

EARLY MONASTIC BUDDHISM

NALINAKSHA DUTT

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BY

NALINAKSHA DUTT, M.A., B.L.,

PH.D. (CAL.), D.LIT. (LOND.), F.A.S.

Premchand Roychand Scholar

(Retd.) Professor of Pali

Calcutta University

CALCUTTA ORIENTAL BOOK AGENCY

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PREFACE

The present work is a revised, enlarged and re-arranged edition of my book *Early Monastic Buddhism* published in 1941. On account of many additions, the extent of the work has appreciably increased, and so it has been thought advisable to confine this volume to the life and teachings of the Founder of the religion. Other aspects of Buddhism will be treated in another book, to be published shortly.

In the first two chapters, the pre-Buddhistic religions have been treated in more details than what is called for, in order to present to our students of Buddhism a picture of what were Vedicism and Brahmanism, against which Buddhism is claimed to be a revolt, offering a distinctly different path for realizing the *summum bonum*. As there are little materials for a critical biography of Gautama Buddha, the sketch of his early and missionary life has been embellished with a few traditional accounts. As regards the teachings of the great Master, care has been taken to present only those doctrines found in the Sutta Piṭaka in Pāli, supplementing them occasionally by expositions of Vasubandhu in his *Abhidharmakośa*, Nāgārjuna in his *Madhyamakārikā* and Buddhaghosa, Yaśomitra and Candrakīrti in their commentaries. The whole of the Sutta and Abhidhamma Piṭakas contain a vast mass of doctrinal expositions, a fringe of which could be touched in this work, but it is hoped that it will serve as a guide and incentive to young scholars who may prefer to dive deep into the Pali texts and commentaries for acquiring a more thorough and detailed knowledge of the early Buddhist doctrines.

Before I conclude, I should put on record that I undertook and completed this book at the insistent and repeated request of my friend Shri Kanailal Mukherji, for which I must offer to him my best thanks. The

Manager of the Calcutta Oriental Press, Shri Asoka Ghosh B. A. also deserves my thanks for carefully and patiently incorporating the various additions and corrections made by me in the proof-stage. Lastly, I should thank my student Miss Kshanika Saha M.A. for patiently reading the proofs and taking great pains in preparing the Index.

39 Ramananda Chatterji Street,
Calcutta, 20th July 1960.

Nalinaksha Dutt

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CHAPTER I

Pre-Buddhistic Brahmanism

Buddhism was ushered into existence by a distinguished son of India, a prince of the Śākya clan, in the sixth century B.C. when there was a new religious and philosophical development not only in India but also in a few countries outside India. Brāhmanism had then dug its root deep into the Indian soil, and spread its branches all over the country. The Brāhmanical hierarchy was so strong and well-organised that the existence of any religious or philosophical view outside the Brāhmanic fold was almost an impossibility. Still about the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. an unconscious opposition to Brāhmanism in principle was gaining ground, and the responsibility of giving expression to it devolved on that mastermind, Gautama Buddha.

In order to comprehend what was Gautama Buddha's contribution to Indian belief and thought, it is necessary to have a bird's-eye view of the Brāhmanic and non-Brāhmanic religious beliefs, amidst which Buddhism made its appearance. An account of these is given here in brief.

In the earliest Buddhist literature (i.e. Pali) there is no reference to the *Brāhmaṇas* and other ritual-literatures nor to the *Upaniṣads*, though there is mention of the *Ṛk*, *Sāma* and *Yajur Vedas* and of the four *śākhās*: *Bavharija* (Bāhvṛca), *Addhariyā* (Adhvaryu), *Tittiriyā* (Taittirīya) and *Chandokā* (Chāndogya).¹ There are also references to the four kinds of sacrifices: *Assamedha*, *Purisamedha*, *Vājapeya*, and *Samyāpāsa*² as well as to the Vedic seers, viz., Aṭṭhaka, Vāmaka, Vāmadeva, Vessāmitta, Yamataggi, Aṅgirasa, Bhāradvāja,

1 *Dīgha*, I, pp. 104, 237, 240; *Majjhima*, III, p. 200; *Addhariyā* refers to White Yajurveda; *Tittiriyā* to Black Yajurveda; *Chandokā* to Sāmaveda; and *Bavharija* to Ṛgveda.

2 *Samyutta*, I, p. 76.

Vāsetṭha, Kassapa and Bhagu,¹ with the observation that these seers were merely hymn-composers with limited knowledge and had not visualised the highest god Brahmā and hence the Vedic hymns were not revelations. These references prove that the composers of the Pāli *Suttantas* were more conversant with the three Vedas than with the subsequent ritualistic and philosophical literatures.

Some of the Atharvavedic rituals were also in vogue, as is evidenced by the list, given in the *Brahmajālasutta*, of the professions taken up by the Brāhmaṇas, e.g., *santikamma* (rituals for averting evils), *paṇidhikamma* (rituals for acquiring desired objects), *aggihoma* (fire-sacrifice), *sappihoma* (sacrifice with clarified butter), *bhūtavijjā* (chanting of *mantras* for controlling spirits), *ahivijjā* (spells for removing snake-poison) and so forth.²

Ancient Brāhmaṇas as depicted in the Pali texts

An interesting picture of the ancient Brāhmaṇas³ is furnished by one of the oldest Pali texts.⁴ It is as follows:—
“The ancient sages (*ṛṣis*) were ascetics (*tapassino*). They exercised self-control, avoiding the five pleasures of sense. Their wealth consisted not of cattle, gold or grains, but of purity and learning. They lived on food left at the door of the faithful and used the bed and clothes offered to them reverentially

1 *Dīgha*, I, p. 104, 241; *Majjhima*, II, p. 200; mantānaṃ kattāro mantānaṃ pavattāro. Of these names three are found in the *R̥gveda*: Vāmadeva as the composer of the 4th Maṇḍala, Bhāradvāja of the 6th and Vāsetṭha of the 7th. The rest are well known names of the *Brāhmaṇas* and *Śrauta-sūtras*. Aṭṭhaka is found in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (vii. 17) and *Śāṅkhāyana Śrautasūtra* (xv. 26) as one of the sons of Viśvāmitra. Vāmaka and Bhagu appear as teachers and sages in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (x 6. 5. 9: vii. 2. 1. 11.) while Yamataggi (Jāmadagni) is well known as the rival of Vaśiṣṭha. Aṅgirasa is mentioned as a teacher in the *Taittirīya Saṃhita* (iii. 1. 7. 3; vii. 1. 4. 1).

2 *Dīgha*, I, p. 9.

3 *Suttanipāta*, p. 50: Na kho, Brāhmaṇa, sandissanti etarahi brāhmaṇā porāṇaṃ brāhmaṇānaṃ brāhmaṇadhamme ti.

4 *Suttanipāta*, Brāhmaṇadhammikasutta,

by the well-to-do. They were never harmed nor interfered, protected as they were by righteousness (*dhamma*), and their access to any house was never barred. They spent forty-eight years of their lives as students (*brahmacārins*) in quest of knowledge and good conduct. Even when they married, they practised self-restraint. They held austerities, rectitude, tenderness, love and forbearance in high esteem. They performed sacrifices with rice, bed, clothes, clarified butter or oil, which they could collect by begging and never killed any cows in sacrifices. They possessed a noble stature, a tender and bright mien, and remained always engaged in their own pursuits.

In course of time, however, they began to covet king's riches, splendour and objects of pleasure, such as women adorned with ornaments, and chariots yoked with stately horses. With an eye to these gains, they approached King Okkāka (Ikṣvāku) and persuaded him to celebrate *aśvamedha*, *puruṣamedha*, *samyāprāsa* and *vājapeya*, and received as fees from him gold, women, chariots, horses, cows, beds and clothes. Coveting more and more they again persuaded king Okkāka to celebrate sacrifices by the offering of cows, which, they said, constituted also wealth of men as were land, gold and grains, and as such were equally fit objects for offering. Such slaughter of cows enraged the gods Brahmā, Indra and even the Asuras and Rākṣasas and multiplied diseases, which were three at first, viz. desire, hunger and decrepitude to ninety-eight and further caused the appearance of discord among the people, and within a household and of acts, impious and improper, among all classes of men."

It is stated in the *Subhasutta*¹ that the Brāhmaṇas were expected to observe five *Dhammas*, viz., *saccaṃ* (truthfulness), *tapam* (austerity), *brahmacariyaṃ* (pure moral life), *ajjhenam* (study), and *cāgaṃ* (sacrifice). In the *Sundarīka-Bhāradvāja-sutta*² there is a reference to the Brāhmaṇas learning *Sāvitti*

1 *Majjhima*, VI, p. 199.

2 *Suttanipāta*, p. 79.

(*Sāvitṛī* = *Gāyatrī*) consisting of three *padas* and twenty four *akṣaras*.

The goal of the *Brāhmaṇas*, according to the *Mahāgovinda* and other *Suttas*¹ was the attainment of *Brahmasahavyatā* i.e. dwelling in the *Brahmaloka* by acquisition of merit through either sacrifices or austere practices (*tapasyā*).

The ideal ancient *Brāhmaṇas* as envisaged in the *Suttanipāta* must have been the seers (*ṛṣis*), to whom the authorship of the hymns is attributed. They probably belonged to the ancient families of priests like *Aṅgirasas*, *Atharvans* and *Bhṛgu*, who, according to Weber, were Indo-Iranian priests, and were, as Macdonell says, accorded a place intermediate between men and gods,² i.e. as semi-divine beings. They practised self-control and performed sacrifices with honey only.³

Manu was the first of the sacrificers. He was followed by *Aṅgiras*, *Bhṛgu*, *Atharvan* and others. *Okkāka* (*Ikṣvāku*) was the eldest son of Manu. Before the completion of the *Ṛgveda*, the ceremony of sacrifice was performed by the three classes of priests: *Brahman*, *Adhvaryu* and *Hotṛ*, and the practice of giving fees came into vogue. At the time of *Yajurveda*, the sacrifice became an elaborate and expensive affair and the paying of remuneration to the officiating priests became compulsory. It is in the period of the *Brāhmaṇas* and *Śrauta-sūtras* that there was an abnormal increase both in the rituals and fees of the officiating priests.

In the early *Ṛgvedic* days, the objects of offering were very likely rice, clarified butter, beds and clothes which the *brahmacārins* could collect from their lay-supporters. The explanation, given in the *Suttanipāta*, that cows were regarded as wealth in those days and so they became objects of sacrifice, indicates how offering of animals became an integral part of a sacrificial ceremony. With the lapse of time the

1 *Dīgha*, II.

2 Keith, *Religion and Philosophy of the Veda*, p. 224.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 224-5: cf. *Dīgha*, I. 5: *Kūṭadantasutta*.

real object of sacrificing cows passed out of people's mind and brought in its train the system of offering all kinds of living beings in a sacrifice. In one Sutta, Buddha suggested that barley was the most innocent and suitable object of offering in a sacrifice. A similar suggestion is found in a late *Brāhmaṇa*, the *Śatapatha*, viz., "At first the gods offered up a man as the victim. When he was offered up, the sacrificial essence went out of him. It entered into a horse; they offered up the horse." In this way, the horse was replaced by the ox, the ox by the goat, and the goat by barley and rice.¹

This innocent form of sacrifice was continued in the *Āraṇyaka* period, in which emphasis was laid more on meditation and repetition of the Vedic hymns² than on sacrificial rituals. Hence, about the 6th century B.C., there were sacrifices, in which both animals and objects like barley and rice were offered, as also there were *Brāhmaṇas*, some of whom lived a saintly life while others coveted wealth through sacrificial rituals.

In the *Vinaya Piṭaka*³ appears the story that Uruvela Kassapa, a great fire-worshipper, just before his conversion to Buddhism, had arranged for a great sacrifice (*aggihuttam mahāyaññam*). In the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*⁴ it is said that King Pasenadi of Kosala arranged for a big sacrifice, for which 500 each of bulls, steers, heifers, goats and rams were collected by his men much against their will. A similar account appears in the *Dīgha Nikāya*⁵ describing that *Brāhmaṇa* Kūṭadanta, a distinguished teacher (*mahāsāla*), maintained by King Bimbisāra, arranged for a sacrifice, for which 700 each of bulls, steers, heifers, goats and rams had been led to the sacrificial posts. There are a few other such accounts in

1 Dalal's *History of India*, p. 128-9 quoting from Eggeling's translation of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*. Cf. Hopkins, *The Great Epic of India*, p. 99: Ṛṣi Kapila was against killing of animals in sacrifices.

2 Keith, *op.*, *cit.*, p. 490.

3 *Vinaya*, I. xix. 1.

4 *Saṃyutta*, I, p. 75-6.

5 *Dīgha*, II. 5.

the Nikāyas¹ but they are all of the stereotyped form. Each of these accounts is followed by an instruction of the Teacher, bringing about a complete transformation of the mind of the sacrificer, e. g., Uruvela Kassapa said that his *aggihutta* could procure material gains but not eradicate mental impurities; King Pasenadi became repentant and declared himself as a lay-devotee of Buddha, while Brāhmaṇa Kūṭadanta was convinced that the right sacrifice was the taking of refuge in the *Triratna*, observance of moral precepts and practice of the four meditations (*jhānas*). In the *Majjhima Nikāya*,² it is pointed out that in a great sacrifice there is scope for rivalry and jealousy for the foremost seat, water and food (*aggāsanam aggodakam aggapinḍaṃ*). In the same *Nikāya*³ there is an interesting account of a sacrifice: A king or a rich Brāhmaṇa gets a hermitage (*santhāgāra*) built outside the town, and resides there after having his hair and beard shaven and putting on rough skins. He is accompanied by his wife and priest. He sleeps on the bare ground and lives on a portion of the milk of a cow and tends the sacrificial fire. He, however, orders that for sacrifice so many cows, steers, heifers, goats and rams are to be killed, so many trees are to be cut down for sacrificial posts, ladle and other wooden requisites. From this account it appears that there was also in vogue a form of sacrifice which was neither of the *Brāhmaṇa* nor of the *Āraṇyaka* type.

Along with the sacrifices there were also the common forms of worship of deities like Indra, Varuṇa and the four Dik-pālas: Dhataratṭha, Virūḥa, Virupakkha and Kuvera, as also of the Yakkhas like Sātagiri.⁴ There was also the belief in the purificatory effects of a dip in the sacred rivers like Gaṅgā, Phalgu, Bāhukā, Sarassatī, and Payāga.⁵

1 *Aṅguttara*, IV, p. 61 speaks of the *mahāyañña* as gifts without any expectation.

2 *Majjhima*, II, p. 204.

3 *Ibid.*, I, p. 343-4.

4 *Dīgha*, II, p. 257.

5 *Majjhima*, I, p. 39.

From the references found in the *Nikāyas*, it is apparent that the Vedic religion as also the Brāhmaṇic sacrificial system were both prevalent at the time of the rise of Buddhism. A brief survey of the Vedic and the Post-Vedic religion, which just preceded Buddhism, is given here along with that of the Upaniṣadic beliefs and teachings.

Vedic Religion (2000-800 B. C.)

The Vedic literature is vast and developed in about a thousand years. The earliest text of this literature, the *Rgveda* of 1028 hymns, composed at different times and compiled about 1500 B. C., gives an idea of the earliest form of religion of the Vedic Indians. The hymns were composed mainly by seers (*ṛṣis*) in praise of certain gods as also for the material benefits of their tribal chiefs. The Vedic Indians were optimistic in their outlook and wanted to make the most of their lives in the present and were not concerned about their future existence. There are a few hymns which seem to hint at monotheism, viz., that there is one God beyond all gods and natural forces.¹

Deities: The deities of the hymns were not, in all cases, personifications of nature, though many of them were of the natural beneficent forces or of calamities that affected the people of those days. The former were *Dyaus* (Sky or Heaven), *Agni* (fire), *Sūrya* (Sun), *Uṣas* (Dawn), *Vāta* (Wind), *Prthivī* (Earth), while the latter were *Vṛtra* (the Withholder of rains, a dragon, a serpent), *Rākṣasas* (Earth-demons), *Vala* (Caves holding the clouds). Sometimes more than one deity represented the same natural forces and *vice versa* or were attributed the identical qualities and functions. This was very likely due to the fact that the favourite god of a composer received all the encomiums that came to his mind. Some of the deities were conceived as lords or warriors, sallying forth to discharge their functions and thereby conferring benefits on mankind, while a few others were regarded as

1 Cf. *Rv.*, x. 5, 27, 38, 129.

complementary to each other and were addressed in pairs, e g. *Dyāvāprthivī*, *Indrāgni*, *Sūryāmasa*.

There are several gods, major and minor. The major ones may be classified as Celestial, Aerial and Terrestrial.

The Celestial gods were (i) *Dyaus* (Sky or Heaven), (ii) the *Ādityas*, *Mitra* and *Aryaman*, *Bhaga*, *Aṃśa* and *Dakṣa* (iii) *Mitra* and *Varuṇa*, (iv) *Uṣas* (Dawn: daughter of the *Dyaus*), (v) *Sūrya*, *Savitṛ* and *Puṣan*, (vi) *Viṣṇu*, (vii) *Vivasvant*, (viii) the *Aśvins*.

The Aerial gods were (i) *Indra*, (ii) *Trita Āptya*, (iii) *Apām Napāt*, (iv) *Ahi Budhnya*, (v) *Aja Ekapād*, (vi) *Mātariśvan*, (vii) *Vāyu* and *Vāta*, (viii) *Parjanya*, (ix) *Apsaras*, (x) *Rudra*, and (xi) the *Maruts*.

The Terrestrial gods were (i) *Agni*, (ii) *Bṛhaspati*, (iii) *Soma*, (iv) the Rivers, and (v) *Prthivī*.

Besides these gods, there were several others, some of whom were of minor importance. The legends relating to the origin of these gods are although ostensibly myths, there are in them many cosmic truths, e.g., creation of the universe, of heaven and the earth with atmospheric space in between, appearance of light and sunshine, release of storm-clouds, and of water, and the existence of a physical order. There are also in them the first attempt to define a social order and to formulate the moral laws, of which the presiding deity is *Varuṇa*, who rewards the pious and punishes the impious. There is also the conception of *Rta*, the law of nature, the law of truth, the laws of customary rites and institutions; it is impersonal. There is also the conception of one Supreme God, named as *Hiraṇyagarbha* or *Prajāpati*, *Viśvakarmā* being the creator or the world-architect. In the *Puruṣa-sūkta* there is a reference to the Cosmic person¹ with a thousand heads, eyes and feet, pervading the whole earth and at the same time transcending it. The main emphasis was, however, on the worship of the deities by

1 Rv. I. 164-46: एकं सत् विप्रा बहुधा वदन्ति ।

prayer and offer of gifts to them to win their favours for material gains.

S a c r i f i c e s : In the Ṛgvedic period the worship of deities was performed ceremonially in a sacrifice, which consisted in inviting gods to the place of offering to take food and drink given by the worshipper. There were no costly gifts of jewels, garments and chariots, as has been the practice later. The deities were not visible and so *Agni* or the sacrificial fire was invoked to convey to the gods the gifts which were actually utilised by the priests, the vicegerents of gods on earth.

The only sacrifice that the Ṛgvedic Indians knew was that of *Soma*, in which the ceremonial pressing of *Soma* formed the essential feature. The gift made were pastoral, e.g., milk, curds, melted butter, grain, barley, rice, cakes with animal victims on very rare occasions. The *Soma* drinks, occasionally wine and honey, produced ecstasy both to the sacrificer and the priests. The main object of this sacrifice was to draw the attention of the gods and to win their goodwill and so it is said "the god hath accepted the offering; he hath become strengthened, he hath won greater might..., may I (the sacrificer) prosper in accordance with the prospering of the god". In the *Ṛgveda* there are stray references to other sacrifices without any description.

Post-Vedic Religion

The sacrificial system was gradually elaborated and made complicated in the *Yajurveda*, the *Sāmaveda* supplementing it with the *Sāmans* (hymns) to be chanted on particular occasions. Many of these *Sāmans* were, however, taken from the *Ṛgveda*. In course of time developed the *Brāhmaṇa* literature and the *Śrauta-sūtras*, which elaborated the rituals to an enormous extent. The performance of a sacrifice entailed so much cost and paraphernalia that it became almost an exclusive privilege of the richer class. The sacrificers could be a *Brāhmaṇa*, a *Kṣatriya* or a *Vaiśya*. The

sacrifice lasted from one day to one year and necessitated animal victims from one to hundreds.

For every sacrifice, the first duty of the sacrificer is to choose ceremonially his officiating priests, who numbered from one to sixteen or seventeen. Of the sixteen officiating priests, the *Adhvaryu* is responsible for the various ritualistic duties, while the *Hotṛ* is to pour the libations, recite *mantras*, hymns and invoke the gods. The *Brahman* watches the accuracy of ritualistic operations, but he usually remains silent. The other priests are assigned separate duties like pressing the *Soma*, kindling the sacrificial fire, making ready the implements and so forth.

After the selection of the officiating priests, the sacrificer (*Yajamāna*) has to perform the *Dīkṣā* (Consecration) ceremony. It is followed by the *Upasad* ceremony of three days, during which the site of the sacrifice is chosen, a hut is constructed, the great altar and the fire-hearths are made ready, and the *Pravargya* or the Hot Milk sacrifice is performed by offering milk heated in a pot made of sacred earth to the *Aśvins*.

Fire forms the central theme of a sacrifice. There are three fires: one is called *Gārhapatya* or the fire maintained in the house of the sacrificer perpetually, the next is *Āhavanīya* (a fire-place of square shape) made specially for the occasion, and the third is *Dakṣiṇa* fire, a fire-place of half-moon shape placed on the south of the *Gārhapatya*¹ fire.

After these preliminaries, commences the actual sacrifice, each of which has different preparations and ceremonies. On completion of the sacrifice, the sacrificer pays the fees to the officiating priests. Lastly, the sacrificer takes his purificatory bath (*Avabhṛtha*).

1 In the *Aṅguttara* (IV, pp. 41, 45), *Āhavanīya*, *Gārhapatya* and *Dakṣiṇa* fires are distorted into *āhuṇeyya*, *gahapati*, and *dakkhiṇeyya aggi*, explaining the first as taking care of parents, the second as looking after dependants and the third as gifts to recluses.

The more important of the sacrifices are (i) *Agnihotra*, (ii) the New Moon and Full Moon sacrifices, (iii) the Seasonal sacrifices, (iv) *Agrāyana Iṣṭī*, (v) *Nirudhapaśubandha*, (vi) the Soma sacrifice or *Agniṣṭoma*, (vii) *Vājapeya*, (viii) *Rājasūya*, (ix) *Aśvamedha*, (x) *Sattras* (sacrificial sessions performed by a large number of men), (xi) *Sautrāmaṇi*, and (xii) Domestic sacrifices. There are several other sacrifices and each sacrifice has a prescribed programme of rituals and ceremonies. The observance of minute details in the performance of a sacrifice seems to have been the main religion of the post-Vedic Indians. The sacrifices are also given deeper and partially philosophical interpretations without, however, formulating any system of philosophy, e.g., they are identified with *Prajāpati*, the Creator of the Universe. Some of the rituals are symbolic representations (i) of the origin of cosmos with its gods and living beings, (ii) of the regulator of the physical and moral laws, (iii) of the rebirth of a sacrificer, (iv) of his attainment of sovereignty and even (v) of complete deliverance from worldly existences.

The Āraṇyakas

The philosophical and cogitational aspects of the sacrifices received greater stress in another literature called the *Āraṇyakas* of a date little later than that of the *Brāhmaṇas*. The *Āraṇyakas* are primarily a ritualistic literature, compiled specially for those who take to forest-life. In this literature the sacrificial rituals are given allegorical interpretations and many of the rituals are replaced by cogitation of the gods and muttering of *mantras*. It is enjoined that the *Āraṇyaka* literature should be studied only by the recluses who have gone to the forest and renounced the worldly ties altogether. Most of the *Brāhmaṇas* have a corresponding *Āraṇyaka*. There were three classes of men who retired to the forests and studied the *Āraṇyakas*. They were: (a) those who felt unhappy at the impermanence of worldly objects; (b) those who wished to attain emancipation by comprehending the *Hiraṇyagarbha* or the order of creation,

and (c) those who longed for progeny and cattle,—the third being looked upon as persons of the lowest category and unworthy of a forest-life. In the *Āraṇyakas* the emphasis is shifted from external ritualism to internal cogitation as also to esotericism, paving the way for the advent of the secret teachings of the *Upaniṣads*, and lastly to asceticism.

The Upaniṣads

The last sections of the *Āraṇyakas* are the *Upaniṣads*, the earliest philosophical literature of the Indians. Though there are as many as 108 *Upaniṣads*, only six or seven of them are regarded as the oldest and the most authoritative. In the *Upaniṣads* the efficacy and importance of sacrifices are not denied, though there are a few doubtful disparaging remarks about the sacrificial rituals. In these texts more emphasis is laid on the quest of the Truth, the Ultimate than on the means like sacrifices for attaining it, but it is evident that the performance of sacrifices continued to be the core of the religion.¹

In the *Vedas* and the *Brāhmaṇas*, there are a few references to the philosophical outlook of the ancient Indians, and it was left to the *Upaniṣads* to develop it; but by the time the *Upaniṣads* appeared, there was a reversal of the general outlook on the present life, optimism having given way to pessimism. As the *Upaniṣads* contain only philosophical speculations, an outline of the same is given here.

The optimistic view of life of the Vedic period gave place to a pessimistic one, in which the present life with its sufferings due to old age, disease and death was no longer regarded as desirable and the people were asked to look for a life which was eternal, free from sufferings and beyond disease and death, the *Amṛta*². A number of ascetic

1 Ranade, however, remarks in his *Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy*, p. 6: "The spirit of the Upaniṣads is, barring a few exceptions here and there, entirely antagonistic to the sacrificial doctrine of the *Brāhmaṇas*."

2 Cf. *Kaṭha*, I. 1. 28; *Maitrī*, I. 2-7.

thinkers¹ offered their solutions of the origin of worldly beings and objects, and tried to explain the highest truth according to their own light. In the *Chāndogya*² it is said that from the primeval being appeared fire, out of which originated water, which in turn produced the earth, but according to *Kaṭha*³ all objects originated from fire, and according to Pravāhaṇa Jaivali from space⁴; but the remarkable statements “*asad vā idam agra āsīt*” and “*tato vai sad ajāyata*” in the *Taittirīya*⁵ and “*naiveha kiṃcanāgra āsīd*” in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*,⁶ establishing “non-existence of any thing” at the beginning, remind us of the doctrine of *śūnyatā* of the Mahāyāna Buddhists, as against the contention of the Hīnayānists “*pubbā koṭi na paññāyati*” (the beginning of the world is unknown). But the most popular and generally accepted interpretation of the origin of world is the one given in the *Chāndogya*⁷ “*āsīd ekam evādvitīyaṃ*” (there was the Being alone and without a second).⁸

Likewise, there are different interpretations of the highest truth. Upakośala, disciple of Satyakāma Jābāla, thought that the ultimate reality was the Sun, the Moon or the Lightning, while Bālāki added to same “the thunder, the wind,

1 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, V. 5. 1 (Ranade, *op. cit.* p. 77): “In the beginning verily, the waters alone existed; from the water was born Satya or Truth; Satya produced Brahman; Brahman gave birth to Prajāpati and from Prajāpati were born the gods”.

Ranade, *op., cit.* p. 263: King Janaka refers to the various interpretations given of the highest truth by the different thinkers:

- (a) It was Speech, according to Jitvan Śailini;
- (b) Breath according to Udaṅka Śaulāyana;
- (c) Eye according to Varku Varṣṇi;
- (d) Ear according to Gardabhī Vipīṭha Bhāradvāja;
- (e) Mind according to Satyakāma Jābāla;
- (f) Heart according to Vidagdha Sākalya;
- (g) Self, and not its adjuncts, i.e., ear of ear; mind of mind, according to Yājñavalkya.

2 *Chāndogya*, vi. 8. 4.

3 *Kaṭha*, II, 5.

4 *Chāndogya*, I. 9. 1.

5 *Taittirīya*, II. 7.

6 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, I. 2. 1-2.

7 *Ibid.*, VI. 2. 1-4.

8 Cf. Ranade, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

the sky, the fire, the water, the mirror, the image, the echo, the sound, the body, the right eye and the left eye.”¹ All these theories, however, were discounted by the other thinkers, who determined the ultimate reality as the Absolute (Brahman), out of which appeared the world of beings and objects.² The Para Brahman or Paramātmā is described in the *Chāndogya*³ as the Truth, free from evil and suffering, old age and death, hunger and thirst. In the same *Upaniṣad*⁴ the Brahman is described as immanent in the phenomenal world and as pervading the body of a being and at the same time it is also transcendent. The immanence is illustrated by the simile of the disappearance of salt in water and in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*⁵ by that of the encasement of a razor in a razor case. In this *Upaniṣad* the merging of Jīvātman in Paramātmā is also described in an erotic language.⁶ In the *Śvetāśvatara*⁷ its presence is traced everywhere in fire, waters, plants and beings, while in the *Taittirīya*⁸ it is identified with existence, consciousness and infinity (*satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ*).

In the *Svetāśvatāra*⁹ the Brahman or Ātman is conceived as a personal God, the Rudra, the source of the phenomenal world of beings and objects, the unity behind diversity. He is not to be identified with either “Nature” or “Time” and is beyond the time distinctions of past, present and future.

1 Ranade, *op. cit.*, p. 251-2.

2 *Taittirīya*, III. 1; *Chāndogya*, III. 14. 1; तज्जलानिति शान्त उपासीत । Brahman (i.e. Para Brahman) becomes Apra Brahman or Īśvara to give rise to the phenomenal world Out of him originate the beings (*tajja*), live in him (*tadan*) and are absorbed in him (*tallam*). Cf. Sinha, *History of Indian Philosophy*, I, p. 12.

3 *Chāndogya*, VIII. 7. 1.

4 *Ibid.*, VI. 13. 1. 3.

5 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, I. 4. 7.

6 *Ibid.*, IV. 3. 21: तद्यथा प्रियया स्त्रिया संपरिषक्तो न बाह्यं किञ्चन वेद नान्तरं एवमेवायं पुरुषः प्राज्ञेनात्मना संपरिषक्तो न बाह्यं किञ्चन वेद नान्तरम् ।

7 *Śvetāśvatara*, II. 17.

8 *Taittirīya*, II. 1.

9 *Śvetāśvatara*, III. 2. 3; VI. 1-12.

Of the various solutions of the ultimate problems, the one offered in the *Chāndogya* and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, viz. “Thou art That (*tat tvam asi*)” or “That I am (*so’ ham*)” has been accepted by the majority of Indian philosophers. It enunciates the theory of the identity of the individual self with the universal self. It forms the keynote of most of the Indian schools of thought.

Āruṇi and Yājñavalkya were probably the latest Upaniṣadic teachers to propound the above philosophical teaching. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, the views of Yājñavalkya are given in these words :

(i) Every being has a “Self” and that “Self” is its dearest object. It is dearer than one’s wife, son or wealth. The real love for the self, however, must not remain confined to one’s own self but to all “selves” without, existing in beings living around us. One must love others because of the “Self” within them. It is by means of such real love, that a person can have full realisation of the “Self” and thereby attain immortality.

(ii) This “Self” is also the highest reality, the Brahman, which pervades the universe. It is immanent in all beings and things of the world. It maintains the order of the universe, regulates the movement of heavenly bodies; in short, it creates and uncreates the world. It is both personal and impersonal.

(iii) This “Self” or Brahman is pure self-consciousness. It is different from consciousness in dream or deep sleep, or physical consciousness. This self-consciousness is the Reality, the God, the Absolute. It is infinite and knowable only within one’s own self.

The highest happiness is obtained by real love or full realisation of the self and it is dissociated from desire, while happiness obtained through love of beings and things of the world as such, is temporary and limited, and is associated with desire (*kāma*), consequently with hunger and thirst, sorrow and pain, decay and death.

The relative position of the individual soul and the pure blissful soul is explained in the *Upaniṣads* by the conception of five sheaths (*koṣa*) thus: The grossest *koṣa* is called *annamaya*, i.e., the body with its sense-organs nourished by food (*anna*); the next *koṣa* contained in the previous one is *prāṇamaya* or the vital force (*prāṇa*) which keeps the body active; the third which is contained in the second is *manomaya*, the mind, the source of volitions; the fourth *koṣa* contained in the third is *Vijñānamaya* or the intellect (*vijñāna*) which discriminates subject from object. Within the fourth *koṣa* lies the fifth *ānandamaya* or pure bliss-consciousness, in which ceases the distinction of subject and object. It is identical with the pure soul, Brahman; hence, it is free, infinite, omniscient and transcendental.

In the *Māṇḍukya* the relative position of the individual soul and the great soul is explained by the four states of consciousness attained through meditation (*yoga*), in which the basis for concentration of thoughts is *Om* (A + U + M). The four states gradually reached in meditation are waking-consciousness, dream-consciousness, deep sleep-consciousness, and self-consciousness, the last being the highest perfect state, the merging of individual soul in the great soul.¹

Apart from meditation, the more common means of merging of the *jīvātman* into the *paramāiman* is the acquisition of knowledge (*vidyā*) by eradicating ignorance (*avidyā*), which causes misapprehension of the body, sense-organs, *manas*, and *buddhi* as identical with the *jīvātman* and consequently leads to bondage of a being with the phenomenal.

1 *Māṇḍukya*, 3-7 :

जागरितस्थानो बहिःप्रज्ञः.....स्थूलभूग् वैश्वानरः ।

स्वप्नस्थानोऽन्तःप्रज्ञः.....प्रविविक्तभूक् तैजसः ।

सुषुप्तस्थान एकाभूतः प्रज्ञानघनः.....आनन्दभूक् चेतोमुखः प्राज्ञः ।

नान्तःप्रज्ञं न बहिःप्रज्ञं नोभयतःप्रज्ञं न प्रज्ञानघनं न प्रज्ञं नाप्रज्ञम् ।

अदृष्टमव्यवहार्यमग्राह्यमलक्षणमचिन्त्यमव्यपदेशमेकात्मप्रत्ययसारं प्रपञ्चोपशमं शान्तं शिवमद्वैतं चतुर्थं मन्यन्ते स आत्मा स विज्ञेयः ।

world. The *vidyā* or perfect knowledge puts an end to the distinctions between subject and object, between the individual soul and the great soul, and to all conceptions that are due to time and space. The means and process of acquiring *vidyā* are right action (*karma*), proper meditation (*samādhi* and *yoga*) and true knowledge (*jñāna*). By *karma* is meant physical discipline (*brahmacarya*) or self-restraint; by *samādhi*, mental discipline or withdrawal of mind from sense-objects¹ and practice of forbearance (*titikṣā*), and by *jñāna*, realisation of the oneness of *jīvātman* and *paramātman* and of the absence of any distinction between subject and object as also of the notion of duality and plurality.

Transmigration of Soul

The theory of transmigration, says Prof. Ranade, is an inheritance from the pre-Aryans, and can be traced also in the *Rgveda*.² In the *Kaṭha*³ there is the famous dialogue between Yama and Naciketas, about existence after death. Yama remarks that a being is reborn just as a ripened corn after decay reappears again. This is similar to the theory of dynamism or the law of causation of the Buddhists. Quite different from this is the exposition found in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*⁴, in which the link between death and rebirth of a being rests on the soul, which passes from one existence to another. The *Prājñā-ātman* accompanies the *Śārīra-ātman* and it leaves one body only when it obtains a footing in another like a caterpillar leaving one blade of grass for another.⁵

1 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, III. 5. 1

2 Ranade, *op cit.*, pp., 145 f. 154

3 *Kaṭha*, I. 1. 20. 21: शस्यमिव पच्यते शस्यमिव जायते पुनः ।

4 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, IV. 4. 3. 5

5 The conception of *ātman* in the *Upaniṣads* has given rise to two views: (i) that the self is similar to a spark issuing out of a mass of fire, and (ii) that the self is similar to space within an earthen jar. Śaṅkara gives preference to the second view and describes it as eternal, unchanging, undecaying, immaculate. It is not gross, not eyes, not life-force, not mind, not doer, it is just pure intelligence.

Theory of Karmaphala

In *Kaṭha* and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* is mentioned that fruits of deeds are transmitted to the next existence. The soul carries the dead being's accumulated fruits of deeds (*karmaphala*). The reborn being earns merits and demerits on account of its past meritorious or demeritorious actions respectively.¹ The *Kaṭha*² adds that *karman* may cause a being

[नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तसत्यस्वभावं प्रत्यक्चैतन्यमेवात्मतत्त्वमिति । प्रत्यक्स्थूलोऽचक्षुरप्राणः अमना अकर्ता चैतन्यं चिन्मात्रं सत् ।...नित्यचैतन्योऽयमात्मा ।]

It pervades the whole body though it is infinitesimally small. At death it passes out of the eyes, or skull or some other portion of the body.

The living self limited by the adjuncts of the body of an individual, his sense-organs, mind, intelligence and notion of I-ness becomes an empirical self, perceiving pleasant and unpleasant feelings. It is unaware of its true nature and is in the grip of nescience; its power and knowledge become limited and it becomes an agent, an enjoyer of acts, by which it accumulates merits and demerits.

The Vedāntists hold the view that the empirical self serves as the transmitter of *karmaic* effects. It continues after the death of a living being and transmigrates from one existence to another. It does not give up the old body till it obtains a foothold in another body. In his comments on *Brahmasūtra* (III. 1. 1) Śaṅkara states that the dying being at the time of his death dreams of his future existence and grows an attachment for it, and so the empirical self extends its creative effort; it is a continuation or extension (*dīrghikarāṇa*) and not exactly similar to the movement of a caterpillar. The empirical self carries with it the subtle body (*sūkṣma-śarīra* = *liṅga-deha*) composed of three vestures or sheaths (*koṣa*):

- (i) *Vijñānamaya* = consciousness as an active agent.
- (ii) *Manomaya* = will as instrumental.
- (iii) *Prāṇamaya* = vital breath or physical organism as energy.

This subtle body carries with it all the merits and demerits accumulated in past existences as also nescience (*avidyā*) along with the impressions left by past experiences (*pūrvaprajñā janmāntarīya saṁskārāḥ*), leaving behind all material elements, gross or subtle. This subtle body remains along with the empirical self till the attainment of liberation.

1 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, III. 2. 13: पुण्यो वै पुण्येन कर्मणा भवति पापः पापेनेति ।

2 *Kaṭha*, II. 2. 7: योनिमन्ये प्रपद्यन्ते शरीरत्वाय देहिनः ।

स्थाणुमन्येऽनुसंयन्ति यथाकर्म यथाश्रुतम् ॥

to be reborn as an inorganic matter. In the *Upaniṣads* there is the conception of the Lord of *Karman*, who administers the law and gives fruits according to one's past deeds. He is *Īśvara*, the *Apara Brahman*, the dispenser of justice. The law of *karman* as defined by *Yājñavalkya* is that a person is filled with desire (*kāmamaya evāyaṃ puruṣa iti*). He wills according to his desire, and he acts as he wills. As he acts so are the fruits are produced. These fruits control his subsequent existence, which, according to *Yājñavalkya*, is generally a better one. For a person without desire the ultimate existence is in *Brahman*.¹

Pessimism

Pessimism had its beginning in the *Upaniṣads*, in which *śreyah* (seeking the excellent) is pointed as superior to *preyah* (seeking worldly happiness)². The *Maitrī Upaniṣad*³ contains

1 Cf. the exposition of *Śaṅkara* and *Rāmānuja*: *Śaṅkara* admits that man is the architect of his destiny and that his *karma*, past and present, must produce fruits which are to be exhausted by enjoyment or suffering. According to the *Brahmasūtra* (III. 1, 8.), *karma* connotes not only meritorious and demeritorious deeds but also fulfilment of duties prescribed for a particular caste (*varṇa*) and stage of life (*āśrama*), as well as performance of sacrifices and expiatory ceremonies (*prāyaścitta*).

Liberation is to be attained, according to *Rāmānuja*, not only by true knowledge (*jñāna*) but also by *karma*, by which, he meant, rituals prescribed in the *śāstras*. It is also enjoined in the Vedāntic texts that *karma* should be free from any desire for rewards (*niṣkāma*) and such *karma* can destroy the accumulated effects of one's past life. *Karma* is divided into three categories : (i) deed already commenced (*prārabdha*), (ii) deed already accumulated (*sañcita*), and (iii) deed that is being accumulated (*saṃyojyamāna*). Of these three, the first must take its own course while the second can be destroyed, and the third prevented by acquisition of true knowledge.

2 *Kaṭha*, I.2.1-2; I.2.3; cf. *Ranade, op. cit.*, p. 293.

3 *Maitrī*, I.2-7: भगवन्, अस्थिचर्मन्नायुमज्जामांसशुकशोणितरलेष्मा-भ्रूदूषिते विण्मूलवातपित्तकफसंघाते दुर्गन्धे निःसारेऽस्मिन् शरीरे किं कामोपभोगैः । कामक्रोधलोभभयविषादेर्ष्येष्टवियोगानिष्टसंप्रयोग - क्षुत्पिपासा - जरामृत्युरोगशोका-

a passage, which has parallels in the Buddhist texts. In this *Upaniṣad*, attention is drawn to the body as the container of foul things like ordure, urine, bile, phlegm, semen, mucus, etc. It is also subject to lust, anger, envy, etc., separation from the desired ones, union with the undesired, and hunger, thirst, old age and death. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*¹ it is said that the recluses seek the eternal and not progeny or wealth while in the *Chāndogya*² appears the statement that the knower of the self goes beyond the sea of misery (*tarati śokam ātmavit*). The Buddhist texts go further and state that all that which is constituted (*saṃkhata*), be it a being in the lowest hell or in the highest heaven, is subject to decay, and hence, existence is suffering (*dukkha*). Buddha therefore made the realisation of *dukkha* as the *sine qua non* of his teaching, the first of the four great truths.³

Retirement from household life

A pessimistic outlook ultimately leads to renunciation of the world and adoption of the life of a recluse. In the *Upaniṣads* there is not much of evidence to show that this outlook on life came into vogue. Yājñavalkya, the great philosopher

द्यैरभिहतेऽस्मिन् शरीरे किं कामोपभोगैः । सर्वं चेदं क्षयिष्यु पश्यामो यथेमे
दंशमशकादयस्तृणवनस्पतय उद्भूतप्रध्वंसिनः ।

Kaṭha, I-1.26.28: अभिध्यायन् वर्णरतिप्रमोदान् अतिदीर्घे जीविते को
रमेत । Cf. Ranade, *op. cit.*, pp. 180, 294f.

1 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, IV. 4.22

2 *Chāndogya*, VII. 1.3

3 दुःखे धर्मज्ञानक्षान्तिः = faith leading to the knowledge that
Kāmadhātu is full of suffering.

दुःखे धर्मज्ञानं = actual realisation of the above.

दुःखे अन्वयज्ञानक्षान्तिः = faith leading to the knowledge that
Rūpa and Arūpadhātus are also full
of suffering.

दुःखे अन्वयज्ञानं । = actual realisation of the above.

See also *infra*.

and disputant, parted with his wives but he did not eschew acquisition of wealth by imparting religious instructions.¹ Many of the distinguished Upaniṣadic teachers were married, and it is taken for granted in the *Upaniṣads*² that they could impart the deeper teaching to the eldest son or the most worthy disciple. In course of parting instructions, the teacher often advised his disciples to get married and have progeny, and to observe the moral laws of a householder, viz., to be respectful to the parents, *guru* and guests³. All these indicate that asceticism developed in the post-Upaniṣadic days and not earlier. Leading a chaste holy life (*brahmacarya*), observing certain austerities (*tapas*), shaving of head (*muṇḍanam*)⁴ and begging of alms (*bhikṣācaryā*)⁵ were prescribed for young students but these had nothing to do with asceticism or recluse-life. The moral virtues prescribed in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and *Chāndogya Upaniṣads* for the students or aspirants for mystic knowledge indicate also that they were not meant for recluses. In the former⁶ these are self-control, charity and compassion, and in addition mendicancy (*bhikṣācaryā*) for those who do not wish for sons and wealth. In the *Chāndogya*⁷ the moral virtues to be cultivated are austerity, charity, straightforwardness, harmlessness and truthfulness. In this text it is further enjoined that a person must not steal gold, drink wine, commit adultery in the teacher's family, kill a Brāhmaṇa and associate with a person who has committed any one of the above-mentioned offences. Speaking of the truth is extolled in all the *Upaniṣads*. In the *Taittirīya*⁸ there are also moral

1 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, IV. 1.1 7

2 *Chāndogya*, III. 11. 5-6

3 *Taittirīya*, I. 11. 1-3

4 *Muṇḍaka*, III. 2.10: शिरोव्रतं विधिवद् येस्तु चीर्णम् ।^v

5 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, III. 5. 1: भिक्षाचर्या^v चरति ; *Kauṣītaki*, II. 1:

तद्यथा ग्रामं भिक्षित्वाऽलब्धोपविशेन् नाहमतो दत्तमश्रीयामिति ।

6 *Ibid.*, V. 2. 1-3.

7 *Chāndogya*, III. 17-4

8 *Taittirīya*, 1.9; cf. Ranade, *op. cit* , p.

instructions intended mainly for householders, viz., respect for the law, truthfulness, austerity, self-control, quietude, maintaining sacrificial fire, performing *agnihotra* sacrifice, serving guests, being humane and having progeny. Buddhism departs wholly from the Upaniṣadic way of life for attaining knowledge and perfection. It insists upon every seeker of truth to eschew worldly life and to become a monk or nun, living on alms and practising austerities, in which meditations formed the essence.

The Upaniṣads and Buddhism

Buddhism no doubt appeared in the wake of the early *Upaniṣads* and dealt with many of the philosophical problems mentioned in them. Prof. Radhakrishnan thinks that "early Buddhism is a restatement of the thought of the Upaniṣads from a new standpoint¹." The emphasis of the *Brāhmaṇa* texts on ritualism waned in the *Āraṇyakas*, which, however, still maintained the belief in the efficacy of sacrifices and there was a set back in this belief in the *Upaniṣads*, which however did not wholly discard it. Some of the *Upaniṣads* recommended offering of oblations to Rudra². There are also stray passages, in which ritualism has been criticised, and which has led Prof. Ranade to remark that "the spirit of the *Upaniṣads* is, barring a few exceptions here and there, entirely antagonistic to the sacrificial doctrine of the *Brāhmaṇas*³" The *Upaniṣads* were the products of a period when sacrificial ceremonies were in full swing, continuing also in the post-Upaniṣadic period, and so, the generalisation of Prof. Ranade seems to be too wide. Stress has no doubt been laid in the *Upaniṣads* on "inner sacrifice" or exertions directed to the realisation of the self within, but it does not suggest that sacrifices were bereft of any efficacy, which happened to be the watchword of Gautama Buddha.

1 *Indian Philosophy*, p. 361.

2 *Śvetāśvatara*, IV. 22

3 *Ranade, op. cit.*, p. 6.

There are no doubt many common features between the *Upaniṣads* and Buddhism, e.g., pessimistic outlook on the present life, observance of moral laws as a means to liberation, conceptions of *avidyā* and *nāmarūpa*, doctrine of *karman* and attainment of *mokṣa* (liberation). There are also fundamental differences between the two schools of thought for which Buddhism has been criticised in the Brahmanical works, e.g., denial of the sanctity of the revealed texts, non-recognition of the *varṇāśrama-dharma*, condemnation of sacrifices, particularly of those involving killing of animals, denial of existence of a permanent soul, consequently, of transmigration, non-recognition of any relation between the constituted and the unconstituted, conception of *Nirvāṇa* fundamentally different from that of *Brahman*.

Sāṅkhya-Yoga

S ā ṅ k h y a - Y o g a : It is mostly out of the *Upaniṣads* that the post-Upaniṣadic systems of thought, both Brāhmanic and non-Brāhmanic have been developed. Of these the Sāṅkhya system may be traced in the *Chāndogya* and *Kaṭha* but it was fully anticipated in the *Śvetāśvatara*, in which the highest truth is retained as the *Para Brahman*, and emphasis is laid on the conception of *Īśvara*, the *Apara Brahman*. In this *Upaniṣad*,¹ mention is made of the origin of *Prakṛti* out of Maheśvara, who is the creator (lit. sender = *preritā*) of both the individual (*jīva* = *bhoktā*) and its object of enjoyment (*jagat* = *bhogyā*). He combines in himself both ignorance (*avidyā*) and knowledge (*vidyā*), hence both of these are eternal, unborn.² Elsewhere³ are mentioned the three *guṇas*: *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, the sense-organs and their objects, and the five great elements. There is also the formulation of the Sāṅkhya philosophy that ignorance (*avidyā*) consists in a *puruṣa*'s identifying itself with *prakṛti* or the objects of experience while knowledge (*vidyā*), hence liberation, consists in the *puruṣa*'s realization of its

1 *Śvetāśvatara*, iv. 10

2 *Ibid.*, i. 9.

3 *Ibid.*, i. 4.

identity being separate from *prakṛti*. In this *Upaniṣad*¹ there are also references to Kapila-ṛṣi and to Sāṅkhya-Yoga² though in a different context.

The *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, though comparatively late, was no doubt pre-Buddhistic and very likely formed the basis of the teachings of Ālāra Kālāma and Rudraka Rāmaputra, the spiritual teachers of Siddhārtha Gautama as stated in the *Buddhacarita*. The Sāṅkhya philosophy as it developed may be defined thus:

There are two reals: one is *Puruṣa* or the Eternal Soul; it is absolutely pure (*śuddha*), possesses perfect knowledge (*buddha*), remains always liberated (*mukta*); it is conscious (*cetana*) and is never an object of thought, it is a seer (*draṣṭṛ*) and remains inactive and acts as a witness (*sākṣin*) of the doings of a being; the other is *Prakṛti* or the Primal Cause, which is also eternal but active and mutable (*pariṇāmī*). The appearance of worldly objects takes place on account of *avidyā* (ignorance) of the separateness of the two reals, *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. The appearance of the phenomenal world, according to this system, is not wholly baseless or a delusion, as the primal cause (*prakṛti*) does undergo a change, which is confined to characteristics (*nimitta*) only of the basic cause (*upādāna*). For this reason it is called '*satkārya-vāda*' or the view that cause exists in its effect³. According to the Sāṅkhya school, the evolution of *Prakṛti* takes place thus: Out of *Prakṛti* issues *Mahān* or its cosmic aspect or *Buddhi* or psychological aspect. It is the unindividuated cosmic intellect which gives rise to *Ahaṃkāra* (egoism) or individuated intellect, which is also a substance, an active agent. In its

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1 *Śvetāśvatara*, v. 2

2 *Ibid.*, vi. 13.

3 The untenability of the Sāṅkhya view, as argued by the Buddhists, lies in the fact that it admits two reals with different characteristics, which are not logical, viz. one, *Puruṣa* as unchangeable and the other *Prakṛti* as changeable (*pariṇāmī*). The latter being real and eternally existing (*nitya*) it is further led to the fallacy that an eternal entity undergoes change.

sāttvika (pure) aspect it leads to the origin of *Manas* (mind), the function of which is determinate perception; it is the central organ of the sense-organs and their perceptions. *Ahaṃkara* also gives rise to five subtle essences, *Tanmātras*, which in their turn evolve into five gross elements: earth, water, fire, air and ether. Out of these originate the five sense-organs: eyes, ears, nose, tongue and body as also the five physical organs: speech, feet, hands, anus and generating organ.

The process of evolution as shown in the *Buddhacarita*¹ is as follows: The primal or ultimate cause (*prakṛti*) and its evolutes (*vikāra*) constitute a being (*sattva*) with the concomitants: birth, old age, disease and death. The primal cause manifests itself in five great elements (*pañcabhūta*) in their minutest states (*tanmātra*), egoism (*ahaṃkara*) and unindividuated (*avyakta*) cosmic intellect (*buddhi* or *mahān*). Their evolutes are the sense-organs of generation and excretion and also the mind.² There is the soul (*ātman*) which is

1 *Buddhacarita*, Ch. XII.

2 The Buddhists criticise the Sāṅkhya for treating speech, hands and feet, etc. as organs of action (*karmendriya*). They argue that a baby, immediately after birth, uses his eyes but does not speak and his acquisition of speech takes place after a certain amount of training; the organ is really tongue, the act of which is speech and therefore speech cannot be an independent *karmendriya*. Now hands and picking up (*āharaṇa*) of objects, or feet and moving (*viharaṇa*) are really one and the same, the relation being of that an object (*dharmī*) and its quality (*dharma*). Hence, the act of picking up by hands and moving by feet are not actions in the same sense as eyes see an object, or ears hear a sound because seeing and hearing are functions (*dharma*) of eyes and ears, their actions are on something else. Hands and feet are really secondary organs, the primary being *kāyendriya*. Again there are beings which pick up things without the help of hands or move without feet, e. g., serpent. If hands and feet are organs of action, the fingers and toes, throat and teeth should also be treated as organs of action. Hence, it is *kāyendriya* and not hands and feet are the organs of action. *Upastha* or the generating part of the body, on the same ground, should not be separated from the body and treated as a separate organ. Lastly anus (*pāyu*) is not an organ because all weighty objects

conscious of the body. This consciousness or awareness is intellection, which was possessed by saints like Kapila. It is the absence of intellection that produces the world of beings. Those who develop individuation (*vyakta*) and are unable to go beyond the notion of I-ness get entangled in worldly joys and sufferings; while those who discard the notion of I-ness and maintain an unindividuated mind go beyond the world of pain and pleasure.

Of the six systems of Brahmanic philosophy the Buddhist writers, it seems, had in their minds the Vedānta and Sāṅkhya systems only, both of which had developed in the pre-Buddhistic days, but the Buddhists were primarily concerned with the refutation of the non-Brāhmanic systems like Jainism, Ājīvikism and the materialistic and semi-materialistic schools of thought.

fall through a hole and so do the excretions of a being, or at the most the excretions are pushed out by wind and not by anus ; hence anus cannot be an organ of action (*Abhidharmakośa-Vyākhyā*, II. 6)

CHAPTER II

Pre-Buddhistic Non-Brahmanism

In some of the early Upaniṣads, two or three Kṣatriyas were accredited with philosophical knowledge, which they imparted to the Brāhmaṇa students. There are instances showing that the Kṣatriya rulers welcomed and patronised philosophical discussions, rewarding liberally the victors in a controversy. It is unlikely that there was any change in the social structure in the Upaniṣadic period but it may be surmised that the Kṣatriyas raised their status intellectually though not socially. It seems that in the regions outlying the Brahmarṣi-deśa, there was scope for freedom in faith and thought and there was less rigidity in *Varṇāśrama-dharmas*.

It is in the non-Brahmanical scriptures of the Jainas and the Buddhists that the Kṣatriyas are given a status superior to the Brāhmaṇas. The founders of the two religions, Mahāvīra and Śākya Gautama were scions of royal Kṣatriya families of the Nāya and Śākya clans respectively. They were no doubt great intellectuals and had the courage to propound new solutions of the philosophical problems. Both of these thinkers applied their mind to the chief problems of the *Upaniṣads*, viz., the nature of soul in its bonded and emancipated state, and arrived at conclusions diametrically opposed to each other, Mahāvīra admitted the existence of multiple souls while Gautama Buddha denied the existence of an eternal soul altogether. The former applied logic of *syādvāda* (relative existence) to everything worldly as well as to the conception of soul while the latter propounded his law of causation (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) combined with momentariness (*kṣaṇikavāda*) and established the non-existence of an eternal soul, and the dynamic state of worldly beings and objects.

Both of these teachers eschewed ritualism and strongly deprecated the killing of living beings, which was so much in vogue in the sacrificial rituals, described above. Their religion consisted of ethical duties, meditation and intellectual culture.

Both of them insisted on a recluse life. Mahāvīra advocated rigorism while Gautama Buddha preferred moderation in religious practices.

Besides these two outstanding religious teachers, there were a few others, whose doctrines are found mentioned in the Jaina and Buddhist texts. Their doctrines very probably did not last long except those of one sect, the Ājīvikas, whose history can be traced from the days of Aśoka up to the 14th century A.D. when they became confined to Southern India. Unfortunately, none of the non-Brahmanical sects except Jainism and Buddhism have left any literature of their own. Our information about these sects is derived mostly from the Jaina and Buddhist sources, in which their doctrines are criticised and perhaps wrongly represented. The views of the founders of these sects as also of Mahāvīra (Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta) are summarised here.

Pūraṇa Kassapa

(i) P ū r a ṇ a K a s s a p a seems to be the oldest teacher and held views wavering between antinomianism and fatalism. His doctrine is that soul remains inactive as in Sāṅkhya and it is the body which acts, hence soul remains unaffected by the results of good and bad deeds of the body. A person earns neither merit by pious acts such as gifts, sacrifices, or by abstinence from evil acts nor demerit by killing, stealing, adultery or speaking falsehood. It is rather difficult to find out exactly what was Pūraṇa's views from such cryptic statements. It may mean that the body enjoys or suffers according to its deeds but not the soul, a doctrine which cannot reasonably be refuted by Sāṅkhya or a Vedānta schoolman. In Buddhism however soul and body are not admitted as two separate entities, not also as identical.

Pūraṇa's doctrine is grouped in the Pāli texts as an "*Akiriya-vāda*" i.e. non-existence of *karmaic* effects. Neither Sāṅkhya nor Vedānta teaches non-existence of *karmaic* effects. It is the body or *Prakṛti* functions and reaps the fruits of its deeds in this life and in future existences. Neither of these two schools of thought denies the transmigration of soul, hence could not have supported Pūraṇa Kassapa's views¹.

Makkhali Gosāla

(ii) M a k k h a l i G o s ā l a, the founder of the Ājīvika sect, was at first a follower of Pārśvanatha, the traditional founder of Jainism. One day he observed a sprout growing up again after it was trampled down. This changed his outlook and he came to the conclusion that beings were subject to re-animation and not death and destruction. He added to it the doctrine that all beings were subject to a fixed series of existence from the lowliest to the highest and this series was unchangeable (*niyati saṅgatibhāva*) and every existence had its own unalterable characteristic as heat is our fire or coldness of ice. He denied the effect of deeds (*karma*) and energy (*vīrya*). He says that a being is helpless ; he can neither help himself nor others ; nor he can attain perfection (*vimutti*) by exertion. He must transmigrate from one existence to another, and it is only after repeated existences that he attains emancipation (*śuddhi*). The consecutive existences of a being including the periods and types of existences are unalterably fixed (*niyata*). The several existences of a being may be compared to a ball of yarn uncoiling itself, the ultimate end of the yarn being *śuddhi* or *vimutti* or end of existences of a being. He upheld fatalism of the extreme type. A being when nearing the end of the several spans of its lives becomes a human being. Its existence as such is divided into six categories, viz., (i) black (*kaṇha*) as bird-catchers, hunters, fishermen etc., (ii) blue (*nīla*) as ascetics observing rigorous practices, including the Buddhists

1 Cf. *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga* in S. B. E., XLV, p. 237.

(Śākyaputtiya Samaṇas), (ii) red (*lohita*) as monks of the Jaina order, (iv) yellow (*halidda*) as lay-devotees of Acelakas and Ājīvikas, (v) white (*sukka*) as Ājīvika monks like Nanda, Vaccha and Saṅkicca, and lastly (vi) very white (*paramasukka*) as Ājīvika saints. Buddhaghosa¹ has made an attempt to explain in detail the various states of existence envisaged in Maṅkhali Gosala's doctrines. In the *Majjhima Nikāya*² this doctrine is described as *ahetuka* (denying cause) and *akiriya* (denying the effects of deeds), while in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*³ it is said to be a doctrine which denies effects of deeds (*kamma*), activity (*kiriya*) and energy (*virīya*). The Ājīvikas are included in *abrahmacariyāvāsas* (those who lead impure life) and are fond of eulogizing themselves and disparaging others.⁴ In the Jaina literature⁵ as also in Tamil works like the *Maṇimekhalai* of the 4th century A.D. and *Civaṇāṇa cittiyar* of the 14th century, the various states of existence distinguished by colour as black, dark, blue, green, red, golden and white have been dealt with in connection with the doctrines of the Ājīvikas⁶. The distinctions made by colour, though not now intelligible, must have been a prominent feature of Ājīvikism. It is not unlikely that the term '*niyati*' was introduced into Indian thought by the Ājīvikas and it cast a definite influence on the Epics, particularly, the *Mahābhārata*.⁷ Manu and the compiler of the *Hitopadeśa* tried to disabuse the minds of the people of this faith in fatalism though Bhartṛhari extolled it in his *Nītiśataka*. The Ājīvikas, it seems, attained great popularity in the post-Aśokan age. There is a tradition that king Bindusāra consulted Piṅgalavatsa (Janāsana in Pali chronicles), an Ājīvika monk, for ascertaining which of his two sons, Aśoka and Vītaśoka would succeed

1 *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, pp. 161-4

2 *Majjhima*, I, p. 409; cf. II, p. 121

3 *Aṅguttara*, I, p. 287

4 *Majjhima*, I, p. 524

5 *Bhagavatisūtra*, XV; *Uttarādhyayana* XXIV.

6 Basham, *History & Doctrines of the Ājīvikas*, pp. 243ff.

7 Hopkins, *The Great Epic of India*, p. 103

him to the throne. Aśoka's mother was very likely a follower or a devotee of the Ājīvikas. After Aśoka's demise his grandson Daśaratha dedicated a few caves specially to the Ājīvika saints, showing thereby that the successors of Aśoka preferred the Ājīvikas to the Buddhists. Dr. Basham has collected reliable evidences to show that this sect became popular in South India and was in existence up to the medieval period.¹

Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta

(iii) N i g a ṇ ṭ h a N ā ṭ a p u t t a (fetterless son of the Nāya clan) or Mahāvīra happened to be an older contemporary of Buddha. Like Buddha he came of a noble family, perhaps the chief of a clan. He led for some time a married life and then renounced the world. He revived the teachings of Pārśvanātha, and formed an order of monks who practised much more austerities than those prescribed for a Buddhist monk. His philosophical views are as follows:

There are nine substances (*navatattva*) viz , (i) soul (*jīva*) present in all that is conscious including a tree or a fruit; (ii) non-soul (*ajīva*) which serves as the basis for the functioning of soul (*jīva*) as body is of the soul; (iii) merits and demerits (*puṇya, pāpa*) which are also substances produced by actions (*karman*) of *jīva* through mind, speech and body; (v) impurities (*āsrava*) which flow into the body due to *karmaic* effects; (vi) self-control (*saṃvara*) which arrests the flow of *karmaic* effects, and also neutralises them; (vii) bondage (*bandha*) of the soul caused by *karmaic* effects transformed into *āsrava* and leading to repeated existence (*saṃsāra*), (viii) elimination (*nirjarā*) of *karmaic* effects or of *āsravas* through *saṃvara* as prescribed for the Jaina monks; and lastly (ix) liberation (*mokṣa*) attained by a monk who has perfected himself in the disciplinary practices and realised the truth as inculcated in Jainism.

In Jaina philosophy no definite statement (*syādvāda*) can be made about any object, not even about the highest truth.

1 Basham, *op. cit.*, Ch. X.

Every object is subject to three momentary states. viz., origin (*utpāda*), continuity (*sthiti*) and decay (*vināśa*). The object in its state of continuity may be regarded as the substance (*dravya*) while in the other two states it is subject to change (*paryāya*). According to the Jaina teaching an object is permanent from the standpoint of continuity (*sthiti*), but it is impermanent (*anitya*) from the other two standpoints. Every object has got to be determined from different standpoints, as it has several aspects and so there can be no absolute statement regarding the nature of an object. This is known as the Jaina doctrine of *Anekāntavāda*. In order to have a true knowledge of an object, its examination is necessary from various aspects and it is by this means alone that the perfect knowledge can be attained. For the sake of practical application, *Anekāntavāda* has been condensed into seven members (*saptabhaṅgi*), i.e., examination from seven different standpoints, e.g., a being is (i) permanent; (ii) impermanent; (iii) both permanent and impermanent; (iv) indescribable; (v) permanent and indescribable; (vi) impermanent and indescribable; (vii) both permanent and impermanent as also indescribable.¹

The Jaina teachings are presented in the *Nikāyas* thus:

(a) *Cātuyāmasaṃvara* (the four restraints), viz., (i) to be free from passion and desire; (ii) to keep aloof from all kinds of traffic; (iii) to get rid of all *parigrahas* (possessions); and (iv) to remain absorbed in meditation of self.

(b) *Tapasyā* (asceticism): It is by means of rigorism in ascetic practices that the past *karmaic* effects can be neutralised and the highest bliss obtained.

(c) Restraint on physical actions (*kāyadaṇḍa*) is more important than that on mental thoughts (*manodaṇḍa*).

(d) *Ahiṃsā* (non-hurting of living beings even by words or thoughts) is the main ethical doctrine of the Jainas.

1 Syād asti; syād nāsti; syād asti nāsti; syād avaktavya; syād asti ca avaktavya; syād nāsti ca avaktavya; syād asti ca nāsti ca avaktavya.

This religion with its great emphasis on asceticism and rigorism imposed on monks and nuns has maintained its existence in India up to the present day. Its lay followers however are limited and still observe many hard and fast rules of self-restraint.

Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta

(iv) *Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta* did not give out any definite views about the ultimates. He is generally described as an agnostic (*ajñānavādin*), a sceptic unwilling to give any definite answer to the ultimate problems, which were, according to him, were indeterminable, a view not incompatible with Buddha's declaration that the problems: whether the soul is identical with body or not, whether an emancipated being exists after death or not, and so forth are also indeterminable (*avyākata*) and should be left aside. Sañjaya, unlike the Buddhist thinkers, carried his logic too far inasmuch as he refused to give any answer to questions relating even to moral responsibility. He is criticised in the Pāli texts as an *Amarāvikkhepikā* (eel-wrigglers) but not as an *akiriyavādin* (non-believer in *karmaic* effects). In the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*¹, the Agnostics are criticised as blind men, who cannot themselves reach the Truth; how can they guide others to it. A blind man guiding another blind either loses the way or follows a wrong path.

Sañjaya happened to be the teacher of Sāriputta and Moggallāna, who joined the Buddhist order along with his other disciples and were much impressed by Buddha's theory of causation, explaining that the beings of the world were in a ceaseless state of flux governed by certain causes and conditions.

Ajita Kesakambalin

(v) *Ajita Kesakambalin* was a materialist. He denies an after-life and so according to him there is no need of earning merits by good deeds, sacrifices or service to parents.

¹ *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, I. 12.

There is no spiritual advancement or perfection in knowledge likewise. There is no demerit if one commits evil deeds. A being is composed of five elements: earth, water, air, fire and space (*ākāśa*). After death each of these returns to the corresponding mass of great elements while the sense-organs (*indriyas*) pass into space. A person's earthly existence ends in the funeral pyre. Nothing survives after death (*bhaṣmī-bhūtasya punarāgamanam kutaḥ*).

A similar account of the *Nāstikas* or *Cārvakas* is given in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*¹ in which is stated that the five gross elements produce *Ātman*. On the dissolution of the elements, however, the living beings cease to exist.....“There is neither virtue nor vice, there is no world beyond”.²

This doctrine of Ajita is clearly a restatement of the Lokāyata or Bārhaspatya school of thought. Dhīṣaṇa, to whom is attributed this type of doctrine in the *Padma Purāṇa*, asserts that there is no God. The variegated world exists by itself. He admits only four elements and not the fifth, *ākāśa*. The combination of the four elements produces consciousness (*caitanya*) as liquor is produced by the fermentation of rice and molasses. When everything ends in death, there is no sense in performing sacrifices or in seeking heaven. It was an anti-Vedic movement and established that a being should seek his own happiness by whatever means he can devise, and not perform acts which are supposed to bring fruits in the next life. It identifies soul with body, a doctrine which has been bitterly criticised by Buddha and is classed as annihilationism (*ucchedavāda*), i.e., the doctrine that a being disappears for ever with the dissolution of the body.

Pakudha Kaccāyana

(vi) *P a k u d h a K a c c ā y a n a* was a pluralist and a semi-materialist. Like Ajita he holds that a being is composed of seven elements: earth, water, air, fire, pleasure (*sukha*), pain

1 *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, I. 12.

(*dukkha*) and soul (*jīva*). These seven elements are neither created nor moulded. They are barren and fixed as a rock or a stone-pillar and do not produce anything and do not interact on one another. They neither move nor change nor hinder one another so as to cause pain or pleasure or indifference. Hence, there is no killer nor instigator of killing, no hearer nor preacher, no learner nor teacher. If a sword passes through the body of a being, it does not destroy it but only slips through the interspaces of the elements forming the body. It is a form of atomism without any parallel. It has been criticised by Buddha as a kind of eternalism (*sassatavāda*) and grouped with Ajita's teaching of annihilationism (*ucchedavāda*), i.e., everything ends with death.

Heretical Doctrines in the Brahmajālasutta

Besides the doctrines of the six teachers or leaders of sects, mentioned above, there were prevalent in the fifth century B. C. some more views relating to the world and soul and the *summum bonum* of a man's life. These views are often referred to in the *Nikāyas* as those of the *Samaṇa-Brāhmaṇas* and have been dealt with in detail in the first discourse in the *Dīgha Nikāya*, the *Brahmajālasutta*, which aims to include all the non-Buddhist views by casting wide a perfect net. It is also believed by some of the modern scholars that the ostensible object of the *Sutta* is to give a bird's-eye view of the non-Buddhist doctrines prevalent in Northern India in Buddha's days. The *Sutta*, it seems, has no presumption of that kind.¹ The doctrines of the six

1 Cf. *Samantapāsādikā*, pp. 60-1: Aśoka disrobed those monks who held one of the sixty-two views; *Majjhima*, II, pp. 233-8 explains the basic causes of these views; Dr. Thomas writes in his *Life of Buddha*, (p. 199) "They (sixty-two doctrines) are abstract classifications of certain principles which appear again and again in the same formal recital, and show no evidence of real discussions with living exponents."

heretical teachers, as also the philosophical views found in the *Upaniṣads* are beyond the purview of this *Sutta*. Its primary object is to draw up a list of the possible theories about the world and soul that might haunt the minds of recluses (*samaṇa-brāhmaṇā*) who by means of intuition or meditation acquired certain powers but could not reach the highest state. The so called sixty-two views appear to be a systematic exposition of the experiences of a recluse or a thinker and have very little to do with the then existing opinions. There may be a few agreements between some of the sixty-two views and the philosophical tenets embodied in the *Upaniṣads* but that does not go to establish that the *Sutta* was composed with any reference to them, the cases of agreement being more or less accidental. The *Sutta*, however, has served two important purposes, viz., to disabuse our minds of many deep-rooted notions about the world and soul, and to caution us against interpreting the doctrine of Buddha in the light of our pre-conceived notions. By way of illustration, it may be pointed out that the notion of *ātman* as a permanent and immaculate entity, existing within our body, unaffected by our deeds (*karma*) is likely to distort the true import of the *attā* or *puggala* of the Buddhist texts, and in the same way, the notion of nihilism (*ucchedavāda* or *natthatta*) may influence the interpretation of *anattā* or *suññatā* doctrine of the Buddhists. A typical instance is given in the *Majjhima Nikāya*¹ that an eternalist (*sassatavādin*) hears Buddha's teaching about the attainment of *Nibbāna* by the destruction of passions, desires, wrong views, etc. and concludes therefrom that Buddha is an annihilationist (*ucchedavādin*).

Cf. *Saddharmapundarikā* (A.S.), p. 35:

विलम्बदृष्टिगहनेषु नित्यमस्तीति नास्तीति तथास्ति नास्ति ।

द्वाषष्टिदृष्टीकृत निश्चयित्वा असन्तभावं परिगृह्य ते स्थिताः ॥

¹ *Majjhima*, I, p. 136-7

The best purpose that has been served by the *Sutta* is that it shows us how to distinguish Buddha's doctrines from what were not his. In the fifth century B. C. or a little later, it was almost impossible for any teacher to give out any fresh line of thought without the chance of its being confused with one or other of the current doctrines, and this confusion could best be avoided by pointing out the pitfalls, in which the later interpreters were likely to encounter. This is done in the *Sutta* to a certain extent. Then again, Buddha, like other great teachers, had at times recourse to enigmatic language, baffling the attempts of many an erudite commentator to find out the exact meaning. This *Sutta* in pointing out *what Buddhism is not* serves therefore as an excellent guide for the comprehension of the enigmatic expressions. Though the *Sutta* contains many statements of doubtful value, an exposition of it as a whole may serve to remove many of our misconceptions. The problems discussed in the *Sutta* are as follows:—

1. Four kinds of *Sassatavādā* (Eternalists)
2. Four kinds of *Ekaccasassatavādā* (Partial Eternalists)
3. Four kinds of *Antānantikā* (Limitists and Unlimitists)
4. Four kinds of *Amarāvikkhepikā* (Evasive Disputants)
5. Two kinds of *Adhiccasaṃuppannikā* (Fortuitous
Originists)
6. Sixteen kinds of *Saññivādā* (Upholders of Conscious
Soul after death)
7. Eight kinds of *Asaññivādā* (Upholders of Unconscious
Soul after death)
8. Eight kinds of *N' evasaññināsaññivādā* (Upholders of
neither Conscious nor Unconscious Soul after death)
9. Seven kinds of *Ucchedavādā* (Annihilationists)
10. Five kinds of *Diṭṭhadhammanibbānavādā* (Believers in
the attainment of Nibbāna in this life)

All of these views have been described in the Buddhist texts, whether Hīnyānic or Mahāyānic, as wrong (*micchādiṭṭhi*)

and are attributed to people's natural inclination of adhering to the heresy of individuality (*sakkāyadiṭṭhi*), consisting in regarding the body or any particular element of it as scul.¹

Speaking about the object of the introduction of this indeterminate problems into the Buddhist texts, Buddhaghosa² almost echoed what the Mahāyāna teachers had said, namely, that they were necessary for the exposition of *Suññatā*, by which, he, of course, meant only *Puggalasūññatā* while the Mahāyānists meant both *Pudgalaśūnyatā* and *Dharmaśūnyatā*.

In our exposition of the problems we shall follow the arrangement of the *Brahmajālasutta* adding, where available, the arguments of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti as presented in the *Mādhyamikavṛtti*.

Sassatavādā

1. Four kinds of *Sassatavādā* (Eternalists), i.e., those who hold that the soul and the world exist eternally.³

The reason assigned by the *Brahmajālasutta* as the basis of this view is that some recluses on account of their spiritual advancement develop the power (*abhiññā*) of remembering their former births (*pubbenivāsānussati*) up to a certain limit. They may be divided into three classes in accordance with the number of births that can be remembered by them. The fourth class refers to those persons who arrive at the conclusion that the world and the soul are eternal by means of logic and reasoning only. In short, the memories of the past and future existences, according to the *Sutta*, make a person a *Sassatavādin*, for he thinks that the world has been

1 See *Samyutta*, IV, p. 286; also E. J. Thomas, *Life of Buddha*, p. 202; *M. Vr.*, pp. 340, 361: *Sakkāyadrṣṭyupaśamāt sarvadrṣṭyupaśamati*; *Samyutta*, IV, p. 287: *imā diṭṭhiyo sakkāyadiṭṭhiyā sati honti*. See also *Paṭis.*, I, pp. 149-150.

2 *Sum. Vil.*, I, p. 102. *Tasmā sabbaññuta-ñāṇassa mahanta-bhāva-dassanattham desanāya ca suññatā-pakāsa-bhāvattham.....*

3 Cf. *Samyutta*, IV, p. 40: *atthatta*.

rolling on from eternity and will be rolling on for ever and that he will be born again and again.¹ Times out of number Buddha was confronted with the question whether he was a Sassatavādin or not, and every time he had to say that he was neither a Sassatavādin nor an Asassatavādin because the question of Sassata does not arise in reference to the highest truth.² It should, however, be remembered that *Sassata* in the Pāli Nikāyas does not bear the metaphysical sense in which it is used in the Upaniṣads while speaking of the great Ātman. The Sassatavādins, according to the Nikāyas,³ are those who take *attā* or self as one of the five khandhas or something apart from them, and hold that it continues for ever and without any change. It is stated in the *Majjhima Nikāya*⁴ that the self (*attā*), according to the Sassatavādins, is the speaker, feeler and enjoyer of the fruits of good and evil actions (*kamma*), is permanent (*nicca*), fixed (*dhuva*), eternal (*sassata*), unchangeable (*avipariṇāmadhamma*), and is steadfast like the so-called eternal objects, viz., the Sun, Moon, ocean, earth and mountain. The Buddhists, because of their *kṣaṇikavāda* (momentariness) and the denial of a permanent entity, are not prepared to admit that the identical being feels the consequences of his action, which as the *Nidāna-Saṃyutta* asserts, would then make them Sassatavādins.⁵

1 *Dīgha*, III, p. 109-110: *Atītaṃ kho aham addhānaṃ jānāmi saṃvaṭṭi pi loko, vivaṭṭi pi loko, anāgataṃ ca kho aham addhānaṃ jānāmi, saṃvaṭṭissati vā loko ti, vivaṭṭissati vā ti.*

2 The Truth or Nibbāna, according to Buddha, is uncaused and unconditioned (*ahetu-appaccaya*) and hence is non-relative, absolute, and is only realisable within one's ownself (*paccattaṃ veditabbo viññūhi*). It cannot be described by any of the empirical terms, and hence the question of eternity or non-eternity does not arise.

3 *Majjhima*, I, pp. 98, 182.

4 *Majjhima*, I, p. 8; *Papañcasūdanī*, I, p. 71.

5 *Saṃyutta*, II, p. 20: *So karoti so paṭisaṃvediyatīti kho Kassapa ādito sato sayamkatam dukkhan ti iti vadam sassatam etam pareti.*

Cf *M. Vr.*, p. 344.

Sassatavāda and Sāṃkhya

The only Brāhmaṇic school of philosophy, to which the Sassatavāda bears resemblance, is the Sāṃkhya. According to this school, there are two distinct eternals, the *Puruṣa* and the *Prakṛti*, the former corresponding to *Attā* and the latter to *Loka*, with this difference that, according to the Sassatavādins, the soul is an active agent while the *Puruṣa* (=eternal *attā*) of the Sāṃkhya is an inactive onlooker, the active agents being *Ahaṅkāra*, the principle of individuation, which, however, issues out of the *Prakṛti* or matter in its primeval form. The eternal *Loka* of the Sassatavādins is the evolved world in its variety.¹

Four kinds of Ekaccasassatavādā

II. *Ekaccasassatavādā* (Partial Eternalists), i.e., those who hold that one of the three classes of the higher gods exists eternally while the rest do not do so; or those who contend that the body or the organs of sense are impermanent while the mind or consciousness (*citta*=*mano*=*viññāṇa*=*attā*) is permanent.

The three classes of the higher gods referred to above are (A) *Ābhassarā*, (B) *Khiddāpadosikā*, and (C) *Manopadosikā*.²

(A) *Ābhassarā*. According to the cosmogonic speculations of the Buddhists, as also of some of the Upaniṣadic teachers,³ there were in the beginning no beings and the first to appear were the *Ābhassarā* gods, capable of taking shape at will,⁴ feeding themselves only with joy (*pīti*); they are

1 See above, p. 24-25.

2 *Dīgha*, I, pp. 17 ff.; III, pp. 28 ff. Cf. *Majjhima*, I, pp. 326 ff.

3 *Sum. Vil.*, p. 110: pakatīyā nibbatta-sattānaṃ natthitāya suññaṃ. *Taitt. Up.* (II. 7): asad vā idam agra āsit, tato vai sad ajāyata. See *Bṛhad. Up.* I, 1-2. Cf. the Egg-legend in *Chā. Up.* 19, 1-3. See also *RV*, X, 129. To this conception, it seems the *Chā. Up.* (VI, 2, 1) refers in the following words: Taddhaika āhur asad evedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam. Tasmād asataḥ saj jāyata iti.

4 *Sum. Vil.*, I, p. 110: jhānamattena nibbattattā manomayā.

self-luminous (*sayampabhā*), moving about in the sky and getting all that they desired.¹

After existing for aeons, there appeared a palace of Brahmā (*Brahma-vimāna*). One of the Ābhassarā gods came to be reborn in the Brahmavimāna or the Brahma-world at the exhaustion of his merits or the span of his life.² But he felt very lonely and wished for companions. Like him other Ābhassarā gods also made their appearance in the Brahma-world.³ The first Ābhassarā god, however, regarded himself as Brahmā or Mahābrahmā thinking that as it was by means of his reflection that other beings appeared in the Brahma-world, he must be their creator. The other beings were also under the impression that the first Ābhassarā god, Mahābrahmā, having been in existence before them, must have been their lord and originator (*issaro kattā nimmātā*).⁴

The text says further that in course of time, some of these beings happened to be reborn in the mortal world and through meditation and such other practices could visualize their former existences up to their birth in the Brahmā world and gave out the view that Mahābrahmā, who had been existing when they were first born, was the creator of all beings and was eternal (*sassata*), whereas the beings who were born after Mahābrahmā were created by him and hence impermanent (*asassata*).

This doctrine naturally reminds us of the Upaniṣadic speculations about the creation of the world by Brahmā the

1 *Dīgha*, III, pp. 84-5.

2 *Dīgha*, I, p. 17, *āyukkhayā vā puññākkhayā*. Cf. *Gītā*, ix, 21.

Te taṃ bhuktvā svargalokaṃ viśālaṃ
kṣīṇe puṇye martyalokaṃ viśanti.

3 Brahmakāyikā bhūmi, see *Sum. Vil.*, I, p. 110.

4 Mahābrahmā is described in the Pali texts as: abhibhū anabhibhūto aññadatthu-daso vasavatti issaro kattā nimmātā seṭṭho sañjitā vasī bhūtabhavyānaṃ (the supreme, the unsurpassed, the all-seeing, the mighty, the lord, the creator, the maker, the chief, the best, the ruler, and the father of all present and future beings).

Prajāpati, the Primeval Being, who by reflection produced fire, which in its turn produced water, which again produced earth (food or matter). Through these three elements the Primeval Being produced the whole universe. According to the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* the created things and beings are mere appearances hence evanescent, while the real, i.e. the eternal things are the Primeval Being and the three above-mentioned elements.¹

(B) *Khiḍḍāpadosikā*.² This class of partial eternalists holds that the Nimmāṇarati, Paranimmita-vasavattī and such other gods,³ who are not given to excessive pleasure and enjoyment (*khiḍḍā*), exist eternally, while others do not. The reason assigned is similar to the previous one, viz., that some of these gods were reborn in the mortal world, where through meditation and other practices they remembered their former births up to the *Khiḍḍāpadosika-deva* stage and not further. This led them to hold the belief as above.

(C) *Manopadosikā*.⁴ This class of partial eternalists believe that the *Cātummahārājikā* gods,⁵ who do not bear ill-will towards one another, exist eternally, while those who do, fall from that state and so they are impermanent. The reason assigned is similar to the previous one with this difference that in this case they remembered up to their existence as *Cātummahārājikā* gods.

(D) The *Takkī Ekaccassatikā*: These, constituting the fourth class, are the logicians who arrive at the conclusion that the soul (= *citta* = *mano* = *viññāṇa*) is permanent, unchangeable, steadfast, and so forth, while the body is not so. This naturally reminds us of the *Maitrī Upaniṣad*⁶ where the soul is described as pure (*śuddha*), tranquil (*śānta*), eternal (*śāśvata*), great by itself

1 Ranade, *Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy*, p. 85-7.

2 *Dīgha*, I, p. 19; III, p. 31.

3 *Sum. Vil.*, I, p. 114.

4 *Dīgha*, I, p. 21; III, pp. 32-3.

5 *Sum. Vil.*, I, p. 114.

6 *Maitrī*, II. 3-4.

(*sve mahimni*), and making the body living (*anenedam śarīraṃ cetanavat pratiṣṭhāpitam*). A similar conception is found in the *Kauṣitakī* and other *Upaniṣads*.¹

Six of the eight forms of the so-called *Sassatavādas* and *Ekaccasassatavādas*, if critically examined, will be found to be based on one of the six *abhiññās* (higher powers) attained by the Arhats, viz., the *Pubbenivāsañāṇa* (knowledge of former births). It is regarded as one of the various but not essential attainments of an Arhat. This power may be obtained by a person by practising concentration of mind but without fully developing insight into the truth, which is an essential condition of Arhat-hood. These meditators, who have not yet attained the Arhat-stage, but have acquired the power of recalling some of their former births, think that they have known what is to be known and give an interpretation of the truth, i.e., of the ultimate beginning and end of existence, according to their own past experiences.

The remaining two classes of speculators, the logicians, one holding the soul and the world to be eternal, and the other holding the soul to be eternal but not the body, have been passed over in the *Brahmajālasutta* with the remarks that opinions are sometimes formed by the logicians who depend purely on reasoning and not on meditation.

Nāgārjuna assails Sassatavāda

As no attempt has been made in the *Brahmajālasutta* to refute the above-mentioned views, it will be worth while to turn to Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamakārikā*, in the last chapter of which, he takes up for refutation the various doctrines, two of which are the *Śāśvata-* and *Aśāśvata-vādas*.

Refuting *Śāśvatavāda*, Nāgārjuna says² that if a person of the past could be shown to be the same as that of the present,

1 See Oldenberg, *Die Lehre der Upaniṣads*, p. 295; Ranade, *Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy*, p. 134.

2 *M. Vr.*, pp. 574-5.

then only Śāśvatavāda could stand, but this is not possible as it would give rise to the contingency of permanency (*nityatva*) of a being as also to the possibility of a being, having a particular form of existence, to assume different bodies (lit. different forms of existence).¹ A permanent being should not be said to transmigrate, i.e., pass through death and rebirth nor can an animal become a human being through good *karma*, without death and rebirth, for, according to the Śāśvatavāda, a man must remain a man, an animal an animal and that is not possible, so *śāśvatavāda* is not tenable.²

One may however question, "Well, how could Śākyamuni say, 'At that time I was the Cakravartī king Māndhatā', if Śākyamuni was not the same as Māndhatā". The object of such a statement, says Nāgārjuna, is (i) to negative the notion of complete separateness (*anyatvapratishedhakam*) and (ii) to establish the non-identity (*naikatva-pratipādakam*) of the two existences of a transmigrating being. Admitting that Śākyamuni was not totally different from Māndhatā, what harm is there in holding that he was identical with Māndhatā. Nāgārjuna's reply is that, besides the objection of *nityatva* (permanency), it would land us in the absurd position that *upādāna* is responsible for the distinction between the two existences and not *ātmā*. The absurdity is shown thus: Let us assume that *ātmā* and *upādāna* are indistinguishable, and

1 *Ibid.*, *ekagatisthasyāpi nānāgatisaṃgrhātavaprasaṅgāt*. That is, it would lead to the absurdity of an animal, for instance, (if it is *nitya*) to become a man or a god without passing through death.

2 To comprehend the arguments of Nāgārjuna, it should be remembered that Nāgārjuna uses the undermentioned synonyms of the Real and the Unreal in the absolute sense.

The Real: *Nitya* = *Śāśvata* = *Svabhāva* = *Ātmā*, meaning that which is permanent, remains eternally the same without origin and destruction and never undergoes the slightest change, something like the so called eternal Himālaya mountains, the Sun, the Moon.

The Unreal: *Anitya* = *Aśāśvata* = *Niḥsvabhāva* = *Anātmā*, meaning that which is impermanent and undergoes change is really non-existing like the two Moons seen by a person with diseased eyes.

that *ātmā* of the previous existence is the same as the one in the present, from this it would follow that *upādāna* (having *pañcaskandhalakṣaṇa*) of the previous existence is the same as that of the present. But this is absurd as no change in *upādāna* in two existences is admissible. Then again, if *ātmā* and *upādāna* be distinguished as the agent and its object, then also it is not proper to say that object (*upādāna*) has changed but not its agent (*ātmā*, i.e., originator *upādātṛ*).¹

Nāgārjuna then points out that *ātmā* is inseparable from *upādāna*, because it cannot exist apart from the *upādāna*. If it is *upādāna* which comes into existence and undergoes change on account of ignorance, *karma*, etc., and not *ātmā*, then one has to say that the existence of *ātmā* is without any cause (*ahetukatvaprasaṅgāt*) and that is impossible according to Nāgārjuna. Hence *ātmā* and *upādāna* are not separable.

Nāgārjuna then attacks the position of the *Aśāśvatavādins*.² He says that if 'men' and the 'men reborn as gods' be regarded as different, like the Neem and Mango trees, then only the *Aśāśvatavādins* can maintain that the soul of the man has been destroyed and a different soul has come into existence, but to maintain such a distinction in characteristics as between the Neem and Mango trees goes against the theory of the characteristic continuity (*saṃtānānuvṛtti*) of beings which is admitted to exist between 'men' and 'the men reborn as gods' and so the position of the *Aśāśvatavādins* becomes untenable.

Nāgārjuna, explaining the position of the *Sāśvatāśāśvatavādins* (Pāli *Ekaccasassatikā*=Partial Eternalists), says that according to this class of thinkers, a man when reborn as a god should partially give up his human attributes and take the divine in their place; so by the destruction of one part of his being he is *aśāśvata*, and by the retention of the other, he

1 *M. Vr.*, ch. xviii.

2 Though it should have been dealt with along with the doctrines of *Ucchedavāda* (see *infra*) we cannot help treating it here in order to bring out the force of Nāgārjuna's arguments.

is *śāśvata*. To hold that one part of a being is divine and the other human is not proper; hence the position of the *Śāśvatāśāsvatavādins* is untenable.¹

After refuting the three positions mentioned above it becomes easy for Nāgārjuna to disprove the contention of the *Naivaśāśvatanāśāsvatavādins*. He says that one may use the expression *na śāśvata* or *na āśāśvata* only when he has shown that there was something *śāśvata* which later on became *aśāśvata*. But it has been already shown that the *śāśvata* and *aśāśvata* nature of beings cannot be established; hence there can be no such being as *naivaśāśvatanāśāśvata*.²

He now rounds up this refutation by examining whether there is, in fact, any *padārtha* (thing) going about in this beginningless world, the existence of which (thing) we have supposed on the basis of the continuous succession of birth and death without any beginning. If it could be proved that the *saṃskāras*,³ or, the self is leaving one *gati* (lit. state of existence) to go to another; from this again, it is going elsewhere, then the *saṃsāra* (stream of existence) could be proved to be without a beginning. But this is not possible, because a thing which is permanent (*nitya*) or impermanent (*anitya*) cannot be said to be either coming or going. That being so, is it right to say that the stream of existences (*saṃsāra*) has a beginning only because of the remoteness and non-perception of the beginning of the chain of births and death (*janmaparamparāyā atidīrghatvenā-dyanupalambhāt*)? Then again, when no entity can be shown as transmigrating (*saṃsartur abhāvāt*), how can the stream of existences (*saṃsāra*) be

1 Nāgārjuna, it seems, is evading the issue here. The contention of the *Śāśvatāśāsvatavādins* is that the soul is divine and immortal while the body is not so. Nāgārjuna here is not distinguishing the soul from the body. He is refuting those only who hold that the soul is one of the constituents of the body, or is at least not distinguishable from the body. This, however, is never accepted by the Brāhmanic *Śāśvatavādins*.

2 *M. Vr.*, p. 529.

3 *M. Vr.*, p. 586; cf. *Ibid.*, p. 529. *Samskāras*=accumulated effect of deeds of past existences, both mental and physical.

said to have a beginning or not? So it is quite wrong to hold that there is something (*kaścit padārthaḥ*) which has been going about in this beginningless world and which can be perceived. There is, in fact, nothing eternal (*śāśvata*) and so it is meaningless to think of anything as non-eternal (*aśāśvata*), or both, or neither of the two.¹

Antānantikā

III. Four kinds of *Antānantikā* (limitists and unlimitists). The *Antānantikā* are those who hold that

- (a) the world is limited in extent and circular in shape;
- (b) the world is unlimited in extent and is without any end;
- (c) the world is limited upwards and downwards but unlimited breadthwise;
- (d) the world is neither limited nor unlimited (in any direction whatsoever.)²

The reasons assigned for these conclusions are as follows: Some meditators who take the finite and circular world as their object of meditation and do not extend it to all the world systems (*Cakkavālas*)³ arrive at the first conclusion. Those who take all the *Cakkavālas* as their object of meditation, arrive at the second,⁴ while those who take the *Cakkavālas* limited upwards and downwards but unlimited breadthwise as their object of meditation, arrive at the third.⁵

1 For Nāgārjuna's position see *M. Vṛ.*, pp. 537, 591.

2 In the usual enumeration of *ditṭhis*, only first and second are mentioned. See e g., *Paṭis.*, I, p. 153.

3 A *Cakravāla* has a Sun and a Moon as also a multitude of stars moving around the *Mahāmeru*.

4 See also *Paṭis.*, I, p. 152-3.

5 As an approach to this view we may point to the theory of the origin of the world in the *Aitareyopaniṣad*, where the heaven and the earth are conceived as "encompassed on the upper and nether sides by regions of water." Ranade, *op. cit.*, p. 95. In the Buddhist cosmology a chiliocosm consisting of 1,000 or more worlds is encompassed by a

These three classes of speculators are, in fact, not concerned about the ultimate end of the world. They speak about the finiteness and infiniteness of the shape of the world. The first three conclusions are, according to the *Sutta*, nothing but the three kinds of experiences obtained gradually through meditation. The author of the *Sutta* wants to show that those who have one of these experiences but have not yet obtained the highest conception of *Suññatā*,¹ give out one's own individual experience as the true conception of the universe. In Buddhist cosmology the universe is believed to be composed of an infinite number of world-systems, of which one thousand or one million or one thousand millions form a chiliocosm.²

As regards those who reach the fourth conclusion, the text says they are logicians who depend on pure arguments. The Buddhist logicians are evidently responsible for the fourth theory. Their characteristic method of exposition of all metaphysical topics is by the fourfold process (*catuskoṭika*).³ It is, as a rule, not applied to empirical objects. By this fourfold process it is contended that the world is non-existent as the *Śūnyatāvādins* hold, or is only a creation of the mind as the *Vijñānavādins* assert, and hence the question of the attributes of *anta* and *ananta* with reference to the world does not arise.

Nāgārjuna's Comment

The exposition of the four *Antānantādi* views given above relates to cosmogony and appears to be a little laboured due,

gigantic wall. See McGovern, *Manual of Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 38; Hardy, *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 89.

1 Cf *Sum. Vil.*, p. 123: *Imasmim pi Brahmajāle hetthā diṭṭhi-vasena desanā utthitā, upari suññatāpakāsanam āgatam.*

2 In Mahāyāna cosmology, the universe is composed of as many worlds as the sands of the Ganges, i.e., innumerable, incalculable. Cf. Eddington, *The Expanding Universe*, (1946), p. 4:

A hundred thousand million stars make one Galaxy.

A hundred thousand million Galaxies make one Universe.

3 Viz., *hoti; na hoti; hoti ca na hoti ca; n'eva hoti na na hoti.*

perhaps, to the expositor's desire to bring them into a line with the previously mentioned *Sassatādi* views and to attribute three of the four views to ecstatic experiences. The exposition of these views elsewhere is of quite a different nature and sounds reasonable. Nāgārjuna has taken up these problems in his *Madhyamaka-kārikā* and has shown how these are untenable. He first states the four positions thus :

(a) Those, who cannot foresee the future appearance of the self or the world (*ātmano lokasya vā*), regard the world as limited (*antavān*);

(b) Those, who can foresee the future appearance of the self or the world, regard the world as unlimited (*na antavān*);

(c) Those, who can foresee the future appearance of the self or the world partially and not fully, regard the world as both limited and unlimited;

(d) Those, who cannot foresee the future appearance of the self or the world either partially or fully, regard the world as neither limited nor unlimited.

Refuting the above four propositions, Nāgārjuna says :

(a) The existence of *paraloka* (after-life or after-world) is admitted by the Buddhists, hence those who admit it should not say that the self or the world has an end because in that case there could not be an after-life or after-world.

(b) Similarly, if the existence of *paraloka* is admitted, one should not say that the self or the world has no end (*ananta*) because in that case also there cannot be a *paraloka*.

(c) The third view that the world is both limited and unlimited is not tenable for the following reasons :

(i) Take for instance, the case of a *man* reborn as a *god*; if it be held that the *skandhas* of the man had been destroyed at his death (i.e. *antavān*), then it cannot be said that they have given rise to a god. They would be like the extinguished

1 *M. Vr.*, pp. 536, 573, 587-591.

lamp with exhausted oil and wick. As it is admitted that a being reappears after death, it should not be said that the self or the world is limited.

(ii) Applying similar reason, it can be shown that the self or the world cannot be said to be unlimited. In the case when a man is reborn as a god, if it be said that the *skandhas* of the *man* had not been destroyed at his death, they could not have given rise to a *god*. The self or the world would be endless and indestructible (*ananto 'vināṣī*) on account of not giving up its own form. It is only when the previous *skandhas* cease to exist, and that another set of *skandhas* comes into existence, as a result of the same, hence it is not proper to say that the self or the world is unlimited (*ananta*) as the previous *skandhas* do not exist any further.

In Buddhism, the repeated existences of a being is nothing but the continuous flow of *skandhas* (*skandhasantāna*), the *skandhas*, however, are being destroyed every moment and have fresh existence like the flame of a lamp. In other words, the previous set of *skandhas* is destroyed every moment but at the same time it is followed by the appearance of the next. It happens uninterruptedly and so it is said to be continuous, though it is not strictly so. The flame of a lamp appears to be continuous and even identical, but, in fact, it is not so because the drop of oil which once fed the flame is exhausted and another drop of oil takes its place to feed the flame, which therefore cannot be identical with the previous one. On account of this apparent uninterruptedness, it is believed to be continuous and even identical. Hence to a Buddhist philosopher, the self or the world cannot be both limited and unlimited, it is ever flowing like a stream undergoing change every moment (until it reaches Nirvāṇa).

Nāgārjuna then takes up for refutation the third view of both limitedness and unlimitedness. He says that the adherents of this view may say that one part of the man (i.e. body) is destroyed, hence *antavān*; while the other part (i.e., soul) remains undestroyed, hence *anantavān* Nāgārjuna

in reply says that it is absurd to hold that one part of a being is destroyed and the other is not. He, however, as a Buddhist philosopher, is not prepared to admit the existence of soul and body as two separate entities. He says that, according to his opponents, a man, if reborn as a god, should be partly human and partly divine, but this is not possible, hence the opponents cannot uphold the view of the self or the world being both limited and unlimited.

He then proceeds to show that this partial identity and partial change cannot be attributed either to the soul (*upādātṛ*) or to the elements of the body (*upādāna*) because it has been established¹ that the soul has no existence of its own part from the *skandhas*, hence to speak of a non-existing entity as partially the same and partially different is absurd on the face of it.

(d) When the third position is not tenable, i.e., when it cannot be said that the self or the world is both limited and unlimited, Nāgārjuna says that no argument need be adduced to refute the fourth view that the self or the world is neither limited nor unlimited.

Amarāvikkhepikā

IV. Four kinds of *Amarāvikkhepikā* (evasive disputants).

There are some thinkers who do not want to draw a line of demarcation between good and evil action ; so when they are confronted with inquiries about good and evil, they do not give a categorical answer, for they believe that they may be wrong in their answer and be opposed by others and that will produce in their mind either pleasure or displeasure,²

1 See *M. Vr.*, Ch. XVIII.

2 *Dīgha*, I, 25: Yattha me assa chando vā rāgo vā doso vā paṭigho vā taṃ mam' assa musā. Yaṃ mam' ssa musā so mam' assa vighāto. See *Sum. Vil.*, I, p. 116. Chando=dubbalarāgo; rāgo=balavarāgo: doso=dubbala-kodho; paṭigho=balava-kodho.

which fact proves that he is wrong and guilty of speaking a falsehood, and so it will be a hindrance to his spiritual progress. Likewise he will have *upādāna* (cause for rebirth) and that will also be a hindrance to his further spiritual progress.

The third class of *Amarāvikkhepikā* are those who are afraid of facing a well-trained logician about good and evil, lest they be vanquished in the dispute and thus be led to bear ill-will towards their opponents. This ill-will would cause hindrance to their spiritual progress.¹

The fourth class of *Amarāvikkhepikā* are those who do not give any definite opinion about the ultimate problems, e.g., whether there is an after-life or not, whether Tathāgata exists after death or not, etc.

These disputants have thus their own good reason for the line of action followed by them in view of the fact that good (*kuśala*) and evil (*akuśala*) are relative terms, and no hard and fast line can be drawn between them. To a Mahāyānist or a Vedāntist there is ultimately nothing as good or evil, and hence no positive statement can be made about them, the best course therefore would be either to remain silent or evade a positive answer, and the latter course has been preferred by the *Amarāvikkhepikā*. Whatever may have been the justification for the disputants becoming *Amarāvikkhepikā*, they were, in the eyes of the Buddhists, men of weak intellect and deluded, and supposed to have been generally incapable of being true *brahmacārins*. Hence they were not regarded as capable of attaining the highest truth.²

Sañjaya, one of the six heretical teachers, has been classed as an *Amarāvikkhepikā*.³ He is described also as an *Ajñānavādin*, i.e., a sceptic, who keeps an open mind in regard to the ultimate problems.

1 See B. M. Barua, *Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, p. 329.

2 *Majjhima*, I, p. 521.

3 See above, p. 33.

Adhiccasaṃuppannikā

V. Two classes of *Adhiccasaṃuppannikā* (Fortuitous Originists). There are some thinkers who hold that the soul and the world originate accidentally without any cause (*adhiccasaṃuppannika*).¹

(a) The texts speak of one class of such thinkers thus: There are some meditators who take up *Vāyo-kasina*² for meditation and then reaching the fourth stage of meditation (*jhāna*) discover that mind is the source of all troubles, and so they induce a state in which mind does not function. Should they die while thus meditating, they are reborn as 'Asaññasattā' (perception-less) gods. Some of these again fall from that state by developing *saññā* (perception) and are reborn in the mortal world where some of them practise meditation and develop the power of remembering former births. Their memory does not go beyond the *Saññuppāda* (perception-arising) state, i.e., the time of their fall from their position as 'Asaññasattā' gods, and so they declare that the soul and the world originate fortuitously.

(b) The second class of *Adhiccasaṃuppannikā*² comprises those who arrive at the above-mentioned conclusion through reasoning. As a parallel to this doctrine, we may refer to the Lokāyatikas or Bārhaspatyas who hold that the happiness and misery of persons are brought about by the laws of nature, and that there is no other cause. It was by an accidental combination of elements that the living beings such as a peacock of variegated colours or a human being is

1 In the *Samyutta*, II, p. 20 it is said that Kassapa once asked Buddha whether misery is uncaused and is not due to one's own and others' actions (*asayaṃkāram aparaṃkāram adhiccasaṃuppannam dukkhan ti*). See also *Dīgha*, III, p. 139.

2 See *Vis. M.*, p. 172: By *vāyo-kasina* is meant that the meditator fixes his mind on the force of air, moving the tips of shrubs or hair or touching his body while blowing through a hole on the wall of his meditating room. See also Hardy's *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 10.

3 *Dīgha*, I, p. 53-54; *Samyutta*, III, p. 211.

born. The conceptions of heaven and hell, merit and demerit, and so forth, according to them, are creations of designing minds. The doctrine of Ajita Kesakambalin is similar to what has been stated above. According to him, there is no preceding cause or condition for the affliction or purification of a person and hence there is no need for exertion. It is a mistake to think, he says, that one can change the course of his life by the observance of precepts or performance of rituals or practice of asceticism.¹

Uddhamāghātanikā

VI. Sixteen kinds of *Uddhamāghātanika-saññivādins*² (those who believe in the existence of a *conscious* soul after death).³ The sixteen conceptions are as follows:—

(a) Soul is material (*rūpī*)⁴ and remains healthy and conscious after death (*arogo param maraṇā saññī*). This view, says Buddhaghosa, is due to the meditator taking the soul as

1 In the *Dīgha Nikāya* (I, p. 30) the five classes of thinkers including the Antānantikas dealt with above are called Pubbantakappikas (i.e. those who speculate about the beginning of the universe). In the *Mādhyamika-vṛtti* (pp. 536, 572), however, only the Śāśvatavādins are called Pūrvāntikas, while the Antānantikas are called Aparāntikas (i.e. those who speculate about the future of the universe) (See also *Majjhima*, II, pp. 228 ff.; *Paṭis.*, I, p. 155). Buddhaghosa remarks in a general way that some of those who have developed the power of remembering former births (*pubbenivāsānussati*) become Pubbantakappikas, while some who have developed higher vision (*dibbacakkhu*) become Aparantakappikas (*Sumaṅgala Vilāsinī*, I, p. 119).

2 The Aparantakappikas, according to the *Dīgha Nikāya*, are forty-four in number, counting from Uddhamāghātanikas up to the Diṭṭha-dhamma-nibbānavādins, while the preceding eighteen are called Pubbantakappikas. (*Sum. Vil.*, I, p. 118-9).

3 *Dīgha*, I, p. 31; *Majjhima*, II, p. 229.

4 *Rūpī attā*. 'Rūpa' is usually translated as 'form'. On the basis of the connotation of 'rūpa' in 'nāmarūpa,' I think, it should be translated by the word 'matter'. In the Buddhist cosmological speculations, 'rūpadhātu' means not 'the world of forms,' but the 'material world.'

the object of his meditation. He further says that such beliefs are held by the Ājīvikas. From the information collected by Dr. Barua, it is apparent that the Ājīvikas conceived of soul as an entity absolutely pure in its nature, but there is nothing to show that the soul, according to the Ājīvikas, is material.

(b) Soul is non-material (*arūpī*) but remains healthy and conscious after death. Buddhaghosa thinks that this view is due to the meditator reaching the Arūpasamāpatti stage by taking soul (*attā*) as the *nimitta* (object of meditation) of Arūpasamāpatti. He attributes to Mahāvīra a doctrine similar to this. Buddhaghosa seems to be correct in his suggestion, because the Jainas also describe their soul (*jīva*) as non-material (*arūpa*) and formless (*amūrta*).¹

Likewise 'Arūpadhātu' means not the 'world of the formless' but the 'non-material world'.

In the *M. Vr.*, it is clearly stated that *nāma* is a collective name of the four *arūpinaḥ skandhā* (i.e. immaterial skandhas) while *rūpa* is that which takes form and offers obstruction (*rūpyata iti rūpaṃ bādhyata ityarthah*). The Tibetan rendering of *rūpyate* is *gshig. tu. ruṅ bas* = because it is susceptible of examination and that of *bādhyate* is *gnod. par. bya. bar. ruṅ* = it is susceptible of being struck (see *M. Vr.*, p. 544 fn.). Cf. Another conception of soul similar to this in the Mahānidāna Sutta (*Dīgha*, II, p. 64): *Rūpī me paritto attā ti* and *Rūpī me ananto attā ti*. It may be observed that if *Rūpī* means 'form' it cannot be *ananta* (infinite) hence *rūpī* should mean 'material.'

1 See *Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy*, p. 309. See also Guerinot, *La Religion Djaina* (Paris, 1826), ch. VI: *L'âme le djīva, est le principe de la vie, la force vitale. Elle possède une série de qualités: elle est immatérielle, amourta, sans forme, aroupa.....*"

The only point to which I want to draw attention is that the word 'aroupa' (*arūpa*) should have been rendered into French by the word 'immatérielle' and 'amourta' (*amūrta*) by 'sans forme'. Mr. Jaini also in his *Outlines of Jainism* (Cambridge, 1916), p. 83, translates *amūrta* by the word 'immaterial'. In the *Dravyasaṃgraha* (edited by Sarat Chandra Ghosal, 1917, The Sacred Books of the Jainas Series), pp. 4, 5, 22, *amūrta* is translated by the word 'formless'.

Mons. Guerinot, however, does not mention the source from which he traced the word 'arūpa'. From the *Dravya-saṃgraha* (p. 22) it is apparent that soul, according to the Jainas, in its pure state, is invisible and it takes matter (*pudgala*) when it is afflicted by passions.

The next six views are more or less stereotyped combinations of *rūpī* and *arūpī*, *anta* and *ananta*. These are as follows :
The soul after death is

- (c) both material (*rūpī*) and non-material (*arūpī*)
- (b) neither *rūpī* nor *arūpī*
- (e) limited (*anta*)
- (f) unlimited (*ananta*)
- (g) both *antavān* and *anantavān*
- (h) neither *antavān* nor *anantavān*

The soul after death is conscious of

- (i) only one object (*ekatta*)¹
- (j) many objects (*nānatta*)²
- (k) limited space or object (*paritta*)³
- (l) unlimited space or object (*appamāṇa*)⁴

The last four views are attributed by Buddhaghosa to the various experiences acquired by ecstatic meditation. He says that the ninth (i) view is held by those who have attained the fourth *samāpatti*, while the tenth (j) by those who have not attained any one of the *samāpattis*. The eleventh (k) and twelfth (l) are held by those meditators who have for

1 Cf. *Brahmakāyikā* (*nānatta-kāyā ekatta-saññino*) and *Subhakiṇṇā* (*ekatta-kāyā ekatta-saññino*) gods=2nd and 4th *Viññāṇatṭhitis* (*Dīgha*, II, p. 69).

2 Cf. *Manussā ekacce ca devā ekacce ca vinipātikā* (*nānatta-kāyā nānatta-saññino*); *Ābhassarā* (*ekatta-kāyā nānatta-saññino*) gods = 1st and 3rd *Viññāṇatṭhitis* (*Dīgha*, II, p. 69).

3 Cf. *Majjhima*, II, p. 13 : *Sabbaso rūpasaññānam samatikkamo, paṭighasaññānam atthaṅgamo, nānattasaññānam amanasikāro ananto ākāso ti ākāsañcāyatanam upasampajja viharati ayaṃ catuttho vimokkho.*

4 Cf. *Majjhima*, II, p. 229 : *Etam va pan' ekesam upātivattatam viññāṇakasinam eke abivadanti appamāṇam āneñjam*: for further elucidation, see also *Majjhima*, II, p. 13.

meditation. an object or space or *viññāṇa*, limited (*paritta*) or unlimited (*appamāṇa*). The soul after death has

- (m) unmixed happiness (*ekanta-sukhī*), e.g., when a being is in the third or fourth *jhānabhūmi*;
- (n) unmixed misery (*ekanta-dukkhī*) e.g., when a being is in hell;
- (o) mixture of happiness and misery, e.g., when a human being is in the mortal world;
- (p) neither happiness nor misery, e.g., when a being is in the Vehapphala heaven.

Buddhaghosa attributes these four views to those who form their conception of soul on the basis of the four different kinds of future existences as indicated above.

Uddhamāghātanika-asaññivādā

VII, Eight kinds of *Uddhamāghātanika-asaññivādins* (upholders of the existence of *unconscious* soul after death).

Among those who are of opinion that the soul remains *unconscious* but healthy after death (*āghāta*), the following eight conceptions of the soul are current:

The soul is

- (a) material (*rūpī*)
- (b) non-material (*arūpī*)
- (c-h) both *rūpī* and *arūpī* and so forth as stated above in connection with the conscious soul (c-h).

Uddhamāghātanika-n' eva-saññināsaññivādā

VIII. Eight kinds of *Uddhamāghātanika-n' evasaññināsaññivādins* (supporters of the view that the soul after death is *neither conscious nor unconscious*).

Among those who adhere to the view that the soul after death remains healthy, but is neither conscious nor unconscious, the following eight opinions exist :

The soul is (a) material (*rūpī*), (b-h) non-material (*arūpī*) and so forth, as shown under the previous head 'unconscious soul after death.'

The opinions placed under the headings 'Adhiccasamuppannikā' and 'Uddhamāghātanikā', are formed, says Buddhaghosa, according to the object (*kasina*) of meditation selected by a meditator. He says that the meditators sometimes become so much engrossed with the object of their meditation that they lose their power of judgment. They are carried away by their ecstatic experiences and give out their individual experiences as the Truth. In the exposition of the thirty-four views given above, he pointed out, as far as possible, how far a *kasina* could be responsible for a particular view.¹ There are some views, however, based on the Buddhist notion of heavens and hells, e.g., *attā hoti ekantasukhī ekantadukkhī, sukhī-dukkhī*, and so forth.

Ucchedavādā

IX. Seven kinds of *Ucchedavādins* (*Natthattavādins*² = Annihilationists). The following are the seven different conceptions of soul held by the Annihilationists in a gradual ascending order but the soul, in every case, is believed to become extinct after death :

- (a) The soul has form (*rūpavā*) and is made of the four elements, and is like the body born of father and mother. In short, its composition is similar to that of the human being.

1 An instance is given in the *Majjhima Nikāya* (I, p. 21) as to how a meditator is sometimes bewildered by the object of his meditation. See *Papañcasūdanī*, p. 121-2 commenting on the passage 'Eke samaṇa-brāhmaṇā rattim eva samānaṃ divā tī ti sañjānāti, etc.'

2 *Samyutta*, IV, p. 401.

- (b) The soul is heavenly¹ and has form. It remains in the Kāmāvacara sphere and is nourished by material food.
- (c) The soul is heavenly, has form and is of the same substance as mind (*manomaya*). It possesses all the parts of the physical body, major and minor, as also the organs of sense (*indriyas*).²
- (d) The soul is of the same substance as beings of the *ākāsānañcāyatana*³ i.e. like these beings, it has neither *rūpasaññā* (perception of material objects) nor *paṭighasaññā* (perception of obstructing objects) and is indifferent to the distinctions made between one thing and another identifying itself with infinite space (*anantākāsa*).
- (e) The soul is of the same nature as beings of the *viññāṇānañcāyatana*.⁴ Like these beings it can remain beyond the sphere of the Ākāsānañcāyatana-upaga gods and identifies itself with 'infinite consciousness' (*anantaṃ viññāṇaṃ*).
- (f) The soul is like the beings of the *ākāsaññāyatana*.⁵ Like these beings, it can stay outside the sphere of the Viññāṇānañcāyatana-upaga gods.
- (g) The soul is similar to the beings of the *nevasaññānāsaññāyatana*,⁶ and hence superior to the Ākiñcaññāyatana-upaga gods. This state of the soul is considered as the best (*paṇīta*) and the most tranquil (*santa*). It also becomes extinct after death.

The seven conceptions of the soul are apparently based on the Buddhistic classification of beings as shown below,

1 *Sum. Vil.*, I, p. 120 : Dibbo ti devaloke sambhūto (by heavenly we mean that it is produced in one of the spheres of Kāmāvacara gods).

2 *Sum. Vil.*, I, p. 120. It is similar to the Rūpāvacara gods.

3 i.e. similar to the 4th class of Arūpāvacara gods.

4 i.e. similar to the 3rd class of Arūpāvacara gods.

5 i.e. similar to the 2nd class of Arūpāvacara gods.

6 i.e. similar to the 1st class of Arūpāvacara gods.

namely, two classes of the Kāmāvacaras, one class of the Rūpāvacaras and four classes of Arūpāvacaras.¹ The underlying idea of these conceptions is that the soul is made of elements that constitute one or other of the above-mentioned categories of beings. In short, these theories amount almost to the identification of the soul with the body (*taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīraṃ*), a theory not accepted by any of the Buddhist philosophers.²

If we critically examine the views under the head 'Ucchedavāda', we find nothing but the Buddhist conception of the seven classes of beings (*viññāṇaṭṭhitis*). First, the soul is identified with the body, and then it is shown that as the body of beings may be of seven different varieties, so also is the soul. The soul may also be interpreted as something separate from the body but of the same nature as the body.

Diṭṭhadhammanibbānavādā

X. Five classes of *Diṭṭha-dhammanibbānavādins* (theorists about the attainment of Nibbāna in this life).

The five classes are as follows :—

Those who believe that the soul attains Nibbāna (perfection)

1 The subdivisions of the Kāmāvacara beings are as follows :—

(a) Beings of Niraya, Tiracchānayoni, Petaloka, Asurabhavana and Manussaloka.

(b) The gods of Cātummahārājikadevaloka, Tāvatiṃsabhavana, Nimmāṇaratidevaloka and Paranimmitavasavattidevaloka.

Those of the Rūpāvacara gods are : Brahmapārisajjadevas, Brahmāpurohitadevas etc. up to Akaniṭṭhadevas.

Those of the Arūpāvacara gods are : (a) Ākāśānañcāyatana, (b) Viññāṇānañcāyatana, (c) Ākiñcaññāyatana and (d) Nevasaññānāsaññāyatana.

For further details see McGovern, *Manual of Buddhist Philosophy*, pp. 49-50, 60-70 ; *Abhidharmakośa*, ch. III, cf. also 'Satta Viññāṇaṭṭhi-tiyo' in *Dīgha*, II, p. 68-69.

For Nāgārjuna's refutation of the Aśāśvatavāda (= Ucchedavāda), See *ante*, p. 45.

2 See *Dīgha*, I, p. 157.

(a) when it fully enjoys the pleasures of the five senses, viz., *rūpa*, *rasa*, *śabda*, *gandha* and *sparśa*;

(b) when it, free from desires (*kāma*) and evil thoughts and actions (*akusala-dhamma*), enters into the first *jhāna* in which state, there is reflection (*vitakka*) and judgment (*vicāra*) and a feeling of joy derived on account of dissociation from the world;

(c) when it, in the second *jhāna*, becomes free from reflection and judgment, internally serene, and remains with thoughts concentrated, and in the enjoyment of happiness derived through meditation;

(d) when it, in the third *jhāna*, becomes indifferent to happiness and unhappiness, remains conscious of all that is happening, and is pervaded by a sense of ease; and

(e) when it, in the fourth *jhāna*, after dismissing both happiness and unhappiness, pleasure and pain, has a pure state having only equanimity (*upekkhā*) and memory (*sati*).

These five views hardly need any comment. The first is that of the worldly man running after worldly pleasures and may well be compared to the materialistic school of philosophy like the Lokāyatikas or the Bārhaspatyas according to whom the *summum bonum* of human life lies in the full enjoyment of the worldly pleasures attainable through wealth yielded by cattle-rearing, trade, agriculture etc.¹ The next four views refer to the four *jhānas*, which are regarded by the Buddhist monks as the first four steps in the path of spiritual advancement.

1 See *Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha*, edited and translated by Prem Sundar Bose, 1929, p. 7.

CHAPTER III

The Religieux in Ancient India

Samaṇa-Brāhmaṇā

The Pāli texts furnish us not only with an account of the various religious and philosophical views, dealt with in the previous chapter, but also with a picture of the religious people and their practices. The religieux are broadly referred to as Samaṇa-Brāhmaṇā, which include the Brāhmaṇas, Buddhists, Jainas, Ājīvikas and all others professing different creeds as also the ascetics (*tapassino*), practising rigorous asceticism. These two terms are found in combination not only in the Pali texts but also in the Jaina scriptures,¹ works of Pāṇini and Patañjali,² records of the Greek historians³ and inscriptions of Asoka.⁴ In the *Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī*⁵ Samaṇā are distinguished as those who are not Brāhmaṇas by birth but have renounced the worldly life while Brāhmaṇas are those who are born in Brāhmaṇa families, and who are interested more in religion and philosophy than in secular affairs. According to Patañjali,⁶ Śramaṇas and Brāhmaṇas belong to rival groups, one being always opposed to the other. In the Buddhist texts, the Wandering recluses (*paribbājakā*) and Ascetics (*tapassino*)

1 *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga*, II. 6

2 V. S. Agrawala, *India as known to Pāṇini*, p. 383-4

3 Strabo XV. 1. 59 : McCrindle (1901), p. 65n. : Fick, *Social Organisation in North India*, p. 62-3

4 Rock Edict XIII

5 *Sum. Vil.*, I. p. 102 : pabbajjupagatabhāvena samaṇā, jātiyā brāhmaṇā lokena vā samaṇā ti ca brāhmaṇā ti ca evaṃ sammatā. Cf. *Majjhima*, II, p. 89 : pubbe khattiyo vā (vesso vā) suddo vā ti samañña sā assa antarahitā samaṇo t'eva saṅkhaṃ gacchatī; *Samyutta*, I, p. 45 : jātibhīnā

6 V. S. Agrawala, *op. cit.*, p. 384

are generally referred to as Samaṇā. An Ājīvika saint is described in the *Papañcasūdani*¹ as a naked Samaṇa. Gotama Buddha was very often addressed by the non-Buddhists as Samaṇa Gotama. A perfect Jaina monk is called a Samaṇa. The word "Samaṇa" is derived from the root *sam*=to quieten, to control. In the *Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī*² a Samaṇa is defined as one who has eschewed evil deeds and thoughts, overcoming thereby suffering, old age, death and rebirth. In the *Mahā-assapurasutta*,³ is detailed the duties and obligations of a Buddhist monk who is regarded as an ideal Samaṇa-Brāhmaṇa. Like the Samaṇas, the Brāhmaṇas are also described as persons of perfect purity and sanctity. As a rule the Samaṇas and Brāhmaṇas were looked upon by the common folk as saintly persons, deserving respect and support. They also received patronage and protection from the rulers. As far as spiritual attainment was concerned, no distinction was made between a Samaṇa and a Brāhmaṇa.

It may be that the Brāhmaṇas observed the rules of the Brāhmanic society and performed the rituals and ceremonies incumbent upon a Brāhmaṇa by birth.⁴ It is not quite correct to classify the Samaṇas and Brāhmaṇas by their observance of moral precepts (*śīla*), or practice of asceticism, (*tapo*), or cultivation of intellectual culture (*paññā*), or adoption of the different means for emancipation (*vimutti*).⁵ It seems to have

1 *Papañcasudani*, I, p. 151

2 *Sum. Vil.*, I, p. 246: samita-pāpattā samaṇo ti veditabbo: see also *Majjhima*, I, p. 280 cf. *Dhammapada*, 388 : bāhitapāpo ti brāhmaṇo samacariyā samaṇo ti vuccati.

3 *Majjhima*, I, pp. 271 f.

4 Cf. V. S. Agrawala, *op. cit.*, p. 314; An ascetic (*muni*, *śramaṇa*) is required to offer *puroḍāśa* (sacrificial cake) to Agni standing in knee-deep waters of the Sarasvatī

5 Cf. Sukumar Dutt's *Early Buddhist Monachism*, p. 42: "In the *Kassapa-sīhanādasutta*, the Samaṇas and Brāhmaṇas are classified together as *Sīlavādā*, *Tapojigucchāvādā*, *Paññāvādā* and *Vimuttivādā*." Gautama Buddha claims that he excelled others in all these four acquisitions. See also *Aṅguttara*, II, p. 200 f.

been a common practice for one group of Samaṇā or of Brāhmaṇā to criticise another on account of mutual rivalry. In the list of societies (*parisā*), Samaṇas are counted as one along with the Brāhmaṇa, Khattiya and Gahapati.¹

The Samaṇas and Brāhmaṇas, i.e., the religieux in general may be subdivided thus:—

(i) *Brāhmaṇa-Purohitas (Ṛtviks)*

It has been stated above² that the performance of sacrificial ceremonies was widely prevalent among the Brāhmaṇas and Kṣatriyas, who believed that it would lead to happiness and ultimate good for a long time.³ Celebration of sacrifices was an intricate affair and required a good deal of study and knowledge of the ritualistic literature. For every important sacrifice, services of a number of priests (*ṛtviks*) were necessary.⁴ Of the many priests engaged, the main function was performed by the Yajurvedic Brāhmaṇa called Adhvaryu (Addhariyā), supervision was made by the Ṛgvedic Brāhmaṇa called Brahman (Bahvṛca=Bavharija) while the chanting of hymns was entrusted to the Sāmavedic Brāhmaṇa, the Udgātā (Chandokā). All the officiating priests must be pure in descent both from the father's and mother's side for seven generations, proficient in the ritualistic spells (*mantra*), three Vedas and their glossary (*nighaṇḍu*), sacrificial works (*keṭubha*), etymological treatises, traditional lore (*itihāsa*), worldly sciences (*lokāyata*) and science of physiognomy. They should be chaste in morals, learned, intelligent and expert in handling sacrificial ladles (*sujam*).⁵ Kūṭadanta, a rich Brāhmaṇa teacher, wanted to learn from Buddha the three kinds of sacrifices and their sixteen accessories (*tividham yaññasampadam soḷasa parikkhāram*). There can be no doubt that in

1 *Majjhima*, I, p. 72: Khattiyaparisā brāhmaṇaparisā, gahapati-parisā samaṇaparisā

2 See *ante*, pp. 1-4

3 *Dīgha*, I, p. 136

4 See *ante*, p. 10

5 *Dīgha*, I, pp. 120, 131; *Majjhima*, II, p. 210

6 *Dīgha*, I, p. 134.

order to be qualified as priests, the officiating Brāhmaṇas had to undergo a long course of both practical and theoretical training. The priests, according to Pāṇini, were experts in sacrificial rituals, proficient in Vedic lore and capable of chanting hymns with proper intonation.¹ They earned their livelihood by officiating as priests in the sacrifices performed by the rich. The professional Purohitas formed a class of religieux, commanding respect and reverence of the people.

(ii) *Brāhmanical Academic Teachers*

In the *Tevijja*,² *Kūṭadanta*,³ *Subha*⁴ and other *suttas* we come across the names of Caṅki, Tārukkha, Pokkharasāti, Jānussoṇī, Toḍeyya, Kūṭadanta and other Brāhmaṇas who are described as teachers enjoying the revenues of villages given to them by the kings of the country.⁵ These Brāhmaṇas were very rich, and known as *mahāsāla-brāhmaṇas*. They occasionally celebrated sacrifices by spending large sums. These Brāhmaṇa teachers also possessed all the four qualities of a *purohita* mentioned above. They were of superior class, and had excellent appearance (*brahmavaṇṇī brahmavaccasī*) and were proficient in perfect intonation of Vedic hymns (*kalyāṇavāco kalyāṇavākkaraṇo*).⁷ They taught *mantras* to 300 to 500 students (*māṇavakas*), who flocked to them from different countries (*nānādisā nānājanapadā māṇavakā āgacchanti*). They comman-

1 For further details, see V. S. Agrawala *op. cit.*, p. 372-3

2 *Dīgha*, I, pp. 235 f.

3 *Dīgha*, I, pp. 127f.

4 *Majjhima*, II, p. 202

5 The terms in which this is expressed are the same in every account, viz., “Kūṭadanto brāhmaṇo Khānumataṃ (Māgadhānaṃ brāhmaṇagāmaṃ) ajjhāvasti satṭhakatthodakaṃ sadhaññaṃ rājabhoggaṃ rañña Māgadhena Seniyena Bimbisārena dinnaṃ rājadeyyaṃ brahmadeyyaṃ.” The custom of giving away lands to Brāhmaṇas was common in ancient India and it still prevails.

6 In *Kāśikā*, *Varṇī* is interpreted as students of the upper three classes.

7 *Dīgha*, I, p. 114 : this attribute was also applied to Buddha; see *Dīgha*, I, 132. Pāṇini explains it as a synonym of *brahmacārin* (V. S. Agrawala, *op. cit.*, p. 81)

ded respect of the people, who thought that it would be beneath their teacher's dignity to go to Gotama Buddha for discussion, and suggested that the latter should come to him. The maxim that guests should be honoured led, however, the Brāhmaṇa teachers, in some instances, to approach the Teacher. These Brāhmaṇas were expected to enter into discussions with distinguished teachers, who paid visits to their countries, in order to convince the people of their great erudition. The description of the discussions is, however, scanty and one-sided, but it leaves no room for doubt in our mind that these Brāhmaṇas were distinguished scholars and teachers, and were maintained by the king as such; they were not required to officiate at sacrifices as the previously mentioned class had to do in order to earn their livelihood. They were not exactly religieux but they were their teachers and formed a class by themselves. They were criticised by Buddha for being mere reciters of the Vedic hymns and for teaching the ways and means for attaining Brahmaloḥa (*Brahma-sahavyata*), which had neither been visualised by them nor by their predecessors, the ṛṣis, the composers of the Vedic hymns like Aṭṭhaka, Vāmaka, etc.¹

(iii) *Anchorites or Hermits*

The system of Hermit life is very old, and was found in ancient times in Egypt, Palestine, Syria, and many other countries of the East. In India, eremitic life was the earliest form of monasticism. In the *Āraṇyaka* literature of the pre-Buddhistic period, we are introduced to a class of Brāhmaṇas, who retired to forests and were commonly known as Vānaprasthas. They studied the *Āraṇyakas*, resorted to the forest and performed sacrifices in their own way by means of meditation and chanting of mantras, but there is no indication in these texts that they practised austerities (*tapasyā*).²

1 See above, p. 1-2

2 For details about the life of the *Āraṇyakas*, see Keith, *Religion and Philosophy of the Veda*, II, pp. 489 ff. See above, p. 11-12.

It is in the *Upaniṣads*¹ that we come across, for the first time, the terms like *muni*, *pravrajin*, and *tāpas* referring to persons living in the forests and practising austerities.²

The division of the people in the *Upaniṣads* as *Pitṛyānists* and *Devayānists* indicates that austerities were regarded as a better means for going to the higher planes.³ The *Pitṛyānists* were those who lived in the villages, performed sacrifices, made gifts, practised austerities, and were engaged in works of public utility like the digging of wells etc. and passed to the higher regions along the path called *Pitṛyāna* but had to return to this world;⁴ while the *Devayānists* were those who lived in the forests and practised faith, truthfulness and austerities (*śraddhā*, *satya*, *tapasyā*), went to the *brahmaloka* along the path called *Devayāna* and never returned to this world.⁵ The latter were certainly *Sannyāsins* who dwelt in the forests, practised austerities, wandered about and lived on alms.

The term *muni* is used in the Pāli works in the sense of a person who is restrained in word, thought and speech,⁶

1 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, IV, 4. 22; *Chāndogya*, II, 23. 1.

2 In the *R̥gveda* (X. 109. 4; 154. 2. VI. 5.4) the words *muni*, *yati*, *tapas* and *tapasvānu* occur but particulars are lacking as to the sense they bore at the time. *Muni* is found to refer to those who read the *stotras* (VII. 56. 8), possessed occult powers (X. 136) and wore long hairs (Cf. *Keśins* in X. 136). In the *Samhitās* and *Brāhmaṇas*, the term *yati* occurs, but the details of the life of a *yati* are again lacking.

3 Law, *Studies in Indian History and Culture*, p. 13.

4 *Chāndogya*, VI. 2. 16.

5 *Ibid.*, V, 10. 1; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, VI. 2. 15. Cf. *Dīgha*, III, p. 239 :
vatena vā sīlena vā tapena vā brahmacariyena vā devo vā bhavissāmi
devaññataro vā ti.

6 In the *Niddesa* (I, p. 58) Munis are subdivided into six classes :
(i) *āgāramunayo* = those who lead a household life, but know the path and doctrine, (ii) *anāgāramunayo* = those who retire from the world and know the path and doctrine; (iii) *sekhamunayo* = those who have attained one of the *maggas* and *phalas*; (iv) *asekhamunayo* = the Arhats; (v) *pacceka-munayo* = paccekabuddhas; and (vi) *munimunayo* = sammā-sambuddhas.

a sage, a good Buddhist, a monk. Like *muni*, the term *tapassin* in Pāli also bears the meaning of a person having mastery over his senses.¹ It retained also the sense that a *tapassin* is one who resorts to the austere practices of remaining naked, or wearing barks, skins, rough cloths, rags etc.

In the *Majjhima Nikāya*.² there is a reference to Brāhmaṇa ascetics (*ṛṣis*) dwelling in the forests as also to the belief that heavenly existence in after-life could be attained by a Brāhmaṇa by means of asceticism (*tapena*), which was one of the five meritorious deeds. Hence, side by side with the sacrificial rituals of the Brāhmaṇas, there grew up a belief among a certain class of men that *śuddhi* (purity), or *vimukti* (emancipation), or *svarga* (heavenly existence) could be obtained by means of self-mortifications alone. In the Pali texts, extreme ascetic practices are spoken of generally in connection with the *paribbājakas* and non-Brāhmanic sects. The Nigaṇṭhas, e.g., held that *sukha* or *duḥkha* or *aduḥkha-asukha-vedanā* was due to previous *karma*; hence, if by ascetic practices (*tapas*) one could purge off the effects of his former deeds and avoid performing fresh acts, he could put an end to his *karma*. On the complete stoppage of karmaic effects, advent of *duḥkha* would be arrested, and without *duḥkha* there could be no *vedanā* (feeling), and absence of *vedanā* would lead to an end of *duḥkha* for ever.³ Such reasoning could not but encourage rigorous ascetic practices and in fact it did among the non-Brāhmanic religieux.⁴

The ascetic practices appear in the *Nikāyas* in a stereotyped form with hardly any change. These may be summarised as follows: There are ascetics some of whom remain almost naked (*acelaka*), some are devoid of social manner (*muttācāra*), some take food by licking hand, while some do not accept

1 *Dīgha*, III, p. 48 f; *Aṅguttara*, IV, p. 84; Paṇini equates *tāpasa* to *śamī*, *damī*, *yogī*, *vivekī*, *tyāgī*, see Agrawala, *op. cit.*, p. 380.

2 *Majjhima*, II, pp. 135, 199.

3 *Majjhima*, II, p. 214. Cf. B. C. Law, *Mahāvīra*, p. 67.

4 See *IHQ.*, II, pp. 698 ff.

food if invited or if any courtesy be shown to them or if food be offered from any kind of storing vessel or the interior of a house or by women in certain circumstances or from a place infested with flies, or where dogs look for food. They do not drink any intoxicating liquor, restrict their visits for alms to one or two or at most seven doors, or limit the quantity of alms to one or two or at most seven pots and so forth. There are some again who live on self-grown vegetables, fruits, or food-rejections, and even grass.¹ There are some who put on barks, rags, skins, rough hair-blankets or feathers. There are some who shave their heads and moustaches, take to different kinds of sitting postures, use beds of spikes, sleep in the open sky or accept for bed whatever comes to them by chance. There are some who bathe thrice to wash away sins, or are extremely careful in injuring the smallest beings, and sometimes even go to the length of not cleaning their body lest they might injure any living being. There are some who live on cow-dung and such other loathsome food or live on just one small fruit and so forth.² It will be observed that these ascetic practices are enumerated with a view to show that they are not of much use for mental emancipation (*citta-vimutti*) and that Buddha himself in his Bodhisattva stages practised most of these and realised for himself their inefficacy. In the *Kassapa-Sīhanāda-sutta*,³ Buddha states that he does not speak ill of all ascetics (*tapassino*) who lead a hard life (*lukhājīvim*) because he knows that some of them go after death to the higher worlds while there are many others who do not.

In the account given in the *Mahāniddeśa*⁴ of the various

1 Pāṇini refers to a class of ascetics who had *Uñcchavṛtti* i.e. living on corns, of which the ascetics kept a stock to last for some time, see Agrawala, *op. cit.*, p. 380.

2 *Dīgha*, I, Kassapasīhanādasutta; *Majjhima*, II, Mahāsīhanādasutta.

3 *Dīgha*, I, p. 161; III, p. 46 f.

4 The *Mahāniddeśa* (I, pp. 89) furnishes us with two lists of religieux (*samaṇabrāhmaṇā*) who seek emancipation through the perfor-

superstitious beliefs current among the ancient Indians for the attainment of purity, a few ascetic practices are mentioned, e.g., strict observance of *sīlas* (moral precepts), living the life of animals, i.e., like the elephant, horse, cow and so forth, rubbing the body by earth, cow-dung, etc. In the *Jātakas* also, we get a picture of ascetic life,¹ but as the dates of composition of these two works are still under controversy, we leave the details for our present purpose.

From the above accounts it can be concluded that rigorous ascetic practices were in vogue in the fifth century B.C.

(iv) *Paribbājakas*

The Carakas of the pre-Buddhistic period may be pointed out as the forerunners of the Paribbājakas of the Buddhist period. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* Bhuju Lāhyāyani says that he and others travelled in Madra as students, and enquired of Sudhanvan about the limits of the world (*lokānam antam*) and also about the whereabouts of the descendants of Parikṣit.² Pāṇini³ speaks of the Carakas as travelling scholars, who had passed out of the stages of *māṇava* (students in general) and *antevāsin* (students residing with the teacher). After completing their education in a school or *gurugṛha*, they wandered about in order to give a finishing touch to their education by acquiring a knowledge of the beliefs and customs of different peoples and countries.

mance of *Vatas* (vowed observances) and *Mutas*. The *Vata-suddhikas* are Hatthivatika, Assav., Gov., Kukkurav., Kākav., Vāsudevav., Baladevav., Puṇṇabhaddav. The *Vatasuddhikas* are those who in proper time rub their body by earth, *harita*, *gomaya*, etc.; *Majjhima*, I, p. 387: *govatika kukkuravatika*. Cf. "Browsers." "These were solitaries of Mesopotamia, and were so called because they lived on grass like cattle" *ERE.*, VIII, p. 783.

1 See *Indian Culture*, IV, pp. 211-216.

2 *Bṛhad. Up.*, III. 3. 1.

3 V. S. Agrawala, *op. cit.*, p. 303 f.

In the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*¹ Caraka is compounded with Parivrājaka and classed as a heretic along with the Ājīvikas and Nirgranthas. In the Pali texts Carakas are replaced by Paribbājakas.

The term “Parivrājaka” (Wandering Recluse) is found in the *Nirukta*.² It is explained in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* as one who takes *pravrajyā* (going out from household life) with the object of attaining Him.³ Yājñavalkya left his wives and took *pravrajyā*.⁴ In the *Upaniṣads* the line of demarcation between a Parivrājaka and a Sannyāsin (Yati) is not very well defined and the two almost overlap each other. The Sannyāsins like the Parivrājakas are said to have been in the habit of wandering about.⁵

In the *Assalāyanasutta*⁶ it is stated that Assalāyana, a learned and intelligent student, was specially selected to meet Gotama Buddha as he had spent a portion of his life as a Paribbājaka. In Pali works the Paribbājakas are described as Wanderers, whose chief object was to meet distinguished religious teachers and philosophers, listen to their discourses and enter into discussions with them “on matters of ethics and philosophy, nature lore and mysticism”.⁷ For seven or eight months of the year they travel from one place to another. The following is a typical description that we get of them in the *Nikāyas*⁸: “Three hundred paribbājakas were dwelling at a paribbājaka-ārāma near Rājagaha. They were making great noise and were engaged in discussions about kings, ministers, wars, articles of food and luxury, and such other desultory talks.

1 *Sad. Puṇḍ.* (A.S.), p. 180

2 *Nirukta*, I. 14; II 8

3 *Bṛhad. Up.*, IV. 4. 22

4 *Ibid.*, IV. 5. 1

5 *Ibid.*, IV. 4. 22

6 *Majjhima*, II, p. 148: caritaṃ kho bhotā paribbājakaṃ.

7 *Buddhist India*, p. 141

8 See, e.g., *Dīgha*, III, p. 36 f.

They were approached by a distinguished lay-devotee of Buddha apparently with the object of having some talks with them on religious or philosophical topics. He was followed by Buddha, who at the very outset of his talk condemned the ascetic practices. Nigrodha, the leader of the *parivrājakas*, endorsed Buddha's view by saying that he and his followers also were not in favour of the ascetic practices. Buddha did his best to convince them of the excellences of his teaching but failed to produce any effective impression." Throughout the *Nikāyas* are scattered such accounts of Buddha or his disciples meeting *parivrājakas* and discussing with them such topics as the nature of soul, value of ascetic life, states of consciousness, eternality or finiteness of the world and the soul, *karma*, knowledge of Buddha, etc¹.

The discussion of Buddha with the *Paribbājaka* Vacchagotta² is interesting, and it throws a flood of light on the conception of *Nibbāna*. Vacchagotta placed before the Teacher all the indeterminable problems,³ the determination of which was regarded by him as not conducive to the attainment of emancipation (*vimutti*). The crucial problem raised by Vacchagotta was "whither goes the soul of a person after his attainment of *Nibbāna*?" Buddha argued that one could visualise the existence, origination and destruction of the five constituents⁴ of an emancipated person but not their whereabouts after his death just as a common man could visualise the fuel and flame of a fire but neither of them after the fire became extinguished on exhaustion of the fuel. He said that it was too deep and subtle for an unenlightened person to realise what

1 See B. C. Law, *Historical Gleanings*, pp. 16-20; *Buddhistic Studies*, pp. 89-112; Cf. Sarabaites and Gyrovagi or Circumcelliones. "The first kind lived together in twos and threes in a monastery, in order to live a life without rule or law; the Gyrovagi went from monastery to monastery, demanding a lodge for a few days." *ERE.*, VII, p. 786-7

2 *Majjhima*, I, p. 483f

3 See above, p. 36-7

4 *Majjhima*, I, p. 485: Iti rūpaṃ iti rūpassa samudayo iti rūpassa atthagamo, and so on with vedanā, saññā, saṅkhārā and viññāṇaṃ.

happened to the flame and fuel, not to speak of the emancipated person and his constituents after his death. This discussion took place in Anāthapiṇḍikārāma at Sāvattihī. After the discussion Vacchagotta became a devoted lay-disciple of Buddha.

Besides the Paribbājakāramas,¹ the villagers and townspeople provided *Kutuhalasālās*² where congregated the *paribbājakas* as also the teachers and philosophers for religious, philosophical and other discussions. Some of the Paribbājakas were very distinguished persons, e.g., Anugāra, Sakuludāyī, Varadhara³, Nigrodha, Poṭṭhapāda, the last of whom was provided with a special hermitage by Queen Mallikā. Vacchagotta dwelt in a *paribbājakārāma* called Ekaṇḍarika⁴ on the outskirts of Vesālī.

Many of these *paribbājakas* hailed from the Brāhmaṇa society, but the majority were non-Brāhmaṇas (*aññatitthiyā*). As a rule they wandered about and lived on alms collected by begging. Instances are not rare of the *paribbājakas* changing their faith and embracing that of the vanquisher in arguments.

In the *Majjhima Nikāya*,⁵ there are references to a class of *samaṇabrāhmaṇā* who lived in company with female wanderers who used to tie the hair on the top of their head (*molibaddhā paribbājikā*), while in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, there are references to the existence of female wanderers (*paribbājikā*).⁶

(v) *Saṅgha* or *Gaṇa*

The term *Saṅgha* or *Gaṇa* literally means a multitude, e.g. of gods, men or animals. It was applied generally to a political, professional or commercial body. In Buddha's days it

1 *Dīgha*, I, p. 178; *Majjhima*, II, p. 1

2 *Dīgha*, I p. 179; *Majjhima*, II, p. 2. *Papañcasūdanī*, III, p. 235 : Yattha pana nānātittiyā samaṇabrāhmaṇā nānāvidhaṃ kathaṃ pavattenti.

3 *Dīgha*, I, p. 178

4 *Majjhima*, I, p. 481

5 *Ibid.*, I, p. 305

6 *Saṃyutta*, III, pp. 238-240

was specially applied to a body of religieux, wandering or dwelling in a town or village. In course of time it came to be applied to an organised body of religieux upholding a definite philosophical view, observing a particular form of discipline, wearing a special type of dress, and/or bearing or carrying a significant symbol. It is said that once King Ajātasattu expressed to his ministers his desire to listen to the teachings of a distinguished religious teacher. He was advised by his ministers to approach one of the following teachers, viz., Pūraṇa Kassapa, Makkhali Gosāla, Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta, Ajita Kesakambalī, Pakudha Kaccāyana and Sañjaya Belaṭṭhi-putta, each of whom was described as a leader and teacher of a body of recluses, founder of a religious sect, renowned and widely recognised, respected by a large number of people, long ordained, and advanced in age.¹ Gautama Buddha is also sometimes described as the leader and teacher of a body of monks.² From the stereotyped description of these teachers it appears that the term *Saṅgha* or *Gaṇa* meant a religious body subscribing to particular principles and rules of discipline (*diṭṭhi-sīla-sāmañña-saṃghātabhāvena saṅgho*).³ In Buddhism, however, *Saṅgha* became almost a technical term and was given the same importance as the *Buddha* and *Dharma*. All the ecclesiastical acts of the Buddhists were known as *Saṅghakamma*; any split in the *Saṅgha* was called *Saṅghabheda* and so forth. Hence *Saṅgha* came to be more and more associated with the order of the Buddhist monks and nuns than with other religious bodies. The term *gaṇa* is found in connection with the Bodhisattvas in Mahāyāna texts⁴ as also with the Jaina monks and nuns.

In the *Milindapañha*,⁵ *gaṇa* is used in the sense of a

1 *Dīgha*, I, p. 47 ; saṃghī c'eva gaṇācariyo ca ñāto yasassī titthakaro sādhusammato bahujanassa rattaññu cirapabbajito addhagato vayo anupatto.

2 *Dīgha*, I, p. 116

3 *Vimānavatthu-aṭṭhakathā*, p. 233

4 *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* (A S), pp. 193, 259

5 *Milindapañha*, p. 101; S. Dutt, *Early Buddhist Monachism*, p. 44

close body of secular or religious men (*tesaṃ tesaṃ rahas-saṃ tesu gaṇesu yeva carati avasesānaṃ pihitam*), e.g., *mallā atonā pabbatā dhammagiriyā brahmagiriyā naṭakā naccakā laṅghakā pisācā maṇibhaddā puṇṇabhaddā (baddhā), candima-suriyā siridevatā sivā vāsudevā ghanikā asipāsā bhaddiputtā*. Some of the names indicate a class of religieux, worshipping a particular deity. Two names of this list, Vāsudevā and Puṇṇabhaddā appear also in the *Mahāniddeśa*¹ as religious sects. The Pisācā of the list may be identified with the Pisācillikā of the *Cullavagga*,² in which they are described as recluses who kept long hair in the nostrils and carried a skull for begging food. But the meaning attributed to the term Pisācā by Pāṇini seems to be applicable here. According to Pāṇini, Pisācā refer to warlike tribes of the N.W. Frontier (Gilgit, Chitral, Kafristan) who were consumers of raw flesh.³ Pabbatā of the above list were also, according to Pāṇini, a martial tribe living in the mountainous region.⁴ Likewise Dhammagiriyā and Brahmagiriyā were also warriors, who or whose ancestors lived in a hilly region called Dhammagiri and Brahmagiri respectively.⁵ The three other terms Naṭakā, Naccakā⁶ and Laṅghakā evidently referred to groups of actors, dancers and skippers. Ghanikā, Asipāsā and Bhaddiputtā were very likely bodies of fighters using a certain type of weapons like swords and iron-clubs.

Another list of bodies of religieux is found in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*⁷ noticed for the first time by that great scholar Rhys Davids in his *Buddhist India*. It is as follows: Muṇḍasāvako Jaṭilako Māgaṇḍiko Tedaṇḍiko Aviruddhako Gotamako Devadhammiko. In the *Majjhima Nikāya*⁸ appear the

1 See above, p. 69-70 fn.

2 *Vinaya*, II, pp. 115, 134

3 V. S. Agrawala, *op. cit.*, p. 447

4 *Ibid.*, p. 434

5 Agrawala, *op. cit.*, p. 435 : saṅghāḥ giricāriṇaḥ and girigahvara-vāsināḥ

6 *Sad. Puṇḍ.*, (A.S.), p. 180 : naṭanṛttakā

7 *Aṅguttara* III, p. 276-7; *Buddhist India*, p. 144-6

8 *Majjhima*, I, p. 501 ; II, p. 40.

names of two paribbājakas Māgaṇḍiya and Vekhanassa. It is doubtful if they had any connection with the two sects Māgaṇḍikas and Vekhanassas. The latter was an old organised order of hermits, whose duties and ways of living have been dealt with in the *Vaikhānasa-dharma-sūtra* and *Vaikhānasa-grhya sūtra* and who are also mentioned in the *Pañcaviṃśa Brāhmaṇa*¹ and the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*². Pāṇini mentions three groups of religieux who followed the *Bhikṣusūtras* of Pārāśārya and Karmanda.³ They were known as Pārāsāriṇas and Karmandinas. The name of a Pārāsāriya Brāhmaṇa occurs in the Nikāyas.⁴ Pāṇini also refers to three other groups called Kaukkuṭikas, Daṇḍājinikas and Ayaḥśūlikas,⁵ and explains the term *Maskarī* of Maskari Gosāla as carriers of bamboo-staff.⁶ Of the other names in the list, *Muṇḍasāvakā* meant shaven-headed monks in general but applied by the orthodox Brāhmaṇas to the non-Brāhmanical recluses, specially to the Buddhist monks. The *Jaṭilas* are described in the *Vinaya*⁷ as Brāhmanical ascetics having matted hair, maintaining the perpetual sacrificial fire and worshipping a snake-god. It is said that one thousand Jaṭilas were converted by Gotama Buddha to his doctrine.

It may be concluded from the above stray and scanty evidences that the religieux sometimes formed themselves into well-knit organised bodies, observing a set of rites, ceremonies and rules of discipline, and at the same time, professing a particular faith or doctrine. These organizations usually recognised one of their members as the leader or the teacher. The Paribbājakas, who very often kept an open mind, ultimately joined one of these organised bodies, a *Saṅgha* or a *Gaṇa*.

1 *Pañcaviṃśa Brāhmaṇa*, xiv. 4. 7

2 *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, xiv. 9. 29; See also *Buddhist India*, p. 144f. *Vaikhānasa-śrauta-sūtra*.

3 Agrawala, *op. cit.*, p. 380

4 *Buddhist India*, p. 144-6

6 *Ibid.*, p. 380

5 Agrawala, *op. cit.*, p. 381

7 *Vinaya*, I, p. 30

CHAPTER IV

Gautama Buddha

In the sixth century B. C. the people of Magadha and Kosala must have been perplexed with widely diverging and conflicting religious and philosophical views as described above, and felt the need of a Teacher who could chalk out a path in the wilderness and lead them to the ultimate goal. It was at the foot of the mighty Himalayas, at Kapilavastu in the Nepalese Terai, appeared in a mortal frame the Great Being, who was destined not only to give a turn to the course of thoughts and beliefs prevailing in India but also to remould and re-orient the thoughts of the whole of Eastern Asia. Such Great Beings appear very rarely in this world with a mission to relieve the distress of the people and to guide them in the right path.

Gautama Buddha, it is said, came down to this world from the Tuṣita heaven where he was the presiding god. He had reached that heavenly state by acquiring immeasurable merits in his several previous existences. There are two stories, one in the *Mahāvastu* and the other in the *Nidāna-kathā*, about his past life, in which he was assured by Dīpaṅkara Buddha that he would ultimately attain the supreme knowledge (*bodhi*). The two stories are as follows :—

I. *Mahāvastu*: Gautama Buddha was once born as a Brāhmaṇa's son known as Megha Māṇava. He completed his Brāhmanic education and came down to the plains of the Himavanta to procure the fee to be given to his Guru on the termination of his studies. He collected 500 coins (*purāṇas*). He then went to see the capital Dīpavatī and found the city in a festive mood. On enquiry he learnt from a beautiful young maiden with seven lotuses in

her hand. that the city had been decorated to welcome Buddha Dīpaṅkara. He thereupon offered to purchase her five lotuses by paying 500 *purāṇas*. He was told that he could have them if only he would promise to take her as his wife. After remonstrating a little, he agreed to her proposal on her assurance that she would not stand in the way of his spiritual career. On seeing the glorious appearance of Buddha Dīpaṅkara, he became deeply reverential and attained the notion of non-duality (*advayasamjñā*). He became a devotee of Buddha by seeing his miraculous powers, and expressed his devotion and admiration by wiping the lotus-like feet of Buddha by his long hair, and while doing so, he developed the aspiration to attain *Bodhi*.

II. *Nidānakathā*: Gautama Buddha was once born as Sumedha Brāhmaṇa at Amarāvātī in a very rich Brāhmaṇa family of pure lineage. He lost his parents at an early age. He learnt the Brāhmanic sciences and was sick of the wealth left by his parents. He gave them away in charity and became an ascetic seeking immortality (*amatamahānibbāna*), which was free from origin and decay, pleasure and pain, disease and suffering. He realised that as every thing in this world had two aspects, positive and negative, so as an anti-thesis to origin (birth) there must be something unoriginated, and he was going to realise it. He went to the Himalayas and took up an abode at Dhammaka mountain living only on fruits falling from trees. He soon attained perfection in meditations and the six higher powers (*abhiññā*).¹ Occasionally he paid visits to the villages for salt and verjuice, and one day he came down to Rammaka, a city in a border country (*paccantadesavisaya*).

1 The six *abhiññās* are: *Idḍhi* (miraculous power), *dibbasota-dhātu* (heavenly ear), *paracittañāṇa* (others' thought-reading), *pubbe nivāsañāṇa* (knowledge of previous births), *dibbacakkhu* (heavenly eyes), and *āsavānaṃ khayañāṇa* (knowledge of the extinction of one's own impurities).

At that time Buddha Dīpaṅkara reached the city and stopped at Sudassanamahāvihāra. Sumedha tāpasa found all the people busy in making the place neat and tidy for welcoming Dīpaṅkara Buddha, and so he also came forward to take a share in the work. He was charmed by the glory of Buddha's appearance and wanted to lay down his life for him. Lest Dīpaṅkara Buddha should soil his feet in a miry place he lay flat on it like a bridge made of jewels (*Maṇiphalakasetu*) in order that he and his disciples, who were all perfects (*arhats*), might tread on his body. While so lying, he wished that he would not merely attain his own salvation by putting an end to the impurities which he could have easily done, but he would also become a Buddha in order that he might rescue endless beings from the stream of existence. At that time, Dīpaṅkara, standing just before his head, made the forecast that the great Jaṭila ascetic would become a Buddha after numberless aeons, and related in detail where he would be born, how he would attain the supreme knowledge (*bodhi*), and who would become his chief disciples. The prediction was confirmed by many miraculous events including an earthquake, and there was no doubt left that Sumedha was a "*Buddha-bījaṃkura*."

Since his existence as Megha Māṇava or Sumedha Brāhmaṇa, the Bodhisatta (i. e. one destined to be the Buddha) was born several times to acquire the ten supreme perfections (*pāramitās*) preparatory to Buddhahood,¹ which he attained in his last mortal existence as Prince Siddhārtha. In his penultimate existence, he was born as the lord of the gods of the Tuṣita heaven.

Before his advent into the world, the Bodhisatta while in the Tuṣita heaven indicated the time, place and family which would suit him best for appearing as a human being. He said that the most suitable time for

1 The ten *Pāramis* or *Pāramitās* are: dāna, sīla, nekkhamma, paññā, viriya, khanti, sacca, adhiṭṭhāna, mettā, and upekkhā.

his birth was the declining epoch of the world, in which birth, old age, disease, and death would be prevalent. The best Continent, he thought, was Jambudvīpa and not Pūrvavideha, Aparagodāna and Uttarakuru. The right place was a town situated in the middle and not in a border country of Jambudvīpa. This middle country is described in the Pali texts, thus:—On the east, the town Kajaṅgala, beyond which was Mahāsāla forest; on the south-east, the river Sallavatī; on the south-west, Setakaṇṇika; on the west the Brāhmaṇa village Thūna; on the north Usīraddhaja mountain. It was 300 *yojanas* in length, 250 in breadth, and 900 in circumference.

The family suited to him should be of the highest caste of the time, and not a low caste like reed-makers, carpenters, or Pukkuṣas. The Kṣatriyas were looked upon at that time as the highest caste, and so he decided to take birth in a Kṣatriya family.

The gods then surveyed the world and picked up the Śākya family of King Śuddhodana as the ideal one for his birth. They also decided that the Bodhisatta should enter into his mother's womb in the form of a six tusked white elephant with a healthy body and a ruddy head, because such a form was interpreted in astrological treatises as indicating the birth of a great being endowed with the thirty-two signs.

In the month of Vaiśākha under the constellation of Puṣyā, the Bodhisatta in the form of an elephant entered, by the right side, into the womb of his mother. His entry into his mother's womb was heralded by an earthquake and a flash of light, illuminating the whole universe and reaching even the hellish beings, who lived ever in darkness and never saw the Sun and the Moon.

After the lapse of ten months, the queen felt that the time for the birth of the Great Being had arrived and approached the king with the request to permit her to go to the garden as the spring season had set in, trees were in flowers, birds were humming everywhere, and pollens were being wafted around.

The king also needed rest after the long observance of the disciplinary restrictions while the queen felt wearied as she had been bearing the Great Immaculate Being for ten months. The queen was happy and relieved on reaching the garden, and moved about among the trees enjoying their soft touch and beauty. Then a branch of the *Plakṣa* tree bent down and came within the reach of her hand. While she held the branch by her right hand and stood there, the Bodhisatta stepped down from her right side to the earth, clean and untouched by any impurity. As no human hands would touch the Great Being, the gods hurried to the spot and received the baby in silken cloths with deep veneration. A lotus came out of the earth, while the Nāgarājas, Nanda and Upananda, sent forth two streams of hot and cold water to wash him and his mother. The baby took seven steps, a lotus issuing out at every step of his, in each of the six directions to indicate that he was going to be the highest among all beings in all the directions.¹

For seven days Lumbinivana became a place of great festivity, as also of pilgrimage of all Sakyans and Koliyans.

It was on the seventh day that the queen, plunging all in dire grief, left the mortal world, and departed to the Trāyastriṃśa heaven to be reborn there as a goddess of exquisite beauty and virtue.

At that time, there dwelt in the Himalayas the distinguished ascetic Ṛṣi Asita, who had obtained the five higher powers (*abhiññā*). By his divine eye-sight he came to know of the birth of the Great Being and went to Kapilavastu, flying through air along with his nephew, Naradatta (*alias* Nālaka), to pay his homage. He was received by the king with due honour and courtesies. After congratulating the king on the birth of the prince, the ascetic expressed his

1 *Majjhima*, III, p. 123 adds that the Bodhisatta not only took seven steps but also uttered the following words “*Aggo 'ham asmi lokassa, setṭho 'ham asmi lokassa, jeṭṭho 'ham asmi lokassa, ayam antimā jāti, n'atthi dāni punabbhavo ti.*”

desire to see the baby, who, the king thought, was then asleep, and so solicited the ascetic to wait till he awoke. The ascetic corrected the king by telling him that such a Being could not sleep long, and usually remained awake. He was thereupon taken to the baby, whose thirty two signs¹ were noticed by him; the signs prognosticated that he would either become a sovereign ruler, or a recluse, a Tathāgata, a Samyaksambuddha. The hermit's eyes became wet with tears, at which the king was upset and enquired of the reasons for his shedding tears. R̥ṣi Asita explained to the king that he felt sad not because anything evil would befall the prince but because he would not live up to the time when the baby would grow up and preach the truth to rescue beings from the bonds of misery and cycles of existence. On hearing the words of the ascetic, the king felt relieved, and offered his respects to the baby. The ascetic then instructed his nephew to become a disciple of the baby as soon as he would become the Buddha.

When the Bodhisatta was a little older, he with his friends went out to a village to see the ploughing of fields.² There he found a quiet place under a Jambu tree. He sat down there thinking of the hardship of worldly life and became absorbed in meditation, rising from the first to the fourth stage of meditation. At that time five ascetics, possessing supernormal powers, were flying through air. Their progress was suddenly arrested when they were about to cross over the Jambu tree. They felt surprised, and on looking down, found the Great Being seated there in meditation. They came down to the earth and adored him with suitable words. While looking for his son, the king reached the place to find him immersed in meditation. He at once removed his royal insignia and saluted him with folded hands.

1 *Dīgha*, III, p. 142 f.

2 In Pali tradition, the occasion is described as the ceremonial putting of the plough to the fields by the king.

When the Bodhisatta became a youth, the Sakyans met together and suggested to the king that he should get his son married. Though the Bodhisatta was averse to all sorts of worldly ties, he however agreed to marry a girl as an expedient to convince the common man that one, enjoying worldly pleasures, could rise above them like a lotus growing in mud and rising above water. He ascertained that the previous Bodhisattas also contracted marriages, and so he set out the qualities which should be possessed by his bride. The royal priest went to different places, searching for a bride for the prince, and at last found out the daughter of 'Daṇḍapāṇi' endowed with all the virtues and qualities required by the Bodhisatta. The king however preferred to give an opportunity to the prince himself to select his own bride, and so he invited all marriageable Sakyan maidens to his palace to take from his hand presents of artificial flowers made of costly metals and jewels. On the seventh day of the announcement, the maidens congregated in the palace and were dazzled by the beauty and glory of the prince. It was only Gopā, daughter of Daṇḍapāṇi, who could withstand the glory, kept herself at a distance, gazing at him. When her turn came to meet him, she advanced towards him quietly and received not only the best of the flowers but also his very costly finger-ring. It was evident to all present that the choice of the prince fell on Gopā and this was noticed by the king's emissaries, who hurried to the king to give the good news.

King Śuddhodana thereupon sent the marriage proposal for his son to Daṇḍapāṇi, who hesitated, and enquired about the attainments and capabilities of the prince, who had grown up amidst luxuries in the royal palace. The king became a little depressed as he apprehended that Daṇḍapāṇi's doubts about the prince's abilities might have some basis. Finding the king slightly dejected, the prince told him to his great relief, that he was able to compete with any body in any arts and crafts, martial exploits, and exhibition.

of physical prowess. He requested the king to arrange a display of skill by all the Sakyan youths. The king readily assented, making all the necessary arrangements for a display, and invited the Sakyan youths to take part in the competition. The arrangements included among other items the following: (i) throwing the carcass of an elephant to the farthest distance, (ii) showing knowledge of scripts, for which the teacher Viśvāmitra was selected as the judge, (iii) skill and accuracy in arithmetical calculations, for which the master accountant Arjuna acted as the judge, (v) shooting arrows (for which the prince took up the unwieldy bow of his forefather Siṃhahanu), (vi) wrestling, (vii) accomplishment in fine arts, such as music, dancing, singing, (viii) composing books and poems, (ix) knowledge of astrological and other sciences and (x) erudition in Brahmanical literature, logic, philosophy, economics, and politics.

The winner in all these contests was promised the hand of Yaśodharā, who, holding the banner of victory, watched the contests. Devadatta, Sundarānanda and several others vied with one another but they were all surpassed by the Prince. Even Arjuna the master-accountant was overawed by the prince's power of calculations. As the prince came out victorious in all the contests, he was given the hand of Yaśodharā by her father Daṇḍapāṇi with the utmost pleasure.

With Yaśodharā the Bodhisatta enjoyed his family life for some time. One night King Śuddhodana dreamt that his son clad in yellow robes and surrounded by gods was going to leave the palace. He got up from his bed and made anxious enquiries about the whereabouts of his son. On receiving the news that his son was sleeping in the palace, his anxieties were allayed but he made lavish arrangements for the prince's enjoyment and had the palace guarded by exceedingly strong gates, which could only be opened and closed by hundreds of men.

The following morning, the Prince expressed his desire to go out to the forests and ordered his charioteer to make his

chariot ready. The king, on being intimated about the prince's desire for excursion, asked the prince to wait for a week. During the seven days, the king ordered his officers to take every precaution that the prince might not come across any unpleasant sight. After the city had been cleaned and decorated, the charioteer took out the prince in the royal chariot, and while passing through the city, the gods created an old man with shrivelled skin and grey hairs, toothless and hunch-backed, leaning on a stick, and placed him in the sight of the prince and the charioteer only. The prince enquired of the charioteer about the man and learnt that every human being must one day reach that stage. He was very much moved at the sight and returned to the palace. On enquiry of the king about the prince's sudden return, the charioteer informed him about the old man and the effect of the sight on the prince's mind. The king took further precautions, but on the second day of his excursion, the prince and the charioteer saw a man suffering from fever, breathing heavily and grovelling in his own excrements. Like the previous day, the prince learnt the actual state of things from the charioteer and returned to the palace. On the third day, the prince and the charioteer came across a dead man carried on a bier to the cremation ground with his relatives crying and lamenting. The prince likewise became aware of the fact that every human being was subject to death and lost his desire to go out on an excursion. On the fourth day he saw a yellow robed person of quiet demeanour with full control over his senses, walking with steady steps and carrying a bowl in his hands. The prince on enquiry learnt from the charioteer that the person had given up his home-life, and was living as a recluse, seeking release from the cycles of existence. The prince's heart was elated at the thought that he could also become a recluse and find the way to deliverance. He felt happy and enjoyed himself to his heart's content in the garden.

When he was disporting himself in the pleasure garden,

the king's messengers brought him the news of the birth of his son. On getting the news, he did not feel very happy, and apprehended that it might cause hindrance to his intention to retire from worldly life. He uttered '*Rāhulo jāto*' (enemy is born). The king, hearing what the prince had uttered, named the baby as Rāhula. On his way back to the palace, in his rich and luxurious royal dress, he was seen by a distant relative of his called Kisā Gotamī, who uttered the stanza :

Nibbutā nuna sā mātā
 Nibbuto nuna so pitā
 Nibbutā nuna sā nārī
 Yassā 'yaṃ idiso pati.

[Happy indeed is the mother who has such a son; surely happy is his father. Happy also is that woman who has got such a husband.]

The word *nibbuta* struck the prince, and he understood it in the sense of serenity and quietude. He was so pleased with the word that he took out his collar of jewels and sent it as a present to Kisā Gotamī, who regarded it as an indication of his fancy for her. The prince returned to the palace and was being entertained by female musicians, but his mind was elsewhere, and he did not feel the least attraction for the entertainments.

The Bodhisatta, thinking it improper that he should retire without his father's consent, approached the king at early dawn when the Sun had not yet arisen. The rays issuing forth from his body illumined the palace and took the king aback. He asked for permission to retire from worldly life, but as the king protested against his intention, the prince said that he would not seek retirement if the king would grant him only four boons, viz., that he would not be subject to old age, disease, death and rebirth. Realising the absurdity of the demands, the king and Mahāprajāpati multiplied the guards and entertainers in order that the prince might not, by any means, leave the palace. The gods however came

down to nullify the efforts of the king and his men to obstruct the prince's retirement.

King Śuddhodana, unable to give any reply to the prince, remained silent. The prince returned to his apartment and found that the female musicians were sleeping with dishevelled hair, some gnawing their teeth, others foaming at the mouth with saliva trickling down, some muttering and some lying in unseemly postures. He felt that he was in a cremation ground or among ogresses. The scene set him thinking about his own body, which, on introspection, appeared to him to be only a bag of filth. He made up his mind at once to leave the palace to become a recluse.

The Prince called Chandaka, and asked him to get his favourite horse Kaṇṭhaka ready for his departure from the palace. He would not listen to the remonstrances and importunities of Chandaka, who wanted him to retire at an old age, and convinced Chandaka by sound reasonings of the necessity of his immediate retirement. He then left the palace on horse-back taking Chandaka with him. He rode for the whole night, crossed the territories of the Sakyas, Koliyas, Mallas, and Maineyas, and at dawn he got down from the horse-back. He gave away his royal jewelleries to Chandaka and asked him to go back with the horse to Kapilavastu. He cut the top-knot of his hairs by his sword and threw it in the air when it was taken up to heavens by the Trāyastriṃśa gods. He wanted to give up his royal dress and was looking for a yellow robe when a god appeared before him in the form of a hunter, wearing a yellow cloth. He exchanged his costly dress with the hunter's apparel and became a properly dressed *paribbājaka* (wandering recluse). The gods felt happy to find the Bodhisatta as a full-fledged recluse.

While Chandaka returned to Kapilavastu and broke the heart-rending news to the ladies of the place, the prince proceeded on foot in quest of the Truth. He was invited by two Brāhmaṇa female hermits and then by Raivata Brahmarṣi and Rajaka Tridaṇḍika to stay in their hermitages, but he

politely declined their invitation, walked farther till he reached Vaiśālī where he stopped at the hermitage of Ārāḍa Kālāma. On enquiry about Ārāḍa Kālāma's attainments, he learnt that he had reached the seventh stage of meditation (*samāpatti*) called *Akiñcaññāyatana* (in which one's mind seeks nothing). He joined the band of his disciples whose number was then three hundred and within a short time by the application of his strong will (*chanda*), energy (*viriya*), self-recollectedness (*sati*), meditation (*samādhi*) and intellection (*paññā*) he attained the seventh *samāpatti*. He was requested by Ārāḍa to stay on in his hermitage as a fellow-teacher of his disciples, but he declined saying that he was not satisfied with the attainment, as it did not appear to him to be the final liberation. He left Vaiśālī and proceeded towards Rājagṛha, entering into the city by the gate near the hot spring. While on begging round, his glorious appearance and serene demeanour struck with awe and wonder the townspeople, who hurried to the palace and gave the king the news of the arrival of a Great Being. On the following morning the king met him and offered a half share of his kingdom, which was politely declined by the Bodhisatta, who pointed out to him the evils of fleeting worldly pleasures. He then proceeded to the outskirts of Rājagṛha and stopped at the hermitage of Rudraka Rāmaputra. On enquiry he learnt that Rudraka could rise to the eighth stage of meditation (*samāpatti*), called *N'evasaññānāsaññāyatana*, in which the sense-perception was neither active nor dead. It was a stage higher than that reached by Ārāḍa Kālāma but was still an attainment confined to the constituted world (*saṃkhata*) and lower than the transcendental (*lokottara*) ensuring peace and rest, the end of misery, the ultimate, the Nirvāṇa. Impressed by his extraordinary ability in quickly attaining the *N'evasaññānāsaññāyatana* stage with slight exertion, five Brāhmaṇa followers of Rudraka preferred to follow Gautama.

The Bodhisatta along with his five new companions went

to Gayāśīrṣa Hill and found there many ascetics given to rigorous practices of self-mortification for spiritual elevation but he observed that they had not freed themselves wholly from worldly attachments. In spite of their extreme asceticism they were far away from obtaining even the superhuman powers, not to speak of the true insight and knowledge. They were trying to produce fire out of wet woods. He realised that fire could only be produced out of dry woods, in other words, by one who had got rid of worldly attachment thoroughly and as for himself, this he had already done.

He then walked towards Uruvela senānī-gāma and was pleased with the sight of the river Nerañjarā with water almost overflowing the banks.

He made up his mind here to take up his independent line of *sādhana* and decided first to take to rigorous ascetic practices, and these he practised for six long years. He exerted so strenuously that sweat came out of his armpit even in extreme winter, his breath was arrested in such a way that he was occasionally taken by the people as dead. His body turned into a bare skeleton without any flesh or blood, and the bones were linked together barely by a chain of sinews. For not washing his body for a long time, a hard crust of earth formed around his body, and the golden colour of his body became dark black. Thus emaciated, one day in a swoon he fell down on the earth.

The Bodhisatta then realised that asceticism alone would not lead to perfect knowledge, and remembered his experience of trances at the Kṛṣṇagrāma (see above, p. 82). He thereupon decided to change his line of practices by taking food and making his body strong.

At that time lived at Uruvelā, Sujātā, daughter of the landowner Senānī. When a son was born to her, she took the vow of making offerings to the god residing in the Nyagrodha tree. In the sixth year of the Bodhisatta's ascetic-life, she made a grand preparation for offering milk-rice to the tree-god on the full-moon day in the month of Vaiśākha.

The Great Being, emitting rays of light, was then seated under the Nyagrodha tree. The maid servant was struck by the sight and hurried to Sujātā to give her the news that the tree-god had descended from the tree and was seated underneath it to receive her offerings. Sujātā took a new golden vessel and poured the milk-rice into it. She was delighted to see the god in flesh and blood, and offered him the bowl of milk-rice.¹ The Great Being accepted the food, went to the river to take his bath and then took his food for the first time after a fast of fortynine days, during which period he had neither bath nor even mouth-wash.

His five Brāhmaṇa ascetic-companions found that the Bodhisatta had failed to achieve the goal by arduous ascetic practices and now he wanted to reach the goal by partaking of food and leading an easy life. They were disappointed and left him in disgust and went to the deer-park near Banaras.

After refreshing himself with food and bath, the Bodhisatta proceeded with steady steps towards the Bodhi tree. The serpent king Kālika watched his footsteps while his queen Suvarṇaprabhāsa eulogized him with appropriate words. He came across a grass-cutter (*yāvasika*) called Svastika and begged of him some grass to prepare his seat for meditation. He then took his seat under the Bodhi tree with the unflinching resolution that his body might dry up, his flesh and bones might decay but he would not leave the seat without attaining *bodhi*.² While he was thus seated for the attainment of final liberation, he was watched by several gods who assembled there from the worlds of the six directions.

Māra was frightened at the determination of the Bodhisatta and apprehended that he was going to lose his rulership over the realm of *Kāma*. He called out his army and armed

1 In the *Lalitavistara*, the tradition about milk-rice is quite different.

2 Cf. *Padhānasutta*

them to the teeth. Thus arrayed with valiant soldiers, Māra proceeded to attack the Bodhisatta. Māra and his whole army were frightened by the mere opening of his mouth, and they thought that they were being attacked by a sword when he just passed his hand over his head. They began to throw heavy missiles at him, but alas! they found that these turned into flowers and remained hanging on the Bodhi tree. They were then addressed by the Bodhisatta with the words that their lord Māra had no doubt attained many extraordinary powers by the performance of sacrifices, and that he had also performed similar sacrifices, and in addition, he had made numberless gifts, including his own limbs, not to speak of his wealth and property, and as a proof, he pointed to the Mother Earth, which quaked again and again, confirming his statement.

Māra was much disappointed, and departed from the battle-field to devise milder means to divert the Bodhisatta from his determination to seek enlightenment. He asked his lovely daughters to exhibit their charms to entice him. They came in a body and made their utmost attempt by sweet words and alluring movements of limbs to seduce the great saint but all their efforts were of no avail. The Bodhisatta remained seated unmoved like a rock. He at last smiled and explained to them the evil effects of sense-enjoyments, transient nature of worldly pleasures, lust as the cause of repeated existences, and the body as a store-house of filth. His words fell on the deaf ears of Māra's daughters, who made further attempts to allure him but all their endeavours failed.

Failing to produce any effect on his mind and resolution, Māra's daughters admitted their defeat and told their father that the Bodhisatta was completely devoid of attachment, hatred and delusion and that he could see through all the feminine wiles and was not in the least affected by the same. They were convinced that no power on earth and heaven could defeat him and on the contrary he had the

ability to rout Māra's army quite easily.¹ After totally routing Māra's army, he took his seat under the Bodhi tree with incomparable firmness,

The Bodhisatta immersed himself in meditation, rising gradually from the first to the fourth *jhāna*. While in the fourth *jhāna* he obtained, in the first watch of the night, the divine eyes and clear insight by which he could know the nature of all beings. In the second watch he developed the power of knowing a being's past existences, and in the third watch of the night he realised that the last vestige of his impurities was totally extinct (*āsava-khaya-ñāṇa*). At this stage he comprehended the truth that all that had origin must have decay, and while cogitating on this fact, he discovered the law of causation (*paṭicca-samuppāda*), in which ignorance (*avijjā*) of the truth formed the basic cause of all worldly sufferings. He then reflected on the law of causation in the reverse order and discerned that the removal of *avijjā* was the only means for reaching the goal, the ultimate. He then obtained an insight into the four truths: suffering (*dukkha*), its origin (*samudaya*), its decay (*nirodha*) and the path to its decay (*magga*). At dawn he visualised the highest Truth, the *Bodhi*, and thereby became the fully enlightened, the *Buddha* or *Prabuddha*. He realised the evanescent nature of phenomenal objects and at the same time the reality of the ultimate, the end of existence (*bhūtaakoṭi*).

After this unique achievement, He passed seven weeks in the following manner:

He remained seated for one week under the Bodhi tree enjoying serene pleasure (*prītyāhāra-vyūha*) on the fulfilment of his mission, viz., putting an end to birth, old age, and death once for all. In the second week he took long strolls meditatively, while in the third week he remained gazing at the Bodhi tree and musing over the way in which he reached the Truth.

1 The fight between Māra and Bodhisattva has been developed in Chapter II of the Mahasannipāta-Ratnaketudhāraṇī-sūtra. See *Gilgit Manuscripts*, Vol. IV.

In the fourth week he again had short strolls. It was in this week that he was approached by Māra with the request that he should now enter into *parinibbāna* (final demise). Buddha could not oblige him and said that he could not comply with his wishes until and unless he had seen his disciples well trained in his teachings and the Order of his monks well organised and well established. He spent the fifth week in the palace of Mucilinda, the serpent king, who stood guard on him by entwining his body and shading him from sun and rain by his hood. He passed from Mucilinda's palace to the Nyagrodha tree (see p. 89) of the goat-herd, who was then a god and passed the sixth week meditating under it. He passed the seventh week under the Tārāyaṇa tree, where he met the two traders Trapuṣa and Bhallika passing from the southern to northern countries.

The two traders were intimidated by some gods, who had been, in previous existences, their relatives, about the presence of Buddha in the neighbourhood and were advised by them to offer honey and such other food to the great saint. They readily acted according to their directions. As Buddha had no bowl to receive the offering, the four divine guardians of the world hurried to the spot with four bowls of gold and jewels. He rejected them and took a bowl made of stone. Trapuṣa and Bhallika had the good luck of offering the first food to Buddha after his attainment of Bodhi, and thereby becoming the first lay-devotees of the Teacher.

During the seventh week, when Buddha was resting under the Tārāyaṇa tree, it occurred to him that the truth visualised by him was too deep and subtle to be comprehended by men of average intellect. Further it was inexpressible in words, beyond disputations, quiescent by nature, unconstituted, ending all objective existence, attachment, hatred and delusion. It would be sheer waste of his energy if he would make an attempt to propagate the Truth. Mahābrahmā came to know his thoughts and solicited him to preach the truth. He pointed out that it could be comprehended by some beings

who were spiritually advanced and whose intellect was much above the average. He also pointed out that Magadha was at that time full of wrong views, and unless the true doctrine was preached, the people would be more and more bewildered and led on the wrong path.¹ Buddha then cast his divine eyes over the world and found that there were different types of beings, some of whom would be capable of comprehending his doctrine. He then tried to find out the best persons, who would be able to derive benefit from his teachings. He first thought of Rudraka Rāmaputra and then of Ārāḍa Kālāma but as they were both dead at the time, he decided to preach his doctrines to the five Brāhmaṇa ascetics dwelling then at the deer-park near Banaras. He observed that they were well advanced spiritually and capable of comprehending his teachings. He left Gaya and took the road to Banaras. On the way he met an Ājīvika ascetic, who was struck by his bright and serene appearance and wanted to know who was his teacher. Buddha replied that there was none equal to him, not to speak of a teacher of his, he was the fully enlightened.² After parting with the Ājīvika ascetic, he went northwards and reached the bank of the Ganges where he asked a ferryman to take him across the river, but as he asked for fare, Buddha crossed it through air. The ferryman felt very much aggrieved and so did king Bimbisāra, and thenceforth the king ordered his ferrymen to carry all recluses without any fare. He then reached Banaras and had his usual begging round.

1 See Ariyapariyesanā sutta in *Majjhima*, I.

2 *Majjhima*, I, p. 171:

Sabbābhibhū sabbavidū aham asmi
 sabbesu dhammesu anupalitto
 sabbañjaho taṇhakkhaye vimutto
 sayam abhiññāya kam uddiseyyaṃ.
 Na me ācariyo atthi sadiso me na vijjati
 sadevakasmin lokasmin natthi me paṭipuggalo.

CHAPTER V

Missionary Life of Buddha

Buddha's missionary activity extended from his twenty-fifth year up to the end of his earthly existence. It commenced at Sarnath. From the city of Banaras, Buddha proceeded to the deerpark, called Isipatana (lit. rendezvous of ascetics) to impart his teachings to his quondam companions, the five Brāhmaṇas.

Realising that it would not be easy for him to convince all the five ascetics together of the Truth discovered by him, Buddha directed two of them to go out to collect alms, while he gave exposition of his doctrines to the remaining three, who again were sent out for collecting alms on the following day, and he imparted his instructions to the other two. He first explained to them that the life of ease as led by a householder as also the life of rigorous asceticism adopted by some ascetics were the two extremes, which should be avoided, and a middle path should be followed. The middle path consisted (i) of restraint in words, action and means of livelihood (*sammā vācā, kammanta* and *ājīva*), (ii) of complete control over one's mind, i.e., by means of resolution and exertion to earn merit and discard demerit, by self-recollectedness and by meditation (*sammā saṅkappa, vāyāma, sati, samādhi*) and lastly (iii) of acquisition of perfect knowledge (*sammā diṭṭhi*) i.e., realisation of the four truths and the twelve-fold law of causation¹

He then explained to them the four truths, of which the first is *dukkha* "unhappy is existence in this world," as it is evanescent and accompanied by repeated births, old age, disease and death. The second truth is *dukkhasamudaya* "the cause of unhappiness or suffering is desire or thirst",

1 See infra

which appears repeatedly and goes on increasing in a worldly man's life, the worst form of thirst being the strong desire of a being at the time of its death to be born again. He expatiated on the second truth by supplementing it with an exposition of the law of causation (*paṭiccasamuppāda*). The third truth is *dukkhanirodha* "cessation of unhappiness or suffering", which can be obtained by complete eradication of desire or thirst. The fourth truth is *aṭṭhaṅgikamagga* "the path and means for ending unhappiness and suffering" consisting of the eightfold practices known as the middle path.¹

The above discourse and its exposition cleared up the vision of the five Brāhmaṇa ascetics. On the fifth day when all the five had got some insight into the teachings, Buddha delivered the *Anattalakkhaṇasutta*, in which he gave out the basic doctrine of his religion, viz., that there was no such entity as a self (*attā=ātman*) apart from the constituents (*khandhas*) of a being.²

Very little is known about the personal histories of the first five converts. The only information that can be gathered from the traditions is as follows—

(1) *Aññāta-Koṇḍañña* or *Ājñāta Kaundīya* came of a rich Brāhmaṇa family of Droṇavastu, near Kapilavastu. He studied the Vedas and other Brāhmanical *śāstras*. He was one of the Brāhmaṇas invited by King Śuddhodana to ascertain the future of Prince Suddhārtha. He was the oldest of the five Brāhmaṇas, who practised asceticism with the Bodhisatta and was the first disciple to comprehend Buddha's teachings.

(2) *Bhaddiya* was the second Brāhmaṇa, who comprehended Buddha's teachings,

(3) *Vappa* belonged to the Vāseṭṭha family of Kapilavastu. He became a *sotāpanna* on the second day of Buddha's visit to Rṣipattana,

(4-5) *Mahānāma* and *Assaji* were the two juniors among the five Brāhmaṇas and were the last two persons to derive

1 See infra

2 See infra

benefit from the teachings. Mahānāma made a very good impression on Citta-gahapati and received from him the gift of Ambaṭakavana, while Assaji became famous for attracting Sāriputta to Buddhism by uttering the verse “*ye dhammā hetuppabhavā, etc.*”

After converting the five Brāhmaṇas, Buddha stayed on for some at R̥ṣipattana, when very probably Pūrṇa Maitrāyaṇīputra, Nālaka and Sabhiya, who were all recluses, expressed appreciation of Buddha’s teachings without, however, becoming monks although it is stated in the *Mahāvastu*¹ that they were ordained by Buddha with the formula “Come O monks” (*ehi bhikṣu*). These three recluses joined the Buddhist order a little later in the first or second year of Buddha’s ministry and became distinguished monks.

Pūrṇa Maitrāyaṇīputra was the son of a rich Brāhmaṇa of Droṇavastu (in Kosala) near Kapilavastu. He was the sister’s son of Aññāta Koṇḍañña, who gave him ordination at Kapilavastu, soon after Buddha’s departure from Banaras. He met Buddha for the first time at Sāvattihī and became an arhat.

Nālaka of Kātyāyana-gotra was the second son of the royal priest of the king of Avantī. His maternal uncle was Asita R̥ṣi, who dwelt at the Vindhya Hills. He taught all the *śāstras* to Nālaka’s elder brother Uttara, who became a teacher at Markaṭa in Avantī. Nālaka learnt from his elder brother all the *śāstras* and went to the Vindhya Hills and became an ascetic-disciple of R̥ṣi Asita. When Buddha was staying at Banaras after delivering the first discourse, Nālaka sought ordination from the Teacher, who complied with his wishes readily.²

1 In the *Mahāvastu* (III, p. 377 ff.) and *Abhiniṣkramaṇa-sūtra* (Romantic Legend, etc., pp. 274 ff.) the conversions of Pūrṇa Maitrāyaṇīputra, Nālaka, nephew of Asita R̥ṣi, and Sabhiya, son of a famous female disputant are introduced before the conversion of Yaśa, the Śreṣṭhiputra.

2 The above episode appears in the Nālakasutta of the *Suttanipāta* and it is said that the Nālakasutta was delivered seven days after the

Sabhiya was the son of a famous female dialectician of the South. He was given education in arts and sciences and specially in dialectics and the literature of the *Parivrājakas*. While roaming all over the sixteen countries (*janapadas*) as a wanderer (*Parivrājaka*), he reached Banaras and there entered into a discussion with Buddha, and was much impressed with the answers given by him to his queries. He was given ordination then and there.¹

Yaśa : When Buddha was staying at R̥ṣipattana, there lived in the city of Banaras a very rich merchant's son called *Yaśa* or *Yaśoda*. One midnight he walked out of the palace and was strolling in the open air near the river bank exclaiming aloud “*upaddutaṃ vata bho upassaṭṭhaṃ vata bho*” (I am in trouble, I am in distress). This was overheard by Buddha who was then sitting on the bank of the river *Varuṇā* and who found that *Yaśa* had accumulated so much merits in his past existences that he was to attain emancipation in this life. Buddha asked him to come near him and delivered to *Yaśa* first the discourse on the merit of gifts, observance of precepts, means of attaining heavenly existences and evils of enjoying worldly pleasures.² When he found that the discourse had the desired effect of softening his mind and making him fit to receive higher spiritual instructions, he imparted to him the mysteries of the four truths, which included the law of causation. Then and there *Yaśa*'s eyes of insight and knowledge became clear and he attained complete liberation along with miraculous powers.

After a long and anxious search, *Yaśa*'s parents were happy to find their beloved son but felt sorry to see him bent upon becoming a recluse. But when they

Dhamma-cakkappavattana-sutta. The only point to be considered is that in Pāli tradition *Nālaka* is not identified with *Mahākātyāyana* as has been done in the *Mahāvastu*.

1 The above story appears in Pāli texts (*Suttanipāta*) as well, but the meeting of *Sabhiya* and Buddha is placed at *Veluvana*.

2 *dānakathaṃ sīlakathaṃ saggakathaṃ kāmānaṃ ādīnavaṃ saṃkilesaṃ*.

realised that their son had attained great spiritual merits, they became reconciled to their fortune of parting with their son. They became lay-devotees of the Teacher.

Hearing that Yaśa had become a monk and a disciple of Buddha, his four friends, all belonging to Śreṣṭhī families, viz., Vimala, Subāhu, Pūrṇa (Puṇṇaji) and Gavāmpati and fifty others joined the order of monks. Of these four, Gavāmpati became a renowned monk possessed of miraculous powers (*iddhi*). He dwelt at Añjanavana in Sāketa and ultimately attained *arhathood*.¹

Buddha's group of disciples now reached the figure fiftynine, who were all free from bondage of worldly attachment. The Teacher praised them for attaining full emancipation and asked them to wander forth in different directions, no two persons taking the same way, for the benefit and happiness of many, and to preach his doctrines which had an excellent beginning, middle and end, and to instruct the people to become true *brahmacārins*. He believed that there were persons, who had spiritual advancement but needed a little more instruction to attain perfection. It is for them particularly he started his missionary organization. As for himself he said that he was going to Gayāśīrṣa to preach the Truth.²

On his way he came across thirty youths of respectable families enjoying their time with their wives in the forest. One of the youths had a hired girl-friend, who slipped away with some of the valuables of the party. When looking for this woman they came across Buddha and enquired of him if he had seen her. They were told by the Teacher to seek their own self and not the woman. This instruction brought sudden change in their minds and they became disciples of Buddha.³

1 Rockhill, *Life of Buddha*, p. 149. Gavāmpati was very ill at the time of the first Council and died soon after.

2 *Vinaya*, I, p. 21.

3 *Vinaya*, I, p. 34-35.

Kāśyapas : Buddha reached Gayāśīrṣa and wanted to convert the ascetics, the Brahmarṣis and Rājarṣis, dwelling there. He first went to the sacrificial hall of the Jaṭila Kāśyapas and asked for permission to stay in their hermitage. The Jaṭilas pleaded want of space and pointed out to him the place for sacrificial fire as the only spot which was available, but warned him saying that there dwelt a highly venomous serpent (*nāga*). Buddha accepted the offer and stayed there, passing the whole night in deep meditation. He was enveloped by the poisonous gas emitted by the serpent, which, however, on finding him serene, quiet and unmoved in the least, became mild, bent down its hood, worshipping him. In the morning, the Kāśyapas, who pitied Buddha for his unfortunate choice of the place for rest, were taken aback when they saw the Teacher not only hale and hearty but carrying the serpent in his bowl. After exhibiting some other miraculous powers of his, Buddha overawed the Kāśyapas and made them his disciples. He delivered to them the sermon *Ādittapariyāya-sutta*, in which he explained that the real fire consisted of attachment (*rāga*), hatred (*dveṣa*) and delusion (*moha*), and that the same was produced by sense-perceptions caused by the contact of sense-organs with their objects.

On listening to this discourse Uruvilva Kāśyapa realised what the real fire was and gave up his belief in the efficacy of maintaining sacrificial fire. He became his disciple and threw away in the flowing stream his clothes and sacrificial utensils. Nadi Kāśyapa and Gayā Kāśyapa, his two brothers, who lived down the stream were frightened to see their elder's belongings carried by the river and went quickly to him, and to their great astonishment, found him dressed in the robe of a Buddhist monk. They also listened to the 'Fire Sermon' and followed the steps of their elder.¹

1 See *Gilgit Manuscripts*, III, pt. i, Intro., p. 35: Kapphiṇa was put in charge of training the 500 Jaṭila monks, while Śārīputra and Maudgalyāyana had 250 Jaṭilas each.

Bimbisāra: Then Buddha proceeded along with his disciples including the new Jaṭila converts to Yaṣṭivana (Laṭṭhivana) of king Bimbisāra and was received by the king with great veneration. The king as well as his retinue were surprised to see the great Jaṭila ascetic, revered by them, sitting along with the disciples of Buddha and felt a bit perplexed to ascertain whether the Buddha or the Jaṭila ascetic was the leader of the congregation. In order to remove their doubts, the Jaṭila ascetic declared that he had realised that his fire-worship and self-mortifications were of no avail for putting an end to desires and for arresting the course of repeated births, and so he had become a disciple of Buddha seeking Nirvāṇa.

When the king's mind became soft and pliable and full of adoration, the Teacher delivered to him a discourse on the non-existence of soul or I-ness, and on impermanence of worldly objects. The king on hearing this discourse was filled with joy and gained insight into the Truth.

The king then entreated Buddha to reside in his garden Veluvana. Buddha agreed and decided to preach his doctrines and train up his disciples there, and thus establish his religion. He dwelt at Veluvana for some time and recruited a few more disciples, of whom the most distinguished were Śārīputra and Maudgalyāyana, who were originally followers of Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta.

Śārīputra: One day Aśvajit (Assaji) and Vāspa (Vappa), two disciples of Buddha, entered into Rājagṛha in their begging round with minds well-composed and sense-organs well-controlled. Their ways and manner, full of grace and dignity, charmed Śārīputra, otherwise known as Upatiṣya, a distinguished learned son of Brāhmaṇa parents, who were both pastmasters in the art of disputation. On Śārīputra's asking Aśvajit as to who was his teacher, he was told that his teacher was the omniscient saint born of the Ikṣvāku family, the highest among men and gods. When Śārīputra enquired about the doctrine of the Teacher, he replied that he was

just initiated into the doctrine and had not yet grasped it thoroughly, deep and subtle as it was, All that he could do was to reproduce a stanza which contained his teachings. He then recited the following couplet :—

ye dhammā hetuppabhavā tesam hetum tathāgato āha,
tesañ ca yo nirodho evaṃ vādī mahāsamaṇo ti.

[The Tathāgata has explained the cause of all objects which are produced by cause. (How to attain) their cessation is the doctrine of the great saint.]

Śārīputra, who was already spiritually advanced, realised its true import and appreciated its logic. He became at once convinced that there was no Īśvara nor a permanent self and that all worldly objects were mere products of causes and conditions, and that the source of worldly objects, which caused sufferings, must be destroyed to attain eternal happiness.

Maudgalyāyana: Śārīputra and Maudgalyāyana were two friends, who parted one day to find out a teacher who could impart the truth and promised each other that one would divulge to the other the truth and its seer as soon as either of them came across any. Śārīputra therefore wended his way towards the abode of Maudgalyāyana and communicated to him what he had discovered. Maudgalyāyana also penetrated into the Truth and gained the eyes of wisdom,

The two friends then decided to give up their teacher, Sañjaya, and to join the Buddhist order of disciples. They were followed by their fellow-brethren, the remaining two hundred and fifty disciples of Sañjaya.

Mahākāśyapa: Soon after this event when Buddha was staying at Bahuputraka-caitya between Rājagṛha and Nālandā, there came to him a Brāhmaṇa sage called Kāśyapa Agnidatta (Pipphalimāṇava) who was once a very rich householder of Rājagṛha, having a very beautiful wife. He gave up all his possessions and became a recluse along with his wife Bhadrā Kāpileyā (Pāli: Bhaddā Kapilānī). Kāśyapa when young was disinclined to marry but on the insistence of his parents

he married a rich Brāhmaṇa girl, who was also of a retiring disposition. After the death of Kāśyapa's parents, they retired and went to different directions. As a Brāhmanical sage, he was perplexed with doubts about the identity and difference of body and soul, while his wife joined a heretical order. He was looking for a teacher who could dispel his doubts and was impressed by the serene and dignified appearance of Śākyamuni, who also found in him a fit and proper person with all the qualities needed to become his true disciple. Buddha welcomed him and imparted to him the fourfold instructions of right exertion (*samyakprahāṇa*).¹ He delivered to him

Śuddhodana : The king with a large retinue proceeded towards the Nyagrodha hill to welcome the prince, now a recluse. He was then thinking within himself what a great son he had, endowed with all the auspicious signs which prognosticated his sovereignty over the whole of Jambūdvīpa, but alas! he was now living on alms collected from door to door. Buddha could easily read his thoughts and then in order to convince the king that he was far greater than a sovereign ruler, he rose up in the sky and walked there to and fro as if on solid land, then he dived deep into the earth as if he was entering into the river water. The exhibition of miracles produced the desired effect on the mind of the king and the Śākyaans accompanying him.

When the king's mind was filled with joy and became respectful towards his son, he took his seat on a lotus throne hovering in the air, and imparted instructions to the king. He first admonished him to discard his extreme affection for his son, as it added grief to grief and then pointed out to him that a person's grief or happiness depended on his acts of body, speech and mind. The pleasures of a Cakravartin or of a heavenly ruler, he said, were also inconstant and fraught with danger and distress like a poisonous snake, or like a burning flame, and it is for this reason that a wise man eschewed such pleasures and sought a haven of rest and peace, which needed no army or weapons, horses or elephants for protection. After listening to the discourses, the king's mind changed and he realised that his son had reached a state which was much higher than that of a Cakravartin. He then paid his respects to Bhagavān and his Saṅgha.

Yaśodharā : On the following day, Buddha entered into the city in the forenoon on his begging round, when all the citizens of Kapilavastu specially the women-folk flocked to their respective doors and windows to have a look at the divine appearance of the prince walking with a dignified gait and with eyes fixed on the earth. They were all charmed by the

glory and sublimity of the great Recluse, though they felt sorry that a prince, who should have moved in richly decorated chariots under a canopy of rare and beautiful feathers, should walk on foot in dusty streets under the burning sun holding an almsbowl in his hands. The most aggrieved was Rāhula's mother Yaśodharā, who hurried to the king to protest against his son's choice of seeking food from door to door. The king made an attempt to dissuade the Teacher from begging his food but failed to produce any effect on his unswerving resolution to accept whatever alms were offered by the rich and the poor, the high and the low, and to live on the same.

Bhagavān delivered many religious discourses which made king Śuddhodana and queen Mahāprajāpati his faithful devotees.

When all the Śākyans, men and women, offered their homage to Buddha, Yaśodharā did not come out of her apartment. Accompanied by his two chief disciples, Buddha went to her after he learnt from king Śuddhodana that since he had left home she had been leading an austere life putting on a piece of yellow cloth and taking one meal a day. By way of complimenting her, he recounted the story of her love and regard for the Bodhisattva in one of her past existences. After Mahāprajāpati had formed the order of nuns, Yaśodharā also became a bhikṣuṇī and attained the six higher powers (*abhijñā*).

Rāhula: When Buddha left the apartment of Yaśodharā, she asked Rāhula to follow his father and demand his heritage. Rāhula acted accordingly and followed his father up to the hermitage where he was ordained by Śārīputra as a novice at the direction of the Teacher.

Rāhula was made a novice (*śramaṇa*) when he was only seven years old. He was kept under constant watch by Buddha himself as also by his chief disciples. It is said that once in order to observe the rule that fully ordained monks should not sleep in the same hall with the novices, Rāhula

passed one night in the compound of the lavatory used by Buddha. At dawn when Buddha found him sleeping there, he was annoyed and directed his teachers, Sāriputta and Moggallāna, to look after the bare necessities of life of a novice.¹ Rāhula, as a rule, avoided special favours shown to him by the monks.

The king's regard for Buddha made the Śākyaans also very respectful to him and some youths of distinguished Śākyaan families wanted to become his disciples and to join the Order. Among them were Ānanda, Anuruddha, Bhaddiya, Kimbila, Nanda and Devadatta. Chandaka and Upāli followed the Śākyaan nobles and joined the order of monks. Ordination of all of them was performed by Buddhahimself at the Anupiya grove.

Ānanda: He was the son of Amitodana, a brother of king Śuddhodana. He received instructions from Puṇṇa Mantānīputta and became a *sotāpanna*. In the twentieth year of Buddha's ministry he was selected by the Teacher as his regular attendant and for twentyfive years he catered to all the needs of the Teacher. Before Ānanda, Upavāna looked after the Teacher.²

Anuruddha: He was the son of Droṇodana, another brother of Śuddhodana. He soon acquired divine vision (*divyacakṣu*). He was given training by Śārīputra in meditational exercises and attained *arhathood* with Buddha's help. He was almost a constant companion of the Teacher.

Bhaddiya: He belonged to an old aristocratic Śākyaan family and was a close friend of Anuruddha. It was at his intercession and promise that he would accompany Anuruddha, that Anuruddha's mother permitted her son to join the order. Bhaddiya liked solitude and became an *arhat* within a few months of his ordination.

Nanda: He was the son of Śuddhodana and Mahāprajāpati. His coronation and marriage were fixed on the third day of the visit of Buddha to Kapilavastu. Buddha visited

1 *Jataka*, no. 16.

2 *Saṃyutta*, II, p. 41.

his house for alms and when the bowl was filled by Prince Nanda, he did not take it in his hand and the Prince also out of reverence could not ask him to carry it, so Nanda had to follow Buddha with the almsbowl to the monastery, where Buddha admonished him to give up his household life and to become a recluse. Prince Nanda was very much enamoured of his betrothed Janapadakalyāṇī and was not willing to become a monk. In order to bring a change in his mind and to prove the evanescence of earthly life, Buddha created some nymphs, whose beauty far surpassed that of Janapadakalyāṇī and promised to give him one, if he would become a monk and take to exertion according to his directions. Prince Nanda agreed and in course of time by striving hard he got over his weakness for home-life and attained *arhat-hood*.

Devadatta: He was the son of the Koliyan Suppabuddha (maternal uncle of the Teacher) and brother of Yaśodharā. Soon after his ordination he attained some miraculous powers by which he could obtain the support of king Ajātaśatru. In the 37th year of Buddha's ministry he grew jealous of Buddha's ever increasing popularity, and began to devise schemes for overthrowing the Teacher from his exalted position.

He collected some monks of his ilk around him like Kokālika and Koṭamaraka Tissa and also a few nuns like Thullanandā, and obtained the support of a small section of lay-devotees like Daṇḍapāṇi and Suppabuddha. Towards the end of Buddha's life, he wanted that Buddha, like other religious heads, should nominate him as his successor. Buddha told him that he was not going to name any successor of his, not even his best disciples like Sāriputta and Moggallāna, not to speak of an evil-minded person like him. On this refusal, Devadatta flew into rage, secured the sympathy of some wicked monks and formed a new party with himself as the leader. He obtained the support of King Ajātaśatru, who was then a prince, designing plans to kill his

old father king Bimbisāra. With Ajātaśatru's help he made attempts to take Buddha's life once by engaging some ruffians, then by throwing a huge boulder from the top of a hill and lastly by letting loose a mad rutting elephant called Nālāgiri. The ruffians turned into devotees when they approached the Teacher while the downward course of the boulder was arrested but a splinter struck the feet of the Teacher, shedding his blood. As regards the mad elephant, it is said that when Nālāgiri rushed into the city trampling down hundreds of men Buddha was passing by the street along with his monks; some of them ran helter and skelter and many disciples and devotees entreated Buddha to step aside to avoid the fury of Nālāgiri, while Ānanda remained steady and did not leave his side. Buddha did not swerve an inch and proceeded unruffled in his usual round. Nālāgiri came rushing at him but alas to the astonishment of all, it lay down at his feet and listened to the reproachful words of the Great Being. This news of taming Nālāgiri spread all round like fire, and Buddha's fame spread far and wide and subdued even Ajātaśatru, who approached the Teacher, asked for forgiveness and expressed his firm faith in him. Failing in his nefarious designs, Devadatta set himself up as a leader of some monks, who disapproved of the easy life permitted by Buddha to his disciples and laid down that every monk should (i) be a forest-dweller, (ii) live on alms and never accept any invitation from the laity, (iii) use rags only collected from dust heap for his robes, (iv) sleep under a tree and never under a roof and lastly (v) never eat fish or flesh even under the restriction prescribed by Buddha.

Upāli: He was the repository of Vinaya rules and one of the most eminent disciples of Buddha. He belonged to a barber's family of Kapilavastu. He accompanied the Śākyan youths to the Anupiya grove and was given all the ornaments discarded by the youths at the time of their ordination. He hesitated to take them and decided to become a monk. He was first

ordained by the Teacher himself in order to humble the pride of birth of the Śākyan nobles, who had to salute him being senior to them as a monk

Chandaka: He was the attendant and charioteer of Prince Siddhārtha. He also joined the order when Buddha paid his first visit to Kapilavastu.

Anāthapiṇḍika and his gift of Jetavana : After his return from Kapilavastu while Buddha was staying at Sītavana, the cemetery on the outskirt of Rājagṛha, a fabulously rich banker of Kosala, called Sudatta, came to Rājagṛha and stayed at the house of his friend, a banker of Magadha. He came to know that the renowned Teacher was at Sītavana, and so he went there to meet him.

Buddha told him that all his riches, fame and his faith and reverence for Buddha and his teachings were all due to his past meritorious deeds. He was going to give him instructions on *śīla* (moral virtues) and *tyāga* (sacrifice) which, however, would just lead him to a heavenly existence, not free from sorrow. He therefore advised him to attain that state in which there would be no more sorrow due to birth, old age, disease and death by realising that the wordly phenomena were without any permanent substance and were just composites of some evanescent elements and qualities. It was one's deeds that produced miseries and happiness, and not his self. All existent things are not without some cause or other, as they are not issued out of nothing. In short, all objects must have a cause. On listening to these arguments, Anāthapiṇḍika's mind become pliable and perceived the excellence of Buddha's teachings. He then said that he was a resident of Śrāvastī, a peaceful land rich in produce, and the king of the country was noble and renowned, called Prasenajit of the family of Lion. He expressed his desire to build a monastery there for the use of Buddha.

Śārīputra was entrusted with the duty of choosing a suitable site at Śrāvastī. With him Anāthapiṇḍika went about to find out a pleasant site and spotted upon the garden

of Prince Jeta. As the prince was very fond of his garden, he said that he could part with it if the buyer could cover it with gold coins. Anāthapiṇḍika rejoiced at the offer and began to unload on the garden cartloads of gold pieces. The prince said that he did not actually agree to sell the land and so the matter was taken to the law court. When the prince learnt that the land was intended for a monastery for Buddha and his disciples, he said that he would take half of the gold for the land only and the trees would remain his property. He was awe-inspired by hearing the name of Buddha and wanted to make a gift of the trees to him as his share of the offering. Then Anāthapiṇḍika offered the land and Prince Jeta the trees to Śārīputra on behalf of Buddha and his Saṅgha. Then under the supervision of Śārīputra, huge halls were erected by masons working day and night and these were so nice in architecture that they surpassed the beauty of royal palaces. The monastery became very popular and made the streets of Śrāvastī shine with yellow robed monks.¹

Buddha went to Śrāvastī from Kapilavastu. The monastery of Jetavana looked like a richly decorated palace full of flowers and incense and was made in every way worthy of residence of the great Teacher. On Buddha's arrival Anāthapiṇḍika made a gift of the land and the monastery to Buddha and his Saṅgha of the four quarters by pouring water from a dragon-shaped waterpot of gold.

1 There is not much disparity in the different biographies of Buddha about the chronology of events up to his first visit to Kapilavastu. In the Pāli texts it is stated that Buddha returned from Kapilavastu to Rājagṛha where he met Anāthapiṇḍika for the first time and accepted his invitation to Śrāvastī, whereas in the Sanskrit texts this meeting of Buddha with Anāthapiṇḍika is placed before Buddha's visit to Kapilavastu and it is stated that Buddha went from Kapilavastu to Śrāvastī where he spent the third rainy season retreat. According to the Pāli tradition Buddha spent the second, third and fourth *vassās* at Rājagṛha.

Prasenajit (Pasenadi): On receiving the news of Buddha's arrival in the city, King Prasenajit hurried to the monastery with his royal equipage and saluted him reverently and expressed his great joy at the good fortune of his kingdom blessed as it was with the footsteps of a great saint.

Buddha observed the mental leanings of the king for wealth and pleasures and so he referred to past kings who went to heaven for good deeds or suffered in hells for evil acts. He admonished the king to refrain from oppressing the people or destroying living beings, to subdue his senses, to forsake unrighteous doctrines and to follow the right path and lastly, to avoid the false teacher encouraging extreme austerities and propounding wrong views. He asked him to observe the rules of kingly conduct and not to exalt himself over others, to exercise his reason and to meditate deeply on the impermanence of earthly objects.

It is doubtful if these instructions produced any effect on King Prasenajit's mind, for the king did neither give up his beliefs in Brāhmaṇic rituals and sacrifices nor did his regard for the heretical teachers decrease.

Heretical teachers: their discomfitures: The heretical teachers and their followers were gradually losing their hold upon the people with the increase of popularity of Buddha and his Saṅgha. There are a few stories in the Pāli texts about their discomfiture at the hands of Buddha and his disciples.

The first was the offer, by a rich banker (*seṭṭhi*) of Rājagṛha, of a red sandal-wood bowl placed on a high bamboo-pole to any recluse who could rise up in the air and take it. None of the heretics possessed that power and so they were all disappointed. Piṇḍola Bharadvāja was passing by that way at the time. He heard of the offer from a devotee of his, and in order to establish the greatness of Buddha and his Saṅgha, he came flying through the air and took it. When this matter was reported to Buddha, he disapproved of the

show of miraculous powers by his disciples and forbade all monks from exhibiting any such power.

The second relates to the great pestilence raging in Vaiśālī, from which its suffering inhabitants could find no escape. They approached all the heretical teachers, who however, failed to give them any relief. They at last approached Buddha, who, with a view to alleviate their sufferings, paid a visit to Vaiśālī. As soon as he stepped into the city, the pestilence ceased, and all the inhabitants felt happy and relieved.

The third deals with the miracle shown by Buddha at Sāvattihī, of growing a mango-tree in a few minutes, and then walking in the air as he did at the time of his visit to Kapilavastu. By the exhibition of this miracle before a large concourse of subjects of King Prasenajit, Buddha once more outshone the heretical teachers, and humiliated them in the presence of the congregation.

Ciñcā māṇavikā: Failing to compete with Buddha in the contest of superhuman powers, the heretical teachers made an attempt to discredit him by foul means. They engaged a cunning but beautiful woman Ciñcā māṇavikā, who was one of their devotees, to throw dirt on Buddha's character. Every evening she was asked to go to the Jetavana monastery, to spend the night somewhere else and at dawn to make a show as if she was coming out of Jetavana. Ciñcā acted according to their directions and after some time when Buddha was once delivering discourses, she appeared there as a pregnant woman and attributed her pregnancy to Buddha. The god Indra was shocked at this perfidy of the woman and exposed her wickedness to the assembled people by proving that she was not actually pregnant.

Dispute between Sakyans and Koliyans: While Buddha was staying at Śrāvastī, a bitter quarrel occurred between the Sakyans and the Koliyans, who were related to the Teacher by the father's and mother's side. The quarrel was due to the right of drawing water from the river

Rohiṇī, which flowed between the territories of the two tribes. The Koliyans put up a dam across the stream and diverted it to irrigate their own fields of crops, which needed just one more watering to ripen them. The Sākyaans would not listen to their demand and reasoning, and said that they were not going to part with their red gold, blue sapphires and black coins for purchasing food grains from their neighbours. They abused each other, referring to the blemishes in their lines of descent. Such mutual recriminations led to a battle-array on both sides of the river Rohiṇī, and also to some loss of lives. Buddha did not like that his relatives should fight among themselves. He thereupon went to the spot and tried to educate them on the evil of mutual jealousies by illustrative stories and discourses. By his personal influence he was able not only to stop the fight but also to persuade many of them to join his order as monks. The skirmishes widowed many women who flocked around Mahāprajāpati and prevailed upon her to form an order of nuns. When Buddha paid his first visit to Kapilavastu, Mahāprajāpati requested the Teacher to make some provision for the spiritual training of women but her request was turned down on the ground that women were better suited for household life and should earn merits by becoming lay-devotees.

Formation of the order of nuns: In the fifth year of his ministry when Buddha was at Vaiśālī, he went to Kapilavastu to see king Śuddhodana lying in his death-bed. After the king's death, he returned to Vaiśālī, where came also the grief-stricken Mahāprajāpati along with the Sākyaan and Koliyan ladies, whose husbands had died or become monks previously. All of them put on yellow robes and had their heads shaven. She appealed again to Buddha to form the order of nuns. At the intervention and persuasion of Ānanda, he sanctioned the formation of the order of nuns, provided the nuns agreed to the eight disabilities¹ imposed by him on

1 See infra

them. Mahāprajāpati reluctantly accepted the conditions and formed the order of nuns with a large number of women.

Buddha is said to have passed the sixth rainy season retreat at Maṅkula Hill, which has not yet been identified, nor it is referred to in any of the discourses. It may be a lonely place located near Śrāvastī, wherefrom Buddha paid his visit to the Trāyastriṃśa heaven.

In the seventh year of his ministry, Buddha went up to Trāyastriṃśa heaven to impart instructions to his mother Mahāmāyā, then a goddess there. In the Pāli texts he is said to have spent the seventh rainy season retreat there. In later traditions, preserved in the *Atthasālinī*, it is said that Gautama Buddha being a mortal, had to come down to the earth every day at meal-time to take his food, which Sāriputta kept ready for him. After taking his meal he gave Sāriputta the gist of the teachings imparted by him to his mother ; this gist happened to be the synopsis (*mātikā*), which was developed by Sāriputta into the *Abhidhamma-piṭaka* and handed down by him to his disciples.¹

After the delivery of his discourses at Trāyastriṃśa heaven, Buddha finally came down to Jambudvīpa at Saṅkāśya (west of Fatehgarh in the district of Farrukhabad). His descent was a favourite subject for the ancient sculptors, who represented the scene by depicting a ladder touching the earth.

Kauśāmbī: After spending the eighth rainy season retreat on the Suṃsumāra hill in the Bhagga country, where Buddha was entertained by Bodhirājakumāra, son of King Udena of Kauśāmbī, he passed on to Kauśāmbī where he spent the ninth *varṣā*, and the tenth in a nearby forest called Pārileyyaka. The main incident at Kauśāmbī was the quarrel between the Vinayadharas and the Dhammakathikas, caused by a minor laches on the part of the teacher of the Dhammakathikas. The quarrel went to such a length that even the intervention of Buddha failed to make up the difference. Out of disgust for

1 *Atthasālinī*, p. 16.

the quarrelsome nature of the monks and laymen of Kauśāmbī, Buddha retired to a forest called Pārileyyaka and preferred to be served there by an elephant and a monkey. At this attitude of the Teacher, the monks and laity of Kauśāmbī came to their senses and made up their differences and went to Bhagavān for asking his forgiveness. On this occasion Buddha delivered discourses on the evil of discord among monks.

The only other legend associated with Kauśāmbī was the attempt of Māgaṇḍiyā's father, to get his very beautiful daughter, Māgaṇḍiyā, married to Buddha, though her mother, who could read the signs of men, protested against such an attempt. On Buddha's remaining unconcerned about the offer, Māgaṇḍiyā felt insulted and resolved to take revenge on him. For her exquisite beauty, she became the queen of Udena of Kauśāmbī, and on one occasion she plotted to bring into disrepute her co-wife Sāmāvatī (see p. 128) for her great devotion towards Buddha, but her sinister motive was ultimately found out by the king.

Kṛṣi Bharadvāja: In the eleventh *varṣā*, Buddha took his residence at Dakkhiṇāgiri in the Brāhmaṇa village of Ekanālā, near Rājagṛha. At that time a rich Brāhmaṇa called Kṛṣi-Bharadvāja celebrated the ploughing festival. Buddha considered the occasion as a suitable one for converting the Brāhmaṇa, who had much accumulated merits to his credit. He therefore went to the place of festivities and took his seat on a high mound, emitting rays of light from his body. This miracle attracted the attention of the people, who flocked round him and paid him homage. This displeased the Brāhmaṇa, who scoffed at Buddha, saying that he was an idler and not a farmer earning his bread by the sweat of his brow. Buddha claimed that he was also a farmer, but only of a different type. He said that his ploughing field was *dharma*, which had to be cleaned of weeds of desires, and needed cultivation by the plough of knowledge, the seed to be sown was purity while watering and tending of seeds were to be done by the ethical observances, and the harvest was Nirvāṇa.

This reply of Buddha brought about a sudden change in the mind of the Brāhmaṇa, who became then and there an ardent devotee of the Teacher.

Verañja: From Ekanālā Buddha went to Śrāvastī, where he was invited by a few Brāhmaṇas of Verañja, near Mathurā (= Vairambha in South Pañcāla). He accepted the invitation to spend there the 12th *varṣā*. In the Sarvāstivāda tradition, it is said that Buddha visited the place at the invitation of the Brāhmaṇa ruler of Vairambha, king Agnidatta. It so happened that during the residence of Buddha and his disciples there, a famine broke out and the residents of the place failed to supply food to the monks. King Agnidatta, it is said, at the instigation of his Brāhmaṇa ministers, who disliked the presence of Buddha at the place, forbade his subjects to give any alms to the monks. Fortunately, a caravan of horse-dealers was passing through the place at the time, carrying barley-grains for their horses. They offered a measured quantity of these grains to the monks and thereby saved them from complete starvation. It is said that a female devotee of Buddha used to pound the grains meant for horses and made them fit for human consumption. The monks lived on the rationed food supplied by the horse-dealers and passed the *varṣā* there, complying with the disciplinary rule of spending the *varṣā* at one place. At the end of the *varṣā*, king Agnidatta came to his senses, realised his mistake, became repentant and sought pardon of the Teacher, who readily forgave him and accepted his invitation for the day. Buddha along with his disciples left the place and passed through Soreyya, Saṅkāśya, Kanauj, Allahabad and reached Banaras.

Mahākātyāyana: While staying at Banaras, Buddha came across Mahākātyāyana, who became one of his most distinguished disciples. He was a son of the royal priest of king Caṇḍa Pradyota of Avantī. After the death of his father he succeeded to the office of the royal priest. He was deputed by the king to invite Buddha to his country. With seven companions he went to Buddha and after listening to his teach-

ings he became an *arhat*. He conveyed the king's invitation to Buddha, who however declined to go to Avantī and said that Kātyāyana would now be able to explain the doctrines to the king. In Ujjeni, Mahākātyāyana dwelt mostly at Kuraragharapapāta in a hut in the Makkara-kaṭa forest but he spent much of his time in Magadha and Kosala, explaining lucidly the terse and enigmatic sayings of the Teacher. He established a centre of Buddhism in Ujjeni. He converted there the rich seṭṭhi's son Śroṇa Koṭikarṇa and a few Brāhmaṇas of the locality. This centre of Buddhism attained importance a century after Buddha's death at the time of the Second Buddhist Synod, and was greatly enlarged by Aśoka and his queen, the mother of Mahinda and Saṅghamittā.

The disciples of Buddha, after passing through the ordeal at Verañja, became very emaciated and were invited by Mahānāma, the rich Śākyan relative of the Teacher and the foster-father of Ambapālī. Buddha accepted the invitation and passed the 13th *varṣā* at Cāliya hill near Kapilavastu, where he and his monks, under the care of Mahānāma, regained their normal health and vigour.

The 14th and 15th *varṣās* were passed by the Teacher at Śrāvastī and Kapilavastu respectively, and no event of importance is associated with the two places during these two *varṣās*.

The 16th *varṣā* was spent by the Teacher at Ālavī, a place near Śrāvastī. The only important event at this place was the conversion of the Ālavaka Yakṣa and of the son of the king of Ālavī.

The 17th and 19th *varṣās* were passed by the Teacher at Rājagṛha and the 18th again at the Cāliya hill. The rest of the *varṣās* were spent by him at Śrāvastī.

The traditional list¹ of *varṣās* should not be taken as a chronological account of the Teacher's ministry. He preached in different places during the nine dry months of the year and spent the rains at a particular place, as mentioned above.

1 Cf. Roerich, *The Blue Annals*, I, p. 21-22.

There were also several disciples who came to the Teacher from far off countries like Gandhāra, Avantī and Aṅga throughout the year. The number of converts was quite large and all are not mentioned in the texts. We come across also names of many persons and places¹ to whom and where Buddha delivered his discourses.

Aśvaghoṣa² furnishes us with a list of prominent converts. It cannot be taken as a chronological list, but it gives us one of the oldest traditions regarding the missionary activities of the Teacher :

1. *Jyotiṣka*, son of a fabulously rich banker of Rājagṛha, was one of the five persons of immeasurable wealth (*amitabhogā*). He however gave away all his possessions, became a monk and attained *arhathood*,

2. *Jīvaka* must have been a very renowned physician in Buddha's days. In Pāli tradition, it is said that king Bimbisāra selected Sālāvatī, the most beautiful maiden found in Rājagṛha, to be the royal courtesan, who could be a rival to the courtesan Āmrapālī of Vaiśālī. Sālāvatī gave birth to Jīvaka, and according to the custom of the courtesan, left him in a forest. Abhaya, son of king Bimbisāra also by a courtesan, discovered the baby and adopted him as his son, for which Jīvaka was given the appellation Komārabhacca (Kumārabhṛtya, i.e., bred and brought up by a prince).⁴ When Jīvaka had grown up, he came to know of his undesirable parentage and decided to earn his livelihood by becoming a physician. He went to Takṣaśilā where he was welcomed by the king of the country, Puṣkarasāri,

1 For an idea of the sites and discourses see *Early Monastic Buddhism*, vol. 1.

2 *Buddhacarita*, XXI.

3 *Aṅguttara Commentary*, I, p. 220.

4 In Sanskrit tradition (vide *Gilgit Manuscripts*, vol. III, pp. 2, 23 f) Jīvaka is described as the illegitimate son of king Bimbisāra by the forlorn wife of a trader. He was brought up by Prince Abhaya, to whose care king Bimbisāra entrusted the child.

who, at the request of Prince Abhaya, introduced Jīvaka to the famous teacher of medical science, Ātreya. The latter found his student to be extraordinarily intelligent and preferred to take him as his assistant whenever he visited a patient. He observed that Jīvaka was a wiser than himself and gave him his due recognition much to the chagrin of his fellow students. There are a number of stories as to how Jīvaka cured Bimbisāra, Caṇḍa Pradyota and other very rich men and women, and earned huge sums and property as his remuneration. There are references to his skill not only in medicine but also in surgery. Jīvaka became anxious to render some service to Buddha. It so happened that Buddha once fell ill of stomach troubles and it is said that he was cured by Jīvaka by making him smell some medicated flowers. As Jīvaka gave free treatment to the monks, a large number of patients joined the Order to have free medical treatment at the hands of Jīvaka and thereby created a problem for the Buddhist Saṅgha. Jīvaka, it is said, became a lay-devotee of Buddha in the 20th year of his ministry and dedicated his mango-garden to the Saṅgha for the residence of monks. He advanced up to the *Sotāpanna* stage. He was responsible for the introduction of the Vinaya rules permitting sick monks to have medical and surgical aids. Jīvaka once raised the question, whether Buddhist monks should eat meat.¹ Buddha explained to him that a monk who practised love (*mettā*) to all beings could not deliberately ask for meat. A monk remained always unmindful of what he took as food and so if he was offered meat in his begging round he might take it, provided it was not specially prepared for him nor he had any suspicion that the meat offered had been prepared for him.

3. *Abhayayājakumāra* was a son of king Bimbisāra by a courtesan of Ujjayinī.² In Sanskrit tradition Abhaya is described as the son of the courtesan Āmrapālī by king Bi-

1 *Majjhima*, I, p. 362ff. Cf. *Gilgit Manuscripts*, III, Intro., i, p. 31

2 *Ibid.*, I, p. 392; III, p. 169; *Saṃyutta*, V, p. 455.

mbisāra.¹ He was at first a follower of the Jainas (Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta) but was won over to Buddhism by the Teacher by solving his doubts. He ultimately became a monk and attained *arhathood*.

4. *Śroṇa Koṭiviśa*, son of a very rich banker of Campā (mod. Bhagalpur), the capital of Aṅga. The palm of his hand and the soles of his feet were so delicate that he could not walk bare-footed. He became a devoted monk and used to practise meditations by circumambulating (*caṅkramaṇa*) the stūpas or sacred sites, which were all used to be marked with the blood of his feet. Noticing the blood-marks one day, Buddha allowed the use of shoes to his monks, as Śroṇa Koṭiviśa declined to use shoes as a special favour.

5. *Nygrodha*, a distinguished Paribbājaka, who resided at Udumbarikārāma near Rājagṛha. He criticised Buddha for advocating mere solitude and not encouraging ascetic practices, which he thought were necessary for spiritual advancement. His views were changed by Buddha by a discourse.²

6. *Upāli-gahapati* of Nālandā was one of the great devotees and supporters of Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta. One day he went to Buddha for establishing the excellence of his teacher and his doctrine. He was, however, silenced and won over by Buddha and became his devotee. His faith in the Teacher became greater when he was permitted to continue his charity to the disciples of Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta.³

7. *Pukkusāti* (Puṣkara-sādī= Fo-kia-lo), king of Takṣaśilā (Gandhāra) was a contemporary of king Bimbisāra. The two kings became friends through some traders who used to carry on trade between Gandhāra and Magadha. Pukkusāti once sent valuable presents to Bimbisāra, who in return sent a golden tablet, on which were inscribed important teachings of Buddha. Pukkusāti on reading them made up his mind to

1 In Pali tradition Vimala Koṇḍañña is mentioned as Āmrapāli's son.

2 *Dīgha*, III, p. 36 f.

3 *Majjhima*, I, p. 371 f.

become a recluse. He put on yellow robes and walked all the way to Rājagṛha to meet Buddha who was then dwelling at Śrāvastī. Buddha observed that he had accumulated enough merits to attain perfection and so he hurried to Rājagṛha and met Pukkusāti without disclosing his identity in the hermitage of Bhaggava. He entered into discussion with Pukkusāti and delivered to him the *Dhātuvibhaṅga-sutta*, when the latter found out that his companion was none else than the great Buddha to whom he then paid his homage.¹

8. *Kūṭadanta* was a learned Brāhmaṇa teacher, to whom king Bimbisāra granted the income of the village of Khānumata for the maintenance of his academy. He was going to celebrate a sacrifice in the Brāhmanical fashion when Buddha intervened and persuaded him to take to righteous conduct and moral observances.²

9. *Pañcaśikha* was a very popular figure in the Buddhist texts, both Hīnayāna³ and Mahāyāna.⁴ He was a *gandharva* and as such a good musician. He played on the flute eulogising Buddha and his teachings. He acted as an intermediary between Buddha and the gods, specially Śakra. He was an ardent admirer and a lay-follower of Buddha. He had as his wife Bhaddā Suriyavaccasā.

10. *Nandamātā* was a distinguished female lay-disciple of Buddha. There were two Nandamātās, one called Uttarā and the other Velukaṇṭakī. It may be they were one and the same person with two names, i.e., Uttarā Nandamātā of Velukaṇṭa village. She entertained Sāriputta and other monks and thereby earned great merits. She became a *Sakadāgāmi*.⁵ The conversion of Velukaṇṭakī Nandamātā might have taken place in the eleventh year of Buddha's ministry. She was also noted for her ability to memorise

1 *Majjhima*, III, pp. 237-47.

2 *Dīgha*, I, p. 127 f. ; see above, p. 65 fn. 5.

3 *Dīgha*, II, p. 263 f.

4 *Samādhirājasūtra*, p. 274.

5 *Aṅguttara*, I, pp. 26, 88; II, p. 164; IV, p. 348.

some texts of the Piṭaka, particularly the *Pārāyaṇavagga* of the *Suttanipāta*.

11. *Viśākhā* was the daughter of Dhanañjaya, son of Meṇḍaka, a very rich banker of Aṅga¹ and a devotee of Buddha. She was born in the city of Bhaddiya. At the request of King Prrsenajit, Dhanañjaya was sent by king Bimbisāra to Kosala where he settled at Sāketa. When Viśākhā reached her marriageable age, she was selected by Migāra, another rich banker of Śrāvastī for his son Puṇṇavaḍḍhana. Migāra was a follower and supporter of Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta and his saṅgha, and wanted his son's wife Viśākhā to be worshipful to them. She however declined to comply with her father-in-law's directions and, after overcoming some difficulties, she was able to make her father-in-law a devotee of Buddha.

Viśākhā used to feed 500 monks daily. She was granted permission by Buddha to give robes to the bhikkhus during the rainy season, bathing clothes to nuns, food to all monks and nuns coming to Sāvattihī, medicine to the sick and rice-gruel to every monk and nun. She erected the Pubbārāma monastery, known also as the Migāramātupāsāda.

12. *Soṇadaṇḍa* (Śroṇadaṇḍa) was a famous teacher of Brāhmaṇical śāstras. He lived at Campā, the capital of Aṅga and was maintained by king Bimbisāra by the grant of a village. He once met Buddha and had a talk with him about the superiority of Brāhmaṇas by birth. He was however convinced by Buddha that not birth but moral virtues counted in determining the superiority or inferiority of a person. Soṇadaṇḍa was much older than Buddha but he declared himself as a lay-follower of the Teacher.²

13-14. *Kenīya* (Kaineṇya-ṛṣi) and *Sela* (Śaila-ṛṣi) were two Jaṭila ascetics,³ who were converted to Buddhism towards the end of Buddha's life. Kaineṇya ṛṣi, on listening to

1 See *Gilgit Manuscripts*, III, i, Intro., p. 32f: for details about Meṇḍhaka.

2 *Dīgha*, I.

3 *Gilgit Manuscripts*, III, i, p. 259f.

Buddha's discourses on the four truths, became highly impressed and advanced spiritually to the *Anāgāmī* stage. He offered to Buddha eight kinds of fruit-drinks, which were accepted by him and were also allowed by him to the monks under certain conditions. Kaineya invited him and his monks to a meal in his hermitage. Śaila-ṛṣi, who, on hearing of Buddha's merits as well as those of his Saṅgha, became anxious to join the Saṅgha. Before meal-time he with his 500 followers approached Bhagavān and got admission into the Saṅgha as ordained monks. When Kaineya was serving food to the monks, he found to his pleasant surprise that his friend Śaila along with his disciples was seated among the monks. Kaineya thereupon decided to join the Buddhist order and sought ordination from the Teacher on the following day.¹ Their training was entrusted to Mahākapphina, Sāriputta and Moggallāna.

15. *Aṅgulimāla* was a son of the priest of king Prasenajit of Kosala. His father was Bhaggava or Gagga, and mother Mantānī. He was sent to Takṣaśilā, where he surpassed his comrades in academic attainments, and this roused the jealousy of his fellow-mates, who managed to create a split between the Ācārya and Aṅgulimāla. In order to get rid of Aṅgulimāla, the Ācārya asked him to procure 100 human fingers as his remuneration. Aṅgulimāla, as in duty bound, went to Kosala, laid himself ambush at the cross-roads, killed 99 men and collected their fingers. Accidentally the 100th victim of his was going to be his mother. Buddha discovered that Aṅgulimāla had great merits to his credit and that all

1 In the Pali tradition, the account of the conversion of Keniya and Sela is given as follows:—

Keniya and Sela belonged to Āpana in Aṅga. The former was a rich Brāhmaṇa, while the latter was a distinguished Brāhmanical teacher with many students. They were followers of the Jaṭilas. Keniya met Buddha and offered him and his monks, sweet drinks and listened to his teachings, which made a good impression on Sela, who thereupon became a lay-disciple of Buddha along with Keniya (*Sutta Nipāta*, p. 102ff).

would be lost if he committed the deadly sin of matricide. He hurried to the waiting place of Aṅgulimāla and became the 100th person. By his extraordinary power he brought Aṅgulimāla to his sense and then addmitted him into his Saṅgha. Soon after Aṅgulimāla attained *arhathood*. This conversion took place in the twentieth year of Buddha's ministry.¹

16. *Brahmāyu* was a Btāhmaṇa teacher of Mithilā. He was 129 yeas old when Buddha visited Videha. He sent his pupil Uttaramāṇava to find out if Buddha possessed all the thirty-two signs of great men. Receiving an affirmative answer from Uttara, he met Buddha at Makhādeva mango garden. He invited Buddha and his monks to his house and entertained them for a week. He died soon after this meeting and became an *Anāgāmi*.²

17. *Mahāli* was a Licchavi and probably a follower of Pūraṇa Kassapa and believed in the existence of soul and body. He met Buddha at Kūṭāgārasālā in Vesāli and listened to Buddha's discourses on the eightfold path and other topics³ and became a devotee of Buddha.

18. *Sīha* was a Licchavi general and a follower of Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta. He was wrongly informed about the teachings of Buddha. Once along with many Licchavis, he met Buddha and was much impressed by his teachings. He invited Buddha and his disciples to his house, served a meal with meat, which brought forth vehement criticism from the followers of Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta. This was made an occasion for Buddha's laying down the five restrictions to be observed by monks in taking meat.⁴ Sīha with many Licchavis became lay-disciples of Buddha. He was permitted to continue his charities to the Nigaṇṭhas, for which his devotion to Buddha increased further.

1 *Majjhima*, II, 103-4.

2 *Ibid*, II, p. 146.

3 *Dīgha* I, 150. 8; *Saṃyutta*, III, 68 f.

4 *Vinaya*, I, p. 233 f; IV, p. 179; see above, pp. 110, 119.

19. *Saccaka* was a teacher of the Licchavis and a devoted follower of Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta. He was defeated in a controversy with Buddha (*Cūla-Saccakasutta*) and became his follower. His four daughters, after discussion with Sāriputta, joined the order of nuns.¹

20. *Jānussoni* was a rich and distinguished Brāhmaṇa teacher. He used to meet Buddha often at Jetavanavihāra and had discussions with him on diverse topics. He was the royal priest of the king of Kosala. He probably became a lay-devotee of Buddha.

21. *Vakkali* (Sans. Vakrapāli) belonged to a celebrated Brāhmaṇa family of Śrāvastī. He became a bhikṣu and developed great faith in Buddha. He was told by Buddha that he could see him truly if he could have an insight into his *dhmma*. One day he was going to commit suicide by throwing himself down the precipice of Gṛdhrakūṭa when he was stopped by Buddha, who gave him directions for meditations and other practices. He however ended his life by a knife, and when he was feeling excruciating pain, he attained *arhathood* but died then and there.

22. *Bāvarī* was the royal priest of the king of Kosala. He became an ascetic, went to Dakṣiṇāpatha and dwelt in a hermitage on the bank of the Godāvarī in Assaka. His disciples met Buddha at Rājagṛha.² They listened to Buddha's discourses and became *arhats* while one of them, Piṅgiya, a nephew of Bāvarī, remained an *anāgāmī*. Piṅgiya returned to Bāvarī and recounted to him what he had learnt from Buddha. Hearing Piṅgiya's exposition of Buddha's teaching Bāvarī also attained *arhathood*.

23. *Sunakkhatta*, a Licchavi prince of Vesālī, became the personal attendant of Buddha towards the end of his life. He remained with Buddha for some time but felt dissatisfied because Buddha refrained from exhibiting miraculous powers and answering his queries about the beginning of the world. He

1 *Majjhima*, I, p. 234 f.

2 For the route taken by Bāvarī's disciples, see *Suttanipāta*, p. 194.

left the Buddhist Saṅgha and became a disciple of Korakhattiya, then of Kaṇḍaramasaka, and lastly of Pāṭikaputta in admiration of their ascetic practices, which were disapproved by Buddha.¹

To Aśvaghoṣa's list of distinguished converts the following may be added:—

24. *Subhūti*, a nephew of Anāthapiṇḍika, became a monk on the day of the ceremonial gift of Jetavana by his uncle to Buddha. He perfected himself in *mettā-bhāvanā* (universal amity). In many Mahāyāna texts, Subhūti is mentioned as an interlocutor but there is no evidence to show that he was the nephew of Anāthapiṇḍika.

25. *Mahākoṭṭhita*, a very learned Brāhmaṇa, became a monk and attained *arhathood*, with proficiency in analytical knowledge (*paṭisambhidā*). In Sanskrit tradition² appears the biography of Kauṣṭhila, who is described as the maternal uncle of Sāriputta, and as a pastmaster in Brāhmanic *śāstras*. He went to the south for learning the Lokāyata doctrine, and there he became a Parivrājaka called Dīrghanakha. In the *Majjhima Nikāya*³ there is the *Dīrghanakhasutta*, which was delivered by Buddha for the benefit of Dīrghanakha paribbājaka, but the *Sutta* benefited Sāriputta more than Dīrghanakha as it helped the former to get his mind freed from all impurities (*Sāriputtassa paṭisañcikkhato anupādāyva āsavehi cittaṃ vimucci*). It is very likely that Koṭṭhita was Kauṣṭhila of the Sanskrit texts, also known as Dīrghanakha Parivrājaka.

26. *Revata Khadiravaniya*, the younger brother of Sāriputta, retired from home-life and became a monk. He preferred meditation in the forests.

27. *Piṇḍola Bharadvāja*, a son of the priest of King Udena of Kosambī, mastered the Brāhmanic *śāstras*. After becoming a monk he acquired the six higher powers (*abhiññā*).⁴

1 *Dīgha*, Pāṭikasutta.

2 *Gilgit Manuscripts*, III, iv, pp. 15, 22.

3 *Majjhima*, I, pp 491-501.

4 See above, p. 78 n.

28. *Mahākappina*, a very rich landowner of the extreme north-western part of India, heard about the name and fame of Buddha from the traders, who visited his country for trade. He was ordained by Buddha himself with the words “*ehi bhikkhu*”. He became an *arhat* and an excellent preacher of the Dhamma. In Sanskrit he is called Mahākapphiṇa.¹

29. *Soṇa Koṭikarṇa*, a rich man of Avanti, became a lay-devotee and then a disciple of Mahākaccāyana. He was deputed by his preceptor to Buddha to entreat him to relax Vinaya rules specially for the Saṅgha of the border countries (*paccantimajanapada*) including Avantī.² There is a long story dealing with the biography of Śroṇa Koṭikarṇa in the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya.³

30. *Raṭṭhapāla* was born in a Brāhmaṇa family of the village Thullakoṭṭhita in the land of Kurus. He heard a discourse of Buddha delivered at Thullakoṭṭhita and made up his mind to become a monk. He had to obtain his parents' consent by having recourse to fasting. He became a monk and attained *arhatship*. After becoming an *arhat* he paid a visit to his home and accepted only rice-gruel which was being thrown away by the maid-servant of the house. His parents and wife made a futile attempt to make him revert to the household life. There is a Mahāyāna text called *Rāṣṭrapālapariṇchā*, in which Buddha gave answer to the queries of Rāṣṭrapāla about the practices leading to the attainment of *bodhi* (*bodhicaryā*).

31. *Khemā* was born in Sāgala (Sialkot) in the land of the Madras. Her exquisite beauty attracted the attention of king Bimbisāra, who made her his chief queen. As she came to know that Buddha hated infatuation for physical beauty, of which she was so very proud, she avoided meeting him. One day she was made to meet the Teacher by a contrivance devised by the king. Buddha observed her mental

1 *Gilgit Manuscripts*, III, iv, p 88

2 *Vinaya, Mahāvagga*, V, 13

3 *Gilgit Manuscripts*, III, iv, p. xvii; *Divyāvadāna*, pp. 1-24.

leanings and also her accumulated merits, and so by his miraculous power he made her realise the evanescence of beauty and worldly existence. She then and there developed insight into the Truth and, with the consent of the king, she retired from worldly life and joined the order of nuns. She became an expert in the exposition of abstruse doctrines.

32. *Sāmāvatī* was the daughter of a *seṭṭhi*, who lost all his possessions on account of a famine. After the death of her father she was adopted as a daughter by Ghosaka *seṭṭhi* of Kosambī. She was very beautiful and was taken in marriage by king Udena of Kosambī, much against the will of Ghosaka. She heard from her maid-servant Khujjuttarā about the greatness of Buddha and his teaching, and developed faith in him. On account of her great devotion for Buddha and through the machination of her co-wife Māgaṇḍiyā, she incurred the displeasure of the king, who, however, in course of time, realised his mistake and made amends for it. She as well as her maid-servant Khujjutarā continued to be the lay-devotees of Buddha and even prevailed upon king Udena to invite Buddha and his disciples to the palace for meals.

Buddha's Last Journey : After completing his work of propagating his teachings and organizing the monastic institutions Buddha made up his mind to enter into *parinirvāṇa*. To lay down his mortal remains at Kuśīnagara he decided to leave Rājagṛha. Vassakāra Brāhmaṇa, the governor of Pāṭaliputra, on receiving the news of Buddha's departure from Rājagṛha went to him and enquired in the name of king Ajātaśatru how the Vajjians could be conquered. In reply Buddha spoke of certain practices and virtues of the Vajjians, which maintained their invincibility. After leaving Rājagṛha, Buddha passed through Ambalaṭṭhikā, Nālandā (Pāvārikambavana) and reached Pāṭaligāma, which was then a mere village left to the care of two Brāhmaṇa officers, Sunīdha and Vassakāra, of king Ajātaśatru. The two officers were instructed by the king to fortify the town against the attack of neighbouring enemies, particularly the Vajjians.

Buddha and his Saṅgha were entertained by the devotees of Pāṭaligāma including the Brāhmaṇa officials, who, out of reverence for Buddha, named the gate and the landing place by which Buddha left Pāṭaligāma as Gotamadvāra and Gotamatittha respectively.

After leaving Pāṭaliputta, Buddha passed through Koṭigāma and Nādikā (Giñjakāvasatha) and reached Vaiśālī (Ambapālīvana) delivering discourses at each of his halting places. On receiving the news of Buddha's arrival in her Mango garden, the courtesan Ambapālī came to invite him and his Saṅgha to her residence for forenoon meals. When Ambapālī was returning home, she met the Licchavi nobles, who were forestalled by her in having the privilege of offering meals to Buddha and his Saṅgha. She was offered by them a price for giving up the privilege, but she declined and made elaborate arrangements for welcoming the Teacher and his disciples and gave them food to her heart's content. After the meal-offering, she donated her Ambavana for the residence of monks. Buddha complimented her for her charity and piety, and instructed her to realise the impermanence of wealth and beauty and to look upon religion as the best ornament. He addressed the Licchavis also and advised them to follow the right path of good conduct and to subdue pride and lust for self and power. He warned them against the heretical teachers who claimed purity by taking the life of an animal or by having three ablutions daily, or by performing fire-sacrifices or by practising austerities without moral rectitude.

After staying for some time in the Mango-grove of Ambapālī, Buddha with his Saṅgha proceeded to Beluvagāma to spend the rainy season retreat there. He fell very ill but he suppressed his illness, as he thought that it would not be proper for him to attain *parinirvāṇa* without giving prior intimation to his innumerable devotees. Ānanda felt very happy to find the Teacher again in good health and said that he knew that he could not depart from this world without giving last instructions to his disciples. He was however told by

the Teacher that he was eighty years old and was carrying on his body as a rickety chariot. His true disciples should not expect from him active guidance, should be self-reliant and depend on his teachings (*attadīpo attasaraṇo, dhammadīpo dhammasaraṇo anaññasaraṇo*) and practise the four kinds of *smṛtyupasthānas* (self-recollectedness).

Buddha returned to Vaiśālī and told Ānanda that he liked the Cetiya of the place, viz., Udena, Gotamaka, Sattambaka, Bahuputta, Sarandada and Cāpāla. While staying at Cāpāla cetiya, he told Ānanda that one who had mastered the four *ṛddhipādas* (power of concentration) of (i) will, (ii) thought, (iii) energy and (iv) investigation could, if he wished, live for an aeon. This hint of the Teacher could not be grasped by Ānanda, who missed the opportunity to beseech him to live for an aeon. At that moment Māra appeared before the Teacher and said that as he had accomplished his task of propagating his religion widely, making many faithful disciples, he should now enter into *parinirvāṇa*. Buddha agreed and said that he was going to lay down his mortal body after three months. When he made this determination, the earth quaked to confirm it. Ānanda became mad with grief when he learnt that his beloved Teacher had fixed the limit of his life. He was consoled by the Teacher with the words that separation from the dear ones was inevitable and all originated beings and objects must have decay and destruction.

Buddha then had all the monks residing in and around Vaiśālī assembled at Mahāvana Kūṭāgārasālā and reminded them that his whole teachings consisted of the thirty-seven *Bodhipakṣīya dharmas*.¹ He left Vaiśālī casting his last look at it. He then crossed Bhaṇḍagāma and Jambugāma and reached Bhoganagara where he directed his disciples to give special attention to observance of moral precepts (*sīla*), meditation (*samādhi*), acquisition of knowledge (*paññā*) and

1 These are as follows: 4 Smṛtyupasthāna, 4 Samyakprahāṇa, 4 Ṛddhipāda, 5 Indriya, 5 Bala, 7 Bodhyaṅga, 8 Mārga. (See infra).

attainment of emancipation (*vimutti*). He then gave them instructions for checking up the authenticity of *Buddhavacana*.

From Bhoganagara he moved on to Pāvā and stayed at the mango garden of Cunda, the blacksmith's son who invited him for the forenoon meal. Cunda prepared *sūkaramaddava* (a kind of mushroom)¹ and offered it to the monks. Buddha asked Cunda to serve *sūkaramaddava* to him alone and not to the monks as they would not be able to digest it. He took it and became seriously ill with excruciating pain. He moved then to Kuśīnagara and laid himself down under a tree on a robe folded four times. He accepted an excellent robe offered by Pukkusa Mallaputta, who became his lay-devotee. He then took his bath at *Kakuṭṭhā nadī* and went to the Sālavana of the Mallas at Kuśīnagara. The whole of Vaiśālī was distressed at the news of the impending demise of the Great Being and appeared like an orphan daughter grieving at the death of her father, and had no words to express her sorrow and weeped in silence.

The warlike Licchavis lost all their strength and energy and were just enduring their sufferings with fortitude. The world was going to lose a mastermind and every one realised that all earthly existences must have an end. The learned monks remained seated with composure and meditated on the truths preached by the Teacher, and were pondering over the fact that their omniscient master was going to have eternal rest. The gods made the Sāla trees full of flowers for shedding on the body of Bhagavān. They came to have their last look at the god of gods and Upāvana, who was fanning Bhagavā at the time, was asked by Buddha to move away so as not to obstruct the view of the gods assembled there. The gods also grieved at the thought of Buddha's impending demise.

Buddha then gave the directions to his lay-disciples to earn merit by pilgrimage to the four places, viz., Kapilavastu,

1 *Sūkaramaddava* is wrongly translated by some scholars as 'Boar's flesh.'

Gayā, Sarnath and Kasia, sanctified by (i) Buddha's birth, (ii) attainment of Bodhi, (iii) delivery of first discourse and (vi) *parinirvāṇa* respectively. He gave also hints for the celebrations to be performed at his funeral pyre.

Ānanda entreated Buddha to choose as the site for his *parinirvāṇa* one of the six important cities, viz., Campā, Rājagaha, Sāvattihī, Sāketa, Kosambī, and Vārāṇasī, but Buddha declined and described the former greatness of Kusīnārā. The Mallas of Kusīnārā then rushed to Buddha's place of rest and offered their adoration.

Subhadda, a heretical paribbājaka, suddenly made up his mind to have his ordination as a Buddhist monk directly from Bhagavān, who in spite of his failing health, complied with his wishes.

After ordaining Subhadda, Bhagavān instructed Ānanda to tell his disciples that after his demise his teachings and disciplinary rules would be their teacher and guide, and that they could discard some of the minor disciplinary rules laid down by him, should they feel so necessary.

He then entered into his last meditation rising from the first to the eighth and then came down to the first. He again rose from the first to the fourth and laid down his mortal remains for ever. The event was signified by an earthquake while Brahmā Sahampati and Sakka, the king of gods, expressed their sorrow by saying that all constituted beings and objects must have decay, and the final decay was all that could be desired. Anuruddha, an arhat, referred to the extraordinary power of concentration of the Teacher and compared his departure from the mortal world and attainment of mental freedom to the flame of a lamp dying out, while Ānanda, who was not very spiritually advanced, was struck by the mysterious outburst of nature, grieving and shedding tears all the time. Thus ended the fleeting life of a Great Being, the god of men and gods, so inexorable is the law of nature : *Aniccā vata saṅkhārā uppādavayadhammino.*

CHAPTER V

The Four Truths & the Middle Path

Introductory

Gautama Buddha, a mastermind, was no doubt well acquainted with the religious beliefs and philosophical speculations prevalent in his days. He felt an inward urge to differ from them and give out the Truth, which he had visualised, after a long course of study and training. He experimented with the trodden paths for attaining perfection but found them to be inefficacious for attaining the goal. He could not totally shake of the age-old Indian beliefs and traditions, and so we find some of them incorporated in his teachings. He accepted only those which appeared to him reasonable and fitted in with his line of thinking. He rejected outright all those views, which might be generalised as *Āstika* (Belief in the existence of the Supreme God, the Creator), *Nāstika* (Annihilationism as also Materialism), and *Daiṣṭika* (Determinism or Fatalism)¹ or as *Śāśvata* (Eternalism) and *Uccheda* (Nihilism)² or a mixture of the two (Partial Eternalism and Partial Nihilism). He did not expressly refer to the *Upaniṣads* or to the philosophy embodied in them but it is clear that he was fully cognizant of the Brahmanic view of *Jīvātman* and *Paramātman* and also of the theory of origin of the world of beings.³ Bearing in mind Buddha's attitude towards the existing beliefs and doctrines we have to ascertain what was his actual teaching.

Buddha observed that all phenomenal objects including the worldly beings were constituted of various mental and material elements, which, however, changed ceaselessly and were devoid of any permanent substance like the soul or the

1 Cf. Agrawala, *op. cit.*, pp. 382, 390

2 See above, Chap. II, p. 28f. See also *Kośa-vyākhyā*, V. 6.

3 *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, ch. IV.

elements. He developed therefrom his theory of dynamism and arrived at the conclusion that a being should rise above the changing state (*anitya*) to an everlasting unchanging state of rest and peace (*nitya, nirvāṇa*). His teachings are embedded in the discourses collected in the *Suttapiṭaka* but these have been mixed up with so many later compositions of Buddha's disciples that it is very difficult to sieve out his original teachings. He dealt more with the practices leading to *Nibbāna* than with the exposition of *Nibbāna* or with the theory of *Karman*. There are, however, clear and repeated assertions that the only reality is *Nibbāna*, which is not mere negation of everything (*abhāvamātra*)¹ and that all the constituted objects of the world are unreal. Buddha however is not explicit about the nature of this unreality. He does not exclude the four great elements from his category of impermanent or unreal objects. His discourses do not also allow us to infer that he upheld the Vedāntic view of illusion (*māyā*). There are a few passages which lend support to the Vedāntic view that the constituted world is not only impermanent but also non-existent, but the question arises whether these passages are the original sayings of Buddha? The Vedāntic view of illusion, is, however, found in Mahāyāna texts.²

As it is not possible to point out exactly what were the actual utterances of Buddha, we may accept as original those teachings which are repeated in several places of the Nikāyas. Most of the traditions agree about three or four *suttas* having been delivered by Buddha, and these *suttas* contain substantially all of his teachings.

In the *Ariyapariyesanasutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya*, it is stated that after the attainment of *bodhi*, Buddha was unwilling to give out the Truth realised by him, as it was so deep and subtle that it would not be possible for the generality of

1 *Kośa-vyākhyā*, II. 55, p. 152.

2 See *Aspects* etc., pp. 125, 185.

people to comprehend it. On second thought, however, he decided to explain the Truth to those who were spiritually advanced. This hesitation came to his mind in connection with the theory of causation, known as *Paṭiccasamuppāda* (= *Pratītyasamutpāda* = *idaṃ sati idaṃ hoti* = this being so that happens = *idappaccayatā*), i.e., things of the world are interdependent, or the things of the world have only relative existence. It was this formula expressed in a versified form that captured the imagination of the learned recluses like Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana. This formula was so important that it has been dealt with in most of the Buddhist texts, early or late. The stanza is reproduced in the colophon of several Mahāyāna texts and is found engraved in numerous seals, and images of Buddha so far discovered. Hence, it is evident that this formula formed the keystone of Buddha's teachings.

As a corollary to the above, Buddha declared that there could not exist a permanent and unchangeable entity as 'soul', and that all or any of the constituents of a being, mental or material, could not be identified with the permanent self, as, in that case, it would also be subject to decay and dissolution. He further taught that on realising the fact that the constituents of a being had only a temporary existence, one should remain indifferent to them and not think of them in the terms of "mine" and "not mine".

Of significant importance are his ethical and his psychological teachings found in the *Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta*, the first discourse delivered by him to the five Brāhmaṇas and in the *Mahāparinibbānasutta*, his last discourse which was intended by him to serve as a guide to his disciples after his demise.

The First Discourse

The *Dhammacakkapavattana-sutta* contains the fundamentals of Buddha's teachings, the so-called Middle Path and the enunciation of the four Truths. Ethically, the middle path

connotes the moderate life of a recluse, i. e., the monastic system prescribed in the *Vinaya Piṭaka*. Philosophically, the middle path is explained as the doctrine which keeps clear of the two extreme views about the world, viz., *Śāśvata* (eternalism) and *Uccheda* (annihilationism).

The first part of the *Sutta* opens with the statement that one should avoid the two “extremes”, one being the life of a worldly man, performing rituals and ceremonies but at the same time remaining immersed in pleasures, and the other the life of a recluse dedicated to self-mortifications. He should choose a middle path, which will open up the eyes of knowledge and lead him ultimately to enlightenment, i.e., *Nibbāna*. By the first “extreme” evidently he had in mind the rich Brāhmaṇas and Kṣatriyas, who indulged in luxuries and sought happiness and heavenly existence through sacrifices performed by professional priests (*ṛtviks*) in a grand manner by killing hundreds of birds and animals. By the second “extreme”, he meant the non-Brahmanical ascetics who took to extreme rigorous practices like residing in a forest, living on a very scanty food, or starving, or undergoing many other hardships to control their body and mind. A moderate form of asceticism was approved by Buddha but it was not made compulsory for all of his disciples. Rejecting the two “extreme” paths, he recommended that his disciples should have just enough food, clothing and a shelter to maintain their physical strength, which is necessary to perform the duties prescribed by him. He wanted that his disciples should remain unconcerned about their food and clothing and be satisfied with whatever they got by begging without expressing their intention to have any particular food or thing needed by them.

The second part of the *Sutta* contains the four truths propounded by Buddha. The fundamental aim and object of his teachings is how to arrest the dynamic flow of the constituents of a living being. The ways and means for doing it are summed up in his enunciation of the four truths.

The Four Truths

The traditional exposition of the four truths is as follows:

(a) The first truth is *Dukkha* or Suffering: Birth is suffering, so are disease, old age, death, grief and lamentation due to the death of friends and relatives, It means also physical and mental pain, meeting uncongenial persons, separation from dear ones, disappointment due to failure to obtain the desired objects.¹

The exposition given above, as is found in the *Mahāvagga*,² is meant for the people in general. *Dukkha* in fact does not bear the ordinary meaning, viz., the woes of the world. It means really any form of so-called existence in this world whether as an animal, as a human being, as a god, or even as a Brahmā. The implied sense is that whatever a being possesses in this world, be it long life, health, wealth, property, sons or daughters, kingship of men or gods, even higher supernatural powers, is subject ultimately to decay. In other words, the combination of five aggregates (*khandhas*) ends in suffering, and it is always accompanied with pain on account of constant change and ultimate decay.

Nothing in this world is ever existing and so one should eschew everything which is impermanent (*anicca*) and seek for the eternal Truth, which is ever existing (*nicca*). By “*dukkha*” therefore is meant “existence in this world with concomitant pain and pleasures” which are without any real substance (*anattā*) and are impermanent (*aniccā*).

(b) The second truth is *Dukkha-samudaya* or Origin of Suffering. It is due to thirst (*taṇhā* = *trṣṇā*) for worldly objects, thirst for re-existence as desired by the eternalists (*sassata-*

1 Cf. *Dīgha*, II, p. 306; *Majjhima*, III, p. 249f., *Vibhaṅga*, p. 99, *Vism.*, p. 498. See *Vism.*, p. 499 for seven kinds of *dukkha*: *dukkha-dukkha*, *vipariṇāmadukkhā*, *saṅkhāradukkhā*, *paṭicchannadukkhā*, *appaṭicchanna-dukkhā*, *pariyāyadukkhā*, *nippariyāya-dukkhā*. Cf. *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, I. 8. See *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, ch. XVI for *daśottara-śatākāraṃ duḥkhaṃ*.

2 *Vīnaya*, I, p. 10.

vādins), and desire for self-annihilation as sought by the annihilationists (*ucchedavādins*).¹ Either of such thirst or desire is associated with a wrong view, which causes rebirth.

The thirst is caused by the notion of I-ness, which leads to self-centredness, i. e., a being wants to be the centre of all that is attractive in this phenomenal world but when it fails to achieve it, it suffers pain.

The second truth is enlarged by the addition of the twelve-linked formula known as the Law of Causation (*Paṭiccasamuppāda*), which traces the sources of suffering to ignorance (*avijjā*) of the three verities, viz., absence of a permanent soul (*anattā*) the root-cause of the notion of I-ness; momentary impermanence of all phenomenal objects (*anicca, khaṇika*); and all worldly objects being impermanent are undesirables (*dukkha*).

(c) The third truth is *Dukkha-nirodha* or the absolute ending of suffering by the removal of ignorance of the above-mentioned three verities. It stops the flow of worldly existences. It is the cessation of *dukkha-samudaya*, complete detachment from desires, relinquishment of all worldly objects and of desires for their possession. It is tranquil, beyond death, signless and free from all characteristics. It is not non-existent like the horns of a hare because it can be realised if the right means be adopted. It is, however, not a fruition of the right means. It is not like the eternally existing atoms (*aṇu-paramāṇu*) of the Vaiśeṣikas, because atoms, however minute and subtle, are also caused, whereas *Nirodha* is unborn (*ajātaṃ*), unoriginated (*abhūtaṃ*), uncreated (*akataṃ*) and unconstituted (*asaṃkhataṃ*).² It is called *sa-upādisesa-nirodha* when an arhat removes all his impurities and realises the truth but still retains his body, the last remains of his

1 *Dīgha*, II, p. 305: *Kāma, bhava and vibhava taṇhā*.

2 *Itivuttaka*, p. 37; *Udāna*, p. 80; cf. *Aspects etc*, p. 172f; cf. *Kośavyākhyā*, I. 48; *Milinda*, pp. 268, 270: *atthi nibbānaṃ, mano-viññeayaṃ nibbānaṃ etc*; p. 323; *atthi esā nibbāna-dhātu santā sukhā paṇitā etc*.

past *upadhi*. When he lays down his mortal frame he is said to have *anupādisesa-nirodha*, and after this he never takes rebirth.

Buddha rejected both eternalism and annihilationism, hence the conception of *Nirodha* or *Nibbāna* should be kept clear of these two views. He referred to it only by negatives though there are a few positive descriptions of same, e.g., it is existing, tranquil, happy and excellent. He said that as *Nibbāna* was transcendental, it was not possible to give any positive description of it by words of human creation, i.e., conventional. He would therefore leave it as indescribable and realisable only by the wise, the perfect within one's own self.¹

(d) The fourth truth is *Aṭṭhaṅgika-magga* or the Path of eightfold practices. It states broadly the course of practices to be taken up by one seeking emancipation. It is divided into three sections: (i) moral precepts (*sīla*), i.e., observance of all the disciplinary rules embodied in the *Vinaya Piṭaka*, (ii) mind-control (*citta*) through various methods including meditations, and (iii) acquisition of knowledge (*paññā*) by comprehending the nature and constitution of a being.²

In the Pali texts the four truths have been commented upon in various ways, of which the following appear to be a fair generalisation: *pavatti* (origin), *nivatti* (cessation), and *tad ubhaya hetu* (causes of the above mentioned two); *ālaya* (desires), *ālayāramatā* (attachment to desires), *ālayasamugghāta* (uprooting of desires), and *ālayasamugghātupāya* (means of uprooting desires);³ *akusalam* (evil), *akusalamūlam* (source of evils), *kusalam* (good), *kusalamūlam* (source of goodness);⁴ *idaṃ* (this = *dukkha*), *hīnaṃ* (low = *dukkhasamudaya*), *paṇītam* (excellent = *dukkhanirodha*), *imassa saññāga-*

1 Paccattam veditabbo viññūhi. Cf. *Laṅkāvatāra*, p. 3: *pratyātmaavedya*.

2 For detailed treatment, see p. 142f.

3 *Vism.*, p. 497.

4 *Majjhima*, I, p. 46.

tassa nissaraṇam (getting rid of the misconceptions=*dukkha-nirodhagāminī-paṭipadā*).¹ These various modes of expressions show that the early Buddhists did not mean that the four truths should be confined only to the four terms: *dukkha*, *samudaya*, *nirodha* and *magga*.

Besides the generalisations mentioned above, it is shown in the *Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhasutta*² that in place of *dukkha*, any term can be used, e.g., food (*āhāra*), old age and death (*jarā-maraṇa*), desire (*taṇhā*), name and form (*nāma-rūpa*) and ignorance (*avijjā*). The four truths indicate the fourfold method of examination of an object, viz., take an object, ascertain its origin, determine how it decays, and enquire the means of its decay.³ Just as the science of medicine has four sections, viz., disease, its cause, its cure, and the medicines for its cure,⁴ so also the science of spiritual culture has four sections, viz., examination of the nature of the things of the world, the cause of their origin, their ultimate decay, and the means that bring about the decay. In the *Abhidharmakośa* the four truths are put under two heads: cause and effect, or world (*saṃsāra*) and cessation (*nirvāṇa*). *Dukkha* and *samudaya* are placed under *Samṣāra*, and *nirodha* and *magga* under *Nirvāṇa*.⁵

1 *Majjhima*, I, p. 38.

2 *Majjhima*, I, p. 260: āhāra, āhārasamudaya, āhāranirodha, āhāra-nirodha-gāminipadā.

3 Prof. Stcherbatsky in his *Conception of Nirvāṇa*, p. 55 remarks: "These four topics the four noble truths as the term has been inadequately translated and represented as fundamental principle of Buddhism contain in reality no doctrine at all."

4 *Yogasūtra* of Patañjali, II. 15 : यथा चिकित्साशास्त्रं चतुर्व्यूहं रोगो रोगहेतुरारोग्यं भैषज्यमिति । एवमिदं शास्त्रं चतुर्व्यूहमेव । तद्यथा संसारः संसारहेतुर्मोक्षो मोक्षोपाय इति ।

5 *Kośavyākhyā*, VI. 4; Sogen, *Systems of Buddhistic Thoughts*, p. 60f., *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, p. 137

The effects of insight into the four truths: *dukkha*, *samudaya*, *nirodha*, and *maggā* leads to the removal of the following beliefs respectively:—

- (i) Belief in a self (*sakkāyadiṭṭhi*); it shakes the mental tranquility of those who cling to the view that the constituted things are everlasting (*dhuva*), happy (*sukha*) and good (*subha*).
- (ii) Belief that there is no after-life (*uccheda-diṭṭhi*) and that the world is a creation of the God or issued out of *Prakṛti* or Time (*Kāla*),
- (iii) Belief in the eternality of self (*sassatadiṭṭhi*) and in the existence in *Arūpaloka* as the highest.
- (iv) Belief in non-action (*akiriya-diṭṭhi*). It also leads to the rejection of the path of ease and pleasure and the path of rigorous asceticism and self-mortifications.

After explaining in detail the *ariyasaccas*, Buddhaghosa¹ reminds us of the non-existence of any individual (*anattā*) by quoting the following stanza:

Dukkham eva hi na koci dukkhito, kārako na kiriya
va vijjati
atthi nibbuti, na nibbuto pumā, maggam atthi,
gamako na vijjatī ti.

[There is grief but none suffering from grief, there is no doer though there is action, there is quietude but none being quieted, there is the path but none going along the path].

It should be observed that the four truths, as explained above, are really not the truths for common men. It is for this reason they are always called *Ariyasacca* (*Āryasatya*), indicating by the qualifying word “*ariya*” that these are truths only for those who have advanced spiritually and are in possession of one of the fruits of sanctification, viz., *sotāpatti*, *sakadāgāmi*, *anāgāmi* and *arahatta*. All monks are not necessarily “*ariyas*”; many of them are “*puthujjanas*” i.e. common men with impurities. Only those who have at least reached

1 *Vism.*, p. 513.

2 Cf. *Majjhima*, I: Ariyapariyesanasutta.

the *Sotāpatti* stage is called an “ariya”. Unless an individual is an “ariya” he cannot realise that the possession of wealth and property, sons and daughters is suffering.

The Middle Path

The fourth truth has been explained above (p. 139) very briefly. In the *Dhammacakkappavatanasutta*, it has been dealt with in a little more details, and so its exposition is taken up here again.

According to the traditional method of exposition, the whole of the Buddhist discipline, as shown in the chart, is divided into three sections, which in English phraseology may be put as p h y s i c a l, m e n t a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l, in Pāli *sīla*, *citta* (or *samādhi*) and *paññā*. If the discourses of the *Dīgha* and *Majjhima Nikāyas* be carefully scanned, it will be noticed that the compilers had always kept this division at the back of their mind.¹

I. Sīla

In every religion and not in Buddhism alone, the first demand that is made of the followers is observance of moral precepts (*sīlas*), that is, restraint in physical actions including speech. It is ordinarily known as *brahmacarya*.

According to the Buddhists, *sīla* consists of *sammā vācā*, *sammā kammanā* and *sammā ājīva*, the three of the eight divisions of the Path leading to Nibbāna. These three terms practically include the whole code of moral laws that are prescribed for the conduct of the Buddhist monks.² In the

1 In the *Brahmajāla-sutta* only the first, while in the *Sāmañña-phala-sutta* the first and second have been exhaustively treated, the third being dismissed only with a para on the comprehension of the *ariyasaccas* (*Dīgha*, I, p. 48).

Cf. *Majjhima*, I, p. 301 :

Sīlakkhandha = sammā vācā, kammanā and ājīva

Samādhikkhandha = sammā samādhi

Paññākkhandha = sammā diṭṭhi and saṅkappa.

2 For detailed treatment, see *Infra*.

*Vibhaṅga*¹ and *Majjhima Nikāya*² these are detailed as follows:

Sammā-vācā=refraining from speaking falsehood, malicious words, harsh and frivolous talk;

Sammā-kammanta=refraining from killing, stealing, and misconduct; and

Sammā-ājīva=refraining from earning livelihood by improper means, i.e., arts and crafts of laymen³. Some of these are astrological or astronomical forecasts, interpretation of dreams and omens, use of magical spells, determination of the nature of men, animal and things by their signs, acting as go-betweens between kings, taking part in marriage ceremonies, giving medicines and so forth.

II. C i t t a

Next to physical, the discipline that is expected of the followers of a religion is mental, which is generally known as *dhyāna* (=Pāli *jhāna*) and *samādhi*. In Buddhism, mental discipline does not necessarily imply only concentration of mind, as will be evident from the three terms that have been used in analysing it in the formula of the eightfold path, viz.,

Sammā-vāyāma=effort or exertion to remove the existing evil thoughts, to keep the mind free from being polluted by fresh evil thoughts, and to preserve and increase the good thoughts;

Sammā-sati=mindfulness of all that is happening within the body and mind including feelings, and examination of the things of the world and at the same time suppressing covetousness (*abhiijhā*) and avoiding mental depression (*domanassa*).

Sammā-samādhi=four stages of meditation.⁴

Sammā-saṅkappa=resolution for renunciation, as also for refraining from hatred and injury to other beings.

1 *Vibhaṅga*, p. 235-6.

2 *Majjhima*, III, p. 251f.

3 *Dīgha*, I, pp. 67-9.

4 For detailed exposition, see chapter VII.

III. P a ñ ñ ā

The third, the intellectual discipline, is denoted by the term *sammā-diṭṭhi*, which means the view propounded by Buddha about the nature of the things of the world and the ultimate. Traditionally, it means realisation of the four truths.

From the above, it is evident that for physical and mental disciplines, Buddhism drew up only a scheme of its own for the use of its followers from among the various moral and meditational practices prevalent in India, and hence there was nothing particularly Buddhistic in them. It is in the third, *paññā or prajñā*, i.e., *sammā-diṭṭhi* that Buddhism offered its own solution of the highest riddle of the universe and wanted its followers to comprehend its new view-point,

By intellectual discipline it means generally the comprehension of the four *ariyasaccas*,¹ but actually, it means realisation of the fact that the *khandhas*, *dhātus*, *āyatanas* etc. are dynamic, having only momentary existence and are devoid of any substance (*anattā*). According to the *Visuddhimagga*, *sīlavisuddhi* (moral purification) and *cittavisuddhi* (perfection in mental exercises) form the two legs of Buddhism, its body being the *diṭṭhivisuddhi* (the true or the Buddhistic view about the nature of the Reality). For attaining *diṭṭhivisuddhi* one must comprehend the nature of

- (i) *khandhas* (constituents of a being),
- (ii) *āyatanas* (organs of sense and their spheres),
- (iii) *indriyas* (faculties), and
- (iv) the characteristics of the four *dhātus* (spheres of existence), the true meaning of the *ariyasaccas* (truths), and of *paṭiccasamuppāda* (the law of causation).

In the *Mahāsakuludāyisutta*² there is almost a comprehensive scheme of the Buddhist doctrine in its three divisions. First there is the reference to the Sīla-practices the severer form of which, though approved by Buddha,

1 *Dīgha*, I, p. 84.

2 *Majjhima*, II, p. 9-22.

has been made optional; it is followed by an exposition of the four *ariyasaccas*, which comprise in a popular form the Buddhist philosophical teaching (*paññā*), and then by an enumeration of the thirty-seven *bodhipakkhiyas*, the eight *vimokkhas*, the eight *abhibhāyatanas*, ten *kasinas*, four *jhānas*, and the six *abhiññās*, in short, all that is denoted by *citta* or *samādhi*.¹

The eightfold path, as stated above, deals with all the aspects of a spiritual life, viz., ethical, psychological and epistemological. The first three of the list relating to speech, deed, and means of livelihood comprise a volume of rules embodied in the *Nikāyas* and *Vinaya*, in which elaborate directions are given about the proper conduct of the monks and nuns. The next two explain the gradual way in which an adept should train up his thought and elevate the mind through a process of concentration to a state of equanimity so that it may remain undisturbed by weal and woe. After attaining perfection in physical and mental discipline, the adept can expect to develop a mind of complete renunciation of worldly attractions and direct his mind to the comprehension of the four Truths and thereby acquire the right view.

In the *Magga Saṃyutta*² the eightfold path is described as the spiritual guide (*kalyāṇamitta*) and is shown as conferring all the spiritual benefits that a Buddhist adept would desire to have. The benefits are cessation or eradication of:—

- (i) sufferings due to birth, old age and death;
- (ii) attachment (*rāga*), hatred (*dosa*) and delusion (*moha*);
- (iii) strong desire (*chanda*), reflection (*vitakka*) and perception (*saññā*);

1 See *Infra* for exposition.

2 *Saṃyutta*, V, p. 64-65.

- (iv) thirst for worldly objects (*kāma-taṇhā*), for repeated existence (*bhava-taṇhā*) and for self-destruction (*vibhava-taṇhā*);
- (v) impurities of desire (*kāmāsava*), of re-existence (*bhavāsava* (i.e., in one of the three spheres as worldly beings), of ignorance (*avijjāsava*) and also of wrong views (*diṭṭhāsava*);
- (vi) strong attachment to worldly objects (*kāmupādāna*), to wrong views (*diṭṭhupādāna*), to rituals and ceremonies (*sīlabbatupādāna*), and to belief in a self (*attavādupādāna*);
- (vii) seven inclinations (*anusaya*), such as attachment (*kāmarāga*) to worldly objects, enmity (*paṭigha*), wrong view (*diṭṭhi*), doubt about the Triratna (*vicikicchā*), pride (*māna*), desire for existence (*bhavarāga*) and ignorance (*avijjā*);
- (viii) five kinds of pleasures derived through the contact of five sense-organs with their respective objects;
- (ix) five hindrances (*nīvaraṇas*) to nirvāṇa, viz., strong desire (*kāmacchanda*), hatred (*vyāpāda*), slothfulness (*thīnamiddha*), arrogance and suspicions (*uddhacca-kukkucca*), and doubt about the Triratna (*vicikicchā*);
- (x) five lower fetters (*orambhāgiyāni saṃyojanāni*), viz., belief in a self (*sakkāyadiṭṭhi*), doubt about the Triratna (*vicikicchā*), belief in rituals and ceremonies (*sīlabbata*), strong desire (*kāmacchanda*) and hatred (*vyāpāda*);
- (xi) five higher fetters (*uddhambhāgiyāni saṃyojanāni*), viz., attachment for existence in the *Rūpaloka* (i.e. gods with physical body), pride (*māna*), arrogance (*uddhacca*) and ignorance (*avijjā*).

In the above enumeration, there are many common terms classified under different categories of impurities.

The positive benefits, derived through the practice of the eightfold path, when it is accompanied by solitude (*viveka*), detachment (*virāga*), cessation of impurities (*nirodha*) and sacrifice (*vosagga*) are—

- (i) attainment of the four fruits of sanctification (*sāmaññaphalas*, i.e., *sotāpatti*, *sakadāgāmi*, *anāgāmi* and *arahatta*);
- (ii) attainment of higher powers (*abhiññā*);
- (iii) perfection in the thirty seven *dhammas* leading to full enlightenment; and lastly,
- (iv) realisation of Nibbāna.

CHAPTER VII

The Moral Precepts

Observance of moral precepts (*sīla*) forms the first step of the path of spiritual progress of an adept. The precepts are classified as physical (*kāyika*), vocal (*vācasika*) and mental (*mānasika*). The *sīlas* are enumerated almost in a stereotyped form in several discourses. In the first Sutta of the *Dīgha Nikāya*,¹ the precepts are divided as minor (*cūla*), medium (*majjhima*) and major (*mahā*), of which the minor section contains the actual precepts, the medium repeats and enlarges the same while the third speaks of the various practices and professions of the Brāhmanic priests. The precepts in the first section are.—

(i) non-killing beings, and laying aside rods and weapons, and extending kindness and goodwill to all beings ;

(ii) non-stealing, and accepting only what is given voluntarily, and leading a pure and honest life;

(iii) chastity, and not adopting the life of a common householder;

(iv) non-drinking wine and other intoxicants;

(v) non-speaking falsehood and remaining always firm, truthful and trustworthy, and never breaking promise;

(vi) non-indulging in malicious talks and not sowing discord among persons, and on the contrary seeking harmony and concord among them;

(vii) shunning harsh words, and using sweet, charming and pleasing words ;

(viii) refraining from desultory talks and speaking always the correct, suitable, instructive, meaningful, reasonable and valuable words;

¹ *Dīgha*, I, pp. 4f; 63f; *Samyutta*, IV, p. 249; *Majjhima*, III, pp. 34,48.

(ix) non-destroying all kinds of seeds, plants and shrubs;

(x) non-taking food at night and more than one meal a day;

(xi) non-using scents, garlands and unguents;

(xii) non-using high and large beds;

(xiii) non-accepting gold and silver;

(xv) non-receiving raw paddy or raw meat;

(xvi) non-accepting gifts of female attendants, girls, maid-servants;

(xvii) non-accepting gift of animals or of cultivated and uncultivated fields;

(xviii) refraining from buying and selling or using false balance, weights and measures;

(xix) non-acting as messengers or go-betweens;

(xx) shunning bribing, deceitfulness and crookedness;

(xxi) never wounding or locking up any person, or committing robbery.

The second section, as stated above, is more or less an enlargement of the above-mentioned precepts.

The third section directs the monks to refrain from the functions performed by men in religious garb, e.g., performance of the Atharva-vedic rituals, use of magical charms and incantations, making astrological and astronomical prognostications, or making forecasts about dreams and other superstitious beliefs. The monks were also prohibited from rendering services as valuers of jewels, metals, animals and such other objects. In short, the monks were instructed to abstain from secular functions, even including medical treatment, usually performed by Brāhmaṇas trained up in secular sciences.¹

In the *Majjhima*² and *Saṃyutta Nikāyas*³ appears a

1 There is a long list of such professions.

2 *Majjhima*, I. 17,42,99,268,360; II, 246; III, 35.

3 *Saṃyutta*, II. 67; IV. 5.

stereotyped list of mental impurities (*cittassa upakkilesā*), which a monk should get rid of. These are enviousness, hatred, covetousness, idleness or slothfulness, distraction, indecision, anger, ingratitude, self-praise, miserliness, deceitfulness, double-facedness, pride, arrogance, conceit, faithlessness, shamelessness, immodesty, absentmindedness, negligence in study, love for the present, grasping, decrying others and so forth.

The earnest monks were required not only to observe the above-mentioned precepts and to eradicate the mental impurities but also to comply with the rules of the *Pātimokkha* and the minor disciplinary rules prescribed in the *Vinaya Piṭaka*. These were known as *Adhisīlas*.¹

The general direction given to the monks is that they must refrain from all acts, mental, vocal or physical, which might be harmful to one's own self or to others or to both.² The root-causes of all good acts (*kusala-mūla*) are absence of greed (*alobha*), hatred (*adosa*) and delusion (*amoha*).³ The monks must exert to eradicate the four innermost tendencies (*anusaya*),⁴ viz., attachment (*rāga*), aversion (*paṭigha*), wrong view (*diṭṭhi*) and I-ness (*māna*). They should neither be living in abundance (*bāhulika*) nor ease-loving (*sāthalika*),⁵ and in addition they should develop amity (*mettā*) towards all beings.⁶ In some passages it is stated that constant awareness of precepts (*sīlānussati*)⁷ can even lead one to Nibbāna.⁸

In the *Visuddhimagga*⁹ Buddhaghosa has attempted to generalise them in the answer to the question: *kati vidham sīlaṃ*. For the monks and nuns is prescribed a

1 *Aṅguttara*, I, 230f.

3 *Majjhima*, I, 47.

5 *Ibid.*, I, 15.

7 *Aṅguttara*, III, p. 312f.

8 *Ibid.*

9 *Vism.*, pp. 10-16

2 *Majjhima*, II, 416.

4 *Ibid.*

6 *Ibid.*, I, 17, 124.

number of moral duties, some of which are codified in the *Bhikkhu-pātimokkha* and *Bhikkhūñī-pātimokkha*, while for the unordained novices (*sāmaṇeras*) are prescribed the well-known ten *sīlas*,¹ of which the first five only are meant for all lay-devotees (*upāsakas* and *upāsikās*), the more faithful among them, however, are permitted to observe the first eight *sīlas* on the *uposatha* days, with the option of observing all the ten *sīlas*. These five or eight *sīlas* are called by Buddhaghosa *gahaṭṭhasīlas* (precepts meant for householders).²

The *Pātimokkha*³ is the accepted code of moral duties for the monks and nuns, and the declaration of non-transgression of many of the rules contained in it on the fortnightly *uposatha* days is regarded as sufficient for recognising a monk or nun as morally pure. There are also some punishments prescribed in the *Pātimokkha* for the delinquent monks as also certain observances for their absolution. Apart from the *Pātimokkha* rules, there are hundreds of other rules, which the monks and nuns are expected to observe. In short, every monk or nun is required to be ideally pure as far as the moral precepts are concerned.

The moral duties of a bhikkhu are classified thus:

1 The ten *sīlas* or *sikkhāpadas* are:

- (i) Pāṇātipātā veramaṇī.
- (ii) Adinnādānā veramaṇī.
- (iii) Abrahmacariyā or kāmesu micchācarā veramaṇī.
- (iv) Musāvādā veramaṇī.
- (v) Surāmerayamajjapamādaṭṭhānā veramaṇī.
- (vi) Vikālabhojanā veramaṇī.
- (vii) Naccagītavāditavisukadassanā veramaṇī.
- (viii) Mālāgandhavilepana - dhāraṇa - maṇḍana-vibhūsaṇaṭṭhānā veramaṇī.
- (ix) Uccasayana-mahāsayanā veramaṇī.
- (x) Jātarūparajataggahanā veramaṇī. (See *Vinaya*, I, pp. 83-4: II, p. 258).

2 *Vism.*, p. 15.

3 See *Infra*.

(i) *Pātimokkhasaṃvarasīla or Disciplinary Observances*

First, a monk is required to be well-restrained according to the 227 disciplinary rules of the *Pātimokkha*. He should also be discreet in his conduct and movements, i.e., he must not commit any wrong physically either in carrying on the affairs of his daily life (*ācāra*), or in frequenting places (*gocara*) unfit for a Buddhist recluse. He must always be apprehensive of the commission of the slightest offence (*aṇumattesu vajjesu bhayadassāvī*) and in general be observant of all the moral precepts (*samādāya sikkhati sikkhāpadesu*).¹

(ii) *Indriyasaṃvarasīla or Restraint in sense-organs*

Next to the observance of the general laws and *Pātimokkha* rules, it is enjoined that a monk must be well restrained in his organs of sense, that is, although these may be functioning as usual, the mind of a *bhikkhu* should not be swayed by the external and internal characteristics, whether good or bad, of the things seen, heard, smelt, tasted or touched.²

(iii) *Ājīvapārisuddhisīla or Food-observances*

The common Pāli expression for propriety in food as found in the Piṭakas is *bhojane mattaññu*, i.e., a *bhikkhu* should know the measure of his food, in other words, should exercise sufficient self-restraint with regard to his food. He must always remember that he takes food not for making his body good-looking but just for its maintenance in order to be able to fulfil his mission. His food is to be of such a type that he should not develop a taste for new sensations (*vedanam*) and at the same time get rid of the old ones.³

In the *Pātimokkha-sutta*, there are a number of restrictions imposed on a monk for the manner in which he should take his food, as well as a series of instructions concerning the right

1 *Vibhaṅga*, p. 246-8.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 248.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 249

ways of collecting his food. As all those instructions cannot reasonably be exhaustive, Buddhaghosa says that a bhikkhu must avoid committing offence relating to *ājīva* whatsoever, though not falling within the scope of the *Pātimokkha* rules, e.g., a bhikkhu should not, by talks or signs or direct or indirect hints, persuade the believing laity to offer gifts of food, dress or other requisites to himself, nor to take recourse to the various means, enumerated in the *Brahmajālasutta*, which are not befitting a Buddhist monk.¹

(iv) *Paccayasannissitasīla or Restraint in requisites*

After dealing with the likely transgressions that a monk may commit in course of his daily life, Buddhaghosa dilates on what should be the aims and objects of monks in wearing robes, accepting alms for food, using seats and beds, or seeking medicaments. In short, it is meant that the whole attention of the monk should be fixed on his goal and he should remain unmindful of his worldly necessities except so far as they are required to keep him fit for reaching the goal.

(v) *Dhutaṅgas or Ascetic Practices*

Buddhaghosa, after thus dealing with the *sīlas* in a general way, passes on to the *dhutaṅgas*, the thirteen rigorous practices permitted to some monks. It will be apparent from what has been said above that, according to the Buddhists, purity is more mental than physical, and hence, in Buddhist ethics, emphasis has been laid more on mental than on physical discipline.² The monks, as a rule, were not required to undergo unnecessary physical discomforts except what was necessary for concentration of mind, i. e., a little food and cloth,

1 *Visuddhimagga*, p. 23-4.

2 In the *Majjhima* (I, p. 238) it is stated that the ascetic practices do not even lead to *kāyabhāvanā* (physical discipline) not to speak of *cittabhāvanā* (mental discipline). Success in the ascetic practices, it is remarked (vide *Dīgha*, III, pp. 42-45), sometimes leads to joy, self-praise, lack of diligence and love of gain, fame and honour.

a bare bed and seat, medicaments and a resting place. The restrictions which were observed by them in these matters are detailed in the *Pātimokkha* and other parts of the *Vinaya*. In the earliest stage of Buddhism, when the monks used to live as hermits in caves and forests, i. e., before the practice of living in monasteries came into vogue, four *nissayas* (minimum requisites) were prescribed for them. These were,—

1. *piṇḍiyālopa-bhojanam* (to take food received by begging only as alms),
2. *paṃsukūlacīvaram* (to use robes made only out of rags collected from dust-heaps),
3. *rukḅhamūlasenāsanam* (to sit and lie at the foot of a tree), and
4. *pūtimuttabhesajjam* (to use only excrements and urine as medicines).

In the *Sutta-Nipāta* and other earlier books of the Piṭakas, practice of a rigorous hermit life has been extolled, but with the introduction of monastic life, the rigorousness was gradually relaxed, and a good illustration of this fact is furnished by the *Mahāvagga* itself.¹

From the rules in the *Pātimokkha*, it is apparent that the earliest form of *nissayas* was already superseded, at the time of its compilation, by the introduction of the rule of accepting more than one's bare requirement (*atirekalābha*), but in any case, there must have been all along a section of monks who were in favour of the observance of rigorous practices in monastic life, and this section was perhaps responsible for the introduction of the ascetic practices (*dhutaṅgas*).

In the four *Nikāyas* and also in the *Vinaya Piṭaka* there is no mention of the term *dhutaṅga*, not to speak of its inclusion in the list of *sīlas*. Some of the *dhutaṅga*-practices, such as *sapadānacārī*, *piṇḍapātiko*, *paṃsukūliko*, *abbhokāsiko*, *ārañṇiko*, *pantasenāsano* are mentioned incidentally in the *Nikāyas*² and *Vinaya*³ but it is also stated that Buddha him-

1 See *Infra*.

2 *Majjhima*, I, 30; II, pp. 6-9.

3 *Vinaya*, II, p. 215.

self did not practise them in his own life while some of his disciples did.¹ It is therefore evident that the *dhutaṅgas* were not recognised in early Buddhism as a group of practices or at least as subsidiary practices compulsory for the Buddhist monks. It may be contended by some that Mahākassapa is referred to in the *Samyutta* and *Aṅguttara Nikāyas*² as the foremost of the *dhutavādins*, hence the *dhutaṅga* practices were in vogue but it may be pointed out that, had it been so, the thirteen *dhutaṅgas* would have found a place in the last section of the *Aṅguttara*, if not, in the *Dasuttarasuttanta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya*.³ The interpretation given in the *Visuddhimagga*⁴ deserves also our attention. According to it, a bhikkhu need not practise the *dhutaṅgas* in his own life but, for that reason, he is not debarred from being a *dhutavādin*, i. e., an advocate or preacher of the *dhutaṅgas*. The silence of the *Nikāyas* and the *Vinaya* is a distinct evidence of its later growth. or at least, its later recognition by the Theravāda sect.

In this connection it is worth while to refer to one of the causes of dispute between Buddha and his cousin Devadatta. The latter wanted to make some rigorous practices compulsory for all the monks of the Saṅgha, to which, however, Buddha was opposed. The practices were allied to the *dhutaṅga* precepts. They were,

1 *Majjhima*, II, p. 9ff.

2 *Samyutta*, II, p. 156; *Aṅguttara*, I, p. 23. See p. 158n.

3 In the *IHQ*. (vol. XIII), Dr. Bapat points out that in the *Nikāyas*, ārañṇaka, piṇḍapātika, paṃsukūlika and tecīvarīka are mentioned while in the *Niddesa* (p. 188), there are other four, viz. sapadānacārika, khalupacchābhattika, nesajjika and yathāsanthatika. In the *Milindapañha* the number is brought to thirteen. In the *Mahāvvyutpatti*, sapadānacārika and pattapiṇḍika are omitted and nāmatika is added. Cf. Kern, *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 75-76; Childers, *Pāli Dictionary*, p. 110.

4 *Vism.*, p. 80-81.

1.	bhikkhū	yāvajīvaṃ	āraññakā	assu
2.	”	”	piṇḍapātikā	”
3.	”	”	paṃsukūlikā	”
4.	”	”	rukḁhamūlikā	”
5.	”	”	macchamaṃsaṃ na khādeyyuṃ.	¹

[Monks should remain their whole life in the forest, live on alms only, use robes made only out of rags from dust-heaps, sleep under a tree, and never eat fish or flesh.]

Though the Pāli tradition has nothing but condemnation for Devadatta's actions, it is apparent that Devadatta was not without some followers and influence, and that his disciplinary principles were not wholly brushed aside by the monks. The adoption of the *dhutaṅgas* by the Pāli school and the prohibition of eating fish and flesh by the Mahāyānists give recognition to Devadatta's principles. The earliest reference to *dhutaṅgas* and their excellence is found in the *Milinda-pañha*² and their full exposition in the *Visuddhimagga*³. The thirteen dhutaṅgas are:—

1. *paṃsukūlikaṅgaṃ* = to wear robes made out of rags collected from dust-heaps of streets, cemeteries, etc.;
2. *tecīvarikaṅgaṃ* = to have not more than three robes, i. e. one each of saṅghāṭi, uttarāsaṅga and antara-vāsaka and even for washing or colouring one must manage with these three only ;
3. *piṇḍapātikaṅgaṃ* = to eat food collected by begging only from door to door, and avoid any of the fourteen kinds of food-offerings permitted in the Vinaya;⁴

1 Buddha permitted *rukḁhamūlasenāsana* for eight months and the eating of fish and meat under three restrictions, viz., *adiṭṭham* (unseen), *asutam* (unheard), and *aparisaṅkitam* (unapprehended). See *Vinaya*, II, p. 197 also *Jātaka*, I, p. 34. Cf. the Mahāyānic restrictions about meat-eating in the *Laṅkāvatara-sūtra*, ch. viii. See also Thomas, *Life of Buddha*, pp. 134ff.

2 *Milinda*, pp. 351-5.

3 *Vism.*, pp 59-83.

4 The fourteen kinds are,—saṅghabhattam, uddesabh, niman-tanabh., salākābh., pakkhikam, uposathikaṃ, paṭipādikaṃ, āgantukabh., gāmikabh., gilānabh., gilānuppaṭṭhākabh., vihārabh., dhūrabh., vārakabh.

4. *sapadānacārikaṅgaṃ*=to beg food from house to house consecutively and without any omission;¹
5. *ekāsanikaṅgaṃ*=to take meal at one sitting, i.e., if one is required to stand up or move to show respect to his teacher or do some other work, he cannot resume his seat and take his food again;
6. *pattapiṇḍikaṅgaṃ*=to possess only one bowl and not a second and to take all kinds of food thrown into it, be they tasteful or not;
7. *khalupacchābhattikaṅgaṃ*=not to take any food after finishing or signifying intention of finishing one's meal, even if any be offered (cf. *Pācittiya*. 35);
8. *āraññaikaṅgaṃ*=to dwell only in forests and not on the outskirts of towns or villages, and the forests must be sufficiently far from any locality;
9. *rukkhamūlikaṅgaṃ*=to live in a place without any shed and under a tree, and the tree must not be one of the boundary marks of a parish, or one within the compound of a monastery or *cetiya* (sanctuary), or a forest bearing fruits and so forth.
10. *abbhokāsikaṅgaṃ*=to live in an open space, i.e., neither under a shed nor under a tree, but one with this vow as well as the previous one is permitted to take shelter in a covered place if it be raining, provided he does not run for any shelter to avoid being drenched;
11. *sosānikaṅgaṃ*=to live in a cemetery. Buddhaghosa in explaining what is a suitable cemetery says that it must not be one used by the people of a village but one left unused for at least twelve years, but from the other conditions mentioned by Buddhaghosa² it seems that he had in mind not a quite unfrequented cemetery;

1 Mahākassapa is said to have been the foremost in this dhutaṅga. see *Vism.*, p. 68.

2 *Vism.*, p. 77.

12. *yathāsanthatikaṅgaṃ* = to use whatever bed or seat is allotted to one without questioning or suggesting an alternative; and
13. *nesajjikaṅgaṃ* = to spend nights sitting and not lying ; of the three watches of night, one may be spent in walking (*caṅkamaṇa*).

In practising the *dhutaṅgas* one may be very severe (*ukkaṭṭha*), moderate (*majjhima*) or mild (*mudaka*). A bhikkhu may or may not observe all the thirteen dhutaṅgas, and if he practises the severer of them, it follows that he is not required to practise the less severe, e.g. an *abbhokāsika* need not bother about *rukhamūlikaṅga*; a *sapadānacārika* must necessarily be a *piṇḍapātika*, and an *ekāsanika* can easily be a *pattapiṇḍika* or *khalupacchābhattika*. A bhikkhuṇī is permitted to practise only eight dhutaṅgas, i.e. they are debarred from being *ārañṇika*, *khalupacchābhattika*, *abbhokāsika*, *rukhamūlika* and *sosānika*. A *sāmaṇera* can practise twelve dhutaṅgas, i.e., omitting *tecīvarikaṅgaṃ*, similarly a *sāmaṇerī* can practise seven omitting the *tecīvarikaṅgaṃ*. For the male and female lay-devotees, only two of the dhutaṅgas are prescribed, viz., *ekāsanikaṅgaṃ* and *pattapiṇḍikaṅgaṃ*.

CHAPTER VIII

The Mental Training

The second course of spiritual exercises prescribed for a monk is for attaining complete control over the mind (*citta*). In verse after verse in the *Dhammapada* and in passages after passages in the Nikāyas the difficulty of controlling the fickle *citta* has been dilated upon, and at the same time it has been emphasised that the only means of attaining *Nibbāna* is by curbing the *citta*, i.e., withdrawing it from all that is attractive in the world and directing it to the highest goal. It is only with a steady mind that one is capable of comprehending the essential oneness or sameness and vastness of the beings of the universe—the *Nirvāṇa* of Buddhist philosophy.

In the eightfold path, four kinds of practices are prescribed to obtain control over the fickle mind. Of these four the most essential is meditation. It is an axiomatic truth that control over mind can be attained only through meditational exercises.¹

There is a graduated course in these meditational exercises, and this course ranges from the most elementary form of *samādhi*, i.e., simple fixation of mind on a black or white circular spot to the most subtle when the meditator loses wholly his consciousness and sensation, and reaches a state which is almost akin to the state of death (*saññāvedayitanirodha*).²

Buddhaghosa, in order to bring out the various charac-

1 Buddhaghosa has often used the two words *citta* and *samādhi* synonymously. He gives the etymological meaning of *samādhi* thus:

“Samādhānatthena samādhi, ekārammaṇe citta-cetasikānaṃ samaṃ sammā ca ādhāraṃ ṭhapanan ti vuttaṃ hoti” (*Vism.*, p. 84.) *Samādhi* means firmly placing; the act of putting or placing the mind and mental functions evenly and properly on one object.

2 See *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, pp. 158-61.

teristic features of a *samādhi*, adopted the *aṅguttara* method of numerical classification, which is as follows:—

(A) *Samādhis* of two kinds:

1. (a) *upacāra-samādhi* and (b) *appanā-samādhi*. While attempting concentration of mind, *upacāra* is said to be that mental state which immediately precedes the fixation of the mind on a certain point; the fixation is termed *appanā* (Sans *arpaṇa*). It may be described also as the preparatory attempts for developing concentration of mind.

(B) *Samādhis* of three kinds:

2. (a) *lokiya* (when the *samādhi* is associated with good thoughts=*kusalacitta*) and *lokuttara* (when the *samādhi* is associated with the attainment of the four fruits of sanctification=*ariyamagga*);
- (b) *sappītika* (meditation associated with joy) and *nippītika* (meditation not associated with joy);
- (c) *sukhasahagata* (meditation associated with a happy state of mind).

(C) *Samādhis* of four kinds:

3. (a) *hīna* (lower), *majjhima* (middle), and *paṇīta* (higher)
- (b) *savitakka-savicāra* (with discursive and discriminatory thoughts), *avitakka-vicāramatta* (without discursive thoughts but with discrimination), and *avitakka-avicāra* (without discursive and discriminatory thoughts);
- (c) *pīti-sahagata* (with joy), *sukha-sahagata* (with happy state of mind), and *upekkhā-sahagata* (with equanimity of mind);
- (d) *paritta* (small) (while in the preparatory stage=*upacāra-bhūmi*), *mahaggata* (large) (while meditating on good objects of the higher spheres, (i.e., *rūpāvacara-kusala* and *arūpāvacara-kusala bhūmis*) and *appamāṇa* (measureless) (while meditations are associated with the four fruits of sanctification=*ariyamagga-sampayutta*).

4. (a) *dukkhā paṭipado dandhābhiñño* (one who experiences difficulty in mental exercises, and acquires mental concentration slowly),
- (b) *dukkhā paṭipado khippābhiñño* (one who experiences difficulty in mental exercises but acquires mental concentration quickly),
- (c) *sukhā paṭipado dandhābhiñño* (one who can practise mental exercises easily but acquires mental concentration slowly) and
- (d) *sukhā paṭipado khippābhiñño* (one who can practise mental exercises easily and acquires mental concentration quickly).

[*Paṭipadā* (lit. path) is that part of mental exercise which is necessary for collecting one's thoughts for reaching the *upacāra*¹ stage. *Abhiññā* (lit. special knowledge) refers to the next course of exercises which lead to *appanā* (i.e. fixing mind upon one point).

Dukkhā here means 'with difficulty' as opposed to *sukhā* 'with ease'; similarly *dandha* means 'slow' as opposed to *khippa* 'quick.']

5. (a) *paritto parittārammaṇo* (not of a high order with limited basis of meditation), (b) *paritto appamāṇārammaṇo* (not of a high order but with unlimited basis of meditation), (c) *appamāṇo parittārammaṇo* (unlimited but with a limited basis of meditation), (d) *appamāṇo appamāṇārammaṇo* (unlimited with an unlimited basis of meditation);
6. (a) *vitakka* (discursive thoughts), (b) *vicāra* (discriminatory thoughts), (c) *pīti* (joy), and (d) *sukha* (happy state of mind)—four combinations of any two or more of these, associated with the four *jhānas*;

1 I. e. withdrawing mind from the surrounding objects as also from the characteristics of the subject for mental concentration.

7. (a) *hānabhāgiyo* (belonging to a lower category),
 (b) *ṭhitibhāgiyo* (belonging to a steadying category),
 (c) *visesabhāgiyo* (belonging to a higher category),
 and (d) *nibbedhabhāgiyo* (belonging to the
 highest category, i.e., Nibbāna);
8. (a) *kāmāvacara* (belonging to the sensuous sphere),
 (b) *rūpāvacara* (belonging to the sphere of material
 forms), (c) *arūpāvacara* (belonging to the sphere
 of non-material forms), and *apariyāpanna* (belong-
 ing to the sphere of the four stages of sanctification,
 i.e., not included in the above three categories);
9. (a) *chanda-samādhi*, i.e., concentration effected (by
 means of strong will), (b) *virīya-samādhi* (by means
 of energy), (c) *citta-samādhi* (by means of mind-
 control), and (d) *vīmaṃsā-samādhi* (by means
 of examination).¹

The above classification helps us only to comprehend the various mental states accompanying the different kinds of meditation but it does not tell us anything about the graduated course to be followed by an adept for passing from the lowest to the highest *samādhi*. So Buddhaghosa goes into minute details of the processes which induce *samādhi* and it will now be our object to consider them in due order as follows:

- A. Ten *Palibodhas* or hindrances to the practice of *samādhis*,
- B. Forty *kammaṭṭhānas* or the objects of meditation,
- C. *Kalyāṇamitta kammaṭṭhānadāyaka* or the spiritual preceptor, prescribing the basis of meditation,
- D. The candidate, and
- E. The successive steps in meditation.

1 See also *Majjhima*, II, p. 11.

A. *Ten Palibodhas or Hindrances*

Obstructions to one practising meditation may be of a varied nature.¹ Buddhaghosa puts them in a nutshell thus :

*Āvāso ca kulaṃ lābho gaṇo kammañ ca pañcamam
addhānaṃ ñāti ābādhō gantho iddhī ti te dasā ti.*

These ten, Buddhaghosa explains, act as hindrances not to all but only to those who has got mental weaknesses as pointed out below :

- (i) *Āvāsa* or dwelling places of monks. This causes hindrance to those who take interest in the construction of monasteries, stūpas and so forth.
- (ii) *Kula* or family. It affects those who care more for the welfare of his relatives or of the families of his lay-devotees than for his own spiritual acquisition.
- (iii) *Lābha* or gain of food and clothes. It sometimes becomes a source of distraction to the monks of repute, for greater demand is made upon their time by people for the privilege of giving them food and clothes, and not unoften these demands are created by his fellow-brethren, who take advantage of his company and receive gifts along with him.
- (iv) *Gaṇa* or members of the congregation. There are some monks whose time is taken up in teaching the texts of the Sutta or Abhidhamma piṭakas and who hardly find time to be alone to practise meditation.
- (v) *Kamma* or works. Buddhaghosa takes it to mean *navakamma* (construction or repair of buildings). He says that much of the time of a monk, who supervises the building works, is taken up in

1 See *Milindapañha*, pp. 365-399. Cf. *Pātañjala*, I, 30: व्याधिस्त्यानसंशयप्रमादालस्यविरतिभ्रान्तिदर्शनालब्धभूमिकत्वानवस्थितत्वानि चित्तविक्षेपास्तेऽन्तरायाः ।

calculating the wages of labourers or supervising the works done or to be done.

- (vi) *Addhāna* or wayfaring. There are occasions when a monk has got to go to a place to give ordination to a person or to procure any requisite. By leaving it undone, he tries to gain concentration of mind but fails to do so.
- (vii) *Ñāti* or relatives, including teachers, disciples or fellow brethren of the church. Sickness of any of the *ñātis* is a source of distraction to some monks.
- (viii) *Ābādha* or one's own sickness, which requires medicine to be cured.
- (ix) *Gantha* or scriptures. Some are so absorbed in studying the scriptures that they do not find time or feel inclined to practise meditation.
- (x) *Iddhi* or miraculous powers. These are attained as one advances in meditation but their use causes hindrance to the development of insight (*vipassanā*).¹

There are some other hindrances enumerated by Buddhaghosa, for instance, long hairs and nails, which should be trimmed off ; old robes which should be repaired ; discoloured robes which should be dyed ; unclean bowls which should be cleansed, and weak beds which should be strengthened.

B. *The Forty Kammatṭhānas or Subjects of Meditation*

The subjects of meditation are hardly possible of enumeration though traditionally they are said to be forty in number. The spiritual preceptor (*Kalyāṇamitta*) was to choose a subject which, he thought, would be the most suitable for his disciple, no matter whether it was included in the traditional list or not. As, for instance, one of the

1 *Vism.*, p. 122.

very common subjects of meditation found in the Nikāyas is *aniccasaññā* to destroy the sense of I-ness (*asmimāna*), but it is not included in the traditional list.

The forty subjects are:—

1. Ten Kasiṇas
2. Ten Aśubhas
3. Ten Anussatis
4. Four Brahmavihāras
5. Four Āruppas
6. One Saññā, and
7. One Vavatthāna.

1. *Ten Kasiṇas or objects in their entirety*

The word 'Kasiṇa' is very probably a Prākṛt form of the Sanskrit word 'Kṛtsna' meaning 'entire.'¹ In the Buddhist meditational practices, the term is applied to those subjects of meditation, which occupy the 'entire' mind, and as such does not give scope to the rising of any other thought.

1. The first of the Kasiṇas in the list is *Paṭhavikasiṇa*, i.e., when earth is taken as an object of meditation. To induce concentration of mind, a beginner is generally asked to fix his attention on a clod of earth, which may or may not be specially prepared for him (*kata* or *akata*), i.e., he may choose a circular-shaped or square-shaped earthen material when it is called *kata* (prepared) or he may choose, say, a ploughed field when it is called *akata* (unprepared). In the former case

¹ *Mahāvvyutpatti* LXXII—Daśa Kṛtsnāyatanāni = Tib. zad. par. gyi. skye. mched. bcu.

Can *Kasiṇa* be the Prakrit form of Sans. *Karṣaṇa* = cultivation (of mind). Cf. Childers, sv. Kasiṇo: the mind is wholly absorbed or engrossed in one predominant idea, on which it is intently fixed. Rhys Davids translates it by the words 'Predominant Ideas' (see *Yogāvacāra's Manual*, p. viii) and Maung Tin and Conze by 'Device' (see *Path of Purity*, II, p. 138 and *Buddhist Meditation*, 1956, p. 14).

particular attention should be given to the fact that the earthen material must be without any colour as it is likely to divert attention from the earth to its *lakkhaṇas* e. g. colour. It is, however, recommended that the earthen material should be of reddish-brown colour like that of dawn, and taken, if possible, from the bed of the Ganges. In a secluded place the adept is to take his seat and try to concentrate his mind on the *paṭhavī-kasiṇa*, cogitating all the while the evils of *kāma*, the solace in overcoming it and the fact that great saints had obtained emancipation by means of such *dhyānas*, repeating constantly the term *paṭhavī* or any of its synonyms, *mahī*, *medinī*, *bhūmi*, *vasudhā* or *vasundharā*. The adept is to try to see with his eyes shut the image of the *paṭhavī* inwardly with as vividness and distinctness as he was doing with his eyes open. As soon as this is accomplished, the concept formed in mind (*uggahanimittam*) is said to have come to stay (*jātam*).¹ He can now go back to his usual place of residence, and cogitate on the *nimitta* acquired by him.² By doing so, he gradually gets rid of the five hindrances (*nīvaraṇas*)³ to religious life and of the impurities (*kilesas*).⁴ By this first attempt at concentration (*upacārasamādhī*), his mind becomes concentrated, and there appears in his mind the *paṭibhāganimitta*, i. e., clear and firm image of the object of meditation (*uggahanimitta*) but now it is much clearer and brighter than the *uggahanimitta* and without the imperfections of the objects (*kasiṇadosa*), which remain in *uggahanimitta*. Then commences really the course of meditational

1 *Vism.*, p. 125.

2 He is now advised to use shoes to avoid wasting time in washing his feet and also a walking stick. *Vism.*, p. 125.

3 *Viz.*, *kāmacchanda* (strong desire), *vyāpāda* (hatred), *thīnamiddha* (idleness), *uddhaccakukkucca* (arrogance) and *vicikicchā* (doubt).

4 The *kilesas* are ten in number, viz., *lobha*, *dosa*, *moha*, *māna*, *diṭṭhi*, *vicikicchā*, *thīnaṃ*, *uddhaccaṃ*, *ahirikā*, *anottappaṃ*. The first four and *uddhaccaṃ* are enumerated when the *kilesas* are counted as five in number.

practices with *upacāra*, *appanā* and ending with *catukka* or *pañcaka-jhāna*.¹

II. The second is *Āpo-kasiṇa*, i. e., when the object of meditation is water. It may be any natural or existing expanse of water as that of a tank or a lake or even of the sea, or clear rain water collected in a vessel before it has reached the earth. The vessel must be full and placed in a quiet secluded corner of the monastery. As in the case of *paṭhavī*, the colour-question must be avoided, i. e., the *lakkhaṇa* of water must not divert the attention of the adept, and concentration should be induced in the same way as explained in the case of *paṭhavī*, uttering in this case the word 'āpo' or its synonyms *ambu*, *udakaṃ*, *vāri*, *salilaṃ*, etc.² Gradually the *uggaha* and *paṭibhāga nimittas* appear and the adept proceeds along the course of meditation.

III. The third is *Tejokasiṇa*, i. e., when the object of meditation is fire. It may be the flame of a lamp, fire in an oven, or a jungle-fire. The fire may also be specially prepared ; in that case, some faggots are to be collected and a pile made of them near a tree and then it should be set on fire. A suitable screen with a hole about four fingers wide is to be placed between the fire and the adept. The adept now is to look at the fire without minding the faggots or the smoke or its colour, even its heat. He should utter the word 'tejo' or any of its synonyms and acquire the *uggaha* and *paṭibhāga nimittas* as detailed above.

IV. The fourth is *Vāyokasiṇa*, i. e., when the object of meditation is wind. It may be seen or felt. In the former case, when it is seen, the adept observes the swaying or shaking of the sugarcane-tops or bamboo-tops or hair-tips, and in the latter case, when it is felt, he feels by his body the rush of wind through a hole in a wall or through a

1 See *Infra*, for details; cf. *Comp. of Phil.*, pp. 54-5.

2 *Vism.*, p. 170

window. He realises that it is wind which is moving the tops of sugarcane, etc. or striking his body, and then as described above, he is to utter the word 'vāyu' or its synonyms and gradually develop the two *nimittas* and induce the *jhānas*.

V. The fifth is *Nīlakasiṇa*, i. e., when the object of meditation is of blue colour. It may be of a flower, a piece of cloth or a blue gem. It should be specially prepared by filling a basket up to the brim with blue flowers so that the pollens or stalk may not be seen. The basket should be covered by a piece of blue cloth in such a way that the mouth of the basket is to appear like the surface of a drum. It should be surrounded by a band of a different colour. Then the adept is to concentrate his mind on the blue colour avoiding the other *lakṣhaṇas* of the flowers and develop the *uggaha* and *paṭibhāga nimittas*, and the *jhānas*.

VI-VIII. The sixth, seventh and eighth are *Pītakasiṇa*, *Lohitakasiṇa* and *Odātakasiṇa*, i. e., when the objects of meditation are yellow, red and white respectively. The *kasiṇas* are to be prepared like the *Nīlakasiṇa*, as detailed above, and the process is the same for developing the *nimittas* and *jhānas*.

IX. The ninth is *Āloka-kasiṇa*, i. e., when the object of meditation is a spot of light. The sun's or the moon's rays, when received through a chink in the walls, or a window or through an opening in a thick foliage, form a circular spot of light on the earth. The adept fixes his attention on it and utters 'obhāso obhāso', 'āloko āloko'. The spot of light may also be obtained artificially by putting a lamp within a jar having a hole in its side. As explained before, the adept by concentrating his mind on the spot of light develops the *nimittas* and *jhānas*.¹

X. The tenth is *Paricchinṇākāsa-kasiṇa*, i. e., when the object of meditation is a 'circumscribed space'. The opening

¹ *Vism.*, pp. 174-5.

in a wall or a window may well be selected as *paricchinna-ākāsa*, or an opening may be made, say, four fingers wide in a well-covered pavilion or in a sheet of leather. The adept is to fix his attention on the opening and utter 'ākāso ākāso' and develop gradually the *nimittas* and *jhānas*.¹

In conclusion, Buddhaghosa speaks of the various miraculous powers acquired by an adept by successfully practising the above ten *kaṣiṇas*.²

2. *Ten Asubhas or Unpleasant objects*

The ten *asubha* (unpleasant) objects of meditation refer to the ten states, through which an uncared for corpse passes before it is completely destroyed. They are,—

- (i) *uddhumātakam* or swollen corpse;
- (ii) *vinīlakam*, i.e., when the colour of the corpse has become blue;
- (iii) *vipubbakam* or the corpse full of pus;
- (iv) *vicchiddakam* or the corpse with limbs torn asunder, (e.g., dead bodies of thieves);
- (v) *vikkhāyitam*, i.e., when the corpse has been mangled by dogs and jackles;
- (vi) *vikkhittam* or the corpse with dismembered limbs;
- (vii) *hatavikkhittam* or the corpse with its limbs partly destroyed and partly scattered;
- (viii) *lohitakam* or the corpse covered here and there with blood (e.g. of a soldier in a battle-field);
- (xi) *puluvakam* or the corpse full of worms;
- (x) *aṭṭhikam* or the skeleton.

After enumerating these ten unpleasant objects of meditation, Buddhaghosa deals with the following topics:

- (i) safety of the place where a corpse is found;

1 *Vism.*, pp. 175-7.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 175.

- (ii) how an adept should behave or what he should ponder over while going to or coming from the place of meditation;
- (iii) sex of the corpse and its suitability;
- (iv) advantages of leaving instructions with the teacher and fellow-brethren about the place selected by him for meditation;
- (v) the path and direction to be chosen;
- (vi) the nature of the noticeable objects around the place where the corpse is found;
- (vii) the characteristics of the corpse to be observed by him, viz., colour, sex, position, direction and size of the corpse, as also joints, apertures, depth of eye-sockets etc., thickness, and a general view of the corpse.

The meditator, as in the case of *paṭhavī*, tries to convert the corpse into a concept (*paṭibhāga*), and then as usual gets rid of the five hindrances (*nīvaraṇas*),¹ and induce the ecstasies by gradually doing away with *vitakka* and *vicāra*, *pīti* and *sukha*.²

3. *Ten Anussatis or Recollections*

The two previous lists of *Kammaṭṭhānas* speak of actual objects upon which the adept concentrates his mind, gradually converting them into concepts. The present list speaks of pure cogitation of the merits (*guṇas*)³ of (i) Buddha, (ii)

1 See above, p. 166, fn. 3.

2 *Vism.*, p. 198; See ante, p. 161

3 In the *Visuddhimagga*, the merits (*guṇas*) of each of these have been quoted from the Piṭaka. These are as follows:

- (i) *Buddhānussati*—Iti pi so Bhagavā araham sammāsambuddho vijjācaraṇasampanno sugato lokavidū anuttaro purisadamma-sārathi satthā devamanussānam Buddhō Bhagavā ti.
- (ii) *Dhammānussati*—Svākkhāto Bhagavato dhammo sandiṭṭhiko akāliko ehipassiko opanayiko paccattam veditabbo viññūhī ti.

Dhamma and (iii) Saṅgha, as also of (iv) *sīla* (observance of precepts), (v) *cāga* (charity) and (vi) *devatā* (ways and means by which one is reborn in the realm of the gods). Such cogitation leads to quietude of the mind (*cittaṃ pasīdati*) and destroys the five hindrances (*nīvaraṇas*),¹ produces great joy and ultimately induces insight leading to arhathood (*vipassanā*).

Besides the six *anussatis* mentioned above, there are three other *anussatis* called (vii) *maraṇa-sati* (viii) *kāyagatā sati*, (ix) *ānāpāna-sati*, and (x) *upasamānussati*, i. e., recollection of inevitable death, of the contents of the physical body, of inhalation, and of final quietude.

(vii) The practice of *maraṇa-sati* implies that the adept after having seen a corpse is to ponder over the fact that he is also subject to that inevitable death and by doing so he rouses his mindfulness of death, mental agitation and also knowledge relating to it. This leads to the destruction of the

(iii) Saṅghānussai—Supaṭipanno Bhagavato sāvakaśaṅgho ujup. b. s., ñāyap. b. s., sāmīcīp. b. s., yad-idam cattāri purisayugān aṭṭhapurisapuggalā esa bhagavato sāvakaśaṅgho āhuneyyo pāhuneyyo dakkhiṇeyyo, añjalīkaraṇīyo anuttaram puñña-khettaṃ lokassā ti.

(iv) Sīlānussati—Aho vata me sīlāni akhaṇḍāni acchiddāni asabalāni akammāsāni bhujissāni viññūpasatṭhāni aparāmatṭhāni samādhisamvattanikāni ti.

(v) Cāgānussati—Lābhā vata me, suladdhaṃ vata me, yo'haṃ maccheramalapariyuṭṭhitāya pajāya vigatamalamaccherena cetasā viharāmi, muttacāgo payatapāṇi vossagarato yācayogo dānasamvibhāgarato ti.

(vi) Devatānussati—Santi devā Cātumahārājikā, santi devā Tāvātimsā, Yāmā, Tusitā, Nimmānaratino, Paranimitta-vasavattino, santi devā Brahmakāyikā, santi devā tat'uttariṃ; yathārūpāya saddhāya samannāgatā tā devatā ito cutā tattha uppannā mayhaṃ pi tathārūpā saddhā samvijjati yathā-rūpena silena...
.....yathārūpena sutena.....yathārūpena cāgena.....
yathārūpāya paññāya samannāgatā tā devatā ito cutā tattha uppannā mayhaṃ pi tathārūpā paññā samvijjatī ti.

1 See above, p. 166, fn. 3.

hindrances (*nīvaraṇas*) and induction of the *jhānas*. Buddhaghosa gives detailed direction about the instances of death to be selected by the meditator.¹

(viii) The practice of *kāyagatāsati* means that the adept is to ponder over the fact that this body from head to foot is full of many impure things and that there are in it hair, nails, spleen, intestines, etc. The most popular way of taking up this *kammaṭṭhāna* is to repeat the list of things contained in the body hundreds or thousands of times either loudly or mentally and thereby induce concentration of mind. Buddhaghosa then gives many other directions about the best way of practising *kāyagatā sati*, and treats in detail the various contents of the body,—a treatment which may well bear comparison to a modern anatomical study.²

(ix) The ninth is *Ānāpānasati*. Inducing meditation by the process of controlling breath was very widely known and is, in fact, adopted by all religions, which advocate concentration of mind. It corresponds partly to the *Prāṇāyāma* as described in the Brāhmaṇic *Yogaśāstras*, in which *pūraka* (inhaling), *kumbhaka* (stoppage of breath) and *recaka* (exhaling) form the three essential factors.³ In the Buddhist meditational practices it is given an important place and forms one of the chief subject-matters of discourse under the heading *Satipaṭṭhāna*⁴ (= *Smṛtyupasthāna* i.e., watchfulness of what is happening in body, feeling and mind, and of what are the spiritual acquisitions gained). In the *Yogāvacara's Manual*, it is given the first place among the various meditational exercises.

Those, who choose breath-control as their *Kammaṭṭhāna*, are required to go to a forest or to a secluded spot, sever his thoughts from the outside world and direct his attention to his own inhalation and exhalation and thus gradually develop *upacāra* and *appanā*.⁵ He should sit cross-legged, keeping his body erect. Then he is to exhale (*assāsa*) and inhale (*passāsa*),

1 *Vism.*, pp. 230 ff.

2 *Ibid* , pp. 243 ff.; 250 ff.

3 Cf. *Majjhima*, I, p. 243-4; *Pātañjala*, I, 34, 49.

4 See *Infra*.

5 *Vism.*, p. 269.

observing the time it takes for full inhalation and full exhalation, watching also when exhalation or inhalation starts (*ādi*), reaches the middle (*majjha*) and ends (*pariyosāna*). In exhalation the breath starts from the navel (*nābhi*), passes through the heart (*hadaya*) and reaches the nose-tip (*nāsikaggam*),¹ and in inhalation the process is in the reverse direction. The mind follows the course of the breath consciously. It is only by long practice that an adept is able to keep himself aware of all the three stages of in-breathing and out-breathing.² Such observation and control of the breath lead to stoppage of all bodily movements (*passambhayaṃ kāyasaṅkhāraṃ*).³

The artificial aids⁴ taken by an adept for *ānāpānasati* are mainly (i) *ganaṇā*, i.e., counting, which is not to exceed ten; (ii) *anubandhanā*, i.e., following the course in its three stages, viz., beginning, middle and end; and (iii) *phusanā*, i.e., watching the points of contact, navel (*nābhi*), heart (*hadaya*) and nose-tip (*nāsikaggam*).⁵ By these aids the adept soon acquires the *paṭibhāga-nimitta* (concept) and develops *appanā* (or *īhapanā*, fixation of the mind) and in some cases the body of the adept becomes so light as to rise up in the air.⁶ At this stage the external inhalation and exhalation cease but there is internal inhalation, to which then the adept's mind is directed. The subject of meditation may be either *assāsa* or *passāsa*, or *nimitta* (after-image) of either.⁷

By meditating upon the *nimitta* without colour (*vaṇṇa*)

1 Not *nābhikaggam*. See *Vism.*, p. 280. In the *Sandhyā upāsana* of the Brāhmaṇas, the three points are navel, heart and forehead, the first being the seat of Brahmā, the second of Keśava and the third of Śambhu.

Cf. *Pātañjalabhāṣya*, I, 34: कौष्ठ्यस्य वायोर्नासिकापुटाभ्यां प्रयत्नविशेषात् वमनं प्रच्छेदनं, विधारणं प्राणायामः । ताभ्यां वा मनसः स्थितिं सम्पादयेत् ।

2 Cf. *Paṭisambhidā-magga*, I, p. 177.

3 *Vism.*, pp. 274-7

4 Cf. *Pātañjalabhāṣya*, I, 50.

5 *Vism.*, p. 278

6 *Ibid.*, pp. 282-3. Cf. *Pātañjalabhāṣya*, I, 34.

7 *Vism.*, p. 285.

and characteristics (*lakkhana*) one destroys the five *nīvaraṇas* and develops the *jhānas*.¹

(x) The last of the *anussatis* is *Upasamānussati* or cogitation of Nibbāna. The adept as usual is to retire to a lonely place and think of the fact that the absence of attachment (*virāga*) is the best of all *dhammas*, constituted and unconstituted. He thereby develops concentration of mind and the *jhānas*.

4. Four Brahmavihāras or States of mental purity

The four Brahmavihāras are (i) amity, (ii) compassion, (iii) sympathetic joy (iv) and equanimity (*mettā*, *karuṇā*, *muditā* and *upekkhā*).² These are so called because they make the minds of the adepts pure like those of the Brahmakāyikā gods and after death they are reborn in the highest plane of existence.³

(i) The adept desirous of practising amity (*mettā-bhāvanā*) should take his seat in a secluded place after he has finished his meal and realise the evils of hateful mind (*dosa-citta*) and merits of forbearance (*khanti*), for by *mettā-bhāvanā*, hatred is removed and forbearance developed.

The first step in *mettā-bhāvanā* is to select the person upon whom the adept is to cast a friendly eye but at the same time keeping his mind free from attachment (*rāga*) and such other feelings. After pointing out the various difficulties in selecting the person, it is suggested that *mettā*-feeling should be first exercised in connection with one's own self, i.e., wish for one's own good and then wish for the good of his spiritual preceptor and then of the next closer to him. In this

1 *Ibid.*, p. 286.

2 Cf. *Pātañjala*, III, 23, and *Bhāṣya*, I. 33: तत्र सर्वप्राणिषु सुखसम्मोगापन्नेषु मैत्रीं भावयेत् दुःखितेषु करुणां पुण्यात्मकेषु मुदितां, अपुण्यात्मकेषु उपेक्षाम् । एवमस्य भावयतः शुक्लो धर्म उपजायते । ततश्च चित्तं प्रसीदति, प्रसन्नमेकाग्रं स्थितिपदं लभते ॥

3 *Vism.*, p. 320.

way he is to extend his range, including ultimately his enemies, after having completely destroyed his inimical feeling (*paṭigha*), if any. He is to extend his scope from the inmates of his own monastery (*āvāsa*) to those of another and so on, to nine or ten monasteries, and then to the inhabitants of a village, town and so forth up to a *cakkavāḷa*.¹ The next step for him is, to break down the line of demarcation (*sīmā-sambheda*) between any two persons, i. e., his feeling of love towards himself, his friends, his enemies or neutrals should be absolutely without any distinction. As for instance, if a man wants to kill his enemy, he must not say that the life of the enemy be spared and that of the man be taken instead; it will not be then *sīmā-asambheda*. To him there should be no distinction between a man and his enemy, and it is this state of mind that, *mettā-bhāvanā* is expected to produce. As soon as *sīmā-asambheda* is developed he has the necessary *nimitta*, *upacāra* and *appanā* and he soon acquires the four *jhānas*.²

In the Nikāyas, the usual statement is that the adept exercises the *mettā*-feelings towards all beings in all the directions one after another. This is possible only after the adept has gone through the procedure described above.

(ii) In *karuṇā-bhāvanā* (practice of compassion) also, the adept is to choose a suitable object of compassion. e. g., an indigent person begging for alms or a criminal when being taken to the place of punishment and so forth. Gradually, he is to extend his range for compassion, including ultimately his enemies, after removing hatred (*paṭigha*), if any. Like *mettā-bhāvanā*, he is to practise *sīmā-asambheda* and develop *nimitta*, *upacāra*, *appanā* and the *jhānas*.

(iii) In *muditā-bhāvanā* (practice of appreciating other's success) the adept is to have a feeling of joy at another's

1 *Vism.*, p. 320.

2 *Vism.*, p. 307.

happiness (*muditā*). The best way to start is with a close friend (*atippiyasahāyako*) of the adept and then with other persons, who may be selected one after another and ultimately his enemy. The remaining process is the same as that of *mettā-bhāvanā*.

(iv) *Upekkhā-bhāvanā* (practice of equanimity) is generally taken up by an adept who has perfected himself in the previous three *bhāvanās* and acquired the *jhānas*. In the *jhānas* too, there are the feelings of pleasure (*pīti*) and detachment (*virāga*), which being akin to fondness (*anunaya*) and hatred (*paṭigha*), have to be eschewed in *upekkhā-bhāvanā*.

In practising *upekkhā-bhāvanā* it is suggested that the person to be selected for the exercise of the feeling of equanimity should be a neutral one and then a friend, and then an enemy. Like *mettā-bhāvanā*, in *upekkhā* too, the *sīmā-asambheda* is to be observed, developing ultimately the *jhānas*.

5. Four *Āruppas* or *Samāpattis*

The *Kammaṭṭhānas* that we have dealt with so far are meant to induce the first four *jhānas*, which keep the mind of the adept within the limits of *Rūpaloka*. The subjects of meditation that we propose to treat now induce the higher *jhānas* from the fifth to the eighth, usually called *Samāpattis*, and carry the mind of the adept to the region of *Arūpaloka*.

(i) The first subject of meditation of the *Āruppas* is unlimited space (*ākāsānañcāyatana* = *ananta-ākāśāyatana*). It starts with *ākāsakaṣiṇa* as dealt with above¹ with the difference that space (*ākāsa*) in this case is unlimited extending over the whole *cakkavāḷa*. So long the conception of *ākāsa* is associated with *cakkavāḷa*, though it is unlimited, the adept does not go beyond the *Rūpaloka*. The adept is to think constantly of unlimited space (*ananta-ākāsa*), but without any reference to the *ākāsa* as extending over

1 See ante, p. 168-9.

a *cakkavāḷa* or so forth. In short, his mind is to be severed from all conceptions of objects (*sabbaso rūpasaññānaṃ samatikkamā*),¹ and hence freed from the possibility of the sense of distinction (*nānatta-saññā*). By constantly meditating over this *nimitta*, he destroys the *nīvaraṇas*,² develops mindfulness (*sati*) and concentrates his mind by means of *upacāra*,³ etc. and attains the fifth *jhāna*.

(ii) The second subject of meditation of the *Ārūppas* is unlimited consciousness (*viññāṇānañcāyatana*=*ananta-viññānāyatana*). This is closely connected with the previous subject of meditation and at the same time a step in advance. In the *ākāsānañcāyatana* meditation, the adept's mind is not without some notion of location (*deśa*). This is considered as faulty and the adept seeks to withdraw his mind from the sense of location and confines his attention to the concept⁴ (*viññāṇa*) of *ananta-ākāsa* and cogitates on *ananta-viññāṇa* only and develops as usual the *jhānas*, reaching the sixth *jhāna*.

(iii) The third subject of meditation of the *Ārūppas* is nothingness (*ākiñcaññāyatana*=*n'atthi kiñci iti āyatana* or *nāssa kiñcanan ti akiñcanam, akiñcanassa bhāvo ākiñcaññam*). In this case the adept withdraws his mind from the concept (*viññāṇa*) of *ananta-ākāsa*, and cogitates on voidness or absence of concept (*viññāṇa*) and everything else (*n'atthi n'atthi ti vā suññam suññan ti vā vivittam vivittan ti vā*). By such cogitation, his mind realises the non-existence of *viññāṇa* and thus gradually develops the seventh *jhāna*, the *jhāna* of nothingness.

(iv) The fourth subject of meditation of the *Ārūppas* is said to be neither perception nor non-perception (*n'evasaññā-*

1 *Rūpasaññā*=*Paṭigha-saññā*, because by *paṭighāta* (contact) of object and eyes arises *rūpasaññā*. See *Vism.*, p. 329.

2 See above, p. 166, fn. 3.

3 *Vism.*, p. 328.

4 *Pavatta-viññāṇa*=consciousness that has arisen in an adept's mind by concentrating his mind on *ananta-ākāsa*.

nāsaññāyatana = *naivasamjñā-nāsamjñāyatana*), but in fact, the mental state of *n'evasaññānāsaññā* is derived by cogitation of *ākiñcaññāyatana*, i.e., absence (*abhāva*) of concept (*viññāṇa*) which is derived from perception (*saññā*). In the seventh *jhāna*, the meditator gradually gets rid of perception (*saññā*) of the four constituents (*rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saṅkhārā* and *viññāṇa*), but retains a perception (*saññā*) of extreme subtlety—the residuum of *saṅkhārā*. He cannot perceive ordinary things but he is not absolutely without perception. Hence the mental state of the meditator in the eighth *jhāna* is without perception of ordinary things (*n'eva saññā*) but not without the subtlest perception (*na asaññā*).

The last two Kammatthānas

The last two Kammatthānas are (i) *āhāre paṭikūlasaññā-bhāvanā* and (ii) *catudhātu-vavatthāna-bhāvanā*.

6. *Āhāre paṭikūlasaññā bhāvanā* (or meditation to develop aversion to food). The adept is to ponder over the evils associated with food. The evils may be of many kinds, e. g., botheration of going out for alms and seeking for it; performing the preliminaries when taking food; the unclean stomach which receives the food, indigestibility of food and so forth. By meditating over these evils, he gets rid of desire for food and gradually of all desires (*taṇhā*). He feels no attachment for his body, and thus attains the *sum-mum bonum* in this life.¹

7. *Catudhātu-vavatthāna-bhāvanā* (or the meditation to determine the four elements of the body). The adept, taking up this *kammatthāna*, examines the contents of his body under the four heads: earth, water, air and fire. He takes into consideration one by one his skin, flesh, sinews, marrow, kidney, bones etc.,² and examines their functions and then looks upon them as nothing but one of the four elements, and as such he regards them as mere

1 *Vism.*, pp. 341-7.

2 For details, see *Vism.*, pp. 358-67.

material objects (*acetana*), indeterminable (*avyākata*), substanceless (*suñña*), non-sentient (*nissatta*) and so forth. Such examination and cogitation make the adept realise the voidness (*suññatam*) of his self as also of the world. He can no longer perceive the existence of different beings. As soon as he develops this mental state, he attains the highest knowledge.¹

C. *Kalyāṇamitta or Spiritual Preceptor*

A monk, anxious to take up a subject for meditation, must, at first, choose a competent spiritual preceptor (*kalyāṇamitta*). He should try to find out one who has mastered the fourth and fifth *jhānas* and has thereby developed insight (*vipassanā*) into the truths of the universe, and has, in fact, become an Arhat, by destroying all the impurities (*āsavas*). Failing to get hold of such persons, he should seek for the next best in the descending scale,² thus:

- (i) an anāgāmi ;
 - (ii) a sakadāgāmi;
 - (iii) a sotāpanna ;
 - (iv) a puthujjana³ who practises the *jhānas* ;
 - (v-vii) a master of three or two or one piṭaka ;
 - (viii) a master of one nikāya with its aṭṭhakathā,
- and lastly, (ix) a lajjī (a man of self-restraint).

If the candidate finds a suitable preceptor in the monastery where he lives, it is well and good ; if not, he should proceed to the place where he may find his preceptor. On his way to, as also on his arrival at, his destination he must not be failing in the duties prescribed in the *Vinaya* (ii, 223) for a disciple (*antevāsika*), and he should reverentially and discreetly approach his preceptor, and apprise him of his intention of taking up a subject of meditation.

1 *Vism.*, pp. 347-70.

2 *Vism.*, pp. 98 ff.

3 By *puthujjana* (*prthag-jana*) is meant one who has not attained any one of the four fruits of sanctification.

Ö. *The Candidate*

The candidate should offer himself to his spiritual preceptor, saying that he is resolved to carry out his commands, and even if necessary, he would not hesitate to throw himself down a cliff or stop his respiration to death if his *kalyāṇa-mitta* wanted him to do so. A candidate with such resolution is not afraid of fearful lonely forests and readily listens to the admonitions of his preceptor.¹

He must possess the requisite intention (*ajjhāsayā*), viz., aversion to attachment, hatred and delusion (*rāga*, *dosa* and *moha*) as well as to house-hold life (*saṅganikā*) and all forms of existence in the world (*sabbabhavagatī*).² He should have ardent desire (*adhimutti*) for meditation and ultimately for Nibbāna.

When he approaches his preceptor for a *Kammaṭṭhāna*, he is to answer the questions, which will be put to him by his preceptor in order to ascertain the *Kammaṭṭhāna* that would suit him best. He is to receive his instructions and then ponder over them carefully.³

Anurūpa-vihāra : The suitability of the place for meditation should also be taken into consideration. The candidate should preferably dwell with his preceptor in the same monastery. Failing that, he should find out a suitable place not far from the abode of his preceptor, for he is to see him occasionally in order to correct himself about the practice of a *Kammaṭṭhāna*. Buddhaghosa enumerates eighteen kinds of places⁴ unsuitable for

1 *Vism.*, pp. 115-6.

2 The opposites of these respectively are *alobha*, *adosa*, *amoha* *nekkhamma*, *paviveka*, and *nissaraṇa*. See *Vism.*, p. 116.

3 *Vism.*, p. 117.

4 *Vism.*, pp. 118-122. The eighteen places are :

Mahāvāsaṃ navāvāsaṃ jarāvāsaṃ ca panthanim,
 Soṇḍim paṇṇaṃ ca, phalaṃ patthitam eva ca
 Nagaraṃ dāruṇā khettaṃ, visabhāgena paṭṭanaṃ
 Paccantasīmāsappāyaṃ, yattha mitto na labhati.

meditational purposes. The suitable place for meditation should fulfil the following conditions:

- (a) not far nor too close,
- (b) easy of access,
- (c) not crowded by day,
- (d) quiet at night, and
- (e) not exposed to mosquitoes, serpents, wind or sun.¹

About the suitability of the time for meditation, it is recommended that it should be after the monk has returned from his begging round and taken his mid-day meal.²

Determination of mental states : The first and foremost duty of the *Kalyāṇamitta* (spiritual preceptor) is to study the mental leanings of the candidate before he can prescribe his subject of meditation. It may be incidentally remarked that unless the perceptor is an Arhat or at least an Anāgāmi or a Sakadāgāmi, he cannot be expected to have acquired the higher powers (*abhiññā*) of knowing others' minds (*paracittañāṇa*) or of one's previous births (*pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇa*), which are indispensable for ascertaining properly the mental leanings of the candidate. For practical purposes, it is suggested that the spiritual preceptor should ascertain the leanings of the candidate by asking him what he likes and dislikes.³ A person's leanings should be ascertained by observing closely his movements (*iriyāpatha*), actions (*kicca*), food (*bhojana*), ways of looking at things (*dassana*),⁴ and lastly the qualities peculiar to him.

Buddhaghosa⁵ classifies the mental leanings of individuals under six classes, viz., (i) *rāga* (attachment), (ii) *dosa* (hatred), (iii) *moha* (delusion), (iv) *saddhā* (faith), (v) *buddhi* (intelligence) and (vi) *vitakka* (discursive thoughts). Class (i) has for its characteristics more of deceitfulness, pride, evil desires, ambition, discontentedness, fickleness etc. ; class (ii) has more of anger, hypocrisy, envy, miserliness etc. ;

1 *Vism.*, p. 122.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 123.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 107.

4 For details, see *Vism.*, pp. 104 ff.

5 *Vism.*, pp. 101 ff.

class (iii) has more of idleness, doubts, obstinacy, etc. ; class (iv) i.e. those with *saddhā* have the characteristics of being given more to charity, desire of seeing holy persons and hearing religious discourses, has joy, love of solitude, credulousness etc.; class (v) has amiability, friendship, moderation in food, mindfulness, watchfulness, emotion and exertion etc.; and class (vi) has propensity for discussion, love for frequenting societies, lack of keenness in application for good objects, unsteadiness, fondness for moving about, etc.

The above is only a very general classification, for Buddhaghosa points out the possibility of further analysis of mental leanings, e.g., those with *rāga* have a liking for evil deeds while those with *saddhā* for moral precepts and so forth; hence there is a commonness between these two classes, i.e. both have a strong feeling or earnestness for evil in one case and for good in the other. Thus, all the six classes admit of further analysis, and a closer discrimination should therefore be made for the prescription of the subjects of meditation.

Another interesting explanation is offered by Buddhaghosa regarding the first three classes. He says that a person's nature may be ascertained by knowing his previous lives, e.g., those who performed good deeds through *rāga* and were as a result born in heavens have in their present life proneness to *rāga*, while those who in their previous lives injured others in various ways and were as a result born in the hells or *nāga* worlds, develop in this existence a leaning towards *dosa*¹; similarly those, who were in their previous lives given to drinking and did not care for learning, have more of *moha*. Buddhaghosa gives another interesting explanation of these three classes of persons.² He says that those with *moha* have in their body more of the two elements, earth and water, while those with *dosa*¹ have more of fire and air, and those with *rāga* have all the four elements in due proportion.

Further information is furnished by him about the kind of

1 I. e. *dveṣa*.

2 *Vism.*, p. 103.

spot to be chosen for a candidate with a particular leaning, what should be the nature of his dress, bowl, begging places, food-givers, food, postures (*iriyāpathas*), and the colour of his subjects of meditation.¹

A selection is suggested from among the forty *kammaṭṭhānas* (subjects of meditation) according to the different mental leanings thus:²

MENTAL LEANINGS

KAMMAṬṬHĀNAS

For <i>rāgacarita</i> ,	the ten asubhas (unpleasant objects) and kāyagatā sati (mindfulness about body);
„ <i>dosacarita</i> ,	the four brahmavihāras and four colours (<i>vaṇṇakasiṇāni</i>);
„ <i>mohacarita</i> and	only ānāpāna-sati (mindfulness about in- halation and exhalation);
„ <i>vitakkacarita</i> ,	
„ <i>saddhācarita</i> ,	the six kinds of anussati (see above p. 171);
„ <i>buddhīcarita</i> ,	marāṇasati, upasamānussati, catudhātu- vavatthāna and āhāre paṭikūlasaññā.

It is not possible to deal comprehensively with all the mental states in any treatise, but the above exposition makes it clear that the choice of the subjects of meditation was given a very important place in the code of Buddhist meditational practices. Buddhaghosa, however, admits that there is neither any original treatise (Pāli) nor any commentary (*aṭṭhakathā*) which deals with the mental leanings of a candidate

1 See for details *Vism.*, pp. 108 ff.

2 *Vism.*, p. 114; *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha*, p. 41-2. Cf. *Udāna*, iv. 1:

asubhā	bhāvetabbā	rāgassa	pahānāya
mettā	„	vyāpādassa	„
ānāpānasati	„	vitakka-upacchedāya	
aniccasaññā	„	asmimānassa samugghātāya	

and what has been said above was gleaned by him from the oral instructions of teachers.¹

The Preliminaries

In the *Visuddhimagga*, a few details are lacking about the preliminaries that a candidate has to go through before he commences his meditational exercises. These are to be found in the *Yogāvacara's Manual*.

The candidate first salutes the Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha by uttering the usual formulæ with the belief that this not only makes him meritorious but also removes many of the hindrances to meditation.²

Then he prays for happiness for all beings including his friends and relatives and at the same time wishes that Māra be kept away from him so that he may succeed in his mission.

He then utters the formula of confession, praying that he may be absolved of all sins that he might have committed knowingly or unknowingly.

He now promises to abide by the teachings of the omniscient Gotama and prays for *uggaha-nimitta*, *paṭibhāga-nimitta*, *upacāra-vidhi*, and *appanā-samādhi*.³ To infuse confidence into his mind he thinks of those of Buddha's disciples, who had before him followed this path and succeeded in attaining their object, and resolves that he will likewise with the help of his teacher, succeed in reaching the goal, Nibbāna.

He now sits cross-legged keeping his body erect and fixes his mind on the subject of meditation (*kammaṭṭhāna*).⁴

1 *Vism.*, p. 107. See *Tittha-jātaka* (Vol. I), in which Buddha changed an *asubha* object of meditation of an adept into a *subha* (a flower), in accordance with his mental leaning.

2 *Yogāvacara's Manual*, p. 3:

Icevāṃ accanta namassaneyyaṃ, namassamāno ratanattayaṃ yaṃ.
Puññābhisandaṃ vipulaṃ aladdhaṃ, tassānubhāvena hatantarāyo.

3 See *Infra*, p. 185f.

4 The *Yogāvacara's Manual* does not treat the subject systematically as has been supposed by Dr. Rhys Davids. It contains just an

E. THE SUCCESSIVE STEPS IN MEDITATION

I. *Upacāra*¹ (*Preparatory to abstraction*)

We have spoken of the various objects of meditation on which the adept fixes his attention, trying all the while to convert it into a concept as clear and distinct as the object he sees with open eyes. The first attempts that he makes at the fixation of his mind on the object of meditation which is termed *parikamma-nimitta* (=aid for abstraction) are called *parikamma-bhāvanā*. When the adept has been able to see the object in his own mind as vividly as he has been doing with eyes open, he is said to have acquired the mental image i.e. concept (*uggaha-nimitta*).² The attempts that are now being made by the adept to make the concept not only clearer and brighter than the actual object as seen by his physical eyes but free from the characteristics (*lakkaṇas*) of colour, form, size, etc., which are treated as meditational laches (*kaṣiṇa*-defects) are known as preparatory abstraction (*upacāra-bhāvanā*). Even at this stage the mind of the adept cannot be steady in concentration; it is like a child unable to stand though making attempts to stand on his legs. The brighter concept, which he now possesses though intermittently, is called reflex image (*paṭibhāga-nimitta*).³ It is exceedingly difficult to make the *paṭibhāga-nimitta* steady and this is not possible for an adept so long he is in the *upacāra* stage. He will now have to exert to pass from preparatory abstraction, which is unsteady, to actual abstraction, which must be steady (i. e. from *upacāra* to *appanā*).

He has got to be very particular about the selection of his dwelling abode (*āvāsa*), places from which to collect alms (*gocara*), improper talks (*bhassa*), associates (*puggala*), food enumeration, like all other Buddhist texts, of the different mental states and objects of meditation, connected with the four *jhānas*.

1 It literally means that the mind of the meditator moves around the object of meditation.

2 *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha*. p. 42

3 *Vism.*, p. 125.

(*bhojana*), seasonal food (*utu*) and postures in which he should pass his time (*iriyāpathas*).¹

II. *Appanā*² (*Abstraction*)

The stage next to *upacāra* is *appanā* in which the adept's power of concentration becomes strong and steady, his mind being likened to a grown up man able to stand on his legs as long as he likes. In the *appanā* stage, the adept can fix his attention on the subject of meditation one whole day or one whole night.³ It is not possible to maintain the concept (*paṭi-bhāga-nimitta*) for any length of time unless the adept reaches the *appanā* stage. It sometimes happens that the adept becomes over-energetic and thereby gets excited and fails to attain the firmness of *appanā* state. As a reaction to it, sometimes it so happens that he gets dejected, his energy slackens and his mind drifts to slothfulness. It is therefore advised that the adept should neither be over-energetic nor slack in directing his mind towards the object of meditation (*nimitta*). It is by maintaining the balance of mental energy that an adept easily obtains *appanā*.⁴

1 *Vism.*, pp. 127-8.

2 It literally means placing or fixing (*arpaṇa*) of mind on the object of meditation.

3 *Vism.*, p. 126.

4 See *Vism.*, p. 137. The ten ways and means for passing from the *upacāra* to the *appanā* stage are enumerated as follows:

- a. Cleanliness in regard to body and clothing.
- b. Equipose (*samabhāva*) of the faculties of faith (*saddhā*), energy (*virīya*), mindfulness (*sati*), concentration (*samādhi*) and knowledge (*paññā*).
- c. Proficiency in acquiring the concept (*nimitta*) and in maintaining it.
- d. Avoidance of mental slackness. This is to be done not by *passaddhi*, *samādhi* and *upekkhā sambojjhaṅgas*, but by *dhammavicaya*, *virīya* and *pīti sambojjhaṅgas*. The *dhammavicaya-sambojjhaṅga* helps the adept to choose those dhammas which put in him more and more of energy (i. e. *ārambha*, *nikkama* and *parakkama*). The *virīya-sambojjhaṅga* makes him remember the fact that it is by being energetic,

For the attainment of *appanā* state the adept stops his subliminal consciousness (*bhavaṅga citta*) and concentrates his mind on the object of meditation, which then becomes an object of mental reflection (*mano-dvārāvajjaṃ*). It is followed by the seven thought-moments (*sattakkhattuṃ javanaṃ javati*). It is in the fourth or the fifth moment that the *appanā* state of mind is developed.¹ It happens in a moment (*ekacittakkhaṇika*). Immediately after *appanā*, i.e., in the sixth or seventh moment reappears the subliminal consciousness (*bhavaṅgacitta*). The *appanā* state therefore refers to a certain mental development which the adept acquires in course of meditational practices. One who has developed that state is able to keep up the concept (*paṭibhāga-nimitta*) for a certain length of time and becomes

- them if he applies his energy and dismisses his slothfulness.
- persons have become great and that he can also be like
- The *pīti-sambojjhaṅga* leads the adept to practise the *anussatis* (see p. 171) and to associate with gentle persons to the exclusion of the vulgar and to reflect on Suttantas which produce serene pleasure (*pasāda*). These three *sambojjhaṅgas* help the adept to make his mind strong and energetic when necessary and protect his mind from becoming weak.
- e. Not allowing the mind to get excited (*uddhata*). This is done not by *dharmavicaya*, *virīya* and *pīti sambojjhaṅgas* but by *passaddhi* (tranquility), *samādhi* (concentration) and *upekkhā* (equanimity) *sambojjhaṅgas*.

Buddhaghosa enumerates the various ways and means, by which the *sambojjhaṅgas* are developed (*Vism.*, p. 134). Re: *Sambojjhaṅgas*, see *infra*.

- f. Toning up the mind. Sometimes the adept gets disheartened by failing to acquire the desired object, viz., knowledge or quietude. To get over such depression of mind, he is advised to remember things which would inspire his mind (*saṃvegavatthūni*), for enumeration of which, see *Vism.*, p. 135.
 - g. Developing equanimity.
 - h-i. Avoidance of persons not engaged in meditation and association with persons engaged in meditation; and
 - j. Strong desire for concentration of mind.
- 1 *Vism.*, pp. 137-8; *Abhi. S.*, p. 17-18.

fit for practising the *jhānas*. He is now a member of the family of meditators (*gotrabhū*).¹ By repeatedly meditating over the concept (*paṭibhāganimitta*), he can induce the first trance (*paṭhamajjhāna*).²

III. The First Trance

The conditions precedent to the attainment of the first trance are :

1. Dissociation from the attractive things of the world (*vatthukāma*)³ and from mental impurities (*kilesa-kāma*),⁴ like strong will (*chanda*), attachment (*rāga*), or the five hindrances (*nīvaraṇas*).
2. Directing (*abhiniropaṇa*) the mind to the object of meditation.⁵ It is compared to the spreading of wings when the bird is about to fly up.
3. Roaming of the mind on the object of meditation⁶. It is compared to the turning round of the bees on the top of a lotus (*anuppabandhana*).⁷
4. Derivation of mental and physical pleasure (*pīnaṇa*) by the removal of hindrances (*nīvaraṇas*), followed by its enjoyment (*anubrūhaṇa*).⁸ and lastly,
5. Concentration of mind (*ekaggatā*).

1 *Vism.*, pp. 138-139; *Atthasālini*, pp. 164 ff.

2 *Abhi. S.*, pp. 42-43: Tato param tam eva paṭibhāgamittam upacārasamādhinā samasevantassa rūpāvacara-paṭhamajjhānam appeti.

3 *vivicc'eva kāmehi.*

4 *vivicca akusalehi dhammehi.*

5 It is *savitakka*.

6 It is *savicāra*.

7 In the *Dukanipātaṭṭhakathā* (see *Vism.*, p. 142), the simile given of *vitakka* and *vicāra* is as follows :

The bird's act of flying by resting on its wings in the air is compared to the adept's placing the mind on the object of meditation (*savitakka*) while its actual flying by moving its wings is compared to the adept's thoughts going deep into the object of meditation (*savicāra*).

Another simile of *vitakka* and *vicāra* is as follows: firm grasping of a dirty bowl by one hand is *vitakka*, while the act of cleansing it by the other hand is *vicāra*.

8 *Vivekajaṃ pītisukhaṃ: iṭṭhārammaṇapaṭilābhatuṭṭhi, pīti, paṭiladdharasānubhavanam sukham.* For distinction between *pīti* and *sukha*, see *Vism.*, p. 145.

The first trance, in short, is composed of five parts (*aṅgas*), viz., discursive cogitation, determination, joy, pleasure and concentration (*vitakka*, *vicāra*, *pīti*, *sukha* and *cittekaggatā*),¹ and leads to (i) purity in the modes of progress (*paṭipadā-visuddhi*), by the elimination of desires and impure mental states (*kāma* and *akusala-dhamma*), (ii) development of equanimity (*upekkhānubrūhaṇa*) on account of the mind becoming pure, calm and concentrated on the subject, and (iii) mental thrill (*sampahaṃsana*) obtained by bringing into being the mental states as described above and by making all the faculties (*indriyas*) perform one function.

The adept, who has once obtained the first trance, should repeat it, and for the sake of doing it, he should choose the same food, place of residence, companions, etc. as he had when he had first developed it. He should be very careful about the hindrances which might spoil his attained fruit. He should now try to enlarge the concept (*paṭibhāga-nimitta*), i.e., if his *paṭibhāga-nimitta* be that of a small piece of land, it should be increased gradually to that of a village, a town, a province, a kingdom, the world and so on. He should also constantly practise *āvajjana* (adverting to trance), *samāpajjana* (entering into trance), *adhiṭṭhāna* (maintaining the trance), *vuṭṭhāna* (rising from the trance) and *paccavekkhaṇa* (introspection).²

IV. The Second Trance

The psychological conditions relating to the second trance are indicated as follows:

1. Cessation of discursive thoughts and determination (*vitakka* and *vicāra*),³ which are concomitants of the first trance. In the second trance, the object of

1 *paṭhamam jhānam upasampajja viharati.*

2 *Vism.*, p. 154; *Atthas.*, p. 169 ff.

3 *Vitakkavicārānam vūpasamo.*

meditation becomes a part and parcel of the mind (*aṅgapātubhāva*), and the physical sensations are no longer external and gross but purely internal and subtle.

2. Attainment of inward calmness and concentration of thoughts on one object (free from *vitakka* and *vicāra*).¹ Calmness (*sampasādana*) is attained by the development of faith (*saddhā*). In the first trance, *saddhā* is present, but it does not produce complete calmness on account of the presence of *vitakka* and *vicāra*. In the second trance, *saddhā* becomes stronger, tranquillizes the mind completely, and leads to complete concentration of thoughts.
3. Total removal of *vitakka* and *vicāra*.² On account of full concentration of mind, the sense-organs (*indriyas*) remain impervious to both inward and outward sensations and as such there is not the remote possibility of the appearance of *vitakka* and *vicāra*.
4. Derivation of pleasure (*pīti*) and pleasant feeling (*sukha*),³ through concentration of mind (*samādhija*) and lastly,
5. Full concentration of mind (*cittekaggatā*).

Like the first trance, the adept should repeat the second trance. He gradually realises that pleasure (*pīti*) also is a source of disturbance to mental tranquility and he should now get rid of it in order to reach the third trance.

V. The Third Trance

The conditions for inducing the third trance are that the adept should be (i) *upekkhako*, (ii) *satimā*, and (iii) *sukha-vihārī*.

- (i) By *upekkhako*, is meant that the mind of the adept

1 *ajjhataṃ sampasādanaṃ cetaso ekodibhāvaṃ*. In the *Vibhaṅga*, “*ajjhataṃ*” is explained as “*paccattaṃ* (= skt. *pratyātma*)” “self-realised”. Cf. *Atthas.*, p. 169.

2 *avitakkaṃ avicāraṃ*.

3 *samādhijaṃ pītisukhaṃ*.

should be unaffected either by pleasure (*pīti*) or displeasure (*virāga*),¹ i.e., his mind must not be perturbed by thoughts of impermanence, painfulness, and soul-less-ness (*anicca*, *dukkha* and *anattā*) and at the same time it should be passive (*anābhoga*) and inactive (*avyāpāra*);

(ii) By *satimā*, is meant that the adept should closely observe what is passing within and outside his mind and body and at the same time be cognizant of the various mental conditions concomitant to the second trance without any delusion (*asammoha*). These two factors, mindfulness and diligence (*sati* and *sampajāna*), are required in *upacāra* and *appanā*: so the reason shown for mentioning it in connection with the third trance is that *sati* and *sampajāna* are necessary in this trance also for keeping the mind away from *pīti* and *sukha* acquired by the adept in the preceding trance.

(iii) By *sukhavihārī*, is meant that though the adept's mind is unaffected by pleasant feeling (*sukha*) while in meditation, his body is pervaded by a feeling of ease which he realises only he has arisen from the trance.²

Constant practice of this meditation makes the adept firm in this trance and he can now proceed to the fourth.

VI. The Fourth Trance

In the fourth trance, no new mental factors are acquired or got rid of by the adept. This trance is more or less the resultant of the first three. The mental states described in connection with this trance are as follows:

- (i) free from physical pain or happiness (*sukhassa ca pahāna dukkhassa ca pahāna*);
- (ii) free from mental pain or happiness (*somanassado-manassānam atthaṅgama*);

¹ *pītiyā ca virāgā upekkhako*. For ten forms of *upekkhā*, see *Vism.*, p. 160; *Atthas.*, p. 172.

² *Sukhañ ca kāyena paṭisaṃvedeti*.

[These two states are acquired by the adept in the preliminary stage (*upacāra*) of meditation;¹ only *somanassa* and *domanassa* are completely eradicated in the fourth *jhāna*].

(iii) *adukkhamasukhaṃ*, i.e., the adept must get rid of attachment and aversion (*rāga* and *dosa*),² as the former is the source of pleasure (*sukha*) and the latter of displeasure (*dukkha*).

(iv) *upekkhā satipārisuddhiṃ* i.e., mindfulness and other mental states reach the purest state through equanimity (*upekkhā*). In this trance when all the obstructing factors to higher meditation have subsided, mindfulness (*sati*) and other factors conducive to the fourth trance become pure and serene.

It should be noted that all these four trances³ are induced by meditating on the various *Kammaṭṭhānas* detailed above. In every trance, the adept has to take up the *Kammaṭṭhānas*, say, *paṭhavī*, induce *upacāra* and *appanā*, and then he easily develops the first trance and passes on to the second. Similarly, in the case of the third and fourth also, the adept has to induce *upacāra* and *appanā* with *paṭhavī*, pass through the first and second trances to reach the third and fourth.

After the fourth *jhāna*, the adept attains emancipation through mental purification (*cetovimutti*).⁴

There are four higher trances called *Samāpattis*. These trances are induced by the cogitation of the four *āruppas* (for details, see above, p. 176f).

1 For details, see *Vism.*, pp. 166-7; *Atthas.*, p. 177.

2 See *ante* p. 181-2: mental states of candidates for meditation.

3 By splitting up the second trance into two, four trances are sometimes spoken of as five in number. See *Vism.*, p. 169.

4 *Atthas.*, p. 177.

CHAPTER IX

The Constituents of a Being

Samkhata(=Saṃskṛta)

The third or the final step of the *Majjhimā paṭipadā* is the acquisition of knowledge (*paññā*), in other words, *sammādiṭṭhi* or the true view of the worldly objects. According to the Buddhists, the true view is that the five masses of elements (*khandhas*), which constitute the world, are without any substance (*anatta*), impermanent (*anicca*), and so instead of being a source of happiness they are really causes of grief (*dukkha*). This view of the constituted world can be obtained after a long course of physical discipline and mental training, and a close study of the *Nikāyas*, which offer an analysis of the constituents and show that they have only a fleeting existence. The aim of the *Nikāya* literature, therefore, is to clear up the blurred vision of its students about the real nature of the worldly phenomena. As it is not feasible nor desirable to place the highest (*paramattha*) truth all at once before the eyes of a beginner, it starts with an analysis and examination of the worldly objects, how they originate (*samudaya*) and decay (*nirodha*), and the ways and means (*magga*) by which their final decay is effected. Of these four processes,² the first two, *dukkha* and *samudaya*, are concerned with objects which are not real in the highest sense, so these two should be treated as conventional (*sammuti*=*saṃvṛti*) truths, and for this reason, in the *Adhidharmakośa*, they are called *samalā prajñā* (non-immaculate knowledge). The other two, *nirodha* and *magga*, are, according to the same text, *amalā prajñā*

1 For the traditional exposition of the *ariyasaccas*, see above, p. 137f.

2 See *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 206-7.

(immaculate knowledge) inasmuch as these are related to the highest truth. The *Nikāyas* are primarily concerned with the conventional truths (*sammuti*) and secondarily with the highest truth (*paramattha*), which is actually a matter of inner realization. The process of intellectual culture in Buddhism, therefore, consists in realising the highest truth, *nirodha*, by following the *magga* and the comprehension of the worldly truths, *dukkha* and *samudaya*. By *dukkha* are meant the (i) the world and its constituents, viz., *khaṇḍhas*, *dhātus*, *āyatanas*, *indriyas* and so forth, and by *samudaya* is meant mainly the law of causation (*paṭiccasamuppāda*).

The world or the three spheres of existence

Lokadhātu: According to the Buddhist cosmology, the universe is composed of ever expanding millions of worlds, of which the Earth is one and is referred to in the texts as *Sahā lokadhātu* and its ruler, the lord of gods, Indra, is known as the *Sahāmpati*. In the *Dīgha Nikāya*¹ Buddha tells Ānanda that the great earth (*mahā paṭhavī*) rests on water, water on air, and air on space (*ākāsa*). In another text Buddha repeats this with the addition that space (*ākāsa*) is without any support and asked his enquirer not to go beyond it.² The *Vaibhāṣikas* infer from this statement of Buddha that there is the real existence of *Ākāśa*.

On this Earth live three or four types of beings in three spheres, viz., *Kāmadhātu*, *Rūpadhātu*

1 *Dīgha*, II, p. 107; *Milinda*, p. 68.

2 *AKV*. i. 5 (p. 17): उक्तं हि भगवता । पृथिवी भो गौतम क प्रतिष्ठिता । पृथिवी ब्राह्मण अम्भण्डले प्रतिष्ठिता । अम्भण्डलं भो गौतम क प्रतिष्ठितम् । वायौ प्रतिष्ठितम् । वायुर्भो गौतम क प्रतिष्ठितः । आकाशे प्रतिष्ठितः । आकाशं भो गौतम कुतः प्रतिष्ठितम् । अतिसरसि ब्राह्मण अतिसरसि महाब्राह्मण । आकाशं ब्राह्मण अप्रतिष्ठितमनालम्बनमिति विस्तरः । तस्मादस्ति आकाशमिति वैभाषिकाः ।

and *A r ū p a d h ā t u*. The three *dhātus* or spheres are not to be conceived as three different physical strata, one above the other, or one different from another. Their difference consists in their living beings having different mental and physical constituents. The living beings of the same plane of existence can only see one another.¹ The only place of abode of all the three types of beings is the *Kāmadhātu*, in which dwell also the higher beings of the *Rūpadhātu* and the *Arūpadhātu*. The beings of the *Kāmadhātu* and the *Rūpadhātu* possess all the five constituents (*khandhas*). The former depend for their origin on gross material food and sexual propensities, both of which produce the desire (*kāma*) for worldly pleasures.² In the *Kāmadhātu* live all hellish beings, spirits, human beings, animals, birds, insects, etc. and six kinds of heavenly beings.³

The beings of the *Rūpadhātu* are mentally and physically superior to those of the *Kāmadhātu*. Though they are constituted of the five *khandhas*, they originate out of attachment to *rūpa* (material objects) and not out of gross desires (*kāma*). The beings of this *Dhātu* are sub-divided into seventeen categories, usually described as dwelling in seventeen heavens.⁴ It

1 *AKV.*, i. 46-47; Cf. *Vism.*, p. 392: miracle of lokavivaraṇaṃ.

2 *AKV.*, iii, p. 6: कवडीकाराहारमैथुनोपसंहितो राग इति ।

3 *Kośa.* iii. 1: नरकप्रेततिर्यञ्चो मानुषाः षड् दिवौकसः । कामधातुः... । Cf. *Atthasālinī*, p. 62; *Mahāvvyutpatti* 156: भौमाः, आन्तरीक्षवासिनः, चातुर्महाराजकायिकाः, द्वायस्त्रिंशाः, यामाः, तुषिताः, निर्माणरतयः, परनिर्मितवशवर्तिनः ।

4 *Kośa*, iii. 2, 12: ऊर्ध्वं सप्तदशस्थानो रूपधातुः ।

(i) ब्रह्मकायिकाः ; ब्रह्मपुरोहिताः ; महाब्रह्माणः corresponding to the first dhyāna.

(ii) परोत्तामाः, अप्रमाणाभाः, आभास्वराः corresponding to the second dhyāna.

(iii) परीत्तशुभाः, अप्रमाणशुभाः, शुभकृत्स्नाः corresponding to the third dhyāna.

(iv) (a) अनभ्रकाः, पुण्यप्रसवाः, बृहत्फलाः, (b) अत्रहाः, अतपाः,

is believed that the beings of this Dhātu were in their previous existence human beings, who perfected themselves in one of the first four stages of meditation (*jhāna*) and developed a mental state which was similar in character to that of the denizens of the various heavens. After death, they were reborn as gods in the Rūpadhātu, having very probably astral bodies.

The Arūpadhātu also is not a sphere apart from the Kāmadhātu. The beings of this dhātu, however, are constituted of *Nāma* only i.e. mind-continuum (*Citta-santati*) and vitality (*Jivītendriya*), which are the resultant of *karmaic* effects. As, according to the Buddhist philosophy, mind can never be supportless (*anālambana*), we have to assume that their bodies are made of such fine and minute material elements, earth, water, air and fire, that these are not to be regarded as gross matter. The beings are described as matterless (*arūpa*) though they are not strictly so. Their bodies being mostly mental are limitless and as such interpenetrate one another, and so it is said that Arūpa beings have no location.¹ They are not wholly free from attachment (*vītarāga*) and so the cause of their origin is their attachment to the higher forms of meditation (*samāpatti*). Before death they were also human beings or gods, who had developed through meditation mental states similar to those of the beings of the Arūpadhātu,² and as such they were reborn in the Arūpadhātu.

There is a fourth Dhātu, which may be called Apariyāpanna (i.e. not included in the three dhātus) or Lokuttara (super-

सुदृशाः, सुदर्शनाः, अकनिष्ठाः (= शुद्धावासकायिकाः) reserved for Anāgāmins only —all the seven corresponding to the fourth dhyāna.

1 *Kośa*, iii 3: आरूप्यधातुरस्थान उपपत्त्या चतुर्विधाः ।

2 The terms for meditations and for heavenly spheres are identical: आकाशानन्त्यायतनम्, विज्ञानानन्त्यायतनम्, आकिञ्चन्यायतनम्, नैवसंज्ञानासंज्ञायतनम् । See above, p. 176f.

worldly). The beings of this dhātu, though dwelling in Kāma, Rūpa or Arūpa dhātus, are classified separately on account of their spiritual attainments leading to perfection. All beings, mortal or divine, who have attained one or more of the eight fruits of sanctification¹ are recognised as Ariyas as distinguished from common persons (puthujjanas). All sotāpannas, sakadāgāmis, anāgāmis and arhats are to be distinguished as beings of the Apariyāpanna or Lokuttara dhātu. The Anāgāmis actually belong to Rūpadhātu but all the other three are usually mortal beings of the Kāmadhātu.

The five constituents (khandhas)

The world of beings and inanimate objects are described as *saṃskṛta* on account of their being constituted of some elements, as distinguished from *Nirvāṇa* the *Asaṃskṛta* (the unconstituted). The constituted elements are put under two heads: *nāma* and *rūpa*, *nāma* denoting the non-material or mental constituents of a being while *rūpa* the material only. All inanimate objects therefore are included in the term *rūpa*. *Nāma* is analysed into four mental states: *vedanā* (feeling), *saññā* (perception), *saṅkhārā* (resultant impressions produced through *karma*) and *viññāṇa* (knowledge derived through the organs of sense). The four subdivisions of *nāma* with the fifth the *rūpa* are termed *Pañcakkhandhā*.

The term *khandha* or *skandha* means heap, mass (*rāśi*). Theoretically, the five *khandhas* in their original state cannot be impure since they are not associated with the three impurities (*kleśas*), viz., attachment (*rāga*), aversion (*dveṣa*) and delusion (*moha*). It is only when out of the *khandhas* a being is constituted then they are distinguished as *Upādānak-khandhas*, which being afflicted with the three above-mentioned impurities can no longer remain pure.

According to the early Buddhists every being is a composite of five *khandhas* (or groups of elements), without a sixth the *Puggala* or *Attā* (=soul).

1 See Infra.

The traditional interpretation of the five *khandhaṣ* (*skandhas*) as given in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, *Vibhaṅga*, Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga* and Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* is as follows:

Rūpakkhandha denotes the four elements: earth (*paṭhavi*), water (*āpo*), fire (*tejo*) and air (*vāyu*), including all that is formed out of these four.¹ It comprises all the material objects whether of the past, present or future, internal or external, gross or subtle, near or distant, good or bad. By past *rūpa* is meant the matter that has undergone change; by future, the matter which will come into existence; and by the present, the matter which is existing at the present moment. By internal *rūpa* are meant the flesh, bone and such other constituents of one's body made out of the four great elements (*mahābhūtas*) and by external, the same of bodies other than one's own. By gross and near *rūpa* are meant the five organs of sense and the sense-objects² while by subtle and distant *rūpa*, the masculinity (*purisindriya*) and femininity (*itthindriya*), vitality (*jīvitendriya*: as water is to the lotus, so is vitality to the *rūpa*),³ the seat of mental faculties (*hadaya*), the faculty of intimation by means of physical and vocal signs (*kāyaviññatti* and *vaciviññatti*), the space within and circumscribing the body (*ākāśadhātu*), the qualities⁴ which make the body light, soft and supple, growing, maintaining continuity and decaying as well as nutritive food (*kabaliṅkāra āhāra*). Hardness, humidity, heat and motion are the respective characteristics of the four great elements. Though each of these elements retains its characteristics they always remain together and cannot be separated from one another. As a *Rūpa-upādānaskandha* it connotes the five sense-organs (*indriya*) of a living being, their five

1 *Dh. S.* 584: *Cattāro ca mahābhūtā catunnañ ca mahābhūtānaṃ upādāya rūpaṃ—idaṃ vuccati sabbaṃ rūpaṃ.*

2 *Vism.*, p. 444: *cakkhu, sotam, ghānaṃ, jivhā, kāyo, rūpaṃ, saddo, gandho, raso and phoṭṭhabbo.* 3 See *Infra*.

4 *Vism.*, p. 444: *rūpassa lahutā, mudutā, kammaññatā, upacayo, santati. jaratā, and aniccatā.*

respective spheres (*āyatana*) and the five cognitions (*viññāna*, produced by the contact of the sense-organs with their objects). The fifteen items included in *Rūpaskandha* or *Rūpa-upādāna-skandha* are as follows:—

<i>Indriya or dhātu</i>	<i>Āyatana</i>	<i>Viññāna</i>
Cakṣu (eyes)	Rūpa (visible objects)	Cakṣurviññāna (visual cognition)
Śrotra (ears)	Śabda (sound)	Śrotraviññāna (auditory cognition)
Ghrāṇa (nose)	Gandha (odour)	Ghrāṇaviññāna (olfactory cognition)
Jihvā (tongue)	Rasa (taste)	Jihvaviññāna (gustatory cognition)
Kāya (body)	Spraṣṭavya (tangible)	Kāyaviññāna (tactual cognition)

Of these fifteen, ten (i.e. items of the 1st and 3rd columns) are internal (*ādhyātmika*) while the remaining five (items of the 2nd column) are external. By pointing out the sense-organs as internal, the *Abhidharmakośa* (i. 39) explains that these are faculties (e. g. *rūpaprasāda* etc.) ingrained in the physical eyes, ears, etc., which become operative only when there is application of the same to the object. The faculties constitute a person, an individual, and so they are internal (*ādhyātmika*).

The items of the second column are external because they are common to more than one person.

Vedanākkhandha connotes all that which one feels (*vedayitalakkhaṇam*).¹ Though it is by nature one, it is usually treat-

1 In the *Vibhaṅga*, *vedanā* and other *khandhas* are explained like *rūpa* as past, present and future, internal and external, gross and subtle, low and high. In *Vism.*, pp. 472-6 such classification is not given.

ed under three aspects: *kusala* (good), *akusala* (bad), and *avyākata* (neutral) and sometimes under five aspects, viz., *sukhaṃ* and *dukkhaṃ* when the object of contact is pleasant and unpleasant, *somanassaṃ* and *domanassaṃ* when the object of thought is pleasant and unpleasant, and lastly *upekkhā* when the object is neither pleasant nor unpleasant.

The feelings are different from the impulsive states of rejoicing and lamenting, and represent the state of feeling persisting in mind. These are also explained by some as not the growth and decay of mind and body but as products of a particular mental contact with a certain state of things.¹ The feelings are also classified as six, the first five being due to five sense-perceptions (*cakṣusaṃsparśa*, *śrotrasaṃsparśa*, etc.) and the sixth due to mental cognition (*manovijñāna*)².

Saññākkhandha is perception or determination (*parichitti*) of characteristics of an object (*nimittodgrahaṇātmika*), e.g., the colour blue of an object. It should be distinguished from the five or six cognitions (*cakṣuvijñāna*, etc.) inasmuch as *Saññā* depends only on mind (*manodhātu*), and appears after sense-perception. It perceives all those characteristics which make a thing known. Though it is by nature of one kind, it is, like the *vedanākkhandha*, treated as of three kinds, viz., *kusala* (good), *akusala* (bad) and *avyākata* (neutral), according to its association with *viññāṇa*, good, bad or indifferent. There cannot be any cognition (*viññāṇa*) without perception (*saññā*), hence it has as many subdivisions as *viññāṇa*. Its function is (i) to make a thing known through its characteristics, as a piece of wood is known to a carpenter; (2) to make the characteristics engage the attention of persons, as an elephant felt by the blind; and (3) to draw attention to the immediate function of an object, as animals know their supplier of grains as the food-giver. Like *Vedanākkhandha* it may also be classified as six, as above (*cakṣu-saṃjñā*, etc.).

1 AKV., I, p. 41

2 *Vedanāskandha* is to be distinguished from *Vedanendriya*.

Saṅkhārakkhandha denotes that aspect of mental state (*cetanā*),¹ the main characteristics of which is to bring together (*āyūhana* and *rāśikaraṇa*) two or more mental activities. It has the virtue of putting forward the mind into action,² and engaging it in the immediate object, and has for its proximate cause the three other *khandhas*, viz., *vedanā*, *saññā* and *viññāṇa*. Apparently, then, *saṅkhārā* mean the resultant mental state—the accumulated effect of the three other *khandhas* or mental functions. These three *khandhas* do not set the mind into action but leave it to *saṅkhārā* to do it. It is the impression left in the mind of a being by its five sense-perceptions, hence it is pointed out in the Pali texts as the collective term for the five volitions associated with *rūpa*, *śabda*, etc.³ It is different from other four *khandhas* inasmuch as its function is to reconstruct them, i.e., to determine their future form and quality; it serves also as the determining factor of future birth, old age and death, hence it conserves *karmaic* effects and gives rise to will, desire and such other mental functions. It is pervaded by desire (*vāsanā*=*abhyāṅga-snānānuvāsana-svabhāva*). It includes all mental states whether associated with, or dissociated

1 In the *Vibhaṅga* (p. 7) *saṅkhārā* are equated to *cetanā*, which arises out of contact of the sense-organs with their objects as does *vedanā* or *saññā* or *viññāṇa*.

2 AKV. V. 29: येऽनुशयाः ये च तत्सम्प्रयुक्ताश्चेतनादयो याश्चैषां वेदनादीनां सर्वेषां चैतसिकानां प्राप्तयो जातिजरास्थित्यनित्यताश्च विप्रयुक्ताः स संस्कारस्कन्धः ।

Samyutta, III, 87: saṁkhatam abhisamkharotīti, tasmā saṅkhārā ti vuccanti. Kiñ ca saṁkhatam abhisamkharonti? Rūpaṁ rūpattāya saṁkhatam abhisamkharonti vedanaṁ vedanattāya, etc. etc. Again *Samyutta*, v. 449: Jāti saṁvattanike pi saṁkhāre abhisamkharonti, jarā-saṁvattanike.....maraṇa-saṁvattanike....

3 *Samyutta*, III, p. 60: Katamā ca saṅkhārā? Chayime cetanakāyā; rūpasāñcetanā, saddasa., gandhasa., rasasa., phoṭṭhabhasa., dhammasāñcetanā see also *Vibhaṅga*, 144: *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, p. 64.

from, mind (*citta-samprayukta* and *citta-viprayukta*). It is used also in combination with other terms.¹

Viññāṇakkhandha connotes the five or six cognitions or perceptive knowledge (*prativijñapti*) that arises through the contact of sense-organs with their respective objects. It is that faculty by which a being becomes aware of things (*viñāṇana-lakkhaṇa*).² The six cognitions derive their name from the sense-organs and not from the objects, e g., visual knowledge is called *cakṣu-viññāna* and not *rūpa-viññāna* and likewise with the remaining four. It should however be noted that the sixth cognition is called *mano-viññāna* though *manas* is not a sense-organ nor it is different from *viññāna* but to maintain uniformity, *manas* is mentioned in the Buddhist texts along with the sense-organs. There is a subtle distinction between *manas* and *viññāna* inasmuch as the former appears immediately after the latter.³ It is also identical with *manodhātu* functioning only on what is past⁴ but this *manodhātu* is not the source or basis of *manovijñāna* as *cakṣu* is of *cakṣuvijñāna*. Incidentally, Yaśomitra, the commentator of the *Kośa*, points out that, according to the Yogācāra philosophy, *manodhātu* is something apart from the six cognitive faculties, while according to the Tāmraparṇīyas (i. e. the Theravādins of Ceylon), *manovijñāna* has its basis in the heart (*hṛdayavastu*)⁵ and it exists also in Arūpadhātu. *Manas* or

1 E.g., Saṃskāra-duḥkhatā (vi. 3, 125 Jap. ed. p. 516), Upekṣā-saṃskāra (*Kośa*, ii, 25; 159; viii, 148), Jīvita-saṃskāra, Āyu-saṃskāra, Vāk-saṃskāra (ii. 10, 33, 122, 174).

2 *Vism.*, p. 452; *Saṃyutta*, II, 94.

3 *AKV.*, I. 17: परणामनन्तरातीतं विज्ञानं यद्धि तन्मनः ।

4 *Ibid.* 12: यद् यत् समनन्तरं निरुद्धं विज्ञानं तत् मनोधातुरिति ।

5 *AKV.*, I. p. 45: योगाचारदर्शनेन तु षड्विज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तोऽन्यस्ति मनोधातुः । ताम्रपर्णीया अपि हृदयवस्तु मनोविज्ञानधातोराश्रयं कल्पयन्ति । तच्चारूप्यधातावपि विद्यत इति वर्णयन्ति

manodhātu ceases in Nirvāṇa without the last remnant (*nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa*) because it does not give rise to the mental state or desire for rebirth (*pratisandhi-citta*).¹

In Pali texts *Viññāṇa* is shown as a synonym of *citta* or *mano*. Though it is of one nature, it is usually treated as of three kinds, good (*kusala*), bad (*akusala*) and neutral (*avyākata*). Each of these three kinds of *Viññāṇa* again is subdivided according to the four spheres, in which the world of beings are divided viz., *kāmāvacaraviññāṇa*, *rūpāvacara-v.*, *arūpāvacara-v.*, and *lokuttara viññāṇa*.² In the *Kāmāvacara* sphere, good state of mind (*kusalaviññāṇa* or *citta*) is first divided into two categories, viz., accompanied with either (a) pleasure (*somanassa*) or (b) indifference (*upekkhā*), and then these two are analysed into eight kinds, according as they are associated with, or dissociated from, knowledge (*ñāṇa*) and persuasion (*saṅkhāra*) by others (e.g., in offering gifts).³ Likewise the *Rūpāvacara-kusala citta* is of five kinds in accordance with the mental states developed by a meditator as he rises gradually from the first to the fourth or fifth stage of meditation (*jhāna*).⁴ The *Arūpā-*

The Tāmraparṇīya view is corroborated in the *Visuddhimagga* (p. 447) in which it is stated that “Mano-dhātu manoviññāṇadhātūnaṃ nissaya-lakkhaṇaṃ hadayavatthu.”

1 AKV., I, p. 45.

2 See IHQ., XV: The Dhamma-saṅgaṇi.

3 A. *Kāmāvacara-kusalacitta* (eight kinds):—

1.	Somanassa-sahagataṃ	ñāṇa-sampayuttaṃ	asaṅkhāraṃ
2.	do	do	sasaṅkhāraṃ
3.	do	ñāṇa-vippayuttaṃ	asaṅkhāraṃ
4.	do	do	sasaṅkhāraṃ
5.	Upekkhā-sahagataṃ	ñāṇa-sampayuttaṃ	asaṅkhāraṃ
6.	do	do	sasaṅkhāraṃ
7.	do	ñāṇa-vippayuttaṃ	asaṅkhāraṃ
8.	do	do	sasaṅkhāraṃ

4 B. *Rūpāvacara-kusalacitta* (five kinds):—

1.	Savitakka-savicāra-pīti-sukha-samādhi-yuttaṃ
2.	Avitakka-savicāra as above
3.	Avitakka-avicāra as above
4.	„ viratta-pītika-samādhi-yuttaṃ
5.	„ atthaṅgatasukham upekkhāsamādhi-yuttaṃ

vacara-kusalacitta is similarly of four kinds, as the meditator rises from the fifth to the eighth *jhāna* called *Āruppasamāpattis*.¹ The *Lokuttara-kusala-citta* is said to be of four kinds as and when a person reaches one of the four stages of perfection (*maggas*), viz., *sotāpatti*, *sakadāgāmi*, *anāgāmi* and *arahatta*.² In all *kusalaviññāṇas* or *cittas* are of twentyone kinds.

It should be remembered that these (8+5+4+4=) twenty one *kusalaviññāṇas* refer not to the mental states of an average man but to those of an individual who is following the Buddhist principles of gradual purification through meditational exercises and whose mind rises by stages to the *Arūpāvacara* and ultimately to the *Lokuttara* stage³.

An average individual can have a bad mental state (*Akusalaviññāṇa*) but not a person who has perfected himself in the first meditation, not to speak of the higher ones. Hence, *akusalaviññāṇa* is confined to the *Kāmāvacara* sphere only, and so from the standpoint of spheres (*avacaras*) it is of one kind only. It is of three kinds according to its causes (*hetu*), viz., avarice (*lobha*), hatred (*dosa*), and delusion (*moha*). Each of them again is further subdivided into twelve in accordance with its combination with one or more of the following: pleasure (*somanassa*) or displeasure (*domanassa*) or indifference (*upekkhā*), and then associated with, or dissociated

- 1 C. *Arūpāvacara-kusalacitta* according to the four higher meditations (four kinds):—

1. Ākāsānañcāyatanajjhānena sampayuttam
2. Viññāṇānañcāyatanajjhānena sampayuttam
3. Akiñcāññāyatanajjhānena sampayuttam
4. N'evasaññā-nāsaññāyatanajjhānena sampayuttam

- 2 D. *Lokuttara-kusalacitta* associated with the four stages of sanctification (four kinds):—

1. Sotāpatti-magga-phala-sampayuttam
2. Sakadāgāmi-magga-phala-sampayuttam
3. Anāgāmi-magga-phala-sampayuttam
4. Arahatta-magga-phala-sampayuttam

3 See above, pp. 176f., 188., 197.

from, wrong belief (*diṭṭhi*), instigation by others (*saṅkhāra*) and revengefulness (*paṭigha*), and lastly associated with lack of faith in the Triratna (*vicikicchā*) and arrogance (*uddhacca*).¹


The *Avyākataviññāṇa* (neutral mental state) has so many subdivisions that it will be easier to comprehend it in a tabular form with comments thereon thus :²

1 E. *Kāmāvacara-akusalacitta* (twelve kinds) : —

Lobha or dosa or moha mūlaṃ

1.	Somanassa-sahagataṃ	diṭṭhigata-sampayuttam	asaṅkhāram
2.	do	do	sasaṅkhāram
3.	do	diṭṭhigata-vippayuttam	asaṅkhāram
4.	do	do	sasaṅkhāram
5.	Upekkhā-sahagataṃ	diṭṭhigata-sampayuttam	asaṅkhāram
6.	do	do	sasaṅkhāram
7.	do	diṭṭhigata-vippayuttam	asaṅkhāram
8.	do	do	sasaṅkhāram
9.	Domanassa-sahagataṃ	paṭigha-sampayuttam	asaṅkhāram
10.	do	do	sasaṅkhāram
11.	Upekkhā-sahagataṃ	vicikicchā-sampayuttam	asaṅkhāram
12.	do	uddhacca-sampayuttam	do

2 *Vism.*, pp. 454ff.



Comments on the table

The neutral mental states, effective for good, and without the three causes, viz., non-avarice, non-hatred and non-delusion (*ahetukaṃ kusalavipākaṃ avyākata-viññāṇaṃ*) are of eight kinds, viz., the six cognitions (*viññāṇas*) derived through the six organs of sense (including *mano*). [Besides these six *viññāṇas*, there is the receiving faculty called *manodhātu*, located in the heart (*hadayavatthu*), the function of which is to cognize the objects.] As the cognitions are associated either with equanimity (*upekkhā*), or pleasant feeling (*somanassa*), the neutral mental states are said to be of eight kinds. All these are further subdivided as shown in the above Table.

The neutral mental states effective for good, and dependent on three causes, viz., non-avarice, non-hatred and non-delusion (*sahetukaṃ kusalavipākaṃ avyākata-viññāṇaṃ*) are also of eight kinds, like *ahetukaviññāṇa*, as pointed above, the only difference being that these are always associated with *alobhādivipāka*.¹

The neutral but effective mental states confined to Rūpa sphere (*Rūpāvacara-avyākata-vipāka-viññāṇaṃ*) like the *Rūpāvacara-kusala-citta* are of five kinds.² It occurs to those who are meditating (*samāpattivaseṇa*)³ and progressing along the path. It is manifest in the mental state desiring re-birth, in sub-liminal consciousness and in death-consciousness.

The neutral but effective mental states confined to Arūpa sphere (*Arūpāvacara-avyākata-vipāka-viññāṇaṃ*) like the *arūpāvacara-kusala-citta* is of four kinds.⁴

The neutral but effective mental states of persons who are in one of the eight stages of sanctification (*Lokuttara-avyākata-vipāka-viññāṇaṃ*) like the *lokuttarakuṣalacitta* is of eight kinds.

1 *alobhādi*=*alobha*, *adosa*, *amoha* and so forth; *vipāka*=effect or resultant consciousness (see Transl. of the *Vism.*, p. 531).

2 Same as *Rūpāvacara-kusala-citta*, see p. 203, fn. 4.

3 *Vism.* Transl. p. 532, by way of right attainment.

4 See above, p. 204 fn. 1

i.e., connected with the eight kinds of mental states of individuals, who are in one of the four *maggas* and four *phalas*.¹

The bad mental states (*akusalacittas*) in their effective (*vipāka*) and incentive (*kiriya*) states are treated as neutral (*avyākata*). The list² of such mental states differs from that of the twelve *akuasala-cittas*, dealt with above (p.205n).

In all, the subdivisions of the *avyākata-vipāka-viññāṇas* of the four spheres (*avacaras*) including *akusala-vipāka-cittas* amount to thirty-six.

The incentive mental states (*Kiriya-viññāṇa*), as indicated in the above Table, is subdivided according to the three spheres (*avacaras*) and then the incentive mental states of *Kāmāvacara* beings into *ahetuka* and *sahetuka* which are subdivided into eleven kinds, while those of *Rūpāvacara* beings into five and of *Arūpāvacara* beings into four, thus making in all twenty kinds.

The sum total of *viññāṇas* stands thus:

Kusalaviññāṇa	...	...	...	21*
Akusalaviññāṇa	...	...	...	12*
Vipākaviññāṇa	...	...	...	36
Kiriyaviññāṇa	...	...	...	20
				89

All these 89 *viññāṇas* function in 14 ways, thus, desire for re-birth (*paṭisandhi*), subliminal consciousness (*bhavaṅga*), reviving (*āvajjana*)³, seeing (*dassana*) hearing (*savana*), smelling

1 See above, p. 204, fn. 2

2 There are seven *Avyākata-akusala-vipāka-viññāṇas*::—

1. Akusala-vipākam upekkhā-sahagataṃ cakkhu-viññāṇaṃ
2. do do sota-do
3. do do ghāṇa-do
4. do do jihvā-do
5. do dukkha-sahagataṃ kāya-do
6. do upekkhā-sahagataṃ sampaṭicchana-cittaṃ
7. do do santīraṇa -do

See above p. 203-5n.

3 Cf. *Vism.*, p. 453: āvajjana-kiccaṃ sādhayamānā kiriyamanodhātu uppajjati.

(*ghāyana*), tasting (*sāyana*), touching (*phusana*), receiving (*sampaṭicchana*),¹ examining (*santīraṇa*), deciding (*voṭṭhapana*), extending (*javana*),² registering (*tad-ārammaṇa*) and mental state just prior to death (*cuti*).³

Of the fourteen ways in which *viññāṇa* functions, as stated above, it is the *paṭisandhi-viññāṇa* that causes re-birth. It is said in the *Samyutta Nikāya*⁴ that only when *viññāṇa* obtains a footing (*patiṭṭhā*) on some basis (*ārammaṇa*), then only there is the possibility of the birth of a being, and not otherwise, and the moment the *viññāṇa* ceases (*cuti*), one is regarded as dead.⁵ During the span of life limited by the two *viññāṇas*, *paṭisandhi* and *cuti*, the remaining twelve *viññāṇas* function. Immediately after the *paṭisandhi-viññāṇa* has done its part, i.e., giving birth according to one's *kamma*, appears the *bhavaṅga-viññāṇa*, which is the resultant of one's past actions (*kammasa vipākabhūtam*). The *bhavaṅga-viññāṇa* however becomes inactive when the organs of sense grow strong enough to function in their respective spheres. Then those six *indriya-viññāṇas* (i.e. including *mano-dhātu*) function and give rise to the *ahetuka-kiriya-manoviññāṇa-dhātu*⁶, making *bhavaṅga-viññāṇa* (subliminal-consciousness) passive. The *kiriya-mano-viññāṇadhātu*⁶ is nothing but mind (*mano=citta*), the function of which is to revive (*āvajjana*) the objects seen, sounds heard and so forth, and to make the

1 Cf. *Vism.*, p. 458-9: cakkhu-viññādīnam anantarā tesam yeva visayaṃ sampaṭiccha-mānā, kusalavipākānantaraṃ kusalavipākā akusalavipākānantaraṃ akusala-vipākā manodhātu uppajjati. Evaṃ dvinnam vipākaviññāṇam sampaṭicchanavasena pavatti veditabbā.

2 Cf. *Atthas.* p. 270: ubhosu tīresu kedārapūraṇam viya javanaṃ.

3 All these are functions of *mano-dhātu*, which is treated as the sixth organ of sense.

4 *Samyutta*, I, 122; II, 67, 103.

5 Cf. *Samyutta*, III, p. 143:

*Āyu usmā ca viññāṇam, yadā kāyaṃ jahantimaṃ
apaviddho tadā seti parabhaddam acetanam.*

6 See p. 206.

organs of sense function again and again. The function of mind then is to receive things communicated to it through the organs of sense; it becomes good or bad according as the things communicated through the organs of sense are pleasant or unpleasant. When the mind ceases to function, *bhavaṅga-viññāṇa* renews its activity, ceasing at death when it is followed by *cuti-viññāṇa*, which in its turn gives rise to *paṭisandhi-viññāṇa*. In this way the continuity of *citta* is maintained, and the cycle of existence is continued.¹ It should be noted that the existence of *bhavaṅga-viññāṇa* (subliminal-consciousness) is not explicitly stated anywhere in the Sutta or Abhidhamma Piṭakas, though it is given prominence in the works of later expositors like Anuruddha and Buddhaghosa.

Buddhaghosa concludes his exposition of *khandhas* with the remark that the people are prone to regard the body as a unitary object and mistakenly apprehend it as a self and that it is only to warn them against this misapprehension that the Teacher spoke of the *khandhas*. The *khandhas* are to be looked upon as bubbles and tempting illusion. These are nothing but a mass of evanescent objects as substanceless

1 This exposition of *viññāṇa* is based on the *Vism.*, pp. 452-460; Transl. *Path of Purity*, III, pp. 527ff. See also *Atthas.*, pp. 266, 269-270. In the *Atthas.*, the position of *bhavaṅga-viññāṇa* has been explained by a simile which is as follows: The course of a flowing river, if turned, by an obstruction, towards a channel (*mahāmātikā*), the water not only flows through it but floods over the two sides of the channel, and then by whatever narrow ways it finds, it moves towards the main river.

The flowing river = *bhavaṅga-viññāṇa*.

The obstruction turning the course of the river = *kiriya-mano-dhātu* (mind = *citta*).

The channel = *vīthicittapavatti* (mind functioning through the six organs of sense).

The flooding over two sides = *javana*.

Falling into the main river = *bhavaṅgotaranam*.

See *IHQ.*, XV: The Dhamma-saṅgaṇi; *The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy* by Anagarika B. Govinda, p. 137 f. *Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidhamma* by H. V. Guenther.

as the trunk of a plantain tree.¹ He offers also an explanation for the order (*kama*) in which the *khandhas* are enumerated.² *Rūpa*, he says, is mentioned first because it is easily comprehensible to an average man. As this *rūpa* (matter, object) gives rise to a feeling good, bad, or indifferent, so *vedanā* is treated as the second *khandha*. As this *vedanā* (feeling) directs one's attention to the form and nature of the source of the feeling and thereby engenders *saññā* (perception), so *saññā* is placed next. After *saññā*, happens the accumulation of mental states, hence *saṅkhārā* is treated as the fourth. Though *viññāṇa* precedes *saṅkhārā* it is mentioned last as it is the most important of the four mental *khandhas*, forming, as it does, the basis of *vedanā*.³

(ii) *Dhātu*

The term '*dhātu*' carries a very wide meaning in the Buddhist literature. When the *dhātu* is said to be constituted (*saṃkhata*) it means all the beings and things of the world, e. g., the three spheres of existence, *Kāma*, *Rūpa* and *Arūpa*; the four great elements (*mahābhūtas*) and the things formed out of these elements; the sense-organs, their objects (*āyatana*s), as also their perceptions; the material and non-material constituents (*khandhas*). The *Bahudhātuka-sutta*⁴ states that for attaining *nibbāna*, one must be proficient in the *dhātus* (*dhātukusalo*), and then enumerates besides the above the following as *dhātus*: mental and physical pain and pleasure, equanimity, ignorance, desire, renunciation, hatred, as also *Ākāsa* and *Nibbāna* or *Nirodha* but the last two are called unconstituted (*asaṃkhata*) *dhātus*.

1 *Vism.*, pp. 477-480.

2 Cf. *AKV.*, I.22. : यथौदारिकसंक्लेशभाजनाद्यर्थधातुतः ।

3 *Vism.*, p. 477: Yaṃ vedayati taṃ sañjānāti ti evaṃ vedanā-visayassa ākāragāhikaṃ saññāṃ; saññāvasena abhisāṅkhārake saṅkhāre; tesāṃ vedanādīnaṃ nissayaṃ adhipatibhūtañ ca nesāṃ viññāṇan ti.

4 *Majjhima*, III, p. 216.

Though the term *dhātu* has a very wide significance, it is applied at the present instance to the six sense-organs, their objects and the six perceptions derived through them, i. e., *cakkhu*, *rūpa* and *cakkhuvīññāṇa* ; *sota*, *sadda* and *sotavīññāṇa* and so forth counting in all the eighteen *dhātus*. Etymologically *dhātu* means those elements which uphold a being. In this sense *cakkhu* is a *dhātu* and so also are the other sense-organs. The sense-organs are also *indriyas*¹ inasmuch these act as predominating factors in perceiving objects ; again these are also *āyatanas* inasmuch as these exert (*ā-yatanti uṭṭhahanti ghaṭanti vāyamanti*)² to perceive an object.

(iii) *Āyatanas*

Āyatanas include both the sense-organs and their objects, the former being distinguished as internal (*ajjhātika*) and the latter as external (*bāhira*), counting in all twelve.³ The function of the *āyatanas* is not only to develop the perceptions (*viññāṇa*) but also to entangle a being in *saṃsāra* (repeated existence). With the exception of *mano*, all the eleven *āyatanas* belong to *rūpakkhandha*⁴ while *mano* only belongs to *viññāṇakkhandha*. *Mano* therefore like *viññāṇa* can be subdivided into 89 states.⁵ The scope of the five organs of sense is limited to their respective objects while the scope of *mano* is almost unlimited, extending over not only all the other sense-organs and their objects but also over all mental states, denoted in Pāli by the word *dhamma*.

The Buddhist texts, in conclusion, point out that although so much attention has been paid to the analysis of *dhātus* and *āyatanas*, one must not forget that these have neither any beginning nor any end, nor do they come from anywhere nor go to elsewhere ; these are in reality substanceless (*nirīha*) and functionless (*avyāpāra*).⁶

1 See above, p. 213.

3 Cf. above, p. 199.

5 See above, p. 203f.; *Vism.*, p. 483.

2 *Vism.*, p. 481.

4 *Dhātukathā*, pp. 2. 117.

6 *Vism.*, p. 484.

(iv) *Indriyas*

Besides the twelve āyatanas and eighteen dhātus, a being requires twenty-two *indriyas*¹ (predominating mental factors) for its existence. The six sense-organs as has been mentioned above are *indriyas* inasmuch as these are predominating factors in a person's appearance, protection, knowledge and distinctiveness.² The seventh and eighth *indriyas* are masculinity (*purisa*) and femininity (*itthi*) as these are predominating factors in sex-distinction. The ninth *indriya* is vitality (*jīvita*) which sustains the body. The five mental states, *sukha*, *dukkha*, *somanassa*, *domanassa* and *upekkhā*,³ which accompany *jīvitendriya* (life-force) are also treated as predominating states in the Buddhist psychology inasmuch as these serve to entangle beings in worldly affairs.⁴ The next group of five mental states, viz., self-confidence (*saddhā*), energy (*viriya*), watchfulness (*sati*), concentration of mind (*samādhi*) and exertion for knowledge (*paññā*) are also treated as *indriyas* inasmuch as these serve to disentangle beings from worldly desires and help them to attain *Nibbāna*. The last three *indriyas* are (i) the determination to know what is unknown (*anaññāta + ñassāmi*), (ii) determination to know the highest truth (*aññā*), and (iii) determination to realise what has been attained by the previous two faculties (*aññātāvī*). The first of this group acts as the predominating factor in removing wrong views and putting an adept on the right course of exercises for realising the truth while the second in helping the adept to realise the fruits of exercises, removal of inclinations (*anuśayas*) for worldly attainments and

1 *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, II, p. 1: आधिपत्यार्थश्चेष्यते । तस्मादित्थमिन्द्रियशब्दस्य व्युत्पत्तिर्नैष्टव्येति ।

2 *Ibid.*, Intro.

3 *Sukha* and *dukkha* = physical pleasure and pain

Somanassa and *domanassa* = mental pleasure and displeasure

Upekkhā = equanimity

4 *AKV.*, II, Intro.

development of insight into the truths ; the third acts as the predominating factor in attaining knowledge of the cessation of rebirth (*khayañāṇa*) and of the attainment of *Nibbāna* in this life.¹

Like the *dhātus* and *āyatanas*, the faculties (*indriyas*) also, Buddhaghosa observes, do not exist in reality.²

1 *AKV.*, II, p. 11

2 *Vism.*, p. 526

CHAPTER X

Paṭiccasamuppāda

Paṭiccasamuppāda or the law of dependent origination is a contribution of Buddha to the philosophical thoughts of India of the 5th century B.C. By this law Buddha wanted to establish that the constituted world was neither a creation of God nor its origin was accidental nor it was issued out of the ever existing *Prakṛti* nor it was a composite of eternal atoms (*aṇuparamāṇu*) nor was it pre-determined as held by the *Ājīvikas* and lastly, it was caused and not uncaused.¹ This law also establishes that the constituted world is in a dynamic state and is never static even for a moment, in other words, it is only a series of point-instants². From this it follows that the beings and objects of the world have only dependent origination and hence they are impermanent and sources of misery, and that except *Nibbāna* and *Ākāśa*, there is nothing that is not originated by sequence of causes and conditions. This law also shows that all that is thus caused and conditioned are evanescent³ and without any substance. It explains the fixed unchangeable and this-conditioned (*idappaccayatā*) nature of beings and objects.⁴

Many scholars who have dealt with the formula of causation have attempted to elicit from it Buddha's theory of the origin of a being, and some of them even drew parallels between the links of the formula and the causal series of

1 *Tattva-saṃgraha*, I, p. 11: तत्त्वैदमुक्तं भगवता । स चायमङ्कुरो न स्वयं कृतो नोभयकृतो नेश्वरनिर्मितो न प्रकृतिसंभूतो नैककारणाधीनो नाप्यहेतु-समुत्पन्नः ।

2 Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, p. 119.

3 *Ibid.*, प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादं चलम् ।

4 *Majjhima*, I, p. 191.

Sāṃkhya.¹ It is noteworthy that such an attempt was also made in Buddhaghosa's time. To refute this viewpoint, Buddhaghosa pointed out that ignorance (*avijjā*), the first link of the chain, must not be regarded as similar to *Prakṛti* (*Pakati*) of the Pakativādins, i. e., Sāṃkhyans, because *avijjā* was neither uncaused (*akāraṇam*) nor was it the primary cause of the world (*mūlakāraṇam*). It owed its origin to mental impurities (*āsavas*). The reason adduced by Buddhaghosa for its being made the first link in the chain was that Buddha used ignorance of the truth (*avijjā*) or desire for rebirth (*bhavataṇhā*) for commencing (*sīsabhāvam*) his discourses on *Paṭiccasamuppāda*, as the chain was without any beginning or end (*vaṭṭakathā* or *anamatagga*).² It is apparent therefore that *avijjā* need not necessarily be the first link in the chain of causation but that it is one of the terms found suitable by the author of the formula to begin the chain. It could as well be commenced by *bhavataṇhā*.³ In the *Samyutta Nikāya*,⁴ the formula starts with food (*āhāra*) as the first link. Hence, we see that the *Paṭiccasamuppāda* is not meant to be an explanation of the origin of the world but that it is just a chain of instances to illustrate the law of this-conditioned nature (*idappaccayatā*), i. e., dependent origination of things. The links of the chain move in a circle without a beginning or end, and without any reference to time and place. The phenomenal existence is represented as a wheel with twelve spokes.

Those scholars, who expected to find in it a key to the origin of the world, have been disappointed and have condemned it as illogical and incongruous. The author of

1 See Kern, *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 46f., La Vallée Poussin, *Theories des douze causes*, p. vii, fn. 2.

2 *Vism.*, p. 525.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 525: purimā, bhikkhave, koṭi na paññāyati avijjāya (or bhavataṇhāya), ito pubbe avijjā (or bhavataṇhā) nāhosi atha pacchā sambhavī ti. Evañ c'etaṃ bhikkhave, vuccati, atha ca pana paññāyati idappaccayā avijjā (or bhavataṇhā). Cf. *Samyutta*, II, p. 178; III, p. 149.

4 *Samyutta*, II, pp. 101-3; *Mahāniddeśa*, I, pp. 25-6.

the formula could not anticipate that his arrangement of the illustrations in a series would give rise to misunderstanding.¹

Twenty-four Paccayas

The chain is not meant to demonstrate a course of evolution. All that is intended to mean is that any two links are related to each other in one or more of the twentyfour ways (*paccayas*), for which the usual general expression is “*imasmim sati idaṃ hoti*” (this being so that happens). There are in the *Paṭṭhāna* twentyfour such relations,² viz., *hetu* (root-cause), *ārammaṇa* (basis, objective cause), *anantara* (immediate c.), *samanantara* (concomitant c.), *sahajāta* (co-existent c.), *aññamañña* (interdependent c.), *nissaya* (supporting cause as earth to tree), *upanissaya* (immediately effective cause), *purejāta* (preceding cause), *pacchājāta* (succeeding cause), *āsevana* (cause which requires repetition, e.g., *kamma*=previous actions), *vipāka* (fruition of previous actions c.), *āhāra* (sustenance c.), *indriya* (predominating factors c.), *jhāna* (meditation c.), *magga* (eightfold path c.), *sampayutta* (associated c.), *vippayutta* (dissociated c.), *atthi* (present c.), *natthi* (non-present c.), *vigata* (absent c.), and *avigata* (non-absent c.). It is in one or more of these twentyfour relations that the two consecutive links are related to each other, e.g., consciousness (*viññāṇa*) is related to mind and matter (*nāmarūpa*) as *aññamañña*; birth (*jāti*) is related to old age and death (*jarāmaraṇa*) as *purejāta* and *upanissaya*, and so forth. The law implies that any two links should be taken up for consideration for realising the *idappaccayatā* of worldly objects.

It is an undeniable truth that a living being or an object never exactly remains the same in two consecutive moments.

1 *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 208-9.

2 Cf. *Vism.*, p. 532; translation, p. 635; Intro. to *Paṭṭhāna* (P.T.S.). The Sarvāstivādius admit four *pratyayas* and six *hetus*, vide Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, I, p. 138.

(*kṣaṇa*)¹ but at the same time it is also a fact that the two consecutive momentary stages of a being or an object are neither wholly identical nor wholly different, because, it is the dissolution of the first momentary state that gives rise to the second, and the relation between the two is not exactly that of cause and effect as is commonly understood, because a cause, which has ceased or has been destroyed, cannot produce an effect, and so according to this formula an effect is a state immediately subsequent to the cause, and that cause and effect appear only in series consecutively and that cause is not transformed into effect. Milk and curds are two consecutive states, one separate from the other, the characteristics of milk being different from those of curds, and hence milk is not transformed into curds as is commonly supposed. Every momentary object is the outcome of the totality of its antecedents and is neither identical with, nor different from, them.

Buddha laid the greatest emphasis on this theory of dependent origination and he held that one who comprehended this theory visualised the truth (*yo paṭiccasamuppādam passati so dhammam passati*).² This dictum is accepted not only by the Śrāvakayānists but also by the Mahāyānists.

Traditional exposition

Pratītyasamutpāda (Pāli *Paṭiccasamuppāda*) means etymologically that every (*prati*) object or being is subject to dissolution (*itya=vinaśvara*; *itau=vinaṣṭau*). Those dissolved (*ityāḥ*) appear (*samutpāda*) again and again.³

1 *Kṣaṇa* is defined in the *AKV.* as 1/160th of a second.
Cf. *Yogācārabhūmti*, p. 214 :

पुनः प्रत्ययत उत्पादः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादः । क्षणिकार्थमधिकृत्य । पुनः प्रत्ययादतीतादत्यक्तात् स्वसन्तानादुत्पादः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादः । अस्मिन् सतीदं भवत्यस्योत्पादादिदमुत्पद्यते [नान्यथा] इत्येतमर्थमधिकृत्यैतन्निर्वचनं द्रष्टव्यम् । पुनः प्रतिगत्य प्रतिगत्य सन्ततोत्पादः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादः । विनश्य विनश्येत्यर्थः । etc.

2 *Majjhima*, I, p. 191; *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, pp. 51, 208-9.

3 *M. Vr.*, p. 4.

Buddhaghosa observes that by *samuppāda* is not meant origin (*uppāda*) pure and simple. It counteracts the doctrine of nothingness (*natthitā = uccheda*) as well as that of eternalism (*sassata*). By the word *paṭicca* is meant that a thing originates not by itself (*ekekato*) nor without a cause (*nāpi ahetuto*); it originates by depending on certain other things (*paccayasāmaggiṃ paṭicca*) as a fruition (*phalavohārena*). By the compound word *paṭtīccasamuppāda* is meant that a cause leads to an effect (*paṭimūlam ito = gato*) unalterably, and the cause and effect are inseparable and they are mutually dependent, and that dependence is unalterably fixed.¹

It should also be noted that all phenomenal objects have existence though it is only momentary (*kṣaṇika*), similar to waves on the sea or ripples on a sheet of water. These waves or ripples are not purely imaginary, and these do exist, but only for a moment, hence it is impermanent (*anitya*). Though they are temporary modifications of the Reality, but they are grasped as something separate and determinate by one who is subject to *avidyā*, i.e., one who is completely ignorant about the Reality, the Truth. It is this individuation or determination by the imperfect that leads to the appearance of the variegated world which becomes ultimately a source of suffering to him. There is no real but merely interdependent origination (*pratītya tat samutpannam notpannam tat svabhāvataḥ*).² According to the Sāṅkhya school also, there is no new origination or creation, because it is just another manifestation of the same substance.

In the Buddhist texts, an attempt has been made to elucidate this theory of causation or dependent origination by a chain of factors that go to make a being thus: A v i d y ā — s a ṃ s k ā r ā — v i j ñ ā n a — n ā m a r ū p a — ṣ a ḍ ḍ ā y a — t a n a — s p a r ś a — v e d a n ā — t ṛ ṣ ṇ ā — u p ā d ā n a — b h a v a — j ā t i — j a r ā m a r a ṇ a.³

1 *Vism.*, p. 518f.

2 *Tattvasaṃgraha*, p. 177.

3 (a) *Avidyā* and *saṃskārā* relate to past existence.

The factors are broadly explained thus: The fact that a being is born implies that it did not attain perfection in its previous existence and had ignorance about the Reality, i.e., non-realisation of the Truth, and this led to the belief in the existence of a self and clinging to I-ness and Mineness as also to its consequent effects, viz., certain wrong mental constructions and impressions (*saṃskārā*).¹ These two factors are assumptions relating to the past existence of a being.

The inception of the present life takes place with *viññāṇa* or the mind known as *Pratisandhi-citta* or the desire to take rebirth² which alone maintains the continuity of a being from one life to another. In the *Dīgha Nikāya*,³ however, *viññāṇa* and *nāmarūpa* are shown as interdependent like two sticks resting on each other. The fact is that the present existence of a being commences with *viññāṇa*, which is followed up by the other four elements of *nāma-rūpa*, viz., feeling (*vedanā*), perception (*saṃjñā*), fresh mental constructions (*saṃskārā*) and the material elements (*rūpa*). The links after *nāma-rūpa* are self-evident, viz., that a being as it

(b) *Vijñāna*, *nāmarūpa*, *ṣaḍāyatana*, *sparsa*, *vedanā*, *tṛṣṇā*, *upādāna* and *bhava* relate to present existence.

(c) *Jāti* and *jarāmaraṇa* relate to future existence.

1 *Kośa-vyākhyā*, III. 28 (p. 53): आत्मनि सत्याश्रयभूते अविद्यादिषु सत्सु संस्कारादयो भवन्तीति । अस्योत्पादादिदमुत्पद्यत इति । एवमेव तथैव कल्पयेयुः ।

2 *Kośa-vyākhyā*, III. 28 (p. 54): संस्कारप्रत्ययं विज्ञानं प्रतिसन्धि-चित्तमभिप्रेतं स्यात् ।.....विज्ञानं कतमत् । मनोविज्ञानमिति । न हि प्रतिसन्धिक्षणे पञ्चविज्ञानकायसम्भवोऽस्ति । मनोविज्ञानेनैव प्रतिसन्धि-बन्धात् । Cf. *Kārikā*, III. 42.

Cf. *Yogācārabhūmi*, p. 212:

पूर्वं तावत् ज्ञेये वस्तुनि संमोहः । सम्मूढस्य तत्रैव मिथ्याभिसंस्कारः । मिथ्याभिसंस्काराच्चित्ते विपर्यासः । चित्तविपर्यासात् प्रतिसन्धिबन्धः । प्रतिसन्धिबन्धादिन्द्रियपरिपूरः ।

3 *Dīgha*, II, p. 56

grows develops the six sense-organs (*ṣaḍāyatana*), which come in contact (*sparśa*) with the external objects, and produce feeling (*vedanā*), good, bad or indifferent. This feeling is the cause of desire (*trṣṇā*), which takes a firm hold of the mind (*upādāna*), and causes in its turn a strong desire for future existence (*bhava*). With this link, the formula of the chain of causation should end, and revert back to *avidyā* and *saṃskārā*. Two more links, however, are added with a view perhaps to explain to the common people that *bhava* (desire for rebirth) i.e. *pratisandhi-citta* is the root of all our future existences (*jāti*), which inevitably end with old age, death, grief, lamentation and sorrow.

The twelve terms composing the law of causation are explained thus:

(1) *Avijjā or lack of true knowledge*

The etymological meaning of the word *avijjā* is that it makes a person learn what should be unlearnt and unlearn what should be learnt. It debars a person from taking a true view of worldly things. It makes a person see happiness in misery, good in evil, and *vice versa*, regard the unreals as reals, make differentiation where no differentiation exists, and so forth. The usual meaning attributed to it in the *Nikāyas* is non-comprehension of the four truths (*ariya-saccas*)¹ while in the *Abhidhamma*, non-comprehension of the world-beginning (*pubbanta*) and world-end (*aparanta*), eternalism (*sassata*) and annihilationism (*uccheda*),² and of this-conditioned nature of objects (*idappaccayatā*).³ *Avijjā* screens the truth, and it is by the removal of *avijjā* that the *vijjā* or truth (i.e. Nibbāna) flashes before the eyes of an adept. In other words, all worldly beings have only limited knowledge, which is far from the true or perfect knowledge of the Reality.

1 See above, p. 137f.

2 See above, pp. 38f., 58f.,

3 See above. Cf. *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, 1162.

(2) *Saṅkhārā or thought-constructions, impressions*

By the word *saṅkhārā*¹ are meant the impressions or traces left in the mind for taking wrong view of things. On account of *avijjā* (lack of true knowledge), a person has the impression that desires conduce to happiness, that performance of sacrifices and practice of extreme austerities lead to liberation and so forth. The function of *saṅkhārā* of previous existence is to produce the thought with which a being is reborn (*paṭisandhi-viññāṇa* or *citta* and the mental states (*viññāṇas*) that follow the *paṭisandhi-citta*, which are all dependent on deeds (*kamma-paccaya*)² of past life, hence, it represents pre-natal forces.

The logical relation (*paccaya*) of *saṅkhārā* to *avijjā* is one or more of the following four, viz, *ārammaṇa*, *adhipati*, *kamma*, and *upanissaya* (see p. 217). The impressions left on the mind by *avijjā* lead one to perform deeds which are (i) meritorious (*puñña*) such as gifts and observance of moral precepts, (ii) sinful (*apuñña*) such as killing and stealing, and (iii) neither meritorious nor sinful such as beliefs in eternalism and annihilationism. These three kinds of deeds may be (i) physical (*kāyika*), or verbal (*vācasika*), or mental (*mānasika*). Again, the impressions or thought-constructions (*saṅkhārā*) may be limited or unlimited, high or low, right or wrong, definite or indefinite. Meritorious deeds (*puññābhisaṅkhārā*) cause rebirth in heavens, while non-meritorious deeds (*apuññābhisaṅkhārā*) in hells and neither meritorious nor non-meritorious deeds (*āneñjābhisaṅkhārā*) in the Arūpalokas.³

(3) *Viññāṇa or consciousness &*(4) *Nāma-rūpa or mind and matter*

The rebirth-consciousness (*paṭisandhi-viññāṇa*) leads to mind and matter, marking the inception of the present life of

1 This term (*saṅkhārā*) should be distinguished from the word *saṅkhārā* in phrases like *aniccā vata saṅkhārā*, where it means all that is constituted. 2 *Vism.*, p. 538. 3 *Vism.*, p. 557-8.

a being. The very fact of its having a fresh existence implies that it could not get rid of ignorance (*avijjā*) and its consequential thought-impressions (*saṅkhārā*) in its past life. An Arhat or Buddha only gets rid of the same and so does not have a fresh *paṭisandhi-viññāṇa* and *nāma-rūpa*. *Saṅkhārā* lead to the re-appearance of *paṭisandhi-viññāṇa*, and the other *viññāṇas* immediately succeeding it, and it is around this *viññāṇa* that the other four constituents cluster, forming a complete being with mind and matter.

Of these four constituents one is matter (*rūpa*) and the other three are perception, feeling and fresh mental impressions (*saññā*, *vedanā* and *saṅkhārā*) which along with *viññāṇa*, are collectively called *nāma*. Buddhaghosa derives *nāma* from the root *nam*, to bend, and says *saññā*, *vedanā* and *saṅkhārā* are called *nāma* because they bend, direct the mind (*viññāṇa*) to the object (*ārammaṇa*). In the formula of twelve links, *viññāṇa* is made the cause of *nāma-rūpa*, but *nāma* also includes *viññāṇa*, which means not only mind but also the mental states derived through the sense-organs. In some enumerations,¹ *viññāṇa* and *nāma-rūpa* are shown to be interdependent. The reason for making *viññāṇa* an independent link is that *saṅkhārā* can be the *paccaya* (i.e. *kamma* and *upanissaya*) of *viññāṇa* only² and not of the other three mental constituents or of *rūpa* (matter). The *paṭisandhi-viññāṇa* is of nineteen kinds.³ The *viññāṇas*, which intervene between the mental state preceding birth (*paṭisandhicitta*) and the mental state preceding death (*cuticitta*), are the five perceptions derived through the five sense-organs. Besides these five, there is the *manoviññāṇa* which may be sub-divided into thirty-two kinds.⁴

1 *Dīgha*, II, p. 56.

2 *Vism.*, p. 559-560.

3 For details, see *Vism.*, pp. 548 ff.

4 Cf. *Vism.*, 455-6; *kāmāvacarassa kusalassa katattā upacitattā vipākaṃ cakkhuviññāṇaṃ uppannaṃ hoti ti*. See *IHQ.*, vol. XV: The *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* (analysed).

Now the *viññāṇas*, which appear after *paṭisandhi-viññāṇa*, gradually lead to *saññā* (perception), *vedanā* (feelings), and fresh *saṅkhārā* (thought-constructions), all of which need the support of *rūpa* (matter).¹ The relation of *nāma* to *rūpa* is one of the four *paccayas*, e.g., *sahajāta*, *aññamañña*, *nissaya* and *vipāka* (see p. 217).² It is clearly stated in the *Vibhaṅga*³ that the sense-organs as also other matters in their subtlest state originate out of mind. This subtle *rūpa* is nourished by the food taken by the mother and shaped by the force of previous *karma*.

(5) *Salāyatana or six sense-organs*

Nāma-rūpa are mentioned as the *paccaya* of the six sense-organs. By *nāma* is meant here the three *khandhas*, *vedanā*, *saññā* and *saṅkhārā*. By *rūpa* is taken the four great elements (*mahābhūtas*), the six objects (*vatthus*) viz., form, sound, smell, taste, touch and objects of thought (*rūpa*, *sadda*, *gandha*, *rasa*, *phoṭṭhabba* and *dhamma*), and vitality (*jīvita*). The above *rūpa* consisting of eleven elements takes its own course of evolution (*sakasantati-pariyāpannam*) and is related to *salāyatana* as *sahajāta*, *aññamañña*, *nissaya*, *vippayutta*, *atthi* and *avigata* (see p.217).⁴ *Nāma* also has the above relations to the six sense-organs with the distinction that it is *sampayutta* and not *vippayutta paccaya* and it is also a *vipāka paccaya*.⁵ But these two, *nāma* and *rūpa*, must come together to be a *paccaya* of the six sense-organs and not otherwise.⁶

(6) *Phassa or contact*

There are as many kinds of *phassa* (contact) as there are *āyatanas*, that is, six. *Phassa* appears as a result of the objects grasped by the sense-organs, taking their own course

1 *Vibhaṅga*, pp. 144, 147: *nāmapaccayā chaṭṭhāyatam*.

2 *Vism.*, p. 561.

3 *Vibhaṅga*, p. 147.

4 *Vism.*, p. 564,

5 *Ibid.*, p. 563.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 562.

of evolution (*sakasantati-pariyāpannam*).¹ The only point to be remembered is that *phassa* is put in the singular number as it is only one though there may be more than one sense-organ functioning, but one form of *phassa* is limited to one *āyatana*. The *āyatanas* are related to *phassa* in six or nine ways.² *Phassa* can also be sub-divided like *viññāṇa* into thirty-two kinds.³

(7) *Vedanā or feeling*

There are as many feelings as there are doors, i. e., the sense-organs. Feeling (*vedanā*) like *viññāṇa* may be sub-divided into 89 kinds.⁴ Visual and other perceptions (*cakkhu-pasāda* etc.,) are related to feeling in eight ways.⁵

(8) *Taṇhā or thirst, desire*

There are as many kinds of thirst as there are sources, i.e., the six objects of the sense-organs, viz., *rūpa-taṇhā*, *sadda-taṇhā* and so forth.⁶ Each *taṇhā* may be of three kinds, *kāma*, *bhava* and *vibhava*. When the *taṇhā* creates a taste for the objects, *rūpa*, *sadda*, etc., it is called *kāma*. When it is associated with the belief that the world is eternally existing (*sassata*) and produces an attachment (*rāga*) for future existence, it is called *bhavataṇhā*. When it is associated with the belief that there is no after-life (*uccheda*), and one becomes regardless of this life, it is called *vibhava-taṇhā*.

(9) *Upādāna or strong attachment*

The previously mentioned *taṇhās* lead to *upādāna* and are related to it in seven or eight ways.⁷ There are four kinds of *upādāna*, *kāma*, *diṭṭhi*, *sīlabbata* and *attavāda*. *Kāmataṇhā* is the cause of *kāmupādāna*, which is the firm grasping of the

1 *Ibid.*, p. 565.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 566.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 565.

4 See above, p. 208.

5 *Vism.*, p. 567.

6 *Vibhaṅga*, p. 380.

7 *Vism.*, p. 570-1.

object, it is thirst for objects not obtained and firmly holding the objects already obtained. *Diṭṭhupādāna* is the firm adherence to wrong views, i.e., firm belief in the doctrine that there is no good effect of gifts or sacrifices, or belief in any one of the indeterminable problems: *sassata* or *uccheda*, *anta* or *ananta* etc.¹ as true. *Sīlabbatupādāna* is the firm adherence to the belief that rituals or particular ascetic practices lead to liberation. *Attavādupādāna* is the firm belief in the existence of a soul, and in its identification with one of the five khandhas.²

(10) *Bhava or desire for existence*

Bhava has two distinct meanings, one is existence according to one's past deeds, called *kammabhava*, and the other is the plane of existence wherein a being is reborn, called *uppatibhava*. The former is regulated by the three kinds of *saṅkhārā*, merit, demerit, and neither merit nor demerit (*puñña*, *apuñña* and *āneñja*) in their two grades, low and high. But *saṅkhārā* are not mentioned as the cause of *bhava*, so we are to ascertain how *upādāna* is the cause of *bhava*. Buddhaghosa points out that *kāmupādāna* leads to such *saṅkhārā* which cause a being to be reborn in the *kāma* and so it can also be described as *kammabhava*. Other *upādānas*, viz., *diṭṭhi*, *sīlabbata* and *attavāda* make a person adhere to wrong views, and influenced by those views he acquires *saṅkhārā* which lead to existences in *Kāma* and other worlds, so in this sense, it can be called *kammabhava*. By *uppatibhava* is meant the three planes of existence, such as *Kāma*, *Rūpa* or *Arūpa* lokas. Some of these contain beings without perception (*asaññā*) and some with perception (*saññā*) and some with very subtle perception almost incapable of perceiving any object (*nevasaññā-nāsaññā*). *Uppatibhava* may also be classified according to the number of khandhas, which a being may possess, e.g. beings of *kāma* or *rūpa* *bhava* have five

1 See above, p. 37.

2 See infra, p. 232f.

khandhas, those of arūpa and nevasaññānāsaññāyatana bhavas have only four, while beings of asaññābhava has one.¹

(11) *Jāti or rebirth*

The living being, which is subject to the desire for re-existence (*bhava*), takes rebirth (*jāti*), i.e., future life. It is not an entity nor an individual but just a conglomeration of *nāma-rūpa* that takes rebirth in a changed form,—the change being effected by its past deeds (*kamma*) as also by time and circumstances in which it reappears. *Jāti* is controlled by *kammabhava*² and not *uppattibhava*. It is related to *bhava* in two ways, *kamma* and *upanissaya* (see p. 217). Rebirth is dependent on certain external circumstances, but assuming those as common to two beings, one notices differences between them. This difference is due to the nature of *kamma-bhava*, i. e. deeds of past life, so it is said that actions distinguish beings, such as, low and high (*kammaṃ satte vibhajati yad idaṃ hīnapañītatāyā ti*).³

(12) *Jarāmarāṇa-soka-parideva-dukkha-domanassa* *or old age, death, grief, lamentation, and sorrow*

Jarāmarāṇa, etc. take place on account of rebirth (*jāti*) but the relation of these to *jāti* is only two, viz., *upanissaya* and *purejāta* (see p. 217).

The last two links, it should be remembered, relate to future existence.

Rebirth and not transmigration

The expositors of the law of dependent origination have deliberately avoided the question of the existence of an entity or individual, which becomes subject to feeling (*vedanā*), desire (*taṇhā*), strong attachment (*upādāna*), and desire for re-exis-

1 *Vism.*, p. 572

2 See above. Cf. *Kammabhava* in *Kośa*, V. 1

3 *Majjhima*, III, p. 203 ; *Vism.*, p. 576.

tence (*bhava*) and rebirth (*jāti*). The object of this law is to establish that a living being composed of five *skandhas* is beginningless, and is in a continuous state of flux, each preceding group of *skandhas* giving rise to a subsequent group of *skandhas*, and this process is going on momentarily and ceaselessly in the present existence as also in the future until the eradication of *avidyā* and the attainment of *Nirvāṇa*. The conventional attribution of time-limit to the continuous flow of *skandhas* gives rise to the notion of birth and death, and this time-limit is generally applied to living beings. This time-limitation, which does not exist by itself, and which is not applied to physical objects, has obscured the life-continuum (*santati*) of a living being. In other words, there is no death or abrupt end of the *skandhas*, i.e., *nāma-rūpa*. There is a drastic change in *nāma-rūpa* at the so-called death stage but these continue in their subtlest, almost imperceptible form from death to rebirth. Just as in a forest a corn ripens, falls to the ground, and then grows again without the help of a cultivator, so one group of *skandhas* also gives rise to another group of *skandhas* without any Creator or doer and this takes place according to the law of causal sequence. The Buddhists describe this process as rebirth and not transmigration and deny the function of *jīvātman* which pass from one existence to another like the caterpillar from one blade of grass to another (see above, p. 17). The process is like a stream of water flowing continuously till it reaches the sea, the *Nirvāṇa*.

CHAPTER XI

Anattā, Anicca & Dukkha

The three terms: *Anattā* (= *Anātman* = absence of soul), *Anicca* (= *Anitya* = impermanence) including *Kṣaṇikatva* (momentariness) and *Dukkha* (= *Duḥkha* = suffering) are the three watchwords of Buddhism and form the core of the Buddhist philosophy. An attempt has been made here to give an exposition of these terms.

Anātman

Next in importance to the doctrine of *Pratītya-samutpada* is the doctrine of *anātman* (absence of soul), which was the subject matter of Buddha's second discourse to his Brāhmaṇa companions. The Brāhmanic thinkers accept as an axiomatic truth that every living being has a permanent soul, which remains unaffected by the actions of an individual, and which is regarded as the carrier of *karmaic* effects and as the link between one life and another. The main objection of the Buddhists to this theory is based on the illogicality of associating two entities, which have contrary characteristics, viz. purity and impurity, grossness and subtlety. The Buddhists question, how can an eternal substance which is pure by nature and fully liberated can be linked with another object which is evanescent, impure and unliberated. Besides such illogical combination, the existence of an eternal soul cannot also be established by direct perception or valid inference. By such arguments the Vedāntic view about soul is refuted by the Buddhists.

Buddha, as a student of Sāṅkhya and other Brāhmanic schools of thought, was well acquainted with this doctrine and evidently he could not very well appreciate the Sāṅkhyan standpoint that soul or *puruṣa* was an inactive agent while intellect (*buddhi*) or egoism (*ahaṅkāra*) which issued out of *prakṛti* was

an active agent. He found some reasoning in the conception of *ahaṅkāra* but none in that of *puruṣa*. He stated, as discussed above, that everything worldly, without any exception, must be caused and conditioned, and *ātman* (soul) being a part and parcel of a living being could not be uncaused and unconditioned as upheld by the Upaniṣadic schools of thinkers. He was also unable to accept the Upaniṣadic proposition that the individual soul was not different from the Great soul,—the self-conscious reality, the manifestation of which is the phenomenal world. His contention was that a being was composed of five *skandhas* (mass of elements), and so the soul should be identical with any one of these five or with all the five taken together, or with something other than the five *skandhas*. As none of these alternatives are applicable to soul, the Buddhists hold that there is no soul. There were among his disciples a few who wanted to identify consciousness (*viññāna*), the fifth *skandha*, with soul, but this was also not tenable in view of the fact that *viññāna* also was subject to origin and decay, while soul, according to the Brāhmanic thinkers, was not so. Many a time Buddha had to cross words on this issue with the Brāhmanic teachers like Vacchagotta and Māluṅkyaputta, to whom he pointed out that as it was impossible to locate the flame of a lamp after it had been extinguished, so it was absurd to look for a soul after death. The flame was visible so long there were causes and conditions, and it became invisible and locationless, when its causes and conditions i. e. oil and wick were absent or withdrawn.¹ The soul, if any, disappears like the flame when the causes and conditions cease to exist and function. Hence the existence of a permanent soul cannot be upheld. There were one or two Buddhist schools of thought like the Vātsīputrīyas, who held that there might not exist an eternal soul but there must be, apart the five *skandhas*, something which was the seat of I-ness, other-

1 *Samyutta*, III, p. 46.

wise, how could Buddha say that in a previous existence, he was such and such a being. It is this seat of I-ness that maintained the identity of one life and another. Instead of using the term “*ātman*”, the Vātsīputrīyas preferred to use the term “*puggala (= pudgala)*”. This new viewpoint was vehemently opposed by the Sthaviravādins (=the Pali School) in the *Kathāvatthu* as well as by the Sarvāstivādins in the *Abhidharmakośa* (last chapter).

Apart from the untenability of the theory of soul from the philosophical point of view, Buddha regarded the conception of soul as the root-cause of our notion of I-ness, and consequently, of our misery. In fact, in every religion and philosophy, an adept is asked to get rid of the notion of I-ness. Attachment to self is the greatest obstacle to spiritual progress and to the attainment of Nirvāṇa, hence the eradication of belief in the existence of a self (*satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*) is the first condition to be fulfilled by an adept aspiring to *srotā-āpanna*hood, the first stage of sanctification¹. It is rather striking that in the *Samyutta Nikāya*² appears a conversation which took place between King Prasenajit and his queen Mallikā on the same lines though not exactly in the same sense as that of Yājñavalkya and his wife Maitreyī. The king asked his queen whether she knew anything dearer than her own self (*atthi nu kho te Mallike koc'añño attanā piyataro ti*) and the reply was in the negative, and the king also gave a similar reply to the counter-question of the queen. When this conversation was brought to the notice of the Teacher, he dilated on the same and requested the king to desist from killing animals in a sacrifice, because the self was as much dear to the animals as it was to him and the queen. At the very beginning of his missionary career, Buddha realised that love of self was the root-cause of worldly misery, and the best way to eradicate this love of self was to establish that there was no soul, immaculate and permanent, a belief to

1 See *Infra*, p. 252.

2 *Ibid.*, I, p. 75.

which the people had clung so far. This belief, he said, led to the notion of I-ness and became a source of grief. Hence, his teaching was that all worldly objects including living beings were selfless and every constituent of a being was subject to the law of causation, and there could not be anything within a being which was not subject to this universal law.

In the Pāli texts it is stated that the belief in the existence of a soul, or in other words, the heresy of individuality (*sakkāya-diṭṭhi*) is due to the misapprehension of one of the five constituents (*khandhas*) as the soul in the following four ways:—

(i) attā is the same as rūpa, or vedanā, or saññā, or saṅkhārā, or viññāṇa (*rūpaṃ* etc.¹ *attato samanupassati*) ;

(ii) attā is possessed of rūpa etc.¹ (*rūpavantam* etc.¹ *attānaṃ samanupassati*) ;

(iii) in attā there is rūpa etc.¹ (*attani rūpaṃ* etc.¹ *samanupassati*) ;

(iv) attā is in rūpa etc.¹ (*rūpasmim* etc.¹ *attānaṃ samanupassati*)².

In the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*³ is explained how this misapprehension takes place. It says that a person while meditating sometimes conceives of

(i) the object of meditation (*paṭhavikasina*, etc.⁴), when converted into a concept as identical with himself. It is like identifying (*advayam*) the flame of a burning lamp with its colour (*yā acci so vaṇṇo yo vaṇṇo sā accīti*);

(ii) the *khandhas* as belonging to self (*attā rūpena rūpavā*) just as some say that a tree and its shadow, although separate entities, are identical, i.e., one belongs to the other (*rukkho imāya chāyāya chāyāvā*);

1 *rūpa* etc.=the five *khandhas*, viz., rūpa, vedanā, saññā, saṅkhārā and viññāṇa.

2 In the *M. Vr.*, p. 432 and elsewhere it is shown that the misapprehension happens in five ways, the first four being the same as stated above, while the fifth being that the *Attā* is something different from the *skandhas*.

3 *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, I, pp. 146-150.

4 See above, p. 165.

(iii) the *khandhas* as existing in the self (*attani rūpaṃ passati*) just as one would say that smell and flower, although two separate entities, are identical, i.e., smell is in flower;

(vi) the *khandhas* as the container of the self as a casket is of the jewel.

It appears from the discourse in the *Milindapañha*,¹ that among the five *khandhas*, *viññāṇa* is more often identified with *attā* or *jīva* than the rest, but no such distinction is noticeable in the *Nikāyas*.

As a consequence to the mistaken identification of *attā* with one of the components of a being, the soul also may be classified like the beings into three types thus²:

(1) *attā* of beings of Kāmadhātu, viz., from Avīci to Paranimmita gods as gross (*olārika*).³

(2) *attā* of beings of Rūpadhātu from Paṭhamajhānabhūmi to Akaniṭṭhabrahmaloka as *manomaya*,⁴ i.e., material but very subtle like mind, and

(3) *attā* of beings of Arūpadhātu from Ākāsānañcāyatana-brahmaloka to Nevasaññānāsaññāyatana-brahmaloka is *arūpa*⁵ i.e. non-material.

According to the Buddhists, *attā* does not exist, it is only a word of common usage⁶ and does not correspond to any real entity, hence no question should arise as to its existence, not to speak of its identification with one of the *khandhas*.

In the *Milindapañha* the question is raised whether *attā* is something different from the *khandhas* and whether it is an active agent living within the body and acting through the organs of sense. This is refuted by Nāgasena by the argument that when the organs of sense cease to work, the

1 *Milindapañha*, p. 86.

2 *Dīgha*, I, p. 195; see also the commentary on *Poṭṭhapādasutta*.

3 *Olārika* = Rūpī cātummahābhūtiko kabaliṇkārāhāra-bhakkho.

4 *Manomaya* = Rūpī manomayo sabbaṅga-paccaṅgi ahīnindriyo.

5 *Arūpa* = Ārūpi saññāmayo.

6 *Dīgha*, I, p. 202: lokasāmaññā lokaniruttiyo lokavohāro lokapaññattiyo; cf. *M. Vṛ.*, p. 345: nāmamātrakam evātmānam.

function of *attā* also ceases, and so it cannot be said that it has a separate and independent existence of its own.¹

Life (*jīva*), according to the Buddhists, is dependent on span of life (*āyu*), heat (*usmā*) and consciousness (*viññāṇa*) just as the sound of a conch-shell has no existence of its own, but is dependent on the blower, his exertion, and the wind blown into it.²

Nāgārjuna's arguments

In his works, Nāgārjuna also takes up the same position as indicated in the Pāli texts, and proceeds in his own way to show that *ātman* is not the same as one of the *skandhas* nor has it a separate and independent existence of its own apart from the *skandhas*. The stanzas on the point in the *Madhyamakāvatāra*³ run thus:—

स्कन्धेष्वत्मा विद्यते नैव चामी सन्ति स्कन्धा आत्मनीतीह यस्मात् ।
सत्यन्यत्वे स्यादियं कल्पना वै तच्चान्यत्वं नास्त्यतः कल्पनैषा ॥

[The soul is not in the *skandhas* (i. e., five constituents) nor are the *skandhas* in the soul; had they (soul and *skandhas*) been separate, then one holding the other could have been imagined; but as there is no separateness between the soul and the *skandhas*, the statement that one holds the other is pure imagination (i. e. false).]

इष्टो नात्मा रूपवान्नास्ति यस्माद् आत्मा वत्त्वार्थोपयोगो हि नातः ।
भेदे गोमान् रूपवानप्यभेदे तच्चान्यत्वेऽरूपतो नात्मनः स्तः ॥

[As the soul is not made of matter (*rūpa*),⁴ its existence cannot be admitted, and for the same reason, it cannot be said that the soul possesses attributes of its own (*vattvārtho-*

1 *Milindapañha*, pp. 55. 86.

2 *Dīgha*, II, p. 338; see also p. 209 n. 5.

3 See *M. Vr.*, p. 434.

4 *Rūpa* here also is not form but matter. It is referring to the *skandhas* in general by a concrete instance. The translations given here are in the light of their Tibetan rendering. See *Madhyamakāvatāra* (Tibetan ed.), p. 265; *M. Vr.*, p. 435 fn. 1.

payoga). If the soul and *rūpa* be regarded as separate, then the relation between the soul and *rūpa* would be like the cowherd and his cows, and if they are regarded as not separate (*abheda*), the soul would be made of *rūpa*, hence neither identity (*tattva*)¹ nor difference (*anyatva*) of the soul and the skandhas can be established.]

All the controversies about *attā* whether in the Pāli texts or in the works of Nāgārjuna rest on the fact that the constituents of a being, if analysed, cannot be shown to have anything called soul, apart from the five skandhas, which include, as they do, all the elements that compose a being.

The Buddhists therefore take two lines of argument, viz., that the soul should either be *identical with* one or more or all of the skandhas, or be wholly *different from* the skandhas, the stock Pāli expression for this is *taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīraṃ* or *aññaṃ jīvaṃ aññaṃ sarīraṃ* (either vitality i.e. soul is identical with body or different from body). The authors of Pāli texts assert, without giving sufficient reasons, that both the above propositions are wrong (*micchādiṭṭhi*), while Nāgārjuna has recourse to his usual critical line of reasoning, viz., *reductio ad absurdum*, to show that it is absurd to establish a relation of identity or difference between the soul and the skandhas. Nāgārjuna's arguments are briefly as follows:

What is *Ātman*—the basis of the sense of I-ness (*ko'yam ātmā nāmeti yo'haṅkāra viṣayaḥ*)? It should be either the skandhas themselves (*skandhasvabhāva*) or something apart from the skandhas (*skandhavyatirikta*). That is, the relation between the soul and the skandhas should be either one of identity (*ekatva*) or of difference (*anyatva*).²

1 See *M. Vr.*, 433: *tattva* = *ekatva*.

2 In the case of *anyatva* again, the question of the relation of the container and the contained (*ādhāra ādheya*) arises, viz., whether *Ātman* is in the skandhas or the skandhas are in the *Ātman*. See *ante*, p. 232; also *Mvyut.*, p. 208.

Both these positions, according to Nāgārjuna, are untenable on the following grounds:

आत्मा स्कन्धा यदि भवेदुदयव्ययभागभवेत् ।

स्कन्धेभ्योऽन्यो यदि भवेद्भवेदस्कन्धलक्षणः ॥

[If ātman be the same as the skandhas, it would be subject to origin and destruction, again if it be different from the skandhas it would be without the characteristics appertaining to the skandhas.]¹

Hence, it is not possible to establish any relation of identity or difference between the soul and the skandhas.

Identification of soul with skandhas how faulty?

The following are some of the untenable positions that would arise by the identification of ātman with the skandhas:

(a) ātman, which had no existence before, comes into being, so it becomes an object constituted (*kṛtaka*) and hence impermanent, but ātman is regarded by the opponents as unconstituted (*akṛtaka*) and permanent;

(b) ātman requires a creator but a creator of ātman, apart from the ātmā itself, is not known. If the ātman be conceived as the creator of itself, then the contingency arises that the world had a beginning and that a being which did not exist before can appear, and so ātman becomes constituted (*kṛtaka*);²

(c) ātman originates without any cause (*sambhūto vāpya-hetukaḥ*). If it be said that ātman had no existence before and there was no creator, and then if its present existence be admitted, it would be admitting origination of an object without cause, but this is not permissible;³

(d) ātman is subject to momentary origination and destruction like the skandhas or upādāna-skandhas, but that is not acceptable to the opponents;⁴

1 *M. Vr.*, p. 341.

2 *M. Vr.*, p. 581.

3 *M. Vr.*, p. 581.

4 Further, at the moment just preceding Nirvāṇa, the destruction and origination of ātmā would take place according to the doctrine of

(e) skandhas and ātman, i. e., *upādāna* (the material cause) and *upādātṛ* (the agent) become one, but *upādāna* requires an agent in order that it may be given a shape. If the agent be the same as *upādāna*, then it would lead to the oneness (*aikyam*) of the agent and the thing produced by the agent, e.g. between the feller of the tree and the tree, the potter and the pot, the fire and the firewood; but this is not admissible;¹

(f) ātman would be many like the skandhas;

(g) there would be no contradistinction (*vaiparītyam*) between the characteristics of matter (*dravya*) and those of ātman;

(h) ātman would be extinct (*uccheda*) in nirvāṇa.

Differentiation of soul from skandhas how faulty?

Having asserted that ātman cannot be identified with the skandhas, Nāgārjuna takes up the counter-proposition, viz., whether ātman is different from the skandhas (*skandha-vyatiriktaḥ*), and shows the absurdities to which this would again lead:

(a) If ātman be different from the skandhas, then it must not have the characteristics of the dependently originating skandhas, viz., origin, continuity and destruction (*utpāda-sthiti-bhaṅga-lakṣaṇā*). As these characteristics are absent in ātman, being different from the skandhas, and as it is said to be not dependently originated, therefore it must be admitted that it is non-existing like the sky-flower, for no definition can be offered of such ātman. It can only be pointed out as the basis of the sense of I-ness.

(b) Again each of the five skandhas possesses some characteristics of their own, i.e., rūpa possesses the character-

momentary existence (*kṣaṇikavāda*). If the agent has been destroyed, who is it that enjoys the fruit? The contingency that arises is that one acts and another enjoys the fruits.

¹ M. Vṛ., p. 576.

istic of taking forms (*rūpana*),¹ *vedanā* and *saṃjñā* that of ascertaining the cause of direct perception (*anubhavanimittod-grahaṇa*) and *vijñāna* of having detailed knowledge of objects. If *ātman* be distinguished from the *skandhas* as *vijñāna* is done from *rūpa*, then it should have some characteristics of its own, e.g., it would be something like mind (*citta*) as distinguished from matter (*rūpa*). If its special characteristics be denied, it is meaningless to say that it has existence apart from the *skandhas*.

Thus, it follows that it is futile to establish between the *ātman* and the *skandhas* a relation of identity (*ekatva*) or difference (*anyatva*), or to give *ātman* the attributes of permanency (*nityatva*) or impermanency (*anityatva*). To say that *ātman* is permanent (*nitya*) or impermanent (*anitya*) would make one either a *Śāśvatavādin* or an *Ucchedavādin*, both of which views are rejected in the Buddhist texts in unequivocal terms. Therefore, *ātman* should not be identified with, or distinguished from, *skandhas* (*upādāna-skandhas*).

Nāgārjuna's conclusion

It may be contended that the non-Buddhists attribute to *ātman* some characteristics which are different from those of the *skandhas*, viz., that *ātman* is not an agent, but an enjoyer of fruits, attributeless and inactive; it is only when it takes something of the world (*prakṛti*) as support then only its distinctions are known.²

Nāgārjuna is not prepared to accept the contention of the non-Buddhists that a perfectly pure *ātman* exists without the *skandhas*, on the ground that any analysis of the constituents of a being does not furnish us with any proof about its independent existence. It has, according to N., for its basis a

1 Cf. *M. Vr.*, p. 343 n: *ruppanalakkhaṇaṃ rūpaṃ*; *rūpa*, the object and instrument of *nirūpaṇa*.

2 *M. Vr.*, p. 344.

mere notion, to which the non-Buddhists have attributed existence and qualities.

So he says that the characteristics, which the non-Buddhists attribute to ātman, are not based on the actual conception of the form of ātman (*na svarūpata ātmānam upalabhya*). The non-Buddhists do not understand the real basis of the notion of ātman, which is a mere term. Though they cannot establish anything, yet, out of fear, they recede from even the conventional truth and become entangled in pure conjectures, and being thus deluded, they conceive of an ātman and attribute to it some characteristics. Nāgārjuna then quotes a few verses giving his own idea of the ātman. He says: Just as on account of a mirror, an image, which is not real, is seen, so also on account of the skandhas, the notion of I-ness, which is unreal, arises.¹ As without a mirror, an image is not seen, so without the conglomeration of elements (skandhas), the notion of I-ness does not arise.²

When Buddha denied the existence of *attā*, i. e., of any permanent substance apart from the *khandhas*, he could not be expected to give an exposition of it. He therefore relegated it to the group of indeterminable (*avyākata*) problems.

Theory of Karman

The denial of a permanent soul was a bold departure made by Buddha from the current beliefs, and for this he had to face many a bitter criticism. One of such criticisms is how to explain, without admitting the existence of soul, the transference of *karmaic* effects after death.

1 The simile is: I=Image on a mirror; skandhas=mirror.

2 *M. Vr.*, p. 345:

यथादर्शमुपादाय स्वमुखप्रतिबिम्बकं । दृश्यते नाम तच्चैव न किञ्चिदपि तत्त्वतः ॥
अहंकारस्तथा स्कन्धानुपादायोपलभ्यते । न च कश्चित्स तत्त्वेन स्वमुखप्रतिबिम्बवत् ॥
यथादर्शमनादाय स्वमुखप्रतिबिम्बकं । न दृश्यते तथा स्कन्धाननादायाहमित्यपि ॥

These verses served to remove the avidyā of Ānanda and made him an Arhat.

As explained above, Buddha took his stand on two theories, viz., the causal sequence and the momentary existence of a composite. Every being, according to him, is in a continuous process of change as stated above, the process being governed by the law of causal sequence, i.e., change is effected every moment by the immediately preceding causes and conditions. A living being composed of five *skandhas* is always in a state of becoming, in a state of flux.

In spite of their non-soul (*anattā*) theory, the Buddhists agreed with the Upaniṣadic thinkers about the transmission of *karmaic* effects from one life to another. To explain this, the Buddhists applied their law of causal sequence and held that every act of being produced its effect then and there. In the formula of causal sequence, *saṃskāras* or mental dispositions as a result of the non-realisation of the Truth (*avidyā*) are shown as the immediately preceding cause of the present existence. The *saṃskāras* represent the accumulated *karmaic* effects left in a being before his rebirth. The results of acts done in the previous life are transmitted to that consciousness which brings about re-existence (*pratisandhi-vijñāna*) and this transmission takes place ceaselessly uninterruptedly (*santāna*) like water flowing in a stream. In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*¹ there is a simile to illustrate the place of *karman* in the future existence of a being. It is as follows: Acts (*karman*) = field (*kṣetra*); consciousness (*vijñāna*) = seed (*bīja*); thirst (*tṛṣṇā*) = water (*sneha*); and lastly ignorance (*avidyā*) regulates thirst and thereby settles the higher or lower states of future existences. This simile is illuminating in many respects, particularly for the analogy of consciousness (*vijñāna*) with seed (*bīja*). This consciousness evidently refers to the last consciousness, in which a being seeks rebirth, i.e., *pratisandhi-vijñāna*. This *vijñāna* gives rise to the four mental factors (*nāma*), which take as their support (*ālambana*) the material elements (*rūpa*). It is with the help of *prati-*

1 *Aṅguttara*, I, p. 223.

sandhi-vijñāna, the karmaic effects, stored in *saṃskāras* of past life, are transmitted to the next life. By this exposition the Buddhists do away with the notion of a permanent self.

The growth of the new *vijñāna* depends on thirst (*trṣṇā*) developed by the individual in the new existence. In the *Mahāvastu*¹ ignorance and thirst are shown as the roots of *karma*, which brings about re-existence. In the *Kośavyākhyā*² it is stated that the *saṃskāras* of merit (*puṇya*), of demerit (*apuṇya*) and of neither merit nor demerit (*āneñjya*) represent the resultants of one's acts of past life while the thirst for re-existence (*bhavataṇhā*) brings about results in the present life.

In the *Suttanipāta*³ emphasis is laid on *kamma* saying that all beings are born of, and subject to, their past deeds, and it is on account of these that one becomes a cultivator, an artist (*sippika*) or a king. There are many *suttas* in which it has been pointed out that a person reaps the fruits of his deeds in his subsequent existence and there is no escape from them.

Deeds are divided into three categories thus: those which produce fruit (i) in this life (*diṭṭhadhammavedanīya*); (ii) in the next life (*uppapjavedanīya*); and (iii) in a future life (*aparāpariya-vedanīya*). In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*⁴ it is stated that acts produce their effects wherever the being comes into existence, and the effects may appear in this existence, or in the next, or in a later existence. In the same *Nikāya*⁵ it is also pointed out that by leading a holy life (*brahmcariyāvāsa*) a person can put an end to the effects of *karman* of past life in the present. Buddha condemned those teachers who did not admit *karman* and its effect on after-life, and he agreed to give ordination to those who believed in *karman* and after-life.⁶ There are two or three ins-

1 *Mahāvastu*, III, p. 62.

3 *Suttanipāta*, 653-4.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 249.

2 *AKV.*, III, 24.

4 *Aṅguttara*, I, p. 134.

6 *Mahāvagga*, I, 3 & 11.

tances, in which Buddha was challenged as an *Akiriya-vādin* (upholder of non-action) to which he replied that he was an *akiriyavādin* so far as evil acts were concerned and he was a *kiriyavādin* in case of good acts. He held that attachment (*rāga*), ill-will (*dveṣa*) and delusion (*moha*) were the mainsprings of *karman*, while their opposites were either producers of good effects or neutralisers of *karman*. In the *Majjhima Nikāya*¹ traditional accounts are given of the sufferings of a person in this life as also in after-life in the various hells on account of his past evil deeds.²

It is by the elimination and neutralisation of deeds (*kamma*) that a person attains full emancipation. Self-exertion is the only means of Nirvāṇa, said Buddha, and by self-exertion he meant performance of certain deeds, moral and spiritual. Hence the greatest emphasis was laid on one's acts and exertion and non-dependence on a superior power or on any ritual and ceremony. *Kamma* is inexorable and can only be counter-acted by proper exertions, as Aṅgulimāla got rid of his sins of indiscriminate killing by his spiritual exercises (*sādhana*). Again, Buddha himself could not escape the effects of his past deeds as is illustrated by the event of his being wounded by a stone-chip of a missile thrown by Devadatta.³ Hence the Buddhists admit the force of *karman* and its effect in later existences though they deny the existence of a soul.

Anityatā and Kṣaṇikatva

The pessimistic view of wordly existence and possessions is based on impermanence, rather evanescence (*aniccatā*) of phenomenal objects. Buddha repeatedly reminded his disciples of this fact by saying '*aniccā vata saṅkhārā uppādavayadhammino*' (impermanent are the composites which are subject to

1 *Majjhima*, Suttas 129, 130, 135, 136.

2 Some of the *Avadānas* and *Jātakas*, particularly the *Vimānavatthu*, *Petavatthu* and *Mahākarmavibhaṅga* illustrate through stories the effects of good and evil deeds.

3 *Mil.*, 134-5.

origin and decay). Even the infinitesimal atoms of earth, water, air and fire (i.e. *rūpa*) are evanescent. The four elements are inseparable (*avinirbhāga*), so also are the four qualities, viz., colour (*vaṇṇa*), smell (*gandha*), taste (*rasa*) and nutritive essence (*ojā*). As such, each of the material elements as distinct objects exists in thought only as are the other *khandhas*, viz., feeling (*vedanā*), perception (*saññā*), impressions (*saṅkhārā*) and knowledge derived through the sense-organs (*viññāṇa*). These have no real existence and are changing ceaselessly, and so, not for a single moment they remain static. The Buddhist theory of impermanence points out the dynamic nature of all beings and objects of the world.

The Buddhists qualify impermanence (*anityatā*) with momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*),¹ i.e., the phenomenal objects are subject to change every moment, and within one moment take place their origin (*utpatti*), duration (*sthiti*) and decay (*vināśa*). As against this contention of the Buddhists, it is argued that momentariness cannot be directly perceived and further it leads to the admission of the absence of any cause (*ahetukatva*) for the origin of the second moment, because the first momentary existence disappears then and there and cannot be effective in producing the second momentary state. The counter-argument of the Buddhists is that momentariness cannot, it is true, be established by direct perception but it should be noted that momentariness is the characteristic nature (*svabhāva*) of effectiveness (*arthakriyākāritva*). By momentary cessation of an object is meant the absence of immediately preceding state (*svādhikaraṇa-samaya-prāgabhāva*). If momentariness as explained above be not admitted, then an object would remain the same for more than one moment, and the object that produces an effect in the present would also produce the same effect in the past and future, and would be subject to the

1 *Kṣaṇa* is indivisible and is calculated in *Kośa-vyākhyā* (III. 88)

fallacy that there could not be an accomplished effect (*kṛta-kāritā*) of an object, in other words, the purpose of an object would not be served.¹ Hence the Buddhists rightly contend that an object is momentary and produces its effect then and there and not in the past or future. It may be argued that an object retains its potentiality which will be effective in future but this argument is also fallacious because of the fact that two opposite characteristics, viz., presentness and pastness, or presentness and futurity cannot exist together. Therefore it should be admitted that the momentariness of an object can only establish the fulfilment of a purpose, and this is not possible if an object remains unchanged for more than one moment. The subtlety of the Buddhist interpretation of *kṣaṇika* is unique and may be regarded as a contribution to Indian thought. In short, it explains fully the dynamism of worldly objects or ceaseless change that takes place in worldly objects, in nature.

Duḥkha

Duḥkha or misery of phenomenal existence was recognised by the pre-Buddhistic thinkers. Buddha told his monks to realise that the tears shed by a being in its innumerable existences, if accumulated, would exceed the water of a sea² The Sāṅkhya schoolmen analyse misery (*duḥkha*) under three heads, viz., internal (*ādhyātmika*) due to physical disorder and mental agitation, external (*ādhibhautika*) due to injuries caused by men and beasts or by any outside agency, and supernormal (*ādhidaivika*) due to supernatural factors, or the great elements (*mahābhūtas*). In Buddhist texts,³ human

1 Cf. Bertrand Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 185: Cause cannot have a duration...the cause after existing placidly for some time should suddenly explode into effect.....is illogical. Again, cause cannot be static, no such cause is to be found in nature.

Cf. *Tattva-saṃgraha*, I, p. 11: भूतिर्येषां क्रिया सैव कारकं सैव चोच्यते ।

2 *Samyutta*, II, 178f.

3 *Visuddhimagga*, p. 499; *Mādhyamikavṛtti*, p. 475 n.

misery is sub-divided in a different manner thus: mental and physical pain (*dukkha-dukkhatā*), pleasure turning into pain (*vipariṇāma-dukkhatā*), and pain which arises and disappears due to change (*saṅkhāra-dukkhatā*).¹

Of the four truths (*cattāri ariyasaccāni*) the first truth to be realised by the wise is “*dukkha*” pain or suffering concomitant to phenomenal existence. Its popular exposition is the non-fulfilment of one’s desire causing resentment or disappointment, separation from the dear ones or association with the undesired ones causing mental pain. This *dukkha* is suffered by the commoners and not by the elect (*ariya*), and so, strictly speaking, such *dukkha* is not *ariyasacca*. *Dukkha* in the eyes of an advanced monk (*ariya*) is the possession of one’s body of five constituents (*upādānakkhandhas*), of wealth and property, because of the fact that one’s earthly possessions are evanescent and subject to decay (*vayadhammā*). Unless and until the nature of *dukkha* is fully comprehended by a monk, the next three truths, viz., desire as the source of *dukkha*, end of desire as the termination of *dukkha* and eighthfold path as leading to the end of *dukkha* remain incomprehensible to him. Realisation of *dukkha* therefore forms the first step in the Buddhist code of spiritual practices and its interpretation is more comprehensive than that of the earlier systems. The Buddhists have dealt with the problem of *dukkha* in as thorough a manner as possible.

1 See above, p. 137-8.

CHAPTER XII

Bodhipakkhiyadhamma

In the *Mahāparinibbānasutta*, the last discourse of Buddha, the Teacher summed up his teachings, saying that the thirty-seven acquisitions leading to the attainment of Perfect Knowledge (*Bodhipakkhiyadhammas*) form the sum total of his teachings. These are divided into seven groups.

It is not necessary that an adept should fulfil all the seven categories of the thirtyseven *dhammas*, and it will be enough for the attainment of emancipation if one or two of the categories are fully developed. Each of the seven categories deals in fact with all the practices needed for attaining the *summum bonum* and hence it will be found that many of the *dhammas* are almost identical though they carry a meaning which is in consonance with the title of the category.

I The first group of practices is called *Satipaṭṭhāna* (= Sans. *Smṛtyupasthāna*) or mindfulness, alertness, awareness of what is happening in one's body (*kāya*), feeling (*vedanā*), mind (*citta*), as also of what are his acquisitions (*dhamma*). This group of practices has been highly praised by the Teacher as the single best path (*ekayāna*) for attaining emancipation, and has been dealt with exhaustively in two suttas of the *Dīgha*¹ and *Majjhima*² *Nikāyas*, as also in other places³. There are four *Satipaṭṭhānas* which are as follows:

(i) *Kāya-satipaṭṭhāna*: For practising this an adept should be observant of whatever is happening in his body, e.g., in inhaling and exhaling, in sitting, lying or standing, in extending or contracting his limbs, and so forth. He has also to ponder over the contents of his body and the different

1 *Dīgha*, II: *Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna-suttanta*.

2 *Majjhima*, I, p. 55: *Satipaṭṭhānasutta*

3 *Saṃyutta*, V, p. 141 f.

states of the body when left in a cemetery. Lastly, he has to bear always in mind that his body is subject to origin and decay.

(ii) *Vedanā-satipaṭṭhāna*: In this practice, the adept should be closely observant of his feeling that is, to say, whether it is pleasant or unpleasant, or neither pleasant nor unpleasant, again, whether it is impure or pure, and so forth. Lastly, he is to bear in mind that it is subject to origin and decay.

(iii) *Citta-satipaṭṭhāna*: In this practice, the adept should ascertain whether or how far his mind is free from attachment (*rāga*), hatred (*dosa*) and delusion (*moha*), further whether it is concentrated (*saṅkhitta*) or distracted (*vikkhitta*), high or low, and so forth.

(iv) *Dhamma-satipaṭṭhāna*: In this practice, the adept should ponder over the facts, whether he has got rid of the hindrances (*nīvaraṇas*), or not, how the origin and decay of the constituents of a being take place, whether he is in possession of the higher spiritual attainments.

II. The second group of practices is called *Sammappadhāna* (= *Samyak-prahāṇa*) or right exertions, efforts. The duties prescribed under this head are the same as those of *sammā-vāyāma* (see p. 143) of the eightfold path, viz., to eradicate demerits, to collect merits and to preserve and increase the merits.

III. The third group of practices is called *Iddhipāda* (= Sans. *Ṛddhipāda*) or attainment of supernormal powers through meditations, for which are required strong desire (*chanda*), energy (*virīya*), mental application (*citta*) and examination and discrimination (*mīmamsā*). The adept should observe that each of these four practices of his is not feeble or clogged by idleness and arrogance. While undergoing these exertions, the adept rises above all distinctions of time and place or day and night and remains also mindful of the contents of his body.

These practices are supposed to confer many miraculous powers, of which there is a long list in the Nikāyas, e.g., he can rise and walk in air as if on land, he can dive into the earth as if in water, he can pass through a wall or any material obstruction, and so forth.

IV. The fourth group of practices is called *Indriya* or dominant factors or forces. These are as follows:

(a) *Saddhindriya* (=Sans. *śraddhendriya*) or the dominant faculty of faith. An adept is required to develop firm faith in Buddha as the fully enlightened, wise, world-knower, the excellent guide of men and gods, and so forth. This faith is also to be extended to *Dhamma* and *Saṅgha*.

(b) *Viriyaṇḍriya* (=Sans. *Vīryendriya*) or the dominant faculty of energy. An adept is required to be highly energetic and exerting for eradicating demerits, acquiring merits and preserving and developing the acquired merits. It is the same as *sammappadhāna* or *sammā vāyāma* (see p. 143).

(c) *Satindriya* (Sans. *Smṛtindriya*) or the faculty of memory. An adept should possess good memory and be able to remember acts done, or words uttered long ago. By the exercise of this faculty, the adept is also required to practise the four *satipaṭṭhānas*.

(d) *Samādhindriya* or the dominant faculty, which brings about concentration of thoughts and makes the adept rise higher and higher in meditations. One of its conditions is full dedication of oneself to this practice (*vossagga*). It is the same as the practice of four *jhānas* (*dhyānas*) (see p. 188f).

(e) *Paññindriya* (=Sans. *Prajñendriya*) or the dominant faculty of intellect. By applying his intellect the adept becomes aware of what he is coming within his knowledge and what he should do away with. Its main function is to make the adept realise the four truths, *dukkha*, *samudaya*, *nirodha* and *maggā*.

V. The fifth group of practices is called *Bala* or internal strength, prowess. The five terms constituting the *Balas* are the same as *Indriyas*, viz., faith (*saddhā*), energy (*virīya*), memory (*sati*), meditation (*samādhi*) and knowledge (*paññā*). The main difference between dominant “faculty (*indriya*)” and “strength (*bala*)” is that the former is actively operating and does not necessarily remain the same for all times while the latter is the result of the activity of the dominant faculty, and so it is steady and makes the adept firmly established in the same, i.e., the dominating faculty changes into steady resilient strength.

VI. The sixth group of practices is called the *Sambojjhaṅga* (Sans. *Sambodhyaṅga*), acquisitions leading to full enlightenment (*bodhāya saṁvattantīti sambojjhaṅga*). These have been highly praised by Buddha as the seven jewels (*ratnas*). These practices destroy the impurities (*āsavas*, of *kāma*, *bhava*, and *diṭṭhi*) and neutralise the five hindrances (*nīvaraṇas*), leading the adept to attain knowledge (*vijjā*) and emancipation (*vimutti*), in other words, the adept becomes an arhat (*khīṇāsava*) and realises that he has accomplished his task and would have no more rebirth (*khīṇā jāti kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ nāparam itthattāya*). The condition precedent to the acquisition of *sambojjhaṅga* is that the adept must be perfect in moral precepts (*sīla*), which are to serve as his support like the earth to the tree (*sīle paṭiṭṭhāya naro sapañño cittaṃ paññañ ca bhāvayaṃ*), and then he should take the eightfold path (*aṭṭhaṅgika magga*) as his spiritual guide (*kalyāṇa-mitta*).

This group of practices is arranged in such a way that one is a stepping stone to the next and may well be compared to the rise of a meditator from the first to the fourth meditation (*dhyāna*). These are as follows:—

(i) *Sati-sambojjhaṅga* (= *Smṛti-sambodhyaṅga*). Its acquisition is to be made in the same way as the four *satipaṭṭhāna* practices (see p. 246-7) which are practically

a form of meditation. He is expected to have advanced far in observing moral precepts (*sīla*), in practising meditation (*samādhi*), in acquiring knowledge (*paññā*) as also in mental emancipation (*vimutti*) from worldly objects and in deeper insight and realisation of what is emancipation (*vimutti-ñāṇa-dassana*). In addition to these, he is also to develop his memory in such a way that after listening to the discourses he may go to a solitary place and cogitate on the topics preached to him.

(ii) *Dhammavicaya-sambojjhaṅga* or discrimination (*vicaya*) about practices, acquisitions, neutralisations, etc., which come under the term “dhamma”, in other words, the adept is to examine whether the “dhammas” he has to deal with are good or bad, pure or impure, excellent or not, black or white and so forth. After listening to a discourse, he is expected to analyse the topics and their implications while sitting at a solitary place for the purpose of perfecting himself in *satisambojjhaṅga*.

(iii) *Viriya-sambojjhaṅga* or energy. It grows on account of application (*ārambha*) of one’s energy and exertion in every possible manner (*nikkama* and *parakkama*). It is similar to *viriyindriya* as explained above. The only addition is that the adept, after listening to a discourse and after discrimination, is to apply his energy to concentration of his thoughts (*bhāvanā*) on the topics of the discourses.

(iv) *Pīti-sambojjhaṅga* or serene pleasure and joy. This in fact is a result of the previous three acquisitions. It is the same process as explained in the case of the third trance (see p. 195), in which an adept after elimination of reflection (*vitakka*) and judgment (*vicāra*) derives pleasure. In the previous *sambojjhaṅga*, he exerts for meditation (*bhāvanā*), and on account of success in it, he has the next acquisition (*pīti*).

(v) *Passaddhi-sambojjhaṅga* or the state of mental tranquility or calmness. The four previously mentioned acquisitions particularly “Pīti” lead to tranquilization of both body and mind.

(vi) *Samādhi-sambojjhaṅga* or meditation. The previous acquisition “Passaddhi” leads to concentration of thoughts, quietude (*samatha*) and mental steadiness.

(vii) *Upekkhā - sambojjhaṅga* confers equanimity of mental state which remains undisturbed by any acquisition or non-acquisition,

These seven practices have been recommended by the Teacher to the sick monks for getting over their illness. Those, who have perfected themselves in these, become very popular and can satisfy others by discourses and expositions. These make them Anāgāmi, either an *Antarāparinibbāyi* or an *Upahaccaparinibbāyi* or *Uddhamsoṭo Akaniṭṭhagāmi* (see *infra*). Ultimately these bring to an end the three impurities, viz., attachment (*rāga*), hatred (*dosa*) and delusion (*moha*). These are sometimes cultivated by the adepts along with the four *brahmavihāras*, viz., amity (*mettā*), compassion (*karuṇā*), joy at others' success (*muditā*) and equanimity (*upekkhā*).

CHAPTER XIII

The Gradual Stages of Sanctification

Buddha wanted to admit into his Saṅgha only those persons,¹ in whom he found some merits (*kuśalamūla*) acquired in their previous births, as those would be helpful to them in their present spiritual life. He meant that the real benefits of his teachings could be derived by meritorious persons only and not by any and everybody. In course of time, Buddha delegated his power of conversion to his senior disciples, who were not in all cases able to know the previous merits of a candidate. Hence ordination was given to many undeserving persons. In Pali works, there are many instances, showing that a person had to his credit sufficient merits (*kuśalamūla*)² entitling him to become a *sotāpanna* after hearing only one discourse; there are also cases of persons becoming a *sakad-āgāmi*, *anāgāmi*, *arahat* by virtue of their stores of previous merits. The implication in such cases is that the persons in their previous lives had died after attaining a particular stage of sanctification, or its corresponding qualities, just preceding the one obtained by them in this life. Every person starts his spiritual career as an average man

1 Cf. *Jātaka*, VI, p. 70; *Petavatthu Cy.*, p. 38; Childers' *Dictionary*, "satthā paccusakāle lokam volokento imassa kulaputtassa upanissayam addasa". *Vinaya*, I, p. 16 : Yasakulaputtassa upanissayam disvā, etc. *Dasaratha-Jātaka* : Upanissaya-sampannānam manussānam saraṇāni c'eva sīlāni ca maggaphalāni deti.

2 These *kuśalamūlas* are called *mokṣabhāgiya* in the *Kośa*. They must be acquired in an existence prior to the attempt to acquire the *nirvedhabhāgiya* (Pāli: *nibbedhabhāgiya*) dharmas. See *Kośa*, IV, 125 fn.; *Dīgha*, III, p. 251 for cha *nibbedhabhāgiyā saññā*, *Samyutta*, V, p. 345 for cha *vijjābhāgiyā saññā*, which are enumerated as follows: *anicce dukkhasaññā*, *dukkhe anattasaññā*, *pahāṇasaññā*, *virāgasaññā*, *nirodhasaññā*.

(= *puthujjana* = *prthagjana*) unless he died at least as a *sotāpanna* in his previous existence.

Puthujjana (= *Prthagjana* = an average man)

A *puthujjana* is defined in the '*Majjhima Nikāya*¹ as one who labours under the delusion of "I-ness" and "Mine-ness" and thinks that he has *rūpa*, *vedanā*, etc. Not knowing the true law, he develops attachment to things which he should avoid, and thereby produces and increases the inflowing impurities (*āsavas*) of worldly desires, desire for re-existence and ignorance (*kāma*, *bhava* and *avijjā taṇhā*). In the *Puggala-paññatti*,² it is stated that a *puthujjana* is one who has neither got rid of the three fetters (*saṃyojanas*) nor applied himself to get rid of them. In the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*,³ a *puthujjana* is described as one who is striving to be an elect (*ariya*) and to be indifferent to the constituted objects (*saṅkhārā*) by regarding himself as impermanent, substanceless and source of suffering but this indifference does not become steady in his mind and sometimes even appears distasteful to him.

Gotrabhū or a member of the family of the elect (*ariya*)

The stage next to *Puthujjana* is *Gotrabhū*, which represents the last state of a *puthujjana*. A person becomes a *gotrabhū* when he is just fit to commence the practices which make a person an *ariya*. The *Paṭisambhidāmagga*⁴ takes *gotrabhū* not only as a stage prior to *sotāpanna* but also as indicating a class of persons who are on the way to *arhathood* and may be in possession of one of the eight fruits of sanctification (*magga-phala*). Likewise the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*⁵ places the *Gotrabhū* stage after the attainment of purity of insight

1 *Majjhima*, pp. 7, 239.

2 *Pug. P.*, p. 12; see *Compendium of Philosophy*, pp. 49-50.

3 *Paṭis. M.*, I, pp. 63-4, 94.

4 *Paṭis. M.*, I, pp. 66-8.

5 *Comp. of Phil.*, pp. 67-71, 129, 215 (treated in detail by Mrs. Rhys Davids in the Introduction).

with regard to the path (*paṭipadā-ñāṇadassana-visuddhi*)¹ and discernment leading to spiritual uplift (*vuṭṭhānagāmini-vipassanā-ñāṇam*) and makes the Gotrabhū an *ariya*, i.e., a *sotāpattimaggaṭṭha*. In the two works mentioned last, Gotrabhū denotes those persons, who are on the path and are entitled to become Arhats, and hence persons in any one of the three stages, *sotāpatti*, *sakadāgāmi*, and *anāgāmi* are to be counted as Gotrabhū.² In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*³ and the *Puggalā paññatti*,⁴ the Gotrabhū is an *ariya* and it is a stage just prior to the Sotāpattimagga.

Saddhānusārī and Dhammānusārī

Those who are between Gotrabhū and Sotāpanna (i.e. *sotāpattiphalapaṭipanna*) are divided into two classes, called *Saddhānusārī* and *Dhammānusārī*.⁵ They still practise the path of insight into the four truths (*Darśanamārga*). According to the *Kośa*, the former are of mild (*mṛdu*) and the latter of sharp (*tīkṣṇa*) faculties. The *Śraddhānusārīs* are those who follow the *dharma* through faith in their spiritual teacher, or in other words, they take to the practice of *smṛtyupasthāna*, etc., and work for the realisation of the Truth by being incited by others (*para-pratyayena*), while the *Dharmānusārīs* are those who set themselves to practise the *Bodhipakṣika dharmas* through the study of the scriptures (*dvādaśāṅga*).⁶ In the *Puggalapaññatti* it is stated that, of the persons who are working for the realisation of *sotāpattiphala*, those who have dominance

1 Buddhaghosa also supports this. See *Vism.*, p. 672: Ito (Paṭipadā-ñāṇadassanavisuddhi) param gotrabhū-ñāṇam hoti.

2 *Comp. of Phil.*, p. 68.

3 *Aṅguttara*, IV, p. 378.

4 *Pug. P.*, p. 14: Atṭha ariyapuggalā ariyā, avasesā puggalā anariyā.

5 *Pug. P.*, p. 15; *Kośa*, VI, 29, 63; *Dīgha*, III, p. 105; *Samyutta*, V, pp. 200, 205; *Vism.* p. 659.

6 *Kośa*, VI, 29. Dvādaśāṅga is mentioned only in the *Vyākhyā* in explanation of the term 'Dharma' of the *Kośa*.

of faith (*saddhindriyaṃ*) in a great measure (*adhimattam*) are called Saddhānusārī, while those who have dominance of knowledge (*paññindriyaṃ*) in a great measure are called Dhammānusārī. The persons of the former class, when established in the *sotāpattiphala*, are called Saddhāvimutta and those of the latter class Diṭṭhippatta. The only difference between these two classes is that the former destroys some of his *āsavas* but not as much as the latter.¹ For progressing along the path to Nibbāna, there are (i) two courses (*dhuras*)—faith (*saddhā*) and knowledge (*paññā*), (ii) two adherences (*abhinivesas*)—quietude (*samatha*) and introspection (*vipassanā*)² and (iii) two ultimate ends—Ubhatobhāgavimutta (one who attains emancipation by two means) and Paññāvimutta (one who attains emancipation by means of knowledge only).³ The followers of *saddhādhura* and *samathābhinivesa* are called Saddhānusārī while those of *paññādhura* and *vipassanābhinivesa* are called Dhammānusārī in the *sotāpannamagga* stage. In the next stage⁴ *sotāpattiphala*, both of them are also called *sattakkhattuparama* (i.e., they are to have seven more births). There are specific qualities, which an adept must possess in order to become a Sotāpanna. In the *Samyutta Nikāya*,⁵ Sāriputta asks Ānanda, “How many are the dhammas which one must give up as well as one must acquire⁶ for being a *sotāpanna* who has gone beyond the possibility of retrogression and is destined to attain

1 *Pug. P.*, 15: *paññāya c’assa disvā ekacce āsavā parikkhīṇā honi na ca kho yathā diṭṭhippattassa*. See also *Kośa*, VI, 63.

2 Cf. Geiger, *Samyutta Transl.*, II, p. 172. See also *DhP. A.*, I, pp. 8; IV, p. 37: *ganthadhura* (way of study) and *vipassanādhura* (way of contemplation).

3 See *Infra*.

4 The first stage is *sotāpattimagga* comprising the two classes called Saddhānusārī and Dhammānusārī.

5 There is a chapter called Sotāpatti-samyutta in the *Samyutta*, V, pp. 264, 362-3, 388.

6 *Dīgha*, III, p. 227: *Sotāpanno avinipātadhammo niyato sambodhiparāyaṇo*.

the highest knowledge. The reply of Ānanda was that one must have firm faith (*pasāda*) in Buddha, Dhamma, and Saṅgha¹ and must be endowed with all the *sīlas* liked and praised by the wise. These form the essentials of the first stage of sanctification (*sotāpattiyaṅgas*).² One who has these Sotāpattiyaṅgas is considered free of five sins, viz., killing, stealing, misconduct, lying, and drinking.³ In the same *Nikāya* a true disciple is described as a Sotāpanna,⁴ who knows the taste, the danger and the way out of the five dominant faculties (*indriyas*), viz., *sukha*, *dukkha*, *somanassa*, *domanassa*, and *upekkhā*. In a discourse in connection with the illness of Anāthapiṇḍika, it is said that a common man is expected also to comply as far as possible with the eight conditions of the eightfold path combined with true knowledge (*sammā ñāṇa*) and true emancipation (*sammā vimutti*) besides the four Sotāpattiyaṅgas.⁵ The Sotāpattiyaṅgas, in fact, are merely preliminaries, though essential, to the actual commencement of practices for attaining the Sotāpatti stage. The duties entailed upon a candidate just after the Sotāpattiyaṅgas are a further increase in pleasure (*pīti*), joy (*pāmojja*),

1 There is a formula for announcing the faith, see *Dīgha*, III, p. 227. The faith is called Saddhindriya, *Samyutta*, V, p. 196. *Paṭis. M.*, p. 161: Ye keci mayi aveccapasannā sabbe te sotāpannā. See *Kośa*, VI. 73, 34.

2 The other four sotāpattiyaṅgas, very rarely found, are: (i) sappurisasamsevā, (ii) saddhammasavanam, (iii) yoniso manasikāro, and (iv) dhammānudhammapaṭipatti, *Samyutta*, V, pp. 345, 411; *Dīgha*, III, p. 227; *Paṭis. M.*, II, p. 17 shows the connection between these and the indriyas.

3 *Samyutta*, II, pp. 68-71.

4 *Ibid.*, V, p. 207; *Paṭis. M.*, I, pp. 115-6 It says "Anaññātāññās-sāmītindriyaṃ ekaṃ thānaṃ gacchati, sotāpattimaggaṃ, and then explains the position of the indriyas. It adds that in the sotāpattimagga-kkhaṇa, except those things already existing, all thoughts that arise are pure, transcendental, and lead to Nibbāna.

5 *Samyutta*, V, pp. 381-4.

calmness (*passaddhi*), concentration (*samādhi*), and the acquisition of six (*cha vijjā- or nibbedha- bhāgiya*) dhammas leading to knowledge, i.e., realisation (*anupassanā*) of (i) transitoriness (*anicca*) of constituted things (*saṅkhārā*), (ii) unhappiness (*dukkha*) due to transitoriness, (iii) essencelessness (*anatta*) of things; as also (iv) giving up (*pahāṇa*) of impurities, (v) detachment (*virāga*), and (vi) cessation (*nirodha*).¹ In the *Dīgha Nikāya* there is the bare mention of the four kinds of knowledge, viz., *dukkhe ñāṇam*, *nirodhe ñāṇam*, *samudaye ñāṇam*, and *magge ñāṇam*.² An exposition of these is given in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*,³ which says that when one has “understanding, search, research, discernment, discrimination, etc. of each of the four truths, he is said to have comprehended the four truths.”

Darśana-mārga (Path of Insight)

Darśanamārga has received special treatment in the *Kośa*,⁴ which may be briefly stated here. There are two paths (*mārgas*) for the realisation of the truths: insight (*darśana*) and meditation (*bhāvanā*),⁵ the latter

1 *Samyutta*, V, p. 345; *Dīgha*, III, p. 251; *Kośa*, Intro. to chs. V and VI, p. iv. Prof. Poussin shows the order of progress in the pre-sotāpanna stage thus:—

- (i) Acquisition of the Mokṣabhāgiya-kuśalamūlas;
- (ii) Acquisition of the Ariyavaṃsas (*Kośa*, VI, 7c-d; 8a-b; *Anguttara*, II, p. 27; *Dīgha*, III, p. 224—rules relating to the requisites of a monk);
- (iii) Aśubhabhāvanā. Ānāpānasmṛti;
- (iv) Practice of Smṛtyupasthānas;
- (v) Acquisition of the Nirvedhabhāgiyadharmas;
- (vi) Satyābhisamaya (15 kṣaṇas)—darśanamārga.

2 *Dīgha*, III, p. 227: knowledge of the four truths but not subdivided into kṣaṇas.

3 *Paṭis. M.*, I, p. 119. See for translation of this stock passage. Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology*, p. 18.

4 Prof. Poussin has given a summary of it in the Intro. to his transl. of the *Kośa*, chs. V and VI; *M. Vr.*, p. 479, n. 4.

5 Bhāvanāmārga is cogitating on the Truths again and again. See *Kośa*, Intro. to chs. V and VI, p. vi.

commencing at the last point of the former. *Darśana* means the first glimpse of the truths, not visualised before (*adiṭṭha-pubba*) while *bhāvanā*¹ means development of the first glimpse to a clearer view of the truth. *Darśana-mārga* is divided into sixteen points (*kṣaṇas*, lit. moments) of comprehension of the truths,² which are as follows:—

1	Duḥkhe dharmajñāna-kṣānti ³	[faith producing the know-
5	Samudaye do.	ledge that existence in Kāma-
9	Nirodhe do.	dhātu is full of suffering, is
10	Mārge do.	subject to origin and decay
		and that there is also the path
		to the origin and cessation
		of suffering].
2	Duḥkhe dharmajñāna	[actual realisation of the fact
6	Samudaye do.	that existence in Kāmadhātu
10	Nirodhe do.	is full of suffering, is subject
14	Mārge do.	to origin and decay, and that
		there is also the path leading
		to their origin and cessation].
3	Duḥkhe anvayajñāna-kṣānti	[faith producing the know-
7	Samudaye do.	ledge that existence in Rūpa
11	Nirodhe do.	and Arūpa dhātus is full of
15	Mārge do.	suffering, is subject to origin
		and decay, and that there
		is also a path leading to their
		origin and cessation].
4	Duḥkhe anvayajñāna	[actual realisation of the fact
8	Samudaye do.	that existence in Rūpa and
12	Nirodhe do.	Arūpa dhātus is full of

1 *Atthasālini*, pp. 43, 163: Bhāveti ti janeti uppādeti vaḍḍheti.

2 See *Kośa*, VI, 261; VII, 4.

3 The order of *kṣaṇas* is to be made out from the number assigned to each of the sixteen *kṣaṇas*. For a list, see *Mvyut.* 56; and for detailed exposition, see *Kośa*, VII, 8, p. 13n.

16 Mārge anvayajñāna suffering, subject to origin and decay, and that there is also a path leading to their origin and cessation].

The exposition of the *Kathāvatthu* follows the traditional line of the Pali texts. It is as follows:

I By insight into suffering (<i>dukkha-dassana</i>) an adept gives up partially and not completely the belief (a) in a self, (b) in the efficacy of ritualistic practices, and (c) lack of faith in the Triratna (<i>sakkāyadiṭṭhi</i>, <i>sīlabbataparāmāsa</i> and <i>vicikicchā</i>) as also the impurities (<i>kilesas</i>) involved.	He is not yet a Sotāpanna or Sattakhattuparama or Kolamkola or Ekabījī.
II By insight into the origin of suffering (<i>samudayadassana</i>) he gives up (a) the belief in a self completely, and the other two (b) & (c) partially, as also the impurities.	do.
III By insight into the cessation of suffering (<i>nirodhadassana</i>) he gives up (c) lack of faith in the Triratna completely and partially (b) the belief in ritualistic practices as also the impurities.	do.
IV By insight into the eightfold path (<i>maggadassana</i>) he gives up completely (b) the belief in the efficacy of ritualistic practices and partially the impurities.	He is now a full-fledged Sotāpanna.

Sotāpanna (=Srota-āpanna)

According to the *Kośa*, a candidate while progressing along these point-instants (*kṣaṇas*) is called a Śraddhānusārī,

Dharmānusāri, or Srota-āpattiphalapratipannaka up to the fifteenth point. It is in the sixteenth point that he is considered established (*sthita*) in the *srota-āpattiphala* and he may now be said to have obtained the realisation of the four truths (*catuḥsatyābhisamaya*). This attainment, or in other words, the completion of the *Darśanamarga* frees him from the non-material impurities (*avastuka-kleśas*) viz., *satkāya-dṛṣṭi*, *vicikitsā* and *śīla-vrata-parāmarśa* and makes him an Ārya, a person entitled to let himself flow along the stream of sanctification. He is no more to be called a Śraddhānusārī or Dharmānusārī. He is now a Srotaāpanna,¹ a Sattakkhattuparama i.e. one who will have seven more existences.²

The fulfilment of moral (*sīla*) practices leads to the purification of conduct³, and serves as the basis for the attainment of Sotāpanna and Sakadāgāmi stages. In the first chapter of the *Visuddhimagga*, Buddhaghosa dilates on the various *sīlas* to be observed by the householders, lay-devotees, monks and nuns, supplementing it by the second chapter on the thirteen ascetic practices (*dhutaṅgas*), which are considered necessary for the ascetics (*yogī*) to bring their *sīlas* to perfection⁴. By complete observance of *sīlas* and a little of meditation and knowledge (*samādhi* and *paññā*)⁵ an adept becomes a Sotāpanna, who must also in addition get rid of the three fetters (*saṃyojanas*) and the two inclinations

1 *Kośa*, VI, 25fn., 53c-d: *Paṭis*. *M.*, I, p. 69 adds that the adept gives up micchādiṭṭhi, micchāsaṅkappa, etc., and takes sammādiṭṭhi, sammāsaṅkappa, etc.

2 There are disagreements among the schools as to the number of existences; some interpret seven existences among men and seven among the gods, and some even more, though the texts cited by each clearly show that seven existences in all were meant. See, for details, *Kośa*, VI, 34, pp. 200-2.

3 *Vism.*, p. 6: *sīlena ca duccarita-saṅkilesavisodhanam pakāsitam hoti*.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 59.

5 It will be observed that an adept commences practising all the three, *sīla*, *samādhi* and *paññā*, but he fulfils only one in one stage.

(*anusayas*), viz., wrong view and lack of faith in the Triratna (*diṭṭhi* and *vicikicchā*)¹. An adept in the Sotāpattiphala² as also in the higher stages obtains the faculty of higher knowledge (*aññindriya*), and the *dhammas* existing in him become neutral (*avyākata*), and the new thoughts that arise in his mind are pure, and conducive to Nibbāna³. A Sotāpanna gets rid of the impurities due to wrong view (*diṭṭhāsava*) and reduces also the other two impurities due to desire for re-existence and to ignorance (*bhavāsava* and *avijjāsava*)⁴, and as such, he is never destined to any existence in hell. In addition to the above attainments, a Sotāpanna must also cogitate on the transitoriness and essencelessness of the five constituents (*upādānakkhandhas*)⁵.

Kolaṃkola and Ekabījī

There are two sub-stages⁶ between Sotāpanna and Saka-dāgāmi, known as Kolaṃkola (=Sans. Kulamkula) meaning one who will pass from one family of beings to another and Ekabījī (=Sans. Ekavīcika),⁷ meaning one who will have one more existence before attaining Nibbāna. Either of them will never fall back into hells and is destined to attain Nibbāna after getting rid of two more lower fetters, viz., attachment and hatred (*kāmacchanda* and *vyāpāda*) and five higher fetters, viz., attachment for material and non-material objects, haughtiness, self-pride and delusion (*rūparāga*, *arūparāga*, *auddhatya*, *māna* and *moha*).

1 *Paṭis. M.*, II, p. 96.

2 *Ibid.*, I, pp. 72-3; II, p. 96.

3 *Ibid.*, I, p. 116.

4 *Ibid.*, I, p. 24.

5 *Saṃyutta*, III, p. 168.

6 *Aṅguttara*, I, p. 233; IV, p. 380-1; *Saṃyutta*, V, p. 205; *Pug. P.*, p. 16; *Netti.*, p. 189; *Vism.*, p. 709; *Paṭis. M.*, I, p. 161; *Kośa*, VI, 34.

7 *Kośa*, VI. 36 gives the etymology of the word thus: *vīci*=interval, separation, i.e., they are separated from Nirvāṇa by one more birth. Quite different, however, is the etymology given in the Pāli texts, in which, *bīja*=seed.

A Kolaṃkola acquires the pure faculties (*anāsrava-indriyas*) and thereby counteracts the impurities caused by other faculties (*indriyas*). He will be reborn twice or thrice among gods when he is designated as a Devakulaṅkula or among men when he is called a Maṇuṣyakulaṅkula¹. The *Nikāyas* do not make any difference between a Sotāpanna and a Kolaṃkola. Buddhaghosa distinguishes them by saying that the Kolaṃkolas have insight and higher faculties (*vipassanā* and *indriya*) of a medium type², while the Sotāpannas have those of a mild type.

The next stage Ekabījī (Ekavīcika) is put in the Pāli texts after Kolaṃkola and before Sakadāgāmi, but in the *Kośa* it is put after Sakadāgāmi.³ The superiority of Ekabījīs, as shown in the Pāli texts, is that they develop meditation and knowledge (*samādhi* and *pañña*) more than Kolaṃkolas but cannot complete them⁴. Buddhaghosa adds that they have sharp faculties (*tikkhindriya*). In consequence of this, they are reborn once more among men (*mānusakaṃ bhavaṃ*) for attaining Nibbāna.

The divisions of Srotaāpannas into three classes are mentioned also in the *Laṅkāvatāra*.⁵ It says that the Srotaāpannas are of ordinary (*hīna*), medium (*madhya*), and (*viśiṣṭa*) classes. The ordinary class will undergo seven more rebirths, the medium (*i.e.* Kulaṅkula) three or five, and the best (*i.e.* Ekavīcika) only one. The fetters (*saṃyojanas*, viz., *saṭkāya-dṛṣṭi*, *vicikitsā*, *śīlavrataparāmarśa*)⁶ are mild, medium or sharp according to the type of Srotaāpannas.

1 *Kośa*, II, 34.

2 *Vism.*, p. 709.

3 *Kośa*, VI. 35, 36,

4 'Na paripūrakārī' is used instead of 'mattasokārī'.

5 *Laṅkā.*, p. 117.

6 *Ibid.*, pp. 117-9 explains Saṭkāyadṛṣṭi as of two kinds, sahaja (natural) and parikalpita (imaginary), and then interprets Vicikitsā and Śīlavrataparāmarśa as a Yogācāra text would do.

Sakadāgāmi

In addition to the attainments acquired in the previous stages, a Sakadāgāmi brings down to the minimum (*tanutta*)¹ the three hindrances, viz., attachment, hatred and delusion, and cultivates a little more of meditation and knowledge (*samādhi* and *paññā*). He eliminates the two inclinations (*anusayas*), viz., attachment and aversion (*kāmarāga* and *paṭigha*). He destroys wholly the impurities due to wrong view (*diṭṭhāsava*) and partially the impurities due to desire for rebirth and to ignorance (*bhavāsava* and *avijjāsava*). A Sakadāgāmi also like an Ekabījī will have one more birth to attain Nibbāna but it is not clear whether he will be reborn as a god or as a man. The texts simply state that he will be reborn in the Kāmadhātu, which includes both men and gods.

Anāgāmi

A Sakadāgāmi, after completing the observance of moral precepts (*sīla*), attempts to rise higher and higher in mental control through meditation (*samādhi*)². The *Visuddhimagga*³ treats in detail the practices that are classed under “*Samādhi*.” A Sakadāgāmi, after perfecting himself in mental training, becomes an Anāgāmi, i.e., he will not be reborn any more in Kāmadhātu.⁴ He gets rid of the five lower fetters, viz., *sakkāyadiṭṭhi*, *vicikicchā*, *sīlabbataparāmāsa*, *kāmacchanda* and *vyāpāda*⁵ and destroys completely the three hindrances, viz., attachment, hatred and delusion (*rāga*, *dosa* and *moha*) and removes thoroughly the impurities due to attachment to worldly objects (*kāmāsava*) but not fully the impurities due to desire for rebirth and to ignorance (*bhavāsava* and

1 *Laṅkā*, p. 119; on this point *Laṅkā*. differs from all Hīnāyana texts.

2 *Vism.*, p. 84.

3 *Ibid.*, ch. II

4 *Pug. P. Cy.*, p. 198: *oraṃ vuccati kāmadhātu*.

5 The first three are destroyed by the Sotāpattis and Sakadāgāmis; so in this stage only the last two are destroyed.

avijjāsava)¹. He comes into existence as self-born² (*upapātika*) and attains Nibbāna.

The Anāgāmis are divided into five sub-classes³ called

(1) Antarāparinibbāyi = Sans. Antarā-parinirvāyin *i.e.* those who practise the path to destroy the five higher (*ud-dhambhāgiya*) fetters just after coming into being and before reaching the middle of their lives⁴.

(2) Upahacca-parinibbāyi (=Upapadya-parinirvāyin) *i.e.* those who practise the path to destroy the five higher fetters after the middle, and a little before the end of their lives.⁵

(3) Asaṅkhāraparinibbāyi, (= Sans. Anabhisamskāra-parinirvāyin) *i.e.*, those who attain *parinibbāna* by putting an end to all impurities with a little trouble and without great effort (*appadukkhena adhimattam payogam akatvā*)⁶. The *Kośa* explains it as those who attain Nirvāṇa without effort because they are not energetic⁷. The *Aṅguttara Nikāya* offers a different interpretation. It says that those who complete the fourth Jhāna, develop the five powers (*balas*) and five dominant faculties (*indriyas*) and attain *parinibbāna* in this life are called Asaṅkhāraparinibbāyi⁸.

(4) Sasaṅkhāraparinibbāyi, (= Sans. Sābhisamskāra-parinirvāyin) *i.e.* those who attain *parinibbāna* by putting an end to afflictions with great trouble and great effort (*dukkhena kasirena adhimattam payogam katvā*).⁹ The *Kośa* explains

1 *Paṭis. M.*, p. 118,

2 In the *Suddhāvāsalokas* (*Pug. P. Cy.*, p. 198).

3 *Vism.*, p. 710. The *Kośa* adds five more to this list. See fn. p. 265. *Pug. P. Cy.*, p. 200 calculates 48 classes of Anāgāmis out of these five.

4 *Pug. P.*, p. 16, *Kośa*, VI. 37 explains it differently.

5 *Pug. P. Cy.*, p. 199: āyukkhayassa āsanne thatvā. It may be remarked in this connection that the length of lives in these existences is counted by thousands of kalpas. *Kośa*, VI, p. 211 explains it as those who attain *sopādiṣṣanirvāṇa-dhātu* immediately after birth.

6 *Pug. P. Cy.*, p. 199.

7 *Kośa*, VI, p. 211.

8 *Aṅguttara*, II, p. 156.

9 *Pug. P. Cy.*, p. 199; see *Vism.*, p. 453: sasaṅkhāra-pubbapayoga.

it as those who attain Nirvāṇa without relaxing the exercises because they are energetic. The *Aṅguttara Nikāya* explains it as those who look upon the body as evil (*asubha*), food as loathsome and all constituted things as undesirable. They cogitate on the transitoriness of things and also on death, and make their minds steady. They develop greatly the five *balas* and five *indriyas*¹.

(5) Uddhamṣota (=Sans. ūrdhva-srotas) Akaniṭṭhagāmi, *i.e.*, those Anāgāmis who do not attain *parinibbāna* while they are in the Avīha heaven but rise higher and higher until they reach the Akaniṭṭha heaven where they attain Nibbāna.²

Arahat

An Anāgāmi on completion of the acquisition of knowledge (*paññā*) becomes an arhat. Buddhaghosa devotes the last twenty chapters of the *Visuddhimagga* to the elucidation of the various topics which comprise the *Paññābhūmi*. In this bhūmi³ the adept is expected to examine analytically the

1 *Aṅguttara*, II, p. 156. Cf. *Kośa*, VI, p. 212 fn. (Jap. ed p. 566) The Anāgāmis (1) and (4) are of sharp faculties, (2) and (3) of mild faculties. (3) and (4) practise the dhyānas while (1) and (2) are described without any mention of dhyānas. About the precedence of (3) to (4), see *Kośa*, VI, p. 212.

2 See *Kośa*, VI. 37, p. 213 for two kinds of Ūrdhvasrotas: (i) Akaniṣṭhagā and (ii) Naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatanagā.

The Akaniṣṭhagā are divided again into three sub-classes:

(a) Pluta (one who soars high), on account of dhyānas practised by him, is born in the Brahmakāyika heaven and lastly he is born in the Akaniṣṭha heaven where he attains Nirvāṇa;

(b) Ardhapluta (one who soars only half-way), on account of dhyānas practised by him, is born in the Brahmakāyika heaven, from which he passes to Suddhāvāsa and thence to Akaniṣṭha to attain Nirvāṇa there; and

(c) Sarvacyuta, before entering into Akaniṣṭha heaven, passes across all the heavens except Mahābrahma. An Anāgāmi cannot have two existences in one heaven because he steadily rises higher and higher.

3 *Vism.*, p. 443

five constituents of the body, the twelve fields of the organs of sense, twenty two kinds of dominant faculties, four truths, and the twelve linked chain of causation. These form the preliminary training of the *Paññābhūmi*, helping the *Anāgāmis* to complete the higher path of introspection (*bhāvanāmārga*)² which commences in the sixteenth moment, *i. e.*, the last point-instant of the path of insight (*darśana-mārga*). The adept while progressing along the stages of sanctification completes the purities (*visuddhi*) derived through the observance of moral precepts (*sīla*) and meditational practices (*citta*) and attains partially the purity of knowledge (*paññā-visuddhi*), which consists of the following :³

(a) purity of views about the Reality and the phenomenal world (*diṭṭhivisuddhi*);

(b) purity by which all the sixteen kinds of doubts about the past, present and future are eliminated (*kaṅkhāvitarāṇa-visuddhi*);

(c) purity consisting in the determination of the right path and distinguishing it from the wrong path (*maggāmagga-ñāṇadassanavisuddhi*);

(d) purity of insight and knowledge about the path to be followed (*paṭipadāñāṇadassanavisuddhi*);

(e) purity in insight and knowledge (*ñāṇadassanavisuddhi*).⁴

An Arhat gets rid of the remaining higher fetters (*ud-dhambhāgiya-saṃyojanas*)⁵ and all afflictions (*kilesa*) and impurities (*āsava*) and comprehends finally the real sense of the four truths, *i. e.*, he obtains perfect knowledge and his mind is completely freed. He will have no more rebirth and will attain *Nibbāna*. A stock-expression about the

1 See above, chs. ix-xi.

2 See above, p. 257.

3 *Vism.*, pp. 443, 587f., *Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 65f.

4 *Vism.*, p. 443. Buddhaghosa names these *visuddhis* as *sarīra* and the *sīla* and *citta visuddhis* as *mūla*. See also *Vism.*, p. 672.

5 These are *rūparāga*, *arūparāga*, *māna*, *uddhacca*, and *avijjā*.

Arhats found in Mahāyāna texts is as follows : “An arhat is devoid of all impurities and free from afflictions, has a well-controlled self and well-freed mind and knowledge. Like a well-bred elephant he has done all that is to be done and has relieved himself of the burden of the five constituents. He is successful in achieving his own object of life and is free from the fetters of rebirth”.¹

There are some Arhats, who in addition to the above attainments, acquire also the four analytical knowledge (*paṭisambhidā*) of word-meaning (*attha*), etymology (*nirutti*), philosophical sense (*dhamma*) and method of oral exposition (*paṭibhāna*). They are distinguished as *saha-paṭisambhidā*.²

Ubhatobhāgavimutta and Paññāvimutta

The Arhats are also distinguished as of two categories, known as *Ubhatobhāgavimutta* and *Paññāvimutta*. The former denotes those, who have attained emancipation by two means, viz., by perfecting himself in the eight Releases (*Vimokkhas*) from thought-constructions and by acquisition of the highest knowledge (*paññā*). The latter practises only the first four meditations (*jhānas*) and not the higher ones nor the Releases (*Vimokkhas*). In the *Dīgha Nikāya*³ credit is given to the former as of superior category.

Of the eight Releases (*Vimokkhas*), which distinguish the two categories of Arhats, four are identical with higher

1 Cf. *Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā*, p. 4: सार्धं सर्वैरहंभिः क्षीणास्त्रवैर्निष्कलेशैर्वशीभूतैः सुविमुक्तचित्तैः सुविमुक्तप्रज्ञैराजानेयैर्महानागैः कृत-कृत्यैः कृतकरण्यैरपहतभारैरनुप्राप्तस्वकार्थैः परिक्षीण-भवसंयोजनैः सर्वचेतोवशि-परमपारमिताप्राप्तैः ।

2 *Mil.*, p. 18 ; *DhpA.*, II, pp. 58, 78, 93; *Anguttara*, II, p. 169; *Mahāvamsa*, p. 3-6.

3 *Dīgha*, II, p. 71: uttaritarā paṇitatarā natthi.

meditations (*Āruppa-samāpattis*),¹ and the remaining four differ from the usual meditations (*jhānas*).

The term “*Vimokṣa*” is explained in the *Abhidharma-kośavyākhyā*² as that which removes the veil which covers the higher meditations. The veil here refers to the bases (*ālambana*) or subjects of meditations. Its another meaning is that it makes the adepts turn their face from the phenomenal world (*adharabhūmi-vaimukhyād vimokṣaḥ*). The only suitable basis (*ālambana*) of such meditations is Nibbāna without the aid of knowledge (*Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha*).³

The eight *Vimokṣas*⁴ from thought-constructions, in short, are as follows :—

(i) In the first Release, a meditator introspects his own body, its colour and contents as also those of others and realises only that the colour and other characteristics of his own body is undesirable (*aśubha*) and substanceless (*suñña*).

1 See above, p. 176-7.

2 *AKV.*, (Jap. ed.), p. 688-9.

3 See *Infra*, p. 275-6

4 *AKV.*, viii. 32-34 (Jap. ed., p. 688); *Dīgha*, II, p. 70-71; *Majjhima*, II, p. 12f.

अष्टौ विमोक्षाः । कतमेऽष्टौ । रूपी रूपाणि पश्यति । १। अध्यात्ममरूपसंज्ञी बहिर्धा रूपाणि पश्यति । २ । शुभं विमोक्षं कायेन साक्षात्कृत्योपसम्पद्य विहरति । ३। सर्वशो रूपसंज्ञानां समतिक्रमात् प्रतिघसंज्ञानामस्तंगमात् नानात्वसंज्ञानाममनसिकारादनन्तमाकाशमनन्तमाकाशमित्याकाशानन्त्यायतनमुपसम्पद्य विहरति । ४। सर्वश आकाशानन्त्यायतनं समतिक्रम्यानन्तं विज्ञानमनन्तं विज्ञानमिति विज्ञानानन्त्यायतनमुपसम्पद्य विहरति । ५ । सर्वशो विज्ञानानन्त्यायतनं समतिक्रम्य नास्ति किञ्चिदित्याकिञ्चन्यायतनमुपसम्पद्य विहरति । ६। सर्वश आकिञ्चन्यायतनं समतिक्रम्य नैवसंज्ञानासंज्ञायतनमुपसम्पद्य विहरति । ७। सर्वशो नैवसंज्ञानासंज्ञायतनं समतिक्रम्य संज्ञावेदितनिरोधं कायेन साक्षात्कृत्योपसम्पद्य विहरति । ८ ।

In these eight *Vimokṣas*, the first and second eliminate desire, the third, *aśubhasaṃjñā*, the fourth, conception of the world, and the remaining four all bases (*ālambana*) of meditations. See La Vallée Poussin, *Abhidharmakośa*, viii. 34; Gunther, *op. cit.*, p. 206

He controls his visual perception and therefore he does not perceive the colour of his body and regards it as unattractive (*amanojñam*).

(ii) In the second Release, the meditator thinks no longer of his own body but his attention is still diverted to others' body and its characteristics, internal and external, which he then tries to regard as undesirable (*aśubha*) and substanceless (*suñña*).

(iii) In the third Release, the meditator derives a feeling of satisfaction, which pervades his whole body on account of his success in removing his mental obsessions caused by his previous notions about his own and other's body.

(iv) In the fourth Release, the meditator frees his mind from the notion of material objects (*rūpa*) and their repercussive nature (*paṭigha*) and dismisses from his mind the sense of distinction, which exists among beings and objects, and regards the world as just infinite space free from all obstructions.

(v) In the fifth Release, the meditator's mind goes beyond the conception of infinite space and internally becomes aware of infinite consciousness only.

(vi) In the sixth Release, the meditator's mind goes beyond the conception of infinite consciousness and realises nothingness of the universe.

(vii) In the seventh Release, the meditator's mind goes beyond the sense of nothingness, for making his perceptual faculty inactive. His perception becomes so subtle that it is perception nor non-perception.

(viii) In the eighth Release, the meditator's mind goes beyond the state of extreme subtlety of perception and reaches a state when his feeling and perception cease to function because his mind has turned away totally from all thought-constructions (*sarvasaṃskārad vaimukhyāt*). As he must rise again from his meditation, he retains his perceptual faculty, but it is inactive..

Two methods of attaining Arhathood

As mentioned above, there are two types of Arhats, called Ubhatobhāgavimutta and Paññāvimutta. These are the two ultimate ends of two classes of adepts, one adopting the path of meditation (*vipassanā-dhura*) and the other that of study and knowledge (*gantha-dhura* and *paññā*). The former called Saddhānusārī depends more on faith in the Triratna and in their spiritual teacher and seeks emancipation mainly through meditational practices. The latter called Dhammānusārī studies the *Sutta* and *Abhidhamma Piṭakas* and tries to comprehend the philosophical tenets embedded in them. He practises the first four meditations (*jhānas*) and does not attempt to go higher. By means of his analytical and philosophical knowledge, he obtains Sotāpannahood. The distinction between the two classes is due to the emphasis laid by one group on meditation for purification of mind (*cetovimutti*) and elimination of attachment, hatred and delusion, and by the other on study and knowledge and elimination of ignorance (*paññāvimutti*).¹ The distinction is also maintained in their post-Sotāpanna career in which a Saddhānusārī is designated as a Saddhāvimutta or Kāyasakkhī because while practising the higher meditations he realises both mentally and physically inward calmness, while a Dhammānusārī is designated as a Diṭṭhippatta because of his continuing interest more in philosophical studies than in higher meditations. When they reach the Arhat stage, the Saddhānusārī and Kāyasakkhī become known as Ubhatobhāgavimutta, and the Dhammānusārī and Diṭṭhippatta as Paññāvimutta. Both of these two categories of perfects are also emancipated both mentally and intellectually (*Cetovimutta* and *Paññāvimutta*), because no one can

1 AKV., VI, p. 607 (Jap. ed.) रागविरागाच्चेतोविमुक्तिः । अविद्या-विरागात् प्रज्ञाविमुक्तिरिति ।

become perfect without purification of mind and perfection in knowledge. A Saddhānusārī commences his spiritual career with *cetovimutti* and ends with *paññāvimutti* while a Dhammānusārī begins with *paññāvimutti* and ends with *cetovimutti*. In the Pali texts the stock-expression for Arhats is: *Idha bhikkhu āsavānaṃ khayā anāsavaṃ cetovimuttiṃ paññā-vimuttiṃ diṭṭhe va dhamme sayam abhiññā sacchikatvā upasampajja viharati* [Here a monk, after destroying his impurities, himself realises, in this life, through his higher attainments, emancipation of both mind and knowledge]

CHAPTER XIV

The Unconstituted

(*Asaṃkhata* = *Asaṃskṛta*)

There is only one *Asaṃkhata* (unconstituted), which has neither origin nor decay nor any change.¹ It remains the same for ever in its own characteristics.² It is causeless (*appaccaya*) and indeterminable (*avyākata*)³.

The Vaibhāṣikas count the *Asaṃskṛtas* as three, viz., *Ākāśa* (uncovered space), *Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha* (emancipation by means of knowledge mainly) and *Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha* (emancipation by meditational practices and not necessarily with knowledge). Of these three, *Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha* is not attained by the supra-mundane path (*lokottaramārga*)⁴ which, is however, indispensable for *Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha*. In the *Sūtras*, is said to be a fruit attainable by perfect saints (*śrāmaṇyaphala*) but it cannot be a product of exertion⁵. It cannot be an effect produced by a cause⁶, as it is ever present, although it is felt and visualized by a person on attaining perfection in mind-control and knowledge. It has neither past nor future (*adhvavinirmukta*) and is always present (*pratyutpanna*).⁷ It is realised by one who has neutralised the impurities (*kleśaprahāṇa*) including the constituted eighty-nine mental

1 *Aṅguttara*, I, p. 152: *Asaṃkhata-lakkhaṇāni*: na uppādo na vayo na ṭhitassa aññathattaṃ. Cf. La Vallée Poussin, *Kośa*, ii, p. 223.

2 *AKV.*, ii, 45: स्वलक्षणो स्थितिभावः । 3 *Dhs.*, 583, 983, 1086.

4 *AKV.*, i, 16. By *Lokottaramārga* is meant the practices prescribed for attaining the four fruits of sanctification.

5 *AKV.* (Jap. ed.), vi, p. 578: सूत्रे त्वसंस्कृतं श्रामण्यफलमुद्राह्यते ।

6 *AKV.*, ii, 55

7 *Ibid.*, ii, 59; v, 63

states of a being.¹ It is pure (*anāsrava*) and has no basis², but it is not a matter (*vastu*)³.

Ākāśa : The Vaibhāṣikas and other schools except the Vātsīputrīyas include *Ākāśa* in the unconstituted. *Ākāśa* is defined as open space without any obstructing object. It is infinite, however much it may remain covered or uncovered. The Vaibhāṣikas admit its existence as real.⁴ The distinctions between *Ākāśa* and other *Asaṃskṛtas* are as follows:—

(a) Uncovered space may become covered and *vice versa* but this is not possible in the case of *Asaṃskṛta*;⁵

(b) *Ākāśa* offers flying room to birds, etc. while the *Asaṃskṛta* does not.⁶

(c) Though *Ākāśa* and *Asaṃskṛta* remain very close to a being and is always present, the former is not attainable while the latter is (*asaṃskṛtasya prāptyutpādāt*);⁷

(d) *Ākāśa* and *Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha* and not *Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha* can neither be a cause nor an effect of exertion (*na phaladharmāḥ*).⁸

Nirodha : *Nirodha* is sometimes denoted as a '*dravya*' or '*dhātu*', which very often leads to the wrong notion that it is an entity, but in the *Mūlapariyāyasutta*⁹ it is clearly stated that any conception about it or its attainment is wrong. In the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* the statement that *Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha* is real (*dravya*)¹⁰ and acts as an obstruction to the inflow of impurities may cause the misapprehension that it is an eternal positive substance in contrast to *Ākāśa*,

1 *AKV.*, vi. 1, 76

2 *Majjhima*, I, p. 424: *ākāso na katthaci patitṭhito*.

3 *AKV.*, i. 7.

4 *Ibid.*, i. 5.

5 *Kvu.*, p. 328

6 *Ibid.*, p. 329.

7 *AKV.*, v. 63

8 *Ibid.*, ii. 55; see *infra*, p. 275.

9 *Majjhima*, Sutta 1.

10 *Ibid.*, i. 5

11 *Ibid.*, vi. 78

12 *AKV.*, i. p. 18: द्रव्यसन् प्रतिसंख्याननिरोधः ।

which carries a negative meaning of absence (*abhāva*)¹ of obstruction. The term 'dhātu' in Buddhist texts has a very wide connotation, e.g., in the *Jñānaprasthāna-sūtra*² exposition is given of *Prahāṇa-dhātu*, *Virāga-dhātu*, and *Nirodha-dhātu* which are the same as *Asaṃskṛta-dhātu*. The first term means elimination of impurities other than attachment (*rāga*); the second means elimination of attachment (*rāga*) only, while the third means elimination of all impurities including attachment, hence, such uses of the term 'dhātu' or 'dravya', therefore, should not be taken as a real entity.

Nirodha, being eternally existing (*nitya*), cannot be any object or state to be obtained by a person. Yaśomitra, it seems, has in mind more the word "*pratisaṃkhyā*" and its function than the word "*nirodha*" in its original and independent sense. What he means to establish is that the inflow of impurities of attachment, hatred and delusion is completely stopped by knowledge (*pratisaṃkhyā*) or full realisation of the four truths. It is the knowledge of the four truths, that acts as a dam (*rodhabhūta*) to the inflow of impurities into the mind of an Arhat. His object here is to explain what "*nirodha*" means in such combinations as *anityatā-nirodha*, *pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha* and *apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha* and not the exposition of the highest truth, *Nirvāṇa*, a synonym of which is *Nirodha*. What he intends to say is that worldly objects, which have come into being (*dharmasthiti*), cease on account of the

1 AKV., i. 6 (p. 17). प्रतिसंख्याऽप्रतिसंख्याननिरोधौ तर्हि अविबन्धनकत्वात् आकाशं प्राप्नुतः । न । तयोः संयोगद्रव्यानुत्पत्तिधर्माणां संयोगप्राप्ति-नियतरोध- भूतत्वेनोत्पत्तिविघ्नरोधभूतत्वेन चावरणभूतत्वात् ।

2 The principal Abhidharma text of the Sarvāstivādins. It is available in translation from Chinese made by Santi Bhikshu Sastri, see p. 27. Cf. AKV. vi. 78.

3 *Dravya* may be compared to *padārtha* of Nyāya philosophy. It may be either *nitya* or *anitya*. See *Kośa*. II, 55; III. 11. Cf. Sthiramati on *Triṃśikā*, p. 10: वस्तुतो न विद्यते विज्ञानं पुनः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वात् द्रव्यतोऽस्ति ।

universal law of impermanence (*anityatā-nirodha*) ; that inflow of impurities ceases when a person realises the four truths (*pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha*), and that certain impurities of a spiritually advanced person cease for ever and will not re-appear with or without knowledge of the four truths (*apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha*)¹. In these three compounded words, Nirodha refers to destruction of impurities and not to the Buddhist conception of Nirvāṇa.

Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha: Acquisition of knowledge is needed for ending all impure (*sāsrava*) dharmas² of the three worlds and not the pure (*anāsrava*) dharmas, which are acquired by means of *Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha*. It is supra-mundane and not worldly (*laukika*) knowledge. It destroys all impurities quickly and directly (*ānantarya*) but not all at once³. It may be described as a fruit of human exertion (*puruṣakāra-phalam*),⁴ a fruit of severance (*visaṃyoga-phalam*)⁵ from impurities, caused by knowledge. But it must be borne in mind that *Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha*, being one of the three unconstituted (*Asaṃskṛta*), is eternal and so it can never be the fruit of a deed or exertion. The word 'Nirodha' of *Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha* refers merely to decay or end of impure *dharmas*. The *Asaṃskṛtas* have nothing to do with cause

1 *AKV.*, i. 6: अनित्यता-निरोध = धर्मस्थितिविघ्न

अप्रतिसंख्या-निरोध = धर्मोत्पादविघ्न

प्रतिसंख्या-निरोध = धर्मसंयोगविघ्न

2 *AKV.*, i, p. 18: सर्वो हि तैधातुक-सास्रव-वस्तु-निरोधोऽनास्रवया प्रज्ञया प्राप्यते । प्रतिसंख्यानं हिन लौकिकी प्रज्ञा ।

3 *Kośa*, i. 6 (p. 18): क्लेशप्रहाणानन्तर्यमार्ग-प्रज्ञा-ग्रहणार्थम् । तेन प्रज्ञाविशेषेण प्रतिसंख्याननिरोधः ।...संयोगनियतरोधभूतो धर्मः ।

4 *AKV.* ii, 59: प्रतिसंख्याननिरोधोऽपि पुरुषकारफलमिष्यते । न चासौ हेतुफलज्जायते नित्यत्वात् ।...प्रतिसंख्याबलेन हि प्रतिसंख्याननिरोधः प्राप्यते । तस्मात् स पुरुषकारफलं भवति ।

5 *AKV.* ii, 58: धिया प्राप्यमाणो निरोधो विसंयोगफलमित्यर्थः ।

and effect¹ which are confined only to the constituted². *Pratisamkhyā-nirodha* therefore cannot be a cause (*hetu*) though it is shown as an obstructing factor against impure *dharma*s. *Nirodha*, being eternal, is incapable of taking or giving a fruit.

Apratisamkhyā-nirodha: In Buddhist spiritual culture there are two paths, viz., path of knowledge (*jñānamārga*) and path of self-control and meditational practices (*sādhana-mārga*); in Pāli, there are two *mārgas* called *Gantha-dhura* and *Vipassanā-dhura*. The former is prescribed for adepts with sharp faculties and the latter for those with mild and medium faculties. *Apratisamkhyā-nirodha* has in view the adepts of the second category, i.e., those who effect cessation of impurities through various means of mental and physical control. In Buddhist texts³ the adepts are classified into (i) mild or dull (*mṛdu*), (ii) medium (*madhya*) and (iii) sharp (*adhimātra*). The adepts of the first two categories are usually prescribed the practices of firm faith (*kṣānti* or *śraddhā*) and quietude (*śamatha* and *vipassanā*) to be attained through meditation (*samādhi*). Normally, an entrant into the sixteen *kṣaṇas* of the four truths develops, first, faith (*kṣānti*) and then, knowledge (*jñāna*)⁴. By physical (*kāya-saṃvara*) and mental restraints and practices (i.e. *dhyāna*, *samāpatti*) the adepts of the mild category eliminate gradually many impurities and thereby destroy their accumulated *karmaic* effects, and become incapable of having future existences, and so, in fact, attain *Nirvāṇa*. To realise the highest truth,

1 AKV. ii, 55 : नासंस्कृतस्य ते हेतुफले ।

2 Ibid. आकाशाप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधवज्र्याः सर्वधर्माः फलमित्युक्तं भवति ।

For details see comments on *Kārikā*, p. 146.

3 *Puggala-paññatti* ; *Abhidharmakośa*, VI.

4 *Dharmajñānakṣānti* in *Duḥkha*, *Samudaya*, *Nirodha* and *Mārga*.

Dharmajñāna in do

Anvayajñānakṣānti in do

Anvayajñāna in do

See above, p. 258.

the adepts of this category need also knowledge (*prajñā*) of the four truths, and most of them do acquire it in the Arhat-stage. In the *Abhidharmakośa*, *apratisamkhyā-nirodha* is described as a complete stoppage of the possibility of appearance of certain impurities or states of existence,¹ because of the ineffectiveness of causes for producing in future an object or state². Evidently, the ineffectiveness is due to the adept's progress in spiritual practices, such as faith (*kṣānti*)³ and quietude (*śamatha*). Hence *Apratisamkhyā-nirodha* is concerned only with pure (*anāsrava*) dharmas of the constituted sphere, i.e., those already acquired by the adepts of the mild category in course of their spiritual practices. In the case of Arhats only it is pointed out that all impurities are eliminated by both *Pratisamkhyā* (= *Prajñā*) and *Apratisamkhyā* (= *śamatha*, *vipassanā*, and *samādhi*) either simultaneously or one after another.

Apratisamkhyā-nirodha also refers to the eradicated impurities of an adept, e.g., removal by a Srota-āpanna of the wrong notion of the existence a self (*satkāyadrṣṭi*), of doubt about the excellence of the Triratna (*vicikitsā*), and of wrong belief in the efficacy of rituals and ceremonies (*śīlavrataparāmarśa*). On account of elimination of the three impurities, a Srota-āpanna is never subject to rebirth in the animal world or hells. The ending of the three impurities as also the avoidance of rebirth in lower forms of existence are indicated by *Apratisamkhyā-nirodha*, because, in this case, destruction (*nirodha*) of certain evils and consequential effects of non-appearance in certain states of existence have been effected without knowledge

1 *AKV.*, i. p. 20, 21 : उत्पादात्यन्तविघ्नो ह्यप्रतिसंख्याननिरोधः ।

2 *Ibid.* p. 23: अनागतानां धर्माणां प्रत्ययवैकल्यात् प्रतिसंख्यामन्तरेणोत्पादस्य नियतरोधभूतो यो धर्मः सोऽप्रतिसंख्याननिरोध इत्युच्यते । Cf. p. 19: अनागतानां धर्माणामुत्पादस्यात्यन्तो विघ्नः अत्यन्तनियतरोधः ।

3 *AKV.* iv, 107: क्षान्तिलाभ्यनपायग इत्यपायभूम्यतिक्रमात् । See also *AKV.* vi, 24.

of the four truths (*pratisamkhyā*). It also includes those pure (*anāsrava*) *dharmas* which are acquired by an adept by means of *pratisamkhyā*. Hence it connotes all pure *dharmas* possessed by an adept, whose acquisitions may have been effected mainly by *śamatha*, *samādhi*, and partially by *prajñā*.

The two types of emancipation, *Pratisamkhyā-nirodha* and *Apratisamkhyā-nirodha*, may be compared to *Paññā-vimutti* and *Ceto-vimutti* respectively of the Pali texts. Those who obtain *cetovimutti* neutralise the impurities along with *karmaic* effects by self-restraint (*śīla*) and meditation (*samādhi*) while those who attain *paññāvimutti* practise self-restraint and meditation but applies mainly his reflective intellect to destroy the impurities, but ultimately a perfect must have both *vimuttis*.¹

The ultimate aim and object of Buddhism is realisation of the unconstituted (*asamkhata*) by eschewing the constituted, which is fruitless.² A person is constituted (*samkhata*) and so is the world, in which he lives. It is therefore indispensable for a person to comprehend first the real nature of the world around him. Hence, the whole of the early Buddhist literature is devoted to its exposition. In the previous chapters (IX-XII), an attempt has been made to give an idea of the Buddhist conception of the phenomenal world and its constituents, as also of the ways and means of getting out of phenomenal existence, which is impermanent, substanceless and a source of suffering. Existence in the phenomenal world is admitted as real with the proviso that it is dynamic in nature³ and that its dynamism is governed

1 *AKV.* i. p. 21, vide comments on सन्ति येषामुभयमिति ; cf. *Puggala-paññatti*, p. 14: Ubhatobhāgavimutto: Idha ekacco puggalo attha vimokkhe kāyena phusitvā viharati, paññāya c' assa disvā āsavā parikkhīṇā honti. See above, p. 267.

2 *AKV.*, ii. 55: अफलधर्माः सर्वे संस्कृताः ।

3 *Aṅguttara*, i. 15; *AKV.*, ii. 45, 46 : उत्तरोत्तरक्षणानुबन्धः । अभूत्वा भावः भूत्वा अभवः ।

by an unchangeable law of nature. The comprehension of this fact is regarded by the Buddhists as perfect knowledge (*viññā*) as opposed to ignorance (*avijjā*) and it ultimately leads to the realisation of the unconstituted Nibbāna.

What is Nibbāna?

Buddha deliberately avoided any positive answer to the question: what is Nibbāna? He knew that Nibbāna was inconceivable, and that any description of it could not but be conventional, and so he said that Nibbāna, the highest truth, could only be realised within one's own self (*paccattam veditabbo viññūhi*=*pratyātmyavedya*); it was inexpressible (*nippapañca*) and so no attempt should be made to describe it; it was so deep and subtle that it could not be communicated by one person to another. All that he could say about it was by negatives. In the *Mūlapariyāyasutta*¹ he said that no conception should be made of Nibbāna nor of its attainment by any person as that would be admitting individuality and its relation to an entity. To say that it was either existing or non-existing would also be falling into the heresies of eternalism (*sassata*) or annihilationism (*uccheda*). Within these limitations, the form and nature of Nibbāna has to be determined. There are, in the Buddhist texts, stray remarks and passages, which throw some light on the conception of Nibbāna, and so it will be our object now to present them in a succinct form.

Inconceivability of Nibbāna

In the *Majjhima Nikāya*² Nibbāna is described as unborn, unoriginated, unconstituted, undecaying, undying, free from diseases, grief and impurities; it is the supreme end that is attained by the best exertion. Elsewhere in the same *Nikāya*³

1 *Majjhima*, I, Sutta 1.

2 *Majjhima*, I, p. 197: *anuttaram yogakkhemam nibbānam ajātam ajaram abyādhim amatam asokam asaṅkiliṭṭham*.

3 *Ibid.*, I, pp. 163, 167.; III, p. 4.

it is described as the highest perfection (*accanta-niṭṭham*) achievable by the utmost exertion (*yogakkhemam*). It is extremely subtle and too difficult to comprehend or visualize.¹

The inconceivability of *Nibbāna* is finely expressed in a few stanzas of the *Sutta-Nipāta*², running thus:—

“Accī yathā vātavegena khitto
attham paleti na upeti saṃkham
evam munī nāmakāyā vimutto
attham paleti na upeti saṃkham.
Atthaṅgatassa na pamāṇam atthi
yena naṃ vajju taṃ tassa natthi
sabbesu dhammesu samūhatesu
samūhatā vādapathā pi sabbe ti”.

[Just as the flame of a lamp struck by a gust of wind disappears and cannot be traced, so also does a perfect saint, freed from name and form, disappears without leaving any trace.

That which disappears is immeasurable, i.e., infinite, and hence there are no words by which it can be spoken of. As it is bereft of all *dhammas*, it goes beyond the range of conventional language.]

A statement similar in tone to the above-quoted stanzas was made by Anuruddha at the demise of Buddha. It is as follows:—

“Pajjotass’ eva nibbānaṃ vimokho cetaso ahū ti”³

[Like the extinguishing of a lamp, Buddha’s mind became absolutely freed.]

Some scholars who inadvertently compared the extinction of the flame of a lamp to *Nibbāna*, wrongly interpreted it as annihilation. In the line quoted above there is no ambiguity

1 *Majjhima* I, p. 167.

2 *Sutta Nipāta*, p. 206-7.

3 *Dīgha*, II, p. 156; cf. *Sutta Nipāta*, p. 215 :

Ajjhattaṇ ca bahiddhā ca vedanaṃ nābhinandato
evam satassa carato viññāṇam uparujjhati.

that the constituted mind (*viññāṇa*), which was normally functioning during Buddha's life-time through the sense-organs, without, of course, attachment, hatred and delusion, ceased finally, i.e., became fully emancipated. It did not require any more support (*anārammaṇa*, *apatiṭṭhita*). It is the constituted mind¹ that suffered extinction and has nothing to do with Nibbāna, which therefore cannot mean annihilation. Prof. Keith also relied on the wrong rendering of the statement but he gave it an Upaniṣadic turn, saying that "the extinction of fire was not that which occurs to us of utter annihilation but rather the flame returns to the primitive, pure, invisible state of fire, in which it existed prior to its manifestation in the form of visible fire."² Prof. Keith's interpretation is also not acceptable, for, according to the Buddhist philosophy, Nibbāna, has nothing to do with anything worldly and unlike the Upaniṣadic *Brahman* it can never have worldly manifestation similar to the flame of a lamp.

Nibbāna is absolutely separate and different from the world and its constituents. It is non-mental (*acetasika*) and wholly dissociated from mind (*citta-vippayutta*).³ The question of origin or non-origin does not arise in the case of Nibbāna,⁴ because it is firm, eternal and changeless.⁵ It is the inconceivable transcendental reality.⁶

1 *Udāna*, Dabba-sutta, viii. 9 describes the *parinibbāna* of Dabba Mallaputta thus:—

Abhedi kāyo nirodhi saññā vedanā pi'ti dhaṃsu sabbā,
Vūpasamiṃsu saṅkhārā viññāṇam attham agamā ti.

2 Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 55-6. Buddhaghosa also writes in the *Sum. Vil.*, (*IHQ.*, II, i, p. 33) that the flame of a lamp becomes indistinguishable (*apaṇṇakabhāva*).

3 *Kvu.*, IX.7; XIV. 6; *Dhs.*, 1513, 1515.

4 *Kvu.*, IX. 7; XIV. 6; *Dhs.*, 1416: Nibbānaṃ na vattabbam uppannaṃ ti pi anuppannaṃ ti. See also *Dhs.* 1534, 1535.

5 *Kvu.*, I. 6 (p. 121): Nibbānaṃ dhuvam sassatam avipariṇāma-dhammaṃ.

6 *Samyutta*, IV, pp. 362, 369f.

Positive and negative attributes

In spite of the inconceivability of Nibbāna, there are, in the *Nikāyas*, passages, which attribute to it a mixture of positive and negative attributes, which are as follows :-

In the *Samyutta Nikāya*¹ Nibbāna is described as

“Asaṅkhatam amataṃ saccam pāram ajajjaram dhuvam anidassanam nippapañcam santam sivam khemam”, and also as “accutapadam”.

[Unconstituted, undying, true, going across, undecaying, firm, signless, inexpressible, calm, quiet, excellent and a place without fall.]

A clear positive hint about the reality of Nibbāna is found in the *Itivuttaka*² :

“*Atthi* bhikkhave abhūtam akatam asaṅkhatam”.

[There exists, O monks, the unoriginated, the uncreated, the unconstituted].

There are similar statements in the *Samyutta Nikāya*³ and later Pali texts, such as the following :-

“*Atthi*-dhammassa nibbānassa rūpaṃ vā saṅghānam vā vayaṃ vā pamāṇam apaññāpanam”.

[The form, location, age and measure cannot be given of Nibbāna—the dhamma that exists.]

A verse attributed to Buddha in the *Māgandiyasutta*⁴ also points to a positive conception of Nibbāna :

“Ārogya paramā lābhā nibbānam paramam sukham”.⁵

[Good health is a great gain; nibbāna is the highest happiness].

In the exposition of this line Nibbāna is shown as immaculately pure and white (*sukkam* instead of *sukham*) and is compared to a human body cleansed of all impurities.

It seems, from the few references given above, that the conception of Nibbāna underwent changes during the period

1 *Samyutta* IV, p. 373, III, p. 143.

2 *Itivuttaka*, p. 37.

3 *Samyutta* II, p. 124-6 ; *Mahāniddeśa*, I, p. 132 ; *Kvu.*, p. 124; *Milinda*, p. 316.

4 *Majjhima*, I, p. 509.

5 Cf. *Dhammapada*, 203: Nibbānam paramam sukham.

of compilation of the *Nikāyas* and that there was a trend to assign to it a more positive than negative attributes.

Is Nibbāna ananta-viññāṇa?

An interesting exposition of Nibbāna by equating it to infinite consciousness (*viññāṇa*) is found in a few stanzas, which appear in slightly changed wordings in different Pali texts¹.

The stanzas in the *Kevaddha-sutta* are :-

Viññāṇam anidassanam anantaṃ sabbato pabhaṃ
Ettha āpo ca paṭhavī tejo na gādhati,
Ettha dīghan ca rassaṇ ca anuṃ thūlaṃ subhāsubhaṃ,
Ettha nāmaṇ ca rūpaṇ ca asesam uparujjhati,
Viññāṇassa nirodhena etth' etam uparujjhati.²

On a certain occasion a bhikkhu was advised by Buddha to put his question thus :—"What is that place where (distinctions like) water and earth, fire and air have no footing, where long and short, fine and coarse, good and bad, or name and form cease absolutely?" instead of asking "Where do the four elements earth, water, fire and air disappear absolutely?" (The answer quoted above was given to it.) "It is viññāṇa (consciousness), which is signless, infinite, and radiant on all sides³

1 *Sutta-nipāta*, p. 198:

Paññā c'eva satī ca nāmarūpaṇ ca mārīsa
etam me puṭṭho pabrūhi, katth' etam uparujjhati?

... ...

Yattha nāmaṇ ca rūpaṇ ca asesam uparujjhati
Viññāṇassa nirodhena etth' etam uparujjhati.

Samyutta, I, 13:

Yattha nāmaṇ ca rūpaṇ ca asesam uparujjhati
Paṭighaṃ rūpasaññā ca ettha sā chijjati jaṭā ti.

See also *Udāna*, I: Bodhivagga.

2 *Dīgha*, I, p. 223; *Sum. Vil.* in the *I. H. Q.*, II, i. *Majjhima*, I, p. 329; *Papañcasūdanī*, I, p. 413.

3 Buddhaghosa says that it is infinite (ananta) because it has no origin, no decay, no duration (sthitī) and no change. It should not however be confused with "viññāṇānañcāyatanam."

Cf. *Majjhima*, I, p. 329: Viññāṇam anidassanam anantaṃ sabbato

(*sabbato-pabham*)¹ where all the distinctions mentioned above cease, and where the (constituted) *viññāṇa*, after cessation, disappears". Buddhaghosa clears up the ambiguity of the term *viññāṇa* by saying that its meaning should be made on the basis of the root *ñā*= to know, that which is to be known, i.e., Nibbāna. He says that the first *viññāṇa* is another name for Nibbāna² while the second *viññāṇa* is one of the five constituents. His interpretation, it seems, is based upon a few Nikāya passages. In the *Majjhima Nikāya*,³ the *Brahmanimantaṇikasutta* offers an explanation of the above-quoted stanzas. In this *sutta* Buddha

pabham. Taṃ paṭhaviyā paṭhavittena ananubhūtaṃ, āpassa āpattena ananubhūtaṃ, etc. The *Papañcasūdanī* (II, p. 413) comments on it thus: —Padadvayena (i.e., *viññāṇam anidassanam*) pi nibbānam eva vuttaṃ. *Anantan* ti tayidam uppāda-vaya-antarhitattā anantaṃ nāma.....*Sabbato pabham* ti sabbato pabhāsampannaṃ. Nibbānato hi añño dhammo sappabhataro vā jotimattaro vā parisuddhataro vā paṇḍarataro vā n'atthi, etc. Cf. *Samyutta*, V, p. 275: Bhikkhu vivaṭeṇa cetasā apariyonaddhena sappabhāsaṃ cittaṃ bhāveti,

1 J. d'Alwis' suggestion of 'pabham' for 'paham' has been preferred here. For a note on this, see *Sacred Books of the Buddhists*, II, p. 283n. Buddhaghosa, it seems, preferred the word "Papam" (from Sanskrit Prapā=a shed on the roadside for providing passengers with water, Aufrecht, *Abhi. Ratnamālā*, p. 283) to "Pabham" more for maintaining the analogy between Nibbāna and the sea mentioned just before this passage.

2 *Sum. Vil. (I. H. Q., II, i)*, p. 33: Tattha viññātabban ti viññāṇaṃ; nibbānass' etaṃ nāmaṃ. With regard to the second 'viññāṇa', Buddhaghosa says "Tattha viññāṇan ti carimaka-viññāṇaṃ pi abhisankhāra-viññāṇan ti" (Cf. *Vism.*, p. 689). He holds that the viññāṇa, the last consciousness of an arhat is constituted (*abhisankhāra*) and that it ceases like the flame of a lamp to pass into a state of indistinguishability (*apañnakabhāva*). Cf. Keith, *op. cit.* pp. 47, 48 where Prof. Keith points out that Prof. Franke's attempt to prove that there is much of negativism in early Buddhism favours the view that Nibbāna of early Buddhism was more idealistic than negativistic. See also O. Franke's notes on Nibbāna in the *Z.D.M.G.*, xix, pp. 475-481.

3 *Majjhima*, I, p. 326f.

criticises the claim of Baka Brahma that he is the supreme god, the creator, eternal, changeless, free from origin and decay and his state is that of the highest emancipation. Buddha points out to him that in the highest emancipated state totally disappear distinctions of phenomenal objects and thoughts, whether taken together or singly. In justification of his above-quoted description of *Nibbāna* as infinite, refulgent, etc., he adds that the description was needed to counteract the current belief about the *ne plus ultra* state and eternality of Brahmaloaka, otherwise, he would have preferred to speak of *Nibbāna* as inexpressible only. In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*,¹ consciousness (*viññāṇa*) is also described as brilliant white (*pabhassaram*). It is this pure white consciousness (*citta*) that is polluted by impurities (*upakkilesa*). This passage suggests that the constituted *viññāṇa* is the original pure state of mind, to which the perfect reverts after thoroughly purifying his mind of all impurities by practice of meditation and equanimity. The question is whether by this pure white mind is meant by the first *viññāṇa* of the above-quoted stanzas. The purified mind, it seems, corresponds to the unpolluted store-consciousness (*ālayaviññāṇa*) of the Yogācārins, and not the ultimate reality, *Vijñaptimātratā*. It should mean mental emancipation (*cetovimutti*, see above p. 270) of the Arhats. *Ceto-vimutti* is one of the two means for attaining perfection, but it is not identical with *Nibbāna*, which is much higher than, and completely different from, pure *viññāṇa*. *Ceto-vimutti* is also described as supportless consciousness (*apatiṭṭhita-viññāṇa*, *anārammaṇa*). It is to be noted that unless mind is supportless, it cannot be pure and emancipated. After death, an Arhat on account of his *ceto-vimutti* attains *Nibbāna*, which is indescribable. In the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*,² Buddha referring to the *parinibbāna* of Vakkali bhikkhu said

1 *Aṅguttara*, I, pp. 10, 257.

2 *Saṃyutta*, III, p. 124.

that the wicked Māra was searching for the consciousness (*viññāṇa*) of Vakkali, who had been just dead, and predicted that Māra's attempt would not be successful because Vakkali had passed away (*parinibbuto*) with *viññāṇa*, which needed no support (*apatiṭṭhita*). The sense of *apatiṭṭhita-viññāṇa* is given elsewhere in the *Samyutta Nikāya*,¹ where it is explained as consciousness which arises only when attachment (*rāga*) to material elements of the body (*rūpa*), and the other four constituents is removed. It is unconstituted, devoid of growth and independent of any cause and condition and hence free. Being free it is steady ; being steady it is happy ; being happy it is without any fear of change for the worse ; being fearless it attains *parinibbāna*.²

In commenting on this passage Buddhaghosa further says that an arhat can never have any thought-construction (*maññanā*) in regard to the four elements or Nibbāna or anything whatsoever, which a puthujjana or a non-arhat has. Buddhaghosa thus tries to show that Nibbāna is inexpressible, infinite and that any attempt to establish a relation between it and an individual is a delusion of mind. From such interpretations of the Nikāya passages³ as well as from

1 *Samyutta*, II, p. 65 ; III, pp. 53-61.

2 *Samyutta*, II, 66 ; III, 53 : Tad apatiṭṭhitam viññāṇam avirulham anabhisaṅkhāraṇ ca vimuttam. Vimuttatā tthitam tthitattā santusitam santusitattā na paritassati. Aparitassan paccattaññu parinibbāyati.

Samyutta, III, p. 124; *Dhp. A.* I, p. 432 : appatiṭṭhitena ca viññāṇena Godhiko Kulaputto parinibbuto.

3 The Nikāya passages referred to here (*Majjhima*, I, p. 4) were not in harmony with Prof. Stcherbatsky's theory and so they did not appeal to him. See his remarks in *Con. of N.*, p. 42n. 'Maññanā' of Buddhaghosa reminds us of one of the passages of the *Prajñāpāramitās*, in which it is said that all dharmas are like dreams and that Bodhisattvas 'svapnam api na manyante, svapnena na manyante, etc. ; see e. g., *Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā*, (A. S. B. ms.), leaves 215, 399b: *saṃsāram saṃsārato na vikalpayati, nirvāṇam nirvāṇato na vikalpayati* and so forth.

his exposition of Nibbāna in the *Visuddhimagga*,¹ it will be apparent that, Buddhaghosa far from supporting nihilism, held that Nibbāna was a transcendental, indescribable state. In fact, there was hardly any school of Buddhism, which favoured the view of annihilation, and so it seems that the opinions of scholars who supported annihilation do not rest on very sure foundations. Prof. La Vallée Poussin has criticised in detail the views of these scholars. He has given the gist of their views, showing the weak points in them, along with his learned dissertation on the interpretation of Nirvāṇa.²

Light is thrown on the above-quoted stanzas in a passage occurring in the *Nibbānasutta* of the *Udāna*³. It runs as follows:—

Atthi, bhikkhave, tad āyatanam yattha n' eva paṭhavī na āpo na tejo na vāyo na ākāśānañcāyatanam na viññāṇānañcāyatanam na ākiñcaṇṇāyatanam na n'evasaññā-nāsaññāyatanam nāyam loko na paraloko na ubho candimasuriyā, tad aham, bhikkhave, n'eva āgatiṃ vadāmi na gatiṃ na ṭhitiṃ na cutiṃ na upapattiṃ, appatiṭṭham apāvattam anārammaṇam eva tam es'ev' anto dukkhassā ti."

[O bhikkhus, there is that space (*āyatanam*) where do not exist earth, water, fire and air; nor spheres of infinite space, of infinite consciousness, of desirelessness, and of neither consciousness nor non-consciousness; neither this world nor next world, nor sun and moon, that, I say, is the end of suffering, (i.e. Nibbāna-dhātu), in which there is no coming or going, no continuity, no decay and no origin; it is supportless, free from rebirth, and basisless.]

It is clear from this extract that Nibbāna is not infinite consciousness (*ananta-viññāṇa*) but that it is something transcendental, in which nothing of the phenomena has any

1 *Vism.*, p. 293-4.

2 La Vallée Poussin, *Études sur l'histoire de religions*, 1925.

3 *Udāna* (ed. by R. Sankrityayana), p. 83.

place. By the use of the verb “*atthi*”, it shows that Nibbāna is an ens and not a non-ens.

Nibbāna is an ens

From the above discussion, it is clear that Nibbāna can neither be the constituted consciousness even it be absolutely pure nor the infinite consciousness (*viññāṇānañcāyatana*) of the sixth higher meditation (*samāpatti*). It is something transcendental and unincluded in the universe¹ but in any case, it exists by itself and does not need any support. In the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*² and the *Kathāvatthu*³ it is compared to matter (*rūpa*) inasmuch as matter (*rūpa*) exists by itself and does not need any support but it differs from *rūpa* because unlike *rūpa* it is not subject to momentary changes.

Nibbāna is called a *dhātu* or *pada* more or less conventionally, because the term *dhātu* means that which upholds a being; it is an ens, described as immortality, haven of peace, non-receding place, other shore, island, etc. (*amata-padam*, *santipadam*, *accuta-ṭhānam*, *pāram*, *dīpam* etc).⁴ All these terms indicate that Nibhāna-dhātu is an ens, where disappears the constituted being after emancipation. In the *Itivuttaka*⁵ occurs the following line:—

“*Atthi ajātam abhūtam akatam asaṅkhatam tasmā jātassa bhūtassa katassa saṅkhatassa nissaraṇam paññāyatīti*”

[There exists the unborn, unoriginated, uncreated, unconstituted, hence, there is the possibility of emancipation (lit. exit) of the born, originated, made, constituted].

To the above, we may add the emphatic assertion of Nāgasena “*Atthi Nibbānam*”⁶ supported by a few similes. A common simile of Nibbāna that it is like a vast ocean

1 Lokuttara, *apariyāpanna*. See *Dīgha*, III, pp. 239, 247, 275, 278

2 *Dhs.*, 1415, 1418.

3 *Kvu.*, IX. 5.

4 *Itivuttaka*, ed. by R. Sankrityāyana, p. 34.

5 *Itivuttaka*, ed. by R. Sankrityāyana, p. 37 ; *Udāna*, p. 84.

6 *Milindapañha*, p. 273.

which does not show any increase or decrease, however much water may flow into it, so also does Nibbāna, though countless *arhats* have entered into it from time immemorial. Nāgasena also argues that one can see the vast mass of water in the ocean but no one can measure it so also is Nibbāna. He goes a little further and says that though air is invisible, its existence is felt by the body of a common man so also is Nibbāna, which though invisible is touched by the body of the wise. The fact that Nibbāna is perceived by the perfect in the present life proves its reality. Like the sun seen by a blindman the moment his blindness is cured, Nibbāna is visualised by the perfect Arhats as soon as they develop their eyes of knowledge. In the *Samyutta Nikāya*, the visualisation is thus expressed:—

“Nirodho nirodho ti kho me bhikkhave pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu cakkhum udapādi ñāṇam udapādi vijjā udapādi āloko udapādi”.

[O Bhikkhus, there arose in me clear vision, knowledge, perfect knowledge, illumination about the hitherto unknown (lit. unheard) *dhamma* called Nirodha.]

From the references given above, there can be no doubt that, according to the early Buddhists, Nibbāna does exist, but no description can be given of it because it is transcendental. It is not *abhāvamātra* of the Sautrāntikas. It is not also immanent in the universe nor it is annihilation of the non-Buddhists.

Nibbānadhātu is described as of two kinds, viz., *saupādisesa* and *anupādisesa*.¹ Both denote perfect Arhats but the former is subject to pleasant and unpleasant feelings while the latter is completely free from them. A very common phrase referring to an Arhat is *anupādisesāya nibbāna-dhātuyā parinibbuto*. It means that an arhat passes from this world after finally ending his feelings etc. whatever was left.

Résumé:—Buddha has avoided any positive statement about Nirvāṇa or Tathāgata's state after death.² His first

1 See above, p. 138.

2 See chapter XV.

utterance about *Nibbāna* or the Truth discovered by him is that "it is profound, hard to comprehend, serene, excellent, beyond dialectics, abstruse, and that it is only to be realised by the wise within one's own self".¹ Nirvāṇa is without origin and decay, disease and sorrow.

Nirvāṇa is not a state or an object to be attained. It is ever existing and is not produced by the eightfold path or thirty-seven *Bodhipakkhiya dhammas* (practices leading to full enlightenment). It comes to an exerting person as a flash of light (*obhāsa*) and any exertion with intention to obtain it is futile but at the same time, exertion is needed to purify one's mind and knowledge (*citta-visuddhi* and *paññā-visuddhi*). Hence, the latter two are the fruits of exertion, and not Nibbāna, which is ever existing. A person, who has risen to the highest stage of meditation, in which there is neither consciousness nor unconsciousness (*n'eva-saññānāsaññā*) or even beyond, i.e., the stage in which one has nearly brought to an end his consciousness (*saññāvedayitanirodha*), a state almost akin to death, is not assured of realising Nibbāna if he is unable to get rid of his thought-constructions although he has achieved the highest possible mental purification through meditation. He is not a *sammā-nibbānādhimutto* (i.e. one who has attained the true emancipation) because his mind is not dissociated from the fetter of the notion of *N'evasaññānāsaññā* or *Saññāvedayitanirodha*. This implies that Nibbāna cannot be attained through mere meditation, however high and subtle it may be, nor by any other exertion, though such exertions are indispensable for the realisation of the Truth. Buddha has elaborately dealt with the various forms of exertions and meditations, preparatory to the realisation of Nibbāna, but the keynote of all his teachings for reaching the *summum bonum* is that a person must completely eradicate from his

1 *Majjhima*, I, p. 167.

mind the notion of individuality, the existence of his self,—it was the realisation alone of *ānattā* or *pudgala-śūnyatā* that can confer the knowledge of the Truth. Throughout the *Nikāyas*, Buddha has harped on this theme, which forms the fundamental basis of his teaching (*mūlapariyāya*). In fact, by ignorance (*avijjā*) he means the notion of I-ness and Mine-ness and it is for the eradication of this notion he formulated the four truths (*dukkham samudayaṃ nirodhaṃ maggaṃ*) including the formula of *paṭiccasamuppāda*. By these truths he tried to educate his disciples in such a way that they might rise above the notion of individuality and not seek to establish any relation of themselves with the worldly objects or even meditations or spiritual attainments. This relation, which he regarded as *kāma* (desire), was limited not only to worldly objects like wealth, property, relatives and friends, or robes and begging bowl, but also to spiritual acquisitions like *abhiññās* (six higher powers), *jhānas* (meditations) and *samāpattis* (higher meditations). He insists that a disciple must not put himself in any relation to what he has seen, heard, thought and known (*diṭṭha, suta, muta, viññāta*)¹ or must not take any interest even in generalisations such as identity (*ekatta*), difference (*nānatta*), or the sum-totality (*sabbaṃ*) of worldly objects. He must not imagine that he is extending his feeling of amity (*mettā*) and of compassion (*karuṇā*) to all beings as that would lead to the notion of two entities, the self of the person exercising love (*mettā*) or compassion (*karuṇā*) and the self of the being to be loved or pitied. It is often said that the world should be looked upon as substanceless (*suññato lokaṃ avekkhassu*)². A Buddha or a Tathāgata is above love or compassion. He lives without giving attention to the characteristics of objects and internally he maintains *suññatā*³. All that the Tathāgata has said is associated with *suññatā*⁴. Lastly, one must not

1 *Majjhima*, III, p. 30: *Diṭṭhe.....sute mute viññāte anupāyo anissito appaṭibaddho vippamutto*, etc. Cf. *Majjhima*, I, p. 3; *Suttanipāta*, p. 178

2 *Suttanipāta*, p. 217.

3 *Majjhima*, III, p. 111.

4 *Samyutta*, II, p. 267.

even think of *Nibbāna* as an ideal perfect state to be attained by him. It is a wrong view to hold that he has attained quietude, he is without *upādāna* ; his thirst is quenched.¹ Such effacement of self is the crux of Buddha's teaching and is the only means to destroy attachment, hatred and delusion (*rāga, dosa, moha*) and to realise the Truth, the *Nibbāna*, and thereby to become a Tathāgata. In Mahāyāna texts Nirvāṇa or Tathāgata is interpreted as oneness, non-duality (*advaya advaidhīkāram*), though there is no conception of two entities, real or unreal. In Pali texts therefore the problem of non-duality is not mentioned. Nibbāna is described as one and only one and that it is of one taste (*ekarasa*). Nibbāna, according to the Buddhists of all times, is absolutely different from everything worldly or constituted. To remove the last vestige of notion that consciousness (*viññāṇa*) continues to exist in Nibbāna, there are in the *Sutta Nipāta*, a few stanzas, which clear up the ambiguous statement found in the stanzas of the *Kevaddhasutta*.² In the latter, it is stated that there is the Consciousness (*Viññāṇa*), which is infinite, signless and all-shining, and in which all distinctions like material and non-material constituents (*nāma-rūpa*) of a being as also, earth, water, air and fire have no place and in which there is no dichotomization like long and short, gross and subtle, good and bad. Buddhaghosa bypasses the plain meaning of *viññāṇa* and explains it as that which is to be known, i.e., the Truth, the Nibbāna. The infinite consciousness is acquired by a person who reaches the sixth stage of higher meditation (*samāpatti*) but in this state also non-material constituent (*viññāṇa*) does not totally disappear, and so "infinite consciousness" of *Kevaddhasutta* has been interpreted in another way.³ In the stanzas of the *Suttanipāta* it has been made clear that the constituted consciousness of a perfect Arhat disappears without leaving

1 *Majjhima*, II, p. 237.

2 See above p. 283.

3 See above, p. 285.

any trace like the flame of a lamp extinguished by a gust of wind, and that nothing can be predicated of the unconstituted *parinibbāna* state of an Arhat. That state is inexpressible. Its reality is however admitted in Pali texts, in which it has been argued that like air though invisible is felt by the Arhats. It is not just void (*suññam*) but it is something which is predicateless (*suññatā*). The earlier or later Buddhist texts except those of the Yogācāra School do not go beyond it in describing Nibbāna.

Nirvāṇa or the truth or the Reality discovered by Buddha mentioned above is beyond any discussion (*atarkāvacara*). It can be realised only by the wise within one's own self. Buddha admonished his disciples or inquirers repeatedly to refrain from putting him questions, relating to the ultimates, which were unanswerable (*avyākṛta*) and which if answered would convey a wrong impression to one who had not reached a very high stage of perfection. In spite of his disinclination to describe *Nirvāṇa*, there, are in the *Nikāyas* stray hints which permit us to draw some inferences. The discourses dealing with *Nirvāṇa* may be divided into two classes, ethical and metaphysical, and the former may be subdivided into negative and positive.

(i) *Ethical, negative* :—*Nirvāṇa* is the end of desire or thirst for worldly objects or existences; it is the eradication of attachment (*rāga*), ill will (*dveṣa*) and delusion (*moha*); it is the removal of all impurities (*kleśas* and *āsravas*) by meditational and other practices; it is the removal of ignorance (*avidyā*); it is an end of repeated existences; it is the cessation of all thought-constructions (*vikalpa*); it is the absence of worldly attributes (*upadhi*); it is not associated with happiness or unhappiness or indifference, it is non-mental, it has no basis, no cause.

(ii) *Ethical, positive* :—*Nirvāṇa* is perfection in *śīla*, *samādhi* and *prajñā*, i.e., the eightfold path; it is realised by exertion (*tapas*), purity (*brahmacarya*) and comprehension of the four truths; it is perfection in four *smṛtyupasthāna* (mind-

fulness) practices; it is *arhathood* in which all the ten hindrances (*saṃyojanas*) are eliminated; it is peace and quietude; it is the place from which there is no fall; it is deathless, the place of bliss and perfect passionlessness.

(iii) *Metaphysical*:—Nirvāṇa is eternal and fixed and beyond the scope of discursive and discriminatory thoughts. It is homogenous. It has neither origin nor decay. It is without past, present or future. It is unlimited and unsurpassable, unfathomable and immeasurable. It is unconditional and unconstituted (*asaṃskṛta*). It is the freedom of mind and intellect. It is supramundane (*lokottara*) and beyond the three spheres of existence Kāma, Rūpa and Arūpa (*apariyāpanna*). It is beyond the fourfold propositions, i.e., it cannot be said to exist, not exist, or both exist and not exist, or neither exist nor not-exist.¹

1 See *Infra*, p. 297.

CHAPTER XV

The Conception Of Tathāgata

The usual expression, in which Gautama Buddha is referred to, in the Pali texts, is “*Tathāgato araham sammāsambuddho*” (Tathāgata the perfect the fully enlightened)¹. The description found in the *Nikāyas* is generally as follows: The Tathāgata is fully aware of the nature of the five constituents (*khandhas*) of a being, their origin and decay ; he is completely free from all thought-constructions and mental aberrations, including the notions of I-ness, Mine-ness, Egoism and other mental proclivities² ; he is endowed with ten supernormal powers (*bala*)³ and four kinds of infallibility (*vesārajja*)⁴; he is the embodiment of clear vision, perfect knowledge, immaculate *dhammas*, absolute purity ; he is the propounder of the Truth, guide for the welfare of all beings, bestower of immortality and lord of *dhammas*⁵. In such descriptions, no distinction

1 See, e.g., *Majjhima*, I, p. 179.

2 *Majjhima*, I, p. 486 : Tathāgato sabbamaññitānaṃ sabbamathitānaṃ sabba-ahiṃkāra-mamiṃkāra-mānānusayānaṃ khayā virāgā cāgā paṭinissaggā anupādā vimutto ti.

3 See *Ibid.*, I, pp. 69-71 for list. The ten *balas* are (1) स्थानास्थान-ज्ञानबलम् (2) कर्मविपाकज्ञा० (3) नानाधिमुक्तिज्ञा० (4) नाना-धातुज्ञा० (5) इन्द्रियवरावरज्ञा० (6) सर्वत्रगामिनिप्रतिपत्तज्ञा० (7) सर्वध्यान-विमोक्षसमाधिसमापत्तिसंक्ल शव्यवदानव्युत्थानज्ञा० (8) पूर्वनिवासानुस्मृतिज्ञा० (9) च्युत्युपपत्तिज्ञा० (10) आस्रवक्षयज्ञानबलम् ।

4 The four *Vesārajjas* are (1) सर्वधर्माभिसम्बोधिवैशारद्यम् (2) सर्वास्रवक्षयज्ञानवै० (3) अन्तरायिकधर्मानन्यथात्वनिश्चितव्याकरणवै० (4) सर्वसम्पदधिगमायनैर्याणिकप्रतिपत्ततथात्ववैशारद्यम्०

5 *Ibid.*, I, p. 111 ; III, pp. 195, 224: cakkhubhūto ñāṇabhūto dhammabhūto brahmabhūto vattā pavattā atthassa ninnetā amatassa dātā dhammasāmi Tathāgato.

is made between the terms “Sammāsambuddha” and “Tathāgata”.

There is another stock passage in the Nikāyas¹, in which ‘Tathāgata’ is mentioned in connection with the formula of the law of causation (*paṭiccasamuppāda* or *idappaccayatā*). Buddhaghosa² comments on this passage saying that it is a formula of sameness (*tathatā*). A set of causes and conditions cannot but produce the same effect. The relation between cause and effect is non-changing (*anāñña*) and non-different (*avitatha*). The law of causation is universal and applicable as much to the birth and death of a worldly being as also to the origin and non-origin of Tathāgatas. It is this law which is comprehended and preached by the Tathāgatas. Hence whoever masters and teaches this uniform (*tathā*) law of causation is a Tathāgata.

In the *Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī*, Buddhaghosa has dilated on the term ‘Tathāgata’³ in his traditional manner thus: The Tathāgatas are those who come (*tathā āgato*) in the same way as the previous Tathāgatas, i.e., all of them embraced the recluse-life, went through a long and arduous process of self-abnegation, perfected themselves in the highest meditation, and ultimately realised the Truth. After rendering benefit to countless human beings, they passed away from the mortal world (*tathā gato*). They realised the same and unchangeable (*tathalakkhaṇa*) Truth. They comprehended and propounded the same four aryan truths (*ariyasaccāni=tathādhamma*). They visualised the phenomenal world in the same manner (*tathādassitā*). They spoke the truth (*tathāvāditā*) only from the day of attainment of *Bodhi* to *Mahāparinibbāna*. They acted according to their words (*tathākāritā*). They surpassed (*abhibhavaṭṭhena*) all beings of the highest heaven or the

1 See, e.g., *Samyutta*, II, p. 25f.: jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇam uppādā vā anuppādā vā tathāgatānaṃ ʾhitā vā sā dhātu dhammaṭṭhitatā dhammaniyāmatā idappaccayatā. Taṃ Tathāgato abhisambujjhati.... deseti etc.

2 *Vism.*, p. 511.

3 *Sum. Vil.*, pp. 66-8.

lowliest hell, and lastly they realised the same truth (*tathāyagato*), which governs the world.

In the Nikāyas, there is another and more often repeated passages, dealing with the fourfold indeterminable problems, viz., whether a Tathāgata exists after death or not? The problems are put thus:

- (i) *Hoti Tathāgato param marañā ti?* (Does Tathāgata (henceforth abbreviated as T.) exist after death?)
- (ii) *Na hoti T. param marañā ti?* (Does T. not exist after death?)
- (iii) *Hoti ca na ca hoti T. param marañā ti?* Does T. both exist and not exist after death?)
- (iv) *N'eva hoti na na hoti T. param marañā ti?* Does T. neither exist nor not exist after death?¹

In the Pali texts though the problems have been treated as inexplicable (*avyākata*) and not conducive to the welfare of beings, there are a few expositions. In the *Samyutta Nikāya*² the problems have been treated in the same manner as the question about the existence of a permanent or impermanent soul. The fourfold problems first raise the question whether the “Tathāgata” and his “Constituents” (*khandhas*) are separate entities, one related to the other in some way. Making the assumption that the *Tathāgata* and *Khandhas* are separate entities, the issues discussed are,

- (a) whether rūpa or vedanā or saññā or viññāṇa is Tathāgata?
- (b) whether T. is in rūpa, vedanā etc.
- (c) whether T. is different from rūpa, vedanā etc.
- (d) whether rūpa, vedanā etc. all taken together are T.
- (e) whether T. is devoid of rūpa, vedanā etc. (*arūpī, avedano, asaññī, asaṃkhāro, aviññāṇo*).

The answer to each of these questions evidently could be nothing but *no h'etaṃ*.

1 See also *AKV*. v. 22.

2 *Samyutta*, IV, p. 382f.

From the available expositions of these problems, it is apparent that the underlying reason for negating all the four propositions is that the enquirers, who seek a solution of the problems, labour under the misconception that the Tathāgata is an individual, a composite of *khandhas*, and that the only difference between a common man and a Tathāgata is that the former is composed of five impure (*sāsava*) and the latter of pure (*anāsava*) constituents. The four problems hinge on the question whether the Tathāgata has a personality, which becomes pure by sustained spiritual culture through ages and continues after *mahāparinibbāna*. The existence of personality is not admitted in Buddhism, and so the only course left is to remain silent about the personality, for any answer, positive or negative, will be misleading like saying that the colour of a sky flower is red or blue. To put it in another way, the question is whether *Nibbāna* is eternal existence and whether the Emancipated Being retains his individuality after demise. Buddha deliberately left such questions unanswered and said that the ultimate end of an emancipated being was a matter of inner realisation only by the wise, the perfect.

It is worth while to know how the great Mādhyamika philosopher, Nāgārjuna, solved the fourfold problems. Nāgārjuna opens his chapter on *Tathāgataparīkṣā*¹ by stating first the position of his opponents, particularly, the Sarvāstivādins. He summarises their position thus: The Tathāgata, while a Bodhisattva, passed through innumerable existences, developing great compassion and expediency, acquiring knowledge, and realising non-duality. During these existences he collected immense merits by rendering the utmost services to all beings, who were dearer to him more than the only son to his father. He ultimately attained omniscience by comprehending the truth (*tattvam*) underlying the worldly *dharma*s, for which he is called a Tathāgata.

1 *M. Vr.*, ch. XXII.

Nāgārjuna argues that if the reality of Tathāgata is admitted by his opponents then they should also admit the continuity of existence (*bhavasantati*), in this case, of the Bodhisattva who ultimately became a Tathāgata. It would imply the admission of the existence of a soul or individuality, which, points out Nāgārjuna, would prove their vast ignorance.

Nāgārjuna's line of reasoning can only be understood if his conception of reality and unreality is known beforehand. He defines real existence (*svabhāva*) as ever existing, unchangeable and can never be combined with anything unreal or changing. To him, unreality is non-existent like things seen in a dream or an image on a mirror or a sky-flower. On this background, are to be understood the arguments of Nāgārjuna.

In order to establish the existence of, or reality of the Tathāgata, Nāgārjuna says, it should be shown that the Tathāgata

- (a) is the same as the constituents (*skandhas*), or
- (b) is different from the *skandhas*, or
- (c) & (d) is in the *skandhas* or *vice versa*, or
- (e) is possessed of the *skandhas* (*skandhavān*).

He contends that none of the five propositions is true, and so the existence or reality of the Tathāgata cannot be established. His detailed arguments are as follows:—

There are two sets of *skandhas*, viz., the usual five constituents (*rūpa, vedanā*, etc.) and the five acquisitions of a Tathāgata, viz., perfection in moral precepts, meditations, knowledge, emancipation, and insight and knowledge of emancipation (*śīla, samādhi, prajñā, vimukti, vimuktijñāna-darśana*). As the second set of *skandhas* is not applicable to all beings, Nāgārjuna takes up the question of the identification of the first set of *skandhas* with Tathāgata and shows how it is untenable.

Is T. identical with the skandhas ?

Nāgārjuna (henceforth abbreviated as N.) says that if T. be identical with *skandhas*, it would be like identifying fire with firewood, in other words, action and actor become one and the same; further if T., the Pure Being, on account of its identity with *skandhas*, would also be subject to origination and destruction. Both of these are not acceptable.

Is T. separate from the skandhas?

N. says, if T. and the substantial cause (*upādāna-skandhas*) be separate, it would be like fire as not being dependent on firewood. If fire be separate from firewood, it need not be ignited, proving thereby the futility of exertion (*ārambha-vaiyartham*). Likewise if T. be without any cause (*anupādāna*), it would follow that one could become a T. without exertion. Again if T. be separate from the constituents, he would be without the characteristics of *skandhas* (*askandhalakṣaṇa*). Hence, it cannot be established that the T. and the *skandhas* are separate entities.

N. then argues if the separateness of T. and *skandhas* cannot be established, there cannot arise the other possibilities, viz., *skandhas* are in T.; T. is in *skandhas*; T. is possessed of *skandhas*. Thus, N. concludes that the T. can neither be proved as identical with *skandhas* nor separate from them, and hence there is no T., the T. who is generally supposed to be the ultimate perfect state of a being. Further, as there is no continuity of a being (*bhavasantati*), it cannot be established that the same being has become a T.

Does T. exist relatively?

It may be contended by some that though it is not possible to establish directly the existence of T., it may be shown that T. exists with reference to something else, viz., basic cause (*upādāna*), of which T. is an image, a reflection of pure *skandhas* similar to the reflection of an object seen on a mirror. N. refutes this contention by saying that

(a) that which appears by depending on something else, e. g. the reflection on a mirror, is substanceless (*anātma*) and whatever is substanceless is unreal (*niḥsvabhāva*). Hence, there is no ground for holding that the so-called T. exists in reality.

(b) Again, if T. had been really existent, then only it would have been possible to establish the separate existence (*parabhāva*) of *skandhas* by showing their apartness (*paratvam*) from T. As it has been already proved that T. is non-existent by its own nature (*svabhāvataḥ*) like the son of a barren woman, the question of separate existence (*para-bhāva*) of *skandhas* does not arise, so it is futile to argue that the existence of T. can be proved at least with reference to the *skandhas*, with which apartness (*paratva*) and hence separate existence (*parabhāvatva*) of T. is out of the question.

Does T. become apparent on account of skandhas?

Now, it may be contended that T. is not to be spoken of as identical with, or separate from, the *skandhas*; he is known only when he takes up (*upādāya*) the *skandhas*¹. Nāgārjuna replies that this position also is not tenable, because it implies the existence of T. as prior to, and distinct from, *skandhas*; and that T. had *skandhas* later on, just as we say, Devadatta exists and he later on acquires wealth. From all considerations, the conclusion that is arrived at is that T. cannot have existence before he has taken up *skandhas*, i.e., he cannot exist uncaused (*anupādāya*) for that would give rise to the fallacy that things can originate without a cause. That which does not exist at all,² how can it take up something else,³ viz., the *skandhas* (*upādānas*).

1 The object of the opponents of Nāgārjuna is to say that T. may exist for ever, but only when he takes up the aggregates (*skandhas*), he becomes apparent to us.

2 e.g. flower in the sky, son of a barren woman.

3 Just as it is meaningless to say that the flower in the sky has red petals.

From the above it follows that a thing, which is not taken up by something else, cannot be regarded as *upādāna*. N. says: now that it has been established that T. was non-existent before the acquisition of *skandhas*, and that T., in fact, did not take up the *skandhas*, then, is it proper to regard a thing as a cause of some other thing even if the latter does not receive the former (in some shape or other). Hence, the *skandhas* should not be regarded as the cause of T. A thing not taken up by something else cannot be called a cause (*upādāna*) of the latter. As there is nothing without substantial cause (*nirupādāna*), there can be no Tathāgata.¹

The T., when examined in the five-fold ways² (i.e. identity, difference, etc.), has been shown as neither existing by itself (*svabhāvataḥ*), nor with reference to the *skandhas* (= *upādānas*) (i.e. *parabhāvataḥ*). Moreover the *skandhas* themselves are non-existent, because they are dependently originated (*pratītya samutpannatvāt*).³

The above arguments are based on Mahāyānic *śūnyatāvāda*, of which Nāgārjuna is an exponent. The *Śūnyatāvādins* do not admit the earthly existence of Buddhas, who, according to them, are created forms or apparitions of the real and eternal Tathāgatas, identified with the ever existing Truth. Nāgārjuna is not prepared to admit the contention of the Śrāvakayānists that a Bodhisattva after countless existences becomes a Buddha as did Gautama Buddha, who in his last existence, was composed of five

1 This may be cleared up by the following simile: Earth is normally the material cause of a jar. But unless a quantity of earth is taken up and converted into a jar, it cannot be called the cause of the jar. When earth remains unutilised, it is not the material cause of the jar; and the existence of the jar cannot be asserted. From this, N.'s conclusion is that there is neither the material cause nor the jar.

2 Cf. *M. Vr.*, p. 435: सत्कायदृष्टिप्रवृत्त्यपेक्षया तु पञ्च पक्षाः समुप-
वर्यन्ते ।

3 For detailed arguments see *M. Vr.*, ch. IV.

constituents. The Śrāvakayānists uphold the view that after *mahāparinibbāna*, Buddhas lose their individuality and become Tathāgatas, indistinguishable from the eternal Truth,¹ and they do not admit the existence of a persisting entity (*pudgala*) in a being apart from the ever changing constituents, and any question about the existence of the Tathāgata after his passing away from mortal world really raises the issue whether there is any persisting entity in a being, and whether that entity continues to exist after the being is absolutely cleansed of his impurities, attains emancipation and passes away for ever. To put it in another way, does the entity (*pudgala*) exist in Nirvāṇa eternally, or not? As the existence of that entity—the personality of beings—is denied, the question whether there is a Tathāgata (the person) after his demise cannot arise, and any answer, if given, would be misleading, and so it is safer and better to leave it as *avyākata* or *anirvacanīya*.

The Tathāgata is beyond the scope of knowledge. The only positive statement that can be made about him is that he is pure knowledge devoid of all conceptions (*nirvikalpajñāna*). The Mahāyānists also admit the reality of the Tathāgatas² but do not make any statement about their attributes (*niṣprapañca*). They further state that those, who claim to have seen his form (*rūpa*) and acted according to his words, are really making wrong exertions. The real Buddhas are to be seen in their universal body (*dharmakāya*) and as the eternal Truth (*dharmatā*). Those who do not

1 According to the Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins, Nirvāṇa exists but is devoid of any individuality. It is like the sea of one taste, one colour etc. and in which all rivers of different names, colours, tastes lose their individual characters.

2 *M. Vr.*, p. 443: न च वयं सर्वथैव निष्प्रपञ्चानां तथागतानां नास्तित्वं ब्रूमः ।

realise this fact can never know the real Buddha¹. From the above discussions, it may be concluded that according to the Buddhists of all ages, whether Śrāvakayānists or Mahāyānists, *Nirvāṇa*, the abode of Tathāgatas, is one and the same; it is transcendental and beyond all conceivable attributes ; it is oneness in which there is no individuality.

1 *M. Vr.*, p. 448 : ये मां रूपेण अद्राक्षुर्ये मां घोषेण अन्वयुः ।

मिथ्याप्रहाणप्रसृता न मां द्रक्ष्यन्ति ते जनाः ॥

धर्मतो बुद्धा द्रष्टव्या धर्मकाया हि नायकाः ।

धर्मता चाप्यविज्ञेया न सा शक्या विजानितुम् ॥

ABBREVIATIONS

Abhi. S.	=	Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha (P. T. S.)
AKV.	=	Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (Devanagari ed. of Calcutta & Romanised ed. of Tokyo.)
Aspects etc.	=	Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its relation to Hīnayāna by N. Dutt
Atthas.	=	Atthasālini (P. T. S.)
Bṛhad.	=	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
Chā.	=	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
Comp. of Phil.	=	Compendium of Philosophy by Shwe Zan Aung (P. T. S.)
Cy.	=	Commentary
Dhs.	=	Dhammasaṅgaṇi (P. T. S.)
ERE	=	Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (Hastings)
IHQ.	=	Indian Historical Quarterly
Kośa	=	Abhidharmakośa of Louis de la Vallée Poussin
Kośa-vyākhyā	=	Abhidharmakośavyākhyā
Kvu.	=	Kathāvatthu (P. T. S.)
Laṅkā.	=	Laṅkāvatāra edited by B. Nanjio
Mil. or Milinda	=	Milindapañha edited by V. Trenckner
M. Vṛ.	=	Mādhyamikavṛtti edited by Louis de la Vallée Poussin
Paṭis.	=	Patisambhidāmagga (P. T. S.)
Pug. P.	=	Puggalapaññatti (P. T. S.)
Ṛv.	=	Ṛgveda
Sad. Puṇḍ.	=	Saddharmapuṇḍarīka (Asiatic Society edition)
Sum. Vil.	=	Sumaṅgalavilāsinī (P. T. S.)
Taitt.	=	Taittirīya
Up.	=	Upaniṣad
Vism.	=	Visuddhimagga (P. T. S.)

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TABLE II

PAÑÑĀ OR ÑĀNAM (KNOWLEDGE)

- (i) in 5 *upādānakkhandhas* (five constituents of a being), viz.
 rūpa (material parts of a body)
 vedanā (feeling—good, bad and neutral)
 saññā (perception— do)
 saṅkhārā (impressions— do)
 viññāṇa (=knowledge=citta=mano) ;

cf. *Kośavyākhyā*, i. p. 149.

- (ii) in 12 *āyatana*s (six organs of sense and their objects), viz.
 cakkhu (eye) and rūpa (object)
 sota (ear) and sadda (sound)
 ghāna (nose) and gandha (smell)
 jihvā (tongue) and rasa (taste)
 kāya (body) and phoṭṭhabba (tactual objects)
 mano (mind) and dhamma (everything, material and non-material)

- (iii) in 18 *dhātus* (elements upholding a body), viz.,
 cakkhu, rūpa and cakkhuviññāṇa (eyes, object and visual perception)
 sota, sadda and sotaviññāṇa (ears, sound, and auditory perception)
 ghāna, gandha and ghānaviññāṇa (nose, smell, and olfactory perception)
 jihvā, rasa and jivhāviññāṇa (tongue, taste and gustatory perception)
 kāya, phoṭṭhabba and kāyaviññāṇa (body, touch and tactual perception)
 mano, dhamma and manoviññāṇa (mind, mental objects, and mental perception)

- (iv) in 22 *indriyas* (faculties latent in a being) (Cf. *Kośa*, I, 48).

(1) cakkhu (eye)	(13) domanassa (displeasing mentally)
(2) sota (ear)	(14) upekkhā (neither pleasant nor unpleasant)
(3) ghāna (nose)	(15) saddhā (faith)
(4) jivhā (tongue)	(16) viriya (energy)
(5) kāya (body)	(17) sati (watchfulness)
(6) mano (mind)	(18) samādhi (concentration of mind)
(7) itthi (femininity)	(19) paññā (knowledge)
(8) purusa (masculinity)	(20) anaññātāññāssāmīti (determination to know what is unknown)
(9) jīvita (vitality, āyu)	(21) aññā (determination to know)
(10) sukha (pleasing physically)	(22) aññātāvī (determination to know the highest).
(11) dukkha (displeasing physically)	
(12) somanassa (i.e. cetasi-kam sukham, pleasing mentally)	

- (v) in *Paṭiccasamuppāda*, i.e., *taṇhāya ñāṇam*

Past life	{ avijjā (ignorance of the Truth) { saṅkhārā (mental impressions)
Present life	{ viññāṇa (consciousness) { nāmarūpa (mental and physical constituents) { saḷāyatana (six organs of sense and their objects) { phassa (contact) { vedanā (feeling, good, bad or neutral) { taṇhā (desire)
Future life	{ upādāna (stronger desire, clinging) { bhava (desire for re-existence) { jāti (birth) { jarāmaraṇa, etc. (old age, death, etc.)

