C.) of the Northern Liang regime, Tsu-ch'u Meng-hsün, the King of Ho-hsi, occupied the area of Tunhuang, where he met Dharmarakṣa and welcomed him to Kutsang.[2] After his arrival at Kutsang in the 10th month of that year, the King of Ho-hsi requested, him to translate the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*.[3] At that time the monks Hui-sung and Tao-lang who were both outstanding figures of Ho-hsi, highly respected Dharmarakṣa and assisted him in the translation work and it was Hui-sung who put down the text of the translation of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* in Chinese characters. Dharmarakṣa said that the Sanskrit text of this *sūtra* consists of 35,000 *ślokas*, which would comprise about one million characters when translated into the Chinese language. The text he was translating then was only an incomplete copy of a little more than 10,000 *ślokas*, wherein many chapters were lacking. Thereupon he went back to his own country to look for a full text of this *sūtra*. Just at that time his mother died of illness, and so he stayed at home for more than a year. After that, he went to Khotan and obtained a Sanskrit text of this *sūtra* which he brought back to Kutsang and translated into Chinese fully in 36 fascicles (*Taisho*, No. 374). At that time the Ven. Chih-meng had also procured a Sanskrit text of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-Sūtra* from India, and after returning to Liangchou he translated it into 20 fascicles. People of later times always confused his Sanskrit text and translation with those of Dharmarakṣa. But actually Chih-meng returned to China from India several years after Dharmarakṣa had

1 This account is taken from the *Preface to Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* and from the *Record of Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*. In the *History of Wei*, fasc. XCIX, it is said that he had been to Shan-shan, from where he fled to Liangchen, because he had committed some blunders. In *Seng-yu's Catalogue*, fasc. XIV, and in the *Biographies of Eminent Monks*, fasc. II, however, he is said to have gone from Kucha directly to Kutsang. But all these legends are not reliable.

2 This is also based upon the accounts given in the *Preface to Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* and the *Record of Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*.

3 *The Biographies of Eminent Monks* mistakes the 10th year of Hsüan-shih as the time when the translation of this *sūtra* was completed and alleged that the translation was started in the 3rd year of Hsüan-shih. This is incredible.

completed his translation. No relationship whatsoever existed between them.

Besides the two above-mentioned scriptures, Dharmarakṣa had also translated, at the request of Hui-sung, Tao-lang and others, (1) the *Mahāvaipulya-mahasannipāta-sūtra* (*Taisho*, No. 397) in 30 fascicles, (2) the *Karunāpuṇḍarīka-sutra* (*Taisho*, No. 157) in 10 fascicles, (3) the *Mahāmegha-sūtra* (*Taisho*, No. 387) in 6 fascicles, (4) the *Suvarṇaprabhāsottama-sūtrendrarāja-sūtra* (*Taisho*, No. 663) in 4 fascicles, (5) the *Upāsakaśīla-sūtra* (*Taisho*, No. 1488) in 7 fascicles, (6) the *Buddhacaritakāvya* (*Taisho*, No. 192) in 5 fascicles, (7) the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (*Taisho*, No. 1581) in 10 fascicles (the above 7 translations are all extant), (8) *Sāgaranāgarāja-paripṛcchā* in 4 fascicles, and (9) *A Composition of Ordination of Upāsakas according to the Bodhisattva Vinaya* in 1 fascicle (these two are lost). Thus his translations amount to a total number of 11 scriptures in 112 fascicles, including both the extant and the lost ones. All his translations were rendered in a flowery style, particularly his translations of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* and the *Buddhacaritakāvya* which are highly florid in style. Nevertheless, his translations convey the original meanings in one way or other without misinterpretations. Thus Tao-lang says in his Preface to *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* that "Dharmarakṣa was piously careful in his translation works always minding not to neglect any single idea. He made thorough studies of the original texts so that the doctrines of the *sūtras* were correctly represented." Besides these, in Fa-shang's Catalogue it is said that the *Trisaṃvaranirdeśa* (*Taisho*, No. 311) was translated by Dharmarakṣa, and in Fei Chang-fang's Catalogue, the *Strīvivarta-vyākaraṇa-sūtra* (*Taisho*, No. 563), the *Sūtra on the former account of the King Mūrdhagata* (*Taisho*, No. 40), and the lost versions of the *Srīmālāsiṃhanāda-sūtra*, the *Ramaka-sūtra* (?), the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, the *Āryasuvikrāntacintādevaputraparipṛcchā* and the *Guṇaratnaprabhāsa-bodhisattva-sūtra* are all ascribed to him. But the literary style of the first three scriptures bear no resemblence to Dharmarakṣa's usual mode of writing, while the original record of the last five translations is unknown. Thus these assertions are incredible. As regards the dates of his translations, besides the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*, we only know that the *Upāsakasīla-sūtra* was translated in the 4th month of the 15th year of Hsuan-shih (426 A.C.) and was completed in the 7th month at the request of Tsu-ch'u Hsing-kuo the son of the King of Ho-hsi, and a group of more than five hundred Upāsakas. The dates of his other translations are all unascertainable. In the printed editions of Seng-yu's Catalogue (fasc. II) since the southern Sung dynasty, most of Dharmarakṣa's translations are marked with dates, but they are not wholly credible as their original sources are unknown.

Later, T'o-pa T'ai, the Ruler of Northern Wei, heard of Dharmarakṣa's mastery of magical arts and sent a messenger to North Liang to invite him. Fearing the strength of the State of Wei, Tsu-ch'u Meng-hsun could not openly oppose the invitation, but at the same time he was also afraid that Dharmarakṣa's presence in the State of Wei might be disadvantageous to him. So he resorted to a secret plot to get rid of Dharmarakṣa. Just then Dharmarakṣa had a wish of going to the Western Regions again to seek after the second part of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*. Tsu-ch'u Meng-hsun, while pretending to help him make the journey sent an assassinator and murdered him on the way. This event occurred in the 3rd of I-ho (433 A.C.) when Dharmarakṣa was at the age of forty-nine.

The theory of *Parinirvāṇa-sūtra* as introduced by Dharmarakṣa, has exerted great influence upon Buddhism in China. In his translation of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* it is elucidated that all living beings possess the element of Buddha-nature which, when awakened, will enable them to attain Buddhahood, and even the *icchantikas* whose roots of goodness have been completely cut off are of no exception. This proposition soon gave rise to a series of hot disputes among the Buddhists of that time, and consequently there emerged from among the Buddhist theorists a sect known as the "Nieh-p'an-shih" (masters of the *Parinirvāṇa-sūtra*). The *Biographies of Eminent Monks*, fasc. VII tells that when the translation of this *sūtra* first appeared, hundreds of monks and laymen directed upon Dharmarakṣa all sorts of doubts and attacks. These difficulties he unravelled effectively in various ways to meet the needs of different circumstances, his eloquence flowing like an endless stream. It is also related in the same work that Chu Tao-sheng before seeing Dharmarakṣa's translation of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*, had only studied the abridged version of the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* in 6 fascicles, and by means of subtle analysis he had come to the conclusion that all living beings, including the *icchantikas*, might become Buddhas. This daring innovation brought upon himself oppo itions from the conservatives who eventually put him to exile. But he was full of self-confidence, saying that if his position was not contrary to truth, he would wish himself to die on the pulpit

Afterwards when Dharmarakṣa's translation of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sutra* was introduced to the South, it was found to be in agreement with Tao-sheng's theory. Thereupon Tao-sheng undertook to preach on this *sutra* at Lu-shan and, it was said, he actually passed away on the pulpit at the conclusion of his lectures. This story well reflected the seriousness of the dispute over the problem of Buddha-nature among the Buddhists of that time, and the high esteem they set upon Dharmarakṣa's translation of the larger *Parinirvāṇa-sūtra*.

Shortly after its production, the translation of this *sutra* was prefaced and commented upon by Tao-lang of Liang-chou (vide, *An Abstruse Treatise on Mahāyāna Buddhism* by Chi-tsang of the Sui dynasty). Chih-sung, who had assisted in the translation work, also taught the newly introduced *sūtras* and *śāstras* in the region of Liang and composed the *Record of the Principle of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* to expound its profound meanings (vide, the *Record of Buddhism and Taoism* in the *History of Wei*). When this translation was introduced to the South of Yangtze River, it was adapted and revised by Hui-yen Hui-kuan, Hsieh Ling-yun and others, and this revised version became known as the southern text of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*. Since then all masters of Buddhism in both the South and the North of China encouraged the study of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*, and a number of commentaries were written on it. Its popularity was still continuing at the beginning of the T'ang dynasty. The *Profound Meanings of Four Mahāyāna Śāstras*, fasc. vii, written by Hui-chun, a Director of Monks of the T'ang dynasty, records three fundamental theories and ten branch theories among the expounders of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* in discussing the Buddha-nature as the right cause of Buddhahood. This may give us some idea about the status of its development.

It was in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra* that the Mahāyāna disciplinary rules of India that were hitherto scattered in various scriptures, were collected together and organized into an integral body. Dharmarakṣa was the person who first introduced Mahāyāna disciplinary rules to China. When he first came to Tunhuang, he translated this *Prātimokṣa* into Chinese, and this manifested his esteem for it. His translation was roughly the same as the later version translated by Hsüan-tsang, the only exception being the lacking of the explicit statement permitting the violation of certain rules against natural sins on certain conditions. Probably this deletion was made to avoid trouble, because that statement contains the suggestion that justifies one to act against the ruling class. He also translated the *Upāsakaśīla-sūtra* and the *Composition of Ordination* of *Upāsakas according to the Bodhisattva Vinaya* and a series of other texts concerning Mahāyāna disciplinary rules, and he also translated a full version of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. In the *Pearl-grove of the Garden of the Law*, fasc. lxxxix, it is said that when Dharmarakṣa brought the *Bodhisattva Prātimokṣa* to China, monk Tao-chin went to Tunhuang to receive it personally. Afterwards three thousand people received the Bodhisattva Vinaya from Tao-chin, and it was handed down successively up to the T'ang dynasty according to the traditions as left by Dharmarakṣa. Moreover, his translations of such important Mahāyāna texts as the *Mahāsannipāta-sūtra* and the *Suvarṇa-prabhāsottama-sūtrendra-rāja-sūtra* as well as the *Buddhacaritakāvya* which was an important work about the life of the Buddha, have all exerted considerable influence upon Mahāyāna Buddhism of the later ages.

LI AN

DHARMĀRĀMA, RATMALĀNE ŚRĪ, (1853-1918), an erudite Buddhist monk of Sri Lanka. He was born in 1853 A.C. in the village of Kalapaluvava near Colombo as the son of Alexander Weerasingha Appuhamy and Dona Isabella de Alwis Siriwardena Hamine. For his early education he was sent to the venerable Koṭagama Mahāthera of the Kitsirimevan Kālani-vihāra at Kelaniya, close to Colombo. Later he studied under the venerable Kahatuduwe Candajoti Mahāthera of Māligāgodalla-vihāra at Udugampola, who, being a relative of the young boy ordained him at the age of seven years and four months, notwithstanding the disapproval of the parents.

It is said that this young novice (*sāmaṇera*) even at the age of eleven years, was such a clever preacher of the Dhamma that his parents' disapproval at his being ordained gradually disappeared. A leading Buddhist philanthropist of the area, a Mudaliyar named Ṇikulas Atapattu, who once heard him preach, suggested that the young *sāmaṇera* be sent to a suitable teacher for higher studies, which resulted in his being sent to Ratmalāne Dharmāloka thera (s.v.) in 1864 A.C., who re-ordained him as his pupil under the name Ratmalāne Dharmārāma. Under his new teacher Dharmārāma learnt Sinhala and Pali languages and Buddhism. At the age of fourteen

he was sent by his teacher to learn Sanskrit under an Indian Pandit named Mātrubhūteśvara Sāmaśāstri who had arrived in Sri Lanka from Kerala at that time. When returning to India this Pandit entrusted his pupil to the care of Śrī Viśvanātha Śivācārya Coomaraswamy so that he could continue his studies in Sanskrit. Subsequently, for another two years from 1869 to 1871, he again studied the Tipiṭaka under his venerable teacher while at the same time, editing several Pali and Sinhala literary works and systematizing the Sinhala alphabet.

In the year 1874 he received his higher ordination (*upasampadā*) at the Malwatta temple in Kandy with Venerable Mādagama Śrī Dharmarakṣita Devamitta Mahānāyaka Thera as his preceptor (*upajjhāya*), on which occasion he recited verses (*aṣṭaka*) composed by him in Pali and Sanskrit.

After the higher ordination he was appointed a teacher of the Ratmalāne Purāna-vihāra Piriveṇa. Subsequently, in 1875 A.C. when the Vidyālaṅkara Piriveṇa was established he was appointed its vice-principal. From 1887 until his death in 1918 he was the head of this institution.

The services rendered by this great scholar monk for higher education during a period of forty-three years, from 1875 to 1918 as vice-principal and later as principal of the Vidyālaṅkāra Piriveṇa is very remarkable. During his tenure of office as Principal the Vidyalaṅkara Piriveṇa developed to the status of a world-famous centre of higher education in Theravāda Buddhism and Oriental studies.

For the spread of Buddhist learning outside the confines of the Vidyālaṅkāra Piriveṇa he established other educational institutions, viz. the Vidyāratna Piriveṇa of Virahena and the Vidyāvardhana Pirivena of Beligammana and further encouraged his own pupils at the Vidyālaṅkāra Piriveṇa to start similar institutions in different parts of the country.

Critical editions of several Sanskrit works and a large number of Pali and Sinhala works also stand to his credit. The Sanskrit *Jānakīharaṇa*, a lost work at that time, was reconstructed by him with the help of a Sinhala paraphrase (*sanna*), composing stanzas wherever it was deemed necessary, and was published in 1891 with an introduction in Sinhala and English. This publication attracted the attention of European and Indian Sanskritists to the study of *Jānakīharaṇa*. In 1893, Pandit Hari Mohan Vidyabhushan, writing on the study of Sanskrit in Sri Lanka expressed the desirability of publishing the whole of Dharmārāma's text in the Roman or the Devanāgari characters. In the same year, Haridasa Sastri brought out an e ition of Dharmārāma's text in the Nāgari script. This edition was subsequently reviewed by Rhys Davids in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (*JRAS*, 1894, Vol. XXVI, pp. 623, f.). Later, in 1907, an Indian scholar named Gopal Raghunath Nandargikar also expressed his indebtedness to Dharmārāma's reconstructon in bringing out his edition (*Jānakīharaṇam*, Bombay, 1907).

Among Pali Texts edited by him are the *Majjhima Nikāya*, *Papañcasūdanī*, *Manorathapūraṇī*, *Hatthavanagalla-vihāra-vaṇṇsa*, *Bālāvatāra* and the *Mahārūpasiddhi*.

Sinhala works edited by him are : *Dharmapradīpikāva*, *Mahābodhivaṇṣa granthipada-vivaraṇaya*, *Pañcikāpradīpaya*, *Kāvyaśekharaya*, *Sālalihiṇi-Sandeśaya Sidatsaṅgarāva*, *Kāvyādarśa Purāṇa Sannaya* and a part of the *Pansiya Panas Jātakaya*.

The classification of the usage of consonants *na ṇa*, *la* and *ḷa* in the Simhala alphabet is another of his significant contributions in the field of literary studies. His works have been held in high esteem by later scholars like Mudliyar W. F. Gunawardena Munidasa Cumaratunga, Sir D. B. Jayatilaka, Wilhelm Geiger, Max Muller and Arthur MacDonell who made use of these work. in their literary pursuits.

Venerable Dharmārāma also held several high posts. In 1893 he was appointed the Chief High Priest of the Colombo District and in 1897 he was made the Chief High Priest of the Chilaw District too. In 1911, on the death of Hikkaḍuwe Śrī Sumaṅgala Mahāthera, the Malwatta Chapter conferred on him the title of *Tripiṭaka Vāgīśvarācārya Upādhyāya*.

Among his reputed pupils were the learned *theras* Luṇupokune Dhammānanda, Bādigama Śrī Ratanapāla, Baddegama Śrī Dharmaratana, Toṭagamuwe Śrī Paññāmoli, Giridara Ratanajoti, Kalutara Sri Somārāma and Sir D. B. Jayatilaka.

In the year 1917 A.C. when his health was failing, he summoned his pupil Luṇupokune Dharmārāma Thera, who was a teacher at that time at the Vidyāratna Piriveṇa at Virahena and made him vice-principal of the Vidyālaṅkāra Pirivena.

Ratmalāne Śrī Dharmārāma Thero passed away on the 3rd of May 1918, at the age of sixty - five.

H. R. PERERA

DHARMA-SCROLL (FA-CHÜAN), a religious genealogy concerned with the succession of abbots in Chinese monasteries. The purpose of dharma-scroll, therefore, is to trace the transmission of the Buddhist law, since orthodox Zen (Chinese : Ch'an) Buddhists regard authenticity of transmission a *sine qua non* for the correct understanding of the Buddha's *dharma*. Hence many a dharma-scroll opens with the story how the Buddha, Śākyamuni, without the use of words transmitted his understanding to his own disciple Mahā-Kāśyapa, who revealed his realisation with a smile at Vultures' Peak (Skt. *Gṛdhrakūṭa*). Likewise, the genealogy is traced, generation by generation, down to the Chinese monk whose name appears last on the scroll. Thus, a dharma-scroll testifies to the reliability of a monk's understanding and his right to profess what he knows. For what he teaches can ultimately be traced to the Buddha himself provided there has been no fault in the chain of transmission, and anyone can learn the same doctrine today from a master at the end of the chain.

It is not possible to suggest a date when dharma-scrolls first came to be used. Nevertheless. Chinese monks are of the opinion that scrolls began to be used at the end of the Ming or beginning of the Ch'ing dynasty. According to H. Welch, the explorer of these scrolls, this surmise does not seem unreasonable. The term Fa-chüan is unknown except among the members of the Chinese saṅgha. Moreover, the Buddhist dictionaries of Mochizuki and Ting Fu-pao do not contain any reference to it. Japanese specialists on Buddhism, too, do not betray a familiarity with these scrolls.

Indeed, if not for the untiring efforts of Holmes Welch, our knowledge regarding these scrolls would have been so meagre that an analytical treatment would have been next to impossible. Welch, in a year of interviews with a dozen *dharma*-masters gathered enough evidence to enable him to publish a valuable article on them in 1963. Our article, therefore, owes its origin to the pioneering labours of Welch.

According to Welch, the history of the development of dharma-scrolls and their diverse functions is extremely complex · This is mainly because within the last three centuries these scrolls have come to be associated with the control of monasteries. In other words, the scrolls have acquired spiritual as well as administrative significance.

The fact that the Buddhist monastery played the part of the parish church in China, together with the fact that Chinese Buddhism had no equivalent to pontiff, cardinal or bishop, naturally resulted in the abbot holding the highest administrative office in modern China. Consequently, dharma-scrolls, the purpose of which was to determine the succession of abbots, played a major role in the monastic life of the Chinese saṅgha.

For the sake of convenience, Welch groups the scrolls into two divisions under the headings monastery-scrolls and private scrolls. The Chinese, however, have invented no standard terms to classify the two varieties. The most significant difference between the two variant forms is that while the monastery-scroll was a permanent monastery-property to be handed on from abbot to abbot for safe-keeping, the private-scroll was the personal property of the disciple. In other words, a private-scroll was a private matter between individual master and individual disciple and the priests whose names have been inscribed on a monastery-scroll were members of a *dharma*-family and were not allowed to take a disciple without consulting their seniors. Nevertheless, there was no rigidity of rule concerning the enscrollment of a monk from another monastery. As a result, a monk could become a dharma-disciple in more than one lineage and even in more than one sect. Due to the laxity of the rules with regard to the transmission of dharma-scrolls, a private dharma could become a monastery dharma and vice versa.

In Chinese monasteries abbots were chosen "by a selection of the worthy" (*hsuan-hsien*). The appointment at some monasteries was done through the practice of balloting. At other monasteries lots were drawn before an image of Wei-t'o, the guardian *bodhisattva* of monasteries. At some monasteries however, the abbot in power named his successor on the basis of consultations with other elders. Very often the difficulty lay in finding a qualified candidate. The qualifications were : 1. The candidate must have had experience in monastery administration. 2. He must be an expert in religious exercises like meditation, study of *sūtras*, participation in daily and other periodic devotions. 3. He must be flawless in the practice of the Vinaya and must be able to teach. 4. He must also have the ability to attract not only listeners, but donations as well, which were essential for the upkeep of the monasteries. 5. Added to all these qualificaions he must be willing to serve.

The last clause is very suggestive. It shows the general sense of apathy shown by the brethren when

it came to the appointment of a new abbot. Frequently, the monks were unwilling to serve in this capacity and Welch relates in his article on the dharma-scrolls, the interesting story of a famous abbot who fell ill under the strain of looking for a successor. The reason for this state of affairs is that the monks in China, as it should be according to Buddhist ideals, wished to devote themselves to the religious life, not to administration.

According to practice, the new abbot could never be the tonsure-disciple of the abbot whose name appeared last in the list of names in the dharma-scroll. Yet, in both transmissions the wishes of the retiring abbot played a critical role.

A significant thing is that all Zen lineages go back to Bodhidharma, who is generally considered the twenty-eighth patriarch, counting from Mahā-Kāśyapa the first patriarch of India. It would be interesting to know when the chain, if it did exist, was broken. Welch's suggestion is that the voluminous Chinese Buddhist literature would afford rich material for the investigation of this intriguing problem.

According to Chinese usage the arrangement of a dharma-scroll consists of a list of the dharma-names giving the succession of abbots with short verses following every name. Each one of these verses is supposed to express a master's understanding of the *dharma*. The Chinese belief is that even by pronouncing the name of a monk, one is preaching the Buddhist law. The main item, of course, is the list of dharma-names. These scrolls are generally rolled up and preserved in engraved cylindrical containers.

For further details see the article by Holmes Welch, Dharma Scrolls and the Succession of Abbots in Chinese Monasteries *T'oung Pao*, Vol. L, Livr. 1-3, 1963 (pp. 93-148).

G. K. WIJESEKERA

DHARMASKANDHA, the sixth of the seven texts of the *Abhidharmo-Piṭaka* of the Sarvāstivāda school preserved in its Chinese version (*Taisho*, No. 1537 : *A-pi-ta-mo-fa-yun-tsu-lun; Nanjio*, No. 1296). Since the first text in this collection, *Jñānaprasthāna*, is considered the basic one and the other six secondary, named *pādas*, this text occupies the fifth place in the *pāda* works. Takakusu thinks that this treatise, although regarded as one of the secondary works, is in no way inferior to the *Jñānaprasthāna*, the basic text, as regards material it contains. He points out that the importance of this treatise has also been acknowledged by the compilers of other *pāda* works. There are many quotations from the text incorporated in other *pādas*, namely, *Saṅgīti Sūtra* (*JPTS.*, 1904-5, pp. 3-12).

Dharmaskandha contains twenty-one chapters. The first chapter is devoted to the exposition of the five precepts (*śikṣāpada* or *śīla*). The second deals with the acquisitions which result in the attainment of the first stage of sanctification, i.e., *śrotāpatti* stage. The third deals with firm faith (*avetya-prasāda*). The fourth explains the various attainments of an adept in the four stages of sanctification, namely, *śrotāpatti*, *sakṛdāgāmi*, *anāgāmi* and *arhatva*. The fifth is devoted to the exposition of the mental experience of an adept, as he proceeds from lower to higher stages of spiritual progress. The sixth treats of four noble races (*ārya-vaṃśa*), i.e., the four types of disciples of the Buddha. The seventh and the eighth deal with the four kinds of victory and the four bases of psychic power (*iddhi-pāda*). The ninth and the tenth treat of four bases of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*) and the Four Noble Truths (*catur-ārya-satya*) respectively. The eleventh, the twelfth and the thirteenth are devoted respectively to the exposition of the four *dhyānas*, the four *apramāṇas* and the four *ārupyas*. The fourteenth and the fifteenth are devoted to the exposition of three kinds of *bhāvanā*, *parikarma*, *upacāra* and *arpanā*, and the seven *bodhyaṅgas* respectively. The sixteenth deals with the topics of miscellaneous character. The seventeenth, the eighteenth, the nineteenth and the twentieth explain the twenty-two *indriyas*, the twelve *āyatanas*, five *skandhas* and diverse elements (*nānā dhātu*) respectively. The concluding chapter is devoted to a detailed exposition of the law of causality (*pratītya-samutpāda*) with its twelve links.

As far as the authorship of the work is concerned, it is composed according to the Chinese tradition, by Maudgalyāyana; but according to Yaśomitra and Bu-ston, by Ārya Śāriputra. It was translated into Chinese by Hsüan Tsang in 650 A.C. (*Sarvāstivāda Literature* by A. C. Banerjee, Calcutta, 1957, pp. 66-67).

UPALI KARUNARATNA

DHARMAŚŪNYATĀ, unreality of elements. Elements (*dharmas*) are unreal (*śūnya*) because they are dependent on each other (*pratītya-samutpanna*), and, as such, are devoid of essence (*niḥsvabhāva*).

This is the conclusion arrived at by the Mādhyamika school by their interpretation of the causal law (*pratītya-samutpāda*) according to which causal law is not the principle of temporal sequence of separate elements (*dharmas*), but a principle of an essential dependence of elements on each other.

The terms *śūnya* and *śūnyatā* are applied to phenomena as well as absolute. Phenomena are *śūnya* as they are devoid of essence and are dependent on each other; the absolute is *śūnya* as it is utterly devoid of the conceptual distinctions of "is" and "not-is", and free from all subjectivity (*nirvikalpa, niṣprapañca*). See DHARMANAIRĀTMYA, ŚŪNYATĀ.

UPALI KARUNARATNA

DHARMASWĀMIN, (Tibetan : Chaglotsaba-chos-rje-dpal), a scholar monk from Tibet whose life's desire was to visit the place of enlightenment of the Buddha at Buddhagayā (q.v.) and worship the Sacred Bodhi-tree, and other objects of veneration at the site.

Until the manuscript of the biography of Dharmaswāmin was discovered by Rahula Sanskrityayana in the monastery of Snar-than, in the Gtsan province of central Tibet in 1936, the name of Dharmaswāmin was forgotten.

Dharmaswāmin was discouraged by many of his colleagues and preceptors from undertaking the journey from Tibet to India as it was the period in which most of the Buddhist states in India were being ruthlessly devastated by Muslim invaders, putting monks to death and razing places of worship to the ground. This was the 13th century India.

The difficulties that had to be encountered by pilgrims to India from Tibet in this troubled period were made known to Dharmaswāmin. But his was a firm resolve and no one could deter him from going to India. Thus in the early part of the 13th century Dharmaswāmin began his journey from Tibet to Vajrāsana.[1]

The itinerary of Dharmaswāmin is valuable as it covers a period which was fateful to Buddhism in its very place of birth. "The history of northern India during the first half of the 13th century has been so far re-constructed mainly from the accounts of Muslim historians. The value of the account left behind by Dharmaswāmin of this period of Indian history is enhanced on account of its being an important record by a Tibetan Monk".[2]

Like many other Buddhist itinerant monks to India, e.g. Fa-Hsien, Hsüan-tsang and others, Dharmasvāmin also had obtained a preliminary education on Buddhism. He had studied for twenty-two years the doctrine of the Buddha and other sciences pertaining to Buddhism, before embarking on his journey to India in 1226. It is recorded that he had mastered the five sciences, namely, *śabdavidyā* (grammar), *hetuvidyā* (logic), *adhyātmavidyā* (philosophy), *cikitsāvidyā* (medicine) and *śilpasthāna-vidyā* (science).[3]

On his way to India Dharmasvāmin stayed in Nepal, and studied there for nearly eight years under the two learned *bikkhus*, Ravīndra and Ratnarakṣita.[4] It was in 1234, at the age of 37, that Dharmasvāmin reached India.

The history of the once famous seat of Buddhist royalty, the Kingdom of Magadha in the 13th century is well depicted in the narrative presented by Dharmaswāmin. This could be one of the best and most trustworthy accounts preserved of the history of Buddhism in this part of India, as no Indian records yield so impartial a description of the state of Buddhist religion during this period of turmoil, when

1 Originally the name Vajrāsana was meant to signify the sacred seat—adamantine seat—on which the Buddha attained supreme enlightenment. But with the passage of time this term was used to refer to the entire region, and the seat of royalty of the local *rājāh* Buddhasena by name, too was designated by the name *Vajrāsana.*

2 George Roerich *Biography of Dharmasvāmin-Chaglotsa-ba-chos-rje-dpal;* original Tibetan text deciphered and translated, published by the K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1959, Introduction, ii.

3 G. Roerich, op. cit., p. 506.

4 Ravīndra, being a Tantric Buddhist, taught Dharmaswāmin, the Maṇḍala Sādhana and works like Vajravatī belonging to Guhyasamāja.

literary activity was at its lowest ebb. One cannot expect Indain scholars of the day to present historical notices, when one observes that these learned men were scattered or exiled or even put to death by the advancing Muslim soldiery.

Of the sites visited by Dharmaswāmin and recorded in his itinerary, those which are of interest for the history of Buddhism are Buddhagaya (s.v.) and Nālandā (s.v.). Nevertheless he had also recorded his stay at such Buddhist sites like Rājagṛha, Gijjakūṭa, Veluvana (Roerich, G., op. cit., p. 521). Vikramaśilā (s.v.), another famous seat of learning in Bihar, was only a heap of rubble when Dharmaswāmin visited the place. The most lamentable part of the fate of Vikramaşilā is that it was existing in its full splendour a few years earlier, as recorded by the uncle of Dharmasvāmin, Chag-dgra-bcom (cir. 1153-1216 AC.) who had visited Magadha. Dharmasvāmin reports that the Muslims have thrown the foundation stones of this University into the Ganges, having razed its buildings to the ground.

At the time Dharmaswāmin visited Buddhagayā, the area had been abandoned by its inhabitants, through fear of an imminent Muslim attack and the local *rājā* named Buddhasena (s.v.)[5] had taken refuge in a forest hideout.

The great Mahābodhi temple (s.v.) at Buddhagayā, it is said, could be seen at a distance in two stages,[6] thus indicating that the edifice was intact with its superstructure reaching the skyline when Dharmaswāmin visited the place.

His description of Buddhagayā enumerates among other things, religious edifices, that were existing from the pre-Christian period up to the mediaeval times of the present era. Thus Dharmaswāmin observes the stone railing at Buddhagayā (installed by queen Kuraṅgi, the wife of king Indrāgnimitra, in the 2nd century B.C.); the sacred Bodhi tree in the centre of the "*Viśva Vajra*";[7] the promenade (*caṅkamana*); the Gandhola (Gandhakuṭi Vihāra); a wall built by Acārya Nāgārjuna; a golden reliquary in which was held a sacred Tooth Relic of the Buddha; the foot-print of the Buddha depicted in a stone-slab; a ruined stone gate built by Ācārya Hayaghoṣa.[8]

A very important observation at Buddhagayā by Dharmaswāmin was the authority wielded by the Siṅhalagaṇa, that is the Sinhalese *Bhikkhus*, as the custodians of the great temple. He says that there were about three hundred Sinhalese monks who belonged to the Śrāvaka School (Theravāda) who had the sole right to sleep within the walls of the Buddhagayā complex, surrounded by a massive wall.

Dharmaswāmin reports of a miserable experience he had to encounter when he met these custodian Sinhalese monks of Buddhagayā. When he entered the premises of the *vihāra*, the chief incumbent monk questioned him as to what book he was carrying in his hand. Being told by Dharmaswāmin that it was the *Aṣṭasāhaśrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, the chief monk barred Dharmaswāmin's entry insisting that he threw away the book into the waters of the adjoining Nairanjana river.

The Sinhalese monks however convinced him as to the futility of Mahāyāna teachings and allowed him to enter the premises to perform his religious worship.[9]

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5 Buddhasena, the ruler of Magadha, is mentioned by Tāranātha in his *History of Buddhism in India*. Tāranātha adds that the local Sena Kings to whom Buddhasena belonged, preferred allegiance to their Muslim overlords.

6 A "stage" being about eight miles.

7 The so-called *viśvavajra* of Dharmaswāmin could probably refer to an illusory diagram of Tantric Buddhism to which Mahāyānists of Tibet belonged : cf. *Jñānakāya, Bhūmisparśa-mudrā* in the *EB*.

8 This may be a reference to the famous Mahāyāna teacher *Aśvaghoṣa : "haya"* means *aśva-* (horse).

9 This incident which reveals the high authority of the Sinhala Saṅgha at Buddhagayā speaks also of the continuation of an ancient tradition. It was reported in the Sinhalese chronicle *Mahāvaṃsa* how the ruling monarch of Sri Lanka constructed a Vihāra at Buddhagayā for the monks from Sri Lanka, as far back as the 4th century A.C. (See Buddhagaya, *EB*. It is most probable that a community of monks from Sri Lanka, who had established themselves at Buddhagayā from the 4th century, developed with the passage of time to be the sole custodians of the great Buddhist establishment at Buddhagayā. It is not surprising that their authority had dwindled with the Muslim conquests of eastern India and as a result the Buddhagayā monument had passed on to the hands of the Hindus of the locality. Thus when Anagarika Dharmapala (s.v.) had taken interest in the restoration of Buddhagayā, it was more or less a monopoly of a Hindu Mahant.

Besides the normal forms of Theravāda Buddhist cult worship, Dharmaswāmin had observed Mahāyāna cults, too, being practised at Buddhagayā. Thus according to him the worship of Tārā in several aspects was prevalent at Buddhagayā.[10]

At Rājagrha he had visited other sites that were famous resorts of the Buddha including the Veluvana monastery. He had met at Rājagrha a great scholar by the name of Yaśomitra (s.v.) who had imparted to him the knowledge of various doctrines.

When Dharmaswāmin visited the famous Buddhist seat of learning, the Nālandā Monastery, it was on the verge of a Muslim attack. The resident monks had been alerted of the imminent danger and had fled before the Muslim soldiers arrived. But Dharmaswāmin had braved to stay behind with the ninety year old chief abbot of the monastery, the Mahāpaṇḍita Rāhula Śrī Bhadra. Dharmaswāmin records that the Nālandā *bhikkhu*-community headed by the learned *thera* Rāhula Śrī Bhadra was lavishly supported by the ruling king of Magadha, Rājā Buddhasena and a rich brahmin layman named Jayadeva. Jayadeva was put into prison by the commander of an invading Muslim regiment, encamped at Odantapuri (s.v.), another seat of Buddhist learning. It was the message sent by Jayadeva that helped the monks of Nālandā monastery to flee for safety before the Muslim soldiers arrived. Dharmaswāmin and his *guru* Rāhula Śrī Bhadra however took refuge in a nearby shrine dedicated to the Buddhist deity Jñānanātha who is believed to possess immense miraculous power. It is said that the Muslim soldiers who came in search of Dharmaswāmin and Rāhula Śrī Bhadra had even searched the very place where they were hiding but could not find them.[11]

The image of Jñānanātha is described by Dharmaswāmin as of one face and four arms. It was slightly bigger than life-size and painted in green.[12] At Nālandā, Dharmaswāmin had also noticed the worship of several other Mahāyāna gods like Khasarpana, Lokeśvara, Mañjuśrī, Tārā and the practice of extremist Tantric cults like Guhyasāmaja.[13]

On his return journey Dharmaswāmin is said to have fallen gravely ill when he reached the kingdom of Tirhut in the neighbourhood of the Indo-Nepalese border. However, the Hindu ruler of Tirhut, King Rāmasingha was favourable towards Dharmaswāmin and had even insisted him to be his royal chaplain, which offer Dharmaswāmin had courteously declined to accept.

After his return to the motherland Tibet and despite undergoing so much hardship, he still devoted many years for the cause of Buddhist learning. He was the author of thirty Buddhist books.[14]

The fame of Dharmaswāmin had spread to other neighbouring Buddhist kingdoms also, and the Chinese emperor Kubilai-Khan, sent special messengers inviting Dharmaswāmin to the royal court. Dharmaswāmin who courteously evaded the Chinese emperor's order under various pretexts however had to obey ultimately the messengers sent by Kubilai-Khan. Thus he began his journey to Mongolia but was forced to return having gone half-way, when his ailments aggravated. Tibetans honoured Dharmaswāmin by making him the chief incumbent of many a Tibetan monastic establishment. This persevering Tibetan scholar monk passed away in the year 1264 A.D. at the age of sixty-seven.

A.D.T.E.P.

10 Roerich, G., op. cit., p. 549.

11 These constant Muslim incursions witnessed by Dharmaswāmin were penultimate to the conquest of Bihar and Bengal by Ikthiyar-ud-Din Muhammed, between 1193-1205 A.C.

12 This could be an image dedicated to Avalokiteśvara in one of his innumerable aspects. The green colour with which the image is associated is at times related to the images of Buddhist divinities like Tārā. In Sri Lanka the gods Upulvan and Saman (s.v.), who were primarily Buddhist deities, seem to have been painted in green (see A. D. T. E. Perera, Upulvan the patron god of the Sinhalese, *Vidyodaya Journal of Arts, Science and Letters*, Vol. 4, No. 1 2, 19 71, pp. 88-104.

13 Roerich, G., op. cit., p. 549.

14 The thirty books are listed by George Roerich at the end of his general introduction, op. cit., p. 501 f.

DHARMATĀ, the real nature of phenomenal existence, the essential unity underlying all phenomena. It is equated with Nirvāṇa (*Mādhyamika Sūtras*, xviii, 7); it is also the nature of the Buddha, the *dharma kāya*-(*Mdhvr*. p. 448).

According to Mahāyāna, the Buddha possesses a dual nature : (1) as identical with the absolute, and (2) as one belonging to the phenomenal sphere. *Dharmatā* is his identity with the absolute, and is variously termed as *dharma-kāya*, *svābhāvika-kāya*, *tathatā*, *bhūtatathatā*, *bhūtakoṭi*, *prajnā* and *śūnyatā*; it is the absolute, the sole reality, which is identical with the real nature of the universe.

The absolute, in one sense. transcends phenomena as it is devoid of empiricality; but, in a vital sense, is immanent in or identical with phenomena as their reality. The Absolute, should not, therefore, be considered as something different or standing aloof from phenomena.

The Buddha, as one belonging to the phenomenal sphere, is the mediator between the absolute and phenomena, and reveals the absolute to the beings of the phenomenal world. See DHARMAKĀYA, TATHATĀ.

UPALI KARUNARATNA

DHARMATĀBUDDHA. An early and rudimentary form of the later *Dharmakāya* of the Mahāyānist *Trikāya* (Triple Body) doctrine, occurring in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*. Its occurrences in this *sūtra* (pp. 56, 57, 241 etc.) show that the *Trikāya* doctrine was not fully developed at the time this *sūtra* was compiled. In it, the *Dharmatā* Buddha exists and operates at the transcendental level. For the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* says : 'Again, Mahāmati, it is the doing of the *Dharmatā* Buddha to establish the exalted state of self-realisation which transcends the phenomena of the (empirical) mind' (*Lank*. p. 57). The responsibility of guiding and directing beings at the worldly level seems to devolve on the *Niṣyanda-Nirmāṇa* Buddha. Says the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* : 'In the same way, Mahāmati, the *Niṣyanda*-Buddha, instantaneously maturing the mentality of beings places them in the palatial abode of the *Akaniṣṭha* mansion where they will become practisers of various spiritual exercises. Mahāmati, it is like the *Dharmatā*-Buddha shining forth instantaneously with the rays that issue from the *Niṣyanda-Nirmāṇa* (Buddha)' (*Lank*. p. 56). This latter, in contrast to the *Dharmatā*-Buddha, not only operates at the worldly plane, but is involved with worldly concerns. 'Again, Mahāmati, what the *Nirmita-Nirmāṇa*-Buddha (or Buddha of transformations) establishes concerns such matters as charity, morality, meditation, tranquilisation, various forms of transcendental knowledge and of understanding the *Skandhas*, *Dhātus*, and *Ayatanas*, emancipation, the *Vijñānas*, and the ways in which they function, the forms which they take, their distinctions and their performances' (*Lank*. 57).

The real antithesis in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* seems to be between the transcendental and unified *Dharmatā*-Buddha and its manifested (or transformed) form, in the interest of worldly beings, as *Niṣyanda-Nirmāṇa* or *Nirmita-Nirmāṇa* - Buddha. This is clearly brought out in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* as follows : 'In order to turn their inclination away from the *śrāvakayāna* and to make them exert themselves in the course of the Mahāyāna, the *śrāvakas* in transformation are given assurance (as to their future Buddhahood) by the Body of Transformation; but this is not done by the *Dharmatā*-Buddha (*Lank*. p.241). Finally the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* sums up the absolute nature of the *Dharmatā*-Buddha in the following words : 'Again Mahāmati, the *Dharmatā*-Buddha is unconditioned. free from conditions, has nothing to do with all doing, senses and measurements, and does not belong to the world of the ignorant, *śrāvakas*, *Pratyekabuddhas* and philosophers who are always clinging to the notion of an ego' (*Lank*. p. 57).

What is of particular interest in this concept of *Dharmatā* Buddha is the *Dharmatā*-Buddha's non-involvement in the historical process. (*Tan nirmita śrāvakān nirmāṇakāyair vyākaroti na ca dharmatā-buddhāḥ*, *Lank*. p. 214). While it retains for itself a transcendental cosmic character, the historical function is performed by its counterpart, the *nirmāṇa-kāyas* who flow out to (*niṣyanda*) the worldly plane or one created (*nirmita*) for the benefit of beings of the world. This is in marked contrast to the position in the early Theravāda wherein the uniqueness of the historical Buddha who is born in the world of man lies in his identification with *Dhamma* which is transcendental : *dhammaṃ hi Vakkhali passanto, maṃ passati maṃ passanto dhamma passati* (*S*. III p. 120). It is in the perfection of the spiritual quality of the historical Buddha that he is identified with *dhamma* and is referred to as being *dhammabhūta* (*M*. I. p. 111). Associated with this are other words like *cakkhubhūto :* vision gained and *ñāṇabhūto :*

wisdom gained (Ibid.). Something like this latter concept seems to be developed in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* in which it is stated that the Bodhisattvas will ultimately attain the *Dharmakāya* of the Tathāgata. "Thus the Bodhisattvas. . . .going beyond the bliss of the tranquilisation belonging to all the *Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas*, and philosophers, will attain the *Dharmakāya* of the Tathāgata, which belongs to the realm and course of Tathāgatahood transcending thought and in which there is no rising of the five *dharmas*. This is intimately bound up with the understanding born of transcendental knowledge . . .' (*Lank*. p 51). However, with the Theravādins, the historical reality is not surrendered in their quest for metaphysical sublimity.

J.D. + A.G.S.K.

DHARMĀYATANA See ĀYATANA and DHAMMADHĀTU.

DHARMOTTARIYA (Pali Dhammuttara, Dhammuttarika, Dhammuttariya), one of the eighteen schools of Buddhism referred to in Buddhist literature. Tradi ion in the North West considers this sect to be the first to branch off from the Vātsīputriyas (Vajjiputtakas) towards the middle of the third century after the *parinirvāṇa* of the Buddha. It should be noted that the *Kathāvatthu* does not make any mention of this school.

According to Bhavya (cf. also *K'uei-chi* III, p. 6) this school was founded by a teacher called Dharmottara and hence its name. This is confirmed by the *Mañjusrīparipṛcchā Sūtra* (*Taisho*, No. 468, p. 501). Bhavya mentions also that there are other traditions giving different versions of its origin. Thus, the traditon of Sammitiyas, as quoted by Bhavya, places them together with the Bhadrayāniyas as a sub-division of the Mahāgiriya which, too, is a major branch of the Vātsiputriyas. An inscription, dated from the second century A.C. prove their presence at Kārle, Soparala and Junnar, in the mountain ranges near Bombay.

According to Paramārtha, the Dharmottariyas were one of the four schools who completed the *Abhidharma-Piṭaka* of the Vātsīputriyas, also called *Śāriputra-Abhidharma* or *Dharmalakṣaṇa-Abhidharma* in nine parts, which are commentaries based on the meaning of *sūtras* (P. Demieville, *Origine des Sectes bouddhiques*, pp. 23, 58).

Little is known of their doctrine. From available sources it appears that a fundamental teaching of this school is that, in birth is ignorance and in arresting of birth is the arresting of ignorance (Rockhill, *Life of the Buddha*, London, 1907, p. 194). The Dharmottariyas share. with the Mahāsaṅghikas, the Sthaviras and several other schools in the doctrine of non-existence of the 'soul' or 'self' and say that those who teach about the existence of a 'self' are merely heretics preaching views similar to those held by the tīrthakas (Rockhill, op. cit., p. 185).

Warder mentions that Dharmottariyas were found in Aparanta on the coast of Mahārāshtra (A. K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism*, India, 1970, p. 292). According to him this school branched off from the Vātsīputriyas owing to some difference of opinion they held with regard to the Abhidharma (Warder, op. cit., p. 275).

H. G. A. VAN ZEYST

DHATARAṬṬHA, Skt. Dhṛtarāṣṭra, is one of the four great kings (*cātummahārājika*) of the early Buddhist pantheon. He figures most frequently in the *suttantas* of *Dīgha Nikāya*. In the *Janavasabha Suttanta* (*D*. II, p. 207), Janavasabha, the reborn spirit of Bimbisāra describes him to the Buddha, as ruler of the eastern quarter. He is there depicted as being usually seated at the eastern quarter of the horizon, facing the west and presiding over his host who occupy seats behind him. In this and the *Mahāgovinda Suttanta* (*D*. II, p. 270) where Pañcasikha, the *gandhabba*, is the reporter instead of Janavasabha, descriptions are given of two important assemblies or meetings at which the king Dhataraṭṭha was among those present, along with the other three kings of the four quarters, and their hosts. Both *suttantas* depict him as being in the company of the thirty-three gods (*Tāvatiṃsa deva*) and as himself being a devotee of the Buddha.

In the *Mahāsamaya Suttanta* (*D*. II, p. 257), the Buddha himself announces Dhataraṭṭha's arrival at the head of his host at the great assembly of celestial beings at Kapilavatthu, to hear him preach the Dhamma, describing him thus :

"King Dhataraṭṭha rules the eastern clime,
Lord of Gandhabbas, mighty monarch he
With splendid following. Sons has he, too,
Many and strong, all after Indra named.
And these of wondrous gifts and mighty powers
Have come rejoicing to the forest glade
To see the brethren met together there."

His lordship over the *gandhabbas*, and the somewhat enigmatic statement that his sons were all named after Indra is reasserted in the *Āḷānāḷiya Suttanta* (*D.* III, p. 203 f.) which also adds, in the words of Vessavana, the *mahā-rāja* of the north, that :

"Attended by Gandhabbas he enjoys
their songs and dances"

and that his sons, besides being "all of one name and the same" (i.e., Indra) have "eighty and ten and one" tales about them." They were according to this *suttanta*, all devotees of the Buddha "though they were non-human" (*amanussa*), and were one and all subject to death. Further, according to the *Mahāsamaya Suttanta*, Dhataraṭṭha arrives at the great concourse at Kapilavatthu, after the arrival of sixteen thousand *yakkhas*, of Vessamitta's retinue and of Kumbhira of Rājagaha who dwelt on mount Vepulla. He precedes his host the Gandhabbas who are followed by their vassals, Māyā, Kuṭeṇḍu, Veṭeṇḍu, Viṭu, Viṭucca, Candana, Kāmaseṭṭha, Kunnughaṇḍu and Niganḍu. Of these the last four are mentioned in the *Āḷānāḷiya Suttanta*, to be among others, the *yakkhas* who ought to be appealed to by Buddhists in the event of distress from other *yakkhas*.

That Dhataraṭṭha of the *cātummahārājika*, is not to be confused with the king of that name who was ruler of the Nāga world in the *Bhūridatta Jātaka* is made clear by the fact that the latter's separate arrival at the great concourse is announced in the *Mahāsamaya*. That nāga king arrives very much later, in the company of the nāgas of Yamunā.

After these *Dīgha Nikāya* references, Dhataraṭṭha figures again only in the *Sirikālakaṇṇi Jātaka* (*J.* III, p. 257 f.) as one of the four great kings and as father of Siri, the goddess of luck and good fortune. A dispute has sprung up between her and Kālakaṇṇi, the daughter of Virūpakkha, as to who has the right of precedence for bathing in the Anotatta lake. The two goddesses decide to refer the matter to their fathers, who confess that they are incompetent to give an impartial judgement (probably being the fathers) and refer them to Virūḷha and Vessavana who in turn send them over to Sakka who is described here as their lord.

Thus it is clear that Dhataraṭṭha was considered to be only a minor king under the overlordship of Sakka. It is also interesting that here Dhataraṭṭha the king of the east is placed in opposition to Virūpakkha, the king of the west. The usual order of mention of the four great kings is Dhataraṭṭha, Virūḷha, Virūpakkha and Vessavana, Dhataraṭṭha always coming first.

The other striking fact in the *Jātaka* is that Dhataraṭṭha is mentioned as the father of the goddess of fortune, Siri, describing herself as "presiding over the course of conduct that gives lordship to mankind", and identifying herself with "wisdom men admire", while Kālakaṇṇi is painted in evil colours. Dhataraṭṭha is thus the father of the Buddhist equivalent of Athene, but unlike in the Greek legend, he is not identical with Zeus. In the later canonical literature, Dhataraṭṭha, like his other three companions, recedes into oblivion, and comes to be mentioned only by the generic name, *cātummhārājika*. Known as Dhṛtarāṣṭra in Buddhist Sanskrit literature he is regarded as the Regent of the east and lord of *gandharvas*. There he usually figures not singly but in the fourfold group. References to him in Buddhist Sanskrit works will be discussed in the article LOKAPĀLA. See further CĀTUMMHĀRĀJIKA.

BANDULA JAYAWARDHANA

DHĀTU (1).

Introductory : The analysis of empirical existence is one of the most distinctive features to be noticed in the teachings of the Buddha. Its main purpose is to deny the existence of a permanent trans-empirical entity like the *ātman*—which in the Vedic tradition is supposed to underlie the world of sensory experience (See ANATTA). There are five main kinds of analysis and the analysis into six *dhātus* is one of them.*

* In the other four methods, the universe is analysed into five *khandhas*, twelve *āyatanas*, eighteen *dhātus* (with an extended application of the term) and a number of *dharmas*.

The six *dhātus* or elements are the earth-element (*paṭhavī-* or *pṛthivī-dhātu*), water-element (*āpo-* or *āp-dhātu*), fire-element (*tejo-dhātu*), air-element (*vāyo-* or *vāyu-dhātu*), space-element (*ākāsa-* or *nabho-dhātu*), and the mind-element (*viññāṇa-* or *vijñāna-dhātu*). The first four of these six elements are called *mahābhūta* or the primary elements of matter. As a technical term *mahābhūta* is used in the *Upaniṣads* and most of the schools of Indian thought, notably the Sāṁkhya, the Vedanta, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the medical tradition as represented by Caraka and Suśruta, to denote the five gross elements into which matter is analysed (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad*, 1, VI; Seal, *Positive Sciences of the Hindus*, Ch. 1.) The names of these five elements are identical with the first five items of our list. However, in Buddhism, as in Jainism, *ākāsa*, the fifth item of the list, is excluded from the category of *mahābhūtas*.

The first five elements represent the material aspects of a living being and the last his psychological aspects. According to the pre-Buddhistic *Upaniṣads*, all these elements are a manifestation of the Ultimate Reality, called the *Brahman*, the Absolute (*Bṛhad* 1, VI, 1). While they are a diversification of the *Brahman* (ibid.), the individual *ātman* is an appearance in every human being of the same *Brahman*. Buddhism, on the contrary, considers these elements to be neither permanent entities themselves, nor manifestations of an Ultimate Reality underlying them (*MA*. V, p. 50; *AA*. II, p. 277; *VbhA*. p. 55, 77; *Abhidharmadīpa*, p. 12).

The term *dhātu* which is sought to be derived from *dadhāti* or *dhāreti* is said to convey the meaning, bearing or producing. And, in the texts, it is said that the six elements are the original factors or primary elements (*mūla-sattvaṃ : Abhk*. V. p. 58), of mind and matter which produce conception (*pratisandhi :* ibid. pp. 57, 58) or rebirth (*punarbhava :* ibid. pp. 33, 42). They are the primary elements on account of which the phenomenon of conception takes place (*channaṃ bhikkhave dhātūnaṃ upādāya gabbhassa avakkanti hoti : A*. I, p. 176; *Saṭ khalu dhātūn pratītya mātuḥ kukṣau garbhāvakrānti : Abhk*. V. p. 57). They are, therefore, considered as the seed of rebirth (*punarbhava-bīja :* ibid. pp. 33, 42).

These seeds of rebirth which bear their own characteristics, e.g. hardness in the case of earth-element, also possess the potentiality to produce secondary elements, e.g., visual element (*cakṣu dhātu*) etc. in the case of the sixth. In brief, they are the psycho-physical factors which serve as the basis of conception.

A somewhat different description of the phenomenon of conception is given in the *Mahāhatthipadopama Sutta* (*M*. I, p. 265) according to which coitus of parents when the mother is properly disposed and the presence of *gandhabba* (q.v.) are essential for successful parturition. Since coitus represents the first five elements of our list and *gandhabba*, the sixth this description could be stated in terms of *dhātus*.

Paṭhavī-dhātu : As defined in the texts this element represents the fact of hardness or rigidity in matter (*kakkhaṭa, kaṭhina, kharigata, khara : M*. III, p. 240; *Vbh*. p. 62; *MA*. II, 222; *Sikṣ*. 245; *Abhidharmadīpa*, p. 12). It is the element that produces hardness in material objects (*Śikṣ* p. 220). The two adjectives, namely, hard and rigid, bring out the essential nature of the earth-element (*Dhs*. p. 177; *Vbh*. p. 82). According to Buddhaghosa the first adjective represents its characteristics (*lakkhaṇa*) and the second, its mode (*ākāra : Vism*. p. 292). In Buddhist Sanskrit texts, too, hardness and rigidity are given as the characteristics of this element (*kakkhaṭatvaṃ, kharagaṃ : Śikṣ*. pp. 220, 245; *Kharalakṣaṇaṃ : Sphuṭārtha Abhidharmakoṣa Vyākhyā*. p. 57).

According to Pali *suttas* what is hard and rigid is *paṭhavī*, whereas according to Pali Abhidhamma, the fact of hardness (*kakkhalatta*) is itself *paṭhavī*. The question is raised as to whether hardness is itself not the *paṭhavī-dhātu*. And it is maintained that, although this is the case, yet for the convenience of definition, *paṭhavī-dhātu* is said to possess the characteristic of hardness (*VismA*. p. 362 f.).

Paṭhavī-dhātu is also explained as that which extends or spreads out (*patthaṭattā paṭhavī : Vism*. p. 305; *Abhvt*. p. 64). Extension is occupation in space. "Tri-dimensional extension gives rise to our idea of a solid body. As no two bodies can occupy the same space at the same time, Buddhists derive their idea of hardness from *paṭhavī*" (*Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 155). Thus the interpretation of *paṭhavī-dhātu* as the element of extension brings into focus a different method of approach.

In the Pali commentaries we get further discussions on the particular function of this element. Buddhaghosa observes that it acts as a foundation, a sort of fulcrum (*patiṭṭhāna-dhātu : DA*. III, p. 1036; *MA*. IV, p. 93; *patiṭṭhānarasā, Vism*. p. 306) and

that it manifests itself as receiving *sampaṭicchana-paccupaṭṭhāna* (*Vism.* p. 306; *DhsA.* p. 332; cf. *pṛthivī dhṛtiḥ, sthairyaṃ : Abhk.* p. 6). This has been further explained to mean that the other three primary elements are established on it and that, therefore, it serves as a support, a basis for them (loc. cit.).

Āpo-dhātu : The water-element represents viscidity (*sneha : VbhA.* 64; *Abhk.* p. 6; *Śikṣ.* pp. 220, 248) and cohesion or binding together in matter (*bandhanattaṃ, ābandha-dhātu, saṅgraha :* (*Dhs.* p. 177; *Vbh.* p. 83; *Vism.* p. 292; *DA.* III, 1036). Cohesion refers more to its function, for the *āpo-dhātu* binds together the other three elements in iron, stones, mountains, elephant-tusks, ox-horns, etc. in masses and makes them rigid (*DhsA.* p. 335).

Flowing (*paggharaṇa*) and the state of streaming (*vissandabhāva, abhisyandana*) are also cited as characteristics of *āpo-dhātu* (*Vism.* p. 292; *DhsA.* p. 336), a view which suggests the popular and common-sense idea of water. This does not mean that *āpo-dhātu* is identical with water. Even the items given as the examples of *āpo-dhātu*, such as bile, blood, urine etc. (*M.* III, p. 240 f.; *Vbh.* p. 62 f.; *Śikṣ.* 247 f.) are not identical with *āpo-dhātu.* They are given as examples of *āpo-dhātu* merely because the element of viscidity is predominent in them although other three elements are also present in them in varying degrees of intensity. The case is the same with water.

Unlike the Vaiśeṣikas who maintain that cohesion is a distinct quality produced by fluidity and viscidity operating together (Bhaduri, S., *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics*, Poona, 1947, p. 126), the Buddhists are of the view that *āpo-dhātu* which stands for the facts of liquidity and viscidity (*ārdrīkaraṇasvabhāvaḥ: Abhk.* p. 6) performs the function of cohesion. No distinction between quality and substance is recognised by Buddhists. Hence it is that according to the Vaibhāṣikas, the phenomenon of cohering of non-broken continuity in a blazing fire is due to the presence therein of *āpo-dhātu.* The same idea is recognised by the Theravādins, too, when they say, that *āpo-dhātu* manifests itself by its action of cohesion (*āpo-dhātu saṅgahapaccupaṭṭhāno, DhsA.* p. 332).

Tejo-dhātu : *Tejo-dhātu* signifies the phenomenon of heat (*usmā* or *usumā, Dhs.* p. 177; *Vbh.* p. 83; *VbhA.* p. 69; *Uṇhatta : MA.* II, 227; *Uṣṇatā : Abhk.* p. 6). It is the element which heats, matures, sharpens and imparts heat to all other material elements (*Abhs. Vibhāvinīṭīkā*, p. 110). On this matter there are two divergent views : Like the Vaiśeṣikas who maintan that cold (*śīta*) is the peculiar quality of the water-substance (*Vaiśeṣika sūtras* of *Kaṇāda*, Ed. and Tr., N. Sinha, *SBH.*, VI, Allahabad, 1911. p. 59), the Vaibhāṣikas associate *śīta* with *āpo-dhātu*, They believe that the touch of cold in wind is due to the presence therein of *āpo-dhātu* (*S. Abhk.* V, p. 33).

The position taken up by the Theravādins in regard to this question is quite different. In the works of the Pali *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* we do not find any explicit statement concerning the position of cold in relation to the primary elements. Nevertheless there is no possibility of its being considered as represented by *āpo-dhātu* because this particular primary element, as maintained by the Theravādins, does not come within the sphere of the tangible (*phoṭṭhabbāyatana*, q.v.). It is only in the *Ṭīkā*-literature that we are presented with a clear statement on this subject. "Although cold is known by the sense of touch", says Sumaṅgala, "it is really *tejo*. The sensation of cold is obtained when the heat is less, for there is no distinct quality called cold. Hence it is that during the summer season when people, having first stayed in the sun, enter the shade, they experience the sensation of cold. And when they stay there for a long time they experience the sensation of heat" (*Abhs. Vibhāvinī ṭīkā*, Ed. D. Paññānanda, Colombo, 1889, p. 111). Thus, in view of the Theravādins, cold is not the peculiar characteristic of *āpo-dhātu*, as is believed by the Vaibhāṣikas, but is the relative absence of heat. And heat is represented by *tejo-dhātu.*

The characteristic function of *tejo-dhātu* is ripening or maturing (*paripācana* or *pakti; M.* III, p. 241; *Vbh.* p. 63: *Śikṣ.* p. 248). For this is the element which heats, matures, sharpens and imparts heat to all other material elements (*Abhs. Vibhāvinīṭīkā*, p. 110).

Vāyo-dhātu : The air-element (*vāyo-dhātu*), as defined in the texts, signifies inflation or distension (*thambhitatta. Dhs.* p. 177; *Vbh.* p. 63; *VbhA.* p. 70). Its characteristic function is mobility or motion (*chambhitatta : Dhs.* 177; *Vbh.* 84; *īraṇa*; *Abhk.* p. 6; *S. Abhk.* V, p.57; *samudīraṇa : DhsA.* 332; *Śikṣ.* 284 f.; *gati : Abhk.* p. 6). Breathing in and breathing out, as well as winds in abdomen, winds that shoot across the several limbs are given as examples of the existence of *vāyo-dhātu* in living beings (*M.* III, p. 241; *Vbh.* p. 63; *Śiks*, 221, 248 f.)

Blowing of wind is an example of the *vāyo-dhātu* that exists externally (ibid.). While the other three primary elements stand for the facts of solidity, cohesion and temperature, this represents the more active and dynamic aspect of matter (*pheranātmaka vāyu : Abhidharmadīpa*, p. 12).

With the development of the theory of momentariness (*kṣaṇa-vāda*, q.v.), the above definition of *vāyo-dhātu* as representative of mobility could not be retained without modification. For according to this theory all elements of existence, material as well as mental, are of momentary duration. Wherever appearance takes place there itself takes place disappearance, with no possibility of movement. If *vāyo-dhātu* is representative of motion how can denial of motion be justified? In keeping with the theory of momentariness motion, too, is given a different interpretation. Motion is not the movement of an element of matter from one locus in space to another (*deśāntara-gamana*), but the appearance of different elements in adjacent locations (*deśāntarotpatti : Abhk.* V, p. 33). The classic example given in this connection is the light of the lamp. The so-called light of the lamp is nothing but a common designation given to an uninterrupted production of a series of flashing points. When the production changes place, one says that the light has changed. But in reality other flames have appeared in another place (Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, I, p. 99).

It is interesting to note that this new definition of motion has somehow or other found its way to Theravāda scholasticism that flourished after the time of Buddhaghosa. In the earlier Pali commentaries, *vāyo-dhātu* is understood as indicative of motion. In the later works, notably the *ṭīkās*, motion is denied, that is to say, it is interpreted as the appearance of momentary elements in adjacent locations (*desāntaruppatti : VismA.* p. 359; *Abhs. Vibhāvinī ṭīkā*, p. 110; *Abhidhammattha vikāsinī*, pp. 249, 251). This new development has necessitated a modification in the earlier definition of *vāyo-dhātu*. Hence it is that the scholiasts seek to define *vāyo-dhātu* as the cause of motion; it is that which causes or brings about the arising of momentary elements in adjacent locations (*desāntaruppattihetu . . . VismA.* p. 359).

Akāsa-dhātu : The space-element is defined as the mere absence of resistant matter (*sapratigha-dravyābhāva-mātraṃ : Abhk.* V., p. 57), space not occupied by matter (*M.* III, p. 241 f.; *Vbh.* p. 64; *DA.* III, p. 1036; *Śikṣ.* pp 221, 249 f.; *Abhk.* p. 12) for example, cavities such as that of ear, nose, alimentary canal etc. in the case of living beings, and doors, windows, intervals between trees etc. in the external world (*M.* III, p. 241 f.; *Vbh.* p. 64; *Śikṣ.* pp. 221, 249 f.). Why *ākasa-dhātu* is brought under matter (*rūpa*) needs explanation.

That *ākāsa-dhātu* is that which affords room for the movement of matter is one of the ways in which it is described in the *Vibhaṅga* (*Vbh.* p. 84). But it is very doubtful whether this was the sole or rather the main factor that was taken into consideration in placing it under matter. For, if it were the reason, then it ought to have been given a position at least on a par with the four primary elements of matter, rather than being considered as dependent on, and therefore secondary to, them.

All schools agree that what is called *ākāsa-dhātu* means cavities, holes, apertures, interstices etc. (*M.* III, p. 241 ff.; *Vbh.* p. 64; *Abhk.* V. p. 57; *Śikṣ.* pp. 221, 248 f.). It could therefore be understood as bounded or delimited space. Hence it is defined as *paricceda-rūpa* (*Visṃ.* p. 382; *Abhs.* p. 27). *Paricceda* signifies not only that which delimits but also that which is delimited (*Abhidhammattha-vikāsinī*, p. 279). The implication is that, since *ākāsa-dhātu* means cavities etc., it sets limits to, and is itself limited by, the surrounding matter. Since cavities etc. have an intimate connection with matter in that they obtain owing to the particular position or situation of the latter, they (cavities etc.) can be conceived as dependent on matter.and since the four primary elements of matter should necessarily enter into the composition of all material things, cavities etc. may well be considered as dependent on primary matter. This is further confirmed by Buddhaghosa when he says that *ākāsa-dhātu* is manifested as the confines of matter and that it has its proximate cause in matter delimited by it (*Visṃ.* p. 379).

Viññāṇa-dhātu : *Viññāṇa-dhātu* is the element of consciousness which represents conscious or psychological aspect of living beings (*vijānana dhātu : DA* III, p. 1036; *MA.* p. IV, p. 93; *AA.* II, p. 278).

This conscious element is described as the factor that causes rebirth (*janmanaḥ āśrayabhūtaḥ : Abhk.* p. 12; *janmano hetuḥ, janako pratisandhibījaḥ : Abhk.* V, p. 58) and gives rise to what is called "the psychophysical being" (*nāmarūpa : Śikṣ.* p. 221; Cf. *viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ : D.* II, p. 56 etc.). It is also described as the mind-element (*mano-dhātu*) which

exists before and after the process of the sixfold sense-perception (*VbhA.* p. 72 f.).

If there is any difference between the *viññāṇa-khandha* and the *viññāṇa-dhātu*, it is not one of kind, but one of degree. The former embraces all states of the mind (*citta*), the sixfold sense-consciousness and, of course, the conscious element (*viññāṇa-dhātu*). The latter, i.e., the *viññāṇa-dhātu*, represents as is clear now, the conscious element in living beings.

It is this conscious element that enters into the mother's womb at conception (*gabbhassa-avakkanti : M.* I, p. 265). It continues to exist, like a stream (*viññāṇa-sota*), extending into both worlds, this and the next (*D.* III, p. 105). It re-enters womb after womb (*gabbhā gabbhaṃ : Sn. v.* 278), and results in what is generally known as *saṃsāra*. In this sense, it is called "the evolving consciousness" (*saṃvattanika viññāṇa : M.* II, p. 262), and does continue up to the stage called "the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception" (*nevasaññā nāsaññāyatana :* ibid. p. 264).

This conscious element, sometimes referred to as *gandhabba* (q.v.) is later renamed *bhavaṅga* (q.v.) in the Theravāda tradition. The Yogācāra school calls it the *ālayavijnāna* (q.v.).

We know that the six elements are the original factors which promote rebirth. They perform different and essential functions in making conception a success. The element of consciousness (*viññāṇa-dhātu*), being the seed of rebirth, is characterised as the producer (*janaka*) of a being (*purusa*). After conception, it acts as the basis for the development of his psyche. The four elements of primary matter (*mahā-bhūta*), being the supporting factors, are characterised as those that nourish him (*posaka*). They also are the elements out of which his physique develops, complete with sense-organs etc. The space-element (*ākāsa-dhātu*), which provides room for his growth, is characterised as that which fosters his development (*saṃvardhaka: Abhk.* V, pp. 57-58, 67). The above characterisation of the six elements shows that they are not only the original factors that cause rebirth, but are also the factors that promote and foster the growth and development, both inside the womb and outside it after birth, of the psycho-physical personality of the being.

As mentioned above, the analysis of the empiric individuality into six primay elements is made for the sole purpose of refuting the view of the existence of a soul (*ātma-dṛṣṭi*), for, it is only when that view is rejected as false that the "notion that 'I am' " (*asmi-māna*) is eradicated (*MA.* IV, p. 104; *VbhA.* p. 77). The so-called reality of the elements themselves (ibid.) is to be understood in their proper perspective; for their reality is not absolute. They enjoy only a relative reality since their existence is not absolute but conditioned. They subject themselves to the laws of causation; they come into being only when there are conditions suitable for their arising; and when the conditions are no more, they cease to exist. They are, therefore, not permanent entities, and are described as devoid of a living entity (*saññā, nissata, njjīva : AA.* II, p. 277; *DhsA.* p. 141; *VbhA.* p. 55).

The false view that arises depending on the six primary elements, namely, that "the six elements belong to me", that "I am identical with them" and also that "they constitute my soul"—finds no ground when the elements are understood in their proper perspective that they are impermanent and devoid of any perduring entity. And this is the way the belief in the existence of a soul is eradicated.

When the belief in the existence of a soul is eradicated one becomes disgusted with the six elements which are supposed to constitute the so-called soul; being disgusted, one is detached from them; being detached one is released from them. And this release is identical with the attainment of Nibbāna, (*M.* III, p. 240 ff.; *PS.* I, p. 136).

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DHĀTU (2)

I Introductory : The term *dhātu* is also used with reference to some eighteen secondary elements which obtain when existence is analysed from the point of view of epistemology. This analysis is a modification of the *āyatana*-analysis with the respective cognitions added, and, therefore, it does not imply any new principle of analysis. Thus, the six sense-organs which are described as "internal bases" (*ajjhattika-āyatana*) and the six sense-data described as "external bases" (*bāhira-āyatana*) plus the six resultant cognitions (*viññāṇa*) constitute the eighteen elements (*aṭṭhārasa dhātu : M.* III, p. 62; *S.* II, p. 140.)

II Definition : Why these eighteen are called elements (*dhātu*) is explained in the commentarial and

exegetical works of different schools. The general definition given is that they bear their own characteristics, or their own intrinsic nature (*attano sabhāvam dhārentīti dhātuyo : Vism.* p. 411; *VbhA.* p. 77; *Mohavicchedanī*, p. 127; *Sabhāvalakkhaṇaṃ dhārayatīti dhātu : Vimuttimagga*, p. 32; *Svalakṣaṇadhāraṇāt dhātu : Abhidharmadīpa*, p. 6; *Svasāmānyalakṣaṇa-dhāraṇāt dhātu : Abhk.* V. p. 33). The implication is that each *dhātu* bears its own nature; no two *dhātus* bear the same nature, and no two characteristics are found in one *dhātu*. Thus, they are discrete elements to be found when the existence is analysed from the standpoint of epistemology. Just as in the world, explains Buddhaghosa, the different constituents of marble, such as malachite, cinnabar etc. are called elements (*dhātu*), so, too, these eighteen are called elements; for they are different constituents of knowledge and the knowable (*ñāṇa-ñeyya-avayavā*). Or, just as the general term 'element' is used with reference to blood etc., which are constituents of the collection called body (*sarīra*) when they are distinguished from each other by dissimilarity of characteristic, so, too, the general term 'element' should be understood as used for the constituents of "the personality" (*attabhāva*) called the pentad of aggregates (*pañcakkhandha*); for these things, eye etc. are distinguished from each other by dissimilarity of characteristics (*Vism.* p. 411; *VbhA.* p. 77). In the Sanskrit texts the term *dhātu* is sometimes defined to convey the sense of clan or tribe (*dhātuḥ gotrārthaḥ : Abhidharmadīpa*, p. 5; *Abhk.* p. 9; *Abhk.* V. p. 33). What is found in a clan or a tribe (*gotra*) belongs to the same kind. The eighteen elements are eighteen tribes which are different from one another. All eyes, for instance, belong to one tribe; but eyes and ears belong to two different tribes. The implication here too, is that the elements are distinguished from each other by dissimilarity of characteristics. What all this amounts to is that there are only eighteen elements, which are different from each other, when the existence is analysed from the point of view of epistemology.

III Enumeration : The eighteen elements, as stated above, consist of the six sense-organs, namely, eye (*cakkhu/cakṣu*), ear (*sota/śrota*), nose (*ghāṇa/ghrāṇa*), tongue (*jivhā/jihvā*), body (*kāya*) and mind (*mano*); the six sense-data, namely, visible objects or colour (*rūpa*), sound (*sadda/śabda*), smell (*gandha*), taste (*rasa*), touch (*phoṭṭhabba/spraṣṭavya*) and objects of the mind (*dhamma/dharma*) plus the six cognitions, namely, eye-consciousness (*cakkhu-viññāṇa/cakṣur-vijñāna*) ear-consciousness (*sota-viññāṇa/śrotra-vijñāna*), nose-consciousness (*ghāṇa-viññāṇa/ghrāṇa-vijñāna*), tongue-consciousness (*jivhā-viññāṇa/jihvā-vijñāna*, body-consciousness (*kāya-viññāṇa/kāya vijñāna*) and mind-consciousness (*mano-viññāṇa/mano-vijñāna : M.* III, p. 62; *S.* II, p. 140; *Ps.* I, p. 135 ff.).

IV Mind and Matter : Of the eighteen elements, the first five sense-organs and the corresponding objects are material elements. The sixth sense-organ, i.e., the mind and the six cognitions—seven in all—are psychological elements. The remaining element, namely, the objects of the mind (*dhamma-dhātu*), the sixth sense-datum consists of both, material and psychological data.

Most of the eighteen elements are discrete elements pure and simple. The same cannot be said of the *dhammadhātu* and the *phoṭṭhabba-dhātu*. The former stands for a number of discrete elements : a very subtle kind of matter, all concepts, all mental concomitants (*cetasika* or *caitta*) and even the unconditioned things including *Nibbāna* constitute the *dhamma-dhātu*, objects of the mind. The *phoṭṭhabba-dhātu*, when considered from the point of view of ontology, is not a separate element; for it has been identified with three of the four primary material elements (*mahābhūta*), namely, earth (*paṭhavī*), fire (*tejo*) and air (*vāyu : Abhs.* p. 27).

V Mind and the Six Cognitions : The arising of the six cognitions is described in the texts as depending on sense-organs and sense-data. The general formula in brief is that there are six sense-organs on the one side; they are confronted on the other by six sense-data. The coming together of these two categories engenders the six cognitions (*M.* I, p. 111 ff.).

Mind-consciousness (*mano-viññāṇa*) is said to arise depending on the mind (*mano*) and on the objects of the mind (*dhamma :* ibid. p. 112; *VbhA.* p. 82 etc.). The common feature of all objects of the mind is that they are apprehended directly by the intellect, without any intermediate agency of the other five sense-organs which are material. In the apprehension of the five material sense-objects, there is also participation by the intellect; but the objects of mind are the exclusive domain of the intellect. As an organ (*manindriya*) and as a common resort for the other five sense-organs the term mind-element (*mano-dhātu*) is preferred while the cognition which is purely mental is called the element of mind-consciousness (*mano-viññāṇa-dhātu*). The difference between the mind (*mano*) as the receptive faculty and the consciousness (*mano-viññāṇa*) accompanying

an abstract object (*dhamma*) is said to be a difference of time; the mind (*mano-dhātu*) preceding its being conscious (*mano-viññāṇa-dhātu*); the latter arising from the former which is its preceding moment (*VbhA*. p. 68).

As Buddhaghosa says the mind-element should be understood as existing before and after the six cognitions, including mind-consciousness-element (*mano-viññāṇa-dhātu*); the latter passes from one object to another, like a monkey who jumps from one branch to another (*VbhA*. p. 80 f.). The implication is that the six cognitions arise from, as well as end in, the mind-element. And Buddhaghosa finally identifies the mind-element with what is called *bhavaṅga* (*VbhA*. p. 82).

Vasubandhu, too, explains mind (*manas*) as the consciousness (*vijñāna*) that exists before and after the six cognitions (*ṣaṇṇāṃ anantarātītaṃ vijñānaṃ yaddhi tan manaḥ : Abhk*. ch. i, V. 19). And, according to the Vaibhāṣikas, *manas* is the basis of six cognitions (*Abhidharmadīpa*, p. 7). Asaṅga identifies *manas* with *ālaya-vijñāna* (*Abhsy*. p. 3).

From the foregoing discussion it is evident that the mind (*manas-mano-dhātu*) represents the basis of mind-consciousness (*mano-viññāṇa-dhātu*), just like the eye (*cakkhu-dhātu*) which constitutes the basis of visual consciousness (*cakkhu-viññaṇa-dhātu*). In this sense, mind is a sense-organ. It is this sense-organ or faculty that is termed mind-element in our list. It is the same element which is referred to as the conscious-element (*viññāṇa-dhātu*) in the analysis of empiric individuality into six primary elements (see DHĀTU (1)). And it is also the same element that is later identified by the Theravādins as *bhavaṅga* (q.v.) and by Yogācārins as *ālayavijñāna* (q.v.).

VI Dhātu, Khandha and Mahābhūta : The first five sense-organs and their objects, ten elements (*āyatana* or *dhātu*) in all, plus some of the mental objects (*dhamma-dhātu* or *dhammāyatana*) come under the aggregate of matter (*rūpa-khandha*). The element of mental objects includes three aggregates, of feelings (*vedanā-khandha*), of perceptions (*saññā-khandha*), and of synergies (*saṅkhāra-khandha*). The remaining seven elements (which in the *āyatana* analysis is one i.e., *manāyatana*), namely, the mind and the six cognitions come under the aggregate of consciousness (*viññāṇakkhandha : Dhk*. p. 1 ff.; *Vism*. p. 505; *Abhk*. ch. i vv. 15-16; *Abhsy*. 12). It should be mentioned here that a category belonging to the *dhamma-dhātu*, namely, the unconditioned (*asaṅkhata-dhamma*) does not find a place in the *khandha*-analysis. As far as the six primary elements are concerned (see *dhātu* (1)), the first five elements namely earth (*paṭhavī*), water (*āpo*), fire (*tejo*), air (*vāyu*) and space (*ākāsa*) represent the first five sense-organs, their objects and a section of the *dhamma-dhātu* of our list. This incidentally is *rūpakkhandha*. The conscious element (*viññāṇa-dhātu*) represents the remaining elements of our list, namely, the mind, th six-cognitions and the other section of the *dhammadhātu*, except of course, the unconditioned (*asaṅkhata-dhamma*).

	18 *dhātu*	12 *āyatana*	5 *khandha*	6 *dhātu*
1.	*cakkhu*	*cakkhu*	*rūpa*	*paṭhavī*
2.	*sota*	*sota*	,,	*āpo*
3.	*ghāṇa*	*ghāṇa*	,,	*tejo*
4.	*jivhā*	*jivhā*	,,	*vāyu*
5.	*kāya*	*kāya*	,,	*ākāsa*
6.	*mano*	*mano*	*viññāṇa*	*viññāṇa*
7.	*rūpa*	*rūpa*	*rūpa*	*paṭhavī*
8.	*sadda*	*sadda*	,,	*āpo*
9.	*gandha*	*gandha*	,,	*tejo*
10.	*rasa*	*rasa*	,,	*vāyu*
11.	*poṭṭhabba*	*phoṭṭhabba*	,,	*ākasa*
12.	*dhamma*	*dhamma*	*vedanā* *saññā* *saṅkhāra* (some) *rūpa*	
13.	*cakkhu-viññāṇa*		*viññāṇa*	*viññāṇa*
14.	*sota-viññāṇa*		,,	,,
15.	*ghāna-viññāṇa*		,,	,,
16.	*jivhā-viññāṇa*		,,	,,
17.	*kaya-viññāṇa*		,,	,,
18.	*mano-viññāṇa*		,,	,,

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DHĀTU (3). The term *dhātu* is also used in a cosmological sense to mean the three spheres or planes into which the entire universe is analysed from an ethical and spiritual point of view. This analysis gives the different aggregates (*khandha*) or the elements (*dhātu* 2 or *dhamma* 2) that obtain in the three

spheres, indicating the different levels of spiritual and ethical progress reached by beings belonging to the three spheres. The spheres are (1) the sensual sphere (*kāma-dhātu*), (2) the material sphere (*rūpa dhātu* and (3) the immaterial sphere (*arūpa-dhātu*).- They are also called the three worlds (*loka*) : the sensuous world (*kāma-loka*), the material world (*rūpa-loka*) and the immaterial world (*arūpa-loka*), as well as the three regions (*bhūmi*) : the sensuous region (*kāmāvacara-bhūmi*), the material region (*rūpāvacara-bhūmi*) and the immaterial region (*arūpāvacara-bhūmi*). See AVACARA.

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DHĀTU (4). The term *dhātu* in the sense of relics is commonly found in commentarial and post-commentarial Pali literature to denote bodily remains (*sārīrika*) of the Buddha, arahants and such holy persons. The term is also found used to denote articles of personal use (*pāribhogika*) of such persons.

It is, however, interesting to note that the *Mahā-parinibbāna Sutta* (*D.* II, p. 164 f.) while describing the distribuion of the Buddha's relics after his cremation does not use the term *dhātu*, but instead uses the term *sarīrāni*. Commenting on this term the *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī* says that when the body was intact it was referred to as *sarīra* whereas now it being disintegrated is referred to as *sarīrāni* (plural of *sarīra : DA.* II, 603 f.). The *Dīghanikāya aṭṭhakathāṭīkā* (II, p. 242) directly identifies *sarīrāni* with bones (*aṭṭhi*).

The commentarial and post-commentarial writers have adopted the term *dhātu* in place of *sarīrāni* most probably by extending its original meaning of 'primary element'. Thus, whatever that remains undestroyed after cremation appears to have been held on par with elements. Extensions of the meaning of the term to include articles of personal use seems to be a still later development.

There is some interesting information regarding the *sārīrika-dhātu* in the *Kālinga-bodhi Jātaka*. Referring to the three types of *cetiyas*[1], sacred mounds or tombs erected in honour of saintly persons, it says that a *sārīrika-cetiya* i.e., a mound enshrining bodily relics of the holy person concerned (in this instance relics of the Buddha) could be erected only after the passing away of the Buddha (*J.* IV p. 228). The assumption herein is that bodily-relics could be obtained only when the person concerned is dead, in this case only after his cremation. The *PED*'s explanation of the term as 'remains of the body after cremation' too, is based on the commentarial tradition. It is interesting, however, to note that this tradition is in conflict with an equally old tradition concerning the hair-relics of the Buddha. The *Jātaka* itself records that the Buddha, at the request of the two merchants Tapassu and Bhalluka for some object of veneration, stroke his head and gave them hair-relics. In this instance the term *dhātu* itself is used to denote hair relics (*kesa-dhātu*). Further, it is said that the two merchants got a *cetiya* built enshrining the hair-relics (*J.* I, p. 81) which shows a *sārīrika-cetiya* is possible even during the life time of the person concerned.

The practice of worshiping of relics of holy persons is anterior to the time of the Buddha. As an indigenous religious practice this may have been quite popular even during the time of the Buddha. As Buddhism spread among the masses the incorporation of this popular practice into Buddhist rituals may have become very necessary. The manner and tone in which the distribution of Buddha's relics has been described in the *Mahā parinibbāna Sutta* indicates that this practice has got totally absorbed into Buddhist retualistic practices of the time.

The four canine teeth, the two collar bones and the frontal bone are regarded as the seven great relics of the Buddha. The *Dīgha-nikāya-aṭṭhakathā* (*DA.* II. p. 604) says that only the above mentioned seven relics remained after the cremation of the Buddha's body, and the rest which were numerous and of the size of mustard seeds scattered around. According to the same source this happened as a result of a resolve made of the Buddha himself.

Worship of relics of both the Buddha and his eminent disciples is quite prevalent in many Buddhist countries including both India and Sri Lanka. The tradition records that emperor Asoka erected 84,000

1 The three types of cetiyas are *sārīrika*, *pāribhogika* and *uddesika*. The *sārīrika-cetiyas* enshrine bodily remains of holy men while the *pāribhogika* enshrine articles used by them. The third type *uddesika* is said to be merely considered to be (*manamattaka*) objects similar to relics and it appears that these include images, sacred texts etc. This category does not strictly come under the category of *dhātu*.

stūpas enshrining the relics of the Buddha. A *stūpa* enshrining Buddha-relics has become an indispensable item in every monastery in all Buddhist countries. The first *stūpa* to be built in Sri Lanka, namely Thupārama-cetiya built during the reign of Devānampiyatissa, is said to enshrine the collar-bone of the Buddha. The Tooth-relic brought to Sri Lanka from Dantapura in Kālinga region in the 4th century A.C. is one of the most venerated relics in Sri Lanka (See DA LADĂ). The frontal bone, as well as the almsbowl-relic are said to be enshrined in cetiyas in Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka there is also a fairly developed chronicle-type literature both in Sinhala and Pali centering round *dhātu*, narrating the history of relics. *Dhātuvaṃsa*, *Daḷadāsirita*, *Daḷadāpūjāvaliya* are a few such works. For details see RELICS.

S.K.N.

DHĂTU HARIPUNJAYA. This royal monastery in Lampun, the ancient city of Haripunjaya, is in northern Thailand, about twenty-six kilometres from Chiangmai. As a sanctuary the site goes back to the Mon period; it is one of the oldest in Thailand. The earliest historical record of this city refers to a time in the 7th cent. when princess Cāmadevī journeyed from Lopburi to become the ruler of Lampun.

The monastery grounds are in the centre of the city; originally the royal palace was sited here. In 897 A.C. the Mon king Atityarāj bestowed this ten-acre area upon the Saṅgha. The stone lions that guard the chief entrance to the temple grounds today once stood in front of the east gate of the old palace. This king erected monastic buildings, including a square *maṇḍapa* of Śrīvijaya style, to enshrine a sacred relic—a bone fragment from the head of Buddha, according to one tradition; a hair, according to another. North-east of this shrine is the square "Golden Cetiya", covered with brass sheathing, reputed to have been built by queen Patumavadi four years after Atityarāj had completed his construction.

In time the *maṇḍapa* was reconstructed into a *cetiya* ten metres tall. In 1276 (or 1281 A.C.) king Menrai of Chiangrāi conquered Lampun and incorporated it into his kingdom of Lānnā Thai. He improved the buildings of Wat Haripunjaya, increased the height of the *cetiya* to thirty metres, and covered it with a metal sheath made of an alloy of copper and gold.

During the period 1443-1447 A.C. king Tilokarāj of Chiangmai appointed an incumbent, Pra Mahāthera Medhaṅkara, to carry on extensive repairs and new construction at the temple. He increased the height of the *cetiya* to forty-six metres, erected a seven-tiered umbrella at the top, and likewise covered the enlarged structure with copper-and-gold sheathing. The interior of the *cetiya* contains a core of laterite covered with brick. King Tilokarāj also cast a number of images of the Buddha made of gold, silver, and bronze. The construction done at this period shows a strong Sinhalese (Sri Lankan) influence.

In the 16th cent. Lampun came under the rule of Burma, and thereafter the repairs in brick and stucco exhibited Burmese influence. In the 18th cent. Lampun province, like other northern Thai principalities became incorporated into Thailand.

Today the *cetiya* of Wat Haripunjaya is fifty-one metres high. Around it are many unusual features, such as an iron fence, iron lamps, tall metal parasols covered with gold, ornate niches for candles and offerings, and a pavement of stone. Surrounding the the *cetiya* at some distance is a walled area containing cloisters and *vihāras*. The large *uposatha* hall to the east of the *cetiya* was rebuilt about 1925. North of the hall is a tower with a bell at the top and below it an enormous bronze gong over two metres in diameter. The date ascribed to this gong (679 A.C.) seems an error.

While some of the lesser monastic structures are not of great age, they may have followed the lines of much earlier buildings. Among these are the Pra Lavo Vihāra, the Pra Buddha Vihāra, the Pra Tanchai Vihāra, the Thousand-Image Vihāra, and the pavilion housing the footprints of Buddhas. In the four corners of the temple grounds are living quarters for monks. The dwelling in the south-east corner was built by the last prince of Lampun, Chao Chakrakhamkhachara, who died about 1932. In the north-east corner of the monastery grounds stands a school-building spacious enough to accommodate over one thousand monks and novices.

Evidence of the age of this monastery may be found in the temple library and the museum—a branch of the National Museum. Here are ancient bookcases and manuscripts, and Buddhist images of

stone bonze and stucco, showing Khmer influence. Votive tablets, old carvings in stone and wood, and old coins all attest to the antiquity of this site. The museum display has no equal in northern Thailand.

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K. E. WELLS

DHĀTUKATHĀ is the third book of the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* of the Pali Canon. As in the case of the other books of the same collection, this, too, was supposed to have been first expounded by the Buddha and was later communicated through Sāriputta. According to the tradition it was preached following the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* and the *Vibhaṅga*, the two preceding Texts of Abhidhamma. Thus it occupies the third place in order and presupposes the knowledge of preceding Texts.

Literally the title *Dhātukathā* means a discourse or discussion on elements but in point of fact the contents of the Text deal not only with elements (*dhātu*) but also with two other categories of Abhidhamma as well, viz. aggregates (*khandha*) and bases (*āyatana*).

The Text is divided into two parts : (1) the Table of Contents and (2) the Catechetical Exposition. The Text on the whole consists of 14 Chapters employing 14 different modes of classification. Thus it deals with the analysis of 371 states or phenomena (*dhamma*) under discussion with reference to the categories of 5 aggregates, 12 bases and 18 elements. The specific purpose of the discussion has been to demonstrate the untenability of the belief in the concept of an enduring soul or person (*attā*).

One of the problems that Buddhism faced from its inception is the conventionally accepted assertion of a soul. There was much speculation in India on the alleged existence of a soul and the majority of Indian thinkers, except the Materialists, seem to have subscribed to some concept of a soul. There was a large number of mutually conflicting views on this issue, as is revealed from discourses like the *Brahmajāla sutta*. As it appears from the sermons of the Buddha, his recurrent use of the term in a consistently pronominal sense does not imply the existence of a metaphysical soul. But it is clear that Buddhism while rejecting the prevalent theories of soul found among those thinkers, did not accept the Materialist position either. And the *Dhātukathā* has taken up the issue at the level of Abhidhamma and consequently it deals with the *dhammas* (states/phenomena) under the categories of aggregates, bases and elements.

According to the *Atthasālinī*, Buddhaghosa's Commentary to the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, a dissentient group that challenges the inclusion of the *Kathāvatthu* in the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* but nevertheless is willing to admit the total number of works of the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* as seven suggests in its place a work by the name of *Mahādhamma-hadaya* (*DhsA*. p. 3). What interests us here is that when this is rejected on the ground that this work includes nothing new with regard to subject-matter (*apubbaṃ natthi*), an alternative work by the name of *Mahādhātukathā* is suggested. This too is rejected on the ground that there is nothing new and that what is canonical in its contents is meagre (*appamattikā va tanti*). This suggestion by the dissentient group which is designated as Vitandavādin hints at the growth of a parallel interpretative text of the *Dhātukathā*. Although its name implies the Greater Text (*Mahā*), it is stigmatised as being the lesser (*appamattikā va tanti*).

Perhaps, it is on account of the rival claims of the Vitandavādins to have their *Mahādhātukathā* included among the Canonical texts of the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* that the colophon of the *Dhātukathā* of the Theriya group carries the note that it conforms to the literary tradition (*vacanamagga*) of the Dwellers of the Mahāvihāra (*Dhātukathā*, P.T.S. editions, p. 113).

The counterpart of the Pali *Dhātukathā* in the literature of the Sarvāstivādins is the *Dhātukāyapāda*. It is either by Pūrṇa or Vasumitra and forms the fourth of the six supplementary texts to the principal work *Jñānaprasthāna Śāstra* (*Aṣṭagrantha*) by Kātyāyaniputra. The Pali text, though it covers among others the themes of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* and mentions the latter by name, is not a supplement but an independent work in its field of study.

SENARATH WIJESUNDERA

DHĀTUKĀYA, the fifth of the seven texts of the *Abhidharma Piṭaka* of the Sarvāstivāda school preserved in its Chinese version (*Taisho*, No. 1540 : *A-pi-ta-mo-chieh-shen-tsu-lun*, *Nj*. No. 1282). Since the first text in this collection viz. *Jñānaprasthāna*, is considered the basic one (*śarīra*) and the other six secondary, the latter are called the *pādas*. (See Etienne Lamotte, *Histoire Du Buddhisme Indien*, Louvain, 1958, p. 203).

Dhātukāya contains 830 stanzas in two chapters (*khandhas*). The first chapter details forty psychological phenomena (*dharma*, q.v.) as follows : I. ten *mahābhūmika-dharmas*, II. ten *kleśa-mahābhūmika-dharmas*, III. ten *upakleśa* (or *paritta*) *mahābhūmika dharmas*, IV. five mental defilements (*kleśa*) and V. the five following *dharmas :* namely, *vitarka*, *vicāra*, *vijñāna*, *āhrikya* and *anapatrāpya*. The second chapter is devoted to a detailed discussion on the relationship between these *dharmas* (A. C. Banerjee, *Sarvastivada Literature*, Calcutta, 1957, pp. 64 ff.).

The classification of the *dharmas* as found in the first chapter is slightly different from that given in the Pali Abhidhamma texts and the *Abhidharmakośa* whereas the relationship of different *dharmas* shown in the second chapter is very akin to that given in *Dhātukathā* of the Pali *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* (ibid.).

As far as the authorship of the *Dhātukāya* is concerned, it was compiled, according to the Chinese tradition, three hundred years after the demise of the Buddha by Vasumitra, but according to Yaśomitra and Bu-Ston by Pūrṇa (ibid.). It was translated into Chinese by Hsüan-Tsang in 663 A.D. (ibid.).

According to Warder rather later (probably c. B.C. 100) Vasumitra (not the commentator) enlarged the *Dhātukāya* with new discussions on the phenomena (*dharmas*) and their classification, and definitions (prefixed to the original work), and composed a new work, the last of the seven Abhidharma treatises of the school, the *Prakaraṇapāda*, which consists of miscellaneous supplementary Abhidharma discussions. (A. K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism*, Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi, 1970, p. 344).

UPALI KARUNARATNA

DHĀTUPANOM. This royal monastery is the outstanding feature of Nakon Panom in north-eastern Thailand on the Mekong river. Its unique *cetiya*, fifty-three metres tall, square, and tapering in graceful curves, is extraordinarily beautiful. The Lao people in that part of the Mekong river valley regard the *cetiya* with awe and reverence. They preserve a legend that the Buddha came from India to select the site on Phu Kampra Hill, and that upon his death his disciple Kassapa brought from Kusinārā a portion of the breast-bone as a relic. Five ruling princes welcomed Kassapa and his retinue of 499 monks, they proceeded to build a *stūpa* within which they deposited the sacred relic, together with gifts amounting to more than 200,000 *catties*[1] of gold and ten million *catties* of silver. Years later another prince, Phya Sumittadharmawongsa, restored the *stūpa*, increased its height, and enshrined the relic at a higher level. He also appointed 3,000 people to care for the monastery, and thereby to establish the town of Dhātupanom.

The dated history, however, begins in 1690 A.C. when Cao Nokasatrya, the ruler of Vientiane, repaired the *cetiya*, increased its height to forty-three metres, and placed on the top a tiered umbrella of gold studded with gems. In 1941 the Fine Arts Department of the government of Thailand made extensve repairs and increased the height of the *cetiya* to fifty-three metres. The former gold sheath covering the pinnacle was recst to make a five-tiered umbrella. The gold in athe three top tiers weighs 8,912.5 grammes.

The legendary account of the founding of this *cetiya*, and of the wealth secreted within, evokes deepest reverence. Worshippers appeal to this *stūpa* for protection from illness and from dangers in travel, and they carry from it protective charms. People come to this shrine for fragments of brick and stucco that might add sanctity to village *cetiyas* being built elsewhere.

The Dhātupanom cetiya is four-sided, with curving edges that rise from the base, swell outward, then taper into form a slender support for the three-tiered spire and its finial of a golden umbrella. The four sides are of white stucco embellished with a yellow floral or tree design; the structure rests on a brick and stucco base three storeys high. Around the base are niches containing figures of celestial

1 A catty is about 1¼ of an English pound weight.

beings and of legendary kings and queens mounted on elephants and horses. The facades and gateways of the temple buildings show Mahāyāna influence. The *cetiya* is so unlike the more familiar Sri Lankan *stūpas*, it seems to reflect an Indian prototype.

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K. E. WELLS

DHĀTU-VAVATTHĀNA. A concept more correctly viewed as *Catudhātuvavatthāna*. 'The term is applied to the meditation that employs the analysis of the four elements of the body as a *Kammaṭṭhāna*. The main object of this meditation is to free the mind from the conception of individuality in regard to the physical body, and to realize its elemental nature with no thought of personal distinction' (*Buddhist Meditation* by P. Vajiranana, p. 318, M. D. Gunasena & Co. Ltd., Colombo, 1962).

This mode of meditation evidently derives its inspiration from an injunction in the *Satipaṭṭhāna suttas* (*D.* II, p. 294 and *M.* I, p. 57) where under 'contemplation on the body' (*kāye kāyānupassi*) a disciple is called upon to look at the body analytically in terms of the elements (*dhātu*[1] q.v.) of which it is constituted (. . . *imam eva kāyaṃ yathāṭhitaṃ yathāpanihitaṃ dhātuso paccavekkhati*). A similar approach is made in the process of meditation in which the body is fragmented in terms of the difierent organs and components of the body, like the heart and the liver on the one hand and blood, phelgm and bile on the other. At the same time, the disciple is constantly reminded in all these cases that the aggregated view of the body as 'this body of mine' (*atthi kāyo ti vā*) is only a conventional one, a matter of expedience, to serve only as a basis for building up a correct and enlightened outlook on one's life (*yāvadeva ñāṇamattāya*), and for steadying one's awareness (*patissatimattāya*).

Buddhaghosa in his examination and elaboration of this concept in the *Visuddhimagga* (p. 347) equates this term *catudhātuvavatthāna* to *dhātumanasikāra* and *dhātukammaṭṭhāna*, all of which mean 'determining in terms of the elements' as well as 'determining the nature of the elements', elements which collectively constitute life. The result which is intended to be achieved through this process of contemplation is the removal of the concept of an enduring being or *satta* (*Dhātuso paccavekkhato pana sattasaññā antaradhāyati* (op. cit., p. 348). This thinning out into nothingness of the concept of 'being', Buddhaghosa looks upon as invariably leading to the acceptance of the position of the void or *suññatā* (*Imaṁca pana catudhātuvavatthānaṃ anuyutto bhikkhu suññataṃ avagāhati*, op. cit. p. 370), wherein the notion of being is exterminated (*sattasaññaṃ saṃugghāteti*, ibid.). This, viewed from the angle of the early Buddhist texts, is the full realization of the concept of *anatta*. In consequence of this, according to the *Visuddhimagga* there arises in the disciple a sense of fearlessness (*bhayabheravasaho hoti*), for on account of the complete elimination of the notion of being there never arises the possibility of notions of (danger to life arising from) wild animals, spirits and demons. It is interesting to note that this completely accords with the position of which Thera Tālapuṭa speaks in the *Theragāthā* about his relationship to the beasts of the wild in whose midst he has taken up residen

mayūrakoñcābhirudaṁhi kānane
dīpīhi byagghehi purakkhato vasaṃ
kāye apekkhaṃ jaha mā virāye . . . Thag. 1113.

'There in the jungle ringing with the cries
Of peacock and of heron wilt thou dwell,
By panthers and by tigers owned as chief.
And for the body cast off care;
Miss not thine hour, thine aim!'

JOTIYA DHIRASEKERA

DHURA. This term in the specific sense of a particular religious office, undertaking or assignment is not met with in the canon. An early occurrence of the term, in a somewhat alligned meaning, is in the *Jātaka Commentary* (*J.* IV, p. 242) whereat reference is made to three types of proper religious courses namely, that of faith, virtue and wisdom (*saddhādhura, sīladhura, paññādhura*) which are not given as alternatives, but as constituents of one whole vocation. As this reference is made while commenting on the term *adhura* (antonym of *dhura*

1 For a detailed discussion on the subject, see DHĀTU (1).

and hence meaning improper course) there is reason to believe that the term *dhura* as such was not completely unknown to canonical literature. However, the term got popularized, in the sense given above only in commentarial, post-commentarial and Sinhala literature when it came to be used coupled with the two words *gantha* (texts) and *vipassanā* (insight) to connote two alternative religious assignments namely *gantha-dhura*, (assignment of study of texts) and *vipassanā-dhura* (assignment of developing insight) undertaken by the bhikkhus. This innovation which took place in Sri Lanka somewhere around the first century B.C. has been greatly responsible in moulding the life of the bhikkhus and shaping the history of the Saṅgha in Sri Lanka.

It is clearly seen from the earliest Buddhist texts that at the commencement of the Order its members had to undertake only a single assignment. This consisted of leading the noble religious life (*brahmacariya*) which conduced to the closely integrated spiritual growth and intellectual maturity enabling an individual to become detached from worldly-life and attain release from *saṃsāric* bondage. In leading the life of *brahmacariya* a bhikkhu invariably had to learn the teachings of the Master, understand it and through its practice, well-gained by this understanding, bring about a complete inner-revolution by thoroughly scooping out the ego-consciousness which is the primary cause of *saṃsāric* suffering (*dukkha*). In this process of religio-intellectual growth 'study' provided the necessary guidance for proper 'practice'.

Factors, however, such as the expansion of the Saṅgha, both geographically and numerically, growth in bulk of the teachings of the Master and his eminent disciples, misrepresentation of this teachings by over-enthusiastic non-initiates and also wilful distortions by non-believing miscreants, seem to have widened the scope and the purpose of the study of the Dhamma. Consequently, the bhikkhus were assigned the task of preserving the *Dhamma* in the oral tradition in its pristine purity.

Urgency and the need for a precise oral tradition was felt more acutely after the demise of the Master. Hence the task that was carried out informally, came to be formally assigned at the first Council held just three months after the Buddha's demise. Though obviously the aim of this assignment was not to give precedence to 'study' over practice, the final outcome turned out to be so. The *brahmacariya*, at lease for many, became a lopsided vocation with emphasis on 'study' and 'practice' relegated to a secondary place.

Early chronicles recounting the inception of Buddhism in Sri Lanka clearly records that Mahinda Thera, like the early eminent disciples of the Buddha, gave pride of place to 'practice'. However, the growth of a vast commentarial literature indicates that there has been considerable scholarly activity among the bhikkhus. This was a legacy that derived from the developments that had already taken place in India. That, much attention was paid to the study of texts is also evidenced by constant references to the view-of eminent teachers of old (*pubbācariya*, *porāṇācariya* etc.). Reference to different categories of *bhāṇakas* (reciters) such as *Dīgha bhāṇaka*, *Majjhima bhāṇaka* etc. also provide evidence for the existence of a wide circle of bhikkhus whose main undertaking seems to have been the 'study' of the texts.

From the early history of Buddhism in Sri Lanka it is seen that the generous patronage of kings and nobles provided a congenial environment for a zealous pursuit of the bhikkhu's vocation. But this situation did not prevail for long. Sporadic foreign invasions and dissensions in the royal families regarding the question of succession had repercussions on the Order. In the wake of political unrest during the first century B.C. came a severe famine which lasted for over twelve years. The life in the capital, i.e. Anuradhapura, came almost to a halt. There was no way for the bhikkhus to eke out their existence. For survival they sought refuge either in the hill country or crossed the sea to India. Many who dared to brave the situation died of starvation and with them the oral tradition of the Dhamma, too, was dying fast. The gravity of the situation is seen from the fact that there was only a single monk alive who knew the *Mahāniddesa* by heart (*VinA*. III, p. 695).

Thus, it is seen that the circumstances prevailing in Sri Lanka about the first century B.C. was threatening to wipe out completely the oral tradition of the texts. As custodians of the Dhamma the bhikkhus felt the urgent need for taking effective measures to arrest further deterioration of the situation and prevent recurrence of such a situation. When the famine subsided, the monks assembled at the monastery called Maṇḍalārama in the Kallagāma janapada to assess the situation and evolve remedies (It should be noted that the committing of the *Tripiṭaka* to writing is a direct consequence of this.). At this

conference there seem to have occurred a clash of opinion with regard to the causes of and remedies to the situation. The moot question was 'what is the foundation of the *sāsana*, the study (*pariyatti*) or the practice (*paṭipatti*)?' That discipline was regarded as the very life of the Order is evident from textual references (*VinA*. I, p. 13) as well as from the general emphasis attached to 'practice' in the bhikkhus' vocation. The surfacing of this question at this conference was, the result of the shift of emphasis from 'practice' to 'study' that had been imperceptibly taking place in the *sāsana* almost since the first council. While the Paṃsukūlikas, held 'practice' to be the foundation of the *sāsana*, the Dhammakathikas thought otherwise and maintained that 'study' is the true foundation. After discussion the Dhammakathikas were able to win the day. In this context it is interesting to note the turn of events at the conference that prompts the suggestion that even during the period prior to the holding of the conference there seems to have been a tacit acceptance of the two assignments, and that bhikkhus undertook either of them according to their preference and inclination. Another noteworthy point is the reference made to the Paṃsukūlikas. This is a Buddhist sect traditionally known for its rigidity of practice, who upheld that practice is the life of the Order, as against the Dhammakathikas who were preachers and hence more devoted to 'study'.

The outcome of the conference was that what was so far tacitly accepted, thenceforth became formally recognised, and moreover study (*pariyatti*) was elevated over 'practice' (*paṭipatti*). As numerous references in the commentaries show there seems to have been deliberate attempts to justify this ascendency of *pariyatti* by antidating the existence of such a division to the time of the Buddha. Thus trying to attribute antiquity to these *dhuras* the *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā* (*DhpA*. I, p. 4) says that Cakkhupāla thera himself, in the presence of the Buddha opted to undertake *Vipassanā dhura* as he found that he was advanced in age and hence not capable of undertaking the assignment of *Gantha-dhura*. Constant attempts were made to highlight the efficacy of *Gantha-dhura* as a means leading to the cessation of suffering. Thus, in one place it is said that even if there happened to be a hundred or thousand bhikkhus practising *vipassanā* there will be no realization of the Noble Path if there is no study of the texts (*AA*. I, p. 93). Both the *Dīgha* and *Majjhima* Commentaries contain statements to similar effect (*DA*. III, p. 898; *MA*. IV, p. 115).

As literary evidence pertaining to the period in question show, it is the *Gantha-dhura* that became popular. It is seen that the youthful, energetic bhikkhus opted for this assignment. The *Vipassanā-dhura* was looked upon as an assignment for the weak and old. The Cakkhupāla story cited above appears to be a deliberate attempt to throw back the contemporary developments to the time of the Buddha, purely to imbue them with antiquity and consequent sanctity. This is evident beyond doubt from the fact that no such division of assignments existed during the time of the Buddha. The commentators were apparently voicing the sentiments of the majority of the Sri Lankan Saṅgha of the period.

As time passed by even within the *Gantha-dhura* there seems to have been some sort of a gradation which was even recognised by the State. The famous Mihintale Inscription of Mahinda IV lays down that five shares (*vasag*, a term the meaning of which is uncertain) should be given to the teacher of *Vinaya-Piṭaka*, seven to the teacher of *Sutta-Piṭaka* while twelve should be given to the teacher of *Abhidhamma-Piṭaka*. An interesting development revealed by this gradation is that even among those who opted to undertake the assignment of 'study' those who selected the *Vinaya Piṭaka* (i.e. the code of discipline and hence the basis of 'practice') were placed in the lowest grade.

As time went on more and more members of the Saṅgha began to opt to adhere to the *Gantha-dhura*. This assignment came to be considered as being capable of leading an assignee to *Nibbāna*. In upholding the superiority of the *Gantha-dhura* in one instance it is said that a person who dwells in the forest fulfils only the *Vipassanā-dhura* whereas one residing amidst the Saṅgha fulfils both assignments and attain release (*AA*. V, p. 68 f.).

It is true that these two assignments were not regarded as two water-tight compartments, where one shuts out the other completely. But what really happened was that with the ascendency of *Gantha-dhura* over *Vipassanā-dhura*, the former became more and more concentrated in the study of texts almost to the neglect of practice of *vipassanā*. It encouraged the bhikkhus to reside in monasteries thus bringing them into constant contact with the lay society. Further, with the lapse of time the scope of *Gantha-dhura* got widened bringing within it a host of secular subjects such as linguistics, grammar, history, logic, astrology, poetics, medicine, fine arts and numerous other subjects which are not even remotely connected

to the purpose of *brahmacariya*. These studies rapidly alienated the bhikkhu from the spirit and ideal of *brahmacariya* as it was understood originally. The degeneration of the Saṅgha as a whole due to frequent contact with the lay-folk and also due to their engagement in secular pursuits, to which the *Gantha-dhura* contributed in no small measure, is clearly evident from the numerous injunctions, prohibiting the bhikkhus fromindulging in worldly activities, proclaimed in the *Kathikāvathas*, conventions adopted after each official purification of the Saṅgha. See also KATHIKĀVATA.

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S.K.N.

DHUTAṄGA (*dhuta :* fixed, firm, regular, rigid, steadfast; *aṅga* limb, constituent, feature). This composite term is generally rendered into English as 'ascetic practices'. The *Vimuttimagga* uses the term *dhuta* alone, at times, to mean *dhutaṅga*. The term *dhutaguṇa* is freely used as an alternative to this (*Miln.* p. 351 ff.). It is also of interest to observe that the term *dhutavāda* (*upholder of austere ways*) is used as a fitting attribute of Mahā Kassapa and his disciples (*S.* II, p. 156; also *A.* I, p. 23).

The earliest reference to *dhutaṅga*, thirteen in number (*terasa dhutaṅga*) and their practice in Buddhism, and that too in a spirit of enthusiastically espousing them, occurs in the *Milindapañha*, (pp. 20, 348 ff.), although a limited number of these monastic virtues are traceable in their original form, apparently with a different emphasis, to Canonical texts, both Dhamma and Vinaya. The *Milindapañha* (*Miln.* p. 380) refers to Upasena Vaṅgīsaputta, a disciple highly esteemed by the Buddha (*Vin.* III, p. 231), as being one who perfected the *Dhutaguṇa* which leads to perfection of monastic character (*sallekhadhutaguṇa-paripūra-kāritāya*). In fact judgeing by the authority of the Canonical texts (loc. cit.) what he and the disciples who opted to follow him faithfully did was to adhere very closely, rejecting the options given, to the first three of the four *nissayas* and be total forest-dwellers (*araññaka*), alms-food-feeders (*piṇḍapātika*) and dust-heap-robe-wearers (*paṃsukūlika*). It is important to note that the *Vinaya* texts does use the word *aṅga* in association with these practices, e.g. *araññakaṅga*. However, the term *dhutaṅga* does not appear to show itself up there.

The *Milindapañha* standpoint with regard to the practise of these *dhutaṅgas* by the Buddhist monks of the day seems to reflect the following :

(a) Even in the Indian contexts where extreme forms of asceticism were widely known, the rigidity and harshness of some of the *dhutaṅgas* appear to have provoked public comments (*Miln.* p. 20). It is remarked that the practice of *dhutaṅgas* by some Buddhist monks is the result of evil deeds done by them in their previous lives, identifying, infact, each of the practices with a specific evil deed of the past. For instance, it is suggested that those who resort to the 'open-air practice' of *abbhokāsikaṅga* have committed, in their previous lives, the crime of looting villages and destroying the dwelling places of people.

(b) The Buddhists themselves appear to have viewed with scepticism the real need of *dhutaṅgas* to work out the Buddhist scheme of salvation, particularly in view of their essentially monastic character, granting that Buddhist laymen themselves reach the religious goal without them. But those who take up the defence of *dhutaṅgas* counter-argue that these laymen would have practised them in some of their previous lives (*Miln.* p. 353).

(c) A sanction and approbation for these is sought from the injunction of the Master himself and the lives of the immediate disciples. It is emphatically stated that without the required purge through the practice of these, there shall be no comprehension of the truth (*Na mahāraja dhutaguṇehi avisuddhānaṃ dhammābhisamayo hoti : Miln.* p. 353).

In the *Visuddhimagga* Buddhaghosa reintroduces the practice of *Dhutaṅgas* to Buddhist monasticism, as an addendum, to bring about perfection of *sīla*. Hence its immediate succession to the *Sīlaniddesa* in the *Visuddhimagga*. Simplicity (*appicchatā*) and contentment (*santuṭṭhi*) are considered basic to the perfection of *sīla* and *dhutaṅgas* are said to nurture their growth.

Explaining the word *dhutaṅga* itself Buddhaghosa chooses to give it a definition through which he wishes to highlight its role, its function as a monastic

practice. He takes *dhuta* of *dhutaṅga* as being derived from the root *dhu*-[1] to shake off, blow. Hence *dhutaṅgas* are practices that help to shake off defilements (*Kilesa dhunanato : Vism.* p. 61). Even if one doubts the etymological correctness of this definition, there is hardly any need to strain over it because such definition which aim at clarifying the meaning of a concept from diverse angles are of frequent occurrence in Buddhist texts.

The standard list of *dhutaṅgas* appearing in Pali sources is as follows :

(i) *Pamsukūlika-aṅga* (refuse-rag wearer's practice)
(ii) *Tecivarika-aṅga* (triple-robe wearer's practice)
(iii) *Piṇḍapātika-aṅga* (alms food eater's practice)
(iv) *Sapadānacārika-aṅga* (house to house seeker's practice)
(v) *Ekāsanika-aṅga* (one-sessioner's practice)
(vi) *Pattapiṇḍika-aṅga* (bowl-food eater's practice)
(vii) *Khalupacchābhattika-aṅga* (later-food refuser's practice)
(viii) *Araññika-aṅga* (forest-dweller's practice)
(ix) *Rukkhamūlika-aṅga* (tree-foot dweller's practice)
(x) *Abbhokāsika-aṅga* (open-air dweller's practice)
(xi) *Sosānika-aṅga* (charnel ground dweller's practice)
(xii) *Yathāsanthatika-aṅga* (any-bed user's practice)
(xiii) *Nesajjika-aṅga* (sitter's practice)

These thirteen *dhutaṅga* practices could be categorized into four divisions basing on the four primary qualities expected of a member of the noble lineage (*ariyavaṃsa* q.v.) These four qualities in brief are contentment (a) with whatever robes one obtains (b) with whatever food one receives (c) with whatever lodgings that fall into one's lot and (d) delight in contemplation (*A.* II, p. 27 f.). Obviously the first two *dhutaṅga* practices of the above list are concerned with the first of the four qualities, namely, contentment with whatever robes obtained; the next five (iii-vii) practices with whatever food obtained; the subsequent five practices (viii-xii) are concerned with lodgings. Though not so obvious, the last practice in the list viz: *nesajjika-aṅga* is undoubtedly concerned wih the fourth quality i.e., delight in contemplation. Buddhaghosa himself speaks of this categorization. Regarding the last item he says that it is connected with energy (*viriya*) which certainly is as good as saying that it is connected with contemplation for, this requires one to put forth energy (*viriya*) or effort (*padhāna*). As Buddhaghosa once again points out these thirteen practices in fact could be reduced to eight. He says that one who keeps the house to house seeker's practice will also keep the alms-food-eater's practice, bowl-food-eater's practice, and later-food-refuser's practice would be adhered to by one who keeps to one-sessioner's practice; similarly one who adheres to open-air dweller's practice consequently keeps the tree-foot dweller's practice and any-bed user's practice. Thus, there are three 'main practices' into which the five subordinate ones could be accommodated. However, the *Visuddhimagga* itself says that the strict observer of the open-air dweller's practice is not allowed to live near a tree. If so, this practice has to be counted along with the five 'subordinate' practices as forming individual practices. Further analysis shows that as pointed out earlier, these practices are primarily connected with basic qualities expected of a monk and the increase in numbers is merely due to a difference in detail.

All thirteen practices are recommended for a *bhikkhu;* only eight (excluding Nos. vii, viii, ix, x, xi) are recommended for a *bhikkhunī*. Only the triple-robe wearer's practice is disallowed for a male novice (*sāmaṇera*). A female novice (*sāmaṇerī*) too, is not expected to adhere to the triple-robe wearer's practice. But she could undertake to observe the remaining seven practices which are observed also by nuns.

The first in the list is the refuse-rag wearer's practice, i.e. the practice of wearing robes made out of rags normally collected from dust-heaps (*paṃsukūla*), hence the name *paṃsukūlika-aṅga*. Both the *Vimuttimagga* and the *Visuddhimagga* enumerate the different types of rag-robes that come within the category of *paṃsukūla*. According to this enumeration any piece of cloth that has been discarded, thus completely excluding any robe directly offered, was considered as coming within this category. But from these texts themselves it becomes clear that the strictness of this *dhutaṅga* has been considerably

1 Cf. Har Dayal, *The Bodhisattva Doctrine*, London, 1932, p. 135, wherein he suggests that *dhuta* could be a synonym of *dhuta* derived from the root *dhav*, to wash, to cleanse, purity, etc.

relaxed and the scope of the definition widen to include even robes offered by some one. This relaxation of the strict adherence to the practice and the expansion of the definition is a feature common to all *dhutaṅgas*. In order to accommodate such relaxations which were brought about by the rapidly changing social, economic and cultural milieu, the texts speak of three categories of followers of these *dhutaṅgas*, namely, the strict, the moderate and the mild followers, the last category comprising of mere nominal observers of the practices.

The triple-robe wearer's practice is a detail of the *paṃsukūlikaṅga*. From the very inception of the Order the bhikkhus were advised to look upon the robe as a simple mode of dress worn merely for the purpose of covering the body (*Vin.* I, pp. 288-289). Thus, they were encouraged to make robes out of discarded pieces of cloth and this along with the triple-robe wearer's practice prevented them from getting into the habit of keeping extra robes, even though they may be rags, and hoarding them for future use. Besides, these two practices enabled them to be as self-sufficient as possible with regard to robes which made their life less of a burden on society (*subhara*) and consequently enabled them to be 'men of few needs' (*appiccha*).

While the monks were expected to consider the robe merely as a mode of covering the body, they were expected also to regard food as a mere source of sustenance of body and nothing more (*A.* I, p. 14). The five *dhutaṅga* practices connected with food are mainly based on this attitude towards food. It is seen that at the inception of the Order the sole means of obtaining food was by going about begging for alms, and hence the designation *bhikkhu* (*bhikkhatīti bhikkhu : bhikṣu*). This practice of begging for alms had to be regulated and similarly food-habits of monks too, had to be moderated to be in keeping with their vocation. These regularizations became more important and in certain cases compulsory when donors began to offer alms directly to the Saṅgha. Monks who desired to adhere strictly to the old practice of obtaining food by going about begging did so by pledging to follow the *piṇḍapātikaṅga*. Those who undertook this practice had to adhere to a certain routine when going about for alms and hence the necessity of observing the *sapadānacārikaṅga*. The *Visuddhimagga* clearly lays down the procedure that a monk had to follow in his alms rounds. From this it is clear that the main aim of this procedure is to rid the monk of his greediness with regard to food. A monk who follows the *sapadānacārikaṅga* is prohibited from going only to those houses where tasty food is offered. By following this practice he is prevented from developing any special relationship with a particular household; on the contrary it helps a monk to remain desirably detached from his patrons. Such a monk who leads a detached life is compared to the moon (*S.* II, p. 197).

Pattapiṇḍikaṅga is a mere detail of the *piṇḍapātikaṅga* for, it is natural that one who seeks his food by going about begging should carry a bowl to collect his food. The importance of this practice lies in the restriction with regard to carrying more than one bowl. A monk is not expected to be in possession of too many things (*bahubhāṇḍa*) for, it burdens him with unnecessary involvements and makes him diffused. Besides, when carrying only a single bowl he is compelled to receive all sorts of food in it and mix them and eat. This practice, therefore, helps him to overcome any feeling of craving that he entertains with regard to different tastes.

The other two practices, namely, *ekāsanikaṅga*[2] and *khalupacchābhattikaṅga* are mainly concerned with moderating the consumption of food. One who undertakes the former by pledging to refuse to eat in several sessions is expected to finish his meal at one sitting, if he happens to rise from the seat for any reason whatsoever while having his meal, he is prohibited to sit once more and continue with his meal. Perhaps this is a practice adopted to train the monks to refrain from partaking food on and off at their pleasure.

The latter practice is undertaken by pledging to refuse anything extra once he has indicated that he has had enough. If, for example, a monk were to receive a second serving while he is yet partaking of the first, he may accept it. But had he made any indication that he has had enough then he should not partake of any more.

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2 *Ekāsanikaṅga* could be derived in two ways. It could be from the combination of the two terms *eka*+*āsanika* (from *asana* meaning seat). In this sense it means ' in one sitting'. The other possible derivation is from *eka*+*asanika* (cf. *as* to eat) and it could mean 'eating once'. Whatever the derivation is the idea behind the practice is to regularize food habits and prevent a monk from getting into the habit of eating whenever he desires.

Here it is important to note that knowledge with regard to the proper measure in eating (*bhojane mattaññutā*) is one of the four guides of moral life (*S.* II, p. 218). In fact the *Visuddhimagga* has *bhojane mattaññutā* (this is in place of *pattapiṇḍikaṅga*) as a separate *dhutaṅga*. Over-eating increases sleepiness and leads to numerous diseases. A monk who has devoted his whole life to attain spiritual advancement cannot afford to succumb to either of these. He should understand that he eats only for the purpose of sustaining his body and that he should not overload his stomach, for that will destroy also his ease and lightness of body, the physical qualities which conduce to mental culture

It is seen that at the inception of the Order monks did not have permanent abodes. They were wanderers, going from place to place, spending the nights in forest groves and parks. Even subsequently when lay patrons provided them with temples and monasteries, many desired to cut themselves away from the hub of city and urban life and resort to groves to engage in contemplation. At a later stage when living in monasteries became the accepted practice, seeking solitude in sylvan surroundings (*araññe*) became a special feature in the life of monks. One who undertook the *āraññikaṅga* practice did not have to spend all his life living in the forest. What is expected of him is to leave before sunrise his abode which is located in the village and spend the day-time in the forest. This was, undoubtedly, to induce and provide a monk with surroundings congenial to contemplation. *Rukkhamūlikaṅga* is in essence, not very different from *āraññikaṅga* for, it was natural for a monk who sought solitude in a forest grove to sit at the foot of a tree (*rukkhamūla*) to spend the day in contemplation. As the *Visuddhimagga* points out a monk who undertakes this latter practice should be careful not to select a tree used as a shrine, a tree inhabited by bats and so on for, such a selection would certainly not provide the necessary peace and seclusion. One who practises the *abbhokāsikaṅga* is prohibited from even staying near a tree. This perhaps is to further reduce a monk's involvement such as cleaning the foot of the tree and so on. The *Visuddhimagga* says that one who is engaged in this practice delights in concentration when he sits in the open-air with the expansive starry sky above him.. This suggests that this practice is followed during the night and that one need not necessarily resort to a forest grove to observe it for, during the night even the monastery surroundings are calm and quiet. However this does not warrant the conclusion that this practice is restricted to the night or that it cannot be practised in a forest grove. In essence this, too, is a variation of the *āraññikaṅga*.

The *Visuddhimagga* specifically says that those who undertake to follow the *sosānikaṅga* have to retire to the charnel ground to spend the night there. Invariably the charnel grounds were in the forest groves bordering the village, and therefore, this too is a practice primarily based on *āraññikaṅga*, The *Visuddhimagga* further says that as thieves, too, resort to charnel grounds during the night to divide their spoil, the monk who wishes to retire to the charnel grounds should inform an elder monk or a king's officer about his intention, lest he might be mistaken for a thief. The charnel ground provided the ideal environment for contemplation on the impermanency of life and at the same time enabled a monk to train himself to live in simplicity.

Yathāsanthatikaṅga,[3] undertaken with the pledge to cast away craving for resting places or with the promise to accept whatever seat or bed that fall into one's lot, is invariably adhered to by all those who practice the *āraññikaṅga* and the other practices associated with it. One who undertakes any of those practices cannot entertain a desire for special resting places. This practice is in full accord with the general rule of ethics on which rests the monk's way of life, namely, that one should be satisfied with whatever one obtains. When compared with the above mentioned twelve practices, the thirteenth, namely, *nesajjikaṅga* or the 'sitter's' practice, on the face of it appears to form a sort of self-mortification. The *Visuddhimagga* says that one who observes this practice is not allowed to lie down even to sleep. But when one analyses the real purpose of this practice it becomes quite clear that this constitutes of complete devotion to contemplation. As pointed out before, this practice is based on *bhāvanārāma*—delight in meditation, a primary quality expected of a member of the Order. In fact, all the other twelve practices are, in one way or the other, concerned with and conducive to the promotion of practice of meditation. One who undertook this *nesajjika* practice was not merely expected to spend the time in a

3 This term is translated in various ways. In the P.E.D. it is translated as 'accepting whatever that is offered'. Kern in his *Manual* of *Buddhism* (Strassburg, 1896, p. 76) interprets it as spreading a night-couch where one happens to be.

sedentary posture, but to remain in that position and practise meditation.

The description of *dhutaṅga* found in Pali sources in general agree with those of the Sanskrit sources. However, an innovation is seen in the inclusion of the practice referred to as *nāmatika*[4] which Edgerton (*BHS.* s.v.) renders into English as 'wearing a garment of felt'. The Pali equivalent of this term seems to be *namataka* (*PED.* s.v. explains it as a piece of cloth or *nantaka* (a contamination of *namataka : PED*, s.v.; cf. *M.* II, p. 7). Both forms are of doubtful etymology. According to Mahāyāna sources an observer of this *dhutaṅga* had to wear a garment made of wool. What is apparent is that this *dhutaṅga* is also connected with the mode of dress of the monks, thus increasing the number of *dhutaṅgas* connected with the dress to three as against two in Pali sources. At this point it also should be borne in mind that the Buddhist Sanskrit texts list only twelve *dhutaṅgas* instead of the thirteen found in the Pali tradition. This they have done by deleting the *pattapiṇḍika-aṅga* which appear to be superfluous due to the presence of *piṇḍapātikaṅga*.

The English phrase "ascetic practices" does not precisely bring out the idea connoted by the term *dhutaṅga*. The content of these practices itself does not justify such a rendering. In fact even Buddhaghosa's definition of the term, which suggests that these are practices that conduce to the shaking off of defilements, is also somewhat off the mark. The tendency to equate *dhutaṅga* with *tapas* is apparently the reason for Har Dayal's conclusion that 'Vanity may have been the motive of many monks who adopted the *dhutaṅgas*' (Har Dayal, op. cit. p. 139).

Now it is established beyond question that the Buddha openly denounced and completely rejected all types of ascetic practices given either to self-mortification (*attakilamathānuyoga*) or to sense-gratification (*kāmasukhallikānuyoga*) not only as being of no use to the attainment of *Nibbāna* but also as being a hindrance to its attainment (See ASCETIC PRACTICES). All his discourses bear ample testimony to the fact that his emphasis was on self-discipline which constitutes of both mental and physical culture, the former being the goal and the latter being a pre-requisite that conduces to its attainment (See CULTURE). An analysis of the *dhutaṅgas* makes it apparent that they are meant to regulate sartorial, dietary and residentiary habits of members of the order, meeting the needs of the circumstances under which the Order came into existence, but without compromising the ideal of their life. Unlike the household life, life in the Order was free of all encumbrances (*M.* III, p. 33). The first step in the arduous process of overcoming these household encumbrances is renunciation and this minimises all contacts with families. Therefore, a bhikkhu had to be independent and self-sufficient as much as possible with regard to clothing, food and lodging. Not merely due to circumstances but also on grounds of propriety, the bhikkhu life had to be extremely simple. Possession of too many things necessarily entails involvement, and this completely defeats the purpose for which the noble life of a bhikkhu is led. Therefore, the whole bhikkhu life was made extremely simple and regulated, and geared to achieve success in the purpose for which it was led.

It is not adornment, embellishment or extra-comfort, but propriety and utility that served as basic considerations with regard to basic necessities of life. On the one hand three-robes (*tecīvara*) made of discarded pieces of cloth (*paṃsukūla*) adequately served to cover the body and also protect it from inclement weather; food obtained from alms-round was sufficient to sustain the body, caves and forest groves provided sufficient shelter and ideal solitude. On the other, such a simple mode of life enabled the monk to be aloof from, and free of all household involvements, independent as far as possible. By adhering to such a mode of life a monk was able to curb his craving for better food, clothing and shelter. The monk's life, as it was conceived at the time of its inception, was simple and free of all burdens that it was readily compared to the mode of life of a bird (*D.* I, p. 71). It is believed to be the ideal way for the fulfilment of *brahmacariya* (ibid. p. 63). Cut-off from all household encumbrances, with basic needs of food, clothing and shelter fulfilled, with physical and mental hindrances considerably reduced, a monk naturally tended to become more attuned to the religious life. He is enabled to devote himself completely and earnestly to the arduous task of achieving mental culture.

4 Burnouf (*Introduction a l'historie du Bouddhism Indien*, Paris, 1876, p. 277) translates the Tibetan version of this term in two ways (i) *celvi qui reste a la place ou il est* (ii) *celvi qui garde son tapos tel qu'il l'a une fois place;* for details see Har Dayal, op. cit., p. 137.

In spite of the effectiveness of these modes of life the Buddha did not attach any undue importance to them. In fact the Buddha refused Devadatta's request to make some of these practices compulsory (*Vin.* II, p. 197). He pointed out that these practices in themselves are not responsible for enhancing the status of a monk (*M.* II, p. 5 f.). The Buddha points out that they are not valid criteria by which to measure the spiritual quality of the disciples. On another occasion he stressed that the mere fact of being engaged in these practices does not elevate the position of the monk making him worthy of respect and veneration. Evil traits of character could continue to be in a person inspite of these practices. According to the Buddha it is self-discipline that really qualifies a monk for veneration (*M.* I, p. 30). Similarly, the fact that a practice is austere or that it is performed by way of penance or as a ritualistic formality is, according to Buddhism, not a reason to attach special significance to it. Practices by themselves are of no value. They acquire importance, as shown above, only if they conduce to self-discipline, character development and mental culture. Circumstances under which the Order arose perhaps necessitated adherence to some of these practices, and they also had the beneficial effort of curbing craving for better food, clothing and lodging. But it was never laid down that they are the only or the best means of curbing craving and bringing about self-discipline. Similarly it was never regarded that the monkhood is lived for the sake of adhering to these practices (cf. *D.* I, p 60 ff.). Hence it was possible to relax these practices to suit the needs of the changing circumstances. Thus, when lay patrons began providing food, clothing and shelter the rigidity of the original modes of bhikkhu life was relaxed. The practices of wearing rag-robes, going on alms-round and seeking shelter in forest groves were gradually given up. It may be that all the members of the Order were not unanimous in adopting these new features. There may have been a section who preferred to adhere to the original way of life and there may have been a conflict of opinion between these two sections. Devadatta's request to make some of the austere practices compulsory appears to be an attempt at exploiting this conflicting situation. Similarly, the Buddha's frequent attempt at illustrating the futility of adherence to mere practice at the expense of self-discipline, too, could possibly be to win over those who attached undue importance to these austere practices

However, with the lapse of time the monks in general, became indifferent with regard to the practice of *dhutaṅgas* as well as to the cultivation of self-discipline. Instead, they became prone to leading a life given to luxury and comfort. Perhaps, the revival of the practice of *dhutaṅgas* and the over-emphasis of its importance were both a protest and a measure of restraint against the rapid and drastic drifting away from the original ideal of bhikkhu life. This development is found clearly reflected in the post-Canonical Pali works and Mahāyāna Sanskrit works. Thus the *Milindapañha*, the *Visuddhimagga* and the *Vimuttimagga* consider the practice of *dhutaṅga* as being indispensable for the *bhikkhu*. The *Milindapañha* devotes the whole of its VIth chapter to the exaltation of these practices. In the *Samādhirāja Sutra* one could see the climax of the glorification of *dhutaṅga* practice.

S.K.N.

DHVAJA. See FLAGS and BANNERS.

DHYĀNA. See JHĀNA.

DHYĀNA-PĀRAMITĀ, perfection of mental concentration, the fifth *pārāmitā* (q.v.) in the Buddhist Sanskrit literature. It is not listed under the ten *pārāmitā* found in the Pali tradition.

Dhyāna which, in the Mahāyāna, is synonymous with *samādhi* (q.v.) is attained through a preliminary stage of preparation which includes (1) renunciation and solitude, (2) cultivation of the four sublime states (*brahmavihāra*, q.v.) and (3) the practice of *kṛtsnāyatana*.

A bodhisattva who undertakes the perfection of mental concentration has to give up family-life and ordinary social intercourse, and retire into a secluded spot in the forest in order to cultivate the concentration of mind; he must live as a celibate recluse. Even if a bodhisattva is married, his marriage is really a pretext for the conversion of others; he does not really enjoy sensual pleasures; he remains a celibate (*SsP.* pp. 116, 117; *AsP.* p. 333). Śāntideva says that a married man cannot attain enlightenment and that a bodhisattva must, therefore, renounce the world in all his lives after taking the great vow (*Śikṣ.* pp. 114, 195). According to the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* (p. 22, ed. by J. Rahder) a bodhisattva becomes

a monk in the first stage of his career. So, even according to Mahāyāna, celibacy is more conducive for enlightenment.

It is true that the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* speaks of the duties of a bodhisattva who is a king (p. 247) and that Śāntideva seems to admit that a bodhisattva may be a householder (*Śikṣ*. 62, 112); and also the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* definitely mentions both laymen and monks in connection with first four *pāramitās : dāna, śīla, kṣānti* and *vīriya*. But the latter does not refer to the laymen in its chapter on *dhyāna*.

This asceticism advocated as a necessary stage in the career of a bodhisattva has given rise to an apparent anti-social element which may be argued as being alien to the spirit of Mahāyāna; for we find that the bodhisattvas are advised to wander alone like a rhinoceros. The trees and flowers in the forest are pleasant friends that give no trouble, and their company is preferable to that of silly and selfish men of the world (*Śikṣ* p. 198; *AsP*. p 291). A bodhisattva who has retired to the forest should find tongues in trees; books in the running brooks (*SsP*. 1455; *Lank*. p. 308). He should devote himself to meditation and self-examination, and also preach occasionally to the laymen who may visit him in his hermitage (*Śikṣ*. 201). He should cultivate the four *brahmavihāras* and practise *kṛtsnāyatanas*. Thus, a bodhisattva can produce within himself that mental state of calm and quietude which is favourable to *dhyāna*.

Dhyāna includes nine mental states that follow one another in regular succession. They are called *anupūrva-vihāras* which consist of the four *dhyānas* of the sphere of subtle matter (*rūpāvacara*), the four *samāpattis* of the immaterial sphere (*arūpāvacara*), and finally the cessation of consciousness and feeling (*saṃjṇā-vedayita-nirodha; Ssp*. pp. 1143-5; *Daśabhūmika Sūtra*, pp. 33-4; ed. by J. Rahder).

These nine attainments, also found in the Pali literature, are not regarded as very important in the Buddhist Sanskrit literature of the Mahāyānists; their interest is in different *samādhis* which bear definite names and produce certain results. One may remain absorbed in one of those *samādhis* for several years or even many millions of aeons (*SsP*. p. 1322; *Asp*. p. 520).

A multitude of *samādhis* have been mentioned in the Mahāyāna texts; but three are considered very important, as they are the entrances to liberation (*vimokṣa-mukha*), namely, the voidness (*śūnyatā*), the signless (*animitta*) and the aimless (*apranihita : Bbh*. 89; *SsP*. 57; *Sūtrāl*. 148; *Śikṣ*. 6).

These *samādhis* are the means to final liberation (*SsP*. 825; *Sūtrāl*. 99), through the perfection of wisdom.

A bodhisattva who has completed the practice of the *dhyāna-pāramitā*, i.e., the concentration of the mind, is ready to step into the next *pāramitā*, the sixth in the list, i.e., the perfection of wisdom, *prajñā-pāramitā*, which is the culmination of the career of a bodhisattva. See PĀRAMITĀ.

UPALI KARUNARATNA

DHYĀNA SCHOOL, is a term used to denote the school of Zen (Ch'an) Buddhism. The term Zen is the Japanese equivalent of the Chinese term Ch'an which itself is derived from the Sanskrit word *dhyāna* (Pali, *jhāna*) meaning meditation or concentration. As the name indicates the main emphasis of this school is on meditational practices leading to mental culture which enables the meditator to realize the Buddha-nature (q.v.).

Though primarily based on Indian Buddhist *dhyāna* practices Bodhidharma (q.v.), who is regarded as the founder of this school in China, at the outset gave it some sort of a Chinese form. It was Hui-neng, the sixth patriarch of this school, who further developed the teachings of this school and gave it a truly Chinese garb.

This school of Buddhism which subsequently became extremely popular in Japan under the name Zen has immensely influenced Japanese culture. See further, ZEN.

S.K.N.

DHYĀNIBODHISATTVA. The Dhyānibodhisattva[1] concept is a secondary development of the concept of Dhyānibuddhas (q.v.). The Dhyānibuddhas are credited with the production of Dhyānibodhisattvas. Each Dhyānibuddha receives from the Ādi-Buddha the particular *jñāna* (knowledge) and *dhyāna* (contemplation) to which he owes his own existence. By this two-fold power of knowledge and contemplation they, separately, produce the five Dhyānibodhisattvas, and therefore, the latter are regarded either as emanations or reflexes of the former. They are said to reside in the spheres of matter (*rūpadhātu*[2]).

The five Dhyānibodhisattvas are Samantabhadra, Vajrapāṇi, Ratnapāṇi, Padmapāṇi and Viśvapāṇi. The origins of some of these bodhisattvas are definitely anterior to the origin of the Dhyānibodhisattva concept. It is quite apparent that at a later period, after the development of the Dhyānibuddha concept, certain important bodhisattvas were regarded as emanations of the Dhyānibuddhas and raised to the status of a Dhyānibodhisattva. Whatever changes that took place in the Dhyānibuddha concept had their effect on the Dhyānibodhisattva concept, also. Thus, when the Dhyānibuddhas were considered as belonging to the *Dharmakāya* (body of law), the Dhyānibodhisattvas came to be regarded as belonging to the *Sambhoga-kāya* (body of bliss). When the number of Dhyānibuddhas was increased the number of Dhyānibodhisattvas, too, was accordingly increased. Thus, there is a group of eight Dhyānibodhisattvas depicted in northern Buddhist temples. They are Avalokiteśvara, Ākāśagarbha, Vajrapāṇi and Kṣitigarbha, Sarvanivaraṇaviṣkambhin, Maitreya, Samantabhadra and Mañjusrī. (cf. Hodgson, op. cit., p. 95).

The Dhyānibodhisattvas are regarded as the actual creators of the physical universe. According to the Aiśvarika doctrine (q.v.) Dhyānibodhisattvas receive the active power of creation from the Ādi-Buddha (q.v.) through the medium of their progenitors, the Dhyānibuddhas. Having acquired all qualities (*sarvaguṇa*) or three qualities they, by virtue of the power received from the Ādi-Buddhas, produce the whole universe by his (Ādi-Buddha's) decree:

However, the worlds created by these Dhyānibodhisattvas are perishable and three such creations belonging to Samantabhadra, Vajrapāṇi and Ratnapāṇi have already perished.[3] The present one, i.e. the fourth, is that of which we form a part. This is the creation of the fourth Dhyānibodhisattva Padmapāṇi (=Avalokiteśvara). The Dhyānibuddha of the present age is Amitābha (q.v.) and the Mānuṣibuddha (Buddha in human form) is Śākyamuni.

The Dhyānibodhisattvas occupy an important place in the Mahāyāna system. Each of them is believed to preside over the perishable world, that each of them create separately, until the advent of the particular Mānuṣibuddha of the age. At the passing away of the latter he is to preside over and protect the world until his successor creates yet another world. Thus, the Tibetans believe that Avalokiteśvara incarnates himself in each successive Dalai Lama in order to continue the propagation of Buddhism begun by Śākyamuni.

The *Guṇa-kāraṇḍavyūha* gives a detailed description of the creative activity of Padmapāṇi. It says that Brahmā proceeds from his shoulders, Maheśvara from his forehead; the sun and the moon from his two eyes and so on.

The fifth Dhyānibodhisattva Viśvapāṇi will create a new world five thousand years after the Buddha Śākyamuni's *parinirvāṇa*. In this world Maitreya will appear as the Mānuṣibuddha and Amoghasiddhi (q.v.) will be the Dhyānibuddha.

These Dhyānibodhisattvas are normally represented as dressed in princely attire and wearing the thirteen bodhisattva ornaments. In the central leaf of the five-leafed crown is the miniature figure of the particular Dhyānibuddha whose emanation he

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1 So called because they are born of contemplations of the Dhyānibuddhas. This, like the word Dhyānibuddha, is not an original Sanskrit term but one coined, probably by western scholars, to distinguish the group of bodhisattvas who are regarded as emanations or reflexes of Dhyānibuddhas from human bodhisattvas.

2 See Alice Getty, *Gods of Northern Buddhism*, 1914, pp. 43 ff. and B. H. Hodgson, *Essays on the Languages, Literature and Religion of Nepal and Tibet*, 1874, pp. 27 f.

3 It is said that these Dhyānibodhisattvas who have already accomplished their task are now either engrossed in worshipping the Ādi-Buddha or have attained *Nirvāṇa*.

is. Usually the hair is drawn up in an *uṣṇīṣa* and may be decorated with jewels. The forehead is normally marked with the sign of *ūrṇā*. If a Dhyānibodhisattva is represented together with his Dhyānibuddha, the former is always represented in a standing posture. But when alone, he is represented as being seated. The Dhyānibodhisattvas may be in the company of their *śaktis* or the female counterpart. For example, Samantabhadra has Dharmavajrā as his *śakti*. Padmapāṇi has Tārā.

The Chinese speak of four Dhyānibodhisattvas namely, Ti-tsang (Kṣitigarbha) presiding over the earth; Kwan-yin (Avalokiteśvara) presiding over water and symbolising compassion (*Karuṇā*); Pu'hien (Samantabhadra) presiding over fire and symbolising happiness and Wen-shu (Mañjuśrī) presiding over air-space and symbolising wisdom. These Dhyānibodhisattvas are popular in Japan, too.

Both in China and Japan they are either dressed like the Buddhas or richly adorned with ornaments, though not with the complete set of the thirteen bodhisattva ornaments. (See also ĀDI-BUDDHA; DHYĀNIBUDDHA).

S.K.N.

DHYĀNIBUDDHA. A Dhyānibuddha belongs to a peculiar class of Buddhas who are generally counted as five in number and who are not required to pass through the different stages (*bhūmi*) of a bodhisattva for, they have never been anything less than a Buddha. A Dhyānibuddha is supposed to exist, as the ideal or spiritual counterpart of a human Buddha (*Mānuṣibuddha*) in the transcendental realms of Buddhist cosmology.[1]

The term Dhyānibuddha requires some comment. It is rendered into English in different ways by different scholars. D. L. Snellgrove translates it as 'buddha of meditation' (*Buddhist Himālaya*, p. 103) and Monier-Williams as 'spiritual Buddha' (*Skt.-Eng. Dictionary*, s.v.). P. Mus refers to the group of Dhyānibuddhas as 'transcendent' Buddhas (*Barabudur*, pp. 577 f.) and L. de la Valle Poussin as 'Buddhas of contemplation' (*ERE.* I, p. 94). L. A. Waddell calls them 'celestial jinas or Buddhas' (*Lamaism*, p. 336). Howeve., it should be noted that the term Dhyānibuddha does not occur in Sanskrit texts but might be a term coined by western scholars to distinguish this peculiar class of Buddhas from the human Buddhas.[2]

The terms frequently found used in Sanskrit texts are *pañca-jina* and *pañca-tathāgata*, and occasionally the terms *sarvabuddha* and *pañca-buddha* are also used.

There are a number of views regarding the origin of the Dhyānibuddhas. It is generally accepted that it is the text called a *Guhyasamāja* that first reveals the existence of a group of five Buddhas who are now referred to as Dhyānibuddhas. Prior to this there are references to Vairocana, Amitābha, Ratnaketu and to *kulas* (families) and even to their *bīja-mantras*. But in these early texts there is no systematic arrangement of these deities or of related concepts as found in the *Guhyasamāja*. Here it is explained elaborately how the five Dhyānibuddhas were produced by Lord Bodhicittavajra. He being requested by the members of the assembly, first sat in meditation called *jñāna-pradīpavajra* and uttered the mantra *vajradhṛk* which belongs to the *dveṣa* family. No sooner this mantra was uttered there appeared Aṣkobhya. Next he entered into the *Samayasambhavavajra samādhi* and uttered the mantra *jinajik* belonging to the *moha* family. With this appeared Vairocana. Thereafter Lord Bodhicittavajra entered into *Ratna-sambhava-vajra-śrī* meditation and uttered the mantra *ratnadhṛk* and at that very moment appeared Ratnaketu.[3] Then he sat in *Mahārāga-vajra-sambhava* meditation and uttered the mantra *ārolik* of the *vajrarāga* family. Then appeared Amitābha. Next he entered into

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1 The abodes of Dhyānibuddhas are not specifically mentioned. L. de la Valee Poussin (*ERE.* I, p. 94) says that they are in the world of becoming. Alice Getty says that they are in the Arūpadhātu heaven (*Gods of Northern Buddhism*, 1914, p. 26). According to Vajrayāna beliefs Akaniṣṭha is to be considered as the abode of all deities. However, it is well known that Sukhāvatī is considered to be the abode of Amitābha, who is one of the Dhyānibuddhas.

2 See Monier Williams, *Buddhism*, pp. 202 f. and his *Skt. Eng. Dictionary*, s.v.; *ERE.* I, p. 94 fn. E. Conze (*Buddhism*, 1951, p. 189) says "....this term introduced by Hodgson about a century ago, is not only faulty Sanskrit : it has never been found in any Tantric text. It is time to discard it." See also E. J. Thomas, *History of Buddhist Thought*, p. 248.

3 He is popularly known as Ratnasambhava. But sometimes he is referred to also as Ratna-nātha.

Amogha-samaya-sambhava-vajra meditation and uttered the mantra *prajñādhṛk* of the *samaya* or *samayākarṣaṇa* family. At that very moment appeared Amoghavajra.[4] When this was done, the Lord Bodhicittavajra again entered into another series of meditations and produced five *śaktis*, (female counterparts) each associated with a particular Dhyānibuddha.

It is not stated from what the Lord produced the Dhyānibuddhas or what the essence of the Dhyānibuddhas is. However, the context seems to suggest that the Lord Bodhicittavajra, with the aid of particular meditation and mantras, transformed himself into various forms of Dhyānibuddhas and their śaktis, and if so, in essence all are to be considered as being of the same Buddha-nature. Or it may be that the mantras were transformed into Dhyānibuddhas.

Later tantric texts represent these Dhyānibuddhas as presiding over the five aggregates of existence (*skandha*). They are even identified therewith.[5] The Tantrists believe that the Dhyānibuddhas originated from the aggregates of existence (*skandha*) which they considered to be eternal.

Das Gupta (ibid., p. 84) commenting on the origin of the Dhyānibuddhas says that they seem to have evolved in later Buddhism with some influence from Sāṅkhya philosophy. He is of the opinion that the five aggregates (*skandhas*) of the Buddhists were confused with the five gross elements (*pañcamahā-bhūta*) of the Sāṅkhya philosophy. According to the Sāṅkhya view these five gross elements and the five sense organs proceed from the five subtle elements (*tanmātra*). He interprets the subtle elements as, 'that in and through which the unmanifested and unspecified reality (*tat*) is measured i.e., manifested and specified'. When considered in this sense he sees a similarity between the five subtle elements and the five kinds of knowledge of the Ādi-Buddha (q.v.).

B. Bhattacharyya (*Buddhist Esoterism*, 1932, p. 129) suggests that the five *mudrās* (symbolic gestures) which the Buddha Śākyamuni made sacred by using them at memorable occasions, gave rise to the five Dhyānibuddhas.[6]

There is another important theory regarding the origin of the Dhyānibuddhas. According to this theory they are said to have been produced by the Ādi-Buddha. In the *Guṇakāraṇḍavyūha* it is said that the Ādi-Buddha desired to become many. This desire itself is called *prajñā*, and in the instant of conceiving this desire were produced the five forms who are now called Dhyānibuddhas (see Hodgson ibid. p. 42).

The Vajrayāna as well as the Aiśvarika doctrine attribute the creation of the Dhyānibuddhas to the Ādi-Buddha, though there are minor variations with regard to the details of these theories. It is said that the Ādi-Buddha, for the purpose of creation, became *pañca-jñānātmika*, possessing five sorts of knowledge, viz., *suviśuddha-dharmadhātu-jñāna, ādarśa-jñāna, pratyavekṣaṇā-jñāna, samatā-jñāna* and *kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna*. With the aid of these and by five separate meditations he produced, in order, the five Dhyānibuddhas, namely, Vairocana, Akṣobhya, Amitābha,[7]

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4 Same as Amoghasiddhi who is also called Karma-nātha. Each Dhyānibuddha seems to have many names. Some of these different names are mentioned by H. B. Hodgson in *Essays on the Languages, Literature and Religion of Nepal and Tibet*, p. 47.

5 See *Advayavajrasaṅgraha* (*Gos.* XL, p. 23) which says, "*pañcaskandhāḥ pañcatathāgatāḥ. Two Vajrayāna Works* (*Gos.* XLIV, p. 41) says, *pañcabuddhasvabhāvatvāt pañcaskandhā jināḥ smṛtāḥ.*" S. B. Dasgupta quotes a verse from *Vajravarāhī-kalpa-mahātantra* which reads,

rūpa-vedanā-saṃjñā-saṃskāra-vijñānam eva ca
pañcabhiḥdda-svabhāvān tu skandhotapatti viniścitaṃ.

(*An Introduction to Tāntric Buddhism*, 1958, p. 84 fn. 5; see also fn. 4).

6 L. de la Valee Poussin (*ERE.* I, p. 98 fn. cites the view of Köppen who maintains that there is some relation between the five Dhyānibuddhas on the one hand and the four trances and the *anāgāmins* on the other. But this view is not endorsed by other scholars. M. Anesaki (*ERE.* IV, p. 837) sees glimpses of the Dhyānibuddha concept in the Mahāsaṅghika teachings which speaks of the Buddha as always being engaged in deep contemplation.

7 According to the Aiśvarika system Ratnasambhava is produced by the *pratyavekṣaṇā-jñāna*. There are minor differences of this sort between Vajrayāna and Aiśvarika concepts of Dhyānibuddhas. But these differences do not cause any important changes in the main concepts.

Ratnasambhava and Amoghasiddhi. These five are considered to be the immediate sources of the five gross elements (*pañca-mahā-bhūta*), and five faculties (*pañca-indriya*) and the five spheres of perception (*pañcāyatana*). Each of them in turn produced a bodhisattva on whom is devolved the active work of creation.

It is suggested that this theory of Ādi-Buddha producing the five Dhyānibuddhas is a late invention by the Vajrayānists to remedy the polytheistic form attained by the Vajrayāna after the deification of the five *skandhas* as the five Dhyānibuddhas[8]. However, this does neither seem to be a completely new invention or a feature quite alien to the theory of the origin of the Dhyānibuddhas. The *Guhyasamāja* itself suggests such a theory. The Lord Bodhicittavajra, who produced the Dhyānibuddhas, appears to have served as the basis for this Ādi-Buddha theory. The Dhyānibuddha concept did not undergo any significant change from what it was in the *Guhyasamāja* by the postulation of the Ādi-Buddha as their progenitor.

The identity of the Ādi-Buddha is not clear or settled. Some consider Vajrasattva as the Ādi-Buddha. Yet others regard either the bodhisattvas Samantabhadra, Vajrapāṇi or even Mañjuśrī as the Ādi-Buddha. Some even acknowledge one of the five Dhyānibuddhas as the Ādi-Buddha. Thus, in Japan the Amidists believe that Vairocana and the three other Dhyānibuddhas are manifestations of Amitābha, while the followers of the Shin-gon sect claim that Amitābha and the three others are the manifestations of Vairocana, who is considered to be the Ādi-Buddha.

Though the concept of Dhyānibuddhas is a late feature in Buddhism, the beliefs which served as a background for the gradual evolution of this concept can be traced to early Buddhist texts. The same Theravāda texts which state that the Buddha Śākyamuni entered into Nirvāṇa also promote the belief that he could have lived for a whole aeon if he so desired. From the very early times it seems to have been generally believed that the Buddha, though he entered into Nirvāṇa, continued to live in an invisible form. The Vetulyakas upheld the theory that the Buddha Śākyamuni never appeared in person in this world but substituted an image of himself. Some even accepted that Śākyamuni had been a Buddha from the beginning of time and appeared in the world at different times in different forms. These ideas gave rise to a belief in several successive Buddhas who, though counted as four, seven or twenty-four formed an infinite series extending both into the past and into the future. When the theory of aeons (*kalpa*) was formulated and finalised it was accepted that the present aeon should have five Buddhas, the first four of whom have already passed away and the last one is yet to appear. (See BUDDHOLOGY, DHARMA-KĀYA).

As already pointed out, the names of Vairocana, Akṣobhya and Ratnaketu were known from early times and it was in the *Guhyasamāja* that they were treated as belonging to the groups of five Buddhas who were produced by Lord Bodhicittavajra. The beliefs such as that of five Mānuṣibuddhas (human-Buddhas) and the substitution of different images of one eternal Buddha, current at the time, may have prompted the author of the *Guhyasamāja* to group these Buddhas together (but cp. *ERE.* I, p. 99) and to represent them as transformations of the Lord Bodhicittavajra.[9] However, it was later that they came to be regarded as the ideal counterparts of the five Mānuṣibuddhas.[10] This development may have been facilitated by the *trikāya* (q.v.) doctrine which upheld that the Buddha possesses three different bodies namely, *nirmāṇa-kāya* (q.v. body of apparition) *sambhoga-kāya* (q.v. body of bliss) and *dharma-kāya* (q.v. body of law). The five Mānuṣibuddhas were regarded as belonging to the *nirmāṇa-kāya*. The five Dhyānibuddhas who, by this time, had

8 B. Bhattacharyya, *Buddhist Esoterism*, p. 127 and *The Indian Buddhist Iconography*, 1958, p. 42.

9 Basically, the way in which the Lord Bodhicittavajra produced the Dhyānibuddhas is the same as the way they were produced by the Ādi-Buddhas. Though known by two different names, both Bodhicittavajra and Ādi-Buddha are primarily the same. It should also be noted that the origin of the Ādi-Buddha concept also can be traced to the Buddha Śākyamuni (*E. B.* I, p. 213 f). Cp. G. Tucci's view which regards the teaching about the Ādi-Buddha and the five Dhyānibuddhas as quite comparable with the Manichaean Father of Light and its five light aeons (*Melanges Chinois et bouddhiques*, III, pp. 345 f.).

10 Three of the Dhyānibuddhas have come and gone. The Dhyānibuddha of the present age is Amitābha, Śākyamuni being his Mānuṣibuddha. The fifth Dhyānibuddha, Amoghasiddhi is yet to come; Maitreya would be his Mānuṣibuddha.

gained prominence over the Mānusibuddhas were given a higher place by assigning them either to the *sambhoga-kāya* or to the *dharma-kāya*.[11]

Earliest references show that the Dhyānibuddhas were five in number. But this enumeration was not fixed, for there is a series of six with Vajrasattva being added. Sometimes the series, with minor variations in the names, runs up to nine with the addition of Vajrakāya, Vajradharma and Vajrakarma (Hodgson, ibid. p. 57 f.). However, besides the series of five the other popular enumeration is that of six. The Japanese and the Chinese Buddhists invoke the Dhyānibuddhas with a six syllabled mantra which reads as a-ba-ra-ka-ki and the sixth is *un* which they claim to signify *hūṃ* (A. Lloyd, *The Creed of Half Japan*, p. 240). This, probably, is the *bīja*-mantra of the sixth Dhyānibuddha. Vajrasattva is regarded as the priest of the Dhyānibuddhas. Quite often he is considered to be the embodiment of the five aggregates of existence (*skandha*) collectively, which is also proof for his late origin. According to de la Vallee Poussin, too, he is the embodiment of the five elements and his colour, white, potentially contains all colours. In Japan he is shown with a rainbow aura, which may be his esoteric sign. (see Alice Getty, ibid. p. 27). Hodgson is of opinion that intellect (*manas*) with apprehension (*dhāraṇa*) and the objects of such apprehension or the whole phenomena of the universe (*dharma*) are referred to as Vajrasattva and adds that he belongs to Vāmācāryas (ibid. p. 29).

The Dhyānibuddhas form the foundation upon which the whole pantheon of Vajrayāna deities are based. As already stated, they produce the five Dhyānibodhisattvas. They are regarded as the progenitors of five families (*kula*) and hence are called Lords of families (*kulesu*). The *Advayavajrasaṅgraha* (p. 40 f.) mentions some of their special names. Thus, Amitābha is called Padmakulī, Akṣobhya as Vajrakulī, Vairocana as Tathāgatakulī, Ratnasambhava as Ratnakulī and Amoghasiddhi as Karmakulī. Each of them has a separate bodhi-

Dhyānibuddha	Vairocana	Akṣobhya	Ratnasambhava	Amitābha	Amoghasiddhi
Dhyānibodhisattva	Samantabhadra or Cakrapāṇi	Vajrapāṇi	Ratnapāṇi	Pamapāṇi or Avalokiteśvara	Viśvapāṇi
Mānuṣibuddha	Krakucchanda	Kanakamuni	Kāśyapa	Gautama	Maitreya
śakti	Vajradhātvīśvarī	Locanā	Māmakī	Pāṇḍarā	Tārā
kula	moha	dveṣa	cintāmaṇi	rāga	samaya
bīja	oṃ	hūṃ	trāṃ	hrīḥ	khaṃ
symbol	cakra	vajra	cintāmaṇi	padma	viśvavajra
mudrā	dharmacakra	bhūsparśa	varada	samādhi	abhaya
vāhana	dragon	elephant	horse or lion	peacock	garuḍa
skandha	rupa	vijñāna	vedanā	saṃjñā	saṃskāra
element,	ether	air	fire	water	earth
sense-perception,	sound	touch	vision	taste	smell
sense-organ	ear	skin	eye	tongue	nose
direction	centre	east	south	west	north
colour	white	blue	yellow	red	green
location in the body	head	heart	navel	mouth	legs

11 Some consider the Dhyānibuddha as belonging to the *sambhoga-kāya* (*ERE.* I, p. 98; also fn. 1 of the same page). Others consider them as belonging to *Dharma-kāya* (Alice Getty, op. cit., pp. 25 f.).

sattva, a *śakti*, *mudrā* (mystic pose), a *vāhana* (mount)[12] etc.

They are normally represented as being seated on a full blown double lotus, legs interlocked, the right foot crossing over in front of the left with the soles of the feet turned upwards. The hand that rests on the lap is normally made to carry a bowl. They wear a robe with the right shoulder bare. No ornaments are worn. The forehead is adorned with a circular mole of hair (*ūrṇā*) and the ear lobes are usually long. The eyes are half-closed, a feature indicating that they are in a state of meditation. Very often their hair is represented as being tied into a knot which appears in the shape of a turban (*uṣṇīṣa*) or represented in short curls resembling sea-shells or beads. If represented in this last mentioned manner, the skull has a protuberance (*uṣṇīṣa*) from which, normally rises a three or five-forked flame. In Japanese representations instead of the protuberance on the skull, they may have their hair arranged in the form of a high *uṣṇīṣa*.

When represented with their *śaktis*,[13] the Dhyānibuddhas are represented in the spiritual embrace (*yab-yum* or *yuga-naddha*) position and are dressed like Indian princes, adorned with the thirteen bodhisattva ornaments. In these representations they are always crowned and hence are called by the Tibetans the 'crowned Buddhas (q.v.)' (Alice Getty, cp. cit. p. 30). In Tibet, Vajrasattva, whether with or without the *śakti*, is normally crowned.

The heads of Dhyānibuddhas are, very often, encircled by a nimbus which is either round or in the shape of a leaf of a bodhi-tree.

In India they are represented in the aura of Dhyānibodhisattvas. In China sometimes only three of them appearing in the aura of Dhyānibodhisattvas. (cp. EB. Vol. II, PLs. xxiv, lvi).

In Nepal they are, very often, represented in niches on the four sides of a chaitya. Vairocana, normally being unrepresented, is supposed to reside inside the caitya. But whenever represented he is placed in between Ratnasambhava and Akṣobhya. Generally Akṣobhya is made to face east, Ratnasambhava south, Amitābha west and Amoghasiddhi north. However, occasionally Vairocana and Akṣobhya change their places. Vajrasattva is never represented in statue form on the caitya.

In India, Akṣobhya usually occupies the highest place among the five Dhyānibuddhas. The *Advayavajrasaṅgraha* (pp. 23 and 42) says that the other four Dhyānibuddhas, who represent the four aggregates of existence, *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā* and *saṃskāra*, are to be marked by a miniature figure of Akṣobhya who represents *vijñāna*, as they cannot be known without the aid of *vijñāna*. But Akṣobhya is in turn to be marked by a miniature figure of Vajrasattva who is the embodiment of *śūnya*. See also ADIBUDDHA, AIŚVARIKA DOCTRINE, DHYĀNIBODHISATTVA.

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S.K.N.

DIALECTIC is a term with a variety of meanings. The term originates from the Greek term 'dialego' which means conversation, debate or discourse.

The term dialectic was used to mean formal logic by the Stoics as well as during the European middle ages, but its meaning here will be considered to be critical discussion making use of opposites, negation, contrariety or contradiction of both terms and sentences. Thus, the negation could be in the negation of a term (as, for example, in the *apoha* theory of Dinnāga (q.v.) where the meaning of a term is given by what it excludes or negates) or in the negation or the contradiction of a statement or statements (as, for example, in the antinomies of Kant) or in both these (as, for example, in the Hegelian and Marxist writings). Dialectic is primarily associated with debate or linguistic discussion, but it could be seen as a process in nature itself (as, for example, Hegel, Marx and Engels held).

Dialectic is very often considered in its negative and destructive or the critical aspect. That is, for

12 These details are shown in the general chart disregarding the differences found in the concepts as developed in various Vajrayāna texts, Aiśvarika teachings, Japanese Buddhism etc.

13 In China and Japan they are never represented together with their *śaktis*.

example, as in Nāgārjuna, in bringing out contradictions in a position to reject it. But it can have a positive or constructive aspect, implicitly (for example, Śaṅkara's criticism and rejection of other systems is indirectly a defence of the Vedānta) or explicitly (as in, say, Marxism where the negation of the thesis leads to a higher level of unity in the synthesis or as in Plato where the dialectic leads to the discovery of Good, the highest Form).

The specific sense in which the dialectic has been used by each thinker (or in each system) will be indicated in the discussion of that particular thinker (or the system).

Greek:– Two of the early Greek philosophers, Anaximander (c. 611—c. 547 B.C.) the Ionian and Heraclitus (c. 535—c. 475 B.C.) the Ephesian seemed to have thought of the world in terms of the play of "opposites". Anaximander saw the opposites in conflict and encroaching on each other like the hot (unjustly encroaching in summer), and the cold (unjustly encroaching in winter). It is these motions or encroachments which lead to world process, for example, of birth and death, growth and decay. Heraclitus saw the world as in constant flux, as indicated, for example, by his statement that one cannot step twice into the same river, as fresh waters are ever flowing (Fragments, 12). He also regarded strife or opposition or 'war' as the essential basis of the universe. While Anaximander saw the conflict of opposites as something that ought not to be, Heraclitus saw conflict of opposites as essential to the unity that is Reality.

Again, the Pythagoreans (6th century B.C.) had the conception of the world as the combination of the Limited (geometrically conceived odd numbers) with the Unlimited (geometrically conceived even numbers) bringing about a "mean" which is health and harmony. But while these notions have elements of dialectical conceptions of nature, the origin of the dialectic proper in the West is traced to the Eleatic Zeno (5th century B.C.), famed for his paradoxes. Zeno refuted the hypotheses of opponents by drawing consequences which were contradictory of those hypotheses, in addition to such consequences being unacceptable going by commonsense. Thus, to deny motion, Zeno argued that an arrow shot with great speed is never in motion, as at every instant it is at some spatial location and static. In another well known piece he argued that Achilles cannot overtake the tortoise.

Greek dialectic has also a different beginning in Socrates (c. 470—c. 399 B.C.). As we come to know from Aristotle's *Topics*, long before Aristotle the dialectic was practised by the Greeks. Two persons agree to have an argument, a 'battle'. One is the questioner, the other is the answerer. The questioner can, usually, only ask questions; and the answerer has to, with certain qualifications, only answer 'yes' or 'no'. Thus, the questioner's questions have to be constructed for 'yes' or 'no' answers. This restricts the questions mostly to conceptual questions. The answerer begins by undertaking to uphold some thesis, say, for example, "knowledge is sense-perception". The questioner has to extract from the answerer by a series of questions an answer or a conjunction of answers which contradict the original thesis. This is the Socratic method, where Socrates, sustained cross-examination of the opponent, makes the opponent draw conclusions which contradict his own thesis, thus leading to an elenchus (based possibly on *reductio ad absurdum* or *prasaṅga*). Serious thinkers like Socrates, Plato and Aristotle practised the dialectic to untangle the conceptual issues, but it was just an instrument of winning arguments in the hands of some Greek Sophists. Such debate in general was called 'eristic' but Aristotle distinguished the serious practice of the art by calling it the dialectic. Of course, not all Sophists gave themselves to mere Sophistry. A great Sophist, Protagoras (c. 480—c. 410 B.C.) for example, is said to have claimed that on every subject two opposite statements could be made and this claim has affinity with the Hegelian as well as some of the Indian dialectics.

Plato (c. 430—c. 350 B.C.) who valued the dialectic immensely says that the dialectician is the man who knows how to ask and answer questions (*Cratylus* 390 c.). In the *Republic* he considers the dialectic a necessary part of the education of the philosopher-king, and the method that leads one to Good, the highest Form (*Republic* VI-VII). Aristotle (384 - 322 B.C.) valued the dialectic as useful for intellectual training, discussion with others using their own premises and examining non-demonstrative first principles. He wrote *Topics* outlining the method of the dialectic. Aristotle's discovery of the categorical syllogism and his enunciation of it in the *Prior Analytics* laid the foundations of formal logic. And this superseded his work on the dialectic.

Modern Western Philosophers:– Descartes' (1596 1650 A.D.) attempt at critical examination of his opinions questioning "the very principles on which

my former beliefs rested" (First Meditation) had some relevance to the beginnings of the dialectic in the modern period. Spinoza (1632 - 1677 A.D.) who both followed and deviated from Descartes came up with the pantheistic ideas : (I) the unity of the whole, (ii) the parts have to be understood in terms of the whole, (iii) there is hierarchy of ideas or principles of reality. Such views culminated in Hegel's monistic dialectic, and indeed Hegel quotes (Logic I, 100) Spinoza's "*omnis determinatio est negatio*" (the definiteness of a concept is its Negativity posited as affirmation) with approval and in support of his own position (*v. infra*). But it was not until the eighteenth century German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804 A.D.) that the dialectic became a conscious concern of a modern Western philosopher. Kant gave a new meaning to the term, again a meaning which has a commonality with some of the ancient Indian dialectics. One section of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is termed the transcendental dialectic, and there he exposes the illusion of transcendental judgements (i.e. judgements which go beyond the limits of experience). He states, for example, how a thesis like "The World has a beginning in time, and is also limited as regards space" as well as its opposite, "The world has no beginning in time and no limits in space; it is infinite as regards both time and space" could be proved. These are the antinomies of pure reason and the dialectic for Kant thus becomes the "logic of illusion", that is, the unavoidable illusions created by pure reason when it applies itself to transcendental questions.

To the thesis and anti-thesis in Kant's dialectic, Fichte (1762 - 1814 A.D.) added an idea of a synthesis. Fichte's dialectic which resolves the contradiction is mostly based on a closer determination of the meanings of the contradictory propositions. Thus, if the two statements 'the ego points itself as infinite' and 'the ego points itself as finite' are considered, "were it posited as both infinite and finite in one and the same sense, the contradiction could not be resolved . . ." (Copleston, Vol. VII, p. 47). The apparent contradiction is resolved by defining the meanings of the two statements that their mutual compatibility could be seen. In the above case one has to see the one infinite activity expressing itself through finite selves.

Hegel (1770 - 1831 A.D.) carried forward the above triad of thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis and took up the position that concepts pass into their opposites in achieving a higher unity. Fixed or static concepts are useful for understanding but the mind must elevate itself from the level of understanding to the level of dialectical thinking which overcomes the rigidity of the concepts of understanding and sees one concept as generating or passing into the opposite. Hegel, in contrast to Kant, said that all concepts lead to contradictions or antinomies. Contradictions present implicitly in the concept becomes explicit when it passes into the opposite. He says, "The Dialectic is an eternal contemplation of one's own self in the other." (i.e. in the non-self) (*Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, p. 192). For Hegel contradiction as well as dialectical process are present not only in conceptual thought but also in the world. But Hegel was an idealist as, for him, it is the (ultimate) Idea or Spirit which is Being. For example, self consciousness and the objects of consciousness are opposites. But it is the consciousness which posits the objects. The dialectical process involved therein in Hegel's view is seen by the following passage. ". . . self-consciousness . . . in this alienation posits *itself* as object . . . This positing, at the same time contains the other moment, that self-consciousness has equally sublated this alienation and objectivity, too, and taken it back into itself so that it is at home with itself in *its* otherness as such" (*Phenomenology of Mind*, pp. 789-90).

Hegel's philosophy had great influence in the nineteenth century but one of the young Hegelians, Ludwig Feuerbach (1804 - 1872 A.D.) opposed the idealistic stand of Hegel and took a consistently materialistic stand. Marx (1818 - 1883 A.D.) and Engels (1820 - 1895 A.D.) who were themselves Hegelians, accepted the atheism and materialism of Feuerbach but unlike him, they also accepted the dialectic of Hegel.

Materialistic Dialectics of Marx, Engels and others:— Marx and Engels appreciated that Hegel's dialectic underlined the following ideas : (i) there are no forms in the world which eternally repeat themselves and are immutable, i.e. there is nothing eternal in the world except eternal change of forms and phenomena replacing one another; (ii) contradictions are there not only between things but "all things are contradictory in themselves" and this inner contradiction of things "is the root of all movement" and vitality.

Hegel, being an idealist, deduced the laws of dialectics not from material existence but from consciousness. Marx and Engels wanted to discover the laws of dialectics in nature or the physical world itself. They together worked out a materialistic

dialectic in which the materialistic dialectical laws emerge as basically those governing the development of the physical or the external world (nature and society), whereas the laws of thought were only their reflection in men's heads. This is the basis of their dialectical and historical materialism. Marx wrote that Hegel's dialectic "is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again". (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, 4, p. 192). The negation and synthesis in Hegel was only imaginary or conceptual according to Marx (1844 *Manuscripts*). But dialectical process is actually in physical reality and society. Thus, for example, Marx and Engels held that primitive communistic-society (thesis) gave way to private-property (anti-thesis) thus alienating man from labour. This negation has to be superseded by negation of the negation, that is, by bringing about a (higher) communistic society by revolution.

Although Marx and Engels were the originators of Marxist ideology, the latter is today more commonly known as Marxism-Leninism. Engels found that physics of the second half of the nineteenth century rid it of rigid substances and hard, billiard ball-like atoms and he saw in this the replacement of t mechanistic and metaphysical concepts by the dialectical ones (*Dialectics of Nature*). Lenin (1870 - 1924 A.D.) in his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* approvingly of this said, "Modern physics is in travail; it is giving birth to dialectical materialism" (p. 294). In the same work Lenin criticized the positivism of Mach and others as idealistic. Mao Tse Tung (1893 - 1976 A.D.) the Chinese Communist leader in an article "On Contradiction" (1937) maintained that each contradictory aspect "finds the presupposition of its existence in the other aspect and both aspects co-exist in one entity." As examples of this situation he mentions life and death, above and below etc He also said that "each of the contradictory aspects, according to given conditions, tend to transform itself to the other."

Existential Dialectics of Soren Kierkegaard:- Another 19th century philosopher who admired Hegel's work but went against it, and this time in a direction quite opposite to that of Marx and Engels, was Soren Kierkegaard (1813 - 1855 A.D.) whose philosophy itself has a dialectic. For Kierkegaard, the individual is more important than the universal and his dialectic deals with the stages of development of the individual man. The stages, as he conceived them are the aesthetic man, the ethical man and man as spirit. The progression is in that sequence, but the transition from one stage to the other is made by choice or self-commitment, and not through conceptual mediation. The progress takes place through will and faith. Faith is a leap, that is, it is making a self-commitment to an objectively uncertain situation, taking a risk. As the title of his book *Either-Or* suggests, the alternatives are there, but there is no synthesis as in Hegel. Choice, or individual commitment is the way, and this is a process by which the spirit is actualized in the form of individuality in the end—in a direct or personal relation to God.

Indian Dialectics:- In some of the Indian systems of philosophy and religion the dialectic (in one or the other of its major sense) has played a perceptible role. The groups which used dialectical arguments centrally are the Jains, the Sceptics, the Buddhists and the Vedāntists. Of these, Buddhists probably could lay a claim to a preponderant use of the dialectic.

Jains:- Jaina logic is based on the *Syādvāda* which has been at times rendered as conditional dialectics. The term '*Syād*' in *Syādvāda* denotes multiplicity and non-absolutism (*anekānta*). Thus, the *Syādvāda* is a doctrine of the multiple character of reality.

The explicit or implicit accompaniment of the term '*Syād*' with a proposition, which is a characteristic of Jaina logic, immediately presents to us the dialectical nature of the system. For one implication of its use is the principle that affirmation without negation or negation without affirmation is not possible.

To understand what is meant by this principle, one should consider the doctrine of seven-fold predication (*saptabhaṅgī*) of the Jains, which gives expression to their *Syādvāda*. In *Saptabhaṅgī* seven ways of predicating some characteristic are given, each predication being qualified as in some respect. This predication is also associated with the Jaina view that imperfect beings look at objects from one particular point of view at a time. Such partial knowledge or a judgement made on partial knowledge is called a *naya*, a standpoint. Every judgement we make is made from some standpoint (*naya*) and considers some aspect (*Syād*) of an object.

Thus, if we consider the sentence *Syād ghaṭaḥ asti*, i.e. 'The pot exists in some respect', this affirmation carries with it a negation. The negation is that the pot, when it exists in its present mode, does not exist,

for example, in its past or future modes. 'The mode that arises is the affirmation, whereas the mode that has passed away or is yet to arise is the negation of the object. Affirmation and negation are thus simultaneous moments of the real." (Yuvacarya Mahāprajña in *New Dimensions in Jaina Logic*, p. 71).

Not only is the contradiction between affirmation and negation denied here, but these opposites are also considered as mutually concomitant. Positive and negative are inextricably bound in anything. The non-absolutism of Jainism synthesises infinite numbers of such dualities. This is seen in the *Saptabhaṅgī*. The example that we considered predicates existence (in some respect) of the pot.

If we, for the moment, concentrate only on the characteristic of existence and leave the other attributes of the pot out of the area of discourse, this attribute gives us seven ways of predicating it. The first four of the predications are,

(1) The pot exists in some respect.

(2) The pot does not exist in some respect.

(3) The pot exists and does not exist in some respect.

(4) The pot is indescribable in some respect.

The last position could now be taken in conjunction with each of the first three in turn, giving rise to seven predications in all.

Jains consider negation as an intrinsic potency of a thing. A substance, if it were exclusively possessed of the attribute of existence bereft of non-existence, would not be able to keep its substancehood. Negation is predicated with reference to other things (for example, an object has existence in respect of its own substance and *non-existence* in respect of an *alien* substance and so it is "dependent on others"). The negation acts as a barrier which prevents the encroachment of alien substances. These observations suggest that the Jaina dialectic has some element analogous to those of Hegelian and Marxist dialectic as well as the *apoha* theory of meaning in Buddhist logic (*v. infra*). The *Saptabhaṅgī* also show a dialectical progression of assertion (thesis) through denial (anti-thesis), to assertion and denial (synthesis) form, as in the Hegelian and Marxist dialectics. It also reflects another aspect of these dialectics in that contradiction is not only seen to be between objects but is also considered as inherent in each object as well.

Sceptics:- The ancient Indian Sceptics, who were, also contemporaries of Jaina saints like Mahāvira (6th Century B.C.) had a five-fold system of negation, in contrast with the seven-fold system of affirmation of the Jains, as their dialectic. The five alternative negations are :

1. I do not say so (*Evam pi me no*).
2. I do say this (*Tathā ti pi me no*).
3. I do not say otherwise (*Aññathā ti pi me no*).
4. I do not say so (*No ti pi me no*).
5. I do not say 'no, no' (*No no ti pi me no*).

The interpretations of the five-fold formula vary, but I mention an interpretation favoured by K. N. Jayatilleke, if at least to make the formula a little intelligible. Jayatilleke suggests that what could have been meant was, if p was the statement in question, the denials were,

1. $\sim$ (p)
2. $\sim$ (not p)
3. $\sim$ (p $\wedge$ not p)
4. $\sim$ (not (p $\wedge$ not p))
5. $\sim$ (1 $\wedge$ 2 $\wedge$ 3 $\wedge$ 4)

if $\wedge$ taken to stand for the constant of conjunction.

We see that although these are negations, they also move in a dialectical progression. First a statement is negated, then the negation of that statement is negated, then the conjunction of the statement and its negation is negated and so on. Indeed Jayatilleke argues that the negations of the Sceptics and the assertions of the Jains, though they appear as directly opposite positions, perhaps do also have a close affinity. Thus, he considers that the position of the Sceptic could be,

1. p may (or may not) be the case.
2. not p may (or may not) be the case.
3. p $\wedge$ not p may (or may not) be the case.
4. not (p $\wedge$ not p) may (or may not) be the case.

and that, except for the doubt of the Sceptic, this compares well with the assertions of the Jain,

1. p may be the case — *syādasti*
2. not p may be the case — *syān nāsti*
3. p $\wedge$ not p may be the case — *syād asti nāsti*
4. p is inexpressibe - *syād avaktavya*

We shall also see that these assertions and negations are considered by some writers to have affinity with another scheme, the *catuṣkoṭi* or the four-fold negations occurring in the Buddhist texts. All three of these systems were probably contemporary.

Buddhist dialectics:- Association of Buddhism with the dialectic, and that in a number of senses of the latter, stretches many-facetedly through the various phases of the development of Buddhism. In the first place Buddhism aimed at avoiding (or transcending) the two extremes of eternalism (*sassatavāda*) and annihilationism (*uchchedavāda*) and enunciating a doctrine of middle-path (*majjimāpaṭipadā*). In this sense, a dialectical effort goes into the very core of Buddhism.

The Buddha saw the world as a becoming (*bhava*) or a process as many of the dialecticians like Heraclitus, Hegel and Marx did. And the process was in nature and not just in thought for the Buddha, and so was it for Heraclitus and Marx and Engels. A process of becoming is always a process of origination and the negation is, in a sense, inherent in the very origination as in the case of birth (*jāti* and death (*maraṇa*). One would perhaps also say that *Nibbāna* is a state which transcends *jāti* and *maraṇa* and the concept of rebirth (*punabbhava*) in Buddhism is a result of an attempt to find a *via media* between, or transcend, the ideas of eternalism and annihilationism.

Early Budhists:- Buddhism, thus, has a dialectical basis generally in its doctrine, but the dialectic also enters Buddhism in more particular ways. To begin with, the Nikāyas carry many instances of expressions which have been termed *catuṣkoṭi*, the tetralemma, or the four-cornered negations. It was already indicated that probably the *catuṣkoṭi* came down from the period of the *Syādvāda* of the Jains and the five-fold negations of the Sceptics, and that some writers have seen certain affiliations or parallels among these three forms. Consider the following example of a *catuṣkoṭi*.

1. *Antavā ayaṃ loko* (This world is finite).
2. *Ananto ayaṃ loko* (This world is infinite).
3. *Antavā ca ayaṃ loko ananto ca* (This world is both finite and infinite).
4. *Nevāyaṃ loko antavā na panānanto* (This world is neither finite nor infinite).

This example, which is an *avyākata*, i.e. questions on which the Buddha kept silent, indicates that the *avyākata* questions in Buddhism also appear in *catuṣkoṭi* form. Taking X to symbolize the world and A and B to symbolize the terms finite and infinite we can symbolize this *catuṣkoṭi* as :

1. X is A
2. X is B
3. X is A and B
4. X is neither A nor B

which gives the usual "logical" form of *catuṣkoṭi*. There has been much discussion on and controversy over the "logical" form and the interpretation of the *catuṣkoṭi*. Thus, for example, if we had taken A to symbolize the term finite and 'not A' to symbolize the terms infinite, the above symbolization reduces to :

1. X is A
2. X is not A
3. X is both A and not A
4. X is neither A nor not A

which saddles us with contradictions. For, it is fairly well agreed that unlike in the Jaina *Syādvāda* the different alternatives in the *catuṣkoṭi* are not made from different standpoints. Thus, on the second symbolization (which is incorrect in the view of the present writer as well as a number of others, as the predicates here have to be considered as contraries and not as contradictories) the third and fourth statements of the *catuṣkoṭi* appear as self-contradictory. Hegel has been, probably incorrectly, accused by some of denying the principle of non-contradiction, and some writers have come up with similar contentions in their interpretations of the *catuṣkoṭi*, but such views seem unwarranted. It is important, for this discussion, to note that the four alternatives in the *catuṣkoṭi* also show a dialectical development from assertion through negation and then the conjunction of the assertion and the negation, to, in the last alternative again, a negation where all the first three statements seem to be negated. Indeed it is maintained by some scholars that this dialectical progression of the four statements in the *catuṣkoṭi* was used at least by the later Buddhists in meditation on existence as well as causality, to gradually enlighten the devotee to the nature of reality or the world.

Although statements in *catuṣkoṭi* form appear exclusively in the Buddhist literature, it is not clear

how far the Buddha himself or the Buddhist Elders were responsible for them. What is of more interest is the fact that in almost all the *catuṣkoṭi* the Buddha rejected all the alternatives; this sometimes, as for example, in the *Kaccāyana sutta*, verbally and adducing reasons. But in the case of the *avyākata* questions, the Buddha observed silence in answer to each of the four alternatives of these *catuṣkoṭi*, (for example, he kept silent when he was asked in turn whether the world was eternal, non-eternal, both eternal and non-eternal, and neither eternal nor non-eternal). Although Buddha's silence in this respect has been variously interpreted, one contemporary scholar, T. R. V. Murti, associated it with the beginnings of the dialectic itself. Murti's study is really of the Mādhyamika dialectic but Murti traces the beginnings of that to the Buddha himself. He wrote:

"The formulation of the problems (*avyākata*) in the thesis, anti-thesis form is itself evidence of the awareness of the conflict in Reason. That the conflict is not on the empirical level and so not capable of being settled by appeal to facts is realized by Buddha where he declares them insoluble.... The opening dialogue of the *Dīgha Nikāya* (The *Brahmajāla sutta*) indicates the standpoint of the Buddha. He characterises all speculations as *diṭṭhivāda* (dogmatism) and consistently refuses to be drawn into the net (*jāla*). He is conscious of the interminable nature of the conflict and resolves it by rising to the higher standpoint of criticism. Dialectic was born. To Buddha, then, belongs the honour of having discovered the dialectic long before anything approximating to it was formulated in the West...." (*Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, pp. 40-1). But it should be pointed out here that the Buddha's instrument was basically not the dialectic. Bhikkhu Nānananda, for example, notes that Murti's "picture of the dialectic is somewhat overdrawn" (*Concept and Reality* p. 85) and writes :

"This word (*avipallatthā*—unperverted—occurring in *Cūla suññatā sutta*) by implication, would mean that any other supposed mode of descent into Voidness, such as the dialectical method, would be a perversion. A perversion indeed it would be, if one contrives to jettison the raft and jubilate over it, even before setting out for the further bank." (pp. 86-7).

"Dialectical consciousness...is an intellectual experience of the ultimate futility of concepts which is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the attainment of the Goal." (p. 89).

Although the Buddha discouraged vicious and undue dialectic of the *takkī* (dialectician) early Buddhist discourses (*sutta*) contain dialogues and rational or causal analyses. This is quite natural, for while Jainism considered itself a religion of analysis (*bhajanavāda*), Buddhism was a religion of analysis (*vibhajjavāda*) as well as a religion outlining the causes (*hetuvāda*). A fine example of the use of dialectic in the sense of argument leading to consequences bordering on contradiction or semantical impasse is the *Kathāvatthu* (3rd Century B.C.), a book of the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*. In the lengthy debate on the unreality or reality of a person (*puggala*) between the Theravādin and the Personalist (*puggalavādin*), which is the first point of controversy taken up in the *Kathāvatthu Kvu.* p. 2, f. we find the following sequence in the argument.

I. Theravādin : Is the person obtained as an absolute truth, as an ultimate reality (*Puggalo upalabbhati Saccikaṭṭha paramaṭṭhenāti*)?

II. Puggalavādin : Yes (*Amantā*).

III. Theravādin : Is a person obtained as an absolute truth, as an absolute reality in the same way that an absolute truth, an absolute reality is obtained (*Yo saccikaṭṭho paramaṭṭho tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamaṭṭhenāti*)?

IV. Puggalavādin:One should not say so (*Na h'evaṃ vattabbe*). The Theravādin now points out that if (III) is not assertible then (I) cannot be answered in the affirmative as done in (II) by the Puggalavādin. This refutation of the position of the personalist is now followed by taking up the thesis of the Theravādin.

1. Puggalavādin : Is a person not obtained as an absolute truth, as an ultimate reality (*Puggalo n'upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamaṭṭhenāti*)?

2. Theravādin : Yes (*Amantā*).

3. Puggala : Is a person not obtained as an absolute truth, as an ultimate reality in the way an absolute truth, an ultimate reality (is obtained) (*Yo saccikaṭṭho paramaṭṭho tato so puggalo n'upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamaṭṭhenēti*)?

4. Thera : One should not say so (*Na hevam vattabbe*). The personalist then points out that if (3) is not assertible then (1) cannot be answered in the affirmative as done in (2) by the Theravādin, and the Theravādin's position is refuted.

This pattern of argument continues taking all manner of aspects relevant to the concept of a person, every time refuting the opposing positions of both the Theravādin and the Puggalavādin. The *Kathāvatthu* is a *Theravāda* text, so ultimately, of course, the *Theravāda* view is considered to be upheld.

The debate in the *Kathāvatthu* has some characteristics of the dialectics of Zeno, Socrates, Kant and Nāgārjuna. Zeno, for example, argues that an arrow shot with great speed does not move, for it is stationary at every instant. Moggaliputtatissa, the author of the *Kathāvatthu* shows that if, for example, one asserts that if a person obtains as an ultimate (truth or) reality, he cannot obtain as an ultimate (truth or) reality, for he cannot be seen to be obtained as an ultimate (truth or) reality in the same way that (any) ultimate (truth or) reality is obtained. This has something close to Zeno's paradoxes, but it is also close to the Socratic dialectic or the Socratic method (*v. supra*) which proceeded by sustained cross examination that made the opponent that is, really the proponent, the person upholding the thesis, to draw conclusions which contradict his own thesis by giving 'yes' or 'no' answers. The *Kathavātthu* material seems more sophisticated in some respects than the Socratic method in that (i) instead of 'no', the more subtle 'do not say so' is used and (ii) both the opposing theses are also refuted at every step. It reflects Kant's dialectic in that both the thesis (the Theravāda position) and the anti-thesis (in the given example, the position of the puggalavādin) are taken up, and shown to be non-provable, whereas of course, Kant took up the thesis and the anti-thesis in each antinomy and showed both of them to be provable. Finally, this leads us to see an affinity between the *Kathāvatthu* arguments and Nāgārjuna's dialectic (*v. infra*). For although even eminent Buddhist scholars like K. N. Jayatilleke have taken the *Na h'evam vattabbe* (one should not say so) as giving a denial and hence a negation of the positions implied by the questions (III) and (3) in the example given above, they are not directly negated. The position is one of non-assertability or inexpressibility or non-knowability (by ordinary means) of the ultimately true and the real. This aspect is somewhat analogous to Nāgārjuna's dialectic (perhaps even Kant's) which takes us exactly to the impasse, showing us the futility of conceptualization. And this position is perhaps implicit even in the dialectic of the *catuṣkoṭi* of the Early Buddhists which we took up earlier.

Finally, before we leave the dialectic in Early Buddhism, we must mention the *Milindapañha*, which probably dates about the beginnings of the Christian era. Here a Greek (Bactrian) king Menander (Milinda) who ruled in some part of North-West India discusses certain points in the Dhamma with Nāgasena, a Buddhist scholar-priest. While difficulties like the concept of a person are also discussed in this work, in the section on dilemmas, a large number of opposing pairs of views, both ascribed to the Buddha, are taken up by the king and the apparent opposition is explained away by Nāgasena. The method of resolution mostly depends on something like the closer determination of the situation or the context in which the opposing utterances were made reminding one of the Fitcheian synthesis (*v. supra*). Thus, for example, the king refers to the following two statements by the Buddha :

A. "Fear springs from fellowship, dust is born of a house. To be houseless and independent, that is the sage's vision."

B. "He should have charming dwelling places built and lodge those who have heard much therein," and asks Nāgasena whether if A is true then isn't B false? That is, aren't A and B opposing theses?

Nāgasena explains that the Buddha meant A to be generally true or applicable but that B was said when the Buddha considered two particular matters, viz. (i) to extoll the gift of dwelling places; (ii) to make it possible for nuns living in a living place to meet experienced monks.

Thus, the 'contradiction' is explained away. The "thesis" and the "anti-thesis" are shown to be possible of coherence. One could perhaps call the resolution a pragmatic synthesis.

Mādhyamika Dialectic:- Buddhists' use of the dialectic reached its high point in Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Mādhyamika school. He is considered to have lived about 200 A.D. Nāgārjuna's dialectic is a dialectic of criticism. It brings out the relativity or the emptiness (*śūnyatā*) of things, by

drawing out contradictory or unacceptable consequences of others positions. The Mādhyamika repeatedly says that he has no *dṛṣṭi* or position of his own to defend. His dialectic is a critique of Reason and Conception.

The thesis and the anti-thesis which led to this critique, according to Murti, is the substance or soul theory *ātmavāda*, and its denial the *nairātmavāda*, (*Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, p. 27), but D. J. Kalupahana thinks that, "The metaphysical theories of causation presented by the Sāṃkhya and Sarvāstivāda constituted the thesis, i.e. the assertion of substance; and the causal theories of the Vaiśeṣika and Sautrāntika provided the anti-thesis" (*Causality*, p. 160). Nāgārjuna's dialectic is characterised by the extensive use of the *catuṣkoṭi* form in its analysis. One reason for this may be that, as Murti suggests, "Four alternative views are possible on any subject. The basic alternatives are two : Being and Non-Being, Affirmation and Negation. From these two, others are derived by affirming or denying both at once, both Being and Non-Being and neither Being nor Non-Being." (*Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, p. 129).

A more likely reason for Nāgārjuna's use of the *catuṣkoṭi* form was that most of the matters that Nāgārjuna was examining was in *catuṣkoṭi* form in the early Buddhist literature and Nāgārjuna was contesting these views. Of course, the dialectician that he was, he saw the great potential in the *catuṣkoṭi* form.

Buddha himself, not being interested in dialectics, either summarily rejected the alternative in the *catuṣkoṭi* or observed silence in the case of *avyākata*. But Nāgārjuna takes the four alternatives one by one and drawing contradictory or unacceptable consequences in each case, rejects every one of them. Thus, for example, in his chapter on causality in *Mūlamādhyamikakārikā*, he considers the four alternatives : (i) cause and effect are the same (*satkāryavāda* or *Sāṃkhya*), (ii) cause and effect are different (Buddhist and Nyāya view), (iii) cause and effect are same and different (Jaina view), (iv) rejecting all the above three alternatives taking up the view that things are produced by chance (Materialists' and Sceptics' view).

Nāgārjuna argues that if cause and effect are the same, there is no point in producing the effect or duplicating itself. If non-substantial differences are admitted (as the *Sāṃkhya* do) between cause and effect (like between clay and pot) then one is still admitting differences. Absolute identity is not even expressible. With such arguments, Nāgārjuna disposes of the first alternative, *satkāryavāda*.

He next takes the second alternative viz., that cause and effect are different Since they are totally different, one cannot produce the other. Absolute difference does not allow even comparison, even to see that they are different. Hence the second alternative is untenable.

The third alternative has the shortcomings of both the first two and more. Things cannot arise by chance as the fourth alternative suggests. For this thesis must have a basis or it is worthless. If it has a basis or reason, then the way the thesis is established using causes or reasons goes against the assertion of no causes in the thesis.

His position, as it comes at the beginning of *Mūlamādhyamikakārika* is :

Na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyām nāpy ahetutaḥ,
ut pannā vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana.

"Things are not originated by themselves;
Nor are they originated by others;
Neither by both; nor without cause;
Therefore there is no origination.

With such arguments Nāgārjuna disposes of all the four alternative views on causality. In the same vein he rejects views on motion and rest, *nirvāṇa* and many other conceptions. By this means he shows the contradictory nature of conceptual thinking, and asserts that things have no reality (*svabhāva*) and that relativity or emptiness (*śūnyatā*) is the only reality.

Nāgārjuna's *Kārikā* seems to utilize the dialectical progression in the *catuṣkoṭi* to lead one from the conventional (*saṃvṛti*) to ultimate (*paramārtha*) truth. The same progression as well as the inclusion of the *saṃvṛti* in the *paramārtha* seems to be exemplified in the verse (xviii-8) :

sarvaṃ tathyaṃ na vā thathyaṃ thathyaṃ cāta
thyaṃ eva ca,
naivātathyaṃ naiva tathyam etad buddhānuśāsanaṃ

i.e. "Everything is real or unreal or both real and unreal or neither real nor unreal; that is the instruction of the Buddha".

This is the only *catuṣkoṭi* the alternatives of which Nāgārjuna does not reject, and Candrakīrti, in his commentary on the *Kārikā*, indicates that the third alternatives here i.e. "everything is partly real and partly unreal" is the view of inferior beings. We thus find the dialectical progression from the lower levels to the higher levels of thought—from *saṃvṛti* to *paramārtha*—incorporated into the *Kārikā*. Aspects of Nāgārjuna's dialectic has been compared with those of Kant and Hegel in many contemporary works. That Nāgārjuna was a philosopher and dialectician *par excellence* is universally recognized. Indeed, the Vedānta of Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara show the influence of Nāgārjuna's work and Nāgārjuna has been called the father of Ch'an and great grandfather of Zen philosophies of China and Japan respectively.

Dialectic of the Vedānta:- The Vedānta is an exposition of the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads* and the *Vedas*, based on the Vedānta Sūtras or the *Uttara Mīmāṃsā*, better known as the *Brahma Sūtras* written by Bādarāyana probably about the 2nd Century B.C. About the period 780 A.D. Gauḍapāda wrote his commentary on the *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad* in verse, the *Māṇḍukyakārika*. Gauḍapāda in his work brought out the monism in the *Upaniṣads*. All the same Gauḍapāda was either a Buddhist himself or, coming after great Buddhist teachers Aśvaghoṣa, Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, was greatly influenced by Buddhism. Gauḍapāda says that the world of appearance (*prapañca*) is not real, the duality is only an illusion (*māyā*) and the ultimately real (*paramārthataḥ*) is the one. Nāgārjuna's influence seems to surface in Gauḍapāda's work for, among other things, Gauḍapāda's dialectic reminds one of Nāgārjuna's. For example, he argues that if cause (*kāraṇa*) is the effect (*kārya*) potentially, then cause is not unproduced (*aja*) as it suffers production thereby, for it cannot be eternal and changing. Nor can anything be born from that which has itself undergone production. Moreover, there is no cause without (reference to) effect, and no effect without (reference to) cause. Thus, he concludes in a manner analogous to Nāgārjuna, that nothing is born either by itself or through others or by both or by chance.

Again, things exist in an imaginary point of view (*kalpita saṃvṛti*) but not in reality (*paramārtha*), for relative existence is no existence. The idea that things exist, do not exist, do and do not exist and neither exist nor not exist or that they are in motion or at rest, both in motion and at rest or neither of these; all such views are imaginary constructions of our delusion. Thus, the beginnings of the Vedānta dialectic echo Nāgārjuna.

Gauḍapāda was the teacher of the teacher of Śaṅkara (788 - 820 A.D.) the key exponent of the Advaita Vedānta. Śaṅkara further developed the ideas outlined by Gauḍapāda, interpreting the *Upaniṣads* and the sūtras on the same lines. Śaṅkara had to show that underlying the teachings in the *Upaniṣads* was a consistent system demonstrating that one Absolute unchangeable, Brahman as the only Reality. He used arguments to show that the other systems—the Mīmāṃsā, Sāṃkhya, Buddhist and so on—were wrong, but it was only his followers like Śrīharṣa who developed the Vedānta dialectic. Once the world of appearance was taken as *māyā* to avoid duality, *māyā* becomes a category which is outside the ordinary logical division of existence and non-existence. Thus, *māyā* is *sat* or "is" in so far as one is in ignorance, it is *asat*, or "is not" as it ceases to exist or manifest itself the moment the right knowledge dawns on one. The world-appearance (*jagat prapañca*) is thus both *sat* and *asat* on the one hand and it is neither *sat* nor *asat* on the other, for it is neither *sat* or *asat* in an absolute sense.

But why is the world-appearance *māyā* or *ajñāna* (lack of knowledge)? Because the world-appearance is self-contradictory. The Vedānta dialectic is developed by followers of Śaṅkara like Śrīharṣa (1190 A.D.) and Citsukha (c. 1200 A.D.) to show this self-contradiction in our basic notions about the world.

Thus, for example, consider the notion of difference, (*bheda*). Again, four explanations are possible of it, viz :

(1) difference may be perceived as appearing in its own characteristics (*svarūpa-bheda*).

(2) difference between two things may be in the absence of one in the other (*anyonyābhāva*).

(3) difference is the divergence of characteristics (*vaidharmya*)

(4) difference is a separate quality itself.

Consider the first case : we see that jug and cloth are different. But if we perceive that the jug is different from the cloth because we perceive that difference as a characteristic of the cloth, then jug also must have penetrated into the form of the cloth, or else how could we perceive in the cloth its difference

from the jug? But, if the jug is thus in the cloth, then, the idea that jug is different from the cloth is self-contradictory. The argument proceeds in similar vein considering various factors and showing that all the four positions lead to self-contradictions. Such arguments indicate the nature of the dialectic developed by the Vedāntists.

Medieval Buddhist dialectic:- The last phase of the Buddhist dialectic in India comes with the two great logicians Dinnāga (q.v.) and Dharmakīrti. It is based on the theory of word-meaning of Dinnāga, the *apoha-vāda*. Unique particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) either as internal consciousness moment (the Yogācāra view) or as an external point-instant (the Sautrāntika view) are the absolute reality in Dinnāga's system.

Language or names can touch this reality only indirectly or dialectically. Language reveals the world of universals, the world of construction or fiction. Dinnāga's view is mostly nominalistic. Language is not a separate source of knowledge and names are only universals and they are negative

Stcherbatsky quotes Dinnāga :

> "Knowledge derived from words does not differ (in principle) from Inference. Indeed the word can express its own meaning only by repudiating the opposite meaning, as for instance the words "have an origin" (designate their own meaning only through a contrast with things having no origin or eternal)". (*Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, p. 459).

This is the essence of the *apoha-vāda*, the 'exclusion' or 'differentiation' theory of meaning. The word cow, or cowness, does not communicate the cognition of all cows (It just cannot, as there are a large number of different types of cows). What it does is to draw a line or demarcate between cow and non-cow. Cow is cognized through contrast with non-cow. The concept 'having origin' has any meaning at all only in its contrast with 'being eternal' and it does not have any meaning over and above this contrast. And the negations are mutual. 'Having origin' means the negation of 'being eternal' and 'being eternal' means the negation of 'having origin' (or may be the negation of 'ceasing to exist'). The way that a name identifies or refers to a particular object is through the negation or elimination of other concepts. Cow gets its meaning by being 'non-horse, non-goat, non-man' and so on, i.e. being not non-cow. Thus, each name, dichotomizes the universe into two, i.e. into that name and its class complement.

The possibility of expression only through mutual negation is an essence of the dialectic. Dinnāga was keeping the conventional reality (what is expressed in language) and the ultimate reality (the inexpressible) separate by his view. Dharmakīrti considered even the potentiality of an infant or a dumb person to verbalize a cognitive state as construction (*kalpanā*) but later followers of Dinnāga like Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla (both 9th century logicians) interpreted *kalpanā* to be only an association of a word or name with an object, reducing it just to verbalization. This move was a result of an attempt to deny any reality to concepts like cow-ness.

Dinnāga's view finds resonance in Hegel who says, "The negative is also positive. The contradictory does not result in absolute Nought, in a Null, but essentially in a negation of its own special contents (*Logic* I, 36) and "The Universality of a concept is posited through its Negativity : the concept is identical with itself only in as much as it is a negation of its own negation" (*Logic* II, 240).

Buddhist dialectic in Kashmir, Tibet, China and Japan:- Dharmottara founded a Kashmirian school around 800 A.D. and this school propagated the views of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti. Chief works of Dinnāga, Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara and commentaries on some of them reached Tibet, and were preserved in Tibetan translation. The visit of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla to Tibet would have strengthened the ties between Buddhist India and Tibet during this period.

Beginning with the 12th century A.D., original works in logic also appeared in Tibet and these were mostly based on Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti. Elements of Dignāga's logic was also taken to China in the 7th century A.D. by the Chinese pilgrim Hsüan-Tsang and from there it was introduced to Japan as well.

A matter of further interest is the influence that Nāgārjuna had on Chinese and Japanese Buddhism. The Ch'an and Zen paradoxes seem somehow to be related to the dialectics of Nāgārjuna. Consider the following *koans*. 1. A monk asked Tung-shan, "Who is the Buddha?" "Three *chin* of flax". 2. A monk asked, "All things are said to be reducible to the

One, but where is the One to be reduced?" Chao-chou answered, "When I was in the district of Ching I had a robe made that weighed seven *chin*".

D. T. Suzuki says that one function of these *koans* would be to "check the working of the intellect, or rather to let the intellect see by itself how far it can go, and also that there is a realm into which it as such can never enter" (*Zen Buddhism*, p. 136). And in this the Zen paradoxes seem to be doing indirectly what Nāgārjuna did with his dialectic, suggesting the self-contradictoriness of concepts and assertions, and thus showing the limitations of the intellect.

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R. D. GUNARATNE

DIBBACAKKHU, (Skt. *divyacakṣu*) literally meaning the 'divine-eye' and usually rendered into English as clairvoyance, is the alleged paranormal (*atikkanta mānusaka*) or the Extra-Sensory-Perceptive ability to apprehend things that lie beyond the sensory range. In Buddhism *dibbacakkhu* is regarded as a form of direct knowledge.

Dibbacakkhu is enumerated as one of the three-eyes[1] or five-eyes[2] of the Buddha. When used synonymously with *cutūpapātañāṇa* (q.v.) (knowledge of the decease and reappearance of beings) it is categorised as the second of the three kinds of knowledge (*vijjā*, q.v.) possessed by the Enlightened Ones, the Buddha and the arahants.[3] As one of the six

1 *tīni cakkhūni: maṃsa-cakkhu, dibba-cakkhu, paññā-cakkhu.*

2 The five eyes are the above three and *buddha-cakkhu* and *samanta-cakkhu.* They are referred to individually in the Nikāyas (*Vin.* I, pp. 6, 8, 34; *S.* I, p. 137; IV, p. 292). It is only in later commentarial and exegetical works that they are listed together (*DA.* p. 183; *Nd.* I, ii, p. 354; *DhsA.* p. 306).

3 The three kinds of knowledge are knowledge about one's past lives (*pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇa*), *cutūpapātañāṇa* and knowledge about the destruction of cankers (*āsavakkhayañāṇa: D.* III, p. 220; cf. *S.* I, p. 146)

kinds of super-knowledge (*abhiññā* q.v.) *dibbacakkhu* is included in the first group of five which pertains to the mundane sphere.[4] It is listed also as the ninth of the ten-powers (*dasabala* q.v.) of the Buddha (*M.* I, pp. 69-70; *Dhs.* p. 76; *Vbh.* pp. 335-44). In the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* it is cited as one of the immediate fruits of recluseship (*D.* I, p. 83).

Dibbacakkhu is mentioned in Buddhist texts as a paranormal mode of perception. It is said that prince Vipassī was endowed with the divine-eye from his very birth as a result of his former good deeds and that he could see a distance of one *yojana* all-round whether during the night or the day (*D.* II, p. 20). The arahant Anuruddha[5] had developed this ability to such an extent that he was ranked foremost among those who possessed the *dibbacakkhu* (*A.* I, p. 23). The Buddha's *dibbacakkhu* extended over an unlimited range. The Buddha himself is said to have used this ability to discern contemporaneous events such as the location of the Pañcavaggiya monks (*M.* I, p. 170) or Velukaṇḍakī Nandamātā giving alms to monks led by Sāriputta and Moggallāna (*A.* III, p. 336). However, Buddhism does not attach importance to this ability as it does not conduce to the attainment of *Nibbāna*. It is only when the *dibbacakkhu* is directed to apprehend the decease and reappearance of beings (*sattānaṃ cutūpapāta*) that it is considered as helpful to the attainment of enlightenment (*D.* I, pp. 82, 161 f.).

The *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī* (I, p. 224) making a general observation on *dibbacakkhu* explains its function as providing a clear over-all view of things that are beyond the sensory range. The *Visuddhimagga* (p. 357, cf. *Mhvu.* I, p. 159) on the other hand makes an elaborate attempt to explain why it is called the *dibbacakkhu* "....it is divine because of its similarity to the divine; for deities have as divine eye the sensitivity that is produced by kamma consisting in the good conduct and is unimpeded by bile, phlegm, blood, etc., and capable of receiving an object even though far off because it is liberated from imperfections. And this eye, consisting of knowledge, which is produced by the power of this bhikkhu's energy in development is similar to that, so it is 'divine' because it is similar to the divine. Also it is 'divine' because it is obtained by means of divine abiding (*brahmavihāra*) and because it has divine abiding as its support. And it is 'divine' because it greatly illuminates by discerning light. And it is 'divine' because it has a great range through seeing visible objects that are behind walls and so on.... It is an eye in the sense of seeing. Also it is an eye since it is like an eye in its performance of an eye's function."

The Buddhist texts are agreed on the point that unless the *dibbacakkhu* is present in human beings as a result of their former good deeds, as in the case of Vipassī, it has to be developed through a jhānic process. Therefore, it is held that a person who wishes to obtain *dibbacakkhu* should first attain the fourth jhāna. Then he should select one of the three objects of meditation (*kasiṇa*) viz. heat (*tejo*), white (*odāta*) or light (*āloka*).[6] Thereafter he should go on consolidating and extending the particular *kasiṇa* until it gets firmly established and remain in whatever area desired by him. Once this is done he is able to bring within the range of his divine-eye objects that are not within the focus of his physical-eye (*maṃsa-cakkhu*). The extension of the range of perception of the *dibbacakkhu* is in proportion to the extension of the range of the *kasiṇa* (*Vism.* p. 90). It can have both internal (*ajjhatta*) or external (*bāhira*) objects.[7]

Earliest textual evidence seem to suggest that Buddhism has adopted, on the ground of similarity of function, the term *dibbacakkhu* to denote the *cutūpapātañāṇa*. The early canonical references to *cutūpapātañāṇa* (*D.* I, pp. 82, 162) do not directly

4 The six are magical powers (*iddhividha*), clairaudience (*dibbasota*), penetration of the minds of others (*cetopariyāyañāṇa*), divine-eye (*dibbacakkhu*), knowledge of former lives (*pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇa*), and the sixth, the knowledge of the destruction of cankers (*āsavakkhayañāṇa*) which belongs to supermundane sphere (*Vism.* p. 314; cf. *D.* III, p. 281).

5 It is said that the range covered by the *dibbacakkhu* of Anuruddha was second only to that of the Buddha.

6 These particular *kasiṇas* are recommended because it is believed that in order to gain *dibbacakkhu* one has to create light where there is darkness so that one may discern things. And as such *aloka-kasiṇa* is considered most suitable (*The Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 63).

7 For example one could see things in one's own belly or things that are below the earth's surface, behind walls, mountains and ramparts or things that are in other world spheres (*Vism.* p. 362).

refer to it as *dibbacakkhu*, but state by way of explanation that the decease and rebirth of other beings are discerned by the divine eye, purified and surpassing the human eye.[8] Similarly, in the early *nikāya* passages where the three-fold *vijjā* are enumerated, the ability to see the decease and rebirth of beings is not called *dibbacakkhu* but *cutūpapātañāṇa*. However, at a very early period the two terms got mixed up and came to be used synonymously. Thus, in the *Thera-Therīgāthā* as well as in the *Apadāna* the term *dibbacakkhu* appears in places where one expects to find the word *cutūpapātañāṇa*.[9]

From the *Dīgha-nikāya* references (*D.* I, pp. 82, 162 f.) it is evident that the purpose of the *cutūpapātañāṇa* is to obtain knowledge of the decease and reappearance of beings (*sattānaṃ cutūpapātañāṇa*) and also to discern how beings fare according to their deeds (*yathākammūpaga*).[10] Later exegetical works (e.g. *Vism.* p. 358; cf. *Compendium of Philosophy*, p 63) appear to regard these as two separate functions of the *dibbacakkhu*.[11] It was considered that *dibbacakkhu*, as denoting *cutūpapātañāṇa*, pertains to the present whereas *yathākammūpagañāṇa* is the discernment of any event in the past history of a particular individual.[12] When the range of application of *cutūpapātañāṇa* and *yathākammūpagañāṇa* came to be delimited in this manner, the supernormal ability by which an event belonging to the future is discerned was designated by the name *anāgataṃsañāṇa* (cf. *Vism.* pp. 366, 367). This power of prophecy, however, is regarded as the privilege of the Buddha, for in the event of foretelling a future happening every possible condition had to be taken into consideration, and only the Buddha was able to do this (*Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 63).

That this categorization is superficial and that it is a matter of mere detail is evident from the fact that in later Buddhist texts all these are regarded as obtainable by a similar process.[13]

It was stated earlier that *dibbacakkhu* can have either an internal or an external object of perception. Yet, in practice, the *cutūpapātañāṇa*, the *yathākammūpagañāṇa* as well as *anāgataṃsañāṇa*—which are merely three aspects of the *dibbacakkhu*—are always used to discern events concerning others. The early Buddhist texts speak also about the particular paranormal ability of knowing one's own past lives. This ability, which appears to be the opposite of *cutūpapātañāṇa* and *yathākammūpagañāṇa* put together, is called *pubbenivasānussati-ñāṇa*. In early Buddhist texts this is not considered as an aspect of the *dibbacakkhu*. Later this anomaly is corrected by declaring that both *pubbenivāsānussati-ñāṇa* and *cutūpapātañāṇā* are within the purview of those who possess *dibbacakkhu* (*Pet.* p. 38).

The *cetopariyāya-ñāṇa* (knowledge of the minds of others) is enumerated in the list of *abhiññās* as a separate supernormal ability. It is apparent that functionally it has much in common with *dibbacakkhu*. The later exegetical works while listing it

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8 *So dibbena cakkhunā visuddhena atikkanta-mānusakena satte passati cavamāne uppajjamane* (*D.* I, pp. 82; *D.* I, p. 161 f.).

9 For e.g. *Pubbenivāsaṃ jānāmi dibbacakkhuṃ visodhitaṃ*
sadattho me anuppatto kataṃ Buddhassa sāsanaṃ

(*Thag. v.* 332; cf. *vv.* 379, 516, 562; note specially the two stanzas Nos. 916 and 917; cf. also *Thig. vv.* 70, 100, 104 etc.; *Ap.* II, pp. 351, 543, 552).

10 *So dibbena cakkhunā.... hine paṇite*
suvaṇṇe dubaṇṇe sugate duggate yathā-
kammūpage satte pajānāti; cf. *M.* III, p. 210.

11 The *Mohavicchedanī*, p. 208 makes no such distinction.

12 *Vism.* p. 366; cf. also *Mohavicchedanī*, p. 90; *Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 63. Further cf. *yathākammūpagañāṇa* with *kammavipāka-ñāṇa* of the *dasabala* list. (*MA.* II, p. 31).

13 *anāgataṃsañāṇassa, yathākammūpagassa ca*
parikkamanaṃ visum natthi, ijjhanti dibbacakkhunā
cutūpapāta-ñāṇan ti dibbacakkhūti vā pana
atthato ekam ev'edaṃ, byañjane pana nānatā
(*Buddhadatta's Manual*, p. 107; cf. *Vism.* pp. 358, 363. However cf. *Kvu.* p. 256).

as a separate kind of ability also pinpoints its close resemblance to *dibbacakkhu* both in process adopted to develop it as well as in its function.[14]

What the particular sense organ that serves as the basis for *dibbacakkhu* is not quite clear. This question is raised in the *Kathāvatthu* (pp. 251-54): "That the physical-eye (*maṃsacakkhu*) when it is the medium of an idea (*dhammupatthaddha*) becomes the divine eye?" The *Kathāvatthu Aṭṭhakathā* attributes this view to the Andhakas and the Sammitiyas. While pointing out that the orthodox Theravādins did not subscribe to this view, the *Kathāvatthu* does not offer a clear answer to the question. It merely says that the Buddha has declared that there are three eyes viz. the physical-eye (*maṃsacakkhu*), the divine-eye (*dibbacakkhu*) and the eye of wisdom (*paññācakkhu*). On this one has to surmise that according to the orthodox tradition the physical-eye and the divine-eye are two separate things. However, the view held by the Andhakas and the Sammittyas seem to find support in the *Itivuttaka* (p. 52), wherein it is stated that rise of the physical eye is the path of the divine-eye.[15] The *Milinda-paṅha* (p. 123), too, seems to favour this latter tradition when it quotes as authority an untraced *sutta* passage which says, "when the physical eye is lost there is no arising of a divine eye without a cause, without any ground.[16]

Many of the definitions of *dibbacakkhu* found in commentarial and later exegetical works are mainly concerned with its dependence on the *kasiṇa*. Thus, *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī* commenting on the *Saṅgīti Sutta* defines *dibbacakkhu* as, "the knowledge dependent on light."[17] The *Mohavicchedanī* (p. 194) defines it as, "as it arises with the diffusion of light the knowledge of divine-eye is called diffusion of light."[18] The *Paṭisaṃbhidāmagga* has, "wisdom on account of its showing manifold and separate objects through illumination is called the divine-eye."[19] What is noteworthy in these definitions is the use of the terms *ñāṇa* and *paññā* to explain the nature of the divine-eye.

It is apparent that the physical-eye and the divine eye are different from each other. The physical-eyes become helpful to observe the *kasiṇa* and the connection between the two ends at that. That the term *cakkhu* is used in a metaphorical sense is obvious. This fact is clearly explained in the *Visuddhimagga* (p. 357), "it is an eye in the sense of seeing. Also it is an eye since it is like an eye in its performance of an eye's function." This fact is further established by a passage in the *Visuddhimagga* (p. 362) itself "Herein when forms that are not within the focus of a *bhikkhu's* physical eye—i.e., such objects as those that are inside his belly, lying in the heart, underneath the earth's surface, behind the walls, mountains and ramparts or in other world spheres come into the focus of the eye of knowledge (*ñāṇa-cakkhu*), and are seen as if with the physical eye (*maṃsa-cakkhuno dissamānaṃ viya*) then it should be understood that the divine eye has arisen." From this explanation it becomes clear that *dibbacakkhu* is another name for *ñāṇacakkhu*[20] and that the term *cakkhu* is used purely in a metaphorical sense.

From the earliest references in the Pali canon to *dibbacakkhu* (*D.* I, pp. 82, 162) it is apparent that it is a result of jhānic experience, and that its genesis occurs when the mind is cleansed of its impurities or

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14 *Kathaṃ paṇ' uppādetabbaṃ cetopariyāya ñāṇasuṃ dibbacakkhuvasen'eva idaṃ ñāṇaṃ paṇ'ijjhati* (*Buddhadatta's Manual*, p. 105; *Visiṃ.* p. 344).

15 *Maṃsacakkhussa uppādo*
Maggo dibbassa cakkhuno :
Though appearing to be against the Orthodox view this is quoted in the *Kvu.* also.

16 *Maṃsacakkhusmiṃ naṭṭhe ahetusmiṃ avatthusmi natthi dibbacakkhussa uppādo* (*Miln.* p. 123)

17 *dibbacakkhu alokanissitañāṇaṃ*, *DA.* III, p. 1003.

18 *Alokapharaṇe uppajjate ti dibbacakkhuñāṇaṃ ālokapharaṇatā nāma* (*Mohavicchedanī*, p. 194)

19 *obhāsarasena nānattekattarūpanimittānaṃ dassanaṭṭhe paññā dibbacakkhuñāṇaṃ* (*Ps.* I, p. 115)

20 Cf. the Buddhist concept of 'knowledge and insight' (*ñāṇadassana*) or 'knowing and seeing' (*jānāti passati*) which mainly, though not exclusively, is a by-product of mental concentration (see K. N. Jayatilleke, op. cit. p. 418 ff.).

defilements.[21] A similar idea is generally found in the Middle and Late *Upaniṣads*, and among the Jains, Ājīvakas and Buddhists,[22] and its origin goes back to a much earlier period. It has been pointed out that the ascription of divinity to cognitive and conative senses in the individual has a long history reaching back to Vedic times.[23] In the *Atharva veda* the idea is very common that superhuman powers can be obtained through the earnest practice of austerities.[24] This idea with some modification, became still common in the *Upaniṣads*. In them it is stated that the yogin by practice of meditation could enormously extend the range of their senses.[25] As pointed out by Jayatilleke (loc. cit.) in the Middle and Late *Upaniṣads* the verbal forms from *dṛś*—to see acquire a new meaning of Extra-sensory Perception, and this is possible through the mind purified by meditation (*dhyāna*).

From very early times it was held that the mind as the sense par-excellence is potentially superhuman[26] and is capable of knowing and seeing.[27] In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (8.12.5) the mind (*manas*) is called the divine-eye (*daivaṃ cakṣuḥ*). Buddhism also holds the view that the mind has telepathic powers and it is the mind that is directed to see things which are not within the normal range of perception, events connected with the life of oneself as well as the lives of others (cf. *M*. I, p. 296, *A*. V, pp. 3, 313). With reference to the production of *dibbacakkhu* it is said, when the mind is concentrated, pure, cleansed, free from blemishes, purged of adventitious defilements, supple, pliant, steady and unperturbed he turns and directs his mind to the knowledge concerning the decease and the survival of beings."[28] When the mind is thus directed, one begins 'to see' with the mind, and the metaphor of *dibbacakkhu* is employed to explain this function of Extra-Sensory Perception. Thus, this function of seeing with the divine-eye is gaining knowledge through the mind that is purified and concentrated. Therefore, the *dibbacakkhu* is referred to as *bhāvanāmaya cakkhu* (*Miln.* p. 153), *ñāṇacakkhu* (*Vism.* p. 362) and even *paññā* (*Pts.* I, p. 115).[29]

As already pointed out *dibbacakkhu* as such is not considered conducive to enlightenment or even essential for enlightenment (cf. *Thag. vv.* 996, 99). It becomes useful only when it is directed to gain direct knowledge about the decease and survival of beings and how they fare according to their deeds and this could be obtained through *paññā*, developed to a penetrative level by some means other than the jhanic process.[30]

Modern psychologists such as J. B. Rhine[31] and W. Carington who have carried out a fair amount of research in the field of Extra-Sensory Perception seem to accept the possibility of the existence of such an ability in human beings. Rhine, is of opinion that there is but one ESP of which clairvoyance and telepathy are different manifestations.

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21 Cf. *D*. I, pp. 82, 164; *M*. I, p. 367; *A*. I, pp. 254, 255; III, pp. 17-19; *S*. III, p. 232; Cf. also the passage *so ime pañca nīvaraṇe pahāya cetaso upakkilese paññāya dubbalīkaraṇe....*' (*M*. 1, pp. 181, 270, 276, 521; II, p. 28).

22 Cf. *Yoga Sūtra* and also the case of Asita. See also K. N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, London, 1963, p. 459.

23 O. H. de A. Wijesekera, 'Upanishadic Terms for Sense-functions', *UCR*. Oct. 1944, Vol. II, Nos. 1 and 2, p. 14 ff.

24 S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, London, 1966, I, p. 121.

25 This seems to have been specially applied to the ear and the eye whose natural functional range itself is far wider than that of the other sense organs. Cf. also K. N. Jayatilleke, op. cit., p. 61.

26 See Wijesekara, op. cit., p. 24.

27 Cf. *Passāmi nam manasī cakkhunā va* (*Sn*. v. 1142); see also *A*, III, p. 200; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 1, 5, 3.

28 *So evaṃ samāhite citte parisuddhe pariyodāte anaṅgaṇe vigatūpakkilese mudubhūte kammanīye ṭhite āneñjappatte satt ānaṃ cutūpapāta-ñāṇaya cittaṃ abhinīharati abhininnāmeti: D*. 1, p. 82; In this state, it is said, one could direct his mind to those things which have to be realized by one's higher knowledge (*abhiññā: A*. III, pp. 17-19).

29 Cf. also, *atthasādakacittaṃ taṃ catutthajjhānikaṃ mataṃ taṃ cittasaṃyutaṃ ñāṇaṃ dibbacakkhūti vuccati*. (*Buddhadatta's Manual*, p. 107). *Dibbacakkhu* itself is referred to as a specific term of knowledge (*ñāṇa*).

30 Those who gain deliverance in this manner are referred to as *paññāvimutta* (q.v.) or *sukkhavipassaka* (q.v.).

31. J. B. Rhine, *The Reach of the Mind*, London, 1948, p.46.

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S. K. N.

DIBBASOTA (*dibbasotadhātu*) literally meaning the 'divine-ear' and usually rendered into English as clairaudience is the paranormal ability to hear sounds that are beyond the normal range of audition. This is one of the five, six or seven kinds of supernormal knowledge (*abhiññā;* cf. terms *pañcābhiññā*, *chalabhiññā* and *satta abhiññā* (*D*. III, *Abhs*. p. 43; *Vism*. pp. 314, 363). The *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* mentions *dibbasota* as an immediate fruit of recluseship. This is regarded also as a source of direct knowledge. However, as Buddhism lays greater emphasis on 'knowing and seeing' (*jānāti passati*) and 'clear insight' (*ñāṇadassana*, *Vin*. III, p. 91), 'divine ear' is not considered as important as the 'divine-eye' (*dibbacakkhu*, q.v.). This supernormal ability of hearing is not considered necessary or even conducive to the realization of arahantship (cf. *Mahali Sutta*, *D*. I, p. 150 ff.), whereas the divine-eye (*dibbacakkhu*) is one among the three *vijjā*s leading to arahantship.

Some of the earliest canonical references to *dibbasota* are in the *Dīghanikāya* (*D*. I, pp. 79, 154) and the *Majjhimanikāya* (*M*. I, p. 502; II, p. 19). The stock description of *dibbasota* explains it as the paranormal (*atikkanta mānusaka*) ability to hear and discriminate two kinds of sounds viz. divine and human whether they happen to originate from far or near. The Buddha is said to have occasionally used this faculty to listen to conversations between persons residing at far off places. Thus, he heard the conversation between the householder Sandhanaka and the wandering ascetic Nigrodha (*D*. III, p. 38). Similarly he, heard Bharadvāja's conversation with the wandering ascetic Māgandiya (*M*. I, p. 502).

Attempts were made from early times to find the nature of the *dibbasota*. Some Buddhist schools (Andhakas and Sammitiyas) appear to have held that the physical-ear when it is the basis for an idea (*dhammupatthaddham*) is the 'divine ear.' This view is rejected by the orthodox Theravādins on the ground that the Buddha has spoken of two different ears viz. the physical-ear and the divine-ear (*Kvu*. p. 354).

As in the case of *dibbacakkhu* in this instance too, the *Visuddhimagga* (p. 343) offers a detailed explanation as to why it is called the 'divine-ear' and also why it is referred to as the 'divine-ear element' (*dibbasota dhātu*). Therein it is said that "it is *divine* because of its similarity to the celestial for deities have as the 'divine-ear element' the sensitivity (*pasāda*) that is produced by kamma consisting in good conduct, and is unimpeded by bile, phlegm, blood, etc., and capable of receiving an object even though far-off because it is liberated from imperfections. And this ear element consisting in knowledge (*ñāṇa*), which is produced by the power of this bhikkhu's development of energy (*viriyabhāvanābalanibbatta*) is similar to that, so it is divine because it is similar to the divine. Furthermore, it is divine because it is obtained by means of the practice of divine abiding (*dibbavihārasannissitattā*) and because it has divine abiding as its support. In the sense of hearing and in the sense of being soulless (*nijjīva*) it is an 'ear element' (*sotadhātu*). Also it is an 'ear element' because it is like the 'ear element' in the performance of an ear element's function.

From the earliest textual evidence itself (*D*. I, pp. 79, 150 ff.), it is clear that the *dibbasota* (cf. also *M*. II, p. 19) is the outcome of a meditational practice. In these early references themselves it is pointed out that to obtain this faculty one has to attain a high degree of mental development by reaching the fourth jhāna. When this stage is reached the mind becomes totally emancipated from the five defilements (*pañcanīvaraṇa*), becomes concentrated, pure, cleansed, purged of adventitious defilements (*vigatupakkilesa*), supple (*mudu*), pliant (*kammanīya*), steady and unperturbed (*D*. I, p. 76, *A*. III, pp. 16, 17). It is this mind that has reached this high degree of concentration that one directs to hear the sounds that are beyond the normal sensory range.

The *Visuddhimagga* (p. 343) describes in detail the method that should be adopted in creating this faculty. Therein it is explained how one should first direct one's mind that is prepared for *samādhi* by

preparatory practices (*parikammasamādhicitta*) to gross sounds within the normal range of hearing and then successively advert to more and more subtle sounds in distant places. When one gives attention to sound signs (*saddanimitta*) in this manner thinking, "Now the 'divine-ear element' will arise," the mind-door adverting (*manodvārāvajjana*) arises making one of these sounds its object. When this ceases four or five rapidities (*javana*) take place; the first three or four of which are of the sense sphere (*kāmāvacara*), while the fourth or the fifth is fine-material-sphere (*rūpāvacara*) absorption consciousness (*appanācitta*), belonging to the fourth *jhāna* (*catutthajhāna*). It is the knowledge (*ñāṇa*) arisen together with the initial absorption of consciousness (*appanācitta*), that is known as the 'divine-ear element.' When consolidating it one should develop it by delimiting a single finger-breadth thinking, "I will hear sounds within this area," and then gradually extend the area upto the world-sphere (*cakkavāla*) or even beyond that. One who has developed this supernormal ability is capable of hearing all sounds that is within the space touched by the object of the basic *jhāna* (*pādakajjhānārammaṇena phuṭṭhokāsabbhantaragate pi sadde sunāti yeva : Vism.* p. 344). It has as its object internal and external sphere of sounds that pertains to the present (*Mohavicchedani*, p. 88). One who is endowed with this supernormal ability of hearing is not merely capable of hearing the sounds but is even capable of discriminating from amidst a multitude of sounds each and every sound that constitute it (*Vism.* loc. cit.).

From the foregoing account it is clear that the *dibbasota* functions beyond the range of the physical media of hearing. The physical ear is of use only at the preliminary stage when one begins to advert one's mind to gross and subtle sounds. Once the preliminary stage is passed the physical ear loses its functional significance. The divine ear which is the knowledge (*ñāṇa*) that arises along with the absorption consciousness (*appanācitta*) begins to function as the ear, and therefore, it is said that one begins to perceive sounds with one's superknowledge (*abhiññāñāṇena sunāti yeva : Vism.* p. 408). Thus the divine-ear is an expansion of auditory perception which functions without the intervention of the physical ear (K. N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, p. 438). See also DIBBACAKKHU.

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DIBBAVIHĀRA, "heavenly state", one of the three states given in the *Saṅgīti-Sutta*, the other two states being the divine state (*brahmavihāra*) and sublime state (*ariyavihāra : D.* III, 220). The *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī* identifies *dibbavihāra* with the eight attainments (*samāpatti*), *brahmavihāra* with four infinitudes (*appamaññā*) and *ariyavihāra* with attainments to four fruitions (*phalasamāpatti : DA.* III, 1006). The former two *vihāras* are mundane attainments while the last one is supramundane.

UPALI KARUNARATNA

DĪGHA-NIKĀYA (vars. *Dīghāgama* or *Dīghasaṅgaha*), the first book of the *Sutta Piṭaka* is a collection (*nikāya, āgama* or *saṅgaha*) of thirty-four suttas most of which are considerably long (*dīgha*), and hence its name. The whole collection is divided into three parts (*vagga*) namely *Sīlakkhandha-vagga*, *Mahā-vagga* and *Pāṭika* (or *Pāṭiya*)-*vagga*, containing thirteen (1-13), ten (14-23) and eleven (24-34) suttas respectively. The arrangement of the suttas points to an attempt by the compilers to group together, as far as possible, suttas related in content. The heterogenous character of the suttas seems to have made the compiler's task difficult. Not only in content, even in form it is of heterogenous character. The *Sīlakkhandha-vagga* on the whole is in prose, while the suttas of other two *vaggas* are in a mixture of prose and verse.

The chronology of the suttas is a much vexed problem. Franke observes that the *Dīgha-nikāya* is "... a literary work which was drawn up on a uniform whole".[1] But the available evidence seems to be more in favour of the view that like the other texts of the *Ti-Piṭaka*, *Dīgha-nikāya*, too, is the final outcome of a gradual growth. This view is supported by such scholars as Winternitz, Pande and Bapat. Yet, however, there is no concensus of opinion among scholars with regard to the exact chronological order of the suttas. Winternitz says that the three *vaggas* of the *Dīgha-nikāya* "... contain earlier and later strata of tradition. The earliest stratum is represented by the first book and later one by the third, whilst the second book is composed of the longest *suttas*, some of which have grown into their present bulk owing to interpolation".[2] Bapat is of opinion that there, "... appears to be at least

1 *ZDMG.* 67, (1913), p. 409 ff. *WZKM.* 27, (1913), p. 198 ff; p. 276.

2 *History of Indian Literature*, II, p. 35.

three different literary strata to which the suttas in the three volumes as they are at present, may be said to belong".[3] Pande making a general observation states that, "... the order of the Pali sutta groups seem to show roughly the historical phenomena of later writings being added to earlier ones since the third and the second books of the Pali *Dīgha-nikāya* are on the whole recognizably later than the first".[4]

The problem of chronology becomes still complicated by the fact that certain *suttas* are made up of portions belonging to early and late periods and this is exemplified by the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* (No. 16) which contains a fairly detailed account of the last year of Buddha's life. Into this account is weaved a host of other incidents, and these additions belong to different periods. Another noteworthy feature of the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* is the vastness of its scope which consequently has given rise to two new suttas (contained within the *Dīgha-nikāya* itself) which centres on incidents briefly referred to in it. Very early in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*, during the Buddha's visit to Nādikā, Ānanda questions the Buddha with regard to the after-death-position (*kā gati ko abhisamparāyo : D.* II, p. 91) of some residents of Nādikā who had passed away by that time. It is interesting to observe that the *Janavasabha Sutta* is both located in Nādikā and that it elaborates the theme of after-death-position of residents of Nādikā who had passed away (ibid. p. 200 ff.).

The other sutta, the *Mahāsudassana* (ibid. p. 169 ff.) is prompted by the reference in the *Mahāparinibbāna* to the Buddha's journeying to Kusinārā where, it is indicated, the final passing away of the Buddha will take place (ibid. p. 139). The *Mahāsudassana* takes up this theme, and through the dramatic situation of Ānanda pleading with the Buddha not to pass away in that provincial hamlet elaborates on the former glories of that town, then known as Kusāvatī and that of its Universal Monarch, Mahāsudassana. Suttas such as *Mahāpadāna* (No. 14) and *Lakkhaṇa* (No. 30) whose contents reflect a stage in the development of docetism could reasonably said to be of comparatively late origin. Perhaps, the *Saṅgīti* (No. 33) and *Dasuttara* (No. 34) suttas drawn up in a new format resembling the plan adopted regularly in the *Aṅguttara nikāya* which enumerate and group main items numerically, in arithmetic progression could be justifiably assigned to a late period.

A perusal of the text reveals that unlike the other four divisions of the *Sutta Piṭaka* the *Dīgha nikāya* on the whole abounds with material *about* Buddhism than *on* Buddhism itself. This becomes very obvious when one compares the contents of *Dīgha* with that of the *Majjhima*, consisting of a large number of suttas devoted to the discussion of doctrinal problems forming the crux of the Buddha's teaching. It is not suggested that the *Dīgha nikāya* is completely devoid of doctrinal discussions; what is meant is that, on the whole, background information about Buddhism preponderate over doctrinal discussion. Hence, the importance of the *Dīgha* as a source book of Buddhism outweighs its importance as a source of Buddha's teaching.

The *Dīgha nikāya*, thus, could justifiably be called a mine of information about the religious, social, economic and political conditions of India prior to and during the time of the Buddha. It also helps one to get an idea of the numerous forces the Buddha had to contend with, the prevalent social and religious views which he had to debunk, the methods he had to adopt in successfully propagating his teaching.

Thus, the first sutta of the *Dīgha nikāya* namely, the *Brahmajāla* (No. 1) presents a detailed picture of the religious fermentation that was taking place in India at the time. It enumerates sixty-four types of speculations and theories, all of which were not of equal importance. Hence, the Buddha had to contend only with those which had gained greater acceptance of the people. As it is evident from the *Dīgha nikāya* some of the most important religious teachings were those put forward by the group collectively referred to as the 'six-teachers'. The *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* (No. 2) contains an account of these teachings. In this sutta the Buddha enunciates, ridicules and debunks these teachings and in the process gives reason for the foundation of his own Order, enunciation of the Vinaya and points out in what respects the recluseship in his Order is superior to that of any other. On the whole the *Subha Sutta* (No. 10) is of very much similar content and purpose.

3 Different strata in the literary material of the *Dīgha Nikāya*, *ABORI*, VIII, April, 1926, p. 16 f.

4 *Studies in the Origin of Buddhism*, p. 79.

Many suttas in the *Dīgha nikāya* bear evidence to the opposition the Buddha had to face when he set rolling a novel teaching and a revolutionary set of social values. The main front of opposition was that of the brahmins who enjoyed undue privileges and benefits by propagating a doctrine to suit their motives. The corner stones of their belief were the (a) existence of a Supreme Godhead, (b) theory of divine creation, (c) sanctity of the *Veda* (d) efficacy of the sacrifices and the (e) divinely ordained institution of caste. In fact, as seen from the *Dīgha nikāya*, prevalence and stability of Brahmanism was to a large extent dependent upon the acceptance of the caste system and in the belief in the efficacy of the sacrifice. Therefore, as the three suttas *Ambaṭṭha*, *Soṇadaṇḍa* and *Kūṭadanta* (Nos. 3, 4, and 5) illustrate, the Buddha was consistently directing his attacks at those beliefs. Both the *Ambaṭṭha* and *Soṇadaṇḍa* not only ridicule and demolish the brahmin concept of caste but also established the Buddhist point of view that birth is of no importance and what really matters is morality and conduct. In the same vein the *Kūṭadanta* shows the futility of the sacrifice wherein are destroyed the lives of many innocent animals, and instead puts forward a new concept of sacrifice wherein no living thing is injured. *Lohicca* and *Tevijja* (Nos. 12 and 13) are two other suttas that contain severe criticism of Brahmanism.

The *Cakkavattisīhanāda Sutta* (No. 26) and the *Aggañña Sutta* (No. 27) are direct attacks on the brahmin theories of creation and evolution of society. The *Aggañña* which is a sort of Buddhist book of Genesis mainly deals with the evolution of the world, of men and of society. It criticizes the brahmin theory of divine-creation, examines and rejects the brahmin's claim to be the heirs of Brahma and declares righteousness to be superior to lineage. The *Cakkavattisīhanāda* puts forward the Buddhist view regarding the inter-relations between numerous economic, social and moral factors which when not in their proper alignment causes corruption and degeneration in society. In fact this sutta is of great importance for students who are keen to know the Buddhist theory of economic, social and political philosophy. So is the *Mahāsudassana Sutta* (No. 17) which gives a Buddhistic interpretation to the concept of universal kingship (*cakkavatti-rāja*).

The *Dīgha nikāya* shows that besides the brahmin's teaching doctrines of other teachers, too, came under severe criticism of the Buddha. It was shown in the *Sāmaññaphala* how the Buddha criticised the teachings of the 'Six-teachers'. Two other suttas namely the *Kassapa sīhanāda* (No. 8) and the *Udumbarika sīhanāda* (No. 25) denounce the practice of a self-mortification. These suttas make it clear that the Buddha was not against many practices that happen to conduce to self-restraint, but, through personal experience, rejected as futile only those practices which merely had self-mortification as the outcome.

When reading through the *Dīgha nikāya* it becomes clear that the religious fermentation of the period was such that religious teachers vied with each other to win over followers. Display of magic and miracles was freely used for the purpose of converting masses. As the *Kevaḍḍha Sutta* (No. 11) illustrates the Buddha did not endorse the performance of miracles for this purpose. Instead he pointed out that a greater and better wonder than displayed by the other teachers at the time is the one adopted by him namely, education in the system of self-training which culminates in arahantship. Yet, as shown by the *Pāṭika Sutta* (No. 24) he was not denouncing the performance of miracles because he was incapable of performing them, but on the contrary he proved that he was capable of surpassing anyone even in that sphere.

The *Pāyāsi Sutta* (No. 23) shows that Materialism was a widely prevalent doctrine at the time. Buddha's disciples had to contend with teachers who put forward such teachings, and from the point of view of Buddhism such teachings were considered as extremely harmful to the wellbeing of the people, herein and hereafter.

As seen from a number of suttas in the *Dīgha nikāya* the moot point that engaged the attention of the religious teachers of the time was the one concerned with the 'soul'. As evident from these sources almost all teachers, except the Buddha, accepted the existence of the soul. The Buddhist point of view on this question is clearly put forward in the *Poṭṭhapāda Sutta* (No. 9). The *Mahānidāna* (No. 15), too, is an important discourse on this point and it clearly enunciates the theory of causality (*paṭiccasamuppāda*). Two other suttas namely, *Mahāli* (No. 6) and *Jāliya* (No. 7) are also noteworthy on this point. Two other suttas of importance from the doctrinal point of view are the *Sakkapañha* (No. 21) and *Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna* (No. 22). The former discusses about the causes of malice, avarice, desire, happiness, sorrow and so on while the latter deals with the four bases of mindfulness.

Criticism and refutation of the views and theories of other religious teachers were not the only methods adopted by the Buddha to facilitate the spread of his teaching. As the *Janavasabha* (No. 18), *Mahā-govinda* (No. 19), *Mahāsamaya* (No. 20) and the *Ātānāṭiya* (No. 32) suttas illustrate, the Buddha, in order to take his message to the masses, conceded to blend with Buddhism certain prevalent beliefs which were not in conflict with his fundamental teaching. These suttas show how the Buddha held out to the masses birth in heavenly worlds as a reward for following his teaching and how he identified non-believers with dark, evil forces, and also how he admitted numerous popular gods into the Buddhist fold. Besides, when the number of lay adherents increased, a setting-up of a general code of discipline for them became necessary and this need is fulfilled by the *Sigālovāda Sutta* (No. 31).

Buddhism had to contend with religious schools which had a long history. And, hence, as seen from the *Mahāpadāna Sutta* (No. 14), it may have become necessary for Buddhism also to trace its history to great antiquity, thus evolving the concept of past Buddhas. The two suttas namely the *Sampasādanīya* (No. 28) and *Pāsādika* (No. 29) also serve the cause of spread of fame of the Buddha and his teaching by detailing the qualities of the perfect teacher and the perfect teaching and identifying these with the Buddha and his teaching.

The above analysis makes it clear that the *Dīgha nikāya*, on the whole is verily an invaluable mine of information regarding social, political and religious conditions of the pre-Buddhist and Buddhist India and that it is an indispensable source of information for the student researching in the field of growth and the spread of Buddhism.

G. K. WIJESEKERA

DĪGHAVĀPI-VIHĀRA, an ancient Buddhist monastery in Ceylon, built by King Saddhā Tissa (137 B.C. 119 B.C.) in the Dīghavāpi-maṇḍala. It is said (*Dpv.* ii, 60; *Mhv.* i, 78) that the site of the *cetiya* of this *vihāra* was sanctified by the Buddha on his third visit to the island by sitting there with the brotherhood and spending some time in meditation. Thus it became one of the sixteen great places of worship among the Sri Lankan Buddhists.

The Dīghavāpi-maṇḍala where this *vihāra* was located was one of the provinces in ancient Sri Lanka in the eastern region of the island. It is not necessarily the region of a long tank as the term may mean. S. Paranavitana (*EZ.* V, 134, n. 1) suggests that it was probably the ancient settlement founded by Dīghāyu in the time of King Paṇḍuvāsudeva (*Mhv.* ix, 10). According to the *Mahāvaṃsa*, King Kākavaṇṇatissa had stationed his second son, Saddhā Tissa in Dīghavāpi, which had its own garrisons to guard the territory there (*Mhv.* xxiv. 2). On his father's death Saddhā Tissa went to Tissamahārāma, performed the funeral rites and went back to Dīghavāpi, taking with him his mother and the elephant Kaṇḍula (*Mhv.* xxiv, 14 ff.). From this time until the death of his brother Duṭṭhagāmani (161 B.C. 137 B.C.) Saddhā Tissa stayed in the Dīghavāpi-maṇḍala (*Mhv.* xxxii, 2).

It is after he became king at his brother's death, according to the *Mahāvaṃsa* (xxxiii, 10 ff.), that Saddhā Tissa built the Dīghavāpi-vihāra, together with the *cetiya* and also made a covering of net-work for the *cetiya*, set with gems and flowers of gold.

References to this *vihāra* in the Pali commentaries are comparatively very few. One of them (*SA.* I, 341 f.) mentions that a young monk who was engaged in the plaster-work of the *stūpa* fell from its upper railing, but was miraculously saved on account of his mere thinking of the *Dhajagga-sutta*. There is another instance (*AA.* II, 249) of a young monk of the Tissamahā-vihāra in Mahagama going to the Dīghavāpi (-vihāra) to hear the Mahājātakabhānaka thera preaching the *Vessantara Jātaka* in a thousand stanzas. The distance from Tissamahā-vihāra to the Dīghavāpi-vihāra is here given as nine *yojanas* and it is said that he covered it in a single day. The *Majjhima nikāya* commentary (V, 101) mentions that the arahant Maliyadeva thera once preached the *Cha Chakka-sutta* at the Dīghavāpi-vihāra on hearing which sixty monks attained arahantship.

A person coming from Anuradhapura had to cross the river (i.e. Mahāvalukā-gaṅga) to go to Dīghavāpi (*MA.* IV, 18). Mahāmunigāma was a village in the Dīghavāpi-raṭṭha (*DhpA.* IV, 50).

As a locality Dīghavāpi remained to be politically important even during later centuries though no mention is made of the *vihāra* in the literary works. The *Mahāvaṃsa* (xcix, 38) records a visit of King Kittisirirājasīṃha in the middle of the 18th century, to the Nakhā-cetiya, but it is not certain whether this was identical with the ancient Dīghavāpi-vihāra, though in Sinhalese writings (e.g. *Rājāvaliya*, xxxiv,

Dhātuvaṃsaya, iv) the *vihāra* is known as Dīghanakha.

Major Forbes (*Eleven Years in Ceylon*, I, 152, n.) and Parker (*Ancient Ceylon*, 318) mentions that the ruins of the Dīghavāpi-vihāra were discovered for the first time in 1810 A.C. and the *cetiya* which is built with brick and mortar, is gigantic in size. The ruined monument at Vāraiadi, near Irakkāmam, which was locally known as Nakha-vehera prior to its reoccupation by the monks in 1924, is today popularly, and probably correctly known as the Dīghavāpi-cetiya (*JCBRAS, New Series*, Vol. VI, *Special Number*, p. 27).

H. R. PERERA

DIKPĀLĀ (Regents of the Quarters), a class of minor gods represented either as a group of eight or ten deities. According to the Buddhist tradition these gods dispel all kinds of impediments and protect the *dharma*. They resemble the Lokapālās (s.v.) in respect of their origin and characteristics. In later times, they came to be identified with the latter.

The origin of the Dikpālās, like that of the Lokapālās, can be traced to Vedic times. The later Vedic texts enumerate ten regents of the quarters (*Gobhila Gṛhyasūtra*, XIV, iv. 7, 37-41; *SBE*, vol. XXX, p. 123). In the *Atharvaveda Saṃhitā* (Eng. trsl. W. D. Whitney, First Half, pp. 133-34) and the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* (*Taittiriya Saṃhitā*, V, 5-10), only six quarters are mentioned with their six regents. In the time of the *Purāṇas* (cf. *Skandapurāṇa*, Sri Venkatesvara Press Vol. II, IX, 27, 67-69 etc.), the concept of Dikpālā seems to have secured more recognition in the brahmanic mythology. The *Purāṇas* enumerate eight Dikpālās, who vary with regard to their names and characteristics. In the Hindu tantric works, too, they play a significant role. The Dikpālās appear in the early epic literature and there, too, the concept of Dikpālā seems to be not fixed, since they appear under different names displaying varying characteristics.

Although the Lokapālās exist in the Pali Canon as a stereo-typed quartet in association with the Cātummahārājikas, there is no mention of the Dikpālās in it. They, however, play a prominent role in Tantric Buddhism. Hence it is possible that they were first introduced into Buddhism from Hindu Tantricism at a much later period (B. Bhattacharyya. *The Indian Buddhist Iconography*, Calcutta, 1958, p. 251). As their epithet itself suggests, the Dikpālās function as presiding deities of the quarters. They, in reality, are reckoned as the personifications of the quarters in the form of deities, and also are regarded as protectors of the *dharma* (Dharmapālā, q.v.).

The Dikpālās are frequently mentioned in several Buddhist Tantric texts. In the *Sādhanamālā* (*Sadh.* Vol. I, p. 192), it is instructed to invoke the Dikpālās by uttering the *mantra: Oṃ āḥ, hūṃ phaṭ svāhā* etc.

In the *Niṣpannayogāvalī* (ed. Abhayakara Gupta, GOS, No. 109, Baroda, 1949) they are mentioned differently in the different *maṇḍalas* and sometimes they are represented along with their female counterparts (*śaktis*). They always appear collectively "in the Maṇḍalas or Circles of deities where directions play an important part" (B. Bhattacharyya, op.cit., p. 252). Mañjuvajra, the sixth Dhyānibuddha, is represented as being surrounded by the Dikpālās namely, Yamāntaka (east), Prajñāntaka (south), Padmāntaka (west), Vighnāntaka (north), Takkirāja (south-east), Niladaṇḍa (south-west), Mahābala north-west), Acala (north-east), Uṣṇīṣa (zenith) and Sumbharāja (Nadir : *Niṣpannayogāvali*, pp. 1-2).

The same group of deities are termed the Krodha deities elsewhere (ibid, p. p. 6, 24). It is also noteworthy that the symbolism of the Dikpālās, as they occur in the *Vagīśvara maṇḍala* of the aforesaid text (p. 51) differ from the usual order. They are : Indra (east), Yama (south), Varuṇa (west), Kubera (north), Īśāna (north-east), Agni (south-east), Nairti (south-west) and Vāyu (north-west). It is evinced from the aforesaid group, which includes the four Lokapālās, that it links closely with the Hindu Dikpālās (cf. J. N. Banerjea, *The Development of Hindu Iconography*, Calcutta, 1956, p. 519).

The *Niṣpannayogāvali* (p. 51) also suggests the existence of yet another group of Dikpālās. Thus their appearance in variable numbers and under different names signifies that their concept was not concrete. The Dikpālās, who were first introduced into Tantric Buddhism, subsequently made their way into Theravāda Buddhism. The cult of the Lokapālās, which was already a part of the Theravāda beliefs, might have facilitated the absorption of the Dikpālās.

Certain bronze figurines of the Dikpālās that have been discovered from some *dāgābas* in Ceylon

clearly show the prevalence of their cult in Ceylon as well. The discovery of the seven bronze figurines of gods in the compartment of a brick *yantragula* in the second relic-chamber of the Topāvāva dāgāba throws light on the existence of the Dikpālā cult in mediaeval Ceylon. Although only seven figures of gods have been found there, it is believed that originally there were ten figurines of gods enshrined, They are identified as the eight Dikpālās (*ata-dikpālayo*) and the two additional Lords of the Upper and the Lower Regions (*dikpatis: ASCAR*, 1909, p. 30; *Bronzes from Ceylon*, p. 22 f.). These gods differ from the Guardian Gods of the earlier period represented by the Lokapālās and display a close affinity with the Dikpālās of the brahmanical system as well as of Tantric Buddhism.

It is evinced from the ruins unearthed from the Vijayārama (8th-9th century A.C.) and the Puliyankulam monastery in Anuradhapura that it was the Lokapālās who were associated in connection with the cult of Guardian gods in early Ceylon (cf. A. K. Coomaraswamy, *Bronzes from Ceylon*, Colombo, 1914, pp. 21, 23). The cult of the Dikpālās was seemingly not then current in the island. Subsequently, however, the Dikpālās surpassed the earlier cult of the Guardian gods represented by the four Lokapālās. As Guardian Gods, the Dikpālās seem to have played a significant role upto very recent times (cf. *Bronzes from Ceylon*, p. 23). Nevertheless, the Dikpālās have apparently ceased to appear as a separate entity and a cult. Having lost their significance, they were finally absorbed into the Lokapālā cult. Thus in the later times the epithet Dikpālā was used interchangeably with that of the Lokapālā in the same context and without any distinction.
See also LOKAPĀLA.

C. S. RANASINGHE

DIMBULĀGALA, (Pali DHŪMARAKKHA, var. UDUMBARAGIRI) a site of ancient monastic settlement, known to have been occupied during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries by some of the forest-dwelling fraternities of Sri Lanka. The residences and shrines were on the summit of a hill 1,700 feet high, as well as on the slopes and the plain which surround the hill. Dimbulāgala is mentioned as Dumbulāgala in an inscription; in Pali the word appears as Dhūmarakkha and Udumbara or Audumbara. During the Colonial period it was called "Gunner's Quoin". It is prominently visible from Polonnaruwa which is some 10 miles northwest of it.

Several inscriptions on the brows of caves and other rock surfaces give evidence of the occupation of different areas of the site by the Saṅgha from the early days of Buddhism in Sri Lanka. Much earlier than the oldest of these inscriptions it (Dhūmarakkha) is chronicled (in the pre-Buddhist period) as having been a residence of Paṇḍukābhaya (circa 5th century B.C.) for four years when he was campaigning for the throne against his uncles (*Mhv.* x, vv. 57, 62). King Mahānāma (406-428 A.C.) built a *vihāra* on a request made by his queen at this site and presented it to the Mahāvihāra community (op. cit. xxxvii, 213). The archaeologist H. C. P. Bell suggested that its remains could be identified with ruins in the north-western area (*Ceylon Antiquary* and *Literary Register*, III, 1917, pp. 1-12; 69-79). The commentary to the *Mahāvaṃsa* (*MhvA.* p. 289), which calls the hill Udumbara, locates the *vihāra* as being 9 *yojanas* distant from Anuradhapura (which is nearly correct), one *yojana* from the sea (it should be at least thrice that distance), and that the Lohapāsāda in Anuradhapura was visible from the hill.

A fine inscription of queen Sundara-Mahā-Devi (early 12th century) carved on a raised panel of rock between two of the caves provides the most detailed information recorded of Dimbulāgala. The queen had prepared two great caves which housed statues (of the Buddha) and *thūpas;* near the caves *bodhi* trees were also planted. The caves had borne names after the sun and the moon, but one cave to which she had given special attention was thereafter named the Kāliṅga cave after her own homeland. The two caves overlook a steep precipice with a narrow ledge, partly relieved by a rock tunnel, joining them. This pathway she had paved with stones and in other ways secured for those who traversed it. The inscription specifically mentions that Buddha-relics were enshrined in the *vihāra*, but there is no indication as to the precise spot. It further describes the place as having had a population of 500 monks (*EZ.* II, pp. 184-9;194-202).

In the latter half of the 12th century it came into notice because of the convocation held in Polonnaruwa under the patronage of king Parākramabāhu I for the important purpose of effecting reforms in the Saṅgha. Its work is given in detail in the Galvihāra inscription which notes that the thera Mahākassapa, head of the Dimbulāgala forest-dwelling

fraternity, presided over the deliberations (*EZ.* II, pp. 256 ff.).

The significance of Dimbulāgala as an ancient site lies in the fact that it remained as the head-quarters of a fraternity of forest dwelling monks who produced among their number several scholars of great repute and monks of great piety. During the twelfth and a few centuries that followed royal patronage was extended to this sect and Dimbulāgala was looked upon as the religious head-quarters of the island. King Parākramabāhu I (1153-1186 A.C.) gave prominence to the monks of Dimbulāgala and carried out a purification of the Order of monks after a convocation. Thus we have the *kathikāvata* of Parākramabāhu I which was promulgated by thera Mahā Kassapa of Dimbulāgala, who was learned in the Three *Piṭakas*. The king appointed Mahā Kassapa as the Chief monk to preside at the convocation called by him in order to purify and bring unification in the Order of monks in Sri Lanka. This document embodies *inter alia* the rules agreed upon at the convocation. The rules are drawn up in terse and accurate legal idiom and serves as the model for subsequent writings of the same class. This fact is well established by *Dambadeṇi-Kathikāvata* which was promulgated in the reign of Parākramabāhu II by Medhaṅkara, the chief monk of the time who presided at the convocation. This *thera* was linked with Dimbulāgala, for he was a pupil of Sāriputta whose teacher was Dimbulāgala Mahā Kassapa. Thus a line of monks from Dimbulāgala with teacher-pupil relationship was responsible for maintaining the purity and the unity in the order of monks during Polonnaruva and Dambadeniya periods. They were erudite scholars though they were of the forest dwelling sect. Mahā Kassapa thera was the author of a Sinhala *sanne*—a paraphrase to the *Samantapāsādikā* which is no longer extant. He was a Sanskrit scholar as well and wrote the *Bālāvabodhana*, an abridged version of the Sanskrit grammar called *Candravyākaraṇa*. He was also reputed to have written a *Porāṇaṭīkā*. an ancient commentary on the *Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha* (G. P. Malalasekara, *The Pali Literature of Ceylon*, London, 1928, pp. 178, 186) Mahā Kassapa's pupil (or contemporary) Moggallāna thera followed his teacher and wrote *Moggallāna Vyākaraṇa*—a Pali grammar based on *Candravyākaraṇa*. He also compiled a Pali lexicon named *Abhidhānappadīpikā* (op. cit., p. 187). Moggallāna's pupil—Piyadassi thera, wrote the *Pada-sādhana*, an abridged Pali grammar based on Moggallāna's work (op. cit., pp. 187, 205).

Sariputta thera was another pupil of Dimbulāgala Mahā Kassapa. He was famous for his sub-commentaries (*ṭīkās*). Malalasekara says of him, "Perhaps brightest among the constellation that adorned Ceylon's literary firmament during Parākramabāhu's reign was Sāriputta, called also Sāgaramati-—like to the ocean in wisdom". He was one of the prominent members of Parākramabāhu's convocation and we are told that the king built for him "a mansion of great splendour containing many halls and chambers" attached to the Great Jetavana Vihāra at Polonnaruwa (op. cit. p. 190). He was the author of the *Sāratthadīpani*, a *ṭīkā* on the *Samantapāsādikā*, the *Sāratthamañjusā*, a *ṭīkā* on the *Manorathapūraṇī*, the *Līnatthapakāsinī*, a *ṭīkā* on the *Papañcasūdanī*. He also composed a *sanne* in Sinhala named *Abhidharmārthasaṅgraha-Sanne* which is an inter-verbal translation and Commentary to the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* of Anuruddha thera to which Sāriputta's teacher, Mahā Kassapa had written a *ṭīkā* in Pali. Thus Sāriputta the pupil composed the *sanne* incorporating in it the explanations and annotations of his teacher. Later on a pupil of Sāriputta wrote in Pali the *Abhidhammatthavibhāvinīṭīkā*, following both the original *ṭīkā* and the Sinhala *sanne*. Sāriputta also wrote the *Pañcikālaṅkāra* which is yet another *ṭīkā* on *Candravyākaraṇa*.

About the authorship of the various *ṭīkās* attributed to Sāriputta, Malalasekara says that "These *ṭīkās* may be regarded... as the work of a school, rather than of a single individual; they were rehearsed in solemn conclave and completed after discussion... He (Sāriputta) was an important member of the Jetavana monastery (supra) and undoubtedly took a prominent part in the proceedings. He may possibly have been appointed to supervise certain sections of the work—the *Vinaya*, *Aṅguttara* and the *Majjhima* portions. It may even be that after consultation with his *saddhi-vihārikas* he was authorised by them to write these sections which now bear his name (op. cit. pp. 194-95).

Sāriputta thera had three pupils—Saṅgharakkhita, Medhaṅkara and Dhammakitti. Of them Saṅgharakkhita was a Pali grammarian and poet. He wrote the *Subodhālaṅkāra*—a work on poetics, the *Vuttodaya*—on prosody, the *Sambandhacintā*—on syntax and two other works the *Susaddasiddhi* or *Sāratthavilāsinī*—a *ṭīkā* on the *Moggallāna Paṅcikā* and the *Khudda-Sikkhā-ṭīkā* (op. cit. pp. 198-99).

Medhaṅkara thera was a senior pupil of Sāriputta, for, Saṅgharakkhita in the *Vuttodaya* men-

tions among his preceptors a certain Selantarāyatana (Sinhala : Galaturu-mūla) thera and in the colophon to the *Sambandha-Cintā* calls himself a pupil of Medhaṅkara "Who purified the religion", evidently Udumbaragiri Medhaṅkara, pupil of Mahā Kassapa and Sāriputta. Medhaṅkara thera was an authority on Vinaya and he wrote the *Vinayasannaya*. From internal evidence it is likely that Medhaṅkara was the *Mahāthera* who promulgated the *Dambadenikathikāvata* during the reign of Parākramabāhu II and was a descendant of the Dimbulāgala fraternity. This *Kathikāvata* has followed the lines adopted by Mahā Kassapa of Dimbulāgala. During the reign of Parākramabāhu IV (1303-33 A.C.) of Kurunegala, Dimbulāgala forest dwelling fraternity continued to gain recognition for scholarship and continuity of tradition. Therefore the king having got the *Jātakas* translated from Pali to Sinhala had them read out in the presence of Great elders versed in the Scriptures. Having done that the king entrusted them to a thera by name Medhaṅkara to preserve them through his pupils (C. E. Godakumbura, *Sinhalese Literature*, Colombo, 1955, pp. 99-100). Medhaṅkara had a pupil named Ānanda who wrote the Sinhala *sannaya* to *Padasādhana*.

Dhammakitti thera composed the Pali poem the *Dathāvaṁsa* and its Sinhala *sanne*.

These scholars—the products of the Dimbulāgala forest dwelling fraternity carried on their literary activities during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries though it was not the ordinary custom of a forest dwelling sect.

This ancient seat of the Saṅgha whose chronicled story dates back to a millenium is rich in archaeological material and has come under the care of the Department of Archaeology which administers ancient sites. To-day this area too has come under the Mahaveli Development Scheme and the new programme has contributed to a change in the life pattern of the monks living there.

M. KR.

DINNĀGA, (DIṄNĀGA) brilliant Indian philosopher and logician of the 5th century A.C. who is regarded as the father of Buddhist logic.

The name Dinnāga, (Dik+nāga : Dig+nāga : Dinnāga) which in Sanskrit means the serpent-king or the dragon or the elephant of the quarters, in the Japanese language is pronounced as *Jin-na*, in Chinese either as *Ch'en-na* or *Chen-na*. The name is translated into Chinese as *Ta-yū-lung*, meaning the great dragon of the quarters (Mahādinnāga) and into Japanese as *Dai-iki-ryū*, with the same meaning. In Tibetan he is called *phyogs-kyi-glaṅ-po*.

A confusion has been created by the wrong restoration of the Chinese pronunciation of his name as Jina (bodhisattva) or (bodhisattva) Jina by certain scholars. The author named Jina bodhisattva or Chen-na of Nanjio,[1] Hsüan-tsang,[2] Max Müller[3] and others is none other than Dimāga, the Indian logician. The Chinese pronunciation of Dinnāga *Chen-na*, has been taken by Nanjio as Jina instead of Dinnāga (*Nanjio*, Nos. 1172, 1173, 1228, 1255, 1256). On the other hand the Chinese translation of the same, Ta-yü-lung, has been taken by him as Nāgārjuna (*Nanjio*, Nos. 1309, 1223, 1224).[4] Thus both these restorations, Jina-bodhisattva and Nāgārjuna by Nanjio refer to Dinnāga. Hsüan-tsang (S. Beal, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 421) gives an account of Jina bodhisattva who is referred to as a native of the Andhra province. The translator gives, in a foot-note, the Chinese phonetic symbols of Jina as Ch'in-na, which is the Chinese pronunciation of the name Dinnāga. The *Nyāyadvāratarkaśāstra*, referred to here as composed by Jina bodhisattva and referred to also by S. Beal in his foot-note 89, seems to be the same as *Thisho*, No. 1628 and *Nanjio* No. 1224, which is a work of Dinnāga. As Dinnāga was a native of Kāñci in South India, it is seen that Hsüan-tsang refers unmistakably to Dinnāga.[5] There was no writer named Jina which is merely a Chinese phonetic equivalent for Dinnāga, and as such it cannot be taken as title of Dinnāga used in the

1 *A Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka*, B. Nanjio.
2 *Chinese Accounts of India*, translated by S. Beal, Vol. IV, pp. 412, 422, 423, 451 and *On Yuan Chawang's Travels in India*, Thomas Watters, Vol. II, pp. 209, 211.
3 *India, What Can It Teach Us?* pp. 361, 362.
4 This confusion with Nāgārjuna seems to have originated from the fact that Dinnāga was also called Mahādinnāgārjuna, (*JASB*. 1905, p. 222).
5 I-Tsing also refers to Dinnāga as Jina (*A Record of the Buddhist Religion* by I-Tsing, translated by J. Takakusu, p. 184, 186). For a detailed discussion on the identification of Jina with Dinnāga, see *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India*, Thomas Watters, II, pp. 211-12.

sense of 'conqueror' as S. C. Vidyabhusana supposes it to be (*JASB*. 1905, p. 222).[6]

The question of the date of Dinnāga is also much debated. Many scholars suggest the 6th century.[7] But it seems quite possible that he lived a century earlier. Being a younger contemporary of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, the first part of the 5th century seems to be the most likely time in which Dinnāga flourished. Most probably his life-time was divided between the two Gupta kings Chandragupta II (385-414 A.C.), also called Vikramāditya, and Kumāragupta I, (414-455 A.C.).[8] Hence it is quite possible that Dinnāga was a contemporary of Kāḷidāsa, another fine product of the Gupta period, whose royal patron is also regarded to have been Chandragupta II.[9] The fact that Dinnāga was a contemporary of Kāḷidāsa is further proved by the fact that according to Mallināṭha, the commentator of Kāḷidāsa, Dinnāga is referred to in the 14th verse of Kāḷidāsa's *Meghadūta*. Mallināṭha gives two commentaries to this verse and in the second commentary he identifies the term 'diṅnāgānam' as a reference to this Buddhist logician. According to this commentary Dinnāga was a critic of Kāḷidāsa's works and Kāḷidāsa, admitting the greatness of Dinnāga, seems to have been quite careful not to have any flaws in his works which would have been inevitably criticised by Dinnāga.[10] Mallināṭha says that the plural form 'diṅnāgānam' is used by Kāḷidāsa as the honorific, plural, which shows that Dinnāga was unquestionably acclaimed a great scholar even by his adversaries. The fact that Dinnāga was a Buddhist priest also must have been responsible for this use of the honorific plural. Based on these facts the date of Dinnāga could be safely taken as the first part of the 5th century A.C., which is also the general agreement among the scholars.[11]

The life-story of Dinnāga, as given by Tibetan historians Tāranātha[12] and Bu-ston[13] is full of legendary material and consequently fact and fiction are mingled together. Therefore when reconstructing his biography one cannot completely disregard the legendary details. One must peruse through them and sift fact from fiction. The chief sources of information are Bu-ston, Tāranātha and Hsüan-tsang.[14]

Dinnāga was born in a brahman family in south India in the town of Simhavaktra in the city of Kāñci or Kāñcipura in the present Madras State. He was converted to Buddhism at an early age. Initiated into the Vātsiputriya sect of Buddhism by the teacher Nāgadatta, he acquired a sound knowledge of the Theravāda Tripiṭaka. The Vātsiputriyas believed in the existence of a real personality apart from the elements of which it is composed. Dinnāga disagreed with the teacher on this doctrinal point and had to leave him. Subsequently he came to Magadha in the north and continued his studies under Vasubandhu (q.v.), a celebrated teacher and scholar of the time. Dinnāga, within a short period, became versed especially in Vijñānavāda and in logic (*nyāya*). He seems to have composed some of his earlier works during this period. Dinnāga

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6 Winternitz calls the name Bodhisattva Jina "an honourable title of the logician Diṅnāga," *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II, p. 271.

7 e.g., Thomas Watters (*op. cit.* II, p. 213) gives it as the sixth century. S. C. Vidyabhusana (*History of Indian Logic*, p. 273 also gives the 6th century. So also Max Muller (*Six Systems of Indian Philosophy* p. 364).

8 The ruling dynasty in Dinnāga's birthplace Kāñci during this period were the Pallawas.

9 See, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, II, Charles Eliot, p. 95.

10 With regard to this mutual antagonism between the two intellectuals it may be pointed out that while Dinnāga was a Buddhist monk, Kāḷidāsa was a Śaivaite brahman.

11 A. B. Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 305. Edward Conze, Chronological table at the end of his *Buddhism*, 1951. H. Shastri, *JASB*. 1905, pp. 253-5. A. C. Banerjee, 2500 *Years of Buddhism*, p. 122. Charles Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, II, p. 95. Winternitz, *History of Indian Literature*, II, p. 362. S. C. Vidyabhusana, who gives circa 500 A.C. as Dinnāga's date in his *History of Indian Logic*, p. 273 (1921), however, gives 400 A.C. as the probable date of Dinnāga in an article in the *JASB*. 1905, p. 227.

12 *Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhism in Indian*, Anton Schiefner, 1869.

13 *History of Buddhism* by Bu-ston, II, translated from the Tibetan by E. Obermiller.

14 S. Beal, *op. cit.* Vol. IV and T. Watters, *op. cit.* Vol. II.

disagreed with his teacher Vasubandhu, too, on matters pertaining to logic and had to live for some time in a cave on Bhorasaila in Oḍiviśa (modern Orissa).[15] Thereafter he sojourned for some time in various places,[16] holding public disputations with opponents specially with defenders of the brahmanic schools. It was during this period that he shot into fame by defeating a brahman challenger named Sudurjaya, at Nālandā.[17] After these sojourns Dinnāga returned to Oḍiviśa.[18] According to Hsüan-tsang, Dinnāga was a familiar figure at the Acara's monastery in Maharāṣṭra (Ajaṇṭā?).[19]

Regarding the legendary material connected with Dinnāga's life, Bu-ston starts his account by reporting the incidents that led Dinnāga to leave his Vātsiputriya teacher Nāgadatta. From this account it becomes clear that the conflict of opinion between the teacher and the pupil was centred on the Vātsiputriya conception of a real personality which Dinnāga vehemently rejected.[20]

Writing about the conversion of Dinnāga from Theravāda to Mahāyāna, Hsüan-tsang[21] says that Dinnāga was requested by the king[22] to attain arhantship, to which he reluctantly agreed. Thereupon Mañjuśrī appeared[23] and reminded him of his high aspirations at the time he entered the Order[24] and requested him to devote himself for the salvation of others by becoming a Buddha. On this advice Dinnāga gave up the idea of an arhat's career and devoted himself to a thorough study of Yogācāra and logic.[25] Subsequently Dinnāga became an accomplished specialist of both Yogācara and Nyāya. Bu-ston says that after studying with Vasubandhu, Dinnāga composed 100 works such as the *Abhidharmakosanarmapradīpa*, the *Gaṇaparyantastotraṭīkā* and the *Ālambanaparīkṣā*. As these were mere fragments not systematically written, he resolved to compose *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, wherein all these works would be united. Accordingly he wrote a verse on the side of the rock in the cavern known by his name.[26] According to Obermiller[27] the first half of this verse is preserved in its original Sanskrit in Yaśomitra's *Abhidharmakośavyākhayā* and the second half is restored from the Tibetan by H. R. R. Iyengar. As quoted by Obermiller the verse runs thus :

pramāṇabhūtāya jagaddhitaiṣine-prāṇamya śāstre sugatāya tāyine

pramāṇasidhyai svakṛtiprakīrṇāt-nibadhyate vipraśrutam samuccitam[28]

Bowing down before Sugata—the teacher and protector—who is *pramāṇa* incarnate, and benefactor of the world, I, for the sake of expounding *pramāṇa*

15 According to Tāranātha, Dinnāga spent his time in meditation in this cave. It is doubtful that he composed his works here.

16 *Buddhist Logic*, I, p. 33 f.

17 Because of Dinnāga's victories over his opponents in religious controversies he was called a "fighting bull" or a "bull in discussion" (*tarkapuṅgava : rstod-pahi-khyu-mchog*). *History of Indian Logic*, S. C. Vidyabhusana, p. 272.

18 According to Tāranātha, Dinnāga came to the south later at the request of the king and engaged himself in many controversies with non-Buddhist teachers on many occasions. Tāranātha also reports that Dinnāga converted Bhadrapālita, the king's minister, who erected sixteen large temples.

19 S. Beal *op. cit.* p. 451 and T. Watters, *op. cit.* p. 240.

20 Bu-ston, *op. cit.* p. 149.

21 Watters, *op. cit.* II, pp. 209-10. Beal, *op. cit.* IV, p. 422.

22 Most probably Chandragupta II or Kumāragupta I.

23 According to Tāranātha, Dinnāga had a great desire to learn a spell from a *mantra-ācarya* (teacher of magic) and beheld the countenance of Mañjuśrī from whom he received an exposition of the doctrine See also *JASB*. 1905, p. 219.

24 This remark indicates that even as a young boy Dinnāga was a promising scholar, which he actually became.

25 This is apparently a reference to Dinnāga's conversion from Hinayāna to Mahāyāna.

26 Could this be a reference to the cave on the mountain Bhorasaila at Oḍiviśa, which was his favourite resort? However, he does not seem to have composed his works there.

27 Bu-ston, *op. cit.* p. 150. nts. 1055 and 1056.

28 This is the opening verse of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. *History of Indian Logic*, S. C. Vidyabhusana, p. 276 where he gives the English translation given here.

(valid knowledge), put together here various scattered matters, compiled from my own works."

Dinnāga's attempts at championing the cause of Buddhism soon met with strong opposition from other schools, specially from brahmanic school of thought, and he had to engage in constant disputations with his opponents whom he easily defeated by his superior ability as a master logician.[29]

The legendary accounts shed also light on his gradual alienation from the Theravāda tradition and shift towards Mahāyānism. According to these legendary accounts this change of faith was due to the intervention of Mañjuśrī bodhisattva. Whatever the influencing force may have been, the legendary account reveals his conversion to Mahāyānism which culminated in his composition of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*. The two main events in both Bu'ton's and Hsüan-tsang's accounts are Dinnāga's conversion to Mahāyāna and the composition of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*,[30] which is his greatest work. The legendary accounts also reveal that Dinnāga had certain supernatural powers and Vidyabhusana gives some more information about them. Divine visions he is supposed to have had, the miracles he is said to have performed with the aid of incantations were all added, it appears, to embellish and sanctify his personality.[31]

The foregoing account shows that the itinerary of Dinnāga included chiefly Nālandā, Oḍiviśa, Mahārāṣṭra and Kāñci. After making a unique contribution to human thought Dinnāga's career came to an end when he breathed his last in a lonely forest in Oḍiviśa, which was a favourite resort of his and where he seems to have spent the evening of his life.

As regards the teaching of Dinnāga it cannot be treated in isolation from the philosophical and logical thinking that preceded him. Dinnāga is outstanding as the first Buddhist thinker to treat logic as a separate subject and to interpret the hitherto existing logical material from the standpoint of a Buddhist idealist. His immediate predecessors were the two master-minds, Asaṅga (q.v.) and Vasubandhu (q.v.), who could be regarded as the earliest Buddhists to treat the subject of logic. It was their teaching of idealism (*vijñānavāda*) that facilitated the creation of unique logician in the person of Dinnāga. Not only Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, but even Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Maitreyanātha, dealt with logical problems. But their treatment of the subject was rather incidental. Dinnāga was the first Buddhist that handled logic independently as a subject in itself. All the brahmanic logicians that came after Akṣapāda based their logical teachings on those of the *Nyāya-sūtras* of Akṣapāda. This school of logic, along with its sister-school *Vaiśeṣika*, being non-Buddhist, there was hardly any systematic Buddhist logic prior to Dinnāga. He improved and modified the Nyāya logic to fit into the Buddhist idealism. This presentation of Dinnāga seems to be the result of a struggle that had been existing between the brahmanic and Buddhist thinkers, among whom Dinnāga was the first and the foremost. Not only in the specific field of Buddhist logic but even in the field of Indian logic in general he was the most illustrious exponent in the medieval period.

An examination of the logical teaching of Dinnāga as well as of other Buddhist teachers would show that Buddhist logic is an admixture of epistemology and logic. In other words, it is an application of logical reasoning for epistemological questions. This could be seen by examining the fundamental theories on which the Buddhist logicians have based their theories. For instance, Dinnāga made an original contribution to Buddhist as well as Indian logic by opposing the brahmanic writers on logic who had enumerated four means of knowledge as : i. perception (*pratyakṣa*), ii. inference (*anumāna*) comparison (*upamāna*) and verbal testimony (*śabda* or *āgama*). Dinnāga applied his logic to disprove that there are 4 means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and to prove that there are only two *pramāṇas*. By his logical theories he proved that *upamāna* and *śabda* are not two separate sources of knowledge, but could be included under *pratyakṣa*[32] and *anumāna*. Another important contribution regarded as an original one of Dinnāga is reduction of the Nyāya syllogism from five to three. The syllogism of the Nyāya school

29 One such opponent is Kṛṣṇamuniirāja apparently a non-Buddhist Brahman teacher. According to S. C. Vidyabhusana (*op. cit.* p. 274) the teacher referred to here is Iśvarakṛṣṇa, whom he takes to be the author of *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.

30 Beal, *op. cit.* pp. 421-3. Watters *op. cit.* pp. 209-10. According to Beal (*op. cit.* p. 421, nt. 89) this may be *Nyāyadvāra-tarka-śāstra*. However Watters (*op. cit.* 241) does not identify the book referred to here.

31 *JASB.* 1905, pp. 220-1, S-C.

32 Diṅnāga defines *pratyakṣa* in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, ch. i,as "perception free from all conceptual constructions"—*pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍhaṃ*.

had the following five members : i. proposition (*pratijñā* or *sādhya*) based on verbal inference (*āptopadeśa*), ii. reason (*hetu*) based on inference (*anumāna*), iii. example (*udāharaṇa*) based on perception (*pratyakṣa*), iv. application (*upanaya*) based on comparison (*upamāna*) and v. conclusion (*nigamana*) based on the first four members (*avayava*). Dinnāga applied his logic and rejected the last two members, *upanaya* and *nigamana* as superfluous.

These two reforms of the existing logical teaching are regarded as the two main contributions of Dinnāga to Indian logic. The above shows that what Dinnāga did was to apply logic to epistemological questions. As such his logic may be called a system of epistemological logic. (See further LOGIC.)

However, the original contribution of Dinnāga to logic is a much-debated question. Regarding this question Stcherbatsky says[33] "The originality of Dinnāga's system of logic consists in the doctrine which admits two distinct sources of knowledge, two only. He calls them perception and inference, but they differ very widely from what is usually understood by these terms in logic and psychology. They exactly correspond to the double character of everything existing, the particular and the universal. The particular again is not the concrete object, usually so designated, but the absolutely particular, the unique, the thing which neither has extension (*deśānugata*), nor duration (*kālānugata*), it is the thing in itself (*svalakṣaṇa*), apart from anything else (*sarvato vyāvṛtta, trailokya-vyāvṛtta*), the point-instant (*kṣaṇa*). By sense-perception (*pratyakṣa*), knowledge corresponding to this point-instant is understood. It is a moment of pure sensation in which no synthesis, no integration at all has been produced (*kalpanāpoḍha*). Every synthetic process of thought is contrasted with the direct cognition by the senses, as an indirect cognition or inference. Dinnāga's inference thus embraces, besides our "induction", all that we would call judgement, intellection, ideation, thought, reason etc., every cognitive process, except pure passive sensation. The point-instant corresponding to pure sensation is the central conception in Dinnāga's system, it represents a differential from which, by a process of integration, all our knowledge is built up."

Dinnāga was undoubtedly indebted to the logicians that came before him, such as Akṣapāda and Vātsāyana. The distinction of Dinnāga lies in the fact that he was the first Buddhist to tackle logic as a separate subject and also in the fact that he brought about a reformation in the logic of his predecessors. In this task he was followed by the other great Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti and many others, such as Uddyotakara and Vācaspatimiśra.

A word may be added here regarding the fame of Dinnāga as a logician in countries other than India, even in those far-off days. Through his works he was known in China, Japan and Tibet, in which countries his works were studied and sometimes commented upon. The Chinese pilgrims Hsüan-tsang of the 7th century was responsible for the introduction of Dinnāga's works to China from where Buddhist logic was introduced into Japan also in the 7th century by the Japanese monk Dohshoh. Hsüan-tsang, on his return from India, brought with him and translated two logical works, the *Nyāyamukha* or *Nyāyadvāra* of Dinnāga and the *Nyāyapraveśa*, the authorship of which is attributed either to Dinnāga or Śaṅkara-svāmin. It is significant that the chief work of Dinnāga, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* is unknown in China and Japan whereas it is well-known in Tibet. In China and Japan *Pramāṇasamuccaya* is replaced by *Nyāyapraveśa*, which according to Tibetan tradition, is a work of Dinnāga and according to Chinese schools is a work of Śaṅkara-svāmin. In this connection it is important that if not for the fact that Dinnāga's works were preserved in their Tibetan and Chinese translations we would not have been able to appreciate in full the contribution of Dinnāga to Indian logic. Dinnāga was known also in Ceylon, for he is referred to as a great logician (*Takusata Dinnāgapāda*) in the *Pārakumbāsirita* (*v.* 77) written during the 15th century.

As it was pointed out earlier most of the works of Dinnāga are not available in their original Sanskrit. He seems to have been a prolific writer, for according to Bu-ston he was the author of 100 treatises while Tāranātha makes him the author of 500 works. These figures most probably are exaggerations. Most of his works are preserved in Chinese and/or Tibetan translations. Twenty-three of his works, as are presently available, are given in the following catalogue, which is based mainly on the *Tohoku* and the *TM*:

33 *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana*, pp. 141-2, nt. 1.

1. (*Arya*)-*prajñāpāramitāsaṃgrahakārikāvivaraṇa* (*Taisho*, 1518; *TM*. 3809; *NJ*. 1309). The Chinese title from which this Sanskrit name is rendered is given in the *Taisho* as *Fu-mu-pan-jo-po-lo-mi-to-yuan-tsi-yao-i-lun*. In the *TM*. the Tibetan title of work as *Ḥphags-pa ses-rab-kyi-pha-rol-tu-phyin-ma bsdus-paḥi tshig-lehur-byas-pa*. The Sanskrit title there is the same as given in the *Taisho* except that the last word *vivaraṇa* is dropped. *Nanjio's* Sanskrit rendering, which is different from the above, is *Buddhamaṭṛkāprajñāpāramitā-mahārtha-saṅgīti-śāstra*. In the *Fundamental Truth of Buddhism* (S. Miyamoto, p. 339), the title is rendered as *Prajñapāramitāpiṇḍārtha*. The Sanskrit text of this work was discovered by G. Tucci in 1939 and is published along with the Tibetan translation, in the *JRAS*. 1947, p. 53 ff. It is an epitome of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*. On the authority of this Sanskrit text, Tucci thinks, that the original title of the work was *Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha*. This book was commented upon as *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsaṃgrahavivaraṇa* by Triratnadāsa, who was a pupil of Vasubandhu and a friend of Dinnāga. Stcherbatsky[34] ascribes this to Dinnāga's period of apprenticeship and calls it "a manual for the class of monistic philosophy". In connection with this work it should be mentioned here that *Nanjio* wrongly ascribes this work to Nāgājuna

2. *Alambanaparīkṣā* (*Taisho*, 1619; *TM*. 4205; *NJ*. 1172), the Chinese title according to Taisho is *Wu-siang-szu-chen-lun*. The Tibetan title according to the *TM*. is *Dmigs-pa brtag-pa*. The Sanskrit text has been reconstructed by N. Aiyaswami Sastri from the Chinese and Tibetan versions and published by the Adyar Library in 1942. [35] According to this work, which is a small treatise, Dinnāga takes the position of his predecessors Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, i.e. *ālambana* the apparent object of consciousness is unreal and consciousness alone is real.[36] *Nanjio* gives the author of this work as Jina bodhisattva, who is none other than Dinnāga.

3. *Hastavālaprakaraṇa* (*Taisho*, 1620; *Nj*. 1255). In Chinese the work is known as *Chiai-chüan-lun*. *Nanjio* renders the Sanskrit title as *Muṣṭi-prakaraṇa śāstra* giving the author as bodhisattva Jina, who is Dinnāga. According to Winternitz[37] Dinnāga only wrote the commentary to the *karikas* whereas the original work was by Āryadeva (q.v.).

4. *Hastavālaprakaraṇa* (*Taisho*), 1621; *NJ*. 1256). In Chinese the work is known as *Chang-Chung-lun*. Nanjio renders it as *Tālāntarakaśāstra*, giving the author as Jina bodhisattva. T. R. V. Murti believes this to be wrongly attributed to Dinnāga. It may be taken as another attempt by Āryadeva at summarising the doctrines in six verses (*The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, p. 94). It is more correct to regard this as a work of Āryadeva for according to *kārikā* iv both the subjective and objective worlds are regarded as unreal, which is the doctrine of the Mādhyamika school, of which Āryadeva was an exponent. The Tibetan, and the Chinese texts with a reconstruction of the Sanskrit text along with an English translation are published in the *JRAS*. 1918, pp. 267 ff. by F. W. Thomas.

5. The Chinese title of this work according to Taisho (1622) is *Ch'ü-yin-chia-she-lun*. Nanjio (1228) renders it into Sanskrit as *Prajñapti-hetu-saṅgraha*(?) *-śāstra*, and gives its author as Jina bodhisattva.

6. Taisho (1623) gives the Chinese title as *Kuang-tsung-siang-lun-sung*. Nanjio's Sanskrit rendering is (1229) *Sarvalakṣaṇadhyāna-śāstra-kārikā* and the author is given by him as Jina bodhisattva.

7. *Ālambanaparīkṣā* (*Taisho*), 1624; *TM*. 4206; *Nanjio*, 1173). *Taisho* gives the Chinese title as *Kung-so-yuan-lun*. The *TM*. gives the Sanskrit title as *Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti*, which should be the actual name of the work as it is Dinnāga's own commentary on his *Ālambanaparīkṣā* (see above No. 2). The Tibetan title of the work is *Dmigs-pa brtag-paḥi ḥgrel-pa*. Nanjio gives the Sanskrit title as *Ālambanapratyayadhyāna-śāstra* as composed by Jina bodhisattva.

8. *Nyāyamukha*, *Nyāyadvāra*, *Nyāyadvārataṛkaśāstra*? are the 3 Sanskrit names given by Taisho (1628). The Chinese title is given as *Yin-ming-cheng-li-men-lun-pen*. Nanjio (1224) gives *Nyāyadvārataṛka-śāstra* as the accepted title of the work as composed by Nāgārjuna.

9. Taisho gives the same three titles as the previous one, (1629), where the Chinese title is given as *Yin-ming-cheng-li-men-lun*. According to Nanjio (1223) the Sanskrit title should be *Nyāyadvāra-taṛkaśāstra*. Nanjio wrongly attributes this to Nāgār-

34 *Buddhist Logic*, I, p. 33.

35 *The Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, 1942, pp. 483-4.

36 *Yadantarjñeyarūpaṃ tu bahirvadavabhāsate*.

37 *History of Indian Literature*, II. p. 352. nt 2.

juna. This and the previous work seem to be two translations of the same Sanskrit work by two separate translators. S. C. Vidyabhusana seems to identify both these works (i.e., *Nanjio*, 1223, 1224) as *Nyāyapraveśa*, which he takes as a work of Dinnāga.[38] If this is the same as *Nyāyapraveśa*, which seems to be doubtful, another problem arises as to the authorship of this work, for there are two schools of opinion, commonly known as the author of *Nyāyapraveśa* was Dinnāga and Śaṅkarasvāmin respectively.[39] Incidentally *Nyāyadvāratarkaśāstra* is said by V. Bhattaccharya to be a different work from the *Nyāyapraveśa* in *GOS*. 39, p. xii in which volume the Tibetan text of the *Nyāyapraveśa* is published. It seems that there are three separate works as *Nyāyamukha*[40], *Nyāyapraveśa* and *Nyāyadvāratarkasāstra* or *Nyāyatarkadvāra*. The authorship of *Nyāyapraveśa* is connected with another controversial subject in that the chapter xxix of the Tamil work *Manimekhalai* is said to be almost identical with the *Nyāyapraveśa*.[41] According to G. Tucci, Dinnāga wrote *Nyāyamukha* and his pupil Śankarasvāmin composed *Nyāyapraveśa*[42]. S. C. Vidyabhusana gives a summary of the *Nyāyapraveśa* from the Tibetan text in his *History of Indian Logic*, 289 ff. and also in the *JASB*. 1907, pp. 609 ff. According to him *Nyāyapraveśa* is a work of Dinnāga.

The other works of Dinnāga as given in the *TM* but not found in the *Taisho* are

10. *Miśrakastotranāma* (1150) known in Tibetan as *Spel-mar bstod-pa shes-bya-ba*. The *TM*. gives both Maticitra (Mātrceṭa) and Dinnāga as its authors. Regarding this work Winternitz[43] says "Dinnāga composed one verse to be placed before each of 150 verses of the *Satapañcaśatikā-stotra* (of Mātrceṭa) and in this way compiled a hymn of 300 verses, known as the "Mixed Hymn of Praise." According to I-tsing[44] a priest by name Śākyadeva again added one verse to each of Jina's (Dinnāga) and consequently the work came to contain 450 verses.

11. *Gunaparyantastotra-ṭīkā* (1156) known in Tibetan as *Yon-tan mthaḥ-yas-par bstod-paḥi ḥgrel-pa*. Under this number this work is included in the *stotra* section of the *TM*. and under the number 4560 it is also included in the *stotra* section of Atīśa's works. This is a commentary by Dinnāga on the *Gunaparyantastotra* of Ratnadāsa.

12. *Gunaparyantastotrapādukārikā* (1157), which is called in Tibetan *Yon-tan mthaḥ-yas par bstod-paḥi don-gyi tshig-leḥur-byas-pa*. This work, too, is included in the *stotra* section under this number and again given in the section of Atīśa's works (4561).

13. *(Ārya)-mañjughosa-stotra* (2712) known in Tibetan as *Ḥphags-pa ḥjam-paḥi-dbyans-kyi bstod-pa*.

14. *Samantabhadracaryāpraṇidhānārthasaṅgraha* (4012) known in Tibetan as *Kun-du-bzaṅ-poḥi spyod-paḥi smon-lam-gyi don kun-bsdus*.

15. *Yogāvatāra* (4074) known in Tibetan as *Rnal-ḥbyor-la ḥjug-pa*.

16. *Abhidharma (kośa) vṛttimarmadīpa-nāma* (4095) known in Tibetan as *Chos mnon-paḥi (mdzod-kyi) ḥgrel-pa gnad-kyi sgnon-ne shes-bya-ba*. Stcherbatsky names this work as *Abhidharma-kośa-marma-pradīpa*. This is a summary of Dinnāga's teacher Vasubandhu's chief work, *Abhidharmakośa*, and hence a manual of Abhidharma.[45]

17. *Pramāṇasamuccaya-nāma-prakaraṇa* (4203) available in Tibetan as *Tshad-ma kun-las-btus-pa shes-bya-baḥi rab-tu-byed-pa*. This is the greatest work of Dinnāga referred to and discussed earlier in this article. A re-translation into Sanskrit from the Tibetan is given in the *Mysore University Publication*, 1930. A summary of its contents is given by S. C. Vidyabhusana in his *History of Indian Logic*, pp. 273-88. This work is well-known in Tibet but not in China.

38 S. C. Vidyabhusana, *History of Indian Logic*, p. 289.

39 See *GOS*. Vols. 38, 39.

40 *IA*. 1930, p. 142, no. 5; *JRAS*. 1928, p. 8.

41 For a discussion of this problem see *GOS*. 38, pp. xiii ff. and also *IA*. 1928, p. 133.

42 *JRAS*. 1928, p. 10. On this question see further *GOS*. 39. xii; *Fundamental Truth of Buddhism*, S. Miyamoto, p. 341 and N. D. Minorov in *Aus Indiens Kultur, Festgabe Fur Richard Von Garbe*, pp. 37-46.

43 *History of Indian Literature*, II, p. 271.

44 *I-Tsing*, translated by J. Takakusu, p. 158

45 *Buddhist Logic*, I, p. 33.

Pramāṇasamuccaya regarded as the epitome of Dinnāga's logical teaching is divided into six chapters as i. Perception (*pratyakṣa*). ii. Inference for one's own self (*svārthānumāna*). iii. Inference for the sake of others (*parārthānumāna*). iv. Reason and example (*hetu-dṛṣṭānta*). v. Negation of the opposite (*apoha*). vi. Analogue (*jāti*)

In the first chapter Dinnāga opposes Akṣapāda who propounded four means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) by saying that there are only two, perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*). In the second, third and fourth chapters he discusses the theory of inference and the syllogistic reasoning connected with it. In the fifth chapter he deals with the theory of negation of the opposite for the establishment of a thesis and in the last with the theory of analogue of which fourteen kinds are given.

18. *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (4204) known in Tibetan as *Tshad-ma kun-kas-btus-paḥi ḥgrel-pa*. This is Dinnāga's own commentary on the previous work.

19. *Trikālaparīkṣā* (4207) called in Tibetan as *Dus gsum brtag-pa shes-bya-ba*.

20. The Sanskrit title is not restored but the Tibetan name given in the *TM*. (4208) is *Tshad-maḥi bstan-bcos rigs-pa-la ḥjug-pa shes-bya-ba*.

21. *Hetucakraḍ(h)amaru* (4209) known in Tibetan as *Gtan-tshigs-kyi ḥkhor-lo gtan-la-dbab-pa*. This is also known as *Hetucakrahamaru* or *Hetucakranirṇaya* or *Hetucakraḍamaru*.[46] It is suggested that Dinnāga has written this work as a kind of appendix to his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and his other works on logic. The Sanskrit text, reconstructed from Tibetan is published along with the Tibetan text in the *IHQ*. 1933, pp. 266-72 by D. Chatterji and translated into English by the same writer (ibid. pp. 511-4).[47]

22. *Yogāvatāra* (4539) known in Tibetan as *Rnal-hbyor-la ḥjug-pa*. This work, under this number, is in the *Vijñānavāda* section. It is again given in the section of Atīśa's works (4074).

23. *Vādavidhi* generally regarded as a work of Vasubandhu, is sometimes ascribed to Dinnāga.[48]

The only work of Dinnāga, referred to by Hsüan-tsang, is the *Yin-ming-lun*, referred to earlier in this article. The Chinese pilgrim relates a legend about the composition of this work. According to this legend, Dinnāga was much taken up by the teaching of the Buddha, and entered the Order, which, of course, is a historical fact. As this treatise on logic was very difficult to be understood, he retired into the forest to investigate its meaning. At this time the mountains and valleys shook and the clouds changed their appearance. Then a mountain-god took him in the air and declared that the meaning of *Yin-ming-lun*, originally uttered by the Buddha, had been lost and Dinnāga, after understanding it, would cause it to spread. When he had finished his work, he proceeded to the propagation of the Yoga system. Bu-ston, in his *History of Buddhism in India and Tibet*, reports somewhat similar miraculous incidents, attending the composition of *Pramāṇasamuccaya* by Dinnāga. Thus it makes one wonder whether this *Yin-ming-lun* of Hsüan-tsang is not the same as the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. As the Chinese pilgrim gives much prominence to this *Yin-ming-lun* it is not impossible that he is referring to the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, the treatise on logic, which is Dinnāga's greatest work. The greater possibility seems to be that Hsüan-tsang refers to the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and not to *Nyāyadvāratarkaśāstra* as taken by Julien.[49] However, it is difficult to reach a definite conclusion regarding the identification of *Yin-ming-lun* of Hsüan-tsang.

I-tsing says in his records[50] that when a priest wished to distinguish himself in the study of Logic, he should thoroughly understand Jina's (Dinnāga's) eight *śāstras*, which he gives as :

a. The *śāstra* on the meditation on the three worlds.

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46 *Hetucakradamaru* and *Hetucakranirṇaya* are treated as two separate works of Dinnāga in *The Fundamental Truth of Buddhism*, S. Miyamoto, p. 341.

47 The Tibetan text, discovered from Sikkhim, is published in *JASB*. 1907, pp. 627 ff. Here the name of the book is given as *Hetucakrahamaru*.

48 Winternitz, *op. cit*. p. 360, no. 5. For a discussion of this question see *IHQ*. 1928, pp. 221-7 and pp. 630-6 On the authorship of *Vādavidhi* see also *JRAS*. 1928, pp. 380-7 and *IHQ*. Vol. IV, p. 631 and Vol. V. p. 81.

49 Beal, *op. cit*. p. 421, nt. 89.

50 Translated by Takakusu, pp. 186-7.

b. *Sarvalakṣaṇadhyāna-śāstra* (*kārikā*). This work is identified with *Nanjio*, 1229, and *Taisho*, 1623, which is the No. 6 in the catalogue of Dinnāga's works given in this article.

c. The *śāstra* on meditation on the object (by Jina). This work is identified as the *Ālambana-parīkṣā* of Dinnāga discussed above (No. 7 in the catalogue given in this article).

d. The *śāstra* on the Gate of the Cause. This work is not identified.

e. *Nyāyadvāratarkaśāstra*. This is identified with *Nanjio*, 1223 and 1224 (See the above catalogue Nos. 8, 9).

f. *Śāstra* on the gate of the resembling cause. This work is not identified.

g. *Prajñaptihetusaṅgraha* (?) which is identified with *Nanjio*, 1228, and *Taisho*, 1622 (No. 5 in the above catalogue).

h. The *Śāstra* on the grouped inference. This seems to be *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (No. 17 in the above catalogue).

BIBLIOGRAPHY: (The following have been selected from the wide range of literature on Dinnāga). *History of Buddhism* by Bu-ston, II part, translated from Tibetan by Dr. E. Obermiller. *Taranatha's Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien* by Anton Schiefner. *Buddhist Logic* by Th. Stcherbatsky, two volumes. *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India*, Thomas Watters, Vol. II. *Chinese Accounts of India*, translated from the Chinese by S. Beal, Vol. IV. *A Record of the Buddhist Religion* by I-Tsing translated by J. Takakusu. *A History of Indian Logic* by S. C. Vidyabhusana. *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana* by Th. Stcherbatsky. *History of the Mediaeval School of Indian Logic* by the same author. *Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon* by A. B. Keith. *Indian Logic and Atomism* by the same author. *Fragments from Dinnāga* by H. N. Randle. *Nyāyapraveśa* parts I and II, GOS. Vols. XXXVIII and XXXIX. *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, by Max Muller. *India – What Can It Teach Us?* by the same author. *Indian Logic in the Early Schools* by H. N. Randle. *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux* by S. Mookerjee. *IHQ*. 1927, pp. 152-60; 1933, pp. 266-72 and 511-14; 1927, 603-6; 1928, 630 ff.; *JASB*. 1905, pp. 222 and 253-5; 1907, pp. 627-32; *IA*. 1930, p. 142; *JA*. Vol. 14, pp. 1-66; *JRAS*. 1928, pp. 7-13 and 380-7; 1931, pp. 381-413; 1902, p. 366; 1929, pp. 77; 451 ff.; 1947, p. 53-75.

A.G.S.K.

DĪPAṄKARA. The first of the twenty-four past Buddhas who are said to have preceded the Buddha Gotama. It is at his feet that the Buddha Gotama is supposed to have first declared his intention of becoming an aspirant for enlightenment.

Dīpaṅkara, whose parents' names are Sudeva (var. Sumedha) and Sumedhā, was born in Rammavatī. He is said to have lived for ten thousand years in the household enjoying much comfort, spending the different seasons in three different palaces called Haṃsa, Koñca and Mayūra. His wife was Padumā and his son was Usabhakkhandha (var. Samavatakkhandha).

Being fed up with household life he left home on an elephant one day and took to a religious life to practise austerities. Finally he attained Buddhahood seated under a Pipphali tree on a grass seat offered by an Ājivaka named Sunanda. He preached his first sermon at Nandārāma (var. Sunandārāma) at Sirighara and converted many heretics. Sumaṅgala and Tissa were his chief male disciples while Nandā and Sunandā were the two chief nuns. His constant attendant was Sugata (or Nanda). Tapassu and Bhallika were his chief male lay-patrons while Sirimā and Soṇā were the two chief women patrons.

Dīpaṅkara Buddha who was eighty-cubits in height had a following of eighty-four thousand arahants, and lived for hundred thousand years. He attained *parinirvāṇa* at Nandārāma and a thūpa of thirty-six *yojanas* in height was built as a memorial for him. His teachings lasted for one hundred thousand years.

The above is the traditional account found in Pali texts such as the *Buddhavaṃsa* and the commentarial and post commentarial works.[1] The Sanskrit tradition contained in the *Mahāvastu* (*Mhvu*. I, p. 193 ff.) differs in detail from the Pali version. The *Mahāvastu* depicts Dīpaṅkara as the son of king Arcimat and queen Sudīpā of Dīpavatī. Most of the details are based on the story of Gotama Buddha.

1 For detail references see *DPPN*. s.v. Dīpaṅkara.

Dīpaṅkara Buddha is a past Buddha and, therefore, undoubtedly a development as a part of Buddhology (q.v.). The belief in past Buddhas is comparatively old and is found referred to in the canon itself (*D.* II, p. 5; *S.* II, p. 5 f.). The *Mahāpadāna Sutta* (loc. cit.) thus refers to seven Buddhas including Gotama Buddha. The six Buddha's that preceded Gotama Buddha are Vipassī, Sikhī, Vessabhū, Kakusandha, Konāgama and Kassapa. At this stage the first Buddha is Vipassī. At a subsequent stage of development of Buddhology the number of past Buddhas (*atītabuddha*) increased to twenty-four with Dīpaṅkara Buddha as the first Buddha. This list occurs for the first time in the *Buddhavaṃsa* (*Buv.* pp. 9 ff.) of the *Khuddaka-nikāya*. In the same text (*Buv.* p. 100) names of three other Buddhas namely Taṅhaṅkara, Medhaṅkara and Saraṇaṅkara are mentioned as preceding Buddha Dīpaṅkara, thus increasing the number of past-Buddhas to twenty-seven and the total number of Buddhas including Buddha Gotama to twenty-eight. According to this enumeration Buddha Dīpaṅkara is not the first of the Buddhas but the fourth. This concept of twenty-eight Buddhas is undoubtedly a still later development of the concept of twenty-four Buddhas.

It is interesting to note that Jainism too contains a concept of twenty-four *Tīrthaṅkaras* with Vardhamāna Mahāvīra, the senior contemporary of Buddha Gotama as the 24th. It could be that the Buddhist concept was developed on the parallel Jain concept and the name Dīpaṅkara (literary meaning Island-maker) was evolved from the term *Tīrthaṅkara* (literary meaning Ford-Maker) which are very much allied in meaning.[2]

S.K.N.

2 The term *dīpa* among other meanings connotes also the sense of island. It is in this sense that the term is used in the well-known advice of the Buddha to his disciples (... *atta-dīpā-viharatha* ... *dhamma-dīpā* ... *D.* III, p. 100). The saṃsāra is compared to an ocean (*J.* III, p. 241), to a great flood (*ogha : S.* I, p. 1) and in this context an island symbolizes safety, refuge, and in an extended sense salvation. The Buddha as the Teacher showing the way to salvation seems to have given rise to the idea of the Island-Maker (*Dīpaṅkara*). In this development the already prevalent concept of *Tīrthaṅkaras* in Jainism may have served as a prototype.

DĪPAṄKARA-ŚRĪ-JÑĀNA. See ATIŚA.

DĪPAVAṂSA. The title signifies the "history of the Island", for the Pali word *vaṃsa* (Skt. *vaṃśa*) in an extended sense connotes 'history', going back to the legendary beginnings. The *Dīpavaṃsa* is the earliest extant attempt at writing the history of the Island of Sri Lanka in the Pali language for the purpose of moral and spiritual edification of the faithful in whom it seeks to generate joy, delight and faith (*pītipāmojja-jananaṃ pasādeyyaṃ : Dpv.* 2, Chap. 1, v. 2).

The *Dīpavaṃsa* is believed to have been written some time before the 5th century A.C. Buddhaghosa, in his commentary on the *Kathāvatthu*, speaking of the splitting up of the original Theravāda into eighteen different schools, quotes as corroborating evidence a number of verses from the *Dīpavaṃsa*.[1] Therefore this chronicle under its present name was known to Buddhaghosa who wrote at least in the 5th century A.C.

Malalasekera writing on the *Dīpavaṃsa* observes: "The *Dīpavaṃsa* was not the work of a single author, but of several generations; a succession of rhapsodies added to by the succeeding authors, as the Introduction tells us, twisted into a garland of history from generation to generation, like flowers of various kinds."[2] Many references to *bhikkhunīs* in the *Dīpavaṃsa* have led scholars to suppose that this may be the work of *bhikkhunīs* of the Mahāvihāra residing in the Hatthālhaka nunnery. This work is the outcome of a fairly large number of previous works, no one of which had any special author, and it is the last of the literary works of Sri Lanka which can be assigned to a period during which no books had any special authors (ibid. p. 132). According to Walpola Rahula,[3] "The rugged nature of its (*Dīpavaṃsa*) language and style, its grammatical peculiarities, its many repetitions and the absence of any plan or scheme in its narrative convince the reader that the *Dīpavaṃsa* is not the continuous work of one individual, but a heterogeneous collection of

1 See *Dīpavaṃsa*, Chap. V, vv. 30-53 and *Pañcappakaraṇaṭṭhakathā*. Part I, *SHB*. p. 81 ff

2 G. P. Malalasekera, *The Pali Literature of Ceylon*, p. 135.

3 *History of Buddhism in Ceylon*, Colombo, 1956, p. xxi.

material like ballads of some unskilled versifiers who lived at different periods in different parts of the Island."

The *Dīpavaṃsa* is mainly based on the *Sīhalaṭṭhakathā* and the *Porāṇaṭṭhakathā* (var. *Aṭṭhakathā*), preserved in the Great Monastery (i.e. the Mahāvihāra) at Anuradhapura. The compiler of the extant work has made an attempt to produce in the *Dīpavaṃsa* an epic by using the traditions stored up in these *Aṭṭhakathās*. The verses are moulded according to the recollections of the *Tripiṭaka*, especially the *Buddhavaṃsa*, *Cariyāpiṭaka* and *Jātaka*.[4] It is also stated in the opening verses of the *Dīpavaṃsa* that this chronicle has been handed down by tradition from generation to generation.[5] Geiger points out that the *Dīpavaṃsa* closely resembles the ancient Indian *Akhyāna* poetry in form (ibid. p. 6).

The *Dīpavaṃsa* is an authoritative work which was well known in Sri Lanka at the time of the great commentator Buddhaghosa. There is a great similarity between *Dīpavaṃsa*, *Samantapāsādikā* and *Mahāvaṃsa* and scholars are of opinion that this is because they stand very close to the original sources, namely the *Aṭṭhakathā*s.[6]

The *Dīpavaṃsa* in its composition is a conglomeration of myths, legends, tales and history, and further we go back in time the more mythical the narrative becomes. It could be regarded as an unaided struggle to create a composite whole from materials existing scattered in various places. The author jumps from one subject to another and often gaps are left in the presentation. Some episodes are set out ballad-wise while others are barely hinted at. Sometimes we find merely mnemonical verses. Repetitions and contradictions are very common. However, it contains a kernel of historical data buried in the midst of traditions and legends.

A clear idea of the aim and scope of this work may be had by a brief descriptive analysis of the twenty-two chapters that form its contents. The aim consists of writing history not in its modern sense, but of undertaking an eulogy of the Island (*thutippasatthaṃ* ; *Dpv.* 2, Chap. 1. *v.* 4). The subject-matter of this eulogy has been set out by the author himself right at the commencement of the work namely, the Buddha's visits to the Island, the introduction of Buddhism to Sri Lanka together with the Theravāda tradition, the arrival of the sacred bodhi-tree and the Tooth-relic. The rest of the first chapter is devoted to the story of the Buddha's first visit to Sri Lanka which according to the author was inhabited at that time by *yakkhas* and *pisācas*. The Buddha is said to have gone to the bank of a river where a *stūpa* was subsequently built—(ibid. p. 20, *v.* 52) where he is described as having miraculously subdued the *yakkhas* who were later settled in Giridīpa[7] in order that the plains could be made safe for the settlement of the faithful (*Dpv.* 2, chap. 1, *v.* 21).

The second chapter is largely concerned with the description of the second and the third visits of the Buddha to the island five years and eight years after the first visit. These visits were to Nāgadīpa and Kalyāṇi (modern Kelaniya) respectively to settle the war between Culodara and Mahodara, two powerful Nāga chiefs who are said to have concluded a peace between them consequent to the intervention of the Buddha. On this visit to Sri Lanka the Buddha is also described as having visited the Dīghavāpi and the Mahāmegha grove.

The first two chapters of the *Dīpavaṃsa* contain a number of legends and myths which appear to be based on folk memories of the conditions in Sri Lanka prior to the historical period of Aryan colonisation and the subsequent introduction of Buddhism. A critical examination of these legends and myths help us to obtain an insight, however meagre, into at least the proto-historic period, a period that has been surmised to extend from about 650 B.C. to about 250 B.C.[8] According to the *Dīpavaṃsa*, Sri Lanka was inhabited by a number of primitive tribes, *yakkhas*, *rakshasas* and *pisācas* (*Dpv.* 2. Chap. 1, vv. 20-21).

Chapter two largely deals with the war-like Nāgas. These tribes could have belonged to different

4 M. Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II, Prague, Smichow, 1933, p. 210.

5 *vaṃsaṃ pavakkhāmi paramparāgataṃ* : *Dpv.* 2, Chap. 1, stz. 4.

6 *History of Ceylon*, ed. H. C. Ray, Colombo, 1959, Vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 49-50.

7 Identified by Wilhelm Geiger with the Central Hills in the interior of the Island; *Mhv.* trs. by W. Geiger Colombo, 1950, p. 4, footnote 4

8 S. P. E. Senaratne, *Prehistoric Archaeology in Ceylon* The Department of National Museums, Ceylon 1969.

stages of primitive civilization engaged in predatory, nomadic and agricultural pursuits (ibid. *v.* 19).

The third chapter is a brief description of the great line of kings from Mahāsammata, who ruled the whole earth, upto the kings who reigned at Kusāvatī. Rājagaha and Mithilā ending with king Ajātasattu in whose eighth regnal year the Buddha is said to have passed away.

The fourth chapter describes briefly the first and the second Buddhist Councils. Though brief, the information presented sheds much light on the Buddhist Councils. While the fifth chapter describes the emergence of the early Buddhist Schools, the sixth, seventh and the eighth chapters deal with the life and achievements of the Indian Buddhist Emperor Asoka, the propagation of Buddhism and the convening of the Third Buddhist Council under Moggaliputta Tissa Thera.

The ninth chapter describes the legend of Vijaya and his arrival in Sri Lanka which event is described as having taken place in the last year of the Buddha (*sambuddhe pacchime vasse*). Although Vijaya is claimed to have come from the kingdom of Lāṭa he is also said to have called at the ports of Suppāraka (modern Sopara) and Bhārukaccha (modern Broach) both on the west coast of peninsular India, before disembarking at Tambapaṇṇi (modern Mannar) in the Island of Sri Lanka.

The tenth chapter, seeks to connect the royal dynasty of Sri Lanka with the Sākyans through intermarriage.

The eleventh chapter deals with the reigns of Mutasiva and Devānampiya Tissa. The latter is said to have held a second coronation on the receipt of the insignia from his unseen friend, the Emperor Asoka.

Chapters twelve to seventeen deal with the most decisive and epoch-making events in the history of ancient Sri Lanka, namely, the arrival of Arahant Mahinda and his introduction of Buddhism to the island, the conversion of king Devānampiya Tissa and his royal court to Buddhism; the missionary career of Arahant Mahinda, the adoption of Buddhism as the state religion, the founding of the Mahāvihāra, the erection of a large number of religious establishments in Anuradhapura, Mihintale and surrounding areas, the coming of the Therī Saṅghamittā, the planting of the sacred bodhi-tree at Anuradhapura, the founding of the Order of *bhikkhunīs* and the propagation and popularisation of Buddhism in many parts of the Island, and finally the death and cremation of Arahant Mahinda.

Chapter eighteen deals with a succession of kings who ruled the Island, the most prominent of them being Duṭṭhagāmani Abhaya who ruled for twenty four years having defeated the Tamil king Eḷāra.

Chapter nineteen is noteworthy for the reference it makes to the services of King Duṭṭhgāmani who fostered Buddhism.

Chapter twenty refers to the reign of Vaṭṭagāmaṇi-Abhaya and the writing down of the *Tipiṭaka* for the purpose of preserving it to the posterity and also for the stability of Buddhism.

Chapter twenty one is devoted to a description of the services rendered by king Abhaya, son of Kūṭakaṇṇa Tissa, to Buddhism.

The final chapter describes the achievements of king Vasabha who is said to have built ten thūpas and several monasteries. This chapter also refers to the celebration of the Vesākha festival in Sri Lanka. The book concludes with the reign of king Mahāsena, which reign is specifically referred to as having been both beneficial and adverse to the cause of Buddhism. Since the *Dīpavaṃsa* has the avowed purpose of eulogising Buddhism in Sri Lanka it appropriately concludes with a stanza drawing a moral from the life of king Mahāsena, and this has taken the form of an exhortation to the faithful to refrain from associating with persons of evil disposition namely, those who cause harm to Buddhism.

From the above synopsis it is clear that there is a marked difference between the *Dīpavaṃsa* and the *Mahāvaṃsa* in the matter of treatment and emphasis accorded to historical persons and events. Whereas the author of the *Mahāvaṃsa* gives the pride of place to King Duṭṭhagāmani and accords to him the unique role of hero of the Sinhalese people and of the Buddhist religion, the *Dīpavaṃsa* cursorily disposes of him in one chapter. On the other hand the authors of both chronicles have shown common agreement in the pride of place and importance accorded to the great Buddhist Emperor Asoka and his son, the celebrated Arahant Mahinda, the apostle of Buddhism in Sri Lanka.

Mention is also made of a *Dīpavaṃsaṭṭhakathā*, a commentary on the *Dīpavaṃsa*, which is no longer extant (*UHC.*, Colombo, 1959, Vol. I, pt. I, p. 51).

INDUMATHIE KARUNARATNE

DĪRGHĀGAMA. See ĀGAMA, DĪGHA-NIKĀYA

DISCIPLES. A disciple is a follower of the doctrine of a religious teacher or a school of thought. They include both lay as well as clerical followers and hence it is a word commonly used to render into English the Pali term *sāvaka* (Skt. *śrāvaka*). The clerical disciples are the *bhikkhūs* and the *bhikkhunīs* and the lay ones are the *upāsakas* and *upāsikās*.

Canonical records state that the Buddha's dispensation started with five disciples who were his erstwnile friends and whom he convinced and converted by preaching the first discourse namely the *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta* (q.v.), Within a short period the number increased to sixty and then the Buddha dispatched them in different directions on missionary activity with the Buddha himself touring the area around Uruvelā.

It is seen that the early disciples belonged to the upper strata of the society. When however, the message of the Dhamma began to reach a wider audience, converts from different levels of society and varied religious denominations became disciples of the Buddha.

At the beginning no formalities were involved in gaining admission to discipleship under the Buddha. The oldest method adopted by the Buddha, in granting admission to discipleship was addressing the aspirant of discipleship as a bhikkhu and calling him to enter into the dispensation. This is generally referred to as the *ehi-bhikkhu* (come, Monk) formula (*Vin.* I, p. 12; III, p. 24). But at a comparatively early stage itself this got quite formalized with a noviceship (*sāmaṇera*) as a pre-requisite and few other formalities added (*Vin.* II, p. 13; *S.* I, 161; see also PABBAJJĀ). Recluses who belonged to other religious denominations (*aññatitthiya*) had to undergo a period of probation (*parivāsa*) before they could qualify as a disciple of the Buddha.

At the beginning the Buddha's disciples followed the normal disciplinary rules adhered to by religious recluses with a few specific Buddhist rules of ethics added. When, however the numbers of disciples increased it became necessary to have a formal code of discipline (*vinaya*, q.v.) to govern and regulate their day to day life.

These changes are reflected even in the mode of obtaining lay discipleship. The earliest two disciples were Tapassu and Bhallika (q.v.) who obtained discipleship by declaring their faith and conviction in the Buddha and the Dhamma and, hence, they are known as the first to obtain discipleship by using the two-word formula (*dvevācika*), that is faith in the Buddha and the Dhamma (*Vin.* I, p. 4). Another item *saṅgha* was added to this formula after the establishment of the Order, and the formula turned out to be a three-word formula (*tevācika*). Yasa's parents are said to be the first of those to obtain discipleship by using this new formula (*Vin.* I, p. 18).

The increase in the number of disciples also necessitated the setting up of some sort of a hierarchical order in the dispensation with two disciples appointed as the chief-disciples. The Buddha himself named Sāriputta and Moggallāna as the two chief-disciples. Among the nuns, too, two bhikkhunis were so named and they were Uppalavaṇṇā and Khemā. Anāthapiṇḍika and Visākhā were named as the male and female chief lay-patrons respectively.

The standing of the disciples in the Order varied also in accordance with the spiritual advancement they have reached. Those who had reached the highest level of spiritual advancement i.e. arahantship, appears to have been referred to as noble disciples or (*ariyasāvaka*) or noble disciples with a deep understanding of the Dhamma (*Sutavato ariyasāvako : M.* I, pp. 8, 300 etc.). The *Etadagga-vagga* (*A.* I, pp. 23-26) gives a list of the dsciples, both lay and clerical, male and female who have attained eminence in some ethical or religious aspect. For a fuller discussion see SĀVAKA.

INDUMATHIE KARUNARATNE

DISCIPLINE. In the Buddhist sense, discipline is the training in a specific mode, the restraining and bringing under control of oneself or another with a view to acquiring greater efficiency for the purpose of achieving a specific goal. Here we are mainly interested in this positive and creative aspect of discipline. For a study of the chastisement of miscreants within the Buddhist monastic Order as a part of its disciplinary machinery see DANDAKAMMA and PĀTIMOKKHA.

Vinaya and *sikkhā* are two of the words commonly used in Buddhist texts to indicate the idea of discipline. Of these two, *vinaya* which means regulating

(i.e. without restricting its meaning to refer exclusively to monastic discipline as laid down in the special collection of Buddhist texts which go under the name of *Vinaya Piṭaka*) has a socio-religious connotation in that it regulates externalised conduct in word and deed in terms of accepted religious values which in turn are bound up with numerous social considerations. Discipline in this sense is well conceived in the *Sigāla Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* (*D.* III, p. 180 ff.) and the commentary on the *sutta* goes so far as to call it *gihivinaya* or discipline of the householder.[1] A major area of this concerns itself with the respect of one for the rights of the other in society, both for the safety of his person and the security of his property, the latter including the members of his family and the means (*bhoga, dhana* etc.) whereby he provides for the sustenance of himself and those dependents.

The first is achieved by disciplining oneself to abstain from destruction of life, starting undoubtedly with manslaughter. This would also include abstaining from every manner of inflicting pain, through assault, mutilation and torture, not amounting to murder.

It is clear from the entire disciplinary structure set up for the layman that what is of primary importance is healthy man-to-man relationship, without friction and without trespass which lead to bitterness and animosity. From this noble and meaningful pedestal that it pervades the entire environment, including both the animate and the inanimate seems only logical.

Discipline in these diverse areas is expected to be acquired through specific items in the code of good behaviour which is introduced under the name of *sīla*. While a broad-based precept like the abstinence from destruction of life or *pāṇātipātāveramaṇi* which is the first of the five basic items of good behaviour for the layman, i.e. the *pañcasīla*, is expected to cover all these aspects of respect for life, many precepts follow which specify these different aspects. These sub-divided items of discipline have come to be included in the elaborated lists of *sīla* which seem to be set apart for the Buddhist monk (*D.* I. p. 64). Under what might be considered the law of property comes theft (*adinnādāna*: item no. 2 of the *pañcasīla*) and adultery (*kāmesu micchācāra*: item no. 3 of the *pañcasīla*). All forms of dishonesty in speech (*musāvāda*) like lying and breach of promise and dishonesty in action like fraud and deceit (*tūlākūṭa kaṃsakūṭa māṇakūṭa* as well as *ukkoṭana-vañcaṇa-nikatisāciyoga*, *D.* I. 64) are viewed as means by which violence is done to social harmony.

The discipline thus expected of laymen both in relation to the welfare of themselves and that of the fellow-members in society is brought about through *sīla* which is observed voluntarily, and out of a sense of social justice. *Sīla* involves no punishments or penalties imposed through religious authority. This area of social restraint or restraints for the sake of social goals is also acknowledged at the same time to be providing the basic grounding in religious discipline, for these considerations of *sīla*, at their very basis, lead to a mastery over the primary roots of evil, of greed, hatred and delusion. They also tend to keep the ego-consciousness of man within reasonable, inoffensive proportions. This, in other words, is the attainment of self-discipline, referred also under the terms *saṃyama* and *dama*. Viewed from this angle, it may be argued that personal rectitude is an equally vital concern of discipline, even more significant than its social implications. But it becomes clear from an analysis of the religio-ethical culture of Buddhism, the four *brahmavihāras* (q.v.) for example, that these two aspects are inseparably bound together.

In the discipline contemplated for the layman in Buddhism there is, in addition to this concern for moral well-being and social harmony, attention focussed on his economic upliftment and his worth as a responsible member of the society to which he belongs. The *Sigāla Sutta* to which reference has already being made, in prescribing for the discipline of the layman (*gihi vinaya*) brings within its scope both these, i.e. the religio-ethical and socio-economic considerations. The fourteen items under which it intends to discipline the lay householder (*cuddasa pāpakāpagato*) cover the main areas. The first four listed under *kammakilesa* have to be reckoned with, in the Buddhist context, as being essentially religious norms. They are 1. destruction of life, 2. theft, 3. unchastity and 4. uttering falsehood. It has been pointed out already that these which come within the scope of the *pañcasīla* are not without their social relevance. In the second category are a set of four conditions subject to which a man may slip into incorrect forms of action or behaviour. It is the intention of the *sutta* to safeguard a man from committing what is improper and unjust through exces-

1 ..... *gihivinayaṃ*, *Sigālovāda suttaṃ*, *DA*. III, p. 942; *Gihivinayo nāmāyaṃ suttanto*, op. cit. p. 959.

sive desire (*chanda*), dislike (*dosa*) ,incorrect judgement (*moha*) and fear (*bhaya*). The social relevance of these seem even more pronounced than that of the former. The last six items which come in the third category are in fact labelled 'conditions that lead to economic break down' or *bhogānam apāyamukhāni*. Their interests are essentially mundane and they attempt to discipline the man in society with regard to his social habits in order to stabilise his economic position. They warn him against looseness of habit, proneness to wine and song and lack of industry and enterprise.

Going beyond this the Buddhist disciple who pledges himself to be fully dedicated to the way of life recommended by the Buddha (*brahmacariya* q.v.) for the attainment of the goal of Nirvāṇa finds the commitments of the household life not very conducive to its pursuit. The life of *brahmacariya* requires of the disciple a greater degree of discipline, leading him necessarily to a life of *pabbajjā* or renunciation. This is reflected in the oft-recurring phrase "this life of *brahmacariya* which is wholly pure and perfect is not easily lived by one who dwells in the household."[2] Thus, there emerges a new Order of the Buddhist disciple, monk and nun (*bhikkhu and bhikkhunī*) who is moving away physically and mentally from the rest of society in the direction of his higher religious goal. This is the Order of the *anagāriya* or the disciple in the state of homelessness (*agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajanti*). The greater degree of discipline which he vows to observe in terms of deed, word (and thought) on account of which he gets ahead of the layman is the result of taking the instructions of the Dhamma as his norm.[3]

In the evolution of the Buddhist monastic organisation, this in fact marks the early phase when discipline among its membership was achieved (rather than enforced) by faithful adherence to the spirit of the Dhamma. This is the early stage in the *sāsana*, prior to the promulgation of legal injunctions or *sikkhāpada* (q.v.)[4]

But this was too idealistic a state to withstand the corrosion of time. As more and more converts began to take to the monastic way of life, induced perhaps by reasons other than conviction, increasing gain and fame (*lābhagga-mahatta*), security of establishment (*rattaññumahatta* and *vepullamahatta*), and many other factors contributed to an increasing disregard of the ideals of monasticism. A codified system of law (see Pātimokkha, Sikkhāpada, Vinaya) had to be introduced with accompanying punishments of varying degrees of severity. Henceforth the *Vinaya* became the instrument of discipline, with a distinct monastic legal validity, with which the lives of the monks and nuns came to be regulated. Classified and graded in relation both to the higher ideal (*ādibrahmacariyika*) as well as to social considerations (*ābhisamācārika*) this instrument of monastic discipline consisted of two major parts.

The first of these two is the *Pātimokkha* which legalises, more or less, the major ethical considerations relating to monastic life. These which generally covered areas of moral chastity, honesty in word and deed, professional propriety and the healthy pursuit of the monastic life, had until then come within the scope of *sīla*.[5] The *ādibrahmacariyakā sikkhā* or the discipline for the attainment of the higher ideal seems to be the concern of this. The second of these is the contents of the *khandhakas* (i.e. the *Mahāvagga* and *Cullavagga*) which concerns itself with the regulation of the socio-communal aspects of monastic life. Admission of new converts to the monastic Order, the cultivation of their moral, intellectual and spiritual life, teacher-pupil relationships, regulations relating to food, clothing and shelter are among its diverse themes. The discipline relating to these, brought about through the instructions of the *Khandhakas* is what was referred to earlier as *ābhisamācārika sikkhā*.

These two areas of codified law, it must be pointed out, generally applies to the fully ordained (i.e. *upasampanna*) monk of the monastic order. The novitiate or *sāmaṇera* is not bound by these. The ten precepts or *dasasikkhāpadāni* are considered adequate for the guidance of his life (*Vin.* I. p. 83).

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2 *nayidaṃ sukaraṃ agāraṃ ajjhāvasatā ekantaparipuṇṇaṃ ekantaparisuddhaṃ saṅkhalikhitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ caritum* : *D.* I, p. 63.

3 *Dhammaṃ yeva sakkaronto dhammaṃ garukaronto dhammaṃ apacāyamānā suvacā bhavissāma sovacassataṃ āpajjissāmāti evaṃ hi vo bhikkhave sikkhitabbaṃ* : *M.* I, p. 126.

4 One should take note here of the stand taken by the fellow celibates of Sudinna at the time they found him guilty of the Dhamma as taught by the Buddha but which had, until then, not been forbidden through legal injunction. See *Vin.* III, p. 19 f.

5 For the evolution of the legalised form out of the spirit of the *sīla* see PĀTIMOKKHA and SĪLA.

Of these ten items of discipline for the novitiate, the first five are more or less the same as those prescribed for the layman (*pañcasīla*). Of the latter five the layman also takes upon himself, on special occasions like the day of the *upavasatha*, the practice of four items which in listing are reduced to three as a result of rearrangement, thus making the set of 8 precepts known as the *aṭṭhaṅga sīla* of the layman. What is of special interest to us here is that these items of discipline which come in the category of *sīla* involve no punishment in their violation as far as the layman is concerned.

Not independent of the process of discipline worked out through the concept of *Vinaya* which has been discussed so far, and running almost parallel to it is the discipline contained under *sikkhā*. The term *sikkhā* has the general meaning of training, discipline and culture, with specific reference to contemplated areas of religious development. Buddhist *sikkhā* or culture is threefold and pertains to 1. morality or *sīla*, 2. mind-training or *samādhi* and 3. development of wisdom or *paññā*. This goes under the name of *sikkhattaya* or *tisso sikkhā* (See *A*. I., pp. 231, 235).

We have already witnessed the process of discipline through *sīla* both in the case of the monk and the layman. It is a stage of socio-cultural grooming, no doubt paving the way according to Buddhist argument, for a mastery over one's mental faculties and powers of judgement. Buddhist texts (*D*. I. p. 71), in fact, introduce these two under the name of *indriyasaṃvara* and *satisampajañña* as coming in the wake of *sīla*. The second, also referred to as *adhicittasikkhā*, begins the second stage of Buddhist culture, i.e. the culture of the mind (*cittabhāvanā*). What results through this stage of discipline or *sikkhā* is the total purging of the mind of five unhealthy states or *nīvaraṇas*. They are covetousness, ill-will, sloth and toper, excitement and worry, and doubt (loc. cit.). Thereafter, the healthy mind grows to its full stature through the different mental exercises known as the *jhānas*. At the fourth *jhāna* the second phase of the process of culture or mental discipline reaches its climax (op. cit. p. 75) and the disciple is ready to embark on the final phase of discipline, namely intellectual discipline or wisdom-culture (*adhipaññā-sikkhā*). It is in this final stage of discipline or development of the requisite areas of wisdom such as the personal realisation of the truth of *saṃsāric* existence and the operation of law of *karma* within that process that one acquires the capacity to transcend it. This final phase of wisdom is referred to as the *āsavānaṃkhaya ñāṇa* or facet of knowledge leading to the extinction of defilements which tie one down to *saṃsāra*. Thus, it becomes clear that from the very first precept of the *pañcasīla* which regulates one's respect for life up to the final facet of wisdom which results in the termination of the *saṃsāric* process and the attainment of *Nirvāṇa*, every stage of the religious life is characterised by the idea of discipline.

JOTIYA DHIRASEKERA

DISEASE. Though the subject of disease is not strictly within the scope of the Buddhist texts, one comes across brief accounts of types, origins and treatment of numerous diseases, dealt with in so far as they are relevant to the theme of human happiness and well-being. Therefore, one has to glean from these references the Buddhist view of and attitude to diseases. To begin with, disease (*vyādhi*) is reckoned as a basic characteristic of life which robs it of a good part of its conceivable happiness. One cannot fail to note its unfailing recurrence in the definition of *dukkha* as '*vyādhi pi dukkhā*' disease is a cause of unsatisfactoriness of life. A wide range of words is used to denote such pathological states : *ābādha* (ailment), *roga* (sickess) *ātaṅka* (illness).

It is seen that the Buddhist texts speak of two categories of diseases viz. physical diseases (*kāyikā-rogā*) and mental diseases (*cetasikā-rogā : A*. II, p. 143). Of these two it is the latter that is analysed and discussed in detail in the texts. However, this emphasis on the mental diseases does not, in the least, suggest that Buddhism pays no heed to physical diseases, or more precisely, to the positive aspect of physical health.

The *Suttanipāta* (*v*. 311) records an old tradition which says that in the beginning there were only three kinds of diseases.

This almost implies a stage in the early history of man when no pathological conditions were observed, the three diseases referred to being desire (*icchā*), hunger or starvation (*anasana*) and senility (*jarā*). This same verse ascribes the origin of diseases, which by then had increased to ninety-eight in number, to the slaughter of cattle, perhaps indicating thereby the Indian repugnance to meat-eating.

This same classification is found repeated in the *Dīgha-nikāya* (III, p. 75), in association with a golden

age of the past. The *Suttanipāta* commentary (*SnA*. p. 324) explains these diseases with the phrase *cakkhuroga-ādinā bhedena* (such types as eye-diseases) indicating that a number of physical diseases are meant. A list of diseases classified on the grounds of aetiology is found in the *Saṃyutta-nikāya* (*S*. IV, p. 230; cf. *Nd*. II, p. 304). These are diseases originating from bile (*pitta*), phlegm (*semha*), wind (*vāta*), union of bodily humours (*sannipātika*), from changes of seasons (*utupariṇāmaja*), from stress of untoward happenings (*visama-parikāraja*), from sudden attacks from without (*opakkamika*) and those arising as a result of one's *kamma* (*kammavipākaja*). A more comprehensive list of thirty-five diseases is found in the *Niddesa* (I, p. 13). This includes the aetiological classification given above as well as the types of diseases.

With regard to the causes that lead to the increase in the number of diseases the *Suttanipāta* (*v*. 311), already quoted, directly says that this increase was due to the slaughter of animals. The commentary does not elucidate this point. Perhaps, it is not wrong to surmise that what is meant is that there is a connection betw en man's susceptibility to diseases and his moral and social habits, their increasing complexity and deterioration. The *Cakkavattisīhanāda Sutta* (*D*. III, p. 75), too, seems to hint at a similar view when it says that when men become unethical in their day to day affairs their life-span gets shorter. Perhaps, this means that they succumb to numerous diseases that arise due to their unethical behaviour. The *Dhammapada* (*v*. 137) also suggests unethical behaviour on the part of man as one of the causes that leads to diseases. That moral deterioration could lead to diseases is a proven fact. Over indulgence in sensual pleasure will obviously have ill effects on physical health. Lack of any sense of restraint, for example in food habits, will not only lead to obesity but also to numerous diseases. Excessive consumption of liquor or uninhibited enjoyment of sexual pleasures undoubtedly reduces body's natural power of resistence and recuperation. Not only unethical and immoral physical activity, even such mental activity brings about numerous types of physical disorders and disabilities. It is a psychologically and medically accepted fact that lust, greed and ambition produce anxiety, tension and conflict causing functional disorders that very often develop into grave organic diseases.

However, it is quite apparent that Buddhist texts do not consider moral degeneration as the one and only cause of diseases. Various classifications of diseases cited above, including the classification of diseases on grounds of aetiology clearly show that numerous other sources of diseases were known to Buddhist texts.

The fact that the body is subject to diseases is found emphasised in Buddhist texts. It is recorded in the *Samyutta-nikāya* (*S*. III. p. 1) as an utterance of the Buddha that, "For one carrying this body about, to claim even a moment of health would be sheer foolishness". This fact itself is considered as sufficient ground to direct one's mind towards renouncing worldly-life with a view to put an end to saṃsāric existence which is subject to disease in addition to other ills such as old-age and death. Yet, the Buddha does not advocate that one, on this account, should resign oneself to suffering in silence. The *Vinaya-piṭaka* amply illustrates the attention paid by the Buddha to the problem of diseases among his disciples. Besides, as Buddhism holds that physical health is a necessity for mental peace (*S*. III, pp. 1, 124 ff.), special attention is directed to the promotion of physical health. The importance attached to the maintenance of health is seen when Buddhist texts state that freedom from disease or state of perfect health (*ārogyā*) is the highest gain (*paramā lābhā*) one could obtain in this life (*M*. I. p. 508, *D*. III, p. 235; *Dhp*. *v*. 204).

Though the *Vinaya-piṭaka* refers to particular diseases and their treatment, it is reasonable to assume that this does not suggest the existence of a particular medical system which could be called 'Buddhist'. (See BHESAJJA). Indian medical science was quite advanced during the time of the Buddha. The Pali texts contain numerous references to the celebrated physician Jīvaka (*DPPN*. s.v.) who is undoubtedly an illustrious product of this ancient Indian medical science which came to be known as Āyurveda system. The Buddhists, too, adopted this system, and, it is seen that Jīvaka himself became the physician to the Buddha and the Saṅgha. There are instances to show how at Jīvaka's request the Buddha enjoined the monks to adopt certain modes of behaviour which helped to keep them physically fit. The practice of walking as a form of exercise (*caṅkama*) was thus enjoined (*Vin*. II p. 119). Besides sanctioning the adoption of numerous remedies prevalent in the Indian medical system the Buddha stressed the importance of personal hygiene and moderation in personal habits. Even dietary habits were regulated with a view to promote health (*M*. I, pp. 124, 437). The Buddha's disciple Bakkula who strictly adhered to these instructions was able to be in perfect health and hence he was named the foremost among the disciples who were

in good health (*DPPN*. s.v. Bakkula). The Buddha even acknowledged the power of the mind over the body and hence, advised the monks to develop the proper mental attitude that, "though my body is sick my mind shall not be sick", thus encouraging them to strive after their goal regardless of the pain caused by diseases.

Though perfect physical health is regarded as the highest form of blessing it was never considered an end in itself. On the other hand, the disciples were cautioned by the Buddha about the possibility of this very blessing turning out to be a source of infatuation (*mada*) leading one astray from the spiritual path.

Therefore, the disciples are duly warned not to get infatuated with the state of health, but to reflect on the fact that such a state is only temporary and that all are subject to disease (*A*. I. p. 146: II, p. 143).

Usually physical diseases are temporary and are often easily curable by the application of proper remedies. But mental diseases (*cetasikā rogā*) are deep rooted, complex, and hence, difficult to be cured. They normally originate from inveterate psychological causes, and all worldlings suffer from some form or other of such psychological disorder. This point is made quite clear by the Buddha, when he says, "Monks, there are these two diseases. What two? Disease of the body and disease of the mind. Monks, there are to be seen beings who can admit freedom from suffering from bodily disease for one year, for two years, for three years....for even hundred years. But monks those beings are hard to find in the world who can admit freedom from mental disease even for one moment, save only those in whom the *āsavas* are destroyed" (*A*. II, p. 143)

The Buddha has shown that all worldlings labour under the deep rooted illusion that there is an ego or a mentor behind the sum-total of all sense-experience. Owing to this inherent misconception the mind becomes extremely susceptible to mental diseases. Defilements such as craving (*rāga, taṇhā*), hatred (*dosa*) and illusion (*moha*), pride (*māna*) which are nothing but different shades of craving, arising from the self same matrix of an illusory ego, influence man's response to sense stimuli. These defilements which consequently arise are found in all worldlings, and that is why when seen from the ideal point of view the whole world appears to be mentally deranged

The norm among the worldlings is that as long as these defilements do not completely overwhelm a person, one is considered normal, and whenever there is an increase in any of these defilements over the others, one is forced to overstep the thin line that separates sanity from insanity. The causes that lead to the loss of sanity have always been numerous and now they have increased with startling rapidity. The fast developing modern urban life, competition in day to day affairs, financial stress imposed by unrealistic standards of living, pressure of technology and pursuit after false values are all gradually pushing man to the brink of insanity. Rapid progress made in the field of mass-media of communication such as television, films, radio, books and newspapers and their unscrupulous usage provide all nutrients to nurture the self-centred, egoistic impulses. Most of these forces influence the mind bringing about anxiety and emotional instability. This leads not only to conflict within oneself but to conflict between the individual and the society. These forces rouse defilements and often the strain caused by the constant onslaught of defilements becomes so severe that the mind completely loses its poise and power of judgement. To escape from this mental strain some seek the help of drugs (q.v.) which, while giving temporary relief, do permanent damage to the nervous system and the brain-cells. Thus, it is apparent that, due to these numerous causes which were non-existent in the less complex society of old, now there is the imminent danger of mental diseases growing into epidemic proportions.

The Buddha as peerless physician, the supreme surgeon, has diagnosed the mental disease, has discovered its causes, found the remedy and then applied it. It was said that the root cause of all mental diseases is the inveterate, false belief in the existence of a permanent ego (*papañca nāmarupam*, *Sn*. v. 530); and from this arises craving and other forms of defilments which gradually lead the mind towards conceptual proliferation (loc. cit.: Also *S*. IV. p. 202 f.). The more one gets involved in prolific imagining, centered on the idea of self (*ayam aham asmī ti maññitam*, *S*. IV, p. 202), the more one gets estranged from reality and enters into a fantasy of one's own devising. This is why imagining is called a disease, an abscess, a barb (*S*. IV, p. 202 ff; cf. *Sn*. v. 530). After finding out the root-cause of mental diseases to be this false notion of an ego, the Buddha proclaims a very methodical system of psychotherapy to purge the mind of this illusion and the accompanying defilements.

Unlike the Freudian method of psychoanalysis which works on the assumption that when the cause of origin of a particular disorder is known its influence on the unconscious motivation will automatically disappear, Buddhism adopts a methodical, a progressively elevating system of ethico-psychology.

It has been pointed out that Buddhist texts attempt to show a connection between the increase in the number of physical diseases and moral degeneration. It is quite apparent that the connection is more marked in the case of moral decline and mental disorders. It should be borne in mind that the term *dukkha* in general connotes all types of mental diseases, and this fundamental fact of saṃsāric *dukkha* is the *raison de'etre* of Buddhist ethics. Thus, one could see that the whole system of Buddhist psychology has an ethical basis. Therefore, in applying this ethico-psychology to cure mental diseases of the worldlings, an initial attempt is made to establish the worldlings on an ethical footing or in other words in *sīla*. Once so established one becomes able to substitute consciously directed higher objectives in place of the base, self-centred activities of the mind. Thus, it is seen that the unethical mental activities are neither suppressed nor driven into the unconscious but gradually eradicated without residue.

All neurotic conditions are due either to craving or some defilement connected with craving. If one does not entertain any of these defilements with regard to the illusion of an ego one becomes free from conceptual proliferation which estranges one from reality, and thereby becomes able to eradicate all proclivities to evil mental states which breed conflict both in the individual and in the society. Therefore, it is said in the *Madhupiṇḍika Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 109), "If, O monk, one neither delights in, nor asserts, nor clings to, that which makes one subject to concepts characterised by the prolific tendency then that itself is the end of all the proclivities to attachment, views, pride, ignorance and attachment to becoming. That itself is the end of taking the stick, of taking the weapon, of quarrelling, of contending, disputing, accusation, slander and false speech. Here it is that all these evil, unskilled states cease without residue."

The eradication of the illusion of an ego is to be accomplished through penetrative wisdom (*vipassanā*) focussed on one's own personality. One has to analyse the mental and corporeal constituents of one's individuality and view them in their true perspective as being impermanent (*anicca*), unsatisfactory (*dukkha*) and without a 'self' (*anatta*). In this manner one has to bring about a complete transformation of one's concept regarding one's individuality.

This total transformation cannot be achieved in a moment. This, being the culmination of a long, methodically set out process, needs much training. The training consists of sense-restraint and sharpening of one's wisdom, and these go hand in hand. Regarding sense-restraint the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* (*D.* I, p. 70) says, "When, O king, he sees an object with his eye, he is not entranced in the general appearance or the details of it. He sets himself to restrain that which might give occasion for evil mental states, covetousness and dejection to flow-in over him so long as he dwells unrestrained as to his sense of sight. He keeps watch over his faculty of sight and he attains to mastery over it. And so in like manner when he hears a sound with his ears, or smells an ordour with his nose or tastes a flavour with his tongue or feel a touch with his body or when he cognises a phenomenon with his mind, he is not entranced in the general appearance or the details of it."

This sense-restraint teaches one how to remain without being led astray by them. When one has cultivated this sense-restraint defilements fail to influence one's response to sense-perception, and thus one becomes able to see things in their true perspective. Therefore it is said, "He who has comprehended name and form characterised by the prolific tendency, which is the root of disease both within and without, is released from bondage to the root of all disease, and is truly, called the 'Knowing One'—the 'Such' (*Sn.* v. 530).

S.K.N.

DIṬṬHADHAMMA, meaning visible order of things (*dhamma*), the world of sensation, this world as opposed to the state after death (*sāmparāyika*, *PED.* s.v.), is generally rendered into English as 'here and now'. The word is used both in its ordinary secular meaning (*A.* II, p. 61) as well as in a somewhat extended meaning giving it a religious flavour (*M.* II, p. 94). It is this latter usage that is important and hence dealt with herein.

It appears that the word *diṭṭhadhamma* when used in the religious sense is almost synonymous with the word *sandiṭṭhika* which the *PED* explains as, "visible, belonging to, of advantage to this life, actual". This latter word is one of the numerous

adjectives used to describe the *Dhamma*, the teaching of the Buddha.. The *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*A*. I, p. 157 f.) gives a number of reasons in justification of this qualification. It succinctly describes how the *Dhamma* conduces to the elevation of moral and psychological character of a person here and now (*sandiṭṭhika*). The *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* (*D*. I, p. 59 ff), too, uses this word to illustrate the advantage of recluseship (*sāmaññā*) that accrues to a recluse here and now (*sandiṭṭhika*). The code of Buddhist ethics meant both for the clergy and the layman aims at moulding the character in a way which will be beneficial both to himself and the society at large, here and now. The Buddhist precepts and the effects of their practice clearly establishes this. The primary aim of the precepts is to control here and now the anti-social tendencies in beings and thus bring about individual and social welfare here and now, providing the ideal environment and paving the way for spiritual progress which gradually leads to freedom (*vimutti*). Even in explaining the concept of *kamma* (q.v.) Buddhism lays emphasis on its effect here and now (*diṭṭhadhamma*). Thus, Buddhism lays down that all human action should be performed in a way that conduce to the well-being of oneself and to the well-being of his fellow beings. (*M*. I, p. 415 f.).

The emphasis placed on this concept of 'here and now' is in complete alignment with the empirical and pragmatic attitude of early Buddhism. The Buddhist position is that man is in bondage here and now and his release has to be attained while being in that state and that it is possible, with adequate effort to achieve it here and now. According to early Buddhism the attainment of freedom from this bondage, which subject one to all ills of existence, does not pertain to the field of eschatological speculation. Thus, the conception of freedom here and now is often met with in Buddhist texts (*diṭṭhe'va dhamme aññā* : *M*. I, p. 63; *diṭṭh'eva dhamme nibbānam* : *A*. IV, p. 353).

The Buddha's teaching is mainly concerned with the present life, its ills (*dukkha*) and the cessation of ills (*dukkhanirodha* : *M*. I, p. 140). It was because the bodhisattva was convinced that the life is beset with *dukkha* that he set forth on his noble quest (*ariyapariyesana*) for freedom i.e. *nibbāna*. His attainment of Enlightenment or Buddhahood epitomises the consummation of this noble quest here and now (*M*. I, p. 167). This attainment also represents his attainment of arahantship, his realization of *nibbāna*. Not only the Buddha, a large number of his followers, too, attained this goal i.e. *nibbāna* in this very life, here and now.

The Buddha's teaching i.e. the Dhamma shows the way to his followers to this goal—to freedom from bondage of lust (*rāga*), hatred (*dosa*) and delusion (*moha*) which are collectively labelled as egoism (q.v.) which keep the beings bound to this vortex of life and death, the *saṃsāra*. It is true that this goal is not attained all at once, but certainly it is attained, here and now. The path leading to this goal is the Noble Eightfold Path (*ariya-aṭṭhaṅgika magga*) which has to be treaded on gradually (cf. *anupubbasikkhā anupubbapaṭipadā*). By successfully following this course one is able to elevate oneself morally and mentally by completely flushing out all the defiling elements that keep one bound to this samsāric existence. By doing this one achieves here and now (*diṭṭhe'va dhamme*) a complete reorientation of one's sense perception, gaining clarity of vision which gives ability to attend to the nature of things rather than to the things themselves. Seeing the true nature of things one gets detached. To the one who is detached there is no wavering, wavering not being, there is calm, calm being, there is no proclivity; there being no proclivity, there is no coming and going, there being no coming and going, there is no death and birth; there being no death and rebirth there is no here or there or any position in between. This itself is the end of suffering (*Ud*. p. 81, *M*. III, p. 266, *S*. IV, p. 59). This is *nibbāna* here and now (*A*. IV, p. 385).

This state which is realized here and now is brought about by a total inner revolution and not through union with the God, the cosmic self or reaching the kingdom of Heaven. Besides, this state is not realized after death, in a life beyond, but in this very life while yet alive. In this respect this state has much in common with the *jīvanmukta* concept of the *Upaniṣads*. The one who is so liberated is called an *arahant*. An arahant is not out of alignment with the world. He lives in the world like any other being, attends to his daily needs, performs his duties, but unlike a worldling does not get personally attached, involved and mixed up with the world. Realization of arahantship enables one to live *in* the world though he is not *of* the world. (*A*. V, p. 152). It is only in this sense that *nibbāna* which is attained here and now is transcendental ((*lokuttara*).

However, there appears to have originated, at a very early stage of the development of Buddhist thought, a strong tendency, perhaps due to the influence of contemporaneous religious beliefs, to

consider *nibbāna* as a transcendental reality beyond any form of conceptualization and logical thinking. The early traces of this tendency can be seen in the attempt to explain the state of the dead *arahant*. The *Itivuttaka*[1] (*It*. p. 38) reference is important in this regard. Herein *nibbāna* is divided into two stages as *nibbāna* with substrate (*saupadisesa nibbāna*) and *nibbāna* without substrate (*anupadidesa nibbāna*). The former is described as follows : "Herein, monks, a monk is a worthy one who has destroyed the defiling impulses, lived the higher-life, done what has to be done, laid aside the burden, achieved the noble goal, destroyed the fetters of existence, and is freed through insight. He retains his five senses through which, as they are not yet destroyed, he experiences pleasant and unpleasant sensation and feels pleasure and pain. This cessation of craving, hate and confusion is called, "*nibbāna* with the substrate left". This is the freedom attained here and now (*diṭṭhe'va dhamme*). The latter stage which is said to pertain to hereafter (*sāmparāyika*) is described as follows : "Herein, monks, . . . is freed through insight. Monks as his experiences, none of which he relished, will be cooled here itself. This is called, "*nibbāna* without substrate"

In spite of this division of *nibbāna* into two stages it is seen, in the final analysis, that the realization of *nibbāna* puts an end to all saṃsāric suffering and that there will be no rebirth. This is the goal aimed at by all Buddhists. There is nothing more to be attained by an arahant after his death, for what he attained at his attainment of arahantship is the end of suffering. Hence, to describe the state of arahantship as consisting of residue of rebirth-potential (*upadisesa*, perhaps from *upādāna-sesa*) appears to be self-contradictory. If one has any residue of rebirth potential in him, such a one cannot be described as one who has realized *nibbāna*. The early Buddhist position is that if one who genuinely strives to attain the goal here and now fails in his attempt because there remains in him some residue of rebirth potential (*upadisesa*) he would become an once-returner (*anāgamin*), thus entailing another life-span, within which he would be able to wear out completely the rebirth potential left. Thus, it is clear that as long as there is rebirth potential, one cannot be described as an *arahant*, one who has attained *nibbāna*. The tradition recorded in the *Itivuttaka* appears to have got these two positions mixed up, and attempts to overcome the difficulty by explaining *upadisesa* as meaning, 'with the physical form and the five sense faculties intact'. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the division of *nibbāna* into two stages and describing one as, 'attained while living' and the other as, 'attained after death' (*sāmparāyika*) is merely an attempt to explain what happens to an *arahant* after death. The Upaniṣadic concept of *videhamukta* bear certain resemblances to the *anupadisesa nibbāna* concept of the Buddhist.

Johansson[2] (op. cit. p. 61) discussing a passage from the *Majjhima* (*M*. I, 486 : *Aggivacchagotta Sutta*) says, "From these quotations we can see that the difference between the two stages of *nibbāna* is not very essential." But, however, he adds that, "In this life the fire can flare up again as there is fuel left, this is impossible after death, when there is no more fuel". This is an extremely untenable assumption. The very content of the freedom attained at the realization of *nibbāna* here and now is the cessation of becoming (*bhavanirodho nibbānaṃ : S*. II, p. 117) or the end of birth and death (*jātimaraṇassa antaṃ : Sn. v.* 467). The vision and the knowledge that constitute Enlightenment (*bodhi*) is, "Sure is the release of my mind, this is my last birth, there is no rebirth for me (*Vin*. I, p. 11; *A*. I, p. 259). The *Suttanipāta* (*v*. 714) clearly says that they do not go twice to the further shore. Further, Johansson (op. cit. p. 61) assumes, commenting on the *Majjhima* (*M*. I, p. 487) cited above, that . . . ". . . The quotation proves that the Tathāgata was thought to continue existing in some form after death . . .". This has the necessary corollary that *anupadisesa nibbāna* is a state attained not here and now (*diṭṭhe'va dhamme*) but after death. But as shown above early Buddhism did not posit any such state that has to be attained after death. *Nibbāna* which could be realized while living marks the end of suffering and rebirth. What happens to an *arahant* after death is one of the questions which have been left undeclared (*avyākata*) by the Buddha. The Buddhist position is that the state of an arahant after death cannot be known by the available means of knowing.[3] The *Suttanipāta* (*Sn. v*. 1076) clearly states the Buddhist position as follows : There is no measure of him who has achieved his goal. That by which one could define him, that is not for him when all phenomena are

1 The commentary says that *Itivuttaka* contains what was remembered by Khujjuttarā, the slave girl of Sāmāvatī. It was subsequently that the monks learnt it.

2 Rune Johansson, *The Psychology of Nirvana*, London, 1969, p. 59.

3 David J. Kalupahana, *Buddhist Philosophy, A Historical Analysis*, Honolulu, 1976, p. 69 ff.

removed, then all means of description are also removed. (cp. also *S.* III, p. 112).

Though it is apparent that the aim of Buddhism is to solve the problem of *dukkha* here and now, there however appears a trend, persisting from very early times, which considered that the Buddha's teaching is for the purpose of securing the well-being of the here-after. (cf. *Vin.* I, p. 179). Perhaps this may be due to the influence of certain religious beliefs that prevailed at the time. Subsequently this trend appears to have gathered momentum and popularity so as to form almost a part of the Buddhist scheme of salvation. At the very beginning the goal was one though it was called by diverse names such as *sambodhi*, *nibbāna*, *arahatta* and so on. Those who genuinely strove to put an end to suffering had only one goal, the goal of *sambodhi* (*sambodhi-parāyaṇa*). If the genuine strivers fail to achieve this goal here and now, they were certain of attaining the stage of once-returner (*anāgamika*) with the definite prospect of attaining freedom. (*M.* I, p. 63). But, as pointed out earlier, the Path is a difficult one. Many found it difficult to tread upon. This may have prompted the necessity of a lesser goal. The prevalent religious beliefs, belief in rebirth, the graduated process that led to the goal, popularity and the spread of Buddhism which necessitated the granting of numerous concessions to popular demands and such other factors may have opened the door for a second goal to be incorporated in the scheme of salvation in Buddhism. As texts show, even with reluctance this innovation had to be accommodated. Thus, the *Dhammapada* (*Dhp.* v. 126) says that those who are destined for a happy hereafter go to heaven, while those who are free from defilements attain *nibbāna*. This goal (*sagga*) which one had to attain after death was never held to be on *par* with the attainment of *nibbāna*[4] here and now (*diṭṭhe'va dhamme*). On the contrary, the Buddha himself looks down upon those who lead the religious life (*brahmacariya*) for the purpose of securing birth in heaven (*A.* I, p. 115).

Sòme recluses and brahmins, too, appear to have upheld, on five different grounds, the possibility of attaining supreme spiritual bliss in this very existence and this view is referred to as *diṭṭhadhamma nibbāna vāda* (*D.* I, p. 36 f.). This goal posited by these recluses and brahmins appear to fall far short of the *nibbāna* of the Buddhists. For example, the first of these groups is said to have asserted that the total enjoyment of sense pleasures itself is the supreme bliss attainable in this very life. The other four are said to have posited the four jhānic states of the sphere of form as their ideal of supreme bliss. It is very well known that indulgence in sensual pleasures (*kāma-sukhallikānu-yoga*) is one of the extremes (*anta*) that was abandoned and denounced by the Buddha as being unsatisfactory, ignoble and unfruitful. The limitations of jhānic attainments, too, are well explained by the Buddha. Thus the Buddhist did not identify jhānic ecstacies with *nibbāna*, but merely described them as blissful sojourns in this life : *diṭṭhadhamma sukhavihāra* (*M.* I, p. 40 f.).

S.K.N.

DIṬṬHI (Skt. *dṛṣṭi* from *dṛś*—to see) : Philosophical stand-point, religious belief, guiding principle, regulative outlook. (In this sense it is identical in meaning with *dassana* : insight, vision). Also heretical view, dogma or theory (e.g. *S.* III, p. 202), generally associated with a derogatory meaning.

The best introduction to the term *diṭṭhi* which in Buddhism has a wide and varied connotation is through a study of specific instances in different contexts. One must not rush to the conclusion, after the study of a few selected references that the term *diṭṭhi* stands stigmatised throughout in Buddhist texts. In a discussion on the four-fold distortions in the sphere of Buddhist thought (*vipallāsa*), the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*A.* II, p. 52) lists together with *diṭṭhi* two other terms, *saññā* and *citta*, taking them to be more or less synonymous, at least functionally, though not etymologically. In this context, these terms refer to the manner in which the Buddhist perceives, thinks of or views himself and the world in the religio-philosophical context. The use of the term *vipallāsa* here together with *diṭṭhi* as *diṭṭhivipallāsa* (q.v. distortion of view) implies that the word *diṭṭhi* in this context stands for the accepted and approved manner in which the Buddhist must view himself and the world. In this sense, the term *dassana* is also used along with *diṭṭhi* (see below). Using the verbal form of the same root *dṛś* from which *diṭṭhi* is derived, the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (*S.* II, p. 110) describes the manner in which those seeking release from the ills of life should view the world. That vision is the true and correct one, the viewing

4 For a useful discussion on this aspect, see Jotiya Dhirasekera, *Parable of the Snake : A translation of the Alagaddūpama Sutta*, Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, Research Studies Series 1, Sri Lanka, 1983, Appendix, p. 20.

in terms of *anicca, dukkha* and *anatta*, i.e. transciency and consequent unsatisfactoriness and soullessness as propounded in Buddhism (*... yaṃ loke piyarūpaṃ sātarūpaṃ taṃ aniccato dakkhinti dukkhato dukkhinti anattato dakkhinti ... parimuccissanti dukkhasmā ti vadāmi*).

Another instance of the use of the term *diṭṭhi* to represent the doctrinal core of Buddhism, a thorough grasp of which is deemed essential for the working out of one's salvation process, is noted in the *Nidāna Saṃyutta* (*S.* II, pp. 43 f. and 58) where the knowledge of *paccayas*, with regard to their origin, cessation etc., qualifies a Buddhist disciple (*ariyasāvaka*) to be called one who possesses true vision. The terms used here to refer to this are *diṭṭhi* and *dassana* (*ayaṃ vuccati bhikkhave ariyasāvako diṭṭhisampanno iti pi dassanasampanno iti pi*: loc. cit.). By this is meant a knowledge of the entire philosophy of causal genesis which traces back the ills of life like decay and death (*jarāmaraṇa*) to *avijjā* or alternatively points out how the ills of life are successively generated through the basic error of *avijjā*. *Avijjā* is the absence of the correct vision, the true insight with regard to the real nature of things which alone holds the key to the resolving of the conflict of life or *dukkha*. At *S.* II, p. 58 f. this same basic knowledge of causal genesis is referred to as *dhamme ñāṇa* or knowledge of the core doctrine (derived through experience) and *anvayeñāṇa* or knowledge through inference, and identified once again as *diṭṭhi* and *dassana*. The possession and perfection of these two forms of knowledge, *dhamme ñāṇa* and *anvaye ñāṇa*, consequently entitles a disciple to be called *diṭṭhisampanna* and *dassanasampanna*.

Confirming as it were this approved sense of the word *diṭṭhi*, Buddhist texts use the term *diṭṭhipatta* (q.v.) or 'vision-gained' with reference to the subsequent attainments of the Ariyan disciple who enters the Buddhist path of salvation as a *dhammānusārī* (q.v.) at *sotāpattimagga*. From *sotāpattiphala* up to *Arahattamagga*, both included, he continues to be called *diṭṭhippatta* through these six successive stages. On attaining *Arahattaphala* finally he is referred to as *paññāvimutta* (q.v.). On the other hand, it is to be noted that *Sn. v.* 152 draws a distinction between *diṭṭhi* and *dassana* and looks upon *diṭṭhi* (in this context) as an extremist view in contrast to *dassana*, (see below) which a disciple endowed with vision should strive to avoid : *diṭṭhiṃ ca anupagamma sīlavā dassanena sampanno ...*

The use of the term *diṭṭhi* in a yet another non-derogatory normative sense, we discover in the *Kosambiya Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 322 f.). In this context it could best be translated as 'guiding principle' or 'regulative outlook' which is recommended to the Buddhist disciple and is considered very desirable for his religious life and spiritual development. The Commentary to the *sutta* defines this as 'right view connected with the way' (*maggasampayutta sammādiṭṭhi*) or 'view at the stage of *sotāpatti magga*'. The *sutta* includes this in a list of six commendable virtues which contribute to the affability, esteem and concord of the monastic community (see also *A.* III, p. 290). Starting with friendliness in thought, word and deed and adding as the fourth and fifth communitarian use of justly earned property and perfection of monastic virtues, the list finally leads to *diṭṭhi* (the regulative outlook which it calls *ariya* or noble which is said to guide the one who abides by it to the final termination of all ills of life (*niyyati takkarassa sammā dukkhakkhayāya*). The term *diṭṭhi* here stands for a very comprehensive concept and is carefully elaborated further in the *sutta*. Seven different manifestations of this *diṭṭhi* are shown as leading up to the production of seven different aspects of knowledge (which may even be viewed as efficiency or skill) which are both unique and transcendental and not shared by the average worldlings (*... ñāṇaṃ adhigataṃ hoti ariyaṃ lokuttaraṃ asādhāraṇaṃ puthujjanehi*, loc. cit.). Discussing the practical value to the Buddhist disciple of this outlook of critical self-analysis, the *sutta* says that the disciple begins by scanning himself to see whether aberrations of the mind like the five *nīvaraṇas* lead to the obsession or perversion of his mind, thus preventing him from seeing things as they truly are.[1] Consequently he attains personal composure and personal tranquillity. At this stage, the Buddhist disciple becomes conscious of his uniqueness in his spiritual quality. Subsequent to this, he acquires new traits of character which go under the general name of *dhammaṭṭhiti* or inherent virtue. These are two in number, the first being that he conceals no guilt of his. The other is that inspite of his involvement in rendering various services to the fellow members of his group he keenly pursues the development of his own three-fold culture (*sikkhā*). He does not lose sight of his greater mission in being involved in

1 *Atthi me kho me taṃ pariyuṭṭhānaṃ ajjhattaṃ appahīnaṃ yenāhaṃ pariyuṭṭhānena pariyuṭṭhitacitto yathābhūtaṃ na jāneyyaṃ na passeyyanti* (loc. cit.).

duties and obligations of monastic life. The two final achievements on account of this *diṭṭhi* are referred to as power or competence (*balatā*). He develops a capacity to listen with keenness to the *dhamma*, and this is finally followed by a capacity to understand the *dhamma* and derive joy out of it. This *diṭṭhi* is looked upon as providing the basic standardized outlook. A uniformity of view (*diṭṭhisāmaññā*) among Buddhist disciples which would result from this common outlook of critical self-analysis is both desired and prayed for (... *diṭṭhisāmaññāgato viharati sabrahmacārīhi āvi c'evaraho ca:* loc. cit.). The *sutta* finally adds that the possession of these seven aspects of knowledge brings the disciple to the realisation of the fruit of *sotāpatti* stage (*sotāpattiphala*) and through it to an initial insight into the true nature of things.

On the other side, the word *diṭṭhi* with associated derogatory meanings like dogma, heresy or extremist view, stands in such combinations as *diṭṭhi-anusaya* (*S.* V. p. 60) *diṭṭhi-upādāna* (*M.* I, pp. 51, 66), *diṭṭhi-parāmāsa* (*M.* I, p. 130). In all these contexts the word *diṭṭhi* implies 'mistaken and misleading views', which have their origin outside the Buddhist fold, with regard to the self and the world (*atta* and *loka*) and the moral implications of action and reaction (*kamma* and *vipāka*).

A good example of the former, i.e. of view relating to the self and the world, occurs in the *Alagaddūpama Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* (*M.* I. p. 135 f.) where it is listed as the last item of the six bases of false beliefs or *diṭṭhiṭṭhāna*, the other five being the association of an egoistic idea of self with regard to each of the five constituents, starting with *rūpa*, which make up the being or *pañcakkhandha*. There the identification of the self with the world (*so loko so attā*) and their eternality (*nicco, dhuvo, sassato* ...) are both asserted. In a more comprehensive note, the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (*S.* II, p. 17) contains both the positive and the negative aspects of this view, viz. the eternalist view or *sassatavāda* and the annihilationist view or *ucchedavāda*, examining and elucidating their arising and the possibility of their eradication in its analysis of *sammādiṭṭhi*. A correct understanding of the manner in which the world comes into being (*lokasamudaya*) and the manner in which it ceases to be (*lokanirodha*) is said to contribute to the elimination of the eternalist's position of assertion (*atthitaṃ = sassatavāda*) and the annihilationist position of negation (*natthitaṃ = ucchedavāda*) respectively. Of the latter, i.e. of the view which negates the good and bad effects of *Kamma* (*natthi dinnaṃ natthi yiṭṭhaṃ* ..., = acts of giving and offering of sacrifices are without result), the *Mahācattārīsaka Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* (*M.* III, p. 71 ff.) makes a thorough examination under its analysis of *micchādiṭṭhi* (See below). All these *diṭṭhis* in their totality (the sixty two views listed in the *Brahmajāla Sutta: Yāni cimāni dvāsaṭṭhidiṭṭhi-gatāni Brahmajāle bhaṇitāni: S.* IV, p. 286 f.) are said to derive from the error of *sakkāyadiṭṭhi*, the error of seeing a lasting, an enduring self (*ātman*) in any of the components of this psychophysical complex which constitutes man.[2] Consequently, in the elimination of *sakkayadiṭṭhi* all *diṭṭhis*, i.e. views which are mistaken and misleading get eliminated.

The *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, while describing *upādāna* and its subdivisions, gives us more details about these stigmatised *diṭṭhis*. The *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* explains the grasping of 'vows and rites' (*sīlabbata-upādāna*) as adherence to the views of recluses and brahmins outside the Buddhist pale which are believed in as leading to purity and salvation[3]. Likewise the grasping of the view of self (*attavāda-upādāna*) is explained as the mistaken identification of an enduring self or soul in the totality of this psycho-physical complex called being or in any part thereof. This was referred to in the *Saṃyutta* (*S.* IV, p. 286 f.) as the basis of all *diṭṭhis*. Although these two items of grasping (of 'vows and rites' and of the view of self) are themselves basically tied up with an incorrect view (*diṭṭhi*) of things, they are listed separately, more for the purpose of classification, as independent items under *upādāna*, bringing together the rest of wrong views under the specific category of *diṭṭhi-upādāna*.[4] Under this category of *diṭṭhi*, as mentioned above, are listed all non-Buddhist religious positions like those which deny the efficacy of *kamma* etc. (*natthi dinnaṃ ... natthi paro loko*) and are designated *micchādiṭṭhi*. However, there is no doubt that it is *diṭṭhi* in its widest connotation which is decried and frowned upon in Buddhism in such usages as *diṭṭhi-anusaya* (leaning on *diṭṭhi*), *diṭṭhi-upādāna* (grasping of *diṭṭhi*) and *diṭṭhi-parāmāsa* (adherence to *diṭṭhi*). To be so affected would be a

2 *Ime kho gahapati diṭṭhiyo sakkāya diṭṭhiyā sati honti sakkāya diṭṭhiyā asati na honti ti* (loc. cit.).

3 *Ito bahiddhā samaṇabrāhmaṇānaṃ sīlena suddhi....iti yā evarūpā diṭṭho: Dhs.* p. 212.

4 ....*ṭhapetvā sīlabbatūpādānaṃ ca attavādūpādānaṃ ca sabbā pi micchādiṭṭhi diṭṭhūpādānaṃ* (loc. cit.).

contradiction of the basic Buddhist position, for it reflects the absence of the true Buddhist vision.

In a beautiful exposition in the *Aggi-vacchagotta Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* (*M.* I, p. 484 ff.), the Buddha clarifies his own position with regard to what are generally held, ten in number, as standard *diṭṭhis*. *Diṭṭhi* here appears as a belief in, a point of view adhered to, generally with regard to what pertains to one's self or the world in their mutual inter-relationship as against what is intuitively seen or comprehended, i.e. *diṭṭhi* as against *diṭṭha* and this latter again only with regard to what is relevant and pertinent to the attainment of salvation. In the former category of *diṭṭhi* are dogmatic views about the eternality or otherwise of the world, the nature self etc. *sassato loko . . . taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīraṃ* (*M.* I, p. 484). The latter, i.e. *diṭṭha* as against *diṭṭhi*, is exemplified in the person of the Buddha in the comprehension of the true nature of self, which in Buddhism is also the comprehension of the true nature of the world of *loka* which is none other than the individual himself (See *S.* I, p. 62). This is the knowledge that is relevant to the way of Buddhist salvation : But this, Vaccha, has been seen by the Tathāgata : Such is the material shape, such is the arising of material shape[5]. . . Therefore in the Tathāgata in whom knowledge (*diṭṭha*) exists, *diṭṭhi* or dogmatic views persist not (*diṭṭhigatanti kho Vaccha apanītam etaṃ Tathāgatassa :* ibid.) This idea is expressed with equal eloquence in the *Suttanipāta* (*Sn. v.* 837) in the statement *passaṃ ca diṭṭhīsu anuggahāya :* 'Seeing things correctly such a person grasps not at any of the *diṭṭhis*.' For he judges right (*nicchеyya*) with regard to 'picked up views' (*samuggahītaṃ*) relating to the diverse spheres which interest man (*dhammesu*). It is also expressed in the *Suttanipāta*.[6]

Amongst the Buddhist texts that campaign for the eradication of *diṭṭhi* as obstacles on the path to salvation, the *Suttanipāta* ranks foremost. Viewing the question of *diṭṭhi* in the religio-philosophical dimension, the *Suttanipāta* seems to highlight two major areas of cohesion which equally need correction. The arbitrary and sectarian evaluation of the diverse religious standpoints or views (*diṭṭhi*), elevating one's own and condemning those of others as inferior leads to an endless chain of fruitless debate[7]. Further to this, the assessment of one's own achievement in the sphere of acquired wisdom (*ñāṇa*) and moral distinction and ritualistic purity (*sīla-vata*) in relation to others (*yad attanī passati ānisaṃsaṃ diṭṭhe sute sīlavate mute vā :* op. cit. *vv.* 797-9) and the consequent slipping into states of mental depravity like arrogance (*nihīnato passati sabbaṃ atītaṃ* op. cit. *v.* 799) in its wake sets up impediments on one's path to salvation (*taṃ vā pi ganthaṃ kusalā vadanti :* op. cit. *v.* 798). Lying at the root of all these aberrations seems to be the illusory notion of 'I' and what derives from it (*attaṃ pahāya anupādiyāno . . . diṭṭhiṃ pi so na pacceti kiñ ci :* op. cit. *v.* 800). But the Buddhist who takes up his position on the basis of a verifiable truth has not the need to dispute or arrogantly assert himself[8]. Thus the Buddha found himself, without much effort, in this position of not being in conflict with others.[9] For he had already eradicated these mental degenaracies which the *Sammādiṭṭhi Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 48) lists as *diṭṭhi-mānānusaya* which obsesses a disciple with notions of 'I' and 'mine' (*asmīti*).

Having noted the prevalence of the term *diṭṭhi* in the religious parlance of the day and noting their own use of it in the Buddhist texts in a general way to designate views of both good and bad types, the Buddhists seem to go further to clarify these to avoid any ambiguity by introducing two specific categories as *micchādiṭṭhi* and *sammādiṭṭhi*. The *Mahācattārīsaka Sutta* (*M.* III, p. 71) offers us what appears to be a more or less standard definition of *micchādiṭṭhi* as follows : *Natthi dinnaṃ natthi yiṭṭhaṃ . . .* 'acts of giving and offering of sacrifices are without result'. Thus *micchādiṭṭhi* is the religious standpoint from which one denies the efficacy of deeds, good and bad, the reality of this world and the next and the possibility of worldlings comprehending the true nature of the world and making it known to others. As seen earlier, this is what the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* (*Dhs.* p. 212) presents as bad *diṭṭhi* under *diṭṭhi-upādāna* and goes further to designate as *micchādiṭṭhi*.

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5 *Diṭṭhaṃ hetaṃ vaccha Tathāgatena iti rūpaṃ, iti rūpassa samudayo : M.* I, p. 486.

6 *nivesanā tassa na santi keciḍhammesu niccheyya samuggahītā Sn.* v. 801.

7 *Paraman ti diṭṭhīsu paribbasāno . . . tasmā vivādāni avītivatto : Sn.* v. 796.

8 *yathāvādi kho āvuso na kenaci loke viggayha tiṭṭhati : M.* I, p. 108.

9 *Nāhaṃ bhikkhave lokena vivadāmi loko ca mayā vivadati. Na bhikkhave dhammavādi kenaci lokasmiṃ vivadati : S.* III, p. 138.

Proceeding on its analysis, the *Mahācattārīsaka Sutta* (op. cit. p. 72) presents *sammādiṭṭhi* at two different levels, mundane and transcendental. *Sammādiṭṭhi* at mundane level consists in the rejection of the *micchādiṭṭhi* which denies the efficacy of *kamma* etc. In this affirmation of *kamma*, particularly of the wholesome effects of good *kamma*, it fosters the doing of good deeds (*puññabhāgiya*) and thereby contributing to a 'good life' but with the invariable consequence of piling up its effects contributing to form the substratum for life in *saṃsāra* (*upadhivepakka*). Nevertheless, it is invariably this form of *sammādiṭṭhi*, as an antidote, that one has to use to shatter the *micchādiṭṭhi* referred to above. (*sammādiṭṭhissa bhikkhave micchādiṭṭhi nijjinnā hoti*, op. cit. p. 76). At the same time, it is to be noted that this form of *sammādiṭṭhi* is critically viewed from the very outset, on account of its being associated with defilements (*sāsava*). Our *sutta* is quick to note that this association with defiling traits (*sāsava*) and this tendency to buildup a substratum (*upadhivepakka*) are both completely at variance with the true aspirations of Buddhism, viz. the complete eradication of defilements or *āsavakkhaya* and the total elimination of substratum of rebirth or *upadhisaṃkhaya*. The character of this form of *sammādiṭṭhi* is contrary to the Buddhist spirit of 'leading to the non-existence of . . .' or *apacayagāmi*. Thus there comes to be the postulation of the transcendental *sammādiṭṭhi* which is resonant of the true Buddhist spirit : *ariya* = noble, *anāsava* = non-defiling and *lokuttara* = transcendental. At this level, *sammādiṭṭhi* is none other than the wisdom (*paññindriyaṃ paññābalaṃ*) of the *ariyan* disciple who is developing his spiritual life in the Ariyan way (*ariyamaggaṃ bhāvayato* . . . op. cit. p. 72). This is the true *diṭṭhi* of the Buddhist disciple, the basis of his religion, safeguards against the distortion of which are provided under *diṭṭhi-vipallāsa*. Elaborating this definition of *sammādiṭṭhi* which is said to come to the Buddhist disciple as he develops himself in the Ariyan way, the *Dīgha Nikāya* refers to it as the knowledge of the four noble truths.[10]

Thus the true and correct *diṭṭhi* in Buddhism, as a way of seeing for oneself and not a believing in, is constituted by the awareness of the threefold characteristics of the phenomenal world or *tilakkhaṇa* and the four noble truths or *catusaccañāṇa* while *sakkāyadiṭṭhi* or belief in an enduring and lasting self, which is the basis of all other derivative *diṭṭhis*, stands opposed and opposite to what is held as correct vision in Buddhism.

JOTIYA DHIRASEKERA

DIṬṬHIPARĀMĀSA (Skt. *dṛṣṭiparāmarśa*), primarily means 'dogmatic adherence to views'. The word *parāmāsa* (from parā—mṛś) is defined by Buddhagosa (*DhsA*. p. 49), as *parato āmasantīti parāmāso* The *PED*. gives an explanatory translation of this definition as follows : "they handle *dhammās as other*" (than what they really are, e.g. they transgress the real meaning of *anicca* etc. and say *nicca*). The *Atthasālinī* translation renders the word into English as 'reversion'. Often the word *parāmāsa* is rendered as perversion (cf. *Dial.* III, p. 43). The word *abhinivesa* (inclination, adherence, dogmatic clinging) is considered as being synonymous with *parāmāsa*. Thus it is apparent that the word *pārāmāsa* connotes the shades of meanings contained in both terms *upādāna* (clinging) and *vipallāsa* (perversion). See DIṬṬHIUPĀDĀNA, DIṬṬHIVIPALLĀSA.

The *Dhs*. (§1174) considers *diṭṭhiparāmāsa* as being similar in content of meaning to *diṭṭhi-āsava*, and defines it as clinging etc. to the ten indeterminates (*dasa-avyākatavatthūni : Dhs*. § 1099). The commentarial tradition is prone to circumscribe the content of *diṭṭhi* to the sixty-two false views enumerated in the *Brahmajāla Sutta* (*D*. I, p. 1 ff.). But there is textual evidence to support the view that *diṭṭhi* in its broadest meaning conveys a much wider sense. The identification of the term *diṭṭhiparāmāsa* with the other term *idaṃ saccābhinivesa* (Skt. *tatsatyābhiniveśa* meaning, adherence to one's own opinion) supports the idea that the word *diṭṭhi* in this context is much wider in meaning than it is traditionally held.

The word *diṭṭhi* in this context means all standpoints or views one takes up with regard to what is seen, heard, sensed and cognized. People who take up such stand-points and adhere to them dogmatically are naturally inclined to consider their viewpoints as individual truths. Considering thus they get entrenched in them (*Sn*. *v*. 824). Being so entrenched they hold as true only what they believe and derounce all other views as false (*idaṃ eva saccaṃ moghaṃ aññaṃ : D*. I, p. 187 f.). Such dogmatic believers are compared to the group of

10 *yaṃ kho bhikkhave dukkhe ñāṇaṃ . . . . dukkhanirodha gaminiyā paṭipadāya ñāṇaṃ. Ayaṃ vuccati bhikkhave sammādiṭṭhi : D*. II, p. 311.

blind men who quarrelled and ended up in fisticuffs when their individual views on what an elephant looks like conflicted with one another (*Ud.* p. 68 f.). Such dogmatic adherence to any view-point is not consistent with the teaching of the Buddha. Thus, even when the Buddha and his enlightened disciples tried to demonstrate the fallacy of certain non-Buddhist views, they did so without getting attached to, entrenched in, dogmatically clinging to any view-point of their own. This was because they had no personal end to serve by clinging to any view. They had no use of any views for they had transcended all views and happened to be in possession of vision (of things in their true nature : *Sn.* v. 152).

The *Alagaddūpama Sutta* (*M.* II, p. 134 ff.), very clearly and lucidly states the Buddhist position with regard to dogmatic adherence to any type of view. Therein it is said that the Dhamma—which is compared to a raft—is meant only for the purpose of crossing over the sea of saṃsāra and not for grasping dogmatically. The sutta goes on to add that when the *dhammas* themselves are to be discarded once they have served the purpose of crossing, what is there to be said about the *adhammas* (i.e. what is not in accordance with the dhamma : *dhammā eva pahātabbā pageva adhammā*) cf. DIṬṬHI.

S. K. N.

DIṬṬHIPPATTA (Skṭ., *dṛṣṭiprāpta*), the vision-possessed one, an āryan person who has attained to (*patta*) the vision (*diṭṭhi*) that the conditioned things (*saṅkhāras*, q.v.) are *dukkha*, (q.v.) and that the cessation thereof is bliss (*sukha*, *Ps.* II, p. 52). A *diṭṭhippatta* is one of the seven āryan individuals (*satta-āriya-puggalā*) referred to in the texts (*D.* III, p. 105, 254; *M.* I, p. 439; *A.* I, p. 74, 118; *Vism.* p. 659).

"The person who considers *saṅkhāras* to be devoid of substance (*anatta*) and, having great vision, acquires the faculty of wisdom (*paññindriya*)—at the six moments of transcendental attainment called *sotāpatti-phala*, *sakadāgāmi magga*, *sakadāgāmi-phala*, *anāgāmi-magga*, *anāgāmi-phala* and *arahatta-magga*, and is called a *diṭṭhippatta*. The same person—at the moment of *sotāpatti-magga*, i.e., the initial moment of transcendental attainment—is referred to as *dhammānusārī* while at the highest moment, i.e., the *arahatta-phala* which he is certain to attain, is called a *paññāvimutta*" (*Vism.* p 659).

Thus, *dhammānusārī*, *diṭṭhippatta* and *paññā-vimutta* although they are referred to as three separate individuals (apparently taking into account the degree of spiritual or intellectual attainment, and the consequent release and the method whereby it is achieved), really represent three stages of the same process, the process of the attainment of freedom. *Magga* and *phala* referred to above, according to the Theravāda Abhidhamma, are two consecutive moments (*khaṇa*), the former immediately leading to the latter. To conceive of two separate individuals, one in the moment of *magga* and another in that of *phala* is, therefore, practically impossible; it is only a theoretical assumption. Here the same person at the moment of *sotāpatti-magga* is called *dhammānusārī* while at the next moment, i.e., the *sotāpatti-phala*, is referred to as *diṭṭhippatta*. Similarly, the same person at the moment of *arahatta-magga*, is known as *diṭṭhippatta* while at the next moment i.e., *arahatta-phala* is called the *paññāvimutta*. So, a *dhammānusārī* necessarily becomes a *diṭṭhippatta* while a *diṭṭhippatta* finally ends up as a *paññāvimutta*.

In the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* of Asaṅga, a basic compendium of Mahāyāna Buddhism, *dṛṣṭiprāpta* occurs in a list of twenty-seven individuals classified and treated on the basis of spiritual fruition (*phala*) they have attained (*Abhsy.* p. 86). The *dṛṣṭiprāpta* is none other than the *dharmānusārī* in the stage where he attains spiritual fruition (ibid. 88); the *dharmānusārī* being the person who, possessed of sharp faculties, applies himself to attain that fruition i.e., realisation of truth (ibid. 88). This means that the person in the stage during which he strives to grasp the truth is called a *dharmānusārī*, whereas in the stage of the realisation of truth is referred to as *dṛṣṭiprāpta*.

UPALI KARUNARATNA

DIṬṬHI-UPĀDĀNA, adhering to false views, the second of the four attachments or clingings, the other three being attachment to the pleasures of the senses (*kāmupādāna*), to works of righteousness (*sīlabbatu*^{0}) and to the views of individuality (*attavādu*^{0} : *D.* III; 230, *Dhs.* §§ 1215, 1536).

The *Cūlasīhanāda Sutta* (*M.* I, 66) refers to these four kinds of grasping and mentions that only the first type is known to some recluses and brāhmans, to some others also the second (*diṭṭhi-upādāna*) and even the third, but the adherence to the false view

of individuality (*attavādūpādāna*) is comprehended only by the followers of the Buddha.

The false views (*diṭṭhi*), here referred to, therefore, do not appear to include the false view of individuality.

The origin of this kind of grasping is said to be craving etc. in the usual sequence of dependent origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*).

H. G. A. VAN ZEYST

DIṬṬHIVIPALLĀSA, literally means distortion of view-point. In the Buddhist texts *vipallāsa* or distortion is seen to spread over three areas, viz. (a) distortion of perception or *saññāvipallāsa*, (b) distortion of thought or *cittavipallāsa* and (c) distortion of view-point or *diṭṭhivipallāsa* (*A*. II, p. 52 and *Vism*. p. 683. Note : At *A*. II, 52, l. 4 *adukkhe bhikkhave dukkhanti* should be corrected to read *dukkhe . . . sukhanti*). The term *vipallāsa* implies the distortion of the Buddhist world-view, the Buddhist's view of himself and the world, i.e. of viewing them in terms of *anicca* (transciency), *dukkha* (unsatisfactoriness) and *anatta* (soullessness). Consequently *vipallāsa* distorts and negates the Buddhist way of life which leads to release. To this group of threefold characteristics or *tilakkhaṇa*, *asubha* or unwholesomeness is added as a fourth. Thus *vipallāsa* or distortion in the three areas of perception (*saññā*), thought (*citta*) and view-point (*diṭṭhi*) is generated through the failure to appreciate and recognise these attributes as being truly characteristic of life.

The *Nidāna - vagga* of the *Saṃyutta-nikāya* is emphatic in saying that those who fail to see in the alluring things of the world the three-fold characteristic of *anicca*, *dukkha* and *anatta* as viewed by the Buddhists can never rid themselves of the miseries of life (*S*. II, p. 110). The *Saṃyutta* adds here two more attributes in terms of which it is deemed desirable for the Buddhist to view the self and the world. They are *rogato* and *bhayato*, i.e. as being subject to disease and dread, their opposites being *ārogyato* and *khemato*, i.e. as being free from disease and free from dread. This same idea seems to be expressed under the concept of *subha* and *asubha* of the earlier listing.

It is to be observed that these three areas of perception (*saññā*), thought (*citta*) and view-point (*diṭṭhi*) in which the above referred to distortion takes place are but three planes in which thoughts, as motives leading to actions, are generated. Hence one has to view the danger in *vipallāsa* or distorted view-point of the self and the world as leading to disastrous consequences, to misery in life and to the obstruction of the path of salvation.

JOTIYA DHIRASEKERA

DIṬṬHIVISUDDHI, purity of views, the third of the seven stages of purity outlined in the *Rathavinīta Sutta* (*M*. I, p. 147 ff.) and elaborated in the *Visuddhimagga* (*Vism*. pp. 587-597). By it is meant the seeing or determining correctly the true nature of *nāmarūpa* (q.v.) or mind-matter complex which constitutes a being (*nāma rūpānaṃ yathāvadassana : Vism*. p. 597). The *Rathavinīta Sutta's* process of purification or *visuddhi*, purification towards the goal of release from saṃsāra, in seven stages, in fact appears to work through the three stages of *sīla*, *samādhi* (*citta*) and *paññā*. The Commentary to the *sutta* (*MA*. II, p. 158) points that the single but complex concept of *paññā* (whose emergence in the Buddhist scheme of salvation as a product of religio-philosophical maturity is to be noted) in this scheme of *visuddhi* is divided into five sub-categories and is headed by *diṭṭhivisuddhi*. Thus as an initial stage of *paññā*, or the gateway to *paññā*, as it were, it gives an insight into the first truth namely, *dukkha sacca* while the succeeding *kaṅkhāvitaraṇa visuddhi*, by its grasp of the sequence of causal relationships elucidates the *samudaya sacca* and the *maggāmaggañāṇadassanavisuddhi* illumines one with regard to the *magga sacca*. Thus by these three mundane aspects of knowledge starting with *diṭṭhi visuddhi* (*lokiyena tava ñāṇena*), the three truths are grasped. It is thus that the last two stages of *visuddhi*, viz. *paṭipadāñāṇadassana visuddhi* and *ñāṇadassanavusuddhi* finally lead the disciple to the goal (*nirodha*) of release in *nibbāna* (*anupādā parinibbāna : M*. I, p. 149 f.). As a religious concept, therefore, it stands polarised to *diṭṭhivipallāsa* (q.v.). See also DIṬṬHI, VISUDDHI.

UPALI KARUNARATNA

DIVĀVIHĀRA, "the day-rest", relaxation during the day, after midday meal, a normal practice of the Buddha and his disciples. When they were residing

in a monastery they relaxed inside the monastery; but, when on tour, they chose a cool place like the shade of a tree (*S.* I, pp. 129, 312; *Divy.* pp 201, 202; *Avś.* pp. 109, 112) a park (*S.* I, pp. 129; III, 91), or the bank of a river (*Mhvu.* II, p. 264), or a lake (*Vin.* I, p. 28). Having gone round for alms and having had the meal, they used to retire into seclusion (*paṭisallāna, paṭisallīna*) for the day-rest; normally they relaxed in sitting posture in seclusion (*S.* I, pp. 129, 132; *Divy.* pp. 201, 202; *Avś.* pp. 109, 112). This relaxation lasted for a while, probably three to four hours, till the heat of the sun subsided. for, it is said that they rose from relaxation in the evening (*sāyaṁhasamayaṁ paṭisallānā vuṭṭhito, S.* III, p. 92 etc.).

In the case of the Buddha, *divāvihāra* formed one of his routine actions after his midday meal (*pacchā-bhattakicca*). The *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī* explaining the actions of the Buddha (*buddhakicca*, q.v.), says that after the midday meal he gave instructions to monks assembled in the *gandhakuṭi*, answered questions put to him by them and gave them subjects of meditation, When they took leave of him he retired for a rest, if it was felt necessary. After a little while he got up and preached to the people assembled in the *dhamma-sabhā* (*DA.* pp. 45-8). The mode of life explained here may apply to the Buddha only when he was living in a *vihāra.*

UPALI KARUNARATNA

DIVINATION : The act of predicting or foretelling events, or of discovering hidden or secret things by real or alleged supernatural means; a prediction or conjecture as to the future.

It was a widely practised art in India at the time of the Buddha. In the *Brahmajāla sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* (*D.* I, p. 8 ff.) there is a vivid account of the various forms of divination as practised by some recluses and brahmans which the Buddha denounces as being unworthy of those who live on food provided by the faithful. It reads : *Yathā vā pan'ekē bhonto samaṇa-brāhmaṇā saddhā-deyyāni bhojanāni ḅhuñjitvā te kuhakā ca honti lapakā ca nemittikā ca nippesikā ca....* (*D.* I, p. 8). "Whereas some recluses and brahmans, while living on food provided by the faithful are tricksters, droners out(of holy words for pay) diviners, and exorcists....": (*SBB.* II. 15 f.).

The term *nemittakā* used in this context has been translated as "diviners" and is further explained (See *SBB.* II, p. 16, notes 1 and 5) as "interpreters of signs and omens". *PED.* s.v. *nemittaka.*

Discoursing further on divination and other allied arts as were prevalent in his time the Buddha, in this sutta, categorizes the various forms of divination as follows :

i. Prophesying long life, prosperity (or the reverse), from marks on the child's hands, feet etc. (*aṅgaṃ*).

ii. Divining by omens and signs (*nimittaṃ*);

iii. Auguries drawn from thunderbolts and other celestial portents (*uppādaṃ*);

iv. Prognostication by interpreting dreams (*supinaṃ*);

v. Fortune-telling from the marks on the body (*lakkhaṇaṃ*);

vi. Auguries from the marks on cloth gnawed by mice (*mūsikacchinnaṃ*);

vii. Looking at the knuckles etc., and, after muttering a charm, divining whether a man is well-born or lucky or not (*aṅga-vijjā*);

viii. Determining whether the site for a proposed house or pleasance is lucky or not (*vatthu-vijjā*);

ix. Divining by the appearance and cawing of crows (*vāyasa-vijjā*);

x. Foretelling the number of years that a man has yet to live (*pakkajjhānaṃ*);

xi. Understanding the language of all creatures (*miga-cakkaṃ*);

xii. Predicting luck or ill-luck from gems, staves, garments, swords, arrows, bows, other weapons, women, men, boys, girls, slaves, slave-girls, elephants, horses, buffaloes, bulls, oxen, goats....and other animals;

xiii. Predicting victory and defeat of armies;

xiv. Predicting sun and moon eclipses etc.;

xv. Forecasting matters relating to rainfall, harvest, food, tranquillity, disturbance, pestilence etc.

xvi. Predicting and arranging auspicious days for marriages, concluding treaties, calling in of debts, expenditure, etc.;

xvii. Obtaining oracular answers by means of the magic mirror (*ādāsa-pañhaṃ*);

xviii. Obtaining oracular answers through a girl possessed. (*kumārī-pañhaṃ*);

xix. Obtaining oracular answers from a god (*deva-pañhaṃ*) (s.v. *D.* I. pp. 8 ff.; *SBB.* II. pp. 15 ff.)

Early accounts of the birth of prince Siddhārtha relate that on the day of his conception his mother, queen Mahāmāyā dreamt that the four regent gods raised her with the bed, and took her to the Himālaya mountain. Thereupon their consorts bathed her in the lake Anotatta, put heavenly clothes on her, anointed her with perfumes and decked her with heavenly flowers. Then they took her to a golden mansion on a silver mountain in the vicinity. As she lay there an elephant of white hue entered her room and after circumabulating her bed three times smote her right side with its trunk and entered her womb. Soothsayers who were consulted prophesied that this dream foretold the birth of a male child who would either be a universal monarch (*cakkavatti*) or a Buddha (*J.* I. p. 50).

It is further recorded in the same work (p. 55 f.) that when prince Siddhārtha was born his father summoned eight brahmans who were most versed in the science of interpreting bodily signs (*lakkhaṇa-paṭiggāhakā*) to forecast the future of his son.

Buddhist Jātaka stories contain an abundance of instances of divination in Buddhist and pre-Buddhist India. As shown in several Jātaka stories (e.g. *Mahā Ummagga Jātaka*, No. 546; *J.* VI. p. 475 ff.) the king's chaplain (*purohita*) was clever in interpreting all omens, sounds, signs, dreams and tokens. A king had also other brahmans in his service who called on him in the morning, every day, to interpret the dreams that he may have had in the night or the constellations of stars of that night (*Nānacchanda-Jātaka*, No. 289; *Mahā-mora Jātaka*, No. 491; *Mahāsupina-Jātaka*, No. 77; *Mahā - Ummagga-Jātaka*, No. 546).

From these stories it appears that the astrological interpretation of the conjunctions of stars and the interpretation of dreams and bodily signs have been widely practised. In the *Cullaka-seṭṭhi-Jātaka* (No. 4) it is said that the bodhisatta, who was born as the treasurer of king Brahmadatta at that time, one day predicted, taking note of the position of stars at that moment, that any young man who picked up the dead mouse that was lying there could start a business with it and become a millionnaire. The *Sarabhaṅga-Jātaka* (No. 522) mentions that the king's chaplain, on the birth of his son, stepped out of doors and looked up at the sky for the purpose of divining his son's destiny, and knew that the boy, because he was born under a certain conjunction would surely be the chief archer in all India. In the *Devadhamma-Jātaka* (No. 6) the bodhisatta, by reading the stars in the sky, knew that his father was dead. Astrologers could also predict, as shown in the *Alīnacitta-Jātaka* (No. 156) whether a child about to be born would be a boy or a girl. Incidentally there were brahmans, as evident from the *Andabhūta-Jātaka* (No. 62) who could predict the sex of the child to be born by looking at a pregnant woman.

Predictions were also made based on the longings of pregnant women. Thus in the *Thusa-Jātaka* (No. 338) it is related how the astrologers, when they were told of the desire of the queen of king Bimbisāra to drink blood from the right knee of her own husband, predicted that the child, conceived in the womb of the queen, will kill the father and seize the kingdom.

Interpretation of dreams too was a major aspect in the field of divination in ancient India. A well-known instance is the interpretation of Māyā's dream referred to above. The *Mahāsupina-Jātaka* (No. 77) relates a very interesting story of the Buddha himself interpreting sixteen dreams that king Kosala dreamt during one night. As related in this Jātaka story (*J.* I, 334 ff.), king Kosala, in the last watch of one night, having dreamt sixteen peculiar dreams woke up in great fright and alarm, and when the brahmans and chaplains came to him in the morning he asked them to interpret the sixteen dreams. The brahmans interpreted the dreams as foretelling disaster and advised the king to perform a great sacrifice to avert the disaster.

Subsequently Queen Mallikā requested the king to go to the Buddha and seek his advice. The kin-related to the Buddha the sixteen dreams where upon the Buddha explained their significance and said, "You Sire, are not the first to have seen these dreams, they were seen by kings of bygone days also; and then as now, the brahmins found in them a pretext for sacrifice; whereupon, at the instance of the wise and good, the bodhisatta was consulted, and the dreams were expounded by him in just the same manner as they have now been expounded". (E. B. Cowell, *The Jataka*, I, p. 188 ff.).

Other instances of importance attached to dreams can be seen in the *Bhūridatta-Jātaka* (No. 543), *Vidhurapaṇḍita-Jātaka* (No. 545), *Mahā-Unimaga Jātaka* (No. 546) and the *Vessantara Jātaka* (No. 547) In the *Vessantara Jātaka*, for instance, Maddi Devī dreamt that a dark man clothed in two yellow robes, with red flowers in his two ears, came, and entered the hut, clutched Maddi Devī by the hair and dragged her out, threw her down on the ground, and amidst her shrieks tore out her two eyes, cut off her arms, cut open her chest and tearing out the heart dripping with blood carried it away. This dream signified the arrival of the brahman Jūjaka and taking her two children away.

The *Satapatta Jātaka* (No. 279) gives an instance of the bodhisatta interpreting the sounds made by a jackal and a crane thus showing that the interpretation of cries of animals and birds was a prevalent practise in India in the field of divination. In the *Māhā-mora Jātaka* (No. 491) it is said that the brahmans, whom king Brahmadatta summoned to inquire as to whether there were golden peacocks, said "O great king! It is said in our verses of lucky marks, of water-beasts, fish, tortoises, and crabs, of land-beasts, deer, wild-geese, peacocks, and partridges, these creatures and men too can be of a golden colour." This indicates that the brahmans of yore had verse compilations dealing with marks and sounds of birds, animals and humans.

Instances showing other superstitious predictions in the field of divination and the Buddha's attitude towards them are found in the *Māhā-maṅgala Jātaka* (No. 453), *Maṅgala Jātaka* (No. 87), *Mātaṅga Jātaka* (497) and *Citta-sambhūta Jātaka* (No. 498). The *Māhā-maṅgala Jātaka* states that one day a large congregation gathered at the royal resting-house at Rājagaha where the people expressed three different opinions regarding good omens. Some held the view that the sight of anything with a lucky appearance was a good omen; suppose a man, when he awake in the morning sees a perfectly white bull, or a woman with child, or a red fish or a jar filled to the brim, or new-melted ghee, or a new garment, or rice-porridge, there is no omen better than these. Those who dissented held that to hear words like 'full', 'full-grown' and 'eat' brought good luck. Others who disagreed with both these views held that the touch of auspicious things like the earth, green grass, fresh cow-dung, clean robes, red fish, gold, silver or food brought good luck (cp. also the commentary on the *Maṅgala Sutta*). The Buddha's views regarding these opinions are given in the *Maṅgala Sutta*.

The *Maṅgala Jātaka* relates another interesting incident of divination, connected with the Buddha. There was a brahmin, in the time of the Buddha, who strongly believed that rat-eaten clothes brought ill-luck. One day, finding that one of his clothes was rat-eaten he requested his son to take it by a stick without touching it with the hand to the charnel-ground (*āmaka-susāna*) and fling it away and afterwards bathe himself before returning home. The Buddha, perceiving in the morning that that day he could be of service to the brahmin and his son, went to the charnel-ground and sat at the entrance. As this cloth was thrown away by the brahman's son the Buddha picked it up in the presence of the brahman's son inspite of the latter's earnest warnings and repeated entreaties. The brahman who was shocked at hearing what had happened went to the Buddha to request him to discard it. The Buddha said to him, "Brahman, by open profession I have renounced the world, and am content with the rags, that lie by the road-side or bathing-place, or are thrown away in dust heaps, or in the charnel-grounds". At the end of the Buddha's discourse the brahman and his son attained to the first stage of the Path (*sotāpatti*).

The other two Jātaka stories, mentioned above viz. the *Mātaṅga-Jātaka* and the *Citta-sambhūta Jātaka* show that it was held in Buddhist and pre-Buddhist India that to behold a caṇḍāla, a very low caste person, when one set upon a journey was unlucky and whenever this occurred it was the practice of the high-caste people to wash their eyes with scented water and turn back.

The Buddha's attitude towards divination is evident from the following words attributed to him in the *Brahmajāla Sutta* (*D.* I. p. 10 f.). *Iti vā iti evarūpāya tiracchāna-vijjāya micchājīvā paṭivirato samaṇo Gotamo ti.* "Gotama the recluse holds aloof from such low arts."

Thus it is seen that divination and other similar practices were described by the Buddha as "low arts" (*tiracchāna-vijjā*) from which he kept himself aloof, and expected his disciples also to do so.

As regards the different types of super-normal knowledge (*abhiññā*) which are akin to divination, they are, the result of the mental development achieved through meditation. They were never used by the Buddha or his followers for worldly gains.

Inspite of the Buddha's disparagement of divination as a 'low art' it is flourishing both among the

Buddhist monks and the laity not only in countries of northern Buddhism like Tibet and Mongolia but also in countries of southern Buddhism like Sri Lanka, Burma and Thailand (cp. L. A. Waddell, Divination Buddhist in *ERE.* IV. pp. 786 ff.).

It has been observed by Waddell (loc. cit.) that the methods of divination practised by the Buddhists appear to fall broadly into three categories, viz. (a) lots—the simplest and generally performed by the people themselves; (b) astrology for which learned adepts are necessary, usually the Buddhist monks; and (c) oracles, often given by a priest or priestess of an aboriginal religion, and seldom by a Buddhist monk. This is generally done through the intermediary of a spirit of the dead or a deity of local origin.

Among the northern or Māhāyāna Buddhists divination is almost universal. Thus, in Mongolia and Tibet it reaches its culminating point whereas in China it is only a little less prevalent where the Indian astrological elements are largely mixed with the Chinese. In Tibet the monks who practise divination are called *tsi-pa* (i.e. calculators). Each sect has its own *tsi-pa* who are among the most learned and respected members of the monastery.

Oracular divination is also a living institution in Tibet. But this somewhat retains its aboriginal features and thus cannot be strictly called Buddhistic. These monks who practise oracular divination usually for the purpose of interpreting omens and dreams and on matters concerning business have as their implements an arrow (*daḥ-dar*) to which are attached coloured silken rags and a magic mirror of metal, which is deemed to reflect the future. For their augury they may gaze into a bowl or pool of water or observe the smoke of a sacrificial fire etc. (cp. Waddell, ibid.).

In China divination prevailed even in the time of the earliest recorded history. Some hundred thousand oracle bones belonging to the Shang period (16th-11th cent. B.C.) have been discovered on which are engraved requests madet o the spirits. There engravings give a picture of a society which regulated almost every aspect of life by divination and which was governed by considerations of good or bad luck (cp. *A Reader's Guide to the Great Religions*, Ed. Charles J. Adams, U.S.A. 1965, p. 33).

The Burmese Buddhists also practise divination where the most important form is said to be that of the Karens who use bones of fowls to divine every-event in their life. Horoscope-reading, ordeals and oaths are also other branches of divination in Burma (cp. *ERE.* III. pp. 28 f.).

In Sri Lanka, fortune-telling, soothsaying, interpretation of dreams or bodily marks, and similar superstitious rites are common elements of the indigenous beliefs which have become part and parcel of the life of Buddhists from time immemorial. Even kings and others of the royal families had faith in such beliefs (cp. *Mhv.* lvii. *v.* 53; lxvii, *v.* 29 ff.). People skilled in interpreting the lines on palms and other marks on the body used to visit the villages and take advantage of the credulity of the villagers (cp. *Mhv.* lxvi. *v.* 132).

Dreams were also considered as forebodings of future events, whether lucky or unlucky. The *Māhāvaṃsa* (*Mhv.* lxii. *v*, 21 ff.) relates a dream seen by the mother of king Parākramabāhu I (1153-86 A.C.) before the birth of her son, which has a close resemblance to the dream said to have been seen by Mahāmāyā on the night of the conception of prince Siddhārtha.

The *Māhāvaṃsa* records a few other instances of divination in relation to Sinhalese rulers. Once, in the third century A.C. three youths who were friends, viz. Saṅghatissa, Saṅghabodhi and Goṭhābhaya were going to Anuradhapura to do service to the king. A blind man with prophetic gifts who was living near the Tissa tank, cried out at the sound of their foot-steps : 'The ground bears here three rulers of the earth'. As Abhaya who was walking last, heard this, he asked the meaning of the saying, and then he was further assured that his race would endure that of the rest. These three youths later became rulers one after the other (s.v. *Mhv.* xxxvi, *v.* 58 ff.; *Mahāvaṃsa* trsl., p. 260).

According to the chronicles of Sri Lanka, in the sixth century, a certain man versed in magic spells wished to procure the kingship for his benefactor Mahānāga (569-71 A.C.). One full-moon night he took Mahānāga to the shore of the Gokanna sea (i.e. Trincomalee) and recited the incantations. Thereupon the Nāga king appeared. Mahānāga touched the Nāga king with three fingers and the magician prophesied : 'After thou has had war with three kings and slain the fourth, thou shall be king and live yet three years, and three people of thy clan shall be kings after thee'. All this was afterwards realized (*Mhv.* xli. *v.* 75 ff.; cp. *Cūlavaṃsa* trsl. Pt. I, p. 59 f.).

References to astrologers (*nēkatika*) can be found even in early inscriptions in Ceylon, e.g. the pre-Christian Periyakaḍu-vihāra inscription (*CJSC.* II. p. 241). This inscription indicates that astrologers enjoyed a high social status in early Sri Lanka. The *Rasavāhinī* (*Rssv.* Pt. II. p. 113) states that astrologers predicted a famine during the reign of king Duṭṭhagāmani (cp. H. Ellawala, *Social History of Early Ceylon*, Dept. of Govt. Printing, Ceylon, 1969 p. 145 f.).

The *Dambadeṇi-katikāvata*, a supplementary code of discipline for Buddhist monks, of the reign of king Parākramabāhu II (1236-70 A.C.) and the *Rājādhi Rājasiha-katikāvata* of king Rājādhi Rājasiṃha (1780-98 A.C.) make reference to divination and other allied arts. The former of these two codes of discipline prohibits the monks from practising sorcery and such other low arts (D. B. Jayatilleka, *Katikāvat-saṅgarā*, Mahabodhi Press, 1922, p. 19). The latter code specifically states that monks should not study low arts like divination and should not practise them (op. cit. pp. 31, 32). It is also mentioned in this code (p. 32) that monks who knowingly violate these rules should not be allowed to remain in robes for they are disobedient both to the rules of the Buddha and of the state. It is explicitly clear from these injunctions that at least some among the Buddhist monks of the time, when these codes were promulgated, had resorted to such practices, and hence the need for their prohibition.

H. R. PERERA

DIVINE AND DIVINITY. In Buddhism the divine as opposed to human, representing a power which creates and commands the human, is rejected. The world of empirical existence with which Buddhism is primarily concerned is said to be without a supreme divinity, a ruler who presides over it (*attāno loko anabhissaro : M.* II, p. 70).

Nevertheless, states of existence other than human, which when relatively assessed in terms of material well-being or spiritual upliftment are said to be superior to the human, are reckoned with in Buddhism. But these have nothing divine in the sense discussed above. These states are better described as being celestial (q.v.) subject, more or less to all the laws of change and transiency which govern the human plane for they all come within the domain of conditioned existence. The exception to the rule are the Brahma worlds of no-return (*anāgāmī*) which is virtually a stage on the verge of liberation (See further DEVALOKA). Thus, in Buddhist cosmology one would encounter a whole host of deities who belong to these different states of existence like the plane of pleasure (*kāmaloka*) and plane of material form (*rūpa loka*) rather than divinities, as aspects and manifestations of the said divine. (See also DEVATĀ). However, with the emergence of the Mahāyāna, one witnesses a near radical change of this position and in the concept of the primary Buddha in the *Ādibuddha* (q.v.) and *Trikāya* doctrines there is a retrieval of the idea of the divine. See also DEIFICATION, GOD.

JOTIYA DHIRASEKERA

DIVYĀVADĀNA is a collection of thirty-eight edifying stories or avadānas, belonging to the Sthaviravāda school of Buddhism. The text was discovered in Nepal by B. H. Hodgson and the name *Divyāvadāna* was given to it by E. Burnouf, as one of the manuscripts that came to his hand contained that word at the end of each story (*iti divyāvadāna pūrṇāvadānaṃ dvitīyaṃ*). In the colophon of one of the manuscripts of the *Vīrakuśāvadāna* found in the Cambridge University library, the statement *iti śrīdivyāvadānoddhruta aṣṭamīvratamahātmya kuśāvadānaṃ samāptaṃ* occurs, and P. L. Vaidya (*BST.* 20, introduction p. IX) is of opinion that the collection we have might be an incomplete collection of *avadānas* going under the name *Divyāvadāna*, since the above mentioned *Vīrakuśāvadāna* does not occur among its thirty-eight stories. To prove his thesis he further says that many of the *avadānas* included in this collection are found translated in Tibetan as independent works, and no translation bearing the title *Divyāvadāna* is found there. He continues to say that the present collection seems to be a compilation differing in age as well as in authorship, as some *avadānas* are written in pure Buddhist Sanskrit on the model of Mahāyāna sūtras in pre-Gupta style, some in semi-classical style and some in purely classical style. The majority of the stories are in prose with a verse or two intervening. In a few stories like *Rudrāyaṇāvadāna* (37) the verses increase in proportion while more than two thirds of the *Śārdūlakarṇāvadāna* (33), the largest in the collection, are in verse. *Maitrakaṇyakāvadāna* (38) is almost entirely in verse with a few prose lines intervening, and in this respect it resembles the stories of the *Jātakamālā*.

Regarding the contents of the work Winternitz (*History of Indian Literature*, Prague, 1933, II, p. 285) says that almost all the stories in the work have been traced to other works and says that the compiler had made use of a 'Book of Asoka', of a *Saṃyuktāgama* and of Kumāralāṭa's *Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā*, in addition to the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya*. Cowell and Neil in the introduction to their edition of *Divyāvadāna* (p. viii) say that many of the legends in the *Divyāvadāna* belong to the *Vinaya Piṭaka* as they continually bring in some reference to a point of discipline. P. L. Vaidya in the introduction to his edition of the same work (*BST*. Vol. 20, p. x) says, "It is now proved beyond doubt that many of the avadānas included in this work are also found in the *Vinaya Vastu* as preserved in the Gilgit Mss., in full or in parts", and identifies a few avadānas in the collection with those in the *Vinaya Vastu*.

The stories in the collection are not arranged systematically as is done in the *Avadānaśataka*. There are stories ranging from past lives of the Buddha (*Supriyāvadāna*, No. 8), predictions of future Buddhahood and pratyeka-Buddhahood, careers of *arahants* (*Pūrṇāvadāna*, No. 2) and their past good Kamma, to stories dealing with the good consequences of constructing and repairing *stūpas* and offerings made to them (*Indranāmabrāhmaṇāvadāna* No. 6).

Though the work is presented as a collection of thirty-eight *avadānas* it does not mean that the stories contain spisodes woven around as many persons. As is shown by P. L. Vaidya (op. cit.) the *Dānādhikaraṇamahāyāna sūtra* (34) and the *Prātihārya sūtra* (12) are remnants of an old *sūtra* belonging to *Mahāyāna*; the *Meṇḍakagṛhapativibhūtipariccheḍaḥ* (9) and the *Meṇḍakāvadāna* (10) relate to one and the same person. The *Saṅgharakṣitāvadāna* (23) the *Nāgakumārāvadāna* (24) and the *Saṅgharakṣitāvadāna*-2 (25) refer to the same person Saṅgharakṣita; the *Pāṁsupradānāvadāna* (26), the *Kunālāvadāna* (27), the *Vītaśokāvadāna* (28) and the *Aśokāvadāna* (29) are connected with the life of Aśoka. The *Indranāmabrāhmaṇāvadāna* (6) and the *Paṁsupradānāvadāna* (26) contain episodes of two individuals in each, Indra and Toyikāmaha, and Upagupta and Aśoka, respectively.

Though the *Divyāvadāna* commences with the Mahāyāna benediction : 'salute to all Buddhas and bodhisattvas' (*namaḥ śrīsarvabuddha-bodhisattvebhyaḥ*), the stories included in the collection do not contain much material that could be called purely Mahāyānic. Winternitz (op. cit. p. 284) says that the few Mahāyāna traces found in the *Divyāvadāna* are obviously later additions.

The exact date of compilation of the work has not been fixed though it is generally agreed that it is later than the compilation of the *Avadānaśataka*. P. L. Vaidya (op. cit., introduction p. xi) considers that the compilation of the *Divyāvadāna* should be placed circa 350 A.C. taking into account the fact that the compiler has made extensive use of the *Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā* of Kumāralāṭa and also the fact that the word Dīnāra occurs several times in the work. Winternitz (op. cit.) too, holds similar views on this matter and says that the compilation could not have been in existence prior to the 4th cent. A.C.

W.G.W.

DIYAVAḌANA-NILAME (Var. (Diyanilame, Māligāve Diyavaḍana Nilame), the designation by which the lay Custodian of the Tooth Relic (*dāṭhādhātu*, Sin. *daḷadā*) is known in Sri Lanka. The precursor of this prestigious post during the early period was the *dhāturakkhādhikāra* meaning "the Custodian of the Relics" or "the Relic Protecting Authority" (*The Dāṭhāvaṃsa, Ch.* IV, V, II, *JPTS*. 1884, p. 137) The *Cūlavaṃsa* also mentions a category of officers called the *daṭhādhāturakkhiyā*—"the Custodians of the Tooth-Relic" (*Mhv*. Ch. 57. *v*, 22), who were placed under the head of the Uttaramula-pariveṇa. The Tooth-Relic had been a much coveted object of worship by the Buddhists and there had been attempts to capture and take possession of the same by claimants to the kingship as well as by invading parties throughout the history of the island. Thus, it was a prime duty of the king, into whose possession the Tooth Relic came, to appoint a special officer as Custodian of the Tooth Relic. This practice is said to have originated in India in the Court of King Guhasīva of Kāliṅga. Prince Danta of Ujjeni who came to the court of King Guhasiva and devoted himself to the worship of the Tooth-Relic was conferred the title of *Dhāturakkhādhikāra*. The king was pleased with Danta's deportment and went so far as to give his daughter Hemamālā in marriage to him and allowed him to reside in the royal palace as custodian of the Tooth Relic (*Dāṭhāvaṃsa*. op. cit. p. 137). The *Daḷadāsirita* elaborates this incident *inter-alia* that Prince Danta was appointed *yuva-raja* and custodian of the Tooth-Relic chamber for life (*Hemamālā naṃ diyaniyan o haṭa pāvā dī yuvaraja tanaturu paṃuṇuvā daḷadāgeṭa divihimiyen himikaravā ... Daḷadāsirita*, ed. Pandit Sorata, V.

Colombo, 1970, p. 29). From this passage it is clear that Danta was appointed Custodian of the Tooth-Relic for life (*divihimiyen*) and also that he had a claim for the kingship, being already appointed a deputy to the king (*yuvaraja*). Later, when Kāliṅga was invaded, king Guhasiva ordered Danta and Hemamāḷā to take with them the Tooth-Relic to Sri Laṅkā for protection. When the Tooth-Relic arrived in Sri Lanka King Kīrti Śrī Meghavarṇa (4th cent. A.C.) received it with devotion and housed it in a separate building close to the king's palace in Anuradhapura. Danta and Hemamāḷā were highly rewarded by king Kirti Śrī Meghavarṇa. Starting from the time of the arrival of the Tooth-Relic in Sri Lanka, up to the time of the arrival of the Portuguese, the Tooth Relic shared all the vicissitudes of the kingdom, and the Custodianship of the Tooth-Relic passed from one to another, perhaps, unrecorded. From the scanty evidence available it appears that during the early period of the history of the Tooth-Relic in Sri Lanka the monks of the Abhayagiri fraternity from the clergy, and descendents of the family of Kāliṅga (*Kilinväsi*) from the laity seem to have had a superior right over the custodianship of the Tooth-Relic. This right of Kāliṅgas stems from Hemamālā who was a native of Kāliṅga. At some other point of time two classes of people belonging to the *gaṇa* (*gaṇavāsi*) and *doraṇāvāsi* (*dvāraṇāyaka asigāhaka* i.e. sword-bearer) clans had exercised a secondary right over the custodianship of the Tooth-Relic. During the Polonnaruva period yet another class of people known by the name of Velaikkar was entrusted the guardianship of the Tooth-Relic. In a Tamil inscription mention has been made of the grammarian Moggallāna, a monk of the Uttaramula fraternity, who made the Velaikkar forces agree to protect the Temple of the Tooth during the troubles which followed the death of Vijayabāhu (University of Ceylon, *History of Ceylon*, Vol. 1, pt. II, 1960, p. 564). Apparently Moggallāna was the custodian of the Tooth-Relic and, therefore wanted the Velaikkar forces to guard the Tooth Relic. There were several other *Theras*—Saṅgharakkhita in the Dambadeniya period and Medhaṅkara in the Kurunegala period who acted as custodians of the Tooth Relic.

The lay custodian of the Tooth-Relic is generally identified with the Diyavaḍana nilame of the Temple of the Tooth or the Divanilame. The origin and the meaning of the term Diyavaḍana-nilame is shrouded in obscurity. It is evidently a term—a designation that came into use during the latter part of the Kandyan period as is clear from the use of the word *nilame* as the second member of the compound. The term *nilame* is a contracted form of the two words *nila* (office) — *maha* (great) meaning "great officer". This term, undoubtedly, came into vogue during the reigns of Nayakkar kings in the Kandyan kingdom. What is meant by the term *diyavaḍana* or *diva* in this particular context of *divanilame* is a matter for conjecture. The designation Diyavaḍana nilame literary means "Water presenting officer" If this is taken as the functional aspect of the office of the Diyavaḍana nilame, then it is on par with the other offices viz:— the *Batvaḍana nilame*, *Saluvaḍana nilame*, *Telvaḍana nilame* (officers presenting rice, robes and oil to the king) of the royal palace. On the other hand, the term *diva-nilame* appears to bear a different meaning and function, though a royal officer yet unrelated to any duties attached to the king. If *diva* is taken to mean the 'island, then the Divanilame means 'The Great Officer for the Island" or if *diva* is taken as an alternate form for *divi* meaning 'life' then the designation means "The Great Officer appointed for life". The former interpretation of the designation of Diyavaḍana-nilame fits into the functions of the court official, while the latter interpretations of the Diyavaḍana nilame as Diva nilame is in conformity with the functions of the custodian of the Tooth-Relic or the Temple of the Tooth. This interpretation gets support from the fact that Danta was appointed the custodian of the Tooth-Relic for life (*daḷadā geṭa divi himiyen himi karavā. Daḷadāsiritu*, p. 29) and the appointment of Diyavaḍana-nilame before it was regulated by later legislation was also for life. The fact that the sacred relic which was always housed by kings near their palace, became the palladium of the Sinhala kingdom since the twelfth century, makes it probable that the custodian of that sacred object of worship and political power must, naturally, be regarded as the "Great Officer" or the officer for the whole Island, the Divanilame.

The material available is so scanty that no clear picture of the evolution of the office of the Diyavaḍana-nilame can easily be traced. At times there had been more than one Diyavaḍana-nilame functioning in the court of the king. An analysis of the various duties attached to the office of the Diyavaḍana-nilame indicates that the Diyavaḍana-nilames attending to the royal baths (*ulpäṅge*) and associated with the Saluvaḍana nilames (officers incharge of the royal wardrobe) were different from the Diyavaḍana-nilame (= Divanilame) who was the custodian of the Tooth-Relic. In a list of Kandyan headmen compiled by John Doyle and James Gay in 1817, i.e. after the fall of the Kandyan kingdom. there are three posts of Diyavaḍana nilames viz:—

Mahā Diyavaḍana-nilame, Pallevahala Diyavaḍana-nilame and the Diyavaḍana-nilame of the Great Temple– Daladā Māligāva. From this record it is clear that the three Diyavaḍana-nilames had distinct functions. From the context it appears that Mahā Diyavaḍana-nilame was incharge of the king's bath etc., while the Pallevahala Diyavaḍana-nilame was incharge of the queen's bath etc. and the Diyavaḍana-nilame of the Great Temple—Daladā Māligāva (i.e. the Diva-nilame) was in charge of the duties attached to the Tooth-Relic. When the last Nayakkar king was deposed in 1815, the two posts of Diyavaḍana-nilame (Māha-and Pallevahala) attached to the royal palace became redundant and fell into oblivion, and the office of the Diva-or Divi-nilame remained functioning as it was attached to the Tooth-Relic and thereby to the Daladā Māligāva. But the original meaning of the Diva-nilame having been confused during the Kandyan period and soon thereafter, the office of the Diyavaḍana-nilame was revived and continued to function in place of the Diva-nilame.[1]

There are no records available relating to the office of the Diyavaḍana-nilame, i.e. the Diva-nilame, before the advent of the Portuguese in Sri Lanka. During the latter part of the Kotte period Hiripiṭiye-nilame was the custodian of the Tooth-Relic. Legend has it, that he knew about the misfortune that would befall the Tooth-Relic from the invaders and, therefore, removed the Tooth-Relic from Kotte to Māligatenna and handed it over to king Māyādunne of Sītāvaka who housed the Relic in Delgamu vihāra in Kuruwita. This shows that the primary duty of the Diva-nilame was to see to the safety of the Tooth-Relic. From Delgamu vihāra the Tooth-Relic was brought to Kandy and housed in a two-storeyed building by king Vimaladharmasūriya I (Koṭagama Vaciśsara, *Saraṇaṅkara saṅgharāja samaya* (in Sinhala), Colombo, 1960, p. 33). In 1815 when the British forces invaded Kandy the Tooth-Relic was removed to Piṭigala for safety. John D'Oyly records that on 14th April 1815, Kapuwatte 2nd Adigar and Māligāve diyavaḍana-nilame i.e. the Diva-nilame set off early to Piṭigala to conduct the *daḷadāvahanse* (the Sacred Tooth-Relic) to Kandy. From subsequent events it is clear that Britishers also treated the Tooth-Relic as the palladium of the Sinhala kingdom, for they also placed guards to protect the Tooth-Relic (H. W. Codrington ed. *Diary of Mr. John D'Oyly*, Colombo, 1917, p. 251)

The Diyavaḍana-nilame was considered to be the principal lay custodian of the Tooth-Relic. But with the change of power in 1815 the custodianship of the Tooth-Relic passed to the hands of the Britishers. In 1847 the Tooth-Relic and the Māligāva property were handed over to the Mahānāyaka theras of Asgiriya and Malwatta Chapters and to the Diva-nilame (who represented the chiefs). With this change of the custodianship, the Colonial Secretary made several changes in the mode of election of the Diyavaḍana-nilame and his powers. For the smooth functioning of the Daladā Māligāva and for the safety of the Māligāva property the two Mahānāyakas and the Diyavaḍana-nilame were held responsible. Now the Diyavaḍana-nilame is one among the three custodians who are responsible for the safety of the Tooth-Relic i.e., his responsbility is shared by two others from the clergy. The key to the outer iron railing that has been placed around the relic chamber is in the possession of the Diyavaḍana-nilame i.e. the Diva-nilame. The two keys of the gold caskets that contain the Tooth-Relic are in the possession of the two Mahānāyaka theras of the Asgiriya and Malwatta Chapters.

It has been generally believed that the Diyavaḍana-nilame's function has connection with the offer of water to the Tooth Relic[2]. But this duty is not performed by him, for all offerings to the Tooth Relic are made by monks who are specially selected for this service. The pot of water that is to be used by monks attending the *tevāva* (ritual) is brought by a subordinate officer and handed over to the monks

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1 In the D'Oyly's diary the office of the Diyavaḍana-nilame and Māligave Diyavaḍana-nilame has been used indiscriminately to designate the custodian of the Tooth-Relic. In some correspondence between the Government Agent, Kandy, and the Colonial Secretary regarding the election of Diyavaḍana-nilame in 1853, the post is mentioned at several places as Diyavaḍana-nilame, Diva-nilame and Deva-nilame. The last mentioned designation—Deva-nilame would, easily, have connected the Diyavaḍana-nilame with the functions of the devales which abound around the Temple of the Tooth. (Colonial Secretary's letter to the G.A., Kandy, No. 152 of the 7th April 1853).

2 Hsüan-tsang records that "the king three times a day washes the Tooth of The Buddha with perfumed water, sometimes with powdered perfumes" (Beal, trsl. *Buddhist Records of the Western World*) *Chinese Accounts of India*, Vol. IV, p. 443). The *Daḷadāsirita* also records the preparation of unguents to be used for the Tooth-Relic, although it does not mention 'a bathing of the Tooth-Relic' (*Daladāsirita*, p. 51).

attending on the service to the Tooth Relic. Naturally, the question then arises as to how and why an officer who has no connection with offering or presenting of water (Sin. *diyavaḍana*) is called the Diyavaḍana-nilame? The plausible explanation is that it is a title that came to be used in place of *Divi* or *Diva nilame* on the analogy of *Batvaḍana, Saluvaḍana* and other nilames who were officials attached to the functions of the king. To suppose that the Diyavaḍana-nilame who was the royal "bath attendant" was also the custodian of the Tooth Relic is not in keeping with the Buddhist tradition.

To-day the office of the Diyavaḍana-nilame is regulated by the *Buddhist Temporalities Ordinance*. He is the chief lay officer of the Temple of the Tooth and his duties are attached more to the temporalities of the Temple of The Tooth than to the custodianship of the Daladā. He is allowed to enter the *sanctum sanctorum* of the Daladā only if he is ceremonially dressed in the traditional costume of nilame. Under certain circumstances which are considered unholy or ritually impure such as being under a taboo because of a death he is not allowed even to touch the casket of the relic. The Diyavaḍana-nilame is charged with the duty of seeing to the proper conduct of traditional rites and ceremonies of the Daladā Māligāva. He, in consultation with the Mahānāyaka theras of the Asgiriya and Malwatta Chapters, appoints the date for the holding of the exhibition of the Tooth-Relic and the annual festival. He is the chief administrative officer of the temporalities of the Temple of the Tooth. He prepares the annual budget of the Temple of the Tooth and submits it to the Public Trustee for his approval. He has power to lease land and other property belonging to the Temple and thereby raise funds for the benefit of the Daladā Māligāva. He has power to utilise Māligāva funds to repair and restore Māligāva buildings. He is fully responsible to the Public Trustee for the smooth functioning of the Daladā Māligāva. The Public Trustee exercises supervisory power over the Diyavaḍana-nilame. The Diyavaḍana-nilame has power to appoint and dismiss petty officers in the Māligāva service. He decides disputes that arise among his subordinates. He has power to employ the servants in the Māligāva service for organising the annual perahera. The occupants of the *Māligāgam* (villages dedicated to the Temple of the Tooth—there are ten such villages), are the tenants of the Diyavaḍana-nilame and they serve, each according to his caste, to maintain the elaborate daily ritual as well as the periodical ceremonies connected with the Tooth-Relic (Devaraja, L. S., *The Kandyan Kingdom*, 1707-1760, Colombo, p. 144). He decides the route of the perahera and the Diyavaḍana-nilame also should participate in the perahera on certain days. In all his duties as chief administrative officer he is assisted by Kāriya-korāla who is his immediate subordinate. Diyavaḍana-nilame's orders and instructions are carried out by Kāriya-korālas. After conducting the annual perahera it is customary for the Diyavaḍana-nilame, along with the Basnāyaka-nilames of the four devala's to proceed to Queen's House (i.e. the official residence of the Head of State) and report to the Head of the State that the annual perahera has been properly conducted according to tradition. As the lay custodian of the Tooth-Relic the Diyavaḍana-nilame is the chief of all Basnāyaka-nilames. But he has no authority over them.

After the occupation by the British legislation has been passed since 1842 affecting the traditional mode of election of the Diyavaḍana-nilame. A modern historian says: "the diyavaḍana-nilame, a *raḍala* and always an important official in the court.... The appointment of diyavaḍana-nilame was sometimes made by the king as a reward for exceptional loyalty. (Devaraja, L. S. op. cit., pp. 143-44). But this position has been drastically changed by the colonical rule and by subsequent legislation. In 1853 the colonial secretary laid down a rule for the election of the Diyavaḍana-nilame. According to this rule only the local chiefs i.e. the Raṭemahattayās and the Basnāyaka-nilames of the Kandyan district numbering only twenty-two were allowed to have a voice in the election of the Diyavaḍana-nilame. Thus, the principal priests were shut out. There was agitation to allow the principal priests and other experienced headmen of the Kandyan Districts also to have a say in the election. This was to facilitate the popular acceptance of the Diyavaḍana-nilame who is charged with the duty of proper conduct of traditional worship and, consequently a Kandyan Chief was invariably elected the Diyavaḍana-nilame.

The office of the Diyavaḍana-nilame is a much coveted post not so much for the pecuniary benefits but for the prestige that is attached to it. As already discussed, he was originally appointed for life by the king himself and was his favourite. He was the custodian of the Tooth-Relic—most sacred object of worship of the Buddhists. Now the *Buddhist Temporalities Ordinance* recognises the Diyavaḍana-nilame as the Trustee of the Daladā-maligāva and curtails his period of office and his powers. This piece of colonial legislation has eroded into the

prestige and derogated the office of the Diyavaḍana-nilame (*Buddhist Temporalities Ordinance*, s. 7; 47, etc.).

M. KR.

DOCETISM. This term denotes the theory that the Buddha had no real material body and human nature, but only an apparent body, a phantaśm of humanity. Accordingly, his acceptance of the ordinary laws that govern human life, viz., his birth, his life and death etc., are considered as so many illusions, mere make-believe acts.

The Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins emphasised the human character of the Buddha. It was the Vaitulyakas who originated a docetic theory with regard to the nature of the Buddha. In fact, the Theravādins did refute this docetic theory of the Vaitulyakas in the *Kathāvatthu* (pp. 559 ff.; *Points of Controversy*, p. 323 ff.).

The theory is best known in the *Mahāvastu* which expressly claims to be drawn from the *Vinaya* of the Lokottaravādins, a branch of the Mahāsaṅghikas; "Nothing in the fully enlightened Buddha is comparable to anything in the world; everything connected with him is supramundane" (*lokottara : Mhvu.* I-159). "When a Buddha is born from the side of his mother, she is not injured, for he has a mind-formed body He is, however, not really born from a mother and father at all, but arises as an apparitional being by the force of his own qualities" (ibid. I, p. 145) "He is above all human needs and weaknesses. His body has no limits and knows no fatigue" (ibid. I, 158). "He eats, drinks and takes medicines in illness, only in order to conform to the ways of the world (*lokānuvartana*) as he is really not subject to hunger thirst, disease or any human needs and infirmities. His body is not formed by the physical union of his parents, and he is born as a child merely in order to act like ordinary human beings" (ibid. I, p. 167).

The *Lalitavistara* and the *Divyāvadāna*, too, contain docetic views which say that the Buddha acts like a human being in order to conform to the custom of the world (*Lal.* pp. 83, 93-4). "He does not sleep or dream. He replies to all questions immediately and spontaneously without the necessity of thinking over the matter even for a moment. Every word uttered by a Buddha has deep spiritual significance and is intended for the edification of the people. His speech is always rational and perfect and is understood by the hearers. He is always in a state of profound concentration (*Divy.* pp 48 ff.; 128, 203 ff.).

We find these tendencies at work before the period at which Mahāyāna can be called a separate system. Though the Buddha is described as a super human being, even in the Pali Canon, it is nevertheless the enlightenment (*bodhi*) which first makes him a superman; and finally he passes away (*nibbāyati, parinibbāyati*) leaving behind him only his doctrine and, at all events, his relics, as objects of worship. The Lokottaravādins, who were still adherents of the Hīnayāna, went further and regarded the Buddhas not as men, but as supernatural beings who descend to earth for a certain period in order to partake of all human experiences. This tendency found its fullest development in the Mahāyāna schools which developed the theological conception of the three bodies (*trikāya*) of the Buddha : (1) the *Dharmakāya*, the cosmic spiritual body is the essential nature of the Buddha as well as the universe; it is the absolute Reality; (2) *Sambhogakāya*, the body of bliss, is the concrete manifestation to the bodhisattvas the power and splendour of divinity; and (3) *Nirmāṇakāya*, an assumed body. In furtherance of the great resolve to succour all beings, the Buddha incarnates himself, from time to time, in forms best calculated to achieve this end. This incarnation is named *Nirmāṇakāya*. The *Dharmakāya* being the ultimate reality of the world; it cannot reveal the truth to the world, because it is itself the truth. For the revelation of the truth, an adequate and proper medium is necessary. That medium is the *Nirmāṇakaya* which is an emanation of the *Dharmakāya*. See further BUDDHOLOGY.

UPALI KARUNARATNA

DŌGEN (1200 A.C.-1253 A.C.), also called Shōyō Daishi, introduced the Sōto school of Zen Buddhism to Japan.

Dōgen, the son of Kuga Michichika who held the post of Naidaijin, was initiated into Zen Buddhism by a disciple of Yeisai. Later, in 1223 A.C. he went to China and studied further under Nyojo of Mount Tien-tung. After his return to Japan in 1228 A.C., for sometime, he resided at the Kenninji temple and later went into residence at Annoyin temple in Kyōto. In his last years he moved into Echizen and founded the Echeiji temple which, even at present, is the headquarters of the Sōto School of Zen.

Dogen was honoured and held in high esteem by his followers as an embodiment of the lofty principles of Zen training and discipline. He preferred solitude and meditation to constant travel and high company. His endeavour was to form small bands of sincere and zealous disciples.

In 1250 A.C. Emperor Go Saga conferred on him the title Buppo-Lenji and also presented him with a special robe as a mark of honour. In 1880 the title Shōyō Daishi was conferred on him posthumously. See JAPAN, ZEN.

S.K.N.

DOGMATISM. Dogmatism may be defined generally as a positive assertion of opinion, held to be true and irrefutable, with an unwillingness to modify or give up the opinion even when reasonable counter-evidence is brought against it. There are many related usages in English such as dogma, dogmatist, dogmatical etc., out of which the term "dogma" may be considered as primary and the others as usages derived from it. The English word dogma is a transliteration of a Greek word which means "that which seems good". The term in its original meaning has been used commendatorily. Greek authors applied it to the decrees of public authorities and to tenets of various philosophical schools. Plato used "dogma" in the Laws (887E – 888D) to mean a correct belief about the gods. In English the term "dogma" is used in the sense of a tenet or doctrine authoritatively laid down by a particular church, sect or school of thought. In a religious context and especially within the context of traditional Christian theology the term has been used to mean a body of opinion, formulated or authoritatively stated, a systematized belief or doctrinal system. In the context of Christian theology dogma is essentially the formulation of belief on the basis of the scriptures. The role of dogma, within traditional Christianity is considered to be the expression of the meaning of God's revelation in conceptual terms. Dogmatic definitions are supposed to express the truth with infallible accuracy and are in this sense believed to be unalterable.

The term "dogma" is also used in a condemnatory sense to mean an imperious or arrogant declaration of opinion. "Dogmatic" may also be explained as proceeding upon *a priori* principles accepted as true instead of being founded upon experience or induction. A system of philosophy based upon principles dictated by reasoning alone and not relying upon experience, and more generally, a way of thinking based upon principles which have not been tested by reflection or experience may, be called "dogmatism".

There is considerable evidence in the Buddhist tradition, especially in the stratum of literature represented by the Pali canonical scriptures that the concept of a dogma and the attitude referred to as dogmatism was very familiar to it. The Buddhist use of the terms *diṭṭhi* and *diṭṭhivāda* correspond very closely to the use of the term "dogma" in the English language. Pali Buddhist literature also talks about the attitude signified by the English term "dogmatism" by using such terms as "*upādāna*", "*abhinivesa*", "*ajjhosāna*" along with the term "*diṭṭhi*". The expression "*thāmasā parāmussa abhinivissa voharati*" which may be rendered as "speaks holding firmly and clinging dogmatically", occurs in the Pali *suttas* in contexts in which there is mention of the acceptance or assertion of philosophical tenets or religious doctrines (*diṭṭhi*) which are dogmatically held. Buddhism uses the term *diṭṭhi* and other terms and expressions which correspond to the English terms "dogma" and "dogmatism" more often in a condemnatory sense. In certain instances the Pali *suttas* use the term "*diṭṭhi*" with the prefixes *sammā* or *micchā* to make the distinction between *sammādiṭṭhi* (right view) and *micchādiṭṭhi* (wrong view).

The Pali term "*diṭṭhi*" and Sanskrit "*dṛṣṭi*" are both derived from the root *dṛś* "to see". The Pali Text Society dictionary gives the meanings, view, belief, dogma, theory and speculation to this term. The Buddha is often represented in the Pali *suttas* stating and classifying the numerous philosophical tenets or dogmas that were prevalent during his time. These dogmas are said to have been held by the two main groups who were engaged in a religious and philosophical quest, the recluses (*samaṇā*) and Brahmans (*brāhmaṇā*). In the *Brahmajāla Sutta* of the *Dīghanikāya* the Buddha enumerates sixty-two philosophical tenets along with the grounds on which they were held and claims that his teaching cannot be categorized under any of these dogmas. While expressing disagreement with the specific philosophical conclusion adopted by the proponents of these doctrines, the Buddha was particularly critical of the dogmatic stance that they adopted with respect to their philosophical tenets. Each proponent of a theory about the nature and destiny of man and the universe is said to have claimed that his theory alone was true and all other theories false (*idam eva saccaṃ mogham aññaṃ*). This dogmatic

attitude prevailed in the midst of a host of mutually contradictory theories. The consequence, as noted in the Buddhist canonical scriptures, was intense bitterness and conflict among those who held firmly to their own respective dogmas.

The Buddha identified as one group of dogmatists, the orthodox Brahmans who relied on the three *Vedas* as the supreme source of truth. They are referred to in the Pali canon as *anussavikā* (revelationists) because they believed that truth had been revealed by Brahmā himself and that it had been handed down in an authoritative tradition. In the *Cāṅkī Sutta* (*M.* II, p. 169) a Brahman youth named Kāpaṭhika is represented as expressing the dogmatic stance of the Brahmans with regard to the authority of the ancient Vedic scriptural tradition in putting the following question to the Buddha :

> Good Gotama, with regard to the ancient Mantras of the brahmans handed down traditionally in the scriptures the brahmans come absolutely to the conclusion that this alone is true and all else is false. What does good Gotama say about this?

Another group of dogmatists mentioned in the Pali canon are those who used logic and reason to formulate their philosophical systems. The *Brahmajāla Sutta* states that logic or reason was one ground on which some of the philosophical theses mentioned in it were based. The *suttas* of the *Aṭṭhakavagga* of the *Suttanipāta* mention how reason was used in enthusiastically defending one's own thesis and rejecting the theses of others. According to the *Brahmajāla Sutta* some dogmatic theses were based on meditative experiences erroneously grasped as giving a complete picture of the nature of reality. It shows that the process of theorizing that ends in the formulation of dogmas does not always depend on *a priori* reasoning alone, but that many of the views mentioned had a basis in what was conceived as higher meditative experience.

One of the dogmas of pre-Buddhist thought which according to Buddhism was looked upon as the root of all dogmas and speculative views was the personality view (*sakkāyadiṭṭhi*). It is recognized among the four types of clinging (*upādāna*) as clinging to the theory of self (*attavāda upādāna*). The first point of entry in the Buddhist path of spiritual progress (i.e. the attainment of the stage of *sotāpanna*) requires the elimination of this dogma. Buddhism recognizes a universal tendency to establish and maintain within the empirical personality, some permanent basis of selfhood or individual substratum. This is the source of affirming the presence of an enduring and abiding self in the psychophysical organism. This gives rise to the dogmatic clinging to one or the other of the diverse views enumerated in the *Brahmajāla Sutta*. That *sakkāyadiṭṭhi* is, from the Buddhist standpoint, the root of all clinging to dogmatic views is explicitly stated in the *Saṃyuttanikāya* thus :

> Now, householder, as to those diverse views that arise in the world....and as to these sixty-two views set forth in the *Brahmajāla*, it is owing to the personality view that they arise, and if there is no personality view, they do not arise.[1]

However, the Buddhist exhortation to discard the dogma of the self does not in any way imply that a dogma of "no-self" should take its place. Just as much as the view that there is a self is a wrong view consequent upon wrong reflection, so is the view that there is no self, if it is asserted with the same dogmatic attitude. So the *Sabbāsava Sutta* says :

> To a person who thus reflects wrongly, one of six views arise : To him arises the view, "I have a self" as true and certain, or to him arises the views "I have no self" as true and certain....[2]

The Buddha identified two philosophical dogmas, widely held by those with a speculative bent of mind, which, according to him, were two extreme views about the nature of reality. They are called (1) the dogma of eternalism (*sassataditthi*) and (2) the dogma of annihilationism (*ucchedaditthi*). The Pali canonical texts also enumerate ten philosophical theses which are said to have been hotly debated by the

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1 *Yānimāni dvāsaṭṭhiditthigatāni Brahmajāle bhaṇitāni imā kho gahapati ditthiyo sakkāyaditthiyā sati honti sakkāyaditthiyā asati na honti.* (*S.* IV, p. 287).

2 *Tassa evam ayoniso manasikaroto channaṃ diṭṭhīnaṃ aññatarā diṭṭhi uppajjati : Atthi me attāti vā'ssa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati, natthi me attāti vā'ssa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati . . .* (*M.* 1, p. 8)

various philosophical schools in the time of the Buddha. The Buddha calls them questions that he finds fit to be left aside (*thapanīya*). They are also called "undetermined questions" (*avyākatāni*) because the Buddha thought that these questions ought to be left unanswered. The ten questions are :

1. Is the world eternal?
2. Is the world non-eternal?
3. Is the world finite?
4. Is the world infinite?
5. Are life and body identical?
6. Are life and body different?
7. Does the perfected person exist after death?
8. Does the perfected person not exist after death?
9. Is it the case that the perfected person both exists and does not exist after death?
10. Is it the case that the perfected person neither exists nor does not exist after death? (*M.* I, p. 426 f.; *D.* I, p. 190 f.).

The dogmatic attitude of those who committed themselves to a particular stand on these questions is described in the *suttas* and the Buddhist disapproval of such an attitude is expressed as follows:

"The world is eternal" is . . . a dogma, it is a thicket of views, it is a desert of views, a puppet-show of views, a convulsion of views, a fetter of views (*M.* I, p. 485 f.).

According to the Buddha, clinging to any of these views dogmatically, is harmful to spiritual progress. The questions themselves are metaphysical ones and there is no conceivable way of checking the truth or falsity of a solution to them. The result is perpetual conflict among those who hold mutually contradictory positions. The Buddha saw no practical advantage at all in holding such opinions. According to the Buddha, they do not conduce to turning away from sense pleasures, to dispassion, to the cessation (of ill), to tranquillity, to higher knowledge, to enlightenment and to *Nibbāna* (*M.* I, p. 431 f.).

Not only do they not conduce to any practical spiritual upliftment of the individual, but also operate as a hindrance to a person's spiritual progress. The real *muni* (sage) does not take sides in the controversies pertaining to these dogmas. He is therefore said to be free from any mental obstruction.[3] It is always not the unprejudiced interest in the search for truth that impells people to hold certain philosophical opinions. The intentions of those who defend dogmatic positions could sometimes be malicious.[4] The opinions themselves could be the product of personal inclinations, likes, dislikes and interests. Clinging to dogmas becomes all the more tenacious because it is an expression of ones prejudices. According to the Buddha, when a person is led by impelling desire, and grasps a view depending on his inclination he finds it difficult to discard it.[5] One clings to such a view because one sees personal advantage in doing so.[6] According to the Buddha dogmas which are very enthusiastically defended are merely rationalizations of desires, inclinations, propensities, likes and dislikes.

Dogmatism inevitably engenders disputes. According to the *Paramaṭṭhaka Sutta*, a person who entertains a dogmatic view takes his own view as the most perfect and disparages the views of others.[7] The *Cūlaviyūha Sutta* states the imperious and arrogant manner in which dogmatists assert their own doctrinal positions :

> Those who cling to their own views alone, come into dispute with others, each claiming expertise for himself saying : "One who understands this knows the truth; whoever rejects this is imperfect."[8]

3 *Vādañ ca jātam muni no upeti — tasmā muni natthi khilo kuhiñci* (*Sn.* v. 780).
4 *Vadanti ve duṭṭhamanā pi eke* (*Sn.* v. 780).
5 *Sakaṃ hi diṭṭhiṃ katham accayeyya–*
Chandānunīto ruciyā niviṭṭho (*Sn.* v. 781).
6 *Yadattani so passati ānisaṃsaṃ* (*Sn.* v. 784).
7 *Paraman ti diṭṭhīsu paribbāsāno — yad uttariṃ kurute jantu loke*
hīnāti aññe tato sabbam āha (*Sn.* v. 796).
8 *Sakaṃ sakaṃ diṭṭhi paribbosānā–*
viggayha nānā kusalā vadanti
Yo evaṃ jānāti sa vedi dhammaṃ
idaṃ paṭikkosam akevalī so (*Sn.* v. 878).

The *Pasūra Sutta* mentions of public debates at which dogmatists attempted to argue in defence of their own views intent on emerging victorious :

> They who love debates enter a gathering and engage in contentious debates calling each other fools. They seek praise calling themselves experts.[9]

From the Buddhist point of view such controversy generates exactly the states of mind which hinder spiritual development. These disputes are not conducive to the mental calm and tranquillity necessary to see things in the proper perspective. One becomes depressed when one is defeated in debate. When one fails to defeat the arguments of others one becomes enraged.[10] Elation and depression are the two-fold result of disputation based on dogmatic views, and both these psychological conditions are harmful to spiritual progress. According to the Buddha, the elation in a person who emerges victorious in debate itself becomes the ground of his spiritual downfall. For it is nothing but an expression of his pride and arrogance.[11] Dogmatism leads to intolerance and fanaticism. Therefore the dogmatist is incapable of being free from conflict and the associated evils.

Buddhism considered dogmatism as an expression of a natural, deep-rooted, innate, proclivity of the human mind. The proclivity to cling to a view is mentioned as one of the dormant tendencies (*anusaya*) of the mind. *Diṭṭhānusaya* (dormant tendency to cling to views) is on equal footing with other dormant tendencies like *rāgānusaya* (dormant tendency to be lustful) and *paṭighānusaya* (dormant tendency to be hateful). Dogmatism is a by-product of *moha* (delusion or confusion), one of the three roots of evil or unskill. It is an unskilled state of mind that has to be eradicated for the attainment of the ultimate goal of Buddhism. Clinging to dogma is also mentioned among the four types of clinging which are produced by craving (*diṭṭhupādāna*). It is sometimes referred to as a passion, equally strong as the passion for sensuous things. Dogmatists who come into conflict, clinging to their own dogmas are said to be deeply and passionately attached to their own views (*sandiṭṭhirāgena hi te'bhirattā*). Dogmatism is also referred to as an intoxicant (*āsava*), which has to be eradicated to attain arahantship.

The Buddha points out that even if a person gives up his view he does so by grasping another.[12] He is like a monkey who lets go one branch only to cling to another.[13] This is so because of the deep-rooted nature of the human proclivity to dogmatism.

Dogmatism, according to Buddhism, is a mark of imperfection. The person with spiritual excellence does not hold on to mentally constructed views.[14] The perfected person in Buddhism is described in the following terms :

> They do not speculate, they do not esteem any views and say "This is the highest purity". They release the knot of dogmatic clinging and do not long for anything in the world.[15]

The *Māgandhiya Sutta* of the *Suttanipāta*, describing the liberation of the Buddha says :

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9 *Te vādakāmā parisaṃ vigayha*
bālaṃ dahanti mithu aññamaññaṃ
.....
pasaṃsa kāmā kusalā vadānā (*Sn. v.* 825).

10 *Yutto kathāyaṃ parisāya majjhe*
pasaṃsam icchaṃ vinighāti hoti
apāhatasmiṃ pana mañku hoti
nindāya so kuppati randham esī (*Sn. v.* 826).

11 *Yā unnati sā'ssa vighātabhūmi*
mānātimāncaṃ vadate pan'eso (*Sn. v.* 830).

12 *Nirassati ādiyaticca dhammaṃ* (*Sn. v.* 785).

13 *Te uggahīyanti nirassajanti*
kapīva sākhaṃ pamukhaṃ gahāya (*Sn. v.* 791).

14 *Dhonassa hi natthi kuhiñci loke*
Pakappitā diṭṭhi bhavābhavesu (*Sn. v.* 786).

15 *Na kappayanti na purekkharonti*
Accantasuddhīti na te vadanti
ādānagantha ṃ gathitaṃ visajja
āsaṃ na kubbanti kuhiñci loke (*Sn. v.* 794).

> To him who is free from attachment to ideas there are no ties. To him who is freed through wisdom there are no delusions. Those who grasp ideas and dogmas, wander about coming into conflict in the world.[16]

The liberation of the Buddhist saint is not merely a liberation from the sensuous things of the world but also from ideology, clinging to which leads inevitably to conflict.

> The Brāhmaṇa (noble one) having learnt of diverse theories that have arisen among others, is indifferent to them, whilst others embrace them.
>
> The sage freeing himself from worldly ties, does not take sides in controversies that arise. He is peaceful among those who are restless. He remains equanimous without embracing views while others embrace them.[17]

In the *Dīghanakha Sutta* of the *Majjhimanikāya* there is mention of three types of attitude to views said to have been held by recluses and brahmans :

(1) I agree with every view (*sabbaṃ me khamati*)
(2) I agree with no view (*sabbaṃ me nakkhamati*)
(3) I agree with some views and disagree with others (*ekaccaṃ me khamati ekaccaṃ me na khamati*)

The Buddha praises the second point of view as tending towards dispassion, lack of bondage, excitement, dogmatism and clinging (*asārāgāya santike asaṃyogāya . . . anabhinandanāya . . . anajjhosānāya . . . anupadānāya santike*), whereas the first and third views are not favoured because they have the opposite tendency. Dīghanakha who opened the discussion on the subject with the Buddha claimed to hold the second view and was gladened by the Buddha's remark that the second position is praiseworthy. Those who took the second position were understood as those who did not commit themselves to any view. But the Buddha hastens to point out that Dīghanakha's position could itself become a dogma. For if one dogmatically holds the view "I agree with no view" it can have the same consequence as taking any other dogmatic position. Therefore, with respect to all three types of views mentioned in the *Dīghanakha Sutta*, if one firmly holds, and dogmatically asserts, that any one of these theories is correct and the others false, (*Imaṃ diṭṭhiṃ thāmasā parāmassa abhinivissa vohareyyaṃ idam eva saccaṃ mogham aññanti*) one is likely to engage in contentious debate (*D.* I, p. 499). As in the *Aṭṭhakavagga* of the *Suttanipāta*, here too, the Buddha sees the result of debate as dispute (*vivādo*) vexation (*vighāto*) and worry (*vihesā*). The Buddha's advice is to eliminate dogmatism altogether and to cultivate an attitude of equanimity and indifference towards all views.

Although Buddhism considers the dogmatic grasping of *diṭṭhi* as a hindrance to spiritual progress, it recommends *sammādiṭṭhi* (right view) as the first step in its eightfold path. *Sammādiṭṭhi* is contrasted with *micchādiṭṭhi* (wrong view). The first category of *micchādiṭṭhi* recognized in Buddhism consists of those theories which have certain specific harmful consequences. As enumerated in the Pali canonical *suttas*, they include a nihilistic world view involving the rejection of the reality of this world, the world beyond, and moral values such as caring for parents, the karmic efficacy of good and bad conduct, and the fruitfulness of leading a religious life. Secondly, there are the speculative views such as those enumerated in the *Brahmajāla Sutta* which are referred to as *diṭṭhigata*. The third is the most basic and universal wrong view referred to as *sakkāyadiṭṭhi*.

According to the *Sammādiṭṭhi Sutta* of the *Majjhimanikāya*, *Sammādiṭṭhi* involves the comprehension of (1) the distinction between good and bad and their bases (*kusala, akusala, kusalamūla, akusalamūla*) (2) the nutrients (*āhara*) of life along with their origin, cessation and the path to their cessation, (3) the four noble truths, and (4) the twelve factors

16 *Saññā virattassa na santi ganthā*
paññā vimuttassa na santi mohā
saññañ ca diṭṭhiñ ca ye aggahesuṃ
te ghaṭṭayantā vicaranti loke (*Sn.* v. 847).

17 *ñatvā ca so* (*brāhmaṇo*) *sammutiyo puthujjā*
upekkhati uggahananta - m - aññe
Visajja ganthāni munīdha loke
vivādajātassa na vaggasārī
Santo asantesu upekkhako so
anuggaho uggahananta - m - aññe (*Sn.* vv. 911–912).

of the law of causal genesis (*paticcasamuppāda*). In brief what Buddhism refers to as *sammādiṭṭhi* is its pragmatic ideology, the sole concern of which is the liberation of man from *dukkha* (unsatisfactoriness). It is claimed that this ideology avoids the two speculative extremes of the dogma of eternalism (*sassatavāda*) and the dogma of annihilationism (*ucchedavāda*). The Buddha explicitly exhorts his disciples not to cling even to this pragmatic ideology which he presents in the form of *sammādiṭṭhi*, for such clinging could itself be a hindrance to the attainment of the Buddhist goal.

In the *Alagaddūpama Sutta* of the *Majjhimanikāya* the Buddha exhorts his disciples not to learn the *dhamma* for the benefit of defending a dogma (*itivādapamokkhānisaṃsaṃ*) or for the benefit of disparaging, or finding fault with, others (*upārambhānisaṃsaṃ : M.* I, p. 133). The *dhamma* should be handled in the way a cobra should be, for if a cobra is grasped by its tail and not by its neck, it will turn round and harm the person who grasped it. According to the admonition of the Buddha, his *dhamma* should be studied and understood only for a specific practical purpose. Like clinging to any other dogma, clinging to the *dhamma* will have the same harmful consequences of feeding one's conceit, self-esteem and attachment and thereby engender conflict within one's self and in society. In the simile of the raft, the Buddha advises his disciples to treat the *dhamma* as a raft for the purpose of crossing over from a condition of suffering to a condition of non-suffering (*kullūpamaṃ vo dhammaṃ desessāmi nittharaṇatthāya no gahanatthāya*). Neither in the process of fulfilling the *dhamma's* purpose nor after fulfilling it should it be clung to as a dogma. Even the wholesome doctrines (*dhammā*) which the Buddha conceived to produce beneficial results are not to be grasped dogmatically. "How much more," the Buddha asks, "should one refrain from clinging dogmatically to wrong doctrines." (*ājānantehi dhammā pi pahātabbā; pageva adhammā : M.* I, p. 135).

It is in the light of this pragmatist approach of Buddhism that the Buddhist teachings in the *Aṭṭhakavagga* are to be understood. The *Aṭṭhakavagga* is undoubtedly a collection which contains the core teachings of Buddhism, which belonged to the earliest stratum of the Buddhist tradition. Most *suttas* included in the *Aṭṭhakavagga* lay repeated emphasis on the point that to present any thesis at all as an assertion of absolute truth is to display one's innate tendency to dogmatism. It is repeatedly described as a mark of spiritual immaturity. The noble one who has transcended the confines of narrow dogmas does not grasp anything as the absolute truth (*sīmātigo brāhmaṇo . . . tassīdha natthi paramuggahītaṃ : Sn. v.* 795). He has no dogma to defend, for it does not occur to him "I assert this" (*Sn. v.* 837). *Sammādiṭṭhi* in Buddhism is not intended to be the correct sixty-third view (*diṭṭhi*) opposed to the sixty-two wrong views that already existed. It should, therefore, according to the Buddha, not lead to dogmatism.

The noble ones confidently affirm the inward peace they have attained (*ajjhattasanti : ibid*). But they make no assertion characterizing the nature of absolute truth, for to make such an assertion is to fall within "Brahma's net" (*brahmajāla*). It is this inward peace that the Buddha maintains as the one truth realizing which people do not engage in debate (*ekaṃ hi saccaṃ na dutiyam atthi—yasmiṃ pajāno vivade pajānaṃ : Sn. v.* 884). The many and diverse truths asserted dogmatically by those who claim themselves to be experts (*kusalā vadānā*) are, according to the Buddha, invalid generalizations made on the basis of their own perceptions (*saññā*) coloured by their deep-rooted prejudices (*na heva saccāni bahūni nānā - aññatra saññāya niccāni loke : Sn. v.*886).

The Buddha's attitude towards dogmatism is also expressed in his critique of two principal sources of "knowledge" on which truth claims of some of his contemporaries were based. The Buddha did not favour an attitude of total reliance upon authority, whether it is the authority of a revealed tradition (*anussava*) or of a scriptural tradition (*piṭakasampadā*) or a venerated person (*samaṇo no garu : A.* p. 189). If such authoritative assertions conflict with what is in fact the case, which is ultimately a matter to be determined by inter-subjective experimental observation, those assertions should be rejected. The same applies to reason as well. For what is consistently reasoned out may also conflict with observable facts.

However, some scholars contend that the attitude recommended in Buddhism towards the teachings of the Buddha is one of uncritical acceptance. According to Kern, "Buddhism is . . . a superhuman (*uttarimanussa*) Law, founded upon the decrees of an omniscient and infallible Master."[18] Poussin says :

18 Quoted in K. N. Jayatilleke, *Eearly Bddhist Theory of Knowledge*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1963, pp. 376–377.

"Buddhism is a faith and a creed, a respectful and close adhesion to the word of the one Omniscient." (ibid. p. 378). Keith also appears to agree with Kern and Poussin on this matter.[19] Oldenberg, Rhys Davids and Radhakrishnan believe that Buddhism uncritically accepted the dogmas of the prevalent Brahmanical tradition. K. N. Jayatilleke disagrees with these scholars contending that their conclusions are a result of a lack of a historical perspective in interpreting the Buddhist teachings. He points out that the doctrines of rebirth and karma, were accepted in Buddhism not merely as an inheritance from the past tradition. According to him, Buddhism arose at a time when neither the acceptance of these theories was widespread nor when the theories were of great antiquity. Besides they were subject to question by influential materialist schools of thought and the elite or independent thinkers of the Buddha's time.

Some scholars have also argued that Buddhism is an authoritarian creed on the ground that the Buddha was considered to be omniscient. Jayatilleke points out that omniscience was not attributed to the Buddha in the early stratum of the Pali canonical literature. On the contrary, the Buddha is represented as disclaiming omniscience and explicitly claiming only three types of higher knowledge (*tevijjā*). The three types of higher knowing were not considered to be an exclusive possession of the Buddha. They were believed to have been acquired by numerous disciples of the Buddha, and excluding the third, *āsavakkhayañāṇa* (knowledge of the elimination of the intoxicants) the others were admitted to be attainable by anyone cultivating the meditative mind even outside the Buddhist fold.

Jayatilleke observes that within the canonical literature itself a later stratum is noticeable, according to which a wide gap is recognized between the knowledge of the Buddha and the knowledge of the arahant. In his opinion, the concept of a *paññā-vimutta* (one emancipated by intellectual knowledge alone) developed during this period. With this development the role of *saddhā* in Buddhism also changed. Jayatilleke says : "It is possible that this new conception of *saddhā* was accompanied by a dogmatism which condemned the free inquiry which the earlier attitude was based on and encouraged." (Jayatilleke, op. cit. p. 400).

K. N. Jayatilleke has good grounds to maintain that according to at least one stratum of the Pali canonical *suttas* the place assigned to faith in Buddhism is conspicuously different from that assigned to it in theistic religions. Dogmas in theistic religions are to be accepted with unquestioning faith. Although Buddhism recognizes the significance of faith in the sense of confidence in the efficacy of the teaching or confidence in the reliability of the teacher, dogmatic acceptance of anything as the sole truth merely on the basis of faith is not encouraged. According to the *Caṅkī Sutta*, if one has faith, it is reasonable for him to say "such is my faith" (*evaṃ me saddhā hoti*), but not to dogmatically conclude "this alone is the truth and everything else is false" (*idam eva saccaṃ mogham aññaṃ: M.* II, p. 171). In the *Vīmaṃsaka Sutta* the Buddha even welcomes his disciples to inquire into the genuineness of his claim to have become an enlightened and morally perfect being. He invites them to test him by observing his behaviour to find out whether his bodily conduct which can be visually observed and his verbal conduct which can be auditorily observed is of such a nature that he could be accused of having a greedy, hateful or deluded disposition (*M.* I, p. 317 f.). The standard Buddhist expression of this non-dogmatic attitude is found in the *Kālāma Sutta* of the *Aṅguttaranikāya* where the Buddha explicitly rejects authority and reason, in favour of experiential observation. The Buddha's advice is not to cling to a dogma, but to have the insight necessary for liberation (*diṭṭhiñ ca anupagamma sīlavā dassanena sampanno*).

It is evident that Buddhological speculation, of which some traces are to be found in the later stratum of the Pali canonical tradition itself and which progressively developed in later Buddhist literature of the Northern schools of Buddhism widened the gap between the knowledge of the Buddha and the attainment of the *arahat* until this gap became unbridgeable and the goal of arahantship itself was much depreciated. It is in this light that Keith's following quotation from *Ratnakūṭa*, presented as evidence for the conclusion that Buddhism is a faith and creed has to be understood :

> Here the Tathāgata alone is my witness, the Tathāgata knows, I do not know; boundless is the enlightenment of the Buddhas.[20]

19 A. B. Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy* Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies, Varanasi, India, 1963, p. 33 f.

20 Quoted by A. B. Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 36.

It is reasonable to conclude that Buddhism in its original form was not in favour of characterizing reality according to any absolutist description. According to the Buddha such characterizations of reality result only in promoting dogmatic attitudes resulting in ideological conflicts. The Buddhist statements about reality were determined essentially by a strong pragmatic concern. The principal concern of original Buddhism was the achievement of a specific result, namely, liberation from suffering. This is the reason for the repeated emphasis of the Buddha, that he lays down nothing but the existence of ill and its cessation (*dukkhañ c'āhaṃ paññāpemi dukkhassa ca nirodhaṃ*). It is important to note that this emphasis occurs particularly in instances where attempts were made to drag the Buddha to commitment to some absolutist position regarding the nature of reality. In consistency with this attitude the Buddha warned his disciples against taking his own teaching as a dogma. However, the dogmatic attitudes reflected within Buddhism itself may be accompaniments in the progressive development of Buddhology and religious ideology. Any doctrine which happens to be accepted by a community of adherents has the tendency to end up as a system of dogmas, and the history of Buddhism has shown that Buddhism has not been an exception to this.

P. D. PREMASIRI

DOMANASSA, generally rendered into English as distress, dejection, melancholy, grief, is one of the five types of feeling (*vedanā*, q.v.).

Domanassa is mental pain, (*cetasikaṃ dukkhaṃ*, *cetasikaṃ asātaṃ*, *S.V.*, p. 209; *Nd.* p. 312; cf. *D.* II, p. 306, *Nett.* p. 12) in contrast to physical pain (*kāyikaṃ dukkhaṃ kāyikaṃ asātaṃ*, *D.* II, p. 306; *M.* I, p. 302; *sārīrikā dukkhā vedanā* : *A.* II, p. 143). However the texts also note the connection between these two types of feelings in certain instances. Thus the *Peṭakopadesa* (pp. 118, 25) cites physical pain as a cause of mental pain, and conversely the *Visuddhimagga* (p. 504) points out how one undergoes physical pain as a result of mental pain.

The direct opposite of *domanassa* is *somanassa*, meaning mental happiness, gladness. The term *appaccaya* (=dissatisfaction) is synonymous with *domanassa* (*D.* I, p. 3; *DA.* I, p. 52).

In the *nikāyas* there is also the usage of *domanassa* in combination with *abhijjhā* (covetousness : *M.* I, p. 340; III, p. 2; *A.* II, p. 16). The well known *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* (*D.* II, p. 290; *M.* I, p. 55) speaks of getting rid of *abhijjhādomanassa*. Perhaps due to its combination with the term *abhijjhā* the term *domanassa* has acquired a sense somewhat different to its original meaning. The commentaries to the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* (*MA.* I, p. 244) equate *abhijjhā* with *kāmacchanda* (desire for sense pleasures) and *domanassa* with *vyāpāda* (ill-will). Emphasising this equation the commentaries say that by naming the two strongest constituents of the five mind defiling hindrances (*pañcanīvaraṇa*) this statement refers to the eradication of all the five hindrances. It is also seen that when coupled with *abhijjhā*, *domanassa* is often referred to as an evil, unwholesome state (of the mind, *pāpakā akusalā dhammā*, *M.* I, p. 180; *A.* II, p. 16).

It is apparent that this equation of *domanassa* with *vyāpāda* is possible only by a stretch of meaning. As the *Peṭakopadesa* (p. 251) points out, hatred (*dosa*) and ill-will (*vyāpāda*) arise from thoughts pertaining to *domanassa* (*domanassopavicāra*), and as such all these mental states are more correlated than being identical. Hatred and ill-will are not necessary corollaries of *domanassa* for, in some instances, there could be *domanassa* without these.

A more general explanation of the term *domanassa* is found in the *Majjhimanikāya* (III, 218). Therein it is pointed out that *domanassa* could arise from the failure to obtain desirable objects sought after by the senses or from recalling the previous enjoyment of such desirable objects which are no longer available. The *Visuddhimagga* (pp. 461, 504) quotes the *Majjhimanikāya* in its definition of *domanassa*. *Peṭakopadesa* (p. 118) points out the possibility of *domanassa* arising from bodily pain. *Mohavicchedani* (p. 11) corroborates the *Visuddhimagga* definition. From all these definitions it is seen that there is general agreement on the point that *domanassa* arises when one experiences an unpleasant feeling which is contrary to one's desires and expectations.

Repugnance (*paṭigha*) seems to be the general condition that arises in the mind when afflicted by *domanassa*. Due to *domanassa* the mind could become vexed, dejected, grieved or even crippled. Depending on the cause of *domanassa* and the consequent pondering over it (*Pet.* p. 251) a positive feeling of hatred and ill-will also could arise. In its intense form *domanassa* may manifest as a serious pathological condition of the mind (*mānasavyādhi* : *Vism.* p. 504).

Therefore, it is natural that *domanassa*, which gradually eats into the mind oppressing, sickening, and even completely crippling the mind, is denounced in the texts as evil (*pāpaka*) unwholesome (*akusala*, cf. *M.* I, p. 180; *A.* II, p. 16), and conducive to the increase of unwholesome qualities (*akusalā dhammā abhivaḍḍhanti : D.* II, p. 278), and as such should be got rid of (*vineyya : M.* I, p. 55; *D.* II, p. 290), and given up (*asevitabba : D.* II, p. 278).

The canonical texts tracing the origin of *domanassa* point out that it arises from lack of control over sense organs. As the means of overcoming it the texts lay down 'restraint of sense organs' (*indriyasaṃvara, D.* I, p. 70; *M.* I, p. 180). In the *Aṅguttara nikāya* (*A.* II, p. 16) this is referred to as the 'effort to restrain sense organs' or *saṃvara-padhāna*, the 'way to self-control' or *damā-paṭipadā* 'practice of restraint' (*A.* II, p. 152).

Besides this type of *domanassa* there is also another which the texts say 'should be practised' 'or made use of' (*sevitabba*) and which is described as being conducive to a decrease of unwholesome qualities. These two contrasting types appear to be the same as the two types of *domanassa* referred to in the *Majjhimanikāya* (III, p. 218) as 'that which is connected with the household life (*gehasita*) and 'that which is connected with renunciation (*nekkhammasita*). Whereas *gehasita-* or *asevitabba-domanassa* arises from the failure to obtain desirable sense objects, *nekkhammasita-* or *sevitabba-domanassa* arises from the desire (*piha*) to attain deliverance. When one sees the true nature of things one becomes able to give up the desire for sense objects and develop a desire to attain emancipation. Due to the delay in attaining emancipation the desire, which is almost an intense feeling of longing, produces pain of mind (*domanassa*). *Cūḷavedalla Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 304) points out that a tendency to repugnance (*paṭigha*) is latent in all painful feelings (*sabbāya dukkhāya vedanāya paṭighānusayo anuseti*). This latent feeling of repugnance should be got rid of, as the texts say, by *domanassa* itself (loc. cit.). The commentary (*MA.* II, p. 369) explains also how this type of *domanassa* could be used as a means to develop effort needed to attain emancipation. But this does not mean that *nekkhammasita domanassa* is a *sine qua non* for emancipation. The suggestion here is that *domanassa*, too, could be consciously made use of to attain one's goal, making it the basis of disinterestedness and detachment.

S.K.N.

DONG-DUONG, an ancient Buddhist monastic site in South Vietnam, where once stood a famous Buddhist *vihāra*.

The *vihāra* at Dong-Duong was built in the 9th century when a major part of Vietnam was under the royal house of Cham kings. Although the *vihāra* itself was erected in the 9th century A.C., there are other discoveries at Dong-Duong which antidate further the existence of Buddhism in this part of Indo-China.

The most important of these finds, is an elegantly carved half life-size bronze image of the Buddha. It depicts features very much similar to early Sinhalese and Amarāvatī types so that one could easily pronounce the importation of cult images of the Buddha from either of these early Buddhist cultural centres to places like Dong-Duong in Vietnam, in the easternmost part of south Asia.

Another is a carved frieze of the famous "Gaja-lakṣmī" motif common to early Buddhist art. (J. Boisselier, *La Statuaine Du Champa*, Paris, 1963). This frieze had once served as a tympanum of a sanctuary entrance. Although the motif is undoubtedly early Indian, yet in the Dong-Duong find, the expressions of Cham artistic features are quite conspicuous by the everted lips, jutting eye-brows, flattened nose and the rigid bulky limbs.

The fame of Dong-Duong as a great centre of Buddhism would have spread with the founding of the famous *vihāra* by king Jaya Indravarman II in the year 875 A.C.[1] King Jaya Indravarman has named his beautiful edifice '*Lakṣmīndralokeśvara*'[2] probably to associate his own name with the Lokeśvara concept as in the Khmer and Śailendra edifices,

1 Dietrich Seckel, *The Art of Buddhism*, Methuen, London, 1964, p. 55; R. C. Majumdar, *Hindu Colonies in the Far-East*, Calcutta, 1963.

2 There are also others who do believe that the name "*Lakṣmīndralokeśvara*" consists of two Hindu elements (Lakṣmī and one Buddhist element—Lokeśvara—and that this was a clear indication of syncretism prevailing in this part of Indo-China (D. Seckel, op.cit., p. 55).

in order to attach divine sanctity to his kingship a practice prevalent in South-east Asia at the time[3].

By the time the Dong-Duong sanctuary was built the Cham architectural style was far from its supposed Indian origin (*Encyclopaedia of World Art*, Vol. III, p. 192 right, showing the west wall of the sanctuary with the southern corner of the porch : op.cit., fig. 395 for the ground plan).

The Dong-Duong monastery of the Lakśmīndralokeśvara vihāra[4] occupies a precinct on an east-west axis which is split into three connecting enclosures. To the east is an imposing portico, with two pylons in front of it. The eastern enclosure is decorated on the outside and is lined on the inside with rows of stone posts along the northern and southern sides, both of which are pierced with doors. At the eastern entrance are two figures of guardian deities, representing "*dvārapālās*" (door-keepers), standing on a *makara* (to the north) and a lion (to the south) respectively.

Inside this enclosure rose a large hall consisting of a nave between two rows of eight pillars and two side aisles supported on the outside, by two rows of smaller pillars. The roof, which no longer exists, must have been tiled. Between the two pillars erected at the western end, there is a platform supporting a pedestal decorated with scenes from the Buddha story (J. Roisselier, op. cit., figs. 57, 58, 59, 60). On this pedestal was a Buddha seated in the European fashion, which has now been removed to the central tower of the western enclosure.

The northern and southern walls of the central enclosure, which are contiguous to the eastern and western enclosures, are no longer there and only the rows of stone posts that ran along the inside, remain. The entrance portico, whose two pylons rise in the westernmost part of the preceding enclosure, included two *dvārapālās* (q.v.), the northern one on a bear and the southern one on a bull (ibid. figs. 9, 10). The demonic features of the *dvārapālās* strike a close resemblance to some of the figures of divinities in Chinese and Tibeto-Nepalese Buddhist shrines.

In the middle of the enclosure there is a long hall that was once tiled. It has two tiered doorways at its east and west ends and is lit by narrow windows. At the northern and southern sides are two-tiered niches resembling blind doors. The western enclosure whose interior walls are decorated, can be reached only through the preceding enclosure by means of a portico that has three entrances to the east, opening into the court of the central enclosure. To the west however this portico has only one central entrance (flanked by two small temples) giving access to the courts of the western enclosure. In front of this portico are two tall rounded pylons and two *dvārapālās* trampling human figures. The tower located in the eastern part of the enclosure is a large structure on a square plan, opening through four bays and built along the axis of the main tower of which it is probably an annex. Of the superstructure only two storeys are left, which resemble the central structure on a smaller scale. The main tower to the west of this tower, is a large building constructed on a double basement and surrounded by four smaller towers on the same terrace to the north, south, west and south-west. To the east it has two flights of steps and the other sides are decorated with blind doors. The storeys of the superstructure are badly dilapidated. Inside is a headless statue of the Buddha placed on a platform decorated with Buddhist scenes (ibid. fig. 11).

The western enclosure includes various other structures, such as seven small temples built against the wall, a tower with four bays to the north-east of the main tower, and two other subsidiary buildings in the north-east and south-east corners of the enclosure.

Other remains at Dong-Duong include a headless figure of an *arahant* holding a lotus flower in his

3 Compare divinity associated with the Khmer and Śailendra rulers of Angkor and Śrī-Vijaya respectively, as lords of the Mountain, like unto the concept of "*Lokanātha Avalokiteśvara*". The cult of divine origin of kings and the practice of the ruler assuming the position of a bodhisattva was prevailing in other Buddhist countries, too, at the time. Sinhalese kings, as such were actual "*Bodhisattvas*" and they had such throne names ending in Bodhi, Agga Bodhi etc. The profession of the cult of divinity associated with kingship was, however, an ancient tradition in the Orient (cf. "*Divaputra*" Kusanas", the son of Heaven in China; the Achemenid king of kings).

4 The description of the Dong-Duong sanctuary is based primarily on the account of the shrine published in the *E.W.A.* Vol. XIV, pp. 774 ff.

folded hands. This image is placed on a lotus pedestal.[5] Further, detached slabs of platform with frieze carvings, both in a shallow surface and more pronouncedly marked convex proportions, add to the hoard of decorated or carved platforms of Cham artists (ibid. figs. 12, 13). Groups of headless figures of *arahants* are depicted seated on high square platforms, the bases of which are designed with vermiculated *makara* patterns (ibid. fig. 14).

The great Buddhist sanctuary at Dong-Duong, then famed as Lakṣmīndralokeśvara vihāra is now only a mass of dilapidated masonry.

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A.D.T.E.P.

DOSA (Skt. *dveṣa*), hatred, one of the three unwholesome roots which determine the actual immoral quality of volitional states and a conscious thought with its mental factors.

The three unwholesome roots (*akusala-mūla*) are greed (*lobha*), hatred (*dosa*) and delusion (*moha*). But, whereas delusion is found in any unwholesome deed or thought (for, evil is essentially a product of ignorance), greed and hatred stand as two opposites, as attraction and repulsion, respectively.

Hatred, then, comprises all degrees of repulsion from the faintest trace of ill-humour up to the highest pitch of hate and wrath (*BD.* p. 94). Thus, ill-will, evil intention, wickedness, corruption and malice are but various expressions and degrees of *dosa* (*PED.* s.v.). Killing is shown (*A.* I, p. 216; V, p. 261) to be a result of a mind obsessed by hate.

Hate, of course, is inspired by wrong views (*micchā-diṭṭhi*), for, if things are seen and understood in their proper perspectives, no ill feelings can arise. Envy (*issā*), selfishness (*macchariya*) and worry (*kukkucca*) are always associated with hatred or ill-will (*dosa*). Sometimes, obduracy (*thīna*) and sluggishness (*middha*) are closely connected with certain forms of hatred.

A hateful temperament is said to be due to a predominance of the elements of cohesion (*āpo*) and oscillation (*vāyu*) and also to a preponderance of phlegm (*semha*) over the other humours in the body (*Vism.* iii, § 80-1).

Hatred is paraphrased in Abhidhamma terminology as a disordered temper, getting upset, a feeling of disgust (*Dhs.* § 418), the throwing off of a normal state and the abrupt reaction of rage (*assuropa*, *DhsA.* 258). It is annoyance (*āghāta*) at the thought of harm done to oneself or to someone dear, or good done to a person disliked. It may spring up as vexation due to climatic conditions which prove a momentary obstacle, such as the wind preventing one to dress (*DhsA.* 367). This would lead to resentment (*paṭighāta*) and repugnance (*paṭigha*), the latter being more a passive state of sense-reaction.

Synonyms are not lacking: ill-temper, irritation, indignation (*kopa*, *pakopa*, *sampalopa*); antipathy, aversion, detestation (*padosa*, *sampadosa*, *manopadosa*); opposition, hostility (*nirodha*, *paṭivirodha*: *Dhs.* §§ 418, 1060).

As malevolence (*vyāpāda*), it is one of the five hindrances (*nīvaraṇa*), which are so called because they trammel thought; it is also one of the ten fetters (*saṁyojana*), which prevent progress on the path of holiness (*ariya-maggā*).

All these various terms, though mainly synonymous, have in application of meaning a shade of difference. Thus, the passive resistance which is resentment and repugnance (*paṭigha*) is a psychological reaction to the feeling of hate (*dosa*), while malevolence, which is malignant ill-will (*vyāpāda*), is active, volitional and intentional hate. The intensifying degrees of hatred are also shown in the composition of the terms (*kopa*, *palopa*, *sampalopa*; *dosa*, *padosa*, *sampadosa*, *manopadosa*). But compared with repugnance (*paṭigha*) which is called a

5 the placing of the statue on a lotus pedestal (*Padma-paduka*) speaks of the supra-human, if not divine, nature of the figure it represents. This statue could either be that of the Buddha or an *arahant*.

powerful type of anger (*balavakodha*), *dosa* is referred to as a weak type (*dulbala-kodha : DA.* I, p. 116).

Thus, the following gradation would appear : *dosa* is the root (*mūla*) of all opposition, which develops into the psychological reaction of repugnance (*paṭigha*) and is intensified into a malignant obstruction as malevolence (*vyāpāda*).

As a cause (*hetu*) of further corruption, *dosa* has to be put away. The method advocated in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* (§§ 1007, 1011) is by means of mind culture (*bhāvanā*), i.e. by a systematised effort in self-training. Mindfulness in what concerns the body or bodily action (*kāyagatā-sati*) is said (*A.* I, p. 43) to be the one thing needful for the perfecting of this culture.

Further, it is said by the Buddha : "Give up one thing. I am your surety for not returning. What one thing? Ill-will, monks is the one thing ye must give up. I am your surety for not returning" (*It.* pp. 1-2).

On the other hand, if this root is not eradicated, it becomes the foundation (*nidāna*) for further growth and fruit. "An act performed in malice, born of ill-will, originating in hate, arising from malevolence, has its fruit wherever an individual is reborn. And wherever that act comes to fruition. whether it comes into bearing in this very life or in some other phase of existence, there one experiences the fruit thereof" (*A.* I, p. 134).

The way of hate is indeed a means to heap up deeds, gathering like a ball (*piṇḍakaraṇatthāya : A.* III, p. 338 and commentary); it is the coming into operation of the chain of causal action (*kamma-nidāna-sambhava : A.* V, p. 262); it is likened to an all-consuming fire (*dosaggi*) in the Buddha's third discourse, the well-known 'Fire Sermon' (*Āditta-pariyāya Sutta : Vin.* I, p. 34, *S.* IV, p. 19).

As much as hate (*dosa*) is one of the roots of evil, the opposite, non-hate (*adosa*), is one of the roots of good, for although expressed in a negative way, non-hate is the 'divine virtue' (*brahma-vihāra*) of benevolence and loving kindness (*mettā*). See ADOSA, ILL-WILL.

H. G. A. VAN ZEYST

DOUBT occupies a very crucial position in the system of Buddhist training laid down for the release of man from the painful cycle of births and deaths of *saṃsāra* and the attainment of this goal in *nirvāṇa*. The Pali word invariably used to designate this is *vicikicchā* (verb : *vicikicchati*). The verb *kaṅkhati* which also means 'to doubt' is often used with *vicikicchati*, as in *satthari kaṅkhati vicikicchati :* distrusts and expresses doubt in the Master (*M.* 1, p. 101). *Kaṅkhā*, the nominal form of *kaṅkhati* meaning doubt, uncertainty, is also used in combination with *vimati* (indecision, uncertainty), jointly used for emphasis of meaning. The terms *kaṅkhā* and *vicikicchā* are also used at times in this general sense (*A.* I, p. 189).

In the specific religious context referred to above *vicikicchā* primarily means distrust while at times, uncertainty and indecision are also closely associated with it. This element of distrust found to exist in an aspirant to the Buddhist goal stands in the way of his accepting the Buddha as a reliable teacher and from accepting his system as an efficient one. This two-fold distrust, to refer to which one notices the joint use of *kaṅkhati* and *vicikicchati* as well as *kaṅkhā* and *vimati* (*M.* 1, p. 101; D. II, p. 154), is adequately dealt with in the Buddhist texts, where it is shown to be operating as disbelief and distrust in the Buddha, Dhamma, Saṅgha and the system of training enunciated by him (*sikkhā*); and consequently leading to the non-acceptance of the entire system.[1] In the *Mahaparinibbāna Sutta* of the *Dīgha nikāya* this same idea of doubt in the Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha is expressed with the words *kaṅkhā* and *vimati* and it is disclosed that all disciples of the Buddha, below the level of *sotāpanna* are not immune from this.[2] The inevitable result of this is that the disciple, while harbouring distrust born of doubt within him, will make no headway in

1 *Yo so bhikkhave bhikkhū satthari kaṅkhati vicikicchati nādhimuccati na sampasīdati ... dhamme kaṅkhati ... saṅghe kaṅkhati ... sikkhāya kaṅkhati ... tassa cittaṃ na namati ātappāya anuyogāya sātaccāya padhānāya :* (*M.* I, p. 101).

2 *Siyā kho pana bhikkhave ekabhikkhussa pi kaṅkhā vā vimati va Buddhe vā dhamme vā saṅghe vā magge vā paṭipadāya vā. Pucchatha bhikkhave :* (*D.* II, p. 154).

his religious life (*M.* I. p. 101). This doubt is said to be, in terms of religious discipline, leading to non-productivity of mind (*cetokhila :* q.v.) i.e. non-development towards the achievement of its intellectual goal.

In marked contrast to this stands the basic virtue of trust or *saddhā* (q.v.). Through this *saddhā*, a disciple is initially drawn to the acceptance of the Buddha as teacher and his teaching as a way of life leading to salvation. This, he is said to conceive preliminarily on hearing the Buddha preach his doctrine.[3] It is this basic *saddhā*, the quality of trusting in (*śrad+dhā*) which initiates the disciple to the new religious life. On the other hand, as the disciple matures on this path of spiritual development, he comes to develop certain faculties which enable him to gain a greater conviction about the truly great spiritual character of the Buddha. Such a one, and such a one alone, who can scan the mind of another (*parassa cetopariyāyaṃ ājānantena : M.* I. p. 317) is called upon to discover for himself the spiritual quality of the Buddha.[4] This, the *Vīmaṃsaka Sutta* (*M.*I, pp. 317-20) calls *Tathāgate dhammasamannesanā*. It is not a venture which any and every one is required to undertake. It is obvious that any premature attempt in this direction is both disruptive and damaging to the religious life. He alone can screen and scan and discover for himself that the Buddha is, well and truly, not involved with the world in an unhealthy way, through his sensory reactions.[5] It is this spiritual pre-eminence of the Buddha which is thus discovered which gives a prestige to his teaching (*dhamma*) and to his followers (*saṅgha*). The totally effective, unshakable trust in the teacher and his system which consequently emerges, is referred to as *akāravatī saddhā*, and is characterised as being based on knowledge or insight (*dassanamūlikā*[6]) and for the same reason being firm and incapable of being dislodged (*dalhā asaṃhāriyā*).

On account of the role which doubt (*vicikicchā*) thus plays as an impediment to spiritual development, it has come to be included in both categories of *saṃyojana* (q.v. = fetter) and *nīvaraṇa* (q.v. = hindrance). As a *saṃyojana* it stands as the second in the list of ten. It thus comes to be included in the set of first three *saṃyojanas* one gets rid of at the stage of being a stream-entrant or *sotāpanna*. This is the stage at which one enters the Buddhist way of religious life with the complete assurance of enlightenment.[7] This elimination of doubt at the stage of *sotāpatti* is more specifically stated at *Sn.v.* 231 where it says that on the acqutsition of insight (i.e. *dassanasampadā* at the stage of *sotāpatti*) the three hindrances of the mind, viz. ego-consciousness, doubt and proneness to ritualistic purity and rigid vows, are got rid of.

Viewing this same attainment more positiveiy the *Saṃyutta nikāya* (*S.* II, p. 69 f.) says that a *sotāpanna* is characterised (*sotāpattiyaṅgehi samannāgato*) by the possession of firm faith in and the acceptance of the *Buddha*, *Dhamma*, *Saṅgha* and *sīla* or training in morality. An equally positive assertion of this occurs in the description of the eye of wisdom (*dhammacakkhu*). At this stage, a disciple is described as being one who has fully grasped the doctrine (*diṭṭhadhammo pattadhammo viditadhammo pariyogāḷhadhammo*) and transcended all doubt and distrust (*tiṇṇavicikiccho vigatakathaṃkatho*). It is also said that for these reasons he is deep in his conviction (*vesārajjappatto*) and is self-reliant and depends not on another in the pursuit of the religious system of the Buddha (*aparapaccayo satthusāsane . . . M.* I, p. 380). It is to be noted that the appearance

3 *So dhammaṃ deseti . . . So taṃ dhammaṃ sutvā tathāgate saddhaṃ paṭilabhati : D.* I, p. 62.

4 This trust in the Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha and the joyous acceptance of them through conviction about their greatness is referred to in other contexts as *aveccappasāda* (*M.* I, p. 37). The *Sammādiṭṭhi Sutta* speaks of such deep-seated acceptance of the *dhamma* (*dhamme aveccappasāda*) as an essential characteristic of *sammādiṭṭhi* (op.cit., p. 46).

5 *Ye saṃkiliṭṭhā . . . vītimissā cakkhusotaviññeyyā dhammā na te Tathāgatassa saṃvijjanti*, op.cit., p. 318.

6 Here we prefer to adopt the P.T.S. reading *ājānantena* as against *ajānantena* of the Sinhala script texts of Sri Lanka (*Buddha Jayanti Tripitaka Granthamāla*, 10 *Majjhimanikāya*, pt. 1, p. 744) which implies gaining a knowledge about the inner purity of the Buddha through inference based on external evidence (*cakkhusotaviññeyyā*) as against the former (i.e. *cetopariya ñāṇa*) which implies knowledge through insight and conviction. Considering the appearance of *ākāravatī saddhā* which is described as being *dassanamūlika* (based on insight), at the end of this exercise, the reading *ajānantena* which points to 'knowledge by inference' appears less convincing.

7 *yesaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ tīṇi saṃyojanāni pahīnāni sabbe te sotapannā avinipātadhammā niyatā sambodhiparāyaṇā : M.* I, p. 141 f.).

of the eye of wisdom seems to be the equivalent of the *dassanasampadā* of *sotāpatti* referred to earlier. See also CONFIDENCE, CONVICTION.

Thus it becomes clear that the complete disappearance of doubt and distrust with regard to the Buddha and his religious system comes with a comprehension of the basic doctrine of Buddhism, viz. the law of causal genesis : *yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhammaṃ*, loc. cit.). At this stage the disciple is infallibly on the way to enlightenment (*niyato sambodhiparāyaṇo*). At this self same purge, a disciple is said to get rid of his ego-consciousness (*sakkāyadiṭṭhi* as referred to at *Sn.* v. 231). The grasp of the three characteristics of phenomenal existence (i.e. transciency, unsatisfactoriness and soullessness or *anicca dukkha* and *anatta*) which must naturally come in the wake of the comprehension of the principle of causal genesis, invariably leads to the shattering of the ego-consciousness (*Vin.* I, p. 14). It is emphatically stated that with the shattering of the ego-consciousness, effected through the grasp of the basic truths relating to life, the dart of doubt and distrust can no longer assail the mind.[8]

Besides this concept of doubt which we have discussed so far, which is clearly enunciated and judged in no uncertain terms in Buddhist texts as being detrimental and damaging to the life which leads to salvation, there appears to be yet another area in which doubt operates. On a closer scrutiny, this form of doubt appears to be reasonable and justifiable. This, which is also referred to by the same name of *kaṅkhā* and *vicikicchā*, seems to pertain to the evaluation of religious norms and injunctions at grass-root level, with a down to earth relevance. It is an expression of doubt which results in an attempt to test at empirical level the truth of basic religious assumptions, irrespective of any specific creed to which they belong. This verification, at the mundane level of man, does not appear to require either supersensory powers of any intuitive awareness. The validity of these assumptions is judged on the basis of their contribution to the moral goodness of man and the well-being of society.

The most interesting context in which this form of doubt appears to have come up for discussion is the admonition given by the Buddha to the Kālāmas of Kesaputta (*A.* I, p. 189 ff.). The spirit of this widely known *Kālāma Sutta* appears to be conveyed again, more or less in the same words to the Licchavi Bhaddiya, but in a slightly different context, by the Buddha himself, while he was residing at the Kūṭāgārasālā of Vesāli (*A.* II, p. 191 f.). As for the Kālāmas, they appear to have been thrown into utter bewilderment by the arrival in their city of religious leaders of diverse convictions who while propounding their own theses condemn and ridicule those of others. This put the Kālāmas into constant doubt as to which one of those teachers spoke the truth. When this was reported to the Buddha, he declared their doubts to be justifiable[9].

In reply to the Kālāmas who questioned him as to how they should react to the diverse views put forward by this galaxy of religious men, the Buddha had this to offer them. Exploring as it were a new foundation for basic religious norms, the Buddha wanted the Kālāmas to discover for themselves (*Tumhe Kālāma attanā va jāneyyātha . . .*) the true nature of the behaviour of the human mind : whether the different pathological manifestations in which it expresses itself conduce or not to the well-being of man. This is what he meant when he asked them to determine the nature of the *dhammas* (i.e. different manifestations of the mind), whether they were skilful or unskilful, whether they conduce to happiness or unhappiness of man i.e. oneself and others, when allowed to operate in one's life. The ones that are discovered to be damaging, he pointed out must necessarily be given up. Thereafter, in a very convincing style, he ascertained from the Kālāmas themselves that greed, hatred and delusion are positively damaging to the welfare and well-being of both the individual and society. In what the Buddha preached to the Kālāmas, he pointed out that violence and threat to life and property come through these three roots of evil which any man of sense, without any special religious credo, should be able to correctly perceive. Hence the need to eliminate them should come, more or less, through personal conviction. At this very pragmatic level, this scrutiny forms the basic criteria by which the worth of a religious creed comes to be judged as being of service to man. Thus it becomes clear that this form of doubt which is

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conceded as justifiable drives one to seek adequate proof, at empirical level, in support of injunctions which are laid down in the name of religion. This is why the Buddha frowned upon revelation and tradition (*mā anussavena mā parampariya*) and dismissed them as lacking in authenticity, to serve as the basis of religious norms. In such a context one had to be critical and sceptical : neither pressure of tradition (*mā paramparāya*) nor power of personality (*mā samaṇo no garū ti*) was to silence one to accepting such a position. Hence doubt or *vicikicchā* of this category runs out to be constructive in that it leads to the building up of knowledge and conviction and thus acquires a positive character. In marked contrast to this, the primary concept of doubt which was defined as the distrust of the Master and the way he expounded is violently destructive and negative. It scorches the seed of religious life at the ground level, leaving no chance whatsoever for germination and growth. It has, therefore, to be initially combatted with trust (*saddhā*) until its final eradication is achieved through awareness at the stage of *sotāpatti* or stream-entrant when the true and infallible initiation into religious life takes place. See FAITH, VICIKICCHĀ.

JOTIYA DHIRASEKERA

DRAMA.

*In Pali Literature:** Pali canonical literature contains numerous references that indicate the prevalence of drama as a popular form of entertainment in India around 6th century B.C. Whether these dramatic performances contained any particular type of presentation that could be labelled as Buddhist drama is a mere matter of conjecture. The artistes who were engaged in these dramatic performances were known by the generic term *naṭa*, meaning dancer or actor. Besides these *naṭas*, numerous others who were associted with dramatical activities are also mentioned in the *Jātaka*. These artistes are mainly from fields of music, dancing and mimicry. For example reference is made to singers (*gāyaka*), to those who provided hand music or perhaps played the cymbals (*pāṇissara : J. VI*, p. 277; cf. *S.* I, p. 6; III, p. 183) and to those who played on earthen drums (*kumbha, thūnika : J.* Loc. cit.). The term *sokajjhāyika* (*J.* VI p. 580; *Vin.* IV, p. 285) seem to denote clowns or comedians. The *sobhiyas* (*J.* VI, p. 277) too appear to be some sort of comedians. The *vetālikas* (loc. cit.) were bards who played a major role in dramatic performances by presenting the narrative in an effective, appealing style. The *Vidhurapaṇḍita Jātaka* besides mentioning these performers make reference also to numerous musical instruments which certainly would have been used to provide the ochestral music in the dramatic performances.

The *naṭas* seem to be professional performers who belonged to a distinct community with a social status of a comparatively lower standard. These communities were headed by their own leaders referred to as *naṭagāmaṇis* who may have been their local civil administrators. Though as a community they are not represented, in Pali literature, as being economically advanced and well established, there are scattered references to individual performers who gained fame and wealth through this profession.

Drama, as evident from Pali sources, appear to have been a very popular form of entertainment patronized by a large circle of appreciative patrons comprising of the ordinary folk as well as kings, rich

* On this aspect Prof. O. H. De A. Wijesekara's article on 'Buddhist Evidence for Early Existence of Drama' : *IHQ*. June, 1941, pp. 196-206, provide valuable information.

What is apparent from the available early Buddhist literary evidence is that Buddhism, especially in its early formative period, did not by any means favourably look upon dramatic activities. In fact there is a preponderance of evidence to show that the Buddhist attitude was harmful to the development of drama. One comes across references to actors and dramatic activities, but these references are often either condemnatory or derogatory and, therefore, mainly deterrent in purpose (cf. *S.* IV, p. 306). Drama certainly was included under *visūka dassana* (visiting of shows) indulgence in which is prohibited by precept.

This position, however, seems to have changed with the development of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Firstly its rich rites and rituals appear to have been conducive to dramatic representation of Buddhist activities. Secondly Sanskrit language which happened to be the medium of Mahāyāna Buddhism provided access to a vast field of aesthetics and fine arts. This undoubtedly inspired dramatic activities. This sort of development is apparent in the case of Sri Lanka where monks themselves became very active in the fields of literature and fine arts after the advent of Mahāyāna Buddhism. (E-in-C).

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of the style called *Prakaraṇa* with nine acts, following the classical type of Sanskrit dramaturgy as laid down by *Nāṭya Śāstra* of Bharata Muni. Dr. De sometimes titles *Śāriputra Prakaraṇa* as *Śāradvatī-putra*.

Prof. H. Luders was able, in 1911, to discover fragments of two other Buddhist dramas in the same ola leaf manuscripts which contained parts of the *Śāri-putra*. Unfortunately the preserved portions are too fragmentary to give the present day reader a clear idea about the writings. It is not possible to say exactly who the authors were of these two dramas since the colophons of these works are also lost.

The first of these dramas has for its theme a Buddhist allegory, of which the details are not clear although a whole leaf of the manuscript has been recovered. According to the description of Prof. De, these remnants have Kīrti (fame), Dhṛti (firmness) and Buddhi (wisdom) as the characters of the play. The Master himself appears, in the drama.

The other play also has been accepted by scholars as a work which was intended for the edification of religious teachings. As Prof. De and Dr. Keith describe the work, it concerns a young voluptuary, called simply the Nāyaka and probably named Somadatta, and his mistress Magadhavatī, apparently a courtesan, who was converted to Buddhism.

Prabodhacandrodaya of Kṛṣṇamiśra of the 11th century, though it cannot be taken as a serious drama on a Buddhist theme, contains religious sentiments that cannot be ignored. Religious and philosophical discourses are conducted in this drama to exhibit the supremacy of Vedantism while Buddhism and other religious beliefs are degraded as being false.

In the seventh century, the famous Sanskrit writer and dramatist, King Śrī Harsha, composed *Nāgā-nanda*, a Sanskrit drama, in which Buddhist sentiments have been expressed. The story, it is clear, has been taken from other Sanskrit sources like *Bṛhat-Kathā* or *Vetāla Pañca viṃsati*. But at the very beginning of the introduction, the qualities of the Master have been described by the playwright.

In Asian Countries:

In Asian countries, especially in countries where Mahāyāna Buddhism has flourished, there is evidence to the existence of either Buddhist drama or dramatic activities associated with Buddhism. Japan aptly demonstrate this fact. Some of the Noh plays are undoubtedly influenced by Buddhist thought. In Burma where Theravāda Buddhism flourishes Buddhism plays a very vital role in the lives of the people, and this influence is seen also in their theatrical productions. As Faubion Bowers observes in his *A Survey of Asian Dance and Drama*, the life of the Buddha as well as dance dramas borrowed from India and Siam have much influenced Burmese drama. In them *Jātaka* tales are brought to the stage though the character of the Buddha is never enacted by an actor. In Thailand and Cambodia too reminiscences of Buddhist themes and sentiments can be witnessed in the contemporary theatre.

Buddhist Retualistic Drama in Sri Lanka:

The development of popular Buddhist rituals paved the way for numerous dramatic elements to be incorporated in them. Most of these rituals cannot be dated far beyond the Kandyan period of Sri Lanka-history. One of these rituals is *Sūvisi Vivaraṇa*, a ceremony still performed at religious festivals held in temples with recitations, dances and drumming as accompanying items.

Sūvisi Vivaraṇa or the 'Twentyfour Revelations' is said to be an innovation based on the Panther dance by M. B. Kiribanda of Halāgiriya, Rambukkana, during the 19th century. According to the traditional belief, the verses associated with this drama are said to have been composed by a Buddhist priest of the Navagamuva Temple. When the patronage of generous devotees could be obtained the organisers of the ritual build 24 images or prepare paintings of the twenty-four past Buddhas in separate cubicles. These are entrusted to 24 rich devotees who pay their obeisance to the Buddhas when their turn comes. Among the offerings are flowers, lamps, betel, medicinal herbs, cloth, incense, perfumes and other requirements.

Sūvisi Vivaraṇa starts with a benediction to the Buddha, Dhamma and the Saṅgha and this is accompanied by drumming and dancing. Each of the Buddhas is described at length in verses, ślokas and incantations, before the offerings are made to him. The whole ritual lasts for at least two nights. '*Yugāsana Bana*' or '*Asana Deke Bana*' or the Discourses from two Pulpits is also a religious dramatic enactment which is dying out fast. Prof. E. R. Sarachchandra (*The Folk Drama of Ceylon*, Govt. Press, Ceylon, 1966, p. 23) describes this dramatic ritual in the following words, "A monk from one pulpit reads out the text in Pali, after which the monk from

the second pulpit reads out, in Sinhalese, the comenentary on this text." Sarachchandra's description rests on the events as it occurred in the fourth decade of this century. However, the content and the form of the *Yugāsana Bana* have changed with the passage of time. The present writer has witnessed cases of *Yugāsana Bana* where the two priests involve themselves in a dialogue on certain matters concerning Buddhism, sometimes illustrating the scenes with the assistance of dramatic enactments by dancers and drummers. This, however, seems to be a recent innovation. *Dorakaḍa Asna* or *the Message at the Gate*, is a ceremony performed, at the end of a 7-day session of pirith, as Prof. Sarachchandra describes (Ibid. p. 19) : "On the morning of the seventh day after a quick recitation of *Maha Pirita* (i.e. the *Karaṇīyametta, Ratana* and *Maṅgala Sutta*) a monk reads what is known as the Calendar (*lita*), and announces the auspicious time and date, according to the Zodiac calendar, at which the *Dorakaḍa Asna* ceremony is fit to be inaugurated. After this, another monk, who had been selected for the purpose at the beginning of the *pirit* session, recites the *Vihāra Asna*, a composition in rhythmic prose, enumerating and mentioning by name a list of *vihāras* and inviting all the gods resident in them and the neighbouring *devālayas* to attend the recitation of the *Maṅgala Sūtra* and the *Aṭānāṭiya Sūtra* that is to take place the same evening. During the recitation of the *Vihāra Asna*, the other monks hold the sacred thread (*pirit hūya*) which is tied all round the walls of the *maṇḍapa* (pavilion). After the recitation of the *Vihāra Asna*, the monk, who reads the zodiac calendar, begins to write what is known as the *devāla talapata* or the message to the *devālaya*. It is inscribed on a palm leaf, and is in effect, an injunction to the gods of all the *devālayas* situated in the vicinity of the *vihāra*, to attend the recitation of the *sūtra*. The message contains a definite command of the monks (*saṅghāñattiya*), and the gods are requested not to break this command. During the writing of the message, the other monks leave the *maṇḍapa*. Four copies of the message are made, and are sanctified by means of saffron water and incense. The palm leaves containing the message are then hung on two ends of an ornamental pingo specially constructed for the purpose. The pingo is handed over by a monk to a boy dressed in the attire of a messenger of the gods (*devadūtayā*), and attended by eight swordsmen. He carries it in procession, with the monks following, to the *devālaya*. At the *devālaya*, before the image of Viṣṇu or Kataragama Deviyo, the monks recite a *sūtra*, usually the *Karaṇīyametta Sūtra*, and after the beating of ceremonial drums (*magul bera*), the boy reads out the message. At the end of the reading, lamps are lit in the *devālaya*, with the help of oil carried there in the procession, and *pirit pān* (water sanctified by the recitation of *pirit*) is sprinkled. The messages are hung in the four cardinal directions inside the *devālaya*, and the procession returns.

When the *devadūtayā* comes back, he is confined in a room guarded by the swordsmen, till the monks come in procession once more in the night for the recitation of *pirit*. Following on the procession of monks comes the *devadūtayā* in the company of the monk who is appointed to recite the blessing (*anusāsanā*). The *Maṅgala Sutra* is now recited, and at the conclusion of it, a dialogue of this nature takes place between the monk who is to recite the blessings, and the *devadūtayā* :

Monk : Are there people to guard the four entrances of this richly-decorated *maṇḍapa*?

Devadūtayā : O, Pious lord, who art endowed with all virtues, outside this richly decorated pavilion there are guardians.

Monk : Didst thou go to the king of the gods?

Devadutayā : I, the messenger who went to invite the king of the gods, have returned and do stand here.

Monk : Have the gods, too, endowed with sight and prowess, arrived?

The *devadutayā* now recites what is known as the *Dorakaḍa Asna*, a fairly long text, the gist of which is that the gods who guard the four quarters, and their entire train have arrived for the *pirit*, in order that they may dispel all evil and bring prosperity to everybody. At the end of this, the monk who had been selected for the purpose, recites what is known as the *Anusāsanā*, in which he enjoins all the gods and everybody who helped in the performance of the ceremony to rejoice in its good results."

The popular belief among the Buddhists in the country is that the messenger should be admitted to the Buddhist Order of monks someday in the future since he bears divine qualities which make him unsuitable for lay life.

Some of the Buddhist tales like the Taming of the demon Ālavaka, the 'Discourses between King Milinda and Monk Nāgasena', Discourses on religion by Dahamsoñda, the story of Prince Mahimsāsa (*Pañcāyudha Jātakaya*) are enacted in the temple premises on fullmoon-days by some experienced

monks with the assistance of dancers who perform the roles of demons.

The elements of drama like acting, miming, impersonation, dancing, dialogues, make-up and movements are employed in these sequences, while drumming is the main item of music.

One has to bear in mind, that no Buddhist monk or layman ever plays the role of the Buddha in these ritualistic dramatic performances in Sri Lanka.

Sarachchandra's description of '*Āḷavaka Damanaya*' which is quoted below will give an idea of its dramatic content (ibid. p. 21 f.). 'The monk begins once again to relate the story. He says how Gadrabha refused to open the door of Ālavaka's abode, but how the door opened of its own accord when the Buddha placed his foot on the door-step, and how the Buddha went in and sat on Ālavaka's gem-set throne. The Buddha preached a sermon to the wives of Ālavaka who stood by him in amazement and reverence. Further, the two demon chiefs, Sātagiri and Hemavata, were flying in the sky on their way to the concourse of demons which Ālavaka himself was attending, and found that they could not pass over the place where Ālavaka's abode was situated, because the Buddha was seated below, and no living being could pass overhead. The demons, therefore, descended to the spot, and finding the Buddha there, they paid homage to him, and continued on their journey. On reaching their destination, they informed Ālavaka about what was happening. Hearing this Ālavaka is beside himself with rage, and at this point the narrative once more turns to drama. The congregation hears a loud "hoo-ing" from the direction of the entrance to the preaching hall. The monk tells the congregation that it is the sound of Ālavaka returning in anger to his abode. Presently another "hoo-ing" is heard, followed by a voice thundering forth, "Woe unto that shaven-headed monk!" In a while, after a third "hoo-ing", the demon Ālavaka enters and stands at the door of the preaching hall. He wears a pair of tight black pants and a red jacket, like some demons in the folk exorcistic rituals. On his feet are jingles, and he carries a sword in his hand. Presently he enters and walks through the congregation into the presence of the monk. Behind him comes Gadrabha in humble and subservient demeanour. The demon runs wildly up and down in front of and among the congregation, miming his fury at the Buddha, and in turn, send a fierce hurricane, a great rain-storm, a rain of coals, a shower of stones and the like, and finally a thick black darkness. When all these fail, the demon himself comes in person and begins to ask the Buddha some questions. Here begins the dialogue that ensued between the demon and the Buddha, and the monk replies on behalf of the Buddha and translates the Pali stanzas into Sinhala for the benefit of the congregation. When Buddha answers all the questions put to him by the demon, the demon is converted and falls down at the Buddha's feet in worship. At this point the monk, continuing his narration, states that the night is turning to morning, and that it is time to take the child sacrifice to the demon Ālavaka. With his words there appear at the door two men representing the ministers of the king, one of them carrying in his arms a baby (a doll is often used for this purpose). The ministers are clad in white, while the child wears royal attire. The ministers come in and hand the child over to the demon Ālavaka. The demon is now ashamed of himself. He takes the child in his arms and places it on the table in front of the monk, who proceeds to relate how the demon took the child and offered it to the Buddha. He continues the narration and says how finally the child was given the name of Hatthalaka by the Buddha, and how the demon reached the Path of Sotapanna." The present writer has witnessed how 'Milinda Prashnaya' was dramatised by the Buddhist monks in the same fashion. A richly attired man acts as king Milinda while the Buddhist monk plays the role of the monk Nāgasena. The highly developed '*Viridu Bana*' and '*Kavi Bana*' which have become popular from the recent past also can be classed in this category. '*Viridu*' is a metrical composition usually played on the musical instrument called '*rabāna*' by the bards or by beggars. While the monk recites Buddhist tales in the form of '*Viridu*' a (lay) assistant will assist him by playing the '*rabāna*' thus providing instrumental music. '*Kavi*' is another form of metrical composition. The present writer has observed some bhikkhus inviting various characters to the arena when the verses are recited during the '*Kavi Bana*' performance. Some bhikkhus engage musicians also, in their preachings.

The dramatic performance of '*Kolam*' in the coastal areas gave birth to two famous *Kolam* performances based on two *Jātaka* tales, namely *Saṇḍakiṇḍuru* and *Maname* (*Chulla Dhanuggaha*). These two stories were popular among Buddhist devotees and after the usual *Bana* preachings by the monks the laymen took over the sermon hall for the performance of *Maname Kolama* or the *Saṇḍakiṇḍuru Kolama*. Another form of folk drama is known as '*Kavi Naḍagama*' which also is a dramatization of the above

two jātakas. *Maname Kavi Nāḍagama* and *Saňdakiňduru Kavi Nāḍagama* were popular among the Buddhists in the Colombo district and in the sixties there lived a group of *Kavi Nāḍagam* players at Hanvella in whose repertoire they had the *Maname*, *Saňdakiňduru*, *Piňguttara* and *Kālagola*, all based on *Jātaka* stories. With the resurgence in the field of Sinhala drama in the fifties came the two dramatic productions, Sarachchandra's Maname—a landmark in the history of modern Sinhala drama, and Galappatti's Saňdakiňduru, both influenced by Buddhist *Jātaka* tales. Sarachchandra in his *Maname* has given a new interpretation to the *Jātaka* tale, while Galappatti reproduced the *Jātaka Kavi Nāḍagama* following the modern theatrical practice. When *Nāḍagama* was first introduced to Sri Lanka during the twentieth century, its form did not suit to dramatize *Jataka* tales or any other Buddhist tales, for it contained sentiments like passion or śṛṅgāra. John Martinus Paulus Pieris Samarasinha Siriwardhene, a Mudiyanse officer, composed the *Kusa* story into '*Kusa Nāḍagama*' and published the work in 1870. Another popular *jātaka* tale, *Vessantara Jātakaya* too was compiled in the form of a *Nāḍagama* called *Vesaturu Nāḍagama* or *Vessantara Jātake Sindu Pota*, by Hendrick de Abrew Rajapaksa, a native physician from Madampagama, Ambalangoda, which was published in 1874. *Kusa* and *Vessantara* are the only two *Nāḍagamas* written following the form of *Nāḍagama*.

Ii is during the period of '*Nūrti*' plays that some Buddhist and *Jātaka* tales became very popular among the dramatists. *Ummagga Jātakaya*, *Vidhura Jātakaya*, *Bhūridatta Jātakaya*, and *Vessantara Jātakaya* were dramatised on the lines of '*Nūrti*' and later on the form of theatrical activities called 'Teeṭar'—derived from the word Theatre—after the second world war. John De Silva and Charles Dias sometimes used the same story competitively for dramatization. *Padamanāvaka Jātakaya*, *Chulla Dhammapāla Jātakaya*, *Guttila Jātakaya*, *Illeesa Jātakaya*, *Dahamsoňḍa Jātakaya*, *Sambulā Jātakaya* *Sattubhasta Jātakaya*, *Devadharma Jātakaya*, *Sāma Jātakaya*, and the anecdotes of Hemamālā and Danta, who brought the Sacred Tooth to the country, Sirisaňgabo, Dhātusena, Duṭugemunu, Swarnatilakā too were dramatised and were popular up to the end of the first half of this century.

With the new awakening of the Sinhala drama, again it is seen that some writers prefer to employ Buddhist tales or *Jātaka* tales as the theme of their plays. Sarachchandra's *Pabāwathī* (*Kusa Jātakaya*) *Vessantara Jātakaya*, *Ekaṭa Maṭa Hinā Hinā* (*Ummagga Jātakaya*) *Maname* (*Chulla Dhanuggaha Jātakaya*) and *Loma Haṃsa* (*Mahāpaduma Jātakaya*), Dayananda Gunawardhene's *Piňguttara* (*Ummagga Jātakaya*) and *Swarnatilakā*, Bandula Jayawardhene's *Swarna Haṃsa*, S. Karunaratna's *Guttila*, Punyasena Gunasinha's production of *Kālagola Nāḍagama* (the script of Charles Silva Gunasinha) bear testimony to the popularity of Buddhist Jātaka tales and religious tales among the playwrights of the modern period.

TISSA KARIYAWASAM

DRIVES. Buddhist psychological analysis is greatly concerned with the understanding of the nature of human motivation. The term 'motivation' covers three aspects of human behaviour, states that motivate behaviour, behaviour motivated by these states and the goals of such behaviour. Hunger as a motivational state would impel a person to seek food and thirst as a motivational state would make a person seek water. This would be followed by appropriate behaviour to seek means for attaining the end and the alleviation of hunger or thirst would be the final goal. Many terms have been used to describe this condition of the organism that *initiates* and *directs* its behaviour towards the goal. Terms like need, want, motive, drive etc. have been used to describe this state.

The word 'drive' has been defined as a complex of internal and external states and stimuli leading to a behaviour which is of survival value.[1] The concept is generally used to describe the needs which keep the organism in a state of equilibrium. Such needs concerning basic requirements like the need for water, food, temperature control refer to homeostatic deficiencies. There are other forms of behaviour like sexuality which are often considered as innate drives but no state of deprivation is involved. Though sexuality is related to the maintenance of the species, the non-satisfaction of the sexual drive does not threaten the survival of the individual. Sexuality has both a clear physiological as well as a strong psychological basis.

1 Thorpe's definition of drive cited by Vernon. See, M. D. Vernon, *Human Motivation*, Cambridge University Press (London, 1969), p. 10.

The avoiding of threatening situations also seems to be innate as it is related to the preservation of life. Here, too, there is no physiological deficit involved. For the maintenance of the life of the individual, the supply of adequate physiological needs of the body is not sufficient; it has to preserve its if against injury, hurt and diverse types of threat. Thus man has developed the emergency reactions of "fight or flight" as a means of coping with external situations which threaten his survival. Thus avoidance and fight are basically linked to the emotions of fear and anger. While man is attracted by situations which enhances his survival, he is repelled and threatened by those which offer a challenge to him. While survival and sexuality are seen as positive values linked to human motivation, aggression emerges more as a reactive response to obtain and hold on to what he values.

While the need to deal with homeostatic deficencies, the satisfaction of the sexual drive, the need to deal with life threatening situations and the emergence of aggression in emergency situations are clearly linked to the physiological basis of the organism and the strong drive for survival, there are more subtle psychological aspects of motivation like need for affection, affiliation, achievement and basically the psychological roots of one's sense of identity. In general psychologists in the west wish to limit the concept of drives to the former aspect of human motivation.

The Buddhist Perspectives on Drives and Human Motivation: While we have made some attempt to clearly and consciously present the framework within which the nature of 'drives' is discussed in systems of current psychology in the west, the Buddhist perspective as well as the modes of emphasis and analysis appear to be somewhat different. Firstly, the Buddhist analysis of motivation is focussed more on the psychogenic rather than the somatogenic aspects of the drives. Secondly, there is a strong ethical dimension which pervades the Buddhist analysis of human motivation; and thirdly, the worldview orientation of Buddhism linked to the Buddhist concept of survival after death and liberation from the cycle of existence presents a different context for reflecting on the primary determinants of human behaviour. Finally, the Buddhist analysis of the determinants of human behaviour are placed within the very large framework of a drive for survival, the satisfaction of sensual and sexual pleasures and the summoning of aggression directed against outside obstacles, as well as towards the self. The highly focussed and specific drives have to be understood in terms of this large framework.

The arousal and persistence of motivational states, according to the psychology of Buddhism has to be understood in terms of number of factors. First there is the unending nature of the motivation cycle. Desires find temporary satisfaction, but they surge up again and again. Though man develops attachment to the objects of satisfaction, he also seeks variety and change, finding delight here and there (*tatra tatra abhinandini S.* V. p. 412). Thus the homeostasis principle or the temporary state of balance is not merely based on replenishing deficiencies in the somatogenic sense but an incessant demand for satisfaction and change, leading to the vicious circle of boredom, lack of stimulation and the search for novelty. The central motivational concept of Buddhism, that of *taṇhā* (literally thirst) is almost in a metaphysical sense a reference to an unending motivation cycle, which is both physiological and psychological.

Another important qualifying feature about the Buddhist analysis of the psychology of motivational states is its ethical dimension. The major springs of human motivation are thus referred to as six in terms of a basis for the ethical evaluation of human action, three wholesome roots (*kusala mūla*) and three unwholesome roots (*akusala mūla*). Of the unwholesome roots *lobha* which can be rendered as greed provides a basis for approach desires, *dosa* rendered as hatred is the generator of avoidance behaviour as well the drive to defend, attack and similar emergency reactions, *moha* rendered as delusion, refers to the basis which interferes with the clarity of understanding human situations and thus generating prejudice, confusion, tunnel vision, obsessions and perverse ideological perspectives. Their opposites are *alobha* (charity), *adosa* (compassionate love) and *amoha* (wisdom). These provide a basis for altruistic action, healthy socialisation, clarity of thought and action. The biological and physiological basis of drives and the need for their satisfaction for human survival are very much recognised by the Buddha in terms of the life styles recommended both for the layman and the monk. The Buddha condemns both one track sensuality as well as self-mortification, and advocated the middle path as the basis for the correct life style. His own way the "noble eightfold path" is referred to as the Middle Path (*majjhimāpaṭipadā*). The Buddha is only critical when basic biological needs are taken beyond their legitimate sphere, desires and human drives overpower and obsess man.

While for the layman, there is, ethically, provision for a more liberal basis for the satisfaction of the drives like hunger and sexuality, the monk has certain rules for a more stringent code for the taking of food and bodily relaxation, while sexuality is not permitted in a life of celibacy. The Buddha's analysis of human needs, desires and drives are thus presented in terms of a valuational structure, a feature quite alien to the analysis of human motivation in western psychology, though a very limited link between human needs and values may be seen in traditions like the humanistic psychology of Maslow and Rogers, as different from the more dominant tradition. For these reasons, it is very necessary to emphasize the ethical stance in the Buddha's analysis of motivational states, whether they be the more physiological and biologically oriented needs and drives or those with a more psychogenic orientation.

Another central facet of the Buddhist interest in motivation is the need to control and tame certain desires, eliminate some and develop others. The strength of the undesirable desires and drives which stand as an obstacle to the spiritual path is described graphically in the *suttas* with the image of a man swimming "against the current" (*It.* p. 114). The current of the river is a name for craving. The expression of craving in three basic forms and in diverse subtle extensions of these forms cover the unwholesome aspects of human motivation. The three forms of craving are the craving for self-preservation (*bhava-taṇhā*), the craving for sensual gratification (*kāma-taṇhā*) and the craving for annihilation and aggressive pursuits (*vibhava-taṇhā*). While drives like thirst, hunger, sleep etc. can be understood in terms of the concept of self-preservation, the Buddhist analysis also brings within the framework of *bhava-taṇhā*, the need for self-assertion, power, recognition etc. The craving for sensuous gratification goes beyond genital or sexual pleasure to include, the need for excitement, diversion, exposure to novel stimuli and the search for diverse and variegated pleasures. The craving for annihilation exhibits aggressive behaviour towards self as in suicide and towards threatening objects and people in the outer world.

Stimuli in the outer world which excites the senses, ideas and memories as well as internal bodily stimuli are the avenues of arousal.

The Nature of Motivation and the Expression of Drives: In terms of the analysis and clarification made regarding the very characteristic features of the nature of motivational states highlighted in the *suttas*, the closest framework to examine the nature of needs and drives would be to look at the concepts of *survival*, *sexuality* and *aggression* in Buddhism.

Sexuality The term *kāma-taṇhā* may be rendered as a strong urge for sensual pleasures, within which is contained the more narrow concept of sexuality. For instance in the third precept, *kāmesu micchācāra* refers more to wrong doing by way of sexual conduct,though Buddhism does not make a rigid distinction between sexuality and sensuality. The word "*methuna*" refers to sexual enjoyment in a more narrow sense. This strong urge for sensual pleasures is more like the concept of a broad-based pleasure principle. The term *pañcakāmaguṇa* in the *suttas* refer to the five types of pleasure objects obtained by way of the eye, ear, nose, tongue and body, while the term *kāma-rāga* refers to the desires and passions of a sensual nature. The term *pañcakāmaguṇika-rāga* refers to the fact that in a human being, there is a deep seated proclivity for the enjoyment of the five senses.

As a drive, it may be more correct to render *kāma-taṇhā* as a kind of "pleasure principle", the natural proneness and adoptability by which the organism is drawn towards pleasure and is repelled by pain. While such a mechanism may safeguard the organism's need for keeping out injurious and painful stimuli, as well as be attracted by agreeable stimuli, this goes beyond the bounds of an organism attempting to survive and struggling to adopt itself, as the Buddha sees this as a kind of primitive pleasure seeking impulse and the urge for sensual delights.

The *Saṃyutta nikāya* has a passage which clearly describes this all-pervading pleasure principle "....if there were not this satisfaction that comes from the eye, beings would not lust after the eye. But in as much there is misery in the eye, beings are repelled by it" (*S.* IV, p. 9). Also it is said, "If misery, brethren, pertained, not to the eye, beings would not be repelled by the eye. But in as much as there is misery in the eye, beings are repelled by it." The same can be said of the other senses.

The Buddha emphasises not merely the emergence and the arousal of the sensuous impulses but their strong persistence. Not only does man relish the delights of sensuality but tenaciously clings to them. In the last analysis, what the Buddha emphasises is not the existence of the sense organs or the impact

of sense impressions, but the persistence of desire and lust. The eye is not the bond of objects, nor are objects the bond of the eye, but desire and lust that arise owing to these factors. There is the concept of *kāma-upādāna* which accounts for the clinging, tenacity and attachment that beings generate in their pursuit of sensual and sexual pleasures. Also there are strong proclivities like the *kāma anusaya* which account for the continuous sustenance received by these latent proclivities. Along with the root *lobha* these concepts help us to understand the strength of the craving for sensual and sexual pleasures, going beyond their simple physiological and biological function. Both sensuality and sexuality have a more complex inter-play of somatogenic and psychogenic factors.

As mentioned earlier, though sex is a powerful motivator of human behaviour, it is different from drives like hunger and thirst as it is not crucial to the survival of the organism, though necessary for the survival of the species. In the case of the broader concept of sensuality, it is even less crucial for the survival of the organism.

Survival and Self-Preservation: The concept of *bhava-taṇhā* accommodates the drive for self-preservation but like the unique psychology of the search for pleasure, the *bhava-taṇhā* concept functions within the wider frame of the "bias towards egocentricity" (rooted in a wrong belief in an abiding and permanent ego entity). Ideologically it is the bias of egocentricity which is conveyed by the term *bhava-rāga diṭṭhi*. Thus within this framework we get the will to live, the drive for self-preservation, the strong acquisitive urge, power, pride, conceit, inferiority feelings etc.

The drive for self-preservation as such, has both physiological and psychological facets. Some basic needs like the need for fresh air, water, food, sleep and relaxation are necessary for the survival of the organism and the term *drive* in western psychology is generally reserved for this aspect of the concept of self-preservation, while more broader motives and motivational states with a strong psychogenic basis is found in strong acquisitiveness, urge for power and uniqueness, pride, conceit, inferiority feelings, forms of self-advertisement etc.

The Buddha will not be critical of the drive for survival, so long as it is a need for the survival of the organism like, food, water, fresh air, sleep and relaxation. In condemning the way of asceticism, the Buddha was striking a middle path according to which basic human needs are satisfied. It is the ethical perspective which comes into the many context where human motivation is discussed in the *suttas* rather than the detailed physiological and biological mechanisms pertaining to drives. Though the rules for the monk are more stringent, bodily health and the value of physical well-being are considered as a necessary pre-requisite. Thus while the Buddha is sympathetic towards survival needs and a critical development in personality development is accepted, he condemns the unhealthy expressions of the bias towards egocentricity. Thus though the Buddha does not discuss in detail, biological drives like hunger, thirst and sleep, he makes a strong critical assessment of pseudo desires which go beyond these biological drives. There is a persistent attempt to draw a distinction between needs and greeds due to the strong ethical perspective within which the Buddhist theory of motivation is chartered.

While accepting the satisfaction of the basic physiological drives which is necessary for the physical well-being of man, there is a very important analysis, of bodily relaxation in terms of the practice of mindfulness. The Buddha teaches simple exercises in the contemplation of breathing, and bodily postures in walking, sitting, standing etc.

The Buddha gives a central place to bodily relaxation through the way of mindfulness as he always sees an important psycho-somatic linkage in the emergence, satisfaction and the control of bodily drives. The value of mental training and mindfulness in relation to the body has been well presented by Nyānaponika Thero : "By directing one's attention to the posture, any nervous haste in going will be restrained : unnecessary and harmful distortions of the body, in the case of the other postures will be avoided, or corrected, and thereby those postural defects with which medical science has to deal in the case of children and adults will be prevented. Unnecessary fatigue of the body, and consequently, of the mind, will be avoided, and reduction of the conscious control over the body prevented."[2]

Aggression: Like sexuality and the survival drive, aggression in Buddhism is placed in a very large framework. *Dosa* which is one of the roots of unwholesome

2 Nyānaponika Thera, *The Heart of Buddhist Meditation*, Rider and Company (London, 1975), p. 64.

behaviour comprises "all degrees of repulsion from the faintest trace of ill-humour up to the highest pitch of hate and wrath." When gratification of drives and desires are blocked there is resentment, if there is frustration strong anger is expressed, if an object of possession is in danger of being lost the emergency reaction of fight is activated. Forms of anger like *dosa* (hate,) *vyāpāda* (ill-will,) *paṭigha* aversion, *kodha* (wrath), *kopa* (grudge) and related states are the affective states which feed forms of aggressive behaviour. Aggression is basically a *reactive* form of behaviour compared with the survival drive and sexuality. Often when these positive impulses of an *appetitive* nature like sexuality and survival are blocked and threatened, are frustrated, aggression emerges as a response. Of course aggression is found as a strong proclivity in man and even found in a baby boy lying on his back. The *Majjhima nikāya* refers to the presence of dormant proclivities in a baby boy and out of these proclivities are mentioned a leaning to attachment to sense pleasures (*kāmarāgānusaya*) and a leaning to malevolence (*byāpādānusaysa: M.* 1, p. 438).

When methods of doing away with unpleasant stimuli, objects and people fail, it is directed against the self. While the ignorant person, according to the Buddha, hankers after pleasures and success, painful stimuli and failures disturbs him, infuriates him and he can be dejected and depressed in a state of sorrow, become violent and aggressive towards objects and people or develop subtle emotions of self-hate and thus develop suicidal tendencies. As graphically described in the *Anguttara nikāya :*

"For crazed they stab themselves with daggers,
In desperation swallow poison
Perish hanged by rope, or fling
Themselves over a precipice" (*A.* IV, pp. 61-62)

In terms of the three forms of craving, *Vibhava-taṇhā*, the craving for annihilation offers an interesting framework for understanding self-destructive behaviour, suicide, self-torture, asceticism, etc. In general the term *bhava-taṇhā* (the craving for self-preservation) is ideologically tied to the belief in the existence of a permanent and persisting ego, while the craving for annihilation upholds the existence of an ego as identical with the physical and mental processes that will be annihilated at death. The desire for annihilation or self-annihilation can spring in two types of contexts, a carefree pleasure lover with the outlook of Don Juan, without any respect for ethical values, and one who sees death as the end of life, a kind of hedonism backed by a materialistic perspective on the question of survival after death; the other, more relevant to our analysis of aggression is the man who is full of worries, disgusted of life. The latter personality profile expressing disgust, frustration and despair, generates a great deal of anger towards the outer world and if outer expression is not possible, aggression is turned 'inwards'.

Nyānaponika Thero sees some affinities between the self-hate element in *vibhava taṇhā* and Fromm's concept of necrophil or 'death-loving' tendencies : 'On a simpler level, the Craving for Annihilation is the outcome of sheer despair, reverse of worldly enchantment. Worn out by the vicissitudes of life, man longs for a sleep without awakening; he wants to obliterate himself as a protest against a world that does not grant him his wishes. As an irrational revenge, fanatical creeds of violence and destruction stem from this very source."[3]

In the *Majjhima nikāya*, there is a central context which throws light on this analysis of *vibhava taṇhā*. The important passage may be reproduced in the Pali, along with Horner's translation which captures well the meaning of the passage :

Ye kho te bhante samaṇa brāhmaṇā sato sattasa ucchedaṃ vināsaṃ vibhavaṃ paññapenti, te sakkāyabhayā sakkāyāparijegcchā, sakkayāṃ ñeva anuparidhāvanti anuparivattanti.[4]

Horner's translation of the passage is as follows :

"those worthy recluses and brahmanas
who lay down the cutting off, the destruction,
the disappearance of the essential being, these,
afraid of their own body, loathing their own body,
simply keep running and circling their own body."[5]

As the words *uccheda*, *vināsa* and *vibhava* are used synonymously, the meaning of *vibhava* and *vināsa* used synonymously suggest the use of *vibhava* as destruction.

3 Nyānaponika Thera, *The Worn Out Skin*, Buddhist Publication Society, (Kandy, 1977), pp. 32-33.
4 p.M. !I, pp. 232-233
5 *Middle Length Sayings*, P. 18 (Pali Text Society), Translation, I. B. Horner, (London, 1959)

At the ethical level, the Buddha is critical of any forms of aggressive behaviour. As a technique of liberating from suffering, he has shown that self-annihilation is completely misguided and that a man cannot violently sever himself from the cycle of saṃsāra. At a psychological and therapeutic level, patience, understanding, equanimity are suggested as resources for dealing with disappointment and frustration.

Concluding Thoughts: We have first outlined the way and the context in which concepts like drive and need are used in western psychology. Then we mentioned the difficulty of discovering exact parallel usages in Buddhism due to the specific nature of the psychology of motivation in Buddhism. As a way of resolving the difficulties, we have taken the larger framework of the examination of the concepts of the motivational constructs of sexuality, survival and self-preservation along with aggression and discussed the nature of drives, needs, motives and related notions within this framework. In this study it was also evident is that in the Buddhist analysis, there a very close linkage among the psychological, ethical and therapeutic concerns as well as the orientation towards liberation from suffering.

M. W. PADMASIRI DE SILVA

DRUGS. The term "drug" is interpreted differently under differing circumstances. In standard usage, however, it refers to a chemical substance which causes a substantial change in a biosystem, when introduced into it in small quantity. Accordingly numerous substances fall within this definition. Some such are medicinal. Some can be poisonous while others are relatively harmless.

The term "abuse" is also one which in common usage, has lost specificity in meaning. Where a drug is used for any purpose other than medicinal, or for scientific experimentation, it amounts to abuse. Sometimes, cultural acceptability of the consumption of a drug is said to qualify it from being considered outwith the term abuse; but this leniency is controversial. Thus it is evident that a very large number of chemical substances are abused by man. It is therefore preferred to refer to the condition as substance abuse, rather than as drug abuse. In practice, however, the terms are used almost synonymously.

"Narcotic" is a word that is derived from "narcosis", which means sleep. Etymologically and even medically, therefore, it refers to a drug that produces sleep. Legally, however, certain drugs are scheduled as narcotics. All such narcotic drugs may not necessarily have the property of inducing sleep.

Many drugs have the quality of causing dependence. When a person becomes dependent on a drug, a regular intake of that substance becomes necessary for him to function normally. Such dependence, with regard to most drugs, is both physical as well as psychological. The term addiction was also used to denote this condition. That usage has a disadvantage in that it carries with it a connotation of criminality. The term 'drug dependence' is therefore preferred.

The above statements should indicate the difficulty of naming, let alone describing, all substances that can cause dependence; nor indeed those listed as narcotics. What is possible is to name the more important categories of substances of dependence, and perhaps briefly describe some of the commoner abused ones.

Nicotine is perhaps the substance which is abused most commonly; and, it falls well within the definition of the term drug. It is one out of the several poisonous substances in tobacco and cigarette smoke. Its toxicity on the brain and the rest of the nervous system is well documented. It has been shown that in sufficient quantity, nicotine can be fatal. Considered as a whole, cigarette smoke has other toxins. It is carcinogenic, increases clotting tendency of blood, and when inhaled by a pregnant mother, is capable of causing harm to the intra-uterine foetus. It is important to recognise that passive smoking (now called enforced smoking), that is, inhaling the smoke from others in the act of smoking is also harmful. That, among other physical and aesthetic reasons, is the case for the prohibition of smoking in public places.

The next common substance of abuse will be alcohol. This substance also falls clearly within the definition of the term "drug." Alcohol needs to be given high priority when drugs are considered. Not only is it consumed by a large number of individuals in most parts of the world, it is also consumed in large quantity. The effects of alcohol are not merely individual; it causes significant harm to the family as well as to society as a whole.

Certain trends with regard to alcohol cause concern. The production and per capita consumption of alcoholic beverages in total populations have been increasing world-wide, over the past 20 years. Between 1960 and 1972, recorded production increased by 19% for wine, 68% for beer, and 61% for distilled spirits. A 8-litre per head consumption rate (expressed as 100% ethanol) found only in 2 countries of the world in 1950, increased to 22 in 1976.[1] Equally disturbing are changes in drinking patterns. Newer segments of society, younger people for instance, have begun to be involved in drinking. Culture constraints to drinking have begun to abade, making the consumption of alcohol commoner outside conventional drinking situations. Import of drinking patterns have contributed to the situations referred to. In general, drinking has become more problem prone. In this connection, the 32nd World Health Assembly, in its resolution WHA 32. 40 stated as follows: "Problems related to alcohol, and particularly to its excessive consumption, rank among the world's major public health problems,....and constitute serious hazards for human health, welfare and life."

A group of substances that is often classified along with alcohol is therapeutic substance category called barbiturates. Barbiturates share with the former, some of its depressant as well as toxic effects. Of these, phenobarbitone was the drug that came into use almost half a century ago. It was used as a sleeping drug, but soon other more efficient substances superceded it. Yet, this preparation is widely used in the treatment of epilepsy. Stemming from its therapeutic origin, this and other allied barbiturate drugs came to be abused. The past decade saw a decline of its abuse; but, recent surveys have indicated a tendency to increasing abuse, particularly in combination with more prevalent drugs

The abuse and dependence upon a variety of therapeutic agents is well documented all over the world. Sri Lanka is no exception. Tranquilisers, antihistaminics, sedatives and certain cough syrups are the commoner ones so abused. Polypharmacy, quackery, self-medication and free availability of drugs are some of the factors that promote this practice.

The abuse of stimulant drugs is historic. For over 400 years, chewing of the Coca leaf has been known in Peru and Bolivia. This was done for its stimulating effects. It was a German chemist who isolated cocaine from this leaf. Although first used as a local anaesthetic, the substance has led to abuse in many parts of the world. Cocaine is an odourless, white, fluffy, fine crystalline powder which may be sniffed, or taken intravenously in solution form. Because of its stimulant effects on the central nervous system, it causes agitation and excitement in the consumer. Hallucinations, aggression and paranoid feelings are known to occur. Cocaine is a drug which is highly prevalent in international trafficking. (So far, in Sri Lanka, heroin abuse has been very limited, the handful of persons so detected being foreigners).

The other widely abused stimulant drugs are the amphetamines. This group of substances was originally used as appetite suppressants, when it was soon observed that it was equally capable of stimulating the cortical areas of the brain. Thus, persons who needed to remain awake for long hours, such as long distance truck drivers, came to consume it. It was then taken up by various categories of people including students, who needed to rid themselves of tiredness and sleepiness. It is correct that amphetamines are capable of postponing sleep and tiredness; but they cannot eradicate the need for sleep. Besides, amphetamine toxicity can cause inability to concentrate, amnesia, confusion, a kind of psychosis, and even epilepsy.

In the early 1960s it was observed that some young people took pleasure in sniffing the vapours that emanated from the glue which was used in pasting together parts of toys such as model aircraft. The phenomenon was termed glue sniffing. It was later discovered that this glue in fact consisted of polystyrene and the solvent toluene. It was fume from the latter that the sniffers inhaled and the activity came to be known as solvent sniffing. It was revealed later that many other volatile substances such as lighter fluid, paint thinner, gasolene etc. were all liable to cause sniffing dependency. (It is observed that the practice of solvent sniffing is found on occasions in Sri Lanka, and included in these substances are petrol, and kerosene).

Solvents such as toluene are deliriants. In general, most solvents when sniffed irritate the inner lining mucosa of the respiratory tract. Equally, they are toxic to various organs of the body, the liver in particular. Some degree of dysfunction of the brain is invariable. Some stages of the process of

1 *Problems Related to alcohol consumption.* 1980 *Technical Report series* 650. World Health Organisation.

intoxication resemble those due to alcohol. Cases of violent or irrational behaviour after inhalation of solvents have been reported.

Many drugs were known to cause hallucinations in the consumer. These are the hallucinogenic drugs. "Psychedelic" is another term used to refer to these substances. Literally, this means mind-affecting or mind altering. They act by chemically stimulating the sensory centres of the brain and simultaneously, blocking or altering perception. The result is a kaleidoscopic conglomerate of stimuli which bombard the brain with erazure of memory, power of reason, and sense of time. Many drugs of abuse have these as some of their properties at least, but in these, mind altering is foremost. In the latter category are substances such as d-lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), mescaline (peyote), dimethyltryptamine, and cannabis. Seeds of the morning glory, and psylocybin which is a fungus growing on certain varieties of mushroom; also have hallucinogenic properties.

LSD is the classic hallucinogen. In 1943, a Sandoz researcher, Albert Hoffman, experimenting with a rye-infecting fungus, accidentally inhaled fumes of LSD which had been produced in the process. He experienced weird sensations including fantasy and colour. He saw his own dead body lying on a sofa while his 'ego' moved about the room moaning. He recorded his experiences as follows : "....The faces of those present appeared like grotesque coloured masks....., confusion alternating with a clear appreciation of the situation, at times standing outside myself as a neutral observer and hearing myself muttering jargon or screaming half madly".[2]

Apart from its physical effects, those due to the mind-alterng qualities of LSD are well described in the following paragraph quoted by Williams. "There is a marked heightening of sensitivity to colour. Primary colours become vivid and flowing. New colours are born and difficult to describe. They swirl and seem to flow, and burst into geometric designs. Perception is distorted; sounds are 'felt' and increase in intensity. Colours are 'tasted', objects pulsate and breathe. Flowers can be seen opening and closing. The body assumes grotesque propositions. The limbs may appear extraordinarily short or elongated. A user is likely to spend hours in rapturous contemplation of the 'unexplainable beauty' of a speck of dert, the geometric design of his finger nail, or a crack in the plaster wall. There is a sense of isolation and depersonalization to the extent the user feels he is fused with all humanity and his surroundings. Time stands still.....Once the idea of sex is suggested, all inhibitions are lifted. Users have removed their clothing and engaged in sexual orgies".

LSD is a colourless, odourless and tasteless substance and the required dosage is small, measured in terms of microgrammes. As such, it is difficult to detect and can be easily concealed. Among the numerous methods of concealment was its incorporation into the gum of envelopes! (LSD abuse is not prevalent in Sri Lanka, although during the past few years it has been detected in a very limited number of instances).

The substance commonly abused in Sri Lanka, which in adequate dosage falls into the hallucinogen category is cannabis. The plant is Cannabis Sativa, commonly known as hemp, marijuana or ganja. There are varying kinds of the cannabis plant, but they contain the same main chemical, delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). All parts of the cannabis plant contain this chemical, but its flowering tops and seeds are the most potent. Different parts and preparations of the plant are termed variously.

Cannabis has been known in the East for several thousand years. The social ill that came from the plant is embodied in the word 'assassin'. It is said to be derived from the word 'hashish', which is a particular preparation of cannabis. The phrase 'running amock' is said to owe its derivation to the Malay word 'amok' which was the shout of cannabis consumers when on their murderous frenzies!

A complex plant, cannabis contains over 420 different compounds of which 61 have been identified as having psychoactive properties. THC is the main one out of these. The harmful effects of these substances are summarised as follows : Damage to the cellular process; brain damage and atrophy; possible genetic damage and effects on reproduction; respiratory difficulties, and amotivational syndrome.[3] A Canadian report identified the following grounds with regard to cannabis abuse as causing social concern : Harmful effects of cannabis on the maturing

2 *Narcotics and Hallucinogenics.* 1967. Williams, John B. The Glencoe Press, California.

3 *Committee on the Judiciary, US Senate, 93rd Congress, Second Session* 1974. US Government Printing Office, Washington.

process of adolescents; the implications for safe driving arising from impairment of cognitive functions and psychomotor abilities; mental deterioration; and, the role played by cannabis in the spread of multi-drug use.[4]

The physical effects of cannabis are well documented. The mental effects, however, are the more far-reaching. The latter are summarised as follows: "Localised disturbances of electrical activity in the human brain have also been reported. The most clearly established acute effects of marihuana are on mental functions and behaviour as it has been shown to impair co-ordination short-term memory, tracking ability, sensory functions, and learning ability. Periods of anxiety and confusion or psychosis have also been reported in research results. Chronic heavy use of marihuana has been shown to be associated with behavioural dysfunction and mental disorders in human beings."[5]

Two further characteristics of cannabis are worthy of note. Firstly. its effects are unpredictable. An unpredictable diminution or loss of moral sense is of grave social concern. The second is that cannabis, like alcohol, is a gateway drug, from the use of which persons are known to often 'graduate' to the use of other substances including heroin. Generally, abuse of cannabis is common among certain strata of society, and forms a characteristic of that subculture. Most behavioural deviations found in such groups are either associated with, or are even consequent to intoxication with cannabis. Thus, apart from proven physical and mental individual harm, the social maleffects that stem from the abuse of this substance is immense.

Opiates, the derivatives of opium, are both historic as well as of great contemporary significance with regard to drug abuse. Opium itself dates back to at least 4000 BC. The mother plant of opium, the Poppy, was then referred to as the 'plant of joy' Mixed into a decoction, it was termed the 'cup of joy.' The consequences of the opium trade between India and China, resulting in the opium wars of the 1840s are well known.

The origin of opium is the plant called Papaver Somniferum, the name itself implying its tendency to produce sleep. This plant, bearing its red, white and sometimes purple flowers and a seed pod called the capsule, grows in countries with a hot-dry climate. There are several poppy-growing countries close to Sri Lanka in this region of the world. Opium, a brownish-black soft resin is obtained from the dried milky-white juice of the Poppy capsule. For smoking purposes, raw opium is prepared by various processes. The more raw preparations are often used as pills for oral consumption.

Sri Lanka imports opium for medicinal purposes but such imports are only by the state, and its distribution is only through official channels, to persons authorised to keep or use opium. There was a category of persons called certified consumers of opium, who, it was considered, needed a certain amount of opium intake daily to keep their habit. Such persons were authorised by the state to receive a monthly allocation of opium for personal consumption. Although this category of person is fast disappearing, there are yet occasional cases of opium dependence in Sri Lanka.

Medically, opium and its extracts are used mostly to relieve pain and as anti-diarrhoeal agents. Some derivatives of opium are cough suppressants. Dependent persons begin with a dreamy euphoric stage, and move on to sleep, stupor, and coma. Dependent persons when off the drug experience withdrawal symptoms such as diarrhoea, insomnia, and restlessness.

Until the 19th century only crude opium was known, when in 1806, Friedrich W. H. Serturner developed morphine as a cure for opium addiction The term morphine is derived from the Greek 'morphens' literally meaning form and shape, and referring to the Greek god of dreams. Morphine is the main alkaloid in opium, and is widely used in medicine as a powerful pain killer. It is also capable of inducing deep sleep. The drug is taken parenterally both in use as well as in abuse, although in the latter situation oral intake is not unknown.

The main effect of morphine is on the nervous system, and hence its sleep-inducing nature. This

4 *Cannabis—A Report of the Commission of Inquiry in to the Non-medical Use of Drugs.* 1972. Le Dain et al Ottawa, Canada.

5 *Cannaibs—A Review of some Imortant National Inquirles and Significant Research Reort,* 1984 Commonwealth Department of Health, Drugs of Dependence Branch. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.

effect, carried to an extreme, causes depression of respiration which is often the cause of death in cases of toxicity. Similarly, the cough centre is depressed, and hence the use of other extracts of opium in various cough syrups. The effect of morphine on the brain centre for vomiting is paradoxical in that it is stimulated, and vomiting is induced.

There are synthetic substances that show effects similar to those of morphine, but have certain therapeutic advantages. Pethidine is one such example, and is the drug of choice in the relief of pain due to renal colic. Severe dependence can develop both to morphine as well as to pethidine. However the condition is not very prevalent in society because of the difficulty of access to the drug. Therefore, most cases of addiction to these substances occur among persons having contact with the medical and veterinary fields.

Morphine, when subjected to the minor chemical change called acetylation, is transformed into the very highly addictive substance heroin. It was first produced commercially in 1898 as a cure for morphinism. The drug is many times as strong as its parent substance morphine, and was originally used to relieve pain in cases of terminal cancer where the risk of producing dependence did not matter in the long run. Heroin is not used now for therapeutic purposes.

The effects of heroin are similar to those of morphine, but much more intense. Its addictive potential is very high, sometimes one intake, and almost invariably a few intakes, being sufficient to cause severe dependence. The drug is a whitish powder, often inhaled as fumes emanating from the heated substance, but at times injected intravenously. The withdrawal effects of heroin are indeed severe, the withdrawn person experiencing sleeplessness, yawning, watering eyes and nose, diarrhoea, sensations of cold, muscle twitches and cramps, abdominal pain, and unbearable pain in the bone and joints.

Certain salient facts emerge from the foregoing description. The number of substances abused by man is numerous. Likewise, although to varying degrees, man becomes dependent on numerous substances (hence the newer usage, 'substance dependence'). Substances of abuse cause physical harm of varying degree to various organs, most appreciably to the brain. They are also responsible for causing harm to the individual and society, spiritually and culturally. Fundamental to the mechanisms by which both individual as well as social harm is perpetrated by drugs of abuse, is the invariable effects they have on the brain with resultant effects on emotions, as well as on the process of thinking. Another factor deserving particular consideration is the structural deterioration of the brain caused by many of these substances resulting in interference with memory and intellect, which in turn can be responsible for national degradation. Future generations can be affected too; that is, by intra-uterine action where the drug has access to the mother, by action on the germ cells of potential parents, and by changes in the personality of children coming from families of substance dependent parents.

As stated, although most of these substances alter the functioning of the brain, the cerebral actions of alcohol help to elucidate the reality of such effects best. The composition of the brain is such that alcohol has a particular attraction to it; hence the immediate effects of alcohol on the organ. The human brain is a large organ, as well as a complex one. Its various parts have to do with, and indeed do control, various functions of the body. Thus, from before backwards, among many others, there are cerebral areas that control movement, sensation, and vision. Close to and below the area responsible for movement, is that which has memory. The small brain situated below the area for vision, is connected with the sense of balance. In the middle of the thin lower stem-like part of the brain is a longitudinal column that maintains consciousness. Close to, and in front of, it are two pin-point nerve centres which control the heart and the process of breathing. If any of these parts were to get depressed, so will the function controlled by it. For instance, if the strip connected with sensation were to be depressed, that person will feel pain less, or not at all. If the small brain is damaged, the person will not be able to stand, or walk straight.

In the central part of the brain there is another area with specific functions governed by it. This is that portion which humans have inherited from their phylogenic history. This part of the brain is the one that governs the basic needs that are common to both man and animals – desires and needs such as those of hunger, thirst, aggression, and sex. Different parts of this area, if stimulated, will arouse the respective need and desire governed by that part. For instance, a particular spot in this area, if stimulated, will make that animal thirsty, and it will continue to drink water even if it be unto death.

It is easy to recognise that man does not always necessarily obey the commands of the mechanism outlined above. A particular desire with regard to a need aroused by a given part of this mechanism may be felt, but unlike an animal, man will not attempt to fulfil it indiscriminately. An animal will, most of the time. Man will control such desires. He will subject it to judgement, and be guided by the dictates of education, feelings of shame, culture, ethics, conscience etc. An animal, apart from perhaps the controls of fear, will have no such built-in restraints. It therefore stands to reason to infer that in the human brain, there should be a part that is responsible for the aforesaid higher functions. There in fact is. It is that portion of the brain situated in front, in relation to the forehead, and hence called the pre-frontal lobe. Therefore, it is the pre-frontal lobe, the higher brain of man that exerts influences of control and judgement, and keeps the base instincts produced by the central part of the brain from uncontrolled fulfilment.

The pre-frontal lobe of a newly born infant is incapable of much control function. In fact, it has to be 'programmed' in early life, through the usual processes of education and socialisation. Most of what is done for growth of personality and for refinement of man really amounts to 'programming' the pre-frontal lobe, enabling it to exert control on the 'animal within man', in conformity with the data supplied to it in terms of good-bad, appropriate-inappropriate, moral-immoral, social-antisocial etc. It will thus be seen that if the pre-frontal brain is not 'trained', and enabled to function as it should, behaviour of such persons would tend to follow the uninhibited dictates of the central brain which is more responsible for an animal behaviour pattern. The same will be true in a situation where pre-frontal functioning is depressed due to one cause or another, even if it had had adequate functional programming earlier.

This in fact is the typical situation with regard to alcohol. Alcohol when in the blood stream reaches the brain very early, and begins by depressing the pre-frontal lobe. The result is a loss of the control that it exerts over thinking and behaviour, approximating the behaviour of the person to that of an uninhibited creature. It amounts to an unleashing of the animal within man. This fact is obvious to any discerning observer. The amount of alcohol consumed and hence the blood concentration of alcohol matters only in so far as the extent of the depression, the quality and nature of this mode of action being the same irrespective of dosage.

Beginning in the pre-frontal lobe, alcohol continues its depressive activity in the brain involving all the cerebral areas described earlier. Hence movement, sensation, memory, vision, balance etc. are all impaired; and yet the base desires predominate with added drive, but now with lesser physical ability for achievement in order to fulfil such desires. It is only when the area governing consciousness is depressed that all activity, both primitive as well as higher, will cease.

The body eliminates alcohol (from body) partly by chemical burning and partly by passage in urine, breath, and sweat. When this is done, after a period of time depending on the total amount of alcohol consumed, the brain begins to regain function; but, complete normalcy takes much longer than is often imagined. (There are certain substances of abuse that maintain altered brain function for periods as long as a couple of weeks after the intake of a single dose). However, it is incorrect to conclude that once the alcohol has left the brain, all is well. Each time alcohol pervades the brain, it destroys some of the brain cells. Once a brain cell is lost due to whatever cause, it is never replaced. The nett result of alcohol consumption is therefore a progressive reduction of available brain cells, thereby causing an impairment of all functions controlled by the brain. In this connection, loss of pre-frontal functions and intellect are predominant. In addition, cerebral deterioration due to alcohol causes a paranoid state where the sufferer develops a doubting mind. Another result is a pathological type of intense jealousy. These disabilities are largely responsible for personality deterioration, and social and family disruptions. The final stage of this brain dysfunction is the development of a condition called delirium tremens. Physically, this condition produces tremors while mentally, the sufferer is troubled by frightening hallucinations of various sorts. This condition can lead to both fatal accident, as well as suicide.

It has already been stated that the number of substances abused by man are very many, and that a large number of these lead to dependence. The question that awaits elucidation is why dependence develops with regard to certain substances, in some people. Much remains unknown with regard to these matters, but what is known reveals both the nature of drugs as well that of man.

Many people who later have become dependent upon a drug have taken it for the first time in order to satisfy a temporary need. The need may be

physical, as in wanting to go to sleep; or it may be psychological, as in wanting to 'feel' better. These two kinds of need may sometimes be combined, as in wanting to feel light, drowsy, and dreamy. On the other hand, it may be that the need to take the drug in the first instance is social, such as wanting to satisfy peers, or to conform to a given social pattern in a particular set of circumstances.

Most drugs produce a feeling of temporary well-being, called an euphoria, in the consumer. This state of euphoria is due to the effect of the drug on the brain. The cause of the euphoria is often a drowsiness, and a blunting of sensations and their appreciation by the brain. Failure, thereby, to perceive the realities of world and life can produce a sense of false well-being. So can impairment of temporal lobe function where inhibitions are lost. There are people who enjoy this phenomenon, obviously without grasp of its true nature. The desire to repeat this transcient 'enjoyment' can make the person repeat the abuse. The ability of a drug to produce such effect is called its re-inforcing potential. Drugs vary in their re-inforcing potential, and those in which this characteristic is stronger, produce dependence easier. Re-inforcing potential is directly proportional to dependence producing ability. Heroin is a good example of a drug with strong re-inforcing potential, and it therefore can produce dependence with a minimum of exposures.

Just as much as there is a variation in dependence producing tendency with various chemicals, so is there a consumer personal difference. With regard to a given substance, different persons have different degrees of affinity, and varying tendencies for dependence. Likewise, in a given individual, the dependency forming potential varies for different chemicals. Thus, the extent and the readiness with which a given person will develop dependence to a particular chemical is an individual factor which depends primarily on the form of certain minute organelles in his nervous system. These structures are called receptors, and are the recepients of drug molecules in the body. The greater the extent of conformity of receptor sites to the shape and form of the molecule of a given chemical, greater is the tendency for that individual to develop dependence to that particular substance. This is an inherent structural characteristic. In fact, attempts are now made to type persons according to their receptor constitution so that the process might yield a dependence tendency grading of people to particular substances.

On the other hand, there are certain mental and personality characteristics of individuals that are associated with, if not causative of addiction, irrespective of the chemical nature re-inforcing potentia of that substance. These are deep-rooted psychological factors such as excessive desire for identity, various complexes etc. In summary, it would be correct to state that a tendency to drug dependence is almost always causatively associated with some inadequacy in personality development. Studies done in Sri Lanka have shown the average heroin abuser to be unmarried male youth of lower social strata, un- or under-employed, and receiving little or no family support.[6] Exceptions to each of these characteristics, however, are seen. Experience has also shown that alcohol dependence is commonest in unstable personalities who have come from problem families, or are themselves parts of problem families. In addition, the part played by society in promoting the drug habit cannot be overlooked. Unjust societies where inequalities prevail, and frustrations are engendered, tend to promote misuse of drugs.

Treatment of persons dependent on drugs is possible, though difficult. A prerequisite for such treatment, however, is that the person concerned should be strongly motivated, and should have the will to withdraw himself from abuse. Treatment itself consists of three stages; namely, withdrawal of the drug, removal of toxic elements from the body, and management of nutritional and other defects invariably concomitant with drug misuse. Withdrawal can be done by merely keeping the dependent person away from the drug, referred to as the 'cold turkey' method. This is painful because of the withdrawal effects. A more humane method is substitution therapy where a less potent but similar drug is substituted in place of the one that has been abused, which is withdrawn gradually. Other methods such as acupuncture, electrostimulation, replacement of body fat etc. have been used with varying degrees of success. Whatever method is used for withdrawal a positive will of the dependent person is paramount to success. So is the empathy, and the understanding of the staff involved in patient care. Adjuvants to medical treatment such as meditation have often proved helpful. Psychotherapeutic manouvres such as self-exposures, sharing of experiences, opportunities for self-expression, vows etc. have all proven to be of use.

The management of a drug dependent person does not stop at the 'treatment' modalities listed above;

6 Various research papers of the National Dangerous Drugs Control Board of Sri Lanka.

nor indeed is it so difficult. The important aspect of management is a process of rehabilitation, which may need prolonged periods of up to 18-24 months. This is the process by which the ex-adict is re-fitted into his family and micro-society from which he came, finds re-employment, gains recognition and identity finds avenues for self-expression, and continues a drug-free life style. For this process to be a success, it is not only the dependent person who has to strive; his family and the constituents of his micro-society have to understand and co-operate. Whatever is done, one has to come to grips with the sombre reality that the results of treatment and rehabilitation, even under the best of circumstances, are poor. Often there are resistant and recurring cases of drug dependence. In such instances, the dependent person's family has to be managed psycho-therapeutically, and taught to face the facts and to get on in life accepting the existing family difficulty as an unavoidable reality.

Prevention of drug dependence is the challenge that faces Sri Lanka. The classical triad of steps in prevention is law enforcement, demand reduction, and treatment. Of these, demand reduction by preventive education is the most practicable step under prevailing circumstances. In earlier times, the communication methodology adopted in preventive education was termed the scare-technique whereby target audiences were scared off the harmful effects of drugs. The effects of this method are found to be short-lived. More effective is education based on reason. More recent experiences have indicated the effectiveness of addressing peoples' feelings on this issue. Another innovative approach is to impart to young people the skills of coping with stress, and the ability to select from alternatives and take positive options.

Viewing the effects of drugs on the individual from a spiritual angle, it becomes obvious that they are a curb on emancipation both at worldly as well as supra-worldly levels. Here and now, abuse of drugs is a cause for financial loss, criminal tendency, unhealthy company, loss of position and human dignity, deviant behaviour, and disruption of family life. There also develops with it a blunting of intellect, and various psychological abnormalities' More importantly, at a higher functional level, sense of morality and ethics is blunted, with obvious consequences. What is even more important is the inability of a drug consumer to appreciate the reality of life, without which ultimate emancipation would be impossible.

NANDADASA KODAGODA

At present drug addiction or drug dependence is a universally prevalent major social problem. Increase in drug production and consumption as well as the ever increasing involvement of the younger generation in drug trafficking and consumption is causing much alarm and concern. The foregoing article which gives the reader a scientific analysis of various drugs, their effect on the human bio-system also states in brief the consequential harm that befall the individual and the society. It shows very clearly that all drugs, in common, cause hallucination, wiping out all sense of propriety, time and reasoning power. In fact all alcoholic substances have this mind-altering effect as their basic common feature, though undoubtedly there is a marked difference in degree between the consequential physical and social harmful effects produced by drug addiction and alcoholism, the former producing much grave and immediate harmful effects than the latter.

Unlike in the present, in ancient societies it was alcoholism that caused much concern as an individual as well as a social problem. This was very much so in India. As evident from the *Rgveda*, use of intoxicating, exhilarating drinks has been a common feature in northern India from very early times. The *Ṛgveda* makes constant reference to the exploits of marauding Aryans who revel in drinking the exhilarating spirituous drink called *soma*. This drink gave such an impetus to their adventurous activities that the Aryans reverentially deified *soma* and built a cult around it. However, as against the high praise and honour showered on *soma* there are also many references in the *Ṛgveda* itself to Indra's—the heroic god of the *Ṛgveda*—numerous misdemeanours under the influence of *soma* and also to sicknesses caused by it (Macdonell and Keith, *Vedic Index of Names and Subjects*, s.v. *Soma*). In spite of the consequential health hazards and its malevolent influence on personal behaviour *soma* was held in high esteem in the Ṛgvedic culture because it exhilarated and emboldened the marauding Aryans in their fight against the native Dasyus. When life became more settled and peaceful the use of intoxicating drinks by members of the society turned out to be a hindrance to social peace and harmony as well as to individual and social well-being. By the time of the 6th century B.C. partaking of alcohol had become such a vital social problem that all major religions of the time condemned it as a menace to individual and social progress. Such downright condemnations are found even in Pre-Buddhistic *Upaniṣads*. Jaina teachings are totally against consumption of alcohol. Buddhist texts, too, contain admonitions against consumption of spirituous drinks, and in

fact the 5th of the five-precepts (*pañcasīla*, q.v.) calls for abstention from falling into heedlessness through consumption of alcohol. Evidence in Buddhist literature points to the fact that economic, social and political changes that were taking place in north India during the 6th century B.C. were instrumental in producing a background conducive to an increase in production and consumption of alcoholic substances, providing opportunities for householders to get more and more involved in consumption of liquor. Not only men, even women were getting involved in this practice (*A*. IV, p. 266). There are numerous instances showing even monks getting involved in consumption of alcohol which the *Vinaya* categorises as an offence deserving expiation (*Vin*. IV, p. 108 f.).

The two most popular alcoholic substances referred to in Buddhist texts are *surā* and *meraya*—which seem to be generic names—both made from plants, grains, yams, fruits etc. (see SURĀ-MERAYA). *Jālogi* and *Kāpotika* are two less known spirituous drinks (*Vin*. II, p. 294; IV, p. 109; *J*. I, p. 360). Buddhism considers consumption of any kind of liquor as an unethical act that should be, avoided (*vajja*) and hence such an act is labelled as an offence (*sāvajja*). The gravity of the offence, however, is said to become more or less in accordance with the consequent mental confusion and hallucination. If no mental confusion is caused the gravity of the offence is less (*appa-sāvajja*) though yet it basically remains an offence. If it causes physical unsteadiness, mental confusion and hallucination, then it is a grave offence (*mahā-sāvajja*). Thus it is seen that even Buddhism was mainly concerned about the influence of alcohol on the human bio-system in general and on the mind in particular. Buddhism brands the habit of consumption of alcohol as a gateway to disease (*rogānaṃ āyatanaṃ: D*. III, p. 182), thus stressing the adverse effects they have on the human bio-system. The *Vyagghapajja Sutta* (*A*. IV, p. 281) calls it a door to the destruction of wealth (*bhogānaṃ apāyamukha*). The *Sigālovāda Sutta* (*D*. III, p. 182 f.) besides calling it a gateway of diseases enumerates five more harmful consequences of consumption of alcohol : i. loss of wealth, ii. increase in quarrels and conflicts, iii. spread of ill-fame, iv. loss of any sense of shame and v. weakening of intellect. Thus it is seen that consumption of such alcoholic substances adversely affects an individual's health, his economic standing, social status, behaviour and conduct and, above all, his intellect.

From an ethical and a religious point of view this last mentioned adverse effect is the most fundamental as well as the gravest one. The effect of alcohol on the brain brings about indolence, negligence, carelessness, remisness and heedlessness. The Pali term *pamāda* connotes all these. The *Dhammapada* (*Dhp. v*. 21) points out that *pamāda* is the basic cause for our languishing in this saṃsāra, succumbing to recurring births and deaths. Therefore it is not difficult to understand the reason why Buddhism—which is concerned with the release of the individual from saṃsāric existence—advocates the avoidance of consumption of mind-altering alcoholic substances. Buddhism shows clear awareness of the harmful effects alcoholic substances have on the brain. This awareness is well manifest when it labels such substances as 'maddening' substances (*unmādantaṃ: Sn. v*. 398). At the beginning this maddening effect may be temporary and is caused by mere intoxication. In the long run, however, the maddening effect may be a permanent feature due to the damage caused to the brain by these alcoholic substances. The final outcome of this maddening effect is the permanent blunting of the intellect which completely prevents the attainment of the knowledge that gives an insight into the real nature of things (*yathābhūta-ñāna*).

Buddhism teaches that to attain this penetrative knowledge that gives an insight into the real nature of things one has to sublimate the mind by gradually culturing it. To elevate the mind to this state one has to cleanse the mind of the five-hindrances (*pañca-nīvaraṇa*) that blunt it (see NIVARAṆA). Ironically, attempts have been made and are still being made to sublimate the mind by using drugs and alcohol. (See *ERE*. s.v. Ecstasy). This practice is quite prevalent now and is fast reaching epidemic proportions. Experiments and researches have clearly shown that the mental rapture experienced by using mind-expanding drugs and alcohol is quite different from the ecstasy experienced through meditational practices. In fact as shown above these spirituous substances are capable of causing permanent damage to the brain and totally blunting the intellect, thus obstructing one's personal well-being and completely thwarting spiritual progress. Therefore there is no doubt that the attempt to sublimate the mind with the help of drugs and other alcoholic substances is doomed to be a disastrous failure.* See further ECSTASY.

S.K.N.

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DRUNKENNESS. In this article it is hoped to discuss the ethical and social implications of addiction to intoxicating drinks, as found in Pali literature.

Scattered references to various kinds of intoxicating drinks[1] addicts to alcohol[2] people who shunned intoxicating drinks of any kind[3] and people who traded in alcohol and spirituous drinks[4] gives one the impression that intoxicating drinks of many kinds were known to Indian people for quite a long time and that drinking was a common feature among many people in that society. It was such a common thing even in the time of the Buddha, that there are references not only to lay men and women but also to recluses and brahamins who used to take intoxicating drinks. In the Vinaya[5], the Buddha refers to recluses and brahamins who were addicts to alcoholic drinks of many kinds, and hence could not make any progress in their spiritual pursuits. Even among Buddhist monks there were some who could not resist the temptation of intoxicating drinks and sought permission from the saṅgha to make it permissible for them to drink a juicy extract called *jalogi* before it fermented into an alcoholic drink. But the request was turned down.[6] Drinking was such a wide-spread practice in that society, that inspite of the fact that it was condemned by the Buddha as a practice that conduced to degeneration not only of the monk, but also of the layman; and inspite of the fact that the Buddha himself had refused permission earlier to monks to drink even an unfermented juicy extract of a tree, we see a group of monks once again seeking official permission from the Order of monks to make it permissible for them to partake of *jalogi*, a hundred years after the death of the Buddha.[7]

From Ṛg Vedic times, partaking of alcoholic drinks was widespread. Indra, the chief god of the Vedic Indians performed all his valorous feats and adventures after partaking of *soma*, the popular alcoholic drink at the time.[8] Subsequently this drink became so popular among them that it was deified, and specific sacrifices were recommended for propitiating this deity.[9] It might not be wrong to conjecture that in these sacrifices the officiating brāhmaṇa priests as well as those who gathered to witness and participate in them partook of this alcoholic drink abundantly.

When Aryans migrated to India, they had to be militant and adventurous in order to conquer and subdue the native people, so that they could establish themselves firmly in those areas. The Ṛg Vedic hymns in praise of Indra often refer to his fighting and subduing foes, who probably were the leaders of the native people.[10] Therefore it is no wonder that these adventurous people had to resort to spirituous drinks to whip up their courage to fight the many obstacles that came their way, and it is also understandable that *soma*, the popular drink at the time, was praised and raised to the position of a god and was propitiated.

When the Aryans began to live more settled lives after subduing the Native Indian people, having driven many of them away further to the south, they must have started to feel the social implications of addiction to alcoholic drinks; and hence when we come to the Vaishnava and Shaiva religions which are post-Buddhist, but nevertheless late developments from the Brāhmaṇa religion, we see strong objection to taking alcoholic drinks; and rules against taking them incorporated in their ethical systems. The Upanishads, too, which are post-Vedic, and some of them even post-Buddhist, contain condemnation of alcoholic drinks as a thing that cause social and spiritual degeneration of man.

Jainism, too, a religion that sprang up as a protest against the corrupt and inhuman religious practices of the Brāhmaṇa religion, exhorts its followers, both monks and laymen, to avoid spirituous drinks and in several places discusses the evil consequences of taking alcoholic drinks. But, here again, it is noteworthy that a refrain against liquor is not included in their basic ethical code for laymen, the five

1 *VvA*. p. 73; *VbhA*. p. 381.
2 *Sn*. *v*. 106; *J*. IV. p. 255; *J*. I. pp. 49, 268; pp. 111. 287.
3 *J*. II. pp. 192, 193.
4 *J*. IV. p. 115.
5 *Vin*. II. p. 295.
6 loc. cit.
7 *Mhv*. p. 22. *v*. 10.
8 Ibid. pp. 3, 5, 9, 18, 20, 23.
9 Ralph T. H. Griffith, *The Hymns of the Ṛgveda*, pp. 57, 59; *ERE*, Vol. 12, n. 614.
10 Ibid. p. 5.

vows.[11] In this respect it is also interesting to note that in some of the earliest texts of the Buddhists too, such as the *Dīgha* and the *Majjhima Nikāyas*, a refrain against liquor is not included among the basic rules of conduct either for the layman or the monk initiate, while in some *suttas* which are as old as the *suttas* of the *Dīgha* and the *Majjhima Nikāyas*, it is included among the five basic observances of a good layman.[12] In the *Veludvāra Sutta* where a practical ethical code for laymen is set down by the Buddha, there is no reference to a refrain against alcoholic drinks. A discourse in the *Dīgha Nikāya*, namely the *Sigālovāda Sutta*, discusses the evil consequences of addiction to liquor, but here too it is not discussed as a refrain along with the other four usual refrains, to wit : refrain from killing, stealing, misconduct in the gratification of the senses and uttering falsehood. Refraining from taking alcoholic drinks is mentioned as the fifth of five rules of training only in several *suttas* in the *Sutta Nipāta*, *Saṃyutta Nikāya* and the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*. In one of them it is said that fear and hatred that an addict to liquor has to experience in this world and in the hereafter, is pacified in the case of one who refrains from taking spirits and liquors of any kind.[13] The second *sutta* says that refraining from taking alcoholic drinks is one of five good qualities in a virtuous woman.[14] The third *sutta* says that refraining from taking spirituous drinks is one of five things that make a person stable and confident.[15] In the *Dhammika sutta* of the *Suttanipāta*[16] where the Buddha admonished the lay disciple Dhammika regarding how to live a righteous life, the Buddha asks Dhammika to refrain from taking intoxicating drinks and also to discourage others who are addicts to them, describing intoxicating drinks as a thing that leads to madness, as a basis for many unwholesome actions, to which only fools are attracted.

How a sane man who normally is kind and harmless to others could become a brute, is illustrated in the *Dhammaddhvaja Jātaka* (No. 220). According to this Jātaka, Elder Sāriputta was born as king of Bārāṇasī, in one of his previous births. This king was strongly addicted to drinking and meat eating. One day the meat prepared for him was eaten by the palace dogs. It was fast day, and as there was no meat in the town, the cook sought the queen's advice. When the king sat down to eat, his small son, whom he loved much, was brought to him in the hope that he might forget to ask for meat. But the plan failed, and in his drunkenness he twisted his son's neck and had his flesh cooked for him to eat. He was very remorseful when he came to his normal senses, and thenceforth he refrained from strong drinks and meat eating.[17]

Kulavāla Jātaka describes how the Asuras were thrown out from Tāvatiṃsa by Magha who was born as Sakka in Tāvatiṃsa as a consequence of the beneficent deeds he performed on earth while born a man. At the time Magha was reborn in Tāvatiṃsa, the Asuras were sharing Tāvatiṃsa with the Suras. Magha did not like this idea. So one day in a feast arranged to welcome the new Sakka and his men in heaven, the Asuras were made to drink nectar heavily, and when they became intoxicated and lost control of themselves, Sakka, with the help of his thirty-three companions, took the Asuras by their feet and hurled them down to the foot of Mount Sineru where the Abode of the Asuras was later established.[18]

In the *Khuddakapāṭha*, which is a minor canonical text, we see the rule of conduct to refrain from taking alcoholic drinks embodied in the ethical code as the fifth of ten precepts to be observed by the monk initiate.[19]

In the *Vinaya*, partaking of any alcoholic drink is forbidden to monks. Though it is not one of the gravest offences that causes a monk to fall away completely from membership of the Order of monks, it is considered a fairly grave offence which requires expiation, before the offender is considered a full member of the Order again. The Buddha while introducing this rule of discipline to the monks clearly shows them how even a very obedient and cultured person like venerable Sāgata could become disrespectful and behave in an unbecoming manner under

11 Dayanand Bhargava, *Jaina Ethics*, p. 103; *ERE.* Vol. 7, p. 470.
12 *Sn. vv.* 387, 388; *A.* 1. p. 212; *S.* 11. p. 69.
13 *S.* 11. p. 69.
14 *A.* IV p. 266.
15 *A.* 111. p. 203.
16 *Sn. vv.* 387-8.
17 *J.* 11. pp. 193-4.
18 *J.* 1. p. 202.
19 *Khp.* p. 1.

the influence of liquor. Having reprimanded Venerable Sāgata for taking alcoholic drinks the Buddha laid down the rule that a monk should not partake of any alcoholic drink, even a tiny speck. The *Vinaya* explanation further discussing this rule of discipline says that a monk is guilty of an offence, which needs expiation, if he drinks alcohol with the knowledge that he is partaking of alcohol, if he takes it with doubts (*vematika*—wondering whether it is alcohol or not), and if he takes in alcohol, but thinking that it is not alcohol. A monk is guilty of a wrong act (*dukkaṭa*) if he drinks something with the feeling that he is partaking of alcohol when actually what he is drinking is not alcohol, or if he is in doubt as to what he drinks is alcohol or not when he drinks a non-alcoholic drink. He is not guilty of any offence if he partakes of non-alcoholic rink with the feeling that he is partaking of a non-alcoholic drink. Further, a monk is not guilty of an offence if he takes in a non-alcoholic drink, but which has either the colour, the smell or the taste of an alcoholic drink; if it is in a concoction of soup, in a concoction of meat, in a concoction of oil, in molasses or in a medicated drink.[20]

It should now be considered why Buddhism objects to taking of liquor by monks as well as by lay adherents. Buddhism being a humanitarian teaching based on the concepts of equality and supremacy of the human being, considers the human mind as of paramount importance. The *Dhammapada* says : Mind is the fore-runner of all things, mind is supreme and things have their origin first in the mind.[21] Buddhism further teaches that all suffering in saṃsāra is due to craving (*taṇhā*), a product of the mind caused by ignorance (*avijjā*) of the true nature of things; and that suffering in saṃsāra could be minimised and ultimately eliminated only by developing insight (*vipassanā*) so that one understands the true nature of things. To develop wisdom, one has to attain concentration of mind (*samādhi*) and to have concentration of mind one has to dispel disturbing tendencies of the mind by practising virtue (*sīla*). To do this one has always to be alert, vigilant, and conscious of what one does. In the *Dhammapada* it is said : "Heedfulness (*appamāda*) is the way to deathlessness, whereas heedlessness paves the way to peril and degeneration.[22] Among other things that conduce to heedlessness of the individual (*pamāda*), addiction to alcohol is an important one (*Pamādaṭṭhāna*). The fifth of the five precepts runs thus : I undertake to observe the precept to refrain from all intoxicating drinks which is the basis for heedlessness (*surāmerayamajjapamādaṭṭhānā veramani sikkhāpadaṃ samādiyāmi*). The objection to alcoholic drinks is plainly because they make a man heedless, i.e., unmindful of what he does. A man has to be efficient (*kusala*) in all his deeds if he wants to minimise suffering and improve his lot, and to do this he has to have presence of mind (*upaṭṭhitasati*). The *Sigalovāda Sutta*, discussing the evil consequences of addiction to alcohol, says that it is one of six ways by which a man's wealth could perish in no time (*bhogānaṃ apāya mukhaṃ*). It further mentions six disadvantages or dangers a man who is an addict to liquor would have to face. They are : Waste of money, paves the way to disputes and quarrels, causes various illnesses, damages reputation, makes one shameless and weakens one's thinking powers.[23]

The commentary to the *Khuddakapaṭha*[24] in discussing this precept enumerates over twenty five advantages that a man could enjoy by refraining from taking alcoholic drinks of any kind : These advantages are : Swift recognition of past, present and future tasks to be done (*atītānāgatapaccuppannesukicca karaṇīyesu khippaṃ paṭijānanatā*); constant establishment of mindfulness (*sadā upaṭṭhita satitā*); freedom from madness (*anummattakatā*); possession of knowledge (*ñāṇavantatā*); non-procrastination (*anālasatā*); non-stupidity (*ajalatā*); non-drivellingness (*anelamugatā*); non-intoxication (*amattatā*); non-negligence (*appamattatā*); non-confusion (*asammohatā*); non-timorousness (*acchambhitā*); non-presumption (*asārambhatā*); unenviousness (*anissukitā*); truthfulness (*saccavāditā*); freedom from malice and harsh speech (*apisunapharusasamphappalāpavāditā*); freedom from dullness both night and day (*rattindivan atanditatā*); gratitude (*kataññutā*); gratefulness (*kataveditā*); unavariciousness (*amaccharitā*); liberality (*cāgavantatā*); virtuousness (*sīlavantatā*); rectitude (*ujutā*); unangriness (*akodhanatā*); possession of conscience (*hirimanatā*); possession of shame (*ottapitā*); rectitude of view (*ujuditthikatā*); great understanding (*mahapaññatā*); wisdom (*medhāvitā*); learnedness (*paṇḍitatā*); and skill in understanding good from harm (*atthānatthakusalatā*).

20 *Vin.* IV. pp. 108-10.
21 *Dhp. vv.* 1, 2.
22 *Dhp. v.* 21.
23 *D.* III. p. 181; pp. 182-3.
24 *KhpA.* p. 34.

Nature of liquor and spirituous drinks is such that when a person takes them they affect the mind. It makes a person temporarily mad and makes a person unmindful of what he does. In such situations a person cannot be alert and aware of what one does, and anything could happen to him or from him in such situations. To maintain social harmony and peace, to have efficiency in all spheres of activity in a society, its members should have presence of mind and alertness all the time. A person who goes under the power of alcohol has no control over himself and hence becomes a source of irritation and harm not only to the members of his own family, but sometimes to his neighbours and the state as well. The unmindful activities of him, will not only make him suffer socially in many ways, but it would drag in many others into difficulty. It would make many people to falter in their social obligations, which would pave the way to inefficiency and corruption, in society. Buddhism has set down a way of life consisting of eight factors[25], wherein right mindfulness is the most important one. A person perfects himself in morals gradually by living an efficient social life, and it is right mindfulness (*sammā sati*) that always guides him in living this efficient social life. A person has to have rightmindfulness to differentiate between right views and wrong views, between right thoughts and wrong thoughts, between right speech and wrong speech, between right action and wrong action, between right livelihood and wrong livelihood, and between right effort and wrong effort. When one is able to differentiate between right views and wrong views etc. and do the right thing having avoided the wrong thing, he not only contributes to social efficiency, harmony and peace, but at the same time gradually and slowly builds up a strong character, his mindfulness grows much stronger and stable helping him to develop concentration of mind (*samādhi*), which would help him to develop wisdom.

W.G.W.

DUALISM is the view that in the fields of (i) metaphysics or (ii) epistemology there are two incompatible and irreducible principles or realms of being. In Western philosophy the term dualism was first used by Thomas Hyde about 1700 A.C. to signify the two supreme principles of good and evil in Persian religion. The terms *dvaita* (dual or plural) and *advaita* (non-dual or monistic) have been in vogue for centuries in Indian philosophy and religion.

Metaphysical dualism is primarily contrasted with monism which asserts one principle of being as, for example, the One of Parmenides or the matter of Materialists. Although dualism is a form of pluralism, i.e., the view that there are many primary substances or principles of being (like the *pañca mahā bhūta* viz., the elements earth, water, air, fire and space in cosmology or the *dharma* in early Buddhist philosophy) dualism could well be contrasted with the general position of pluralism.

Metaphysical dualism could be absolute or relative. If the differences in the two principles involved are irreducible or irreconcilable, as for example, in the case of the Cartesian dualism of spirit and matter, then the dualism is absolute. If there is some sense of reconciliation possible then the dualism could be considered as relative. This reconciliation is sometimes achieved by the opposite principles being based on a more fundamental one. Thus in Roman Catholic Theology spirit and matter are only different modalities in the absolute unity of being.

Metaphysical dualism is seen both in religion and philosophy. Zoroastrianism maintains an absolute dualism between good and evil, light and darkness and the struggles between these is the basis of its cosmology. There is, as we saw, a relative dualism in Christianity between God and creature or spirit and matter. Among the Indian religions and philosophies, an irreducible difference between self or soul and the body is sometimes a feature in the Upanishadic speculations and this commonsensical distinction is developed into a very radical dualism in the Sankhya and Yoga systems which posit the two real and eternal principles of creative substance *prakṛti* on the one hand and the autonomous self *puruṣa* on the other. The *Advaita* Vedanta of Śaṅkara, Ramanuja and others is an attempt to get over the dualistic (or pluralistic) aspects of Vedic and Upanishadic literature in making *brahman* the sole principle of being. But it probably retains some traces of dualism in the distinction between the real (*brahman*) and *māyā* (illusion) and these justifiably could have been inspired by Nagarjuna's distinction between the *paramārtha* (the ultimate) and *saṃvṛti* (the conventional). Buddhism which accepts *anattā* (no-soul) and *anicca* (impermanence) does not base itself on any monistic or dualistic metaphysics and it would be improper to interpret Nagarjuna's Madhyamika system either in terms of a dualism or monism. Cognisance must also be taken of the fact

25 *D.* 1. pp. 157, 165; *M.* 1. p. 118; *It.* p. 18.

that the *advaitin* in Hindu philosophy had to reduce not a duality but a trinity—*brahman*, individual *ātman* and *prakṛti* to a unity.

In Chinese philosophy, the principle of *Yin* and *Yang* form the basis of a dualistic cosmology. *Yin* represents the passive or the feminine and *Yang* the active or the masculine aspects of being. The interplay of these two complementary principles creates the universe. But since *Tao* and the *Wey* is the basic principle of being as well as substance, it determines the *Yin* and the *Yang* and hence, the dualism here could be considered as relative.

In Western philosophy, dualistic theories date from the Greeks onwards. Empodocles reduces existence to the principles of love and hate. Pythagoreans had the principles of the Limited and the Unlimited (based on their study of number) as the basis of the world. Plato had a dualism between the world of reason or ideas and the world of phenomena. Descartes' distinction between body and mind (*res extensa* and *res cogitans*) could be considered an absolute dualism although both depend on God. Kant's philosophy too has an element of dualism in his distinction between phenomena and the noumena.

Epistemological dualism is the view that perception and other forms of cognition which are non-inferential have two aspects, viz., the datum immediately present to the cognizing mind (sense data e.g., red) and the real object cognised (i.e., the object that is perceived e.g., book). Epistemological monism either assimilates the sense content or sense-data to object (realism) or the object to the sense-data or content (idealism).

R. D. GUNARATNE

DUBBHĀSITA. A term pertaining to Buddhist monastic discipline. Literally, an error in speech or improper utterance. Like *Dukkaṭa*, *Dubbhāsita* is a derivative offence, sub-legal in status, traceable to a primary offence of the Pācittiya group (*Vin.* IV, p. 6). *Pācittiya* rule No. 2, legislates against reproachful, insulting speech among the membership of the monastic community (*omasavāde pācittiyam:* ibid.). One who violates this is guilty of a *Pācittiya* offence. Slightly differing conditions which are believed to reduce the gravity of the offence, in some cases, make the offence a *Dukkaṭa*. With further differences, elsewhere, the offence becomes a *Dubbhāsita* (op.cit., p. 11). It is interesting to observe here in passing that the two succeeding *Pācittiya* rules (Nos. 3 and 4) which deal with speech in some way or another (slander and incorrect recital of the dhamma), are however, in their sub-legal category termed *Dukkaṭa* (misdeed) rather than *Dubbhāsita* (error in speech). The *Uttaravinicchaya*, a work of Thera Buddhadatta, believed to be a contemporary of Buddhaghosa, however, adds an instance of *Dubbhāsita* under the *Pācittiya* rule No. 4 (*Vin.* V. p, 419).

Given below in translation are three instances from the *Vinaya* texts dealing with the question of 'insulting speech' (*omasavāda*) where the offence, under differing circumstances, ranges from one of expiation (*Pācittiya*) to one of wrong-doing (*Dukkaṭa*) and one of wrong speech (*Dubbhāsita*).

1. 'If one who is ordained, desiring to jeer at, desiring to scoff at, desiring to shame one who is ordained speaks of a low thing—(a member of) a despised class, a bamboo-plaiter, a hunter, a cartwright, a refuse-scavenger, with low words and says: "You are (a member of a) despised class, you are a bamboo-plaiter, you are a hunter, you are a cartwright, you are a refuse-scavenger," for each sentence there is an offence of expiation". (*Book of the Discipline*, II, p. 178).

2. 'If one who is ordained, desiring....to shame one who is ordained, speaks thus, saying: "There are here some (members of) despised classes, bamboo-plaiters, hunters, cartwrights, refuse-scavengers, "for each sentence there is an offence of wrong-doing' (op. cit. p. 182).

3. If one who is ordained, not desiring to jeer at, not desiring to scoff at, not desiring to shame one who is ordained, (but having) a fondness for joking, speaks of a low thing of a (member of a) despised class, a bamboo-plaiter, a hunter, a cart-wright, a refuse-scavenger with low words, and says. "You are (a member of) a despised class....you are a refuse-scavenger, "for each sentence there is an offence of wrong speech." (op. cit., p. 184). *Dubbhāsita* is the last in the list of seven offences or *satta āpattikkhandhas*. Being a derivative offence it is not of *Patimokkha* standing but is reckoned with in the explanations of the *Vibhaṅga*.

JOTIYA DHIRASEKERA

DUCCARITA. According to Buddhism, human life acquires its quality, good or bad, in terms of its actions through thought, word and deed. Thus a morally or spiritually good character is acquired primarily through the immunity from such bad forms of conduct or action. It is such character defining bad conduct which is envisaged under *duccarita*. Such conduct also degrades the quality of the life to come (. . . *apāyaṃ duggatiṃ vinipātaṃ nirayaṃ upapajjati*, *A*. I, p. 147) in the life after death (*kāyassa bhedā paranmaraṇā*, ibid.). Hence, without eliminating all forms of *duccarita* and positively cultivating its antitheses—*sucarita*, one cannot aspire to commence successfully one's onward march along the path of spiritual progress. This is why the Buddha in his numerous discourses persistently and emphatically admonishes his followers to wean themselves away from *duccarita* and cultivate its opposite, *sucarita*, thus gradually elevating themselves from the position of base worldling (*puthujjana*) to the state of a perfected supramundane being i.e. an arahant. In order to enlighten the followers regarding this essential prerequisite, without which realization of Nibbāna is not possible, the Buddha systematically analyses and lays bare what *duccarita* is, what its harmful implications are, how it affects the individual, what bearing it has on society and how one could overcome it and transform one's character completely in a manner that conduces to the attainment of Nibbāna.

According to Buddhist ethics one's actions are to be taken as the criterion in evaluating one's conduct. Hence, it is on the basis of one's actions alone that one is adjudged as being base (*vasala*) or noble (*brāhmaṇa: Sn. v.* 136). These actions are divided into three categories according to the media through which they are performed. The three media are the body (*kāya*), speech (*vaca*) and mind (*mano*). Thus, bad action performed by these three media are referred to as *kāya-duccarita*, *vacī-duccarita* and *mano-duccarita*. All such bad actions are collectively designated as 'unskilful' or 'unwholesome' (*akusala*, q.v.) whereas its opposite 'skilful' or 'wholesome' (*kusala*, q.v.) actions comprise of good actions performed through the above mentioned three media. In the Pali canon (*D*. III, p. 214; *M*. III, p. 46 f.: *A*. V, p. 264 f.) one finds instances where these three main types of bad conduct are further categorised into ten sub-divisions which constitute the tenfold unwholesome course of action (*dasa-akusala kamma patha*, q.v.) standing in the way of spiritual advancement. The crux of Buddha's ethical teaching is that one should completely abstain from performing all such unwholesame actions (*akusala*) and engage in doing wholesome actions (*kusala*; *Dhp. v.* 183)

According to the Buddha's analysis greed (*lobha* or *rāga*), hatred (*dosa*) and delusion (*moha*) are the root causes from which springs bad conduct (*A*. I, pp. 158, 216). Impelled by these root causes of evil an individual has his 'vision' blurred and consequently becomes unaware of the true state of things. Thus, he loses awareness of the basic facts of life such as that he is subject to old age (*jarā*), disease (*vyādhi*) and death (*maraṇa*). As a result he gets infatuated with his youthfulness (*yobbana-mada*), his health (*ārogya-mada*) and life (*jīvita-mada*), which he falaciously considers as permanent, and indulge in evil activities through body, speech and mind (*A*. I, pp. 146-47). These evil actions that tarnish his conduct further bind him to the state of a base worldling thus leaving no opportunity for spiritual advancement.

The Buddha advocates a path of self-analysis and a transformation of character as the way out from this course of *duccarita*. In advocating this path the Buddha had to primarily dispel certain prevalent views which did not consider moral elevation of conduct as having any bearing on the attainment of spiritual development. Hence, the Buddha completely rejected the view held by some of his contemporaries that there is no adverse effect of *duccarita*. On the contrary he positively declared that there is adverse effect of *duccarita* (*M*. III, p. 211 f.). He very lucidly enumerated the evil consequence of *duccarita* one has to face, not only in this life (*diṭṭha dhammika*) but also in the life after (*sāmparāyika* : cf. *A*. I, p. 49). As immediate evil consequences of *duccarita* the Buddha pointed out that a person with a bad conduct will be burdened with a guilty conscience; will be condemned by the wise; will gain a bad reputation and that he will be in a confused state of mind at the time of death. As an evil consequence that take effect in the life after he will be born in a woeful state, in hell (*A*. III, p. 267). The Buddha did not also fail to point out the severe punishment meted out in this life by authorities to those of evil conduct (*M*. III, p. 164 f.). The strain of evil consequences that burdens one of guilty conscience is also vividly described by the Buddha (loc. cit.). The same source contain also a chilling description of the suffering the wrong-doers have to undergo in their next birth. In another place there is a lively dialogue that is purported to have taken place between the person born in hell as a consequence of his *duccarita* and the lord of the hell *yamarāja*. The latter is represented as teasingly questioning the former as to whether he was even aware of the facts of life such as that he was subject to old age, disease and death when he indulged in *duccarita*. By these means the Buddha

attempts to focus his followers' attention on the seriousness and certainty of evil consequences of *duccarita* and produce a deterrent effect on them and direct them into a path leading to healthy moral development.

The Buddha, points out the lack of restraint with regard to sense organs (*indriya-asaṃvara*,) as the nutrient of *duccarita* (*A*. V, pp. 113, 116, 118). The only remedy for this is restrainment of sense organs (*indriya-saṃvara*). Hence it is said that those who are restrained all round in deed, word and thought are blessed and that a conscientious person who is restrained all round is called a 'guarded' person (*rakkhito : S*. I, p. 73). This guarding has to be effected internally and not externally, for no amount of external cleansing can purify an individual (*M*.I p. 36; *S*. I,p. 169). Self-analysis and self-understanding are of crucial importance to achieve this internal cleansing. This will make one understand that what one is, is the outcome of what one does and what one will be, depends on what one will do. When one equipped with this understanding sets out along the path of the spi itual pregress one's fear of self-reproach (*attānuvāda-bhaya*), fear of reproach by others (*parānuvāda-bhaya*), fear of punishment (*daṇḍa-bhaya*) and fear of falling into woeful states (*duggati-bhaya*) will serve as effective means of controlling one's bad conduct. Similarly, cultivation of such qualities as moral shame and fear (*hirī-ottappa*, q.v.) will certainly help to deter one from falling into *duccarita* for it is said that these two factors namely, moral shame (*hiri*) and fear (*ottappa*) check the whole world and without these the world is bound to fall into utter moral chaos (*A*. I, p. 51).

S.K.N.

DUGGATI (Skt. *durgati*), miserable existence, realm of misery, as opposed to *sugati*, happy-existence, the realm of bliss. There are four realms of misery, namely (1) *Niraya*, purgatory, (2) *Tiracchānayoni*, realm of beasts, (3) *Pettivisaya*, realm of ghosts and (4) *Asurakāya*, realm of Titans (*D*. III, 234, 264; *M*. I, 73, etc; *Mhvyut*. *BB*. XIII, 65; *Mhvu*. I, 42 etc). Its analogous expressions are *apāya* and *vinipāta*. See GATI (1).

DUG-PA, or Duk-pa, a Tibetan sect, an off-shoot of the Kar-gyu-pa (sect), now mostly professed by the people of Bhutan. It was founded by a lama named Gtsang-pa-rgyal-ras-pa (1161-1211 A.C.). It is said that when this lama was building his monastery in the province of Tsang he was surprised by the outburst of thunder (*duk*) and hence, after forming the new sect he called it Dug-pa. A badge, consisting of a vertical cross formed by two thunder dragons, worn by the head lama of this sect is also suggestive of the connection between thunder and the name of this sect. However, there is no evidence, except of course the frequent outburst of thunder and flashing of lightning in the rocky region of Tibet bordering Bhutan where this sect arose, to establish the authenticity of this explanation of the origin of the name.

In the 17th century a lama named Z'ab-drung-ńag-dhań-rnam-rgyal of the Dug-pa (sect) came to Bhutan with a band of soldiers, established himself in power and formed a hierarchy parallel to that of the Dalai lama in Tibet. He took upon himself the title of Dharma-rāja and ruled the country as its spiritual and temporal head. This system continued till 1907, when the last Dharma-rāja died and it became impossible to find his incarnation. Thereupon the Deb-rāja, the regent whose duty was to look after the affairs of the country during the minority of the Dharma-rāja, took over the temporal and spiritual power.

In Bhutan this sect underwent certain changes to suit the indigenous beliefs. The adoption of a fictitious book of revelation which is said to have been unearthed by a lama named Sań-gyas-glińnot only made it possible to incorporate popular beliefs such as witch-craft and spirit-worship into the tenets of this sect, but also facilitated the relaxation of numerous disciplinary rules. (See H. Hoffmann, *The Religion of Tibet*, London, 1961, pp. 156 f.; *ERE*. II, pp. 561 f.).

S.K.N.

DUKKARAKĀRIKĀ. By *dukkarakārikā*, in the Buddhist texts, is meant the whole gamut of austere ascetic practices with which the Bodhisatta experimented in his quest for a solution to the problem of *saṃsāric* ills : (*kudassu nāma imassa dukkhassa nissaraṇaṃ paññāyissati jarāmaraṇassāti*, *S*. II, p. 5. For details of these, See ASCETIC PRACTICES). After

a painful travail of six long years, on attaining enlightenment through a method very different from these, the Buddha was in a position to denounce them as being an extremist way which was of no use for the attainment of the Buddhist goal (*Yo cāyaṃ attakilamathānuyogo dukkho anariyo anatthasaṃhito*, *S.* V, p. 421; *dve'me bhikkhave antā pabbajitena na sevitabbā : Vin.* I, p. 10), and he stigmatised them in no uncertain terms as being spiritually corroding (*anatthasaṃhito*). This, he did, for two reasons. He saw no virtue in the mere rejection of comfort or happiness (*sukha*) and subjecting the body to torment (*attakilamatha*). His attitude to happiness is clearly enunciated in the *Mahāsaccaka Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 247) where, after he was convinced of the futility of austerities as a means to spiritual upliftment, he confesses that he sees no reason why he should flee from happiness (*na kho ahaṃ tassa sukhassa bhāyāmi :* loc. cit.) as long as such happiness did not entail spiritual corruption (*aññatreva kāmehi aññatra akusalehi dhammehi :* loc. cit.), either in its production or its enjoyment. On the other hand, he also held the belief that physical composure resulting from the absence of stress and strain on the body was essential for the attainment of such a state of mental upliftment. 'Through a body extremely emaciated and strained, such a state of mind could not be achieved' he said (*Na kho taṃ sukaraṃ sukhaṃ adhigantuṃ evaṃ adhimattakasimānaṃ pattukāyena :* Ibid. See further CONCENTRATION and CULTURE). Concluding as it were the assessment of austerities as a part of religious life in Buddhism it is said in the *Māra Saṃyutta* (*S.* I, p. 103) that soon after his enlightenment, the Buddha was once under the Ajapāla Banyan trees, rejoicing over the fact that he had freed himself from those spiritually destructive austere ascetic practices which he had taken upon himself in his search for enlightenment (*Mutto vataṃhi tāya dukkarakārikāya sādhu mutto vataṃhi tāya anatthasaṃhitāya dukkarakārikāya*, *S.* I, p. 103).

JOTIYA DHIRASEKERA

DUKKAṬA : A term in Buddhist monastic discipline which evaluates the actions of Buddhist disciples in terms of the codified law of the *Pātimokkha* laid down for them. Literally, a misdeed (*du*+*kata*), a very minor offence, in terms of certain categories of regulations of the said code. These, being derived from primary offences, are sub-legal in status. The term is also used to include offences committed through the violation of rules of procedure as laid down in the *Khandhakas* (q.v.).

In the codified law of the *Pātimokkha* there are seven different categories of rules (*sikkhāpada*, q.v.) regulating the moral and social life of the members of the Buddhist Saṅgha. In a legal sense, all specified conditions must be fulfilled to make a misdeed a punishable offence in its own category. In the absence of such completeness, as well as in the presence of mitigating factors like insanity, misapprehension etc., an offence is placed in sub-legal category, existing outside the codified law of the *Pātimokkha*, nevertheless within the framework of the Buddhist Vinaya. In fact, it can descend, in its seriousness, more than one grade lower.

Both *Pārājika* and *Saṅghādisesa* offences, when they come within this sub-legal category, are referred to as *Thullaccaya*. With lesser conditions satisfied, it can even get reduced to the level of a *Dukkaṭa* (*Vin.* III, p. 48). Under the *Pārājika* offence of stealing, the mere attempt to procure an accomplice for the commission of such an act amounts only to a *Dukkaṭa*.[1] So also is the act of touching a coveted object. But disturbing the position of such an object (*phandāpeti*) results in the higher grade of offence of Thullaccaya. Moving it away from the place where it is deposited (*ṭhānā cāveti*) completes the major offence of *Pārājika* (ibid.). *Nissaggiya*, *Pācittiya* and *Pāṭidesanīya* have their sub-legal offences termed *Dukkaṭa* (*Vin.* III, p. 197; IV, pp. 10, 176). The only instance where the *Dukkaṭa* comes as an offence in its own right is the category of injunctions known as the *Sekhiya dhamma*, the last series in the *Pātimokkha* code, violation of which constitutes a *Dukkaṭa*, neither more nor less. In this latter sense, *Dukkaṭa* can be viewed as a primary offence but its wider use in the Buddhist Vinaya as a derivative offence is clearly indicated.

JOTIYA DHIRASEKERA

1. There are situations in which incidents having the semblance of a *Pārājika* offence, but imcomplete with regard to the fulfilment of required conditions, come to be graded under *Saṅghādisesa* of similar moral tone (See. *Vin.* III. p. 37 and compare with p. 119 ff).

DUKKHA. This term is generally rendered into English as 'suffering', and it is found often used at least in three main contexts. In its ordinary sense of suffering, unhappiness, unpleasantness it is used to denote one of the three categories of feeling namely, unpleasant, painful feeling (*dukkha vedanā*).[1] It is used almost in a religious technical sense with a deeper philosophical significance to denote one of the three characteristics (*tilakkhaṇa*) of all phenomena of existence.[2] It is also used in a very complex sense impregnated with deep philosophical and psychological nuances, to denote an anguishing, tormenting mental experience of varying intensity.[3] The cause of this experience may be physical or otherwise. This experience is so basic and universal that Buddhism points out that all unenlightened beings in their day to day activities of life are bound to undergo this experience on different occasions, due to different causes, in varying degrees and forms. It is this aspect of *dukkha* that forms the content of the 'First' of the Four Noble Truths (q.v.). It is seen also that the conceptions denoted by the above referred three main contexts are interconnected, the former two leading to and converging in the latter one.

The complexity of the idea denoted by the term *dukkha* has been referred to by the Buddha himself. He says, 'In this Noble Truth of *dukkha* described by me, immeasurable are the shades and details, immeasurable the implications . . .' (*S.V.* p. 430). It is so complex that there is no single word in English which could be considered as being exactly coterminous with and covering the same ground as the Pali term *dukkha* (Skt. *duḥkha*). Walpola Rahula Thera very correctly points out that unsatisfactory and misleading renderings of this term have led many people to consider Buddhism as pessimistic. He says, "It is true that the Pali word *dukkha* (or Sanskrit *duhkha*) in ordinary usage means 'suffering', 'pain', 'sorrow', or 'misery' as opposed to the word '*sukha*' meaning 'happiness', 'comfort', or 'ease'. But the term *dukkha* as the First Noble Truth which represents the Buddha's view of life and the world, has a deeper philosophical meaning and connotes enormously wider senses. It is admitted that the term *dukkha* in the First Noble Truth contains, quite obviously, the ordinary meaning of suffering, but in addition it also includes deeper ideas, such as 'imperfection', 'impermanence', 'emptiness', 'insubstantiality'. It is difficult therefore to find one word to embrace the whole conception of the term *dukkha* as the First Noble Truth and so it is better to leave it untranslated than to give an inadequate and wrong idea of it by conveniently translating it as 'suffering' or 'pain'.[4]

Derivation of the term *dukkha* too is not certain. Numerous attempts have been made at getting at its derivation and giving a clear definition. According to the *Pali-English Dictionary* (*PTS.* s.v. *dukkha*) it is derived from prefix *duḥ* plus *ka*. The same source says that some others explain its derivation on the analogy of *sukha*. Buddhaghosa suggests two alternative derivations. (1) "...as to derivation (of the word *dukkha* (suffering) : the word *du* (bad) is met with in the sense of vile (*kucchita*), for they call a vile child a '*du-putta*' (bad-child). The word *kham* (-'ness'), however, is met with in the sense of empty (*tuccha*), for they call empty space '*kham*'. And the first truth is vile because it is the haunt of many dangers, and it is empty because it is devoid of the lastingness, beauty, pleasure and self, conceived by rash people. So it is called *dukkham* (badness suffering, pain) because of vileness and emptiness. (2) As kind of feeling Buddhaghosa derives it semantically. "...It makes beings suffer (*dukkhāyati*), thus it is pain (*dukkha*); or it consumes in two ways (*dvedhā khaṇati*) by means of arising and presence, thus it is pain.[5]

Dukkha is of different types and intensities. For example the *Aṅguttara-nikāya* (III, p. 416) speaks of excessive and trifling *dukkha* and *dukkha* that is slow to change and quick to change. The *Saṃyutta* refers to a better known three-fold division (*S.* IV, p. 259). They are i. *dukkha-dukkha* ii. *viparināma-dukkha* and iii. *saṅkhāra-dukkha*. The *visuddhimagga* explains them in detail. According to it *dukkha-dukkha* (intrinsic *dukkhā*) is so-called because of their nature, their name and painfulness. It explains that physical and mental pleasant feelings are called *viparināma-dukkha* (*dukkha* in change) because they cause the arising of *dukkha* when they change. Feeling of equanimity (*upekkhā*) and the remaining dispositions of the three planes are called *saṅkhāra*

1 For details on this aspect see EXPERIENCE, FEELING, VEDANĀ.
2 See ANICCA, ANATTA.
3 The present article is mainly concerned with this aspect.
4 Walpola Rahula, *What the Buddha Taught*, Gordon Fraser, 1959, pp. 16, 17.
5 *Vism.* pp. 494, 527. As translated by Nānamoli Bhikkhu, in his '*The Path of Purification*', pp. 563, 605.

dukkha (*dukkha* due to dispositions) because they are subject to rise and fall (*Vism.*, p. 499).

Besides these the *Visuddhimagga* (loc. cit.) speaks of other minor divisions of *dukkha* such as concealed *dukkha* (*paṭicchanna dukkha* or *apākaṭadukkha*) in which category is included ear-ache, tooth-ache etc. which afflictions are not openly evident. Afflictions produced by torture etc. is grouped under exposed or evident *dukkha* (*pākaṭa* or *appaṭicchanna dukkha*). Except intrinsic *dukkha* all in the exposition of *dukkha* beginning with 'birth' (*jati*) are called indirect *dukkha* (*pariyāya dukkha*) because they form the basis for one kind of *dukkha* or another. Buddhaghosa identifies intrinsic *dukkha* with direct *dukkha* (*nippariyāya dukkha*).

The Buddha pin-points *dukkha* as the predicament of all unenlightened (*anabhisambuddha*) beings. According to the Buddha's own admission his main concern was the predicament of man and finding a solution for it. In fact it is the recognition of the prevalence of *dukkha* in life and the world that prompted the bodhisattva Siddhārtha (i.e., prior to attainment of Enlightenment) to leave household life.[6] The Buddha succeeded in finding a solution for this predicament, and his success is referred to as 'enlightenment' (*bodhi*, q.v.). After solving his own predicament the Buddha attempted to communicate to others the solution he discovered. In fact this communication was the main objective of his missionary activity spanning over four decades. On more than one occasion the Buddha has summarized his teaching thus : As I did formerly even now I preach about *dukkha* and the cessation of *dukkha* (*M.* I, p. 140; *S.* III, p. 119). As pointed out before *dukkha* forms the 'First' of the Four Noble Truths[7] (q.v.) and it is so fundamental to Buddhism and to the 'Path' it advocates to freedom, that it forms the pivot round which revolve all the teachings of the Buddha.

Buddha's view about *dukkha* and its solution is succintly stated in the *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta* which is supposed to be the Buddha's first discourse. This sutta occurs in the *Vinaya Piṭaka* (*Vin.* I, p. 10) and in the *Saṃyutta-nikāya* (*S.* V, p. 412; cf. *M.* I, p. 185) with minor variations.[8] The definition of *dukkha* presented by the *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta* consists of universally prevalent instances of physical and mental 'suffering' of varying degrees and forms with a final summing up of the whole conception in a philosophical manner. Obviously emphasis is more on the apparent, ordinary instances of *dukkha*, and this is quite understandable when the background and context in which this discourse was presented are taken into account. The texts state clearly how the Buddha initially hesitated to preach as he was not certain whether the listners could grasp such a profound doctrine, unheard of before. So it is natural that he made it a point to use the simplest definition and explanation when he delivered his first discourse to the five ascetics (*Pañcavaggiyā bhikkhu*, q.v.).[9] This simple practical approach of his is very conspicuous at the begining of his dispensation when he had to put across to his listeners novel ideas.

The first part of the definition of *dukkha* in the First Noble Truth which begins with 'birth' (*jāti*) and end in 'not obtaining what one desires' (*Yaṃ pi iccham na labhati taṃ*) introduces this concept in a very broad manner citing most elementary instances that cause *dukkha*. Hence there is no difficulty in

6 *M.* I, p. 163 ff. cf. "Monks, I say that *dukkha* results in bewilderment or search (*sammohayepakkaṃ vāhaṃ bhikkhave dukkhaṃ vadāmi pariyeṭṭhi vepakkaṃ vā : A.* III, p. 316).

7 The three remaining truths are mere extensions of this first truth. They are (ii) the arising of *dukkha* (iii) the cessation of *dukkha* and (iv) the path leading to the cessation of *dukkha*.

8 The *Saṃyutta* version has 13 different items in its description of *dukkha*. These are (1) *jāti* (birth), (2) *jarā* (decay or growing old), (3) *vyādhi* (disease), (4) *maraṇa* (death), (5) *soka* (sorrow), (6) *parideva* (lamentation), (7) *dukkha* (here meaning physical pain), (8) *domanassa* (grief), (9) *upāyāsa* (tribulations), (10) *appiyehi sampayoga* (association with persons and things which are not dear), (11) *piyehi vippayoga* (dissociation from persons and things which are dear), (12) *yaṃ pi iccham na labhati taṃ*, (not obtaining what one desires) and finally (13) *pañcupādānakkhandā* (the five aggregates). The *Vinaya* version drops nos. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 which does not, however, materially alter the content of *dukkha*. The *Vibhaṅga* containes a similar list with the exception of *vyādhi*, and the *Visuddhimagga* (p. 527) justifies its omission on the ground that it's not universally applicable.

9 The five namely, Koṇḍañña, Vappa, Bhaddiya, Mahānāma and Assaji are the first five disciples of the Buddha and they also happened to be his erstwhile colleagues. For details see under individual names and also *pañcavaggiyā bhikkhu*.

understanding it. Commentarial as well as post-commentarial literature contains, detailed explanations of these numerous instances of *dukkha*. One such explanation is found in the *Visuddhimagga* (*Vism.*, p. 499). It takes item by item (*vyādhi* is omitted in this enumeration) and discusses how these either cause or lead to or consist of *dukkha*. Explaining *jāti* (birth) it describes the nauseating conditions under which the foetus exists in the mother's womb, the suffering it undergoes while being there, as for example being burnt when the mother is consuming anything hot etc. and also the pain the new-born as well as the mother suffers at the time of birth. Discussing *jarā* Buddhaghosa points out how ageing brings about disappearance of youth and leads to death, how senility and debility cause both physical and mental suffering. Buddhaghosa attempts to show the difference among *soka*, *parideva*, *domanassa* and *upāyāsa*. He says *soka* is a sort of burning in the mind in one who is affected by loss of relatives and so on. Although in meaning it is same as *domanassa*, he points out that *soka* has inner consuming as its characteristic, whereas *domanassa* has distressing of the mind as its characteristic. Very correctly he explains *parideva* as external manifestation of *dukkha*, both physical and mental, demonstrated by crying and lamentation. *Upāyāsa* he describes as a form of *dukkha* in which *soka*, *parideva* and *domanassa* are all combined in a somewhat sub-dued manner. The item *dukkha* in this list is taken to be physical pain which consequently causes mental anguish[10], and this is contrasted with *domanassa*. The remaining instances of ordinary *dukkha* namely association with persons and things which are not dear, dissociation from persons and things which are dear, not getting what one desires all cause mental anguish.

The last item in this list of enumeration is as follows: *saṃkhittena pañcupādānakkhandhāpi dukkhā* (in brief the five aggregates of clinging are *dukkha*). This appears as a summary of the whole definition in a philosophical tone. However, what exactly is meant by this brief summing up is not easily comprehensible as the other items in the list. The difficulty in getting at the precise meaning is due to the puzzling nature of the term *pañcupādānakkhandhā*. The *Visuddhimagga* (loc. cit.) explanation does not quite well clarify this term. In explaining this term Buddhaghosa says birth (*jāti*) etc. are generated in the aggregates of clinging as weeds, creepers etc. are on the ground. And then he goes on to add that 'birth' is the initial *dukkha*, 'ageing' and 'death' the medial and final *dukkha* respectively of the five aggregates of clinging. In the same vein he describes how other instances causing *dukkha* oppress these five aggregates of clinging. He concludes the whole explanation by saying that "the Blessed One summed up *dukkha* with the statement, 'the five aggregates of clinging are *dukkha*,' in order to show that *dukkha* is present in any of the five aggregates of clinging in the same way that the taste of water in the whole ocean is to be found in a single drop of its water."

This detailed explanation does not quite clearly state what exactly are denoted by the term *pañcupādānakkhandhā*. The impression one gets by reading this is that the term *pañcupādānakkhandā* is synonymous with the more familiar term *pañcakkhandha* denoting the five aggregates into which Buddhism analyses the empiric individual.[11] If the two terms denote the one and the same thing, then the inevitable conclusion would be that as long as these five aggregates (*pañcakkhandha*) remain intact and the individual continues to exist, so long an individual has to undergo *dukkha* on varied occasions, in varying degrees and forms. If this position is accepted then one has to grant that the Buddha and all the other arahants were subject to *dukkha* as long as they lived. But the canonical evidence very clearly establish the contrary position. The attainment of arahantship is co-extensive with the realization of *Nibbāna*, and the realization of *Nibbāna* is defined as the total elimination of *dukkha*.[12] A point to be noted in this regard is that the realization of *Nibbāna* does not make an arahant immune to physical pain. There is abundance of evidence in canonical texts themselves

10 On physical pain see also *D.* II, p. 306; *M.* I, pp. 10, 85-87; *S.* III, p. 1.

11 These are form (*rūpa*), feeling (*vedanā*), perception (*saññā*), obsession (*saṅkhāra*) and consciousness (*viññāṇa*). This, however, is only one such division. There are other divisions into which the individual is analysed, *dhātu* (elements), *āyatana* (gateways) and *nāma-rūpa* (name-form). See *S.* III, p. 101; cf. *M.* III, p. 16 f.

12 *anto dukkhassa : Ud*, p. 80.

to show that arahants as long as their bodies remained intact have on occasions suffered physical pain.[13]

The *Itivuttaka* (*It.* p. 38) describing the state of a living arahant states, "Herein, monks, a monk is a worthy one who has destroyed the defiling impulses, lived (the higher) life, done what has to be done, laid aside the burden, achieved the noble goal, destroyed the fetters of existence and is freed through insight. He retains his five senses, through which, as they are not yet destroyed, he experiences pleasant and unpleasant, sensations and feels pleasure and pain."[14] If realization of *Nibbāna*, as pointed out before, is the end of *dukkha*, then the living arahant's experience of (pleasant and) unpleasant sensations and feelings of (pleasure and) pain is not what is meant by *dukkha* in its religious technical sense. According to the context it appears that the living *arahant* experiences pain (and pleasure) which does not make any impact on him mentally and, therefore, he is not mentally disturbed, agitated or afflicted by such feelings. The fact that he displays no mental reaction to these experiences is still made clear by the *Itivuttaka* description of the state of the dead arahant. Regarding the dead arahant it says, "Herein, monks, a monk....freed through insight. Monks, all his experiences *in which he did not delight* (italics for emphasis) will be cooled here itself". The fact that an arahant even while living did not take any delight (*anabhinanditāni*) in all his sensory experiences (*sabbavedayitāni*) clearly shows his mental detachment from them. Thus, it appears that mental involvement is a necessary ingredient of *dukkha* (and *sukha*—happiness—as well).[15] It is not the mere sense experience that causes *dukkha*, but the mental reaction to it. This fact is very succinctly stated in the *Aṅguttaranikāya* where it is said, "Many forms discernible by the eye, may come within the visual range of a monk whose mind is completely liberated but they do not grip his mind" (*A.* III, p. 377). This is repeated with regard to other sense faculties. The mind of such a person remains unmixed (*amissikataṃ*) with those objects of senses, and remains steadfast and fixed. He sees their passing away (i.e. their impermanence).

Thus it is clear that an arahant in whom the five aggregates remain intact and, therefore, continues to live with his sense faculties functioning, does not experience *dukkha*. This is because his mind is liberated and hence not gripped by sense objects. This also leads to the conclusion that *pañcakkhanda* by themselves are not *dukkha* and that *dukkha* is not an inherent quality of these, though occasionally references both in canonical and non-canonical literature suggest it to be so.[16] This leads to the allied conclusion that *pañcakkhandha* and *pañcupādānakkhandha* are, therefore, not synonymous and do not denote the same thing.

Dhammadinnā in answering Visākha who questioned her as to what was meant by the Buddha when he referred to an enduring individuality (*sakkāya*)[17] says : "Friend Visākha, these five groups of grasping are called 'individuality' by the Blessed One, that is to say group of grasping after material shape (*rupupādānakkhandha*), group of grasping after feeling (*vedanūp*⁰)', group of grasping after perception (*saññup*⁰), group of grasping after obsession (*saṅkhārup*⁰) and group of grasping after consciousness (*viññāṇup*⁰)." When she was further questioned as to whether these five groups of grasping comprise the whole of grasping or whether there is grasping apart from these, Dhammadinnā very clearly answers : "No, friend, Visākha, groups of grasping comprise the whole of grasping and there is no grasping apart from the five groups of grasping. Whatever is the attachment and desire (*chandarāgo*) for the five groups of grasping, that is grasping after them." This indicates a stage when the five aggregates (*pañcakkhanda*) which constitute individuality have turned into objects of grasping (*upādāna*). Thus,

13 For an interesting discussion on this point see 'Sense Experience of the Liberated Being as Reflected in Early Buddhism; Lily de Silva in *Buddhist Philosophy and Culture, Essays in Honour of N. A. Jayawickrame*, Eds. David J. Kalupahana, W. G. Weeraratne; Publ. by N. A. Jayawickrame Felicitation Volume Committee, Sri Lanka, 1987.

14 *manāpāmanāpaṃ paccanubhoti, sukha dukkhaṃ paṭisaṃvediyati;* cf. *M.* III, p. 104 f.

15 It was pointed out before that happiness turns out to be unhappiness (*dukkha*) through change, and this is *viparināma dukkha*.

16 cf. *Vism.* p. 499 f. *Dhp.* v. 202 *n'atthi khandhādisā dukkhā*. *Dukkha* as one of the three characteristics, (*tilakkhaṇa*) of all phenomena of existence, too, is not an inherent characteristic like *anicca* and *anatta*, but more of the nature of an attributive. If it is an inherent quality then it would not be possible to put an end to it.

17 *M.* I, p. 299 f. *Sakkāya* as a technical term refers to an enduring 'self' (*attā*).

upādānakkhanda are *khandhas* i.e. aggregates that have been defiled by grasping (cf. *S.* III, p. 47). How this happens is explained in the *Māgandiya Sutta* (*M.* I, p. 511). One, being deceived, defrauded and cheated by one's mind, grasping grasps form, feeling, perception, obsession and consciousness; and depending on these grasping arise the whole mass of *dukkha*. It is further said that *dukkha* could be ended by putting an end to grasping.[18]

This same fact namely, that *dukkha* is caused by our wrong perception of the *pañcakkhandha* which makes us become attached to them is stated differently elsewhere. Thus, the *Saṃyutta* (*S.* IV, p. 382) records a conversation between the Buddha and Anuruddha on this subject. The Buddha questions Anuruddha whether the five aggregates are permanent or not, to which the latter answers in the negative. Then he asks Anuruddha whether what is impermanent is *dukkha* or *sukha* (pleasant). The latter says it is *dukkha*.

How does impermanence which is an inherent characteristic of all phenomena cause *dukkha*? This, too, is finally due to a deception effected by the mind.[19] Being deceived by the mind one tends to regard what in fact is impermanent as permanent and grasps them. However, when faced with reality (i.e. impermanence) which is contrary to one's expectations, one experiences *dukkha*.

What is apparent from the above discussion is that one's *dukkha* is the result of one's distorted perceptual process. How the perceptual process gets distorted is explained in numerous ways in canonical literature itself. Among other factors man's natural instincts such as desire for pleasure (*sukha-kāma*) and aversion for pain (*dukkhapaṭikūla*) influence all his activities from his birth (*S.* IV, p. 172). As soon as an individual is born he begins to feel the impact of the outside world. By this impact, sensations are roused within him. It is this interplay between the individual (i.e. his sense faculties) and the outside world (objects of senses) that gives rise to suffering, conflict, unsatisfactoriness and such types of mentally anguishing experiences connoted by the term *dukkha*. Therefore, to understand *dukkha* it is necessary to understand what this interplay is and how it takes place, or in other words one should fully comprehend the process of sense perception. *Saṃyutta* (*S.* IV, p. 138) emphatically says that religious life (*brahmacariya*) led under Gotama is for the purpose of understanding the sense organs, sense objects and sense contact i.e. sense perception. It is this understanding that leads to the ending of *dukkha*.

The process of sense-perception[20] through which one forms views about himself and the world around him is described in numerous places in the *nikāyas*. One such analytical description is found in the *Madhupiṇḍika Sutta* (*M.* I, pp. 111-112). It is as follows : Depending on eye and visible form arises visual consciousness, meeting of the three is contact (*phassa*); because of contact arise feeling (*vedanā*); what one feels one perceives (*saññānāti*); what one reflects on, one is obsessed with (*papañceti*); what one is obsessed with, due to that concepts characterized by such obsessed perceptions (*papañcasaññā-saṅkhā*) assails such a person with regard to visible forms cognizable by the eye, belonging to the past, future and the present." The same process is repeated with regard to the other sense faculties.

From this account it is very clear that the perceptual process starts on a very impersonal note and proceeds so till the arising of feeling (*vedanā*). With the arising of feeling the process switches over to a personal note making it appear a subject-object relationship, with feeling as an experience of the subject. This marks the intrusion, which to the worldling is no intrusion at all, of ego-consciousness into the field of sense perception. From this stage onwards up to the arising of obsessions (*papañca*) the process is controlled and guided by the ego-consciousness. Once these obsessions begin to operate the whole process of perception takes a totally new turn. These obsessions assail the subject, who up to then shapes the perceptual process, subjugating

18 Besides *upādāna* numerous other causes are given as the origin of *dukkha*. The *Culla-vedalla Sutta* (*M.* I. p. 299) cites *taṇhā* as the cause of its origin, whereas *Dvayatānupassanā Sutta* (*Sn.* p. 139 f.) views its origin from numerous other angles. *S.* I, p. 22 gives *chanda* (cf. *S.* II, p. 174) while *S.* IV, p 147 cites *sakkāya-diṭṭhi*. Numerous references give *upadhi* as the cause of origin of *dukkha*. cf. *Sn vv.* 364, 1051; *M.* I, pp. 162, 454; *S.* II, p. 108 etc. For a discussion see Lily de Silva op.cit.

19 Mind is the forerunner and guide. The world is led and even put into trouble by the mind (*Dhp.* v. 1; *S.* I p. 39).

20 For a very illuminating discussion on the process of sense perception see Bhikkhu Ñāṇananda, *Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thought*, publ. by Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy, Sri Lanka, 1976 See also David J. Kalupahana, *Causality : The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, Honolulu, 1975.

him to an order of objective things and making him a hapless object. These obsessions are, according to the commentaries, craving (*taṇhā*), conceit (*māna*), and dogmatic views (*diṭṭhi*) which are three aspects of the ego-consciousness. A further analysis makes it clear that these are co-extensive with selfishness or egoism (*mamatta, asmimāna*) and belief in a perduring self (*sakkāyadiṭṭhi*) that prompts one to view the five aggregates as 'this is mine' (*etaṃ mama*), 'this I am' (*eso' hamasmi*), 'this is myself' (*eso me attā*). One's natural instincts such as desire for happiness and aversion to pain further impel and stabilize the ego-consciousness. Due to this egoism all sense data that one's sense-faculties receive from the world outside get an egoistic colouring, perverting his view regarding himself and the world around him.[21]

Due to this perversion of view which causes ignorance he sees things which are by nature impermanent as permanent and things which (due to their impermanency) are non-satisfactory (*dukkha*) as satisfactory (*sukha*) and things which are devoid of an enduring self (*anatta*) as having an enduring self (*attā*, *A.* II, p. 52). His view being veiled by ignorance he craves for things he likes and hates things he dislikes. Foolishly expecting happiness to be everlasting he gets totally engrossed in enjoyment (*assāda*) of sensual pleasures and fails to see its inevitable evil consequences (*ādinava*). He, however when faced with the evil consequences that go contrary to his desires, experiences *dukkha*. How this distortion of view is caused by the mind defiled by ignorance and made to think on egoistic terms is very clearly stated in the *Suttanipāta* (*Sn.* v. 757) : "In whatever egoistic terms they think an object, *ipso facto* it becomes otherwise. And herein verily lies its falseness, the deceptive phenomena that it is."

Canonical literature makes numerous references to a number of theories of causation of *dukkha* (and happiness) prevalent during the time of the Buddha. The *Pāsādika Sutta* (*D.* III, p. 138) refers to eight such theories, namely i. 'suffering' and happiness are eternal ii. 'suffering' and happiness are not eternal iii. they are both eternal and not eternal, iv. they are neither eternal nor not eternal v. they are 'self' caused, vi. they are externally caused, vii. they are both 'self' caused and externally caused and viii. they are neither self caused nor caused by another but come into being fortuitously. The Buddha does not uphold any of these extreme views. He points out that the theory of self-causation, leads to eternalism, while the theory that *dukkha* is caused by another leads to annihilationism. Instead of resorting to any of these extreme views the Buddha as shown above, gives a causal explanation of the origin of *dukkha* (*S.* II, p. 19).

From the above discussion it is seen that according to Buddhism in the ultimate analysis *dukkha* is due to egoism, and that it is ego-consciousness that shapes and gives a particular colouring to the relationship between the individual and the world outside. It is evident, therefore, that the intensity of *dukkha* on a given occasion is relative to the intensity of the ego-consciousness affecting the relationship between the individual and the object belonging to the world outside.

While the 'First' and the 'Second' Noble Truths define *dukkha* and identify its cause of origin respectively, the 'Third and the 'Fourth', Noble Truths deal with the Path leading to its cessation. This Path is the Noble Eightfold Path (See AṬṬHAṄGIKA-MAGGA). This Path presents a very comprehensive programme of training and discipline that leads to one's total inner revolution by the simultaneous perfection of one's morality (*sīla*), concentration (*samādhi*) and wisdom (*paññā*). Development of morality accompanied by restraint of senses promotes concentration. This helps to cleanse the mind of hindrances[22] that obstruct and prevent the development of wisdom (*paññā*). Once the mind is freed of these hindrances and made supple and pliant, one is able to direct one's mind towards the development of higher knowledge (*abhiññā*, q.v.). With the help of *abhiññā* one is able to see things as they have come to be (*yathābhūta*). When one views things as they are or as they have come to be (*yathābhūta*) ego-consciousness and its numerous ramifications that up to then distorted and perverted one's view vanish away. The feelings of attachment (*taṇhā, rāga*) and aversion (*dosa, paṭigha*) that grip and oppress one's mind and subject one to *dukkha* turn into detachment (*virāga*) and disenchantment (*nibbidā*). This disenchantment is a natural consequence of the straightened view. As the *Aṅguttara* says (*A.* V., p. 313), "A person who knows and sees

21 See DIṬṬHI.

22 These are five in number and are called *nīvaraṇa* or *pañcanīvaraṇa*. They are sensuality (*kāmacchanda*) ill-will (*vyāpāda*), sloth and torpor (*thīna-middha*), worry and flurry (*uddhacca-kukkucca*) and sceptical doubt (*vicikicchā*).

things as they are need not make an effort of will saying, 'I shall become detached'. It is the nature of things (*dhammatā*) that a person who knows and sees becomes detached". Non-attachment to what is given in sensory experience helps achieving freedom from bondage to *saṃsāra* (*Sn.* v. 847). The mind of a person who is thus freed attains stability (*ṭhitiṭ*). With his mind made stable, he is able to regard the seen as just the seen, the heard as just the heard, the sensed as just the sensed, the cognized as just the cognized.[23] One, whose mind is so stabilised does not tremble, get ruffled, excited and agitated when faced with the viscissitudes of life.[24] The state of a person who has attained this sort of stability of mind which enables him to withstand *dukkha* is graphically described in the *Aṅguttara-nikāya*: "Imagine, Lord, a mountain crag, cleftless, chasmless, massive; and a squall to come very strongly from the east: it would not shake, nor rock nor stir that crag. Or were a squall from the west . . . from the north . . . from the south, it would not shake nor rock, nor stir it. Even so, Lord, if objects cognizable by the eye come very strongly into the range of a monk's vision—wholly freed in mind, they obsess not his mind and his mind is untroubled, firm, having won to composure; and he marks their set so, too, of sounds, smells, tastes, touches and ideas . . .

Dispassion, minds detachment, harmlessness,
Graspings and cravings end, mind undeluded:
Who hath applied himself these, hath seen
  Sensations rise—his mind is wholly freed;
And in that monk, calmed, wholly freed, naught need
Be added to what's done, naught due is found.
As massive crag by wind is never moved,
So sights, tastes, sounds, smells, touches, yea, the things
  Longed for and loathed, stir not a man like that
  His mind stands firm, released; he marks their set.[25]

What is apparent from the foregoing discussion is that *dukkha* is an anguishing experience inevitably to be undergone by the unenlightened persons due to their perverted vision regarding life and the world. The enlightened, as their vision is perfected, do not become subject to *dukkha*. The conception of *dukkha* thus presents an explanation of the predicament of the unenlightened man in relation to the external world. It does not, as some take it to be, represent the Buddha's view of life and the world[26], in general. *Dukkha* being the most elementary and universal fact of experience undergone by the vast majority of beings, the Buddha adopts it as the principle on which he bases his scheme of spiritual training leading to wisdom, which gives a clear understanding of life and the external world, enabling one to overcome *dukkha*.

S.K.N.

DUKKHĀNUPASSANĀ, seeing correctly, realising or cultivating an outlook (*anupassanā*) with regard to the unsatisfactoriness (*dukkha*) of all phenomenal existence, summed up in Buddhism as the five aggregates (*pañcakkhandha*), namely, matter (*rūpa*) sensations (*vedanā*), perceptions (*saññā*), mental forces (*saṅkhāra*) and the psyche (*viññāṇa*). It forms one of the three aspects of realisation of the true nature of all phenomena, (See *S.* II, p. 110 f.), the other two aspects being impermanence (*anicca*) and the non-substantiality (*anatta*). It involves seeing or understanding everything that exist as giving rise to suffering, owing to the conflict generated through their

23 *Ud.* p. 8. The advice given to Bāhiya Dārucīriya.

24 These are generally regarded as eight in number (*aṭṭha lokadhamma*). These are gain (*lābha*), loss (*alābha*), good repute (*yasa*) and ill-repute (*ayasa*), praise (*pasaṃsā*) and blame (*nindā*), happiness (*sukha*) and unhappiness (*dukkha*).

25 See *A.* III, p. 377 f. *Gradual Sayings*, III, pp. 269 f.

26 The emphasis laid on the conception of *dukkha* (*M.* I, p. 140; *S.* III, p. 119) and some canonical statements such as 'the world is established on *dukkha*' (*dukkhe loko paṭiṭṭhito*: (*S.* I, p. 40) and such other reasons too appear to have influenced this conclusion that *dukkha* represents the Buddha's view on life and the world. But when the concept of *dukkha* is thoroughly analysed and these statements are viewed in their proper contexts it becomes clear that *dukkha* does not represent the Buddha's view of life and the world around the individual, but demonstrate the lot of the unenlightened people. It is this untenable and unfounded assumption that *dukkha* represents the Buddha's view of life and the world, that has led many to consider Buddhism as pessimistic.

continually changing nature. This realisation thus never arises in isolation; it always dawns together with the other two aspects of realisation, mentioned above.

It dispels the perception of pleasure (*sukha-saññā* : *Ps. I*, pp. 47, 58; II, pp. 42, 67; *Vism.* 239, 520) a wrong notion that naturally arises in the undisciplined mind with regard to the five aggregates and constitutes the major impediment to the realisation of Truth (loc. cit.).

See ANATTĀNUPASSANĀ, ANICCĀNUPASSANĀ, ANUPASSANĀ and DUKKHA.

UPALI KARUNARATNA

DUL-VA (vars. *Dul-ba*; *Ḥdul-ba*=Pali and Sanskrit *Vinaya*) is the first of six sections constituting the Kangyur (q.v.) which is one of the two main divisions of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka, the other division being the Tangyur (q.v.). The *Dul-va* which is the Tibetan counterpart of the *Vinaya Piṭaka* of the Pali canon is based on the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya* written in Sanskrit. It runs into 13 volumes in the Snar-than edition.

The *Dul-va* contains seven parts of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya*, and they are as follows :

i. *Ḥdul-ba-gshi* (*Vinaya vastu*). This was translated in the 9th century from the original Sanskrit by Sarvajñadeva and Darmākara of Kashmir, Vidyākaraprabha and the Tibetan scholar Dpal-gyi lhun-po. This was revised by Vidyākaraprabha and Dpal-brtsegs (*TM.* No. 1).

ii. *So- sor- thar- bahi mdo* is the Tibetan version of the *Prātimokṣa Sūtra* (*TM.* No. 2).

iii. *Ḥdul-ba rnam-par-ḥbyed-pa* is the Tibetan rendering of the *Vinaya-vibhaṅga*.

This enumerates the 253 rules for the monks with examples illustrating how their transgression takes place. This text contains also rules pertaining to the dress and general etiquette of monks. (*TM.* No. 3)

iv. Dge-Slon-mahi so-sar thar- *bahi mdo* corresponds to the Sanskrit *Bhikṣuṇī-prātimokṣa Sūtra* (*TM.* No. 4).

The above three texts were rendered into Tibetan by Jinamitra and Kluḥi rgyal-mtshan.

v. *Dge slon - maḥi ḥdel-ba rnam-par ḥbyed-pa* is the Tibetan version of *Bhikṣuṇī-vinaya-vibhaṅga*. The rendering is by Sarvajñadeva, Dharmākara, Vidyākaraprabha and Dpal gyi lhun-po. A revision of this was done by Vidyākaraprabha and Dpal-brtsegs (*TM.* No. 5).

vi. *Hdul-ba phran-tshegs-kyi gshi* comprising of two volumes is the Tibetan rendering of the *Vinaya-kṣudraka-vastu*. Vidyākaraprabha, Dharmaśrībhadra and *Dpal-ḥbyor* are its translators (*TM.* No. 6).

vii. *Ḥdul-ba gshuṅ bla-ma* is known in Sanskrit as the *Vinaya-uttara-grantha*. The translator is said to be Kluḥi rgyal mtshan. Three scholars namely, Dor-ma-seṅ-ge, Byaṅ-chub- seṅ-ge and Thsul-krims yon-tan are said to have revised this text.

Alexander Csoma de Kōros who spent a life-time in Tibet studying Tibetan literature has given a summary of these in an article under the title 'Analys du Kandjour et du Tandjour'. This was published in 1881 in the *Annals du Musée Guimet*. See also *Asiatic Researches*, Vol. 20, p. 41 ff. etc.

These seven parts of the *Dul-va* are to be found in the Peking edition of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka (ed. by D. T. Suzuki) under the numbers 1030, 1031, 1032, 1033 1034, 1035, 1036-7.

Besides matters relating to *Vinaya* (discipline) the *Dul-va* contains also *jātakas*, *nidānas*, *avadānas* and *udānas*. For example its third volume contains 13 *jātakas* while the fourth contains 39 such tales. Burnouf points out this mixed nature of the text as a feature common also to the Sanskrit original.

It is interesting to note that the *Dul-va* sheds much light on the history of early Buddhism and also that the accounts of the Councils of Rājagaha and Vesāli contained in its 11th volume differ from the Pali and Chinese versions. (cf. W. W. Rockhill, *The Life of the Buddha*, London, Trübner & Co., Ludgate Hill, 1884, p. iv). See also BKAḤ-ḤGYUR.

M.KR.

DURĀROHĀ, See BHŪMI.

DUṬṬHAGĀMAṆĪ ABHAYA, popularly known as Gāmaṇī and Duṭṭhagāmaṇi, was one of the early Buddhist Kings of Sri Lanka (circa 161-137 B.C.) who occupies an important place in the history of the island as a powerful monarch as well as a great patron of Buddhism. He was the elder son of Kākavaṇṇa Tissa, the ruler of Rohana in the southern region of Sri Lanka, and Vihāradevī, the daughter of the ruler of Kalyāni, modern Kelaniya. Kākavaṇṇa Tissa was a direct descendant of *uparāja* Mahānāga, the younger brother of King Devānampiya Tissa (q.v.), who fled from Anuradhapura under tragic circumstances and established himself at Mahāgāma. Thus Duṭṭhagāmaṇī was a scion of the princely house that took refuge in Rohana and therefore a person with a claim to the throne of his forefathers. He was also duty-bound to defend and foster Buddhism which was introduced and established in the country during the time of Devānampiya Tissa, his ancestor.

The *Mahāvaṃsa* (chap. xxii-xxxii) is the main source of information on the history of this ruler. Its author who considered Duṭṭhagāmaṇī as a national hero describes his career in eulogistic terms attributing a supernatural character to the events of his period.

Duṭṭhagāmaṇi was born at a time when the political power in the northern part of Sri Lanka was in the hands of a powerful Tamil (Damila) ruler named Elāra, from south India. The *Mahāvaṃsa* (chap xxi, v. 13 ff.) describes him as a lover of justice, but under him Buddhism did not enjoy the same active support given to it by king Devānampiya Tissa and his immediate successors. Moreover, some of Elāra's soldiers appear to have treated the Buddhist shrines and the bhikkhus with scant respect. Records in Pali commentarial literature, chronicles and grass-roots literature like *Sahassavatthu* and *Rasavāhinī* bear ample testimony to this fact. The *Mahāvaṃsa* (chap. xxiii, v. 9) refers to damage caused to Buddhist monuments by the Damilas. While describing the campaigning against this trend and the mobilising of forces to stem this tide, the *Rasavāhinī* refers to incidents of Bodhi-trees being cut and Buddhist monks being harassed by the Damilas[1]

There was at that time, a Kṣatriya family in Rohana with links to the ruler of Kalyāni. The policy of Kākavaṇṇa Tissa, father of Duṭṭhagāmaṇī seems to have been to weld together the various elements of political power in Rohana into one unit under his own person. He achieved this unification by peaceful means. He married Vihāradevī the daughter of the ruler of Kalyāni who was related to the Kataragama-Kṣatriyas and in consequence of this, the princely family of Kataragama which had borne authority in that region, from the time it was colonised by the Sinhala settlers, became united around the person of Duṭṭhagāmaṇī when the need arose. This matrimonial alliance between Kākavaṇṇa Tissa and Vihāradevī put an end to the clash that existed between the two hostile princely families of Rohana as they now came to be connected by marriage. To win over the kinglets of Seru and Soma—the two princes who were the rulers of the northern part of Rohana, he made use of the attachment to Buddhism of the Sinhala nobles as well as the people and in this regard he received the cooperation of a Buddhist monk named Cūlapiṇḍapātiya Tissa who was respected by all. This monk made it known that the frontal bone relic of the Buddha which was in Kākavaṇṇa Tissa's possession was destined to be enshrined in a *stūpa* at Seru. When Kākavaṇṇa Tissa proceeded with his army to build a *stupa*, it being an unobjectionable visit, the princes of Seru and Soma with their retainers received Kākavaṇṇa Tissa with the honour due to an overlord and assisted him in the building of the shrine. Thus Kākavaṇṇa Tissa resolved the rivalries of the various factions having a claim to overlordship of the Sinhalese, and paved the way for Duṭṭhagāmaṇī to count upon the undivided loyalty of the people of Rohana (University of Ceylon, *History of Ceylon*, Vol. I, pt 1, Colombo, 1959, pp. 145-55).

It was the ambition of prince Gāmaṇi from his childhood to regain and restore the cultural supremacy of the Buddhists which was eroding under the pressure of the invader. His father Kākavaṇṇa Tissa was himself preparing against threats from the invader. Kākavaṇṇa Tissa raised an army from among able bodied men of Rohana and had it trained, and established workshops for the manufacture of weapons to equip his soldiers and had garrisons posted at strategic points along the course of the river Mahaveli. But he was cautious not to encourage any rash and premature adventure. When Gāmaṇī was prevented by his father from undertaking a campaign against Elāra—a formidable foe-at an inopportune time, the father's refusal of permission

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[1] *Laṅkāyam damilā dāni chindantā bodhipādape-thūpe ca paṭimāyo ca vināsesuṃ anekadhā....bhikkhavo sīlasampannā accinnacīvarā bhītā....Rasavāhinī*, ed. K. Nanavimala, p. 198).

was taken by Gāmaṇī as cowardice on the part of his father and is said to have sent the latter women's ornaments to wear. The father's resistance and the retaliation of the son led to an estrangement between them and the young prince was forced to flee the palace to take refuge in Malaya—the hill country of Rohana.

Kākavaṇṇa Tissa died when Gāmaṇī was hiding in Malaya. On receiving the news the prince returned to Mahagama, the capital of his father's kingdom and after a brief encounter with the younger brother Tissa (Saddhā Tissa), he established himself as the ruler of Rohana. After gaining control over affairs of Rohana Gāmaṇī sent his brother Tissa back to Dīghavāpi with instructions for an intensive campaign of food production. He wanted to store provisions at Dīghavāpi, a base from which his advancing forces could be easily supplied. Modern historians remark that Duṭṭhagāmaṇī anticipated the greatest military genius of modern Europe by acting on the principle that an army marches on its belly. In his march against Eḷāra, Gāmaṇī and his advisers instilled the ideological factor into the minds of the soldiers that they were risking their lives and fortunes, not in their self interest, not for the aggrandisement of their king, but solely in defence of their religious and cultural heritage, which was so dear to them. Thus Duṭṭhagāmaṇī's campaign against Eḷāra was to foster the religion, and to give emphasis to this fact the monks of Tissamahārāma-vihāra gave a relic of the Buddha to be enclosed in the sceptre of the king, and a band of Buddhist monks accompanied the army to perform religious rites and ceremonies and to rehabilitate deserted *vihāras*, as and when the necessity arose. Vihāradevī the queen mother also accompanied the son and shared the perils and hardships of the campaign with the common soldier. It was her counsel and willingness to play the part of a decoy, in the trap to ensnare the Tamil commander, that helped Gāmaṇī to capture a stronghold at Ambatittha. When Eḷāra advanced with the main body of his forces, with redoubtable Dīghajantu at their head, to give battle to Duṭṭhagāmaṇī at Kasāpabbata, it was Vihāradevī's advice that helped the Sinhala forces to rout Eḷāra's army. Then Duṭṭhagāmaṇī marched against Eḷāra and in a final combat the Tamil ruler was slain by Duṭṭhagāmaṇī himself. He became the ruler of the whole island with Anuradhapura as his capital.

King Duṭṭhagāmaṇī ruled at Anuradhapura for twenty-four years (161-137 B.C.). After his accession there was peace in the country. He entrusted the economic development of the country to his brother Tissa (supra). Thus he could devote full time to further the development of Buddhism which he declared as the sole aim of his war against the Tamils (*Mhv.* xxv. 17 f.). He constructed several Buddhist monuments surpassing in size those that were constructed prior to his time. Three of them are famous, namely the Maricavaṭṭivihāra, the Lohapāsāda and the Mahāthūpa now known as the Ruvanvälisāya.

The Maricavaṭṭi-vihāra, the first undertaking, is eloquent of Duṭṭhagāmaṇī's devotion to the saṅgha, for it was built as a penance for partaking of some long pepper (*marica*) without giving a share of it to the monks. It was built on the spot where Duṭṭhagāmaṇī's sceptre, containing a relic of the Buddha given by the monks of Tissamaharama, remained firmly embeded in the earth and no one being able to remove it. Its construction was completed in three years and on the occasion of its consecration ceremony a hundred thousand monks and ninety-thousand nuns are said to have been present (*Mhv.* xxvi, v. 8 ff).

He built the celebrated Lohapāsāda, which is described as a magnificent edifice of nine storeys and nine hundred chambers, for the use of the saṅgha as a meeting hall (*uposathāgāra*). This building was roofed with plates of copper, thus giving it the name Lohapāsāda "Brazen Palace". The stone pillars on which this huge building stood are seen to this day in the neighbourhood of the sacred Bodhi tree at Anuradhapura. The Mahāthūpa was the greatest of King Duṭṭhagāmaṇī's works. It was an undertaking which speaks of the boldness and daring which were the outstanding features of Duṭṭhagāmaṇī's character, for in his day a monument equalling or even nearing it in size existed nowhere in the whole of the Indian World. It is significant that the king was determined to have it constructed without exacting from his subjects the free labour to which he was entitled, and ordered payment of remuneration to all workmen. The materials for the construction were readily received as donations but the donors remained anonymous. Great multitudes of monks from different places, local and foreign, attended the foundation laying ceremony and the ceremony held for the enshrinement of relics.

The King, however, fell ill before the *chatta* and the plaster work of the *thūpa* were finished. He sent a message to his brother who was at Dīghavāpi to come and complete the work. Tissa arrived and realising the critical condition of his brother, covered

the *thūpa* with white cloth so as to appear as if it was plastered. A *chatta* too was made of bambo reeds and the king was told that the *thūpa* was complete. Lying on a palanquin the king passed round the *cetiya* and paid homage to it. Then he was placed on a couch at a place between the Mahāthūpa and the Lohapāsāda, and looking at the two splendid monuments, he became glad at heart. Theraputtābhaya who was a soldier in Duṭṭhagāmaṇī's army, now a resolute monk, admonished the king on the impermanency of all material things and requested the king to contemplate on the meritorious work he had accomplished. The book in which the mertorious deeds (*puñña-potthaka*) of the king were kept recorded was read to him. This postwar record of Duṭṭhagāmaṇī's meritorious deeds reveals that he was an ardent Buddhist. It has been stated that the king built ninety-nine *vihāras* and provided alms to the community of monks and nuns. He held twenty-four *Vesāka* festivals, bestowed robes to the whole saṅgha, had a thousand lamps with oil and white wicks burning perpetually in twelve places as an offering for the Buddha, and bestowed food and medicine on the sick, constantly, at eighteen places. Oil for lamps was distributed on the *uposatha* days. He decreed the preaching of the doctrinne all over the island and bestowed gifts on the preachers. His last words to his successor Tissa were to complete the mahāthūpa and not to be slack in his duty towards the saṅgha.

There is yet another aspect of Duṭṭhagāmaṇī's character which is less known and lamentably less admired. This pertains to his magnanimity and his political wisdom which in turn reflects the extent to which he had imbibed the culture of Buddhism. All that was expected of a just and fair ruler in terms of Buddhist teachings was portrayed in his character as a king. His war against the Damilas, who were dominating in the northern section of Sri Lanka, assailing the culture of the Buddhists, has to be viewed as a war of defence. The atrocities and ravages caused, perhaps not by too representative a group of the invaders, were, nevertheless considerably damaging both to the spirit of the majority community and to their cultural heritage. It is equally clear that it was for the failure to arrest this mob violence that Elāra, who was acclaimed as a just ruler, had to pay with his life. But a war, no matter what triggers it off, is an economic disaster on the land and of this, Duṭṭhagāmaṇī appears to have been fully conscious. The *Mahāvaṃsa* (*Mhv* XXVIII, v. 4) records that on the eve of initiating the construction of the Mahāthūpa, Duṭṭhagāmaṇī lamented the fact that the war against the Tamils had brought about affliction upon the people (*Damile maddhamānena lokoyaṃ pīlitomayā*) and for that reason he could levy no more taxes to raise money for the Mahāthūpa project. This accords with the general Buddhist view that all taxes should be just and fair (*-dhammikaṃ baliṃ*). Duṭṭhagāmaṇī seems to have been equally concerned about the welfare of his subjects on the question of work and wages. In the construction of the Mahāthūpa he insisted that all workmen be paid adequate wages and that food and other gifts be provided for them at the work-place to be picked up according to each one's choice. Such was the stature of Duṭṭhagāmaṇī as a just and magnanimous ruler.

M. Kr.

DUTY, in its widest sense is action that embodies the binding force of what is right and proper and applies to all human behaviour, ethical as well as non-ethical. In ethics the term duty (derived from the Latin *debitum*—owing, debt) expresses the basic concept of moral obligation, what one is bound to or ought to do individually or collectively. The history of human thought records a wide variety of concepts of duty each based on a distinctive religious or philosophic outlook pertaining to the nature and destiny of man and the universe.

Duty is a central concept in Buddhist social ethics, and the different aspects of its meaning are embodied in terms like *dhamma*, *karaṇīya*, *kattabba* and *vatta*. Duty is a species of purposeful behaviour which is binding and obligatory on the individual and the society alike. Duty as distinctive conduct in thought, word and deed is a form of normative action functionally related to human ends and means. Since all human behaviour is relative to some goal or other and since duty is part of the means of realising ends, it is clear that duty as goal-directed action must necessarily lend itself to operational evaluation. In the Buddhist view, duty is not an absolute category to be defined in the abstract and in isolation. Nor is it an imposition from without by a 'divine' agency considered as either God or impersonal cosmic absolute. The element of 'compulsion' involved in the performance of duty is therefore, in Buddhism, not an external restraint or sanction. With the Buddhist, the motivation for performance of duty is an inner incentive. The pre-set goal of Buddhism, as set out and enjoined in the sacred texts as the

Summum Bonum, is *Nirvāṇa* which is defined as freedom (*vimutti*), inner peace (*ajjhattasanti* and) wisdom (*paññā*). *Nirvāṇa* as freedom is essentially release from the life of self-centredness which is rooted in, and sustained by greed (*lobha*), hatred (*dosa*) and ignorance (*moha*). To be is to be related and the individual has to live not only within human society but also constantly surrounded by the greater biological and physical environment of the entire universe. The relation between man and his environment need not be one permanent conflict, for in reality it is a constant symbiosis. What this means in the context of human life is that the individual needs society just as much as society needs the individual for their healthy growth and mutual well-being. Generosity, love and wisdom (*alobha*, *adosa*, *amoha*) rather than greed, hatred and ignorance are found to be conducive to the realisation of peace, harmony and enlightenment both within the individual and among individuals in society. The duties enjoined on the Buddhists are precisely those means which seek to bring about such ends within man and society alike.

It is clear from the fore-going statements that duty in the Buddhist view is not moral action performed under duress and coercion. It is moral conduct deliberately and conscientiously acted out and is motivated by the creative power of one's own analysis and understanding of the relevant facts of life. Duty in Buddhism is thus directly born of freedom of choice and moral responsibility and is grounded in knowledge and understanding..

The connection between duties and the demands of others comes out clearly in the fact that we use the word 'obligation' as a synonym for 'duty,' and this word is derived from a root meaning 'tied' an obvious metaphor for coercion. Obligation could be divided into three categories such as obligation by circumstances, obligation by threats and moral obligation. The latter limits the range of free choice. In fulfilling a moral obligation, a man chooses to do what he does, but does not choose freely. The feature which distinguishes moral obligation from all others is that the former is self imposed. The obligation to do one's duty needs justification. The view which seeks to justify the purpose of moral action is called the '*teleological*' view of ethics. And the view which seeks to emphasise duty, rather than purpose, as the fundamental concept of ethics is called the '*deontological*'. According to the teleological view duty and obligation have to be defined in terms of purpose whereas according to the deontological view the notion of duty or obligation is incapable of being analysed or made dependent in this way.

Buddhism refers to three criteria upon which people base their performance of duties. One's duty may be informal, inspired and directed by (i) social convention (*lokādhipateyya*) or (ii) the authority of doctrinal sanction (*dhammādhipateyya*) (iii) one's own conscience (*attādhipateyya*).

Among the social obligations mentioned in the Buddhist literature, an apt example could be cited from the *Saṃyuttanikāya* (*S.* I, p. 33) where it says that those who make groves and plant fruit trees, who cause bridges, dams and wells to be constructed and who provide shelter (to those who are homeless), would acquire great merit and birth in heaven would be the result after their death.

While the inner peace of *Nirvāṇa* can be realised only by each individual within himself, the peace, harmony and well-being of society can be promoted, and needs to be promoted, both by individual and collective effort. Man's primary social group is the family which has endured to this day from times prior to the birth of all civilizations. The family is the human society in miniature. The health of the human social organism depends on the health of the family whose members widen their inter-relations to form wider organisations such as the tribe, caste and community, nation and international brotherhood. Buddhism recognizes the vital role of the family as the cradle of social ethics. Familial relationships form the base of the pyramid of Buddhist social morality. After stabilising the foundations of familial duties Buddhism has carefully gone into the duties that are proper to members of other social classes engaged in a wide variety of work in different spheres of life. Teachers and pupils, masters and servants, clergy and the laity, guests and hosts, kings and subjects have been studied in their inter-relations and inter-actions and have been found to owe duties to each other and one another. Duties entail rights but Buddhism, consistent with its basic outlook of detachment and altruism, has tended to place its emphasis on the former. In a situation where everybody performs his duty obsession with rights appears both pointless and selfish.

In the *Sigālovādasutta* of the *Dīghanikāya* (*D.* III, p. 180-93) the Buddha has declared in detail the reciprocal relationship (*aññamañña*) between parents and children, teachers and pupils, between friends, masters and servants and clansmen, clergy and brahmins.

The Buddha confirmed and emphasized the family relationship exhorting all the persons who decided to remain in the worldly life to maintain the family ties together with the dignity of the family as a social unit. In order to gain this goal the Buddha says the parents and children should discharge their duties towards each other properly. A child is expected to support his parents since they supported him at one time, take upon himself the duties incumbent on them, keep up the lineage and tradition (*kulavaṃsa*) of his family, follow the method of inheritance and make gifts in due course to the dead. The parents are expected in return to show their love for their children by restraining them from vice, exhorting them to virtue, training them for a profession, arranging a suitable marriage for them and handing over to them the inheritance in due course.

In Buddhism the relationship between teacher and pupil is highly valued. A pupil should rise from his seat in salutation, wait on the teacher, desire to hear him, render him personal service and honour him by reception. The teacher should reciprocate to his pupil by teaching and training him well, making him grasp all the arts and crafts thoroughly, speaking well of him in the presence of his friends and companions and by making him secure in everyway including the knowledge of his duties towards the rest of the society.

Of the more advanced type of advice given to householders, a great deal of importance has been attached to the relationship between husband and wife. According to the Buddha, a husband should be courteous to his wife, not despise her, be faithful to her, should hand over the authority to her and provide her with necessary adornments. On the other hand the wife should minister to her husband by ordering the household well, by being hospitable to his and her relatives, by being faithful, by taking care of his wealth and by being efficient in discharging all her duties.

According to the *Sigālōvādasutta* a friend should be ministered by a clansman thus: he should be 'generous, courteous and benevolent towards his friends by treating him as he treats himself and by being as good as his word. The friend in return should love him, protect him when he is off his guard, and on such occasions should guard his property, be a refuge to him in danger, not forsake him in his troubles and show consideration for his family.

In describing how a master should minister to his servants and employees, the Buddha has declared that the former should assign them with work according to the strength of the workmen, support them with food and wages, look after them in their sickness, share with them the rare delicacies and grant them leave according to need. In return for the master's kindness, the servants and employees should rise before the master rises, go to sleep after he has done so, take what is given to them, work well and establish a good reputation for him.

The duties of a clansman towards the recluses and the brahmins are described in the following manner. The former should be affectionate towards the latter, by keeping his house open to them and by supplying them with their temporal needs. His kindness should be appreciated by the latter by restraining him from doing evil deeds, exhorting him to do good deeds, loving him with kindly thoughts, teaching him what he has not learnt, correcting what he has learnt and by teaching him the way to Nibbāna.

The *Metta Sutta* (*Sn.* v. 143-152) and the *Mahā-maṅgala Sutta* (*Sn.* p. 46 f.) are two important suttas where the various aspects of duties of a layman are described. The first sutta which teaches mainly the practice of goodwill towards all beings like a mother fostering her only son, mentions that a layman should be diligent and upright, gentle, free from deceit, not wish harm to another etc. The second sutta describes thirty-eight auspicious actions (*maṅgalāni*) which should be performed by a layman. A layman is expected to avoid the company of fools, associate with the wise, honour the worthy ones, reside in a suitable place, carry out the prescribed rules, cherish his parents, wife and children, be pious, look after the kith and kin, shun all evil, listen to the dhamma, practise patience, be courteous and pursue diligent study of the dhamma etc.

In such Buddhist texts like the *Jātakaṭṭhakathā*, the duties of a righteous king are described. The usual phrase '*dasa rājadhamme akopetvā dhammena rajjaṃ kāresi* (he ruled in righteousness without violating the ten-fold code of the king) occurs in several places. A righteous king should be endowed with such qualities like generosity—*dāna*, morality—*sīla*, liberality—*pariccāga*, honesty—*ajjava*, gentleness—*maddava*, simple living—*tapa*, non-anger—*akkodha*, non-violence—*avihiṃsā*, forbearance—*khanti*, and agreeability—*avirodha* (*J.* I, p. 260, II, p. 400; III, p. 274, 320; V, pp. 119, 378).

An aspect of the meaning of duty is covered by the term *vatta* which is defined as 'that which is done, which goes on or is customary, i.e. duty, service,

custom and function' (PED). Four sets of reciprocal duties on the part of those who share the cells (*saddhivihārikavatta*), the preceptors (*upajjhāyavatta*), the pupils (*antevāsikavatta*) and the teachers (*ācariyavatta*), are dealt with at length in the *Vinayapiṭaka* in a chapter specially devoted to duties or *vatta* (*Vin.* II, p. 222 ff.). One who shares the cell (*saddhivihārika*) with a preceptor is expected to get up early and attend to the needs of the latter and offer him his robes etc. If he desires to visit the village, he should, with his consent accompany him as his attendant. On his return the latter should offer him water to wash himself and generally look after his needs until he finishes his mid-day meal. In accordance with his wish he should give him either warm or cold water for his bath. If he wishes to speak, he should be allowed to do so without any disturbance. His dwelling place should be well cleaned by the *saddhivihārika*. If the preceptor is either remorseful or holds wrong views, he should be advised by the pupil, reminding him about the dhamma. A *saddhivihārika* is not expected to do anything such as giving or receiving an alms-bowl, a robe and a requisite without the knowledge of the preceptor. He should not leave the dwelling place without receiving the consent of the preceptor to do so. The preceptor should be well looked after while being ill until he fully recovers. In return for his services the preceptor should help the former in regard to recitation, interrogation, exhortation and instruction. He should be attended to by the preceptor exactly in the same manner in which he was looked after by the former. The duties mentioned above are common to the pupil (*antevāsika*) and the teacher (*ācariya*) as well

Another aspect of the meaning of duty is denoted by the term '*karaṇīya*' which is defined as that which ought to be, must or should be done (*PED.*). This term often occurs in Buddhist canonical texts (*D.* I, p. 85; II, p. 68; *M.* I, p. 271; *S.* III, p. 68; IV, p. 281; *A.* I, p. 58; IV, p. 16; *Vin.* III, p. 12; I, p. 39). The three-fold duties of a monk (*samaṇakaraṇīyāni*) and of a farmer and householder (*kassakassagahapatissakaraṇīyāni*) are discussed in the *Samaṇavagga* of the *Aṅguttaranikāya* (I, p. 229). These duties of monks and laymen could be described as self directed duties. The three-fold duties of a monk are : to understand the training in higher morality, higher thought and higher insight and that of the farmer are : to plough and harrow the field, to sow the seeds at the proper seasons and to let in and let out the water in the proper seasons.

With the gradual transformation of the life of eremitical mendicancy into one of settled monasticism among the Buddhist saṅgha, the circumstances of corporate life and commensality made it necessary for the monks and nuns to prescribe detailed duties incumbent on different classes of monastic residents. In the *Sammappadānavibhaṅga* (*VbhA.* p. 297) eight sets of such duties are mentioned. They are the eighty-two small duties, the fourteen large duties, the fourteen kinds of duties to be performed towards each of the following namely : the open space round the bodhi-tree, the drinking vessel (*pānīyamāḷaka*), the hall in the monastery where the *pātimokkha* is recited (*uposathāgāra*), the guests and the itinerant monks

Performance of one's duties has been emphasized so much by the Buddha that it has become part and parcel of the life of both the laity and the clergy. It is a means by which one achieves the goal of happiness both in this life and in the life after.

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INDUMATHIE KARUNARATNE

DVĀRA. The word *dvāra* which in Pali and Sanskrit means door, doorway, has a very special significance in the ethico-religious context of Buddhism as implying the doorway of each of the six sense organs. The first five of these, viz. eye, ear, nose, tongue and the body are the external organs while the mind, the sixth, is regarded as an internal organ. Through the first five of these, stimuli from the world outside enter the cognitive arena of each individual being, and set in motion a ceaseless process of mental conflict and imbalance, which results from the surrender by man of cautious judgement to over-riding emotion (*anupaṭṭhitakāyasati ca viharati parittacetaso . . . So evaṃ anurodhavirodhaṃ samāpanno . . . M.* I, p. 266). This is the process of mental corrosion, diversely known through terms like *upādāna* (=grasping),

āsava (=defilement) and *saṁkhāra* (=conditioning for existence) which plunges him deep in the ocean of saṃsāric turmoil. Thus the sense organs are fittingly called *dvāra* or doorway because they provide the point of contact between the sentient being and his external world : the point of entry through which the world invades and overwhelms man. Herein emerges the five aggregates of grasping or *pañca upādānakkhandha*, through maladjustment towards which flow all the distress and unsatisfactoriness of life. (See *M.* I, 190 f.). The Buddhists recognise at this point the proclivity of the human mind to be attracted and repelled in terms of objects and things which please and displease (. . . *piyarūpe rūpe sārajjati appiyarūpe rūpe byāpajjati* . . . *M.* I, p. 266). It is indicated that this puts the mind out of gear and prevents it from comprehending the real nature of life which alone leads to purity and wholesomeness of life itself (ibid.). It is because of this final verdict of the Buddhists on the day to day process of communication with the world outside, which is looked upon as the process of gathering momentum for saṃsāric perpetuation, that the good disciple is called upon to lead his life in the world with the entries to the sense organs well guarded (*indriyesu guttadvāratā*, *D.* I, p. 70). The verb specifically used here to refer to this is from the root/*gup*—to guard, watch over. The other verbal concept found in this same context is *saṃvuta* (Skt. *saṃvṛta*) which literally means close, shut, i.e. close or shut the door, barring entry. Hence the derived meaning of *saṃvuta* as restrained.

In Buddhism, the mechanics of this cognitive process and the consequent data processing is as follows. The five physical or external sense organs—the eye, ear, nose, tongue and touch each has its own independent door way or point of entry, without interconnections among themselves. The co-ordinator of these is the sixth sense organ of mind (*manu*) which in addition to this role, has its own independent functioning (*M.* I, p. 295; *S.* V, p. 217 f. See also *M.* I, p. 190). The mind, while it thus does the processing of raw data for the five external organs to build up their respective areas of knowledge, jointly and severally, indulges in its own function of analysing and processing, over and over again, the data which is stored up in the form of *dhammadhātu* which it has collected through the other sense organs. (For further details regarding the Buddhist explanation of this process see COGNITION, INDRIYA, PERCEPTION). It is because of this active and conscious role of the mind in making decisions with a remarkable degree of personal responsibility that the Buddhists look upon the possibility of guarding and restraining this door way or point of entry through an educative process of evaluation and judgement. The word *citta* is also sometimes used to refer to this role of the mind. (See such usages as *cittaṃ guttaṃ sukhāvahaṃ : Dhp. v.* 36). It is through such correct judgement that entry is refused to what is known to be confusing and involving. For if the *dvāra* or the doorways of entry are not properly guarded, evil ways of thought invade the mind of man through these channels (. . . *yatvādhikaraṇaṃ enaṃ cakkhundriyaṃ asaṃvutaṃ viharantaṃ abhijjhādomanassā pāpakā akusalā dhammā anvassaveyyuṃ : M.* I, p. 346). Attraction and repulsion by way of reaction to sensory stimulation has to be watched over at this stage. For it is this process of being torn between these two positions that puts the mind ill at ease (*piyarūpe rūpe sārajjati appiyarūpe rūpe byāpajjati . . . evaṃ anurodhavirodhaṃ āpanno* . . . *M.* I, p. 266). It is here that a correct awareness of the self and the world outside (*ajjhattika* and *bāhira*) with regard to their real nature (*yathābhucca*) is needed. That is the knowledge of *anicca*, *dukkha* and *anatta* (of transciency, unsatisfactoriness and soullessness). This, the Buddha pointed out to Rāhula (*Mahā Rāhulovāda sutta : M.* I, p. 421) as the most profitable cultivation of mind. This is what leads to the desirable detachment of mind (. . . *cittaṃ virājeti :* op. cit., p. 422) and the consequent equipoise in which state the likes and dislikes which arise in the mind do not overwhelm a man (. . . *uppannā manāpāmanāpa phassa cittaṃ na pariyādāya ṭhassanti*, op. cit., p. 423). That awareness automatically bolts the doors of sense organs (*dvāra*) the moment a threat of invasion by sense stimuli is indicated.

JOTIYA DHIRASEKERA

DVĀRAPĀLA. See GUARDSTONE.

DVĀRAVATĪ, an ancient Buddhist kingdom in Thailand (Siam) which has left innumerable survivals of its culture particularly in the field of Buddhist art.

According to Siamese annals this kingdom was established in the early centuries of the Christian era by the Indianised groups of the Mon People from lower Burma who gradually settled themselves in the Me-Nam valley and carved out a kingdom for themselves. This kingdom with its administrative centres probably at Lopburi and also at Lampun (in the

North) had lasted until cir. 1000 A.D., when the Khmers conquered them and established the Mon-Khmer hegemony with the capital at Lopburi, to be ousted themselves by the more determined and war-like Thais who descended from the ancient Nan-chao kingdom of the Yu-Nam province of southern China when that region was threatened by the Mongol invasions of the legions of Kubilai Khan.

Although most writers believe that Siamese culture begins with the Dvāravatī period such a surmise is untenable. According to tradition one region where Asokan missioneries have reached is the Suvarṇa-bhūmi (the land of Gold). This particular region is identified with the territory of lower Burma and Siam which has innumerable legends and traditions locating the "land of Gold" within this terrain. It is quite probable that Buddhism reached these parts of South Asia at a very remote date. This view is confirmed by archaeological finds, belonging to the supposed kingdom of Dvāravatī, that are of archaic design, e.g. objects illustrating the Buddha in aniconic form like the Wheel of Law, Symbol of the Sacred Feet, etc. carved on stone. Nevertheless the true Dvāravatī period is reckoned from about the 6th century A.C. with an abundance of Buddhist images that resemble very much post-Gupta or pre-Pāla art of the mainland India and also the classical Sinhala Buddhist statuary from Sri Lanka. The last fact is discernible if a close study is made of Dvāravatī survivals.

There is a consensus of opinion among scholars of Siamese history that the religion that prevailed in the kingdom of Dvāravatī was Theravāda Buddhism which fact itself is strong evidence for the possible ties this kingdom had with Sri Lanka from the earliest times. Dvāravatī, the first Siamese kingdom founded by the Mon people collapsed after the 10th century when the Khmers first and the Thais subsequently over-ran these territories. Nothing substantial of Dvāravatī architecture survives except for foundations and fragments in the region where the kingdom was centred and one or two monuments at Lampun, the little kingdom to the north that was a cultural offshoot of Dvāravatī. Regarding a fragment of Dvāravatī architecture one recent writer observes—"an assemblage of pilasters and balconies, volutes and arches carved in stone—is an aerial palace with well-fed godlings peering from the dormers to see what is going on below. Stucco reliefs of scenes from the Buddha's life must have been numerous in Dvāravatī art, but only fragments remain" (A. B. Griswold, *Art of Siam*, No. 2 for 1960, p. 131).

At the outset, the school of Dvāravatī must have employed Indian and also Sinhalese master artists, but their work has disappeared. The Mon sculptors owe much to Sinhalese and Indian proto-types, and especially to the Gupta and classical Sinhala styles from Anuradhapura, but they did not take over the conventions of any one of these outside schools wholesale. The finest products of Dvāravatī art in stone, bronze, and terra-cotta images of the Buddha, are full of simple dignity and lacking neither in grace nor in finish.

Images in the seated position generally follow the Indian and Sinhalese proto-types but with certain adaptations. The two standing bronze images discovered respectively from Phong-Tuk (A. B. Griswold and L. B. Buribk, *Images of the Buddha in Thailand*, Bangkok, 1957, fig. 2 and 3) and Korat province (op. cit. fig. 4) show clearly how the Gupta and the Sinhala art traditions have prevailed in the Dvāravatī school concurrently.

The *Pong-Tuk* image shows both the shoulders covered with a slight disturbance of the horizontality of the figure recalling the *Praxetalian dehanchement*, or to use a more conventional oriental term the *Tri bhaṅga* pose whereas the Korat image has every resemblance to the equipoised erect Buddha figures common to Sri Lanka from the earliest times. Moreover the Korat one has the *cīvara* covering only the left shoulder. The hand poses, too, bear every likeness to several Buddha miniatures from Sri Lanka discovered from ancient sites like Veheragala, Medavacchiya, and the imports from Sri Lanka like the Celebes bronze Buddha.

A stone bas-relief from Nagara Prathama (Nakon Pathom) represents the Buddha in the typical preaching position of late Gupta style Ajaṇṭā images. The legs are hanging down (*pralambapāda*, op. cit., fig. 5). But the ethnic type of the human figures in this panel including that of the Buddha is pure Mon.

The square faces, thick everted lips and prominent jaws with robust muscular physique differentiate the true Mon art of Dvāravatī easily from the imported models.

Of the Buddha images there are various representations e.g. the Buddha in *Dharmacakra Mudrā* and seated in the so-called European fashion or *pralambapāda*. The Buddha images seated in the *dhyāna* pose betray the easy leg position of the traditional Sinhalese icons. The hand pose of these images is often the *bhāsparśa* (earth-touching) attitude. However *varada* (bestowing favours), *abhaya* (dispelling

fear), *ākhyāna* (instructing) *mudras* are also not absent in these hand poses (*op. cit.* figs. 6, 7, 8, 9).

It is clear that Dvāravatī style in Buddhist art was superceded by styles of subsequent periods like the Lopburi, Ayudhyā, U-Thong etc. The characteristic Dvāravatī features in Buddhist statuary remained unchanged for many more centuries in Siamese art.

Although Dvāravatī disappeared from the political arena, the traditions set up by it, especially in regard to Buddhist statuary, were adopted as canons for the growing Buddhist cultural centres of subsequent times that have arisen within and without the southern Siamese locale. Both the Thais and the Khmers have benefitted much from the Dvāravatī school of Buddhist art Some centres of the later Mon-Khmers and of the Thais where Dvāravatī art tradition flourished are Lopburi, Nakhon Paihon, Nakon Si Tammarat, Pong-Tuk, Ratburi, Ku-Bua, Supanburi, U-Tong, Bejrapura (pet Buri), Dong-Si-Maha Bodh-(Si-Maha-Pot), Lampung (Haripuñjaya). Historians have surmised that this was the most important seat, if not the capital itself, of the Dvāravatī kingdom.

Nagara Paṭhama (Nakhon Pathon). The chief attraction here is the huge Pathamacetiya. It is possible that the outer *stūpa* encases a series of others of which the innermost may go back to Dvāravatī times or even earlier. The Pathamacetiya is surrounded by a circular gallery in which are exhibited a quantity of statuary, stone wheels of the Dharma and many more Dvāravatī antiquities discovered in the neighbourhood by chance or by excavation. A small *vihāra* has been turned into a museum which contains stucco-reliefs and architectural fragments of the Dvāravatī period. In another *vihāra* next to it is one of the masterpieces of Dvāravatī sculpture, a stone Buddha seated in the European fashion, brought from Wat Bhah Meru in the previous century (A. B. Griswold and C. B. Buribhand, op.cit., fig. 6).

Another valuable piece of Dvāravatī sculpture from Nagara Paṭhama is a large stone relief carving representing the Buddha in the *Dharmacakra mudrā*, seated in the European fashion. The plaque is fragmentary but representations of other figures indicate that the carving is the depiction of the first sermon. The *Pañcavaggiyā* monks are seated in deferential attitude at the Master's right side. The Buddha is flanked on either side by a caurī (fly-whisk) bearing personage, probably two diviinties, and a multitude of other beings, human or divine, fill the scene (L. B. Buribhand and A. B. Gripwold, op. cit., fig. 5).

Several other sites in and around Nagara Paṭhama have yielded Dvāravatī antiquities.

Nakon-Si-Tammarat (Nagara Śrī Dhammarāja)—exhibited in a museum in the great Relic monastery—is a collection of Buddhist antiquities discovered in the locality including two Buddha statues of the Dvāravatī style.

Pong-Tuk. Excavations conducted in the early decades of the present century by George Coedes disclosed important vestiges of Dvāravatī architecture at Pong-Tuk in Rājapurī (Rat Burī) province. Numerous antiquities too have been discovered at this site including several bronze Buddha images of Dvāravatī style. (L. B. Buribhand and A. B. Griswold, op. cit., fig. 2).

Rājapurī (Rat Burī) province is rich in antiquities belonging to the Dvāravatī period. Periodical rebuilding has covered many original Dvāravatī structures. Even the great Relic monastery here is supposed to be a structure built on a site where there was a Dvāravatī period temple. Remains of Dvāravatī Buddhist architectural forms have been discovered from the close by township Ku-Bua. A natural grotto, known as the Rishi's Cave (Tam Rusi), situated about 5 miles northwest of Rāj Burī, has a relief carving on its inside wall depicting the Buddha in European style betraying every characteristic of the Dvāravatī period Buddhist art and this has been further substantiated by an inscription datable to the 7th century A.C. attributing the work to the holy rishi Śrī Samādhigupta.

Supanburī (Subarnapurī—city of gold); at Wat Parileyyaka of this city, there is a colossal Buddha image about 65 ft. high, seated in the European fashion, which the critics of Siamese art believe to have originated from the Dvāravatī period, but has been so much restored that its exact date of origin is uncertain.

U-Tong (Yet another city claiming the name 'City of Gold'). Recent excavations conducted by H. G. Quaritch Wales (1936) and by J. Boisselier (1961) show that the site has been continuously occupied from pre-historic times to the end of the Dvāravatī period. It was one of the greatest cities of the Dvāravatī kingdom and has yielded a wealth of bronze and other forms of statuary of Dvāravatī Buddhist art.

Lampun (Hari Puñjaya) was founded in the 7th cent. by the Mon princess Cammadevī from Lopburi. Its Mahāyāna monastery is an ancient site, judging from a few chance discoveries there, including a stone

deer in the Dvāravatī style, evidently intended to hold a *Dharmacakra* (Wheel of the Dhamma).

A.D.T.E.P.

DVATTIṂSĀKĀRA, a Pali term meaning thirty-two aspects' which refer to thirty-two constituents of the human body. The Buddhist view of the human body, from the anatomical point of view, is that it is composed of thirty-two constituents and this view is apparently based on knowledge of ancient Indian anatomy that had been developed through ages by way of actual dissection of the body itself. (See BODY).

The term *dvattiṃsākāra* does not occur in the suttas although the thirty-one (and not thirty-two) parts of the body are listed therein (*D.* II 293; *M.* I, 57, IV. 90, *A.* V. 109) in connection with the first *satipaṭṭhāna* (q.v.). It is in the *Khuddakapāṭha*, a late text which has come to be included in the *Khuddaka nikāya* of the Pali Sutta Piṭaka, that we find for the first time the list of thirty-two parts under the title *dvattiṃsākāra* (*Khp.* p. 2). In the sutta period, the term could not have originated since the suttas contain only thirty-one parts and not thirty-two (*dvattiṃsa*). In the subsequent period, as is evident from the commentaries, the term is invariably employed with reference to the thirty-two parts of the body.

The thirty-two parts are 1. hair of head (*kesa*), 2. hair of body (*loma*), 3. nails (*nakha*), 4. teeth (*danta*), 5. skin (*taco*), 6. flesh (*maṃsa*), 7. sinews (*nahāru*), 8. bones (*aṭṭhi*), 9. marrow (*aṭṭhimiñja*), 10. kidney (*vakka*), 11. heart (*hadaya*), 12. liver (*yakana*), 13. pleura (*kilomaka*), 14. spleen (*pihaka*), 15. lungs (*papphāsa*). 16. large intestines (*anta*), 17. small intestines (*antaguna*), 18. gorge (*udariya*), 19. excrement (*karisa*), 20. bile (*pitta*), 21. phlegm (*semha*), 22. pus (*pubba*), 23. blood (*lohita*). 24. sweat (*seda*), 25. fat (*meda*), 26. tears (*assu*), 27. serum (*vasā*), 28. saliva (*khela*), 29. snot (*siṅghāṇikā*), 30. synovic fluid (*lasikā*), 31. urine (*mutta*) and 32. brain (*matthaluṅga* : D. II, 293; *M.* I. 57, III, 90; *A.* V. 109; *Khp.* 2, Vism. 249 ff.).

As we have already said the last item. i.e., *matthaluṅga* does not appear as a part in the suttas. Buddhaghosa explains this omission by saying that in the suttas, it is included in *aṭṭhimiñja*, the ninth item (*Vism.* 240). But, when the significance of the brain came to be realised most probably in the post-sutta period, it has been considered a separate item.

Viewed in the light of modern anatomy, the view that the human body is composed of thirty-two parts may not seem comprehensive, and scientific, in the strict sense of the term– although it is not inaccurate. It is perhaps due to the fact that the Buddhist theory of body is advanced not for the sake of scientific knowledge, but for the purpose of educating the *yogin* with the doctrine of *anicca*, *dukkha* and *anatta* by showing that the body is a composite organism and that there remains nothing that can be called a body when analysed, and also for the purpose of infusing aversion to one's own body by showing that the body is full of loathsome impurities (*pūraṃ nānappakkārassa asucino*. *D.* II, p. 293).

These thirty-two parts form a subject for meditation. Contemplation on these parts severally is referred to as a *kammaṭṭhāna* and it occurs under various titles in the texts. It forms an aspect of *kāyānupassanā* (q.v.) in the two *satipaṭṭhāna-suttas* (*D.* II, 293; *M.* I, 57) and an aspect of *Kāyagatāsati* in the *Kāyagatāsati sutta* (*M.* III, 90). It is called *asubhasaññā* in the *Girimānanda sutta* (*A.* V. 107) and *paṭikkūlamanasikāra* and *kāyagatāsati* in the *Visuddhimagga* (p. 240). *Kayagatāsati* or *paṭikkūlamanasikāra* is one of the forty *kammaṭṭhānas* enumerated in the *Visuddhimagga* (ch. viii).

A bhikkhu must contemplate on the fact that his own body is composed of thirty-two parts; that it could be analysed into thirty-two items. When it is so analysed there remains nothing that can be called a body, there is nothing permanent underlying it. Realisation comes to him that his body is *anicca*, *dukkha* and *anatta*. This realisation is what is called *yathābhūtañāṇa*: seeing things as they really are. He also comes to know that these parts are impure and loathsome; that his body is full of loathsome impurities.

Seeing his own body impermanent and loathsome, he becomes averse to it (*nibbidā*). The person who is averse to his own body because it is loathsome—he naturally gives up his attachment to it; he becomes detached from it (*virāga*). One who is averse to and detached from his own body attains absolute freedom (*vimutti* : *A.*V. 2-3). Attainment of absolute freedom is the real purpose of contemplation on *dvattiṃsākāra*[1].

UPALI KARUNARATNA


1 Perhaps for the purpose of attaining the same goal of detachment, the *Satipaṭṭhāna Suttas* (*D.* II, 294; *M.* I, 57) also recommend the contemplation on the analysis of the human body in terms of the four major elements (*dhātu*, i.e. *mahābhūta*) of which it is composed (*dhātuso paccavekkhati*). Here the discipline on the mind is brought about not through the feeling of loathsomeness as in the case of *dvattiṃsākāra* but through a feeling of relative voidness and substancelessness.

DVEṢA (Pali, dosa) meaning malice, hatred, ill-will, is one of the three root-causes of unskilful or unwholesome actions (*akusala-mūla*) the other two being *rāga* (attachment, craving, desire) and *moha* (ignorance, confusion). *Dveṣa* is of different degrees and varying intensities, ranging from the faintest trace of displeasure to extreme detestation and wrath. Buddhist texts, both Pali and Sanskrit, use different terms to connote these varying stages of *dveṣa*. Some such terms are *kopa*, *paṭigha* (*pratigha*) *kodha* (*krodha vyāpāda* or *byāpāda*.)

Dveṣa, being the antithesis of *rāga*, arises when one is faced with situations or events which are contrary to one's desires and liking or when one's gratification of desires are thwarted. In such situations one becomes subject to mental conflict (*dukkha*) which forces one to give vent to one's feeling of displeasure either in a very passive manner or in an extremely aggressive manner. Often one's *dveṣa* is demonstrated against the outer-world, external objects and people whom one dislikes. But *dveṣa* also at times is directed inwardly, against one's own-self. This happens when frustration sets in as a result of *dveṣa*. A frustrated person, if he finds himself unable to resist and fight against the outer-world that causes displeasure in him, would in the alternative direct his feeling of *dveṣa* inwardly, against one's ownself thus causing self destruction by acts of self-torture and even suicide. (*A*. IV, p. 96 ff.) See DOSA.


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
Mihintale Caves, Sri Lanka, used as dwellings of Buddhist monks in the pre-Christian era.

Copyright : Archaeological Department, Sri Lanka.




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Dambulla Caves, Sri Lanka (Exterior view).




The Mai-chi-shan (Wheat Stack Hill) Grottoes, Western China, enshrining statues and mural paintings dating from the Northern Wei Dynasty to the Ming Dynasty (4th–17th century).

Buddhists in New China, Peking, 1956.




Buddhists in New China, Peking, 1956.

Cave No. 4 of the Maichishan Grottoes (557-581 A.C.): "Seven-Buddha Pavilion".




Peter Swann, *Art of China, Korea and Japan*, London, 1963.

Part of the cave-temples at Yun-Kang, Shansi, North China (460-80 A. C.).




Peter Swann, *Art of China, Korea and Japan*, London, 1963.

Part of the main cave-temple at Lung-men, Honan province, central China, showing large figures in full T'ang dynasty style, 672-5 A. C.




Sir Aurel Stein, *On Ancient Central Asian Tracks*, London, 1933.

Rows of small cave-temples seen from the Caves of the Thousand Buddhas at Tun-huang.




The great stūpa of Subashi, Central Asia.

Encyclopaedia of World Art, London, 1959.



Encyclopædia of World Art, London, 1959.

Cave of the Pretas, Kizil, Central Asia.



Ajātasattu learns of Buddha's death. A painting from Kizil, Chinese Turkistan. *The Way of the Buddha*, Government of India, 1958.



D. Seckel, *Art of Buddhism*, Art of the World Series, London, 1964.

Fig. 1. Scenes from the life of Śākyamuni (detail of Pl. X).



B. Rowland, *The Art and Architecture of India*, Great Britain, 1956.
Fig. 2. Arhant, Painting from Kizil.



Encyclopaedia of World Art, London, 1959.

Fig. 1. Buddha Dipaṅkara, from Duldur-akhur. Wood. Paris, Musée Guimet.




Encyclopaedia of World Art, London, 1959.

Fig. 2. Musician, from Duldur-akhur. Wood. Paris, Musée Guimet.



Encyclopaedia of World Art, London, 1959.

A wall-painting depicting a scene from the Vessantara Jātaka, from the Cave of the Musicians' Kizil, 7th century. Berlin, Museum für Völkerkunde.



Aleksander Belenitsky, *Central Asia*, London, 1969.



Bronze plaques, AK-Beshim, Semirechye (8th century A. C.).



B. Rowland, *The Art and Architecture of India*, Great Britain, 1956.

g. 1. Two divinities from Kizil.



B. Rowland, *The Art and Architecture of India*, Great Britain, 1956.

Fig. 2. A female figure from Dandan Uiliq.



Cremation of the Buddha. Mural in the Cave of Māyā, Kizil.

Encyclopaedia of World Art, London, 1959.




Aleksander Belenitsky, *Central Asia*, London, 1969.

Fig. 1. Sogdian art. Cup decorated with a scene of feasting. Silver, partly guilded, 6th-6th cent. A. C.



Aleksander Belenitsky, *Central Asia*, London, 1969.

Fig. 2. Seal representing a man mounted on an elephant. Gold. Sogdian inscription with owner's name, 6th-7th cent. A. C.



D. Seckel, *The Art of Buddhism*, Art of the World Series, London, 1964.

Fig. 1. Seated Buddha. Clay sculpture with polychrome painting.




D. Seckel, *The Art of Buddhism*, Art of the World Series, London 1964.

Fig. 2. Bust of a worshipping deity. Clay sculpture with polychrome painting. From the Naksatra cave, Shorchuk, Chinese Turkestan.



Encyclopaedia of World Art, London, 1959.

Scene from the Rūpavatī Avadāna. Mural fragment from Kizil. Berlin, Museum für Völkerkunde.



Sāñci stūpa. An example of *ayāgika-cetiya*.

The Way of the Buddha, Government of India, 1956




the Buddha, Government of India 1956.
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


D. T. Devendra, *The Buddha Image and Ceylon*, Ceylon, 1957.

Fig. 2. Buddha, bronze, from Badulla, Sri Lanka, Cir, 5th-6th Cent. A. C.




The Sacred Bodhi Tree at Anuradhapura, Sri Lanka. An example of *pāribhogika-cetiya*.



Ajanta Cave No. Interior of Caitya-hall (1st century B. C.).

H. Zimmer, *The Art of Indian Asia*, U.S.A., 1955.



B. Rowland, *The Art and Architecture of India*, Great Britain, 1956.

Interior of Caitya-hall, Karli.




Fig. 1. Cetiyaghara at Mādirigiriya, Sri Lanka.

Copyright: Department of Archaeology ,Sri Lanka.




Fig. 2. Cetiyaghara at Tirlyāy, Sri Lanka.

Copyright : Department of Archaeology, Sri Lanka.




Fig. 1. Jaṅkarāma at Anuradhapura, Sri Lanka. *Copyright : Department of Archaeology, Sri Lanka.*





Fig. 2 Cetiyaghara at Dambadeniya, Sri Lanka. *Copyright : Department of Archaeology, Sri Lanka.*



Cetiyaghara at the Bodhi-tree shrine, Kalutara, Sri Lanka.

Copyright : Archaeological Department, Sri Lanka.



Fig. 1. Relic caskets from Ghaz Dheri. *Annual Report of the Archæological Survey of India*, 1902-3.



Annual Report of the Archaeological Survey of India, 1902-3.

Fig. 2. Figure of Buddha, from Chârsada.



The Way of the Buddha, Government of India, 1956.

Fig. 1. Two chattras held over Māyā as she proceeds by chariot to the Lumbini garden. A sculpture from Borobudur, Java.




The Way of the Buddha, Government of India, 1956.

Fig 2. Birth of the Buddha : Chattra and cāmaras held over the new-born prince. A sculpture from Nāgārjunikonḍa.



Buddhists in New China, Peking, 1956.

'Buddhist Pilgrims'. Stone sculptures made in the Northern Wei Dynasty (386-534 A. C.)
In Suogsien country, Honan Province.



Buddhists in New China, Peking, 1956.

Fig. 1 A Buddhist sūtra written in four different language — Tibetan, Mongo'ian, Manchurian and Chinese, in the Yung Ho Kung collection, Peking.



Buddhists in New China, Peking, 1956.

Fig. 2. A wooden block for printing the Tripiṭaka, carved in the early Ching Dynasty (17th century), stored in the Pei Ling Monastery, Peking.



Buddhists in New China, Peking, 1956.
Ordination Ceremony. Over 280 novices from different parts of China kneeling and reciting the ordination vows in the courtyard of the Lungchang Monastery on Mt. Paohus.




Fig. 1. Sam-ye, the Black Chorten. D. L. Snellgrove, *Buddhist Himalaya*, Oxford, 1957.





Fig. 2. Stūpas, Tibet. *The Way of the Buddha*, Government of India, 1956



Helmut Hoffman, *The Religions of Tibet*, London, 1961.

Fig. 1 An ancient Chorten near Daithang.




Fig. 2. Chortens in the Gumbum Monastery. *Buddhists in New China* Peking, 1956.



Fig. 1 : **CĪVARA** : Covering both shoulders.



Fig. 2 : **CĪVARA** : Covering one shoulder.
Courtesy : The Way of the Buddha



COLAS : Standing Buddha from Kanchipuram, 6th-7th century A.C., showing traces of Sinhala art.

Courtesy : Aiyappan, Sirinivasan, *Story of Buddhism with Special Reference to South India.*





COLAS : Buddha images in dhyāni and Padmāsana postures depicting influence of Sinhala sculpture.

Courtesy : Aiyappan, Sirinivasan, *The Story of Buddhism with Special Reference to South India*.

PLATE XXXVIII




Fig. 1 : **COLAS** : Buddha image showing affinity with early Sinhala type.



Fig. 2 : Avalokiteśvara, a copy of early Anuradhapura type.

Courtesy : Bulletin of the Madras Govt. Museum, New Series, Vol. VII, No. 1.



CROWNED BUDDHA : India, Pala period, 10th cen. A.C.

Courtesy : Benjamin Rowland, *Evolution of the Buddha Image*.

PLATE XL



CROWNED BUDDHA : Head of a Crowned Buddha, Thailand
Ayuthia period, 15th-16th cens. A. C.


Courtesy : Seckel, *Art of Buddhism.*



· ḌĀKINĪ (Tib. NA-RO-MK'HA-SPYOD-MA).
In a ferocious form as depicted in a Tibetan temple banner.

Courtesy : Alice Getty, *The Gods of Northern Buddhism*

PLATE XLII




DAḶADĀ : The casket of the Sacred Tooth Relic.

Courtesy : Ananda Bulathgama.




DAḶADĀ : Prince Danta's and Princess Hemamālā's arrival in Sri Lanka with the Daladā concealed in latter's hair, as depicted in a modern painting in Kelaniya Rajamahāvihāra

PLATE XLIV



DAḶADĀ MĀLIGĀVA : (The Temple of the Sacred Tooth Relic)
A frontal view showing the Octagon.

Courtesy : Ananda Bulathgama.



DAḶADĀ MĀLIGĀVA : Illuminated on a festive occasion.


Courtesy : Ananda Bulathgama.

PLATE XLVI



DAḶADA PERAHĀRA : Dancers in rhythmic action

Courtesy : Ananda Bulathgama.



DAḶADA PERAHĂRA : Gaily caparisoned Māligāva Tusker in the centre carrying the casket of the Sacred Tooth Relic


Courtesy : Ananda Bulathgama

PLATE XLVIII



DAḶADĀ PERAHĀRA : Diyavaḍana Nilame walking majestically in the perahāra.

Courtesy : Ananda Bulathgama.



DAMBULLA : Facade of Dambulla Rajamahāvihāra.

Courtesy : Senake Bandaranayake, Gamini Jayasinghe.
The Rock and Wall Paintings of Sri Lanka.

PLATE L



DEVADATTA and assassins, Gandhāra.




DHAMMACAKKA: The worship of Dhammacakka, Mathura




DHAMMACAKKAPPAVATTANA SUTTA: Symbolic representation of the first sermon - Sāñcī

Courtesy: *The way of the Buddha*



DEVANAMPIYATISSA: Demarcating the boundaries of the Mahāvihāra.
A modern painting from Kelaniya Rajamahāvihāra.

PLATE LII



DEVARĀJA CULT: Towers featuring faces of Lokeśvara, (Bayon, Angkar Thom Cambodia) symbolising the cult of "God King" (Devarāja)

Courtesy: Seckel, *The Art of Buddhism.*



DHARMAPALA, ANAGARIKA


PLATE LIV

List of Names of Diyavaḍana Nilames of the Temple of the Sacred Tooth Relic based on historical records.

1. Kapuwatte Adikaram (1814 - 1824)
2. Pilimatalavve Adigar (1818 -)
3. Dehigama Loku Banda (1824 - 1827)
4. Kuda Molligoda (1827 - 1828)
5. Kuda Dehigama (1828 - 1835)
6. Mullegama Adikaram (1835 - 1842)
7. Dulleve Adikaram (1842 - 1848)
8. Loku Banda Dehigama (1848 - 1862)
9. Cuda Banda Dunuvila (1862 - 1882)
10. Cuda Mudiyanse Giragama (1882 - 1897)
11. Senaviratna Ratwatte (1897 - 1901)
12. Cuda Banda Nugawela (1901 - 1916)
13. Punchi Banda Nugawela (1916 - 1937)
14. Tikiri Banda Ratwatte (1937 - 1947)
15. Cuda Banda Nugawela (1947 - 1961)
16. Harris Leuke Ratwatte (1961 - 1964)
17. Heen Banda Udurawana (1964 - 1974)
18. Nissanka Wijeratna (1974 - 1984)
19. Neranjan Wijeratna (1984 -)



6 Dullewé Adikaram
1842 - 1848




7 Loku Banda Dehigama
1848 - 1862



8. Gadu Banda Burnawila
1882 - 1892



9 Kuda Mudiyanse Giragama
1882 - 1897



10. Seneviratna Ratwatte
1897 - 1901



11. Coda Banda Nugawela
1901 - 1916


PLATE LVI



12 Punchi Banda Nugawela
1916 – 1937



13 Tikiri Banda Ratwatte
1937 – 1947



14 Cuda Banda Nugawela
1947 – 1961



15 Harris Louis Ratwatte
1961 – 1964